WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008100020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 31, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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N" Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OSD review completed
Secret
43
State Dept. review
31 July 1970
completed
No. 0381/70
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(Information as of noon EDT, 30 July 1970)
Page
FAR EAST
LAOS: Pace Slows as Vientiane Awaits Envoy . . . . . . . . 1
CAMBODIA: Government Still on the Defensive . . . . . . . . 1
VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
COMMUNIST CHINA: Reopening the Red Schoolhouse . . . . . . . 7
EUROPE
Geneva Trade Talks to be Tough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
WEST GERMANY: Soviet and Polish Talks Proceed . . . . 9
Soviet Relief Effort to Peru Bogs Down . . . . . . . . . 10
The Soviet Economy at Midyear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
MARITIME ISSUES: Superpowers at Bay . . . . . . . . . . 11
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA,
EGYPT: Nasir's Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
MIDDLE EAST: Peace Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
OSD review completed
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA (continued)
LIBYA: Soviet Arms Deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
MUSCAT AND OMAN: Palace Coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
INDIA: Prime Minister Faces New Parliamentary Session . . . . . . 17
SOUTH AFRICA: Vorster to Pursue Pragmatic Policies . . . . ` 18
MOZAMBIQUE: New Counterinsurgency Campaign . . . . . . . . 19
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
GUATEMALA: Politics and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . 21.
CUBA: High-level Personnel and Structural Changes Coming . . . 21
Mexico Outraged over Hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
BOLIVIA: Crisis and Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
COLOMBIA: A NEW PRESIDENT AND A NEW POLITICAL SPECTRUM
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Laos: Pace Slows as Vientiane Awaits Envoy
The military situation has remained essen-
tially unchanged during the past week as atten-
tion has been focused on the anticipated arrival of
a negotiating team from Communist leader
Souphanouvong. Although an increasing number
of reports had claimed that enemy forces would
attack key points in southern Laos on the supply
routes leading to Cambodia, no major action has
developed. There has been more sharp fighting in
the central panhandle this week as Communist
units responded to the government's continuing
efforts to harass enemy supply lines. In the north,
heavy rains have curtailed ground and air activity.
Soth Pethrasy, the senior Pathet Lao repre-
sentative in Vientiane, has told Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma that the delegation from
Souphanouvong will arrive on the International
Control Commission flight from Hanoi on 31
July. He also confirmed earlier reports that the
team will be led by Souk Vongsak, whose posi-
tion as a minister in the coalition government
until 1964 makes him the highest ranking envoy
yet sent to Vientiane by the Pathet Lao.
Despite these and earlier indications that the
Communists might be preparing some substantial
new initiative toward a settlement, Pathet Lao
spokesmen in a number of capitals during the past
week have been taking a rather negative position
in referring to prospects for any substantial talks.
The Laotian Communist delegate in Hanoi on 23
July, for example, characterized Souk's trip to
Vientiane as only a "good-will gesture" and dis-
missed the idea that there has been any change in
the Pathet Lao negotiating position.
Soviet press accounts of interviews with
Pathet Lao officials in Paris and Vientiane have
reiterated the usual line that a halt in all US
bombing in Laos is a "necessar first step" to-
ward a settlement.
Such suggestions of inflexibility in the Com-
munist attitude may be only an effort to stake
out a position from which the bargaining can
begin. On the other hand, Hanoi may have no
intention of entering into genuine negotiations at
this time, and may only be seeking to stage ex-
tended discussions that will serve to restrict
Vientiane's freedom of action. 25X1
Cambodia: Government Still on the Defensive
The Communists have continued to con-
centrate primarily on small-scale attacks against
isolated government positions and lines of com-
munication. In the week's heaviest fighting, Com-
munist troops again drove government forces out
of the southwestern resort town of Kirirom.
Enemy forces initially occupied the town in early
July and held it for a week before government
troops recaptured it. Steady enemy pressure and
supply problems combined to force the latest
government withdrawal from the town.
Farther south, in Kampot Province, the
Communists attacked and briefly occupied a
OSD review completed
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CAMBODIA
THAILAND
T
M eonchery
Tonle\,
Sop\4
- Komeos'
LOV
Comm mist-controlled location
Com mun ist-control led
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Kompong Som
(S ihpn GU ky ile)
SOUTH VIETNAM
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cement factory northeast of Kampot city before
being forced to retreat by Cambodian and South
Vietnamese troops. The Communists also con-
tinued to harass traffic and government positions
along Route 4. No new enemy attacks, however,
were launched against the military training center
at Romeas, or against the Lovek ordnance depot.
In the east, the provincial capitals of Prey
Veng and Svay Rieng provinces were the targets
of minor enemy harassing attacks. South Viet-
namese units conducted clearing operations along
Route 1 in Svay Rieng, and along Route 7 in
Kompong Cham Province, but made only in-
frequent contact with enemy elements.
I n the northeast,
Communist forces are receiving supplies pur-
chased for them in southern Laos via the Route
13/Mekong River transportation corridor. The
source of these supplies appears to be Pakse, the
major town and military headquarters for south-
ern Laos. North Vietnamese Army representatives
receive the supply shipments from Laotian in-
termediaries near the Cambodian border and
forward them by boat to Stung TrengJ
UNCODED7 three boatloads of supplies have 25X1
reached Stung Treng daily since late last month.
It is likely that some Laotian officials are tacitly
cooperating in this traffic.
Vietnam
The Communists have stepped up military
action in the northern provinces of South Viet-
nam, and stronger attacks are in prospect. The
North Vietnamese 304th Division has moved east-
ward into Quang Tri Province and soon could
pose a threat to allied military installations in the
coastal lowlands and even to the provincial cap-
ital. I n Thua Thien Province, where last week US
forces withdrew from one forward base under
pressure from elements of the North Vietnamese
324B Division, enemy units are preparing to at-
tack other allied outposts.
Documents captured recently in Quang Tri
Province discuss enemy tactics against the screen
of US and South Vietnamese forward fire support
bases set up in the mountains of western Quang
Tri and Thua Thien provinces. The documents
indicate, for example, that the mission of the
304th Division is to draw in and tie down allied
forces in those areas as a means of supporting
Viet Cong forces operating in the populated dis-
tricts to the east.
Enemy Feels the Pinch
ages is turning up in southern South Vietnam.
Some of these shortages can be linked directly to
More evidence of Communist supply short- 25X1
allied operations.
Communist forces in III Region (formerly "III
Corps") anticipate significantly reduced logistical
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support during the remainder of 1970, and that
"allied expansion of the war to Cambodia" had
created financial difficulties and a disruption in
rear service activities.
Supply shortages among enemy units have
not been uncommon in southern South Vietnam
in the past, but since 30 April Communist forces
clearly have become more apprehensive over the
future availability of supplies. Conservation ap-
SOUTH
VIETNAM
pears to be their current watchword, and this
probably means Communist military activities in
this part of South Vietnam will be limited for
some months.
Magnitude of Communist Losses in Cambodia
Allied operations against base areas in Cam-
bodia resulted in the capture of more than 7,000
tons of foodstuffs, more than 20,000 individual
arms, 2,500 crew-served weapons, about 15.7 mil-
lion rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition,
and 142,000 rounds of rocket, mortar, and recoil-
less rifle ammunition. The foodstuffs could have
fed all enemy combat battalions in southern
South Vietnam (the area relying on Cambodian
base areas for logistic support) for about ten
months.
Weapons captured would have been suf-
ficient to equip 53 battalions with individual arms
and 38 battalions with crew-served arms. The
losses of small arms and heavy machine-gun
ammunition are equivalent, at 1969 force levels
and combat rates, to 16 months' requirements;
gsl;Qes of large rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle
negr runds are equivalent to nine and a half months'
requirements. These losses exceeded food and
ammunition losses sustained by the Communists
in South Vietnam during all of 1969.
Communist food losses, mainly rice, are the
least significant because they can be replaced
from South Vietnam or Cambodian sources. The
Communists' weapons losses should not seriously
impair their combat capability. Only 35 percent
of the identified small arms are relatively new
models of the type currently used by the Commu-
nists. Hanoi could make up these losses fairly
quickly by having infiltrators carry their own
arms; in 1968 and 1969 most infiltrators were not
issued weapons until they arrived in base areas
along the South Vietnamese border.
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Ammunition losses probably will cut into
Communist combat capabilities for some time.
Even before the allied move into Cambodia, many
Communist units reported periodic shortages of
ammunition as a result of in-country supply dis-
tribution problems. The capture of large quanti-
ties of ammunition and the dispersal of border
stocks will compound the enemy's resupply dif-
ficulties, particularly in III and IV Military
Regions.
President Thieu has elaborated South Viet-
nam's public position on a cease-fire, apparently
to demonstrate again that Saigon is more flexible
and forthcoming than Hanoi. Thieu told the press
last week that South Vietnam now is willing to
accept an immediate cease-fire that could be fol-
lowed by negotiations for a political settlement.
This is the first time he has publicly suggested a
"standstill" cease-fire, or that an end to the fight-
ing could precede political negotiations.
Although such a cease-fire would entail high
risks for the government, Thieu probably is con-
fident that the Communists will reject his sug-
gestion as they did his proposal for elections a
year ago. I n any event, he asserted that the
Communists would have to stop infiltration and
terrorism and accept international supervision. He
said he doubted that the Communists would
accept such a cease-fire because they control so
little territory. This comment also reflects
confidence that the government is in a relatively
strong position in most of the countryside despite
a resurgence by the Communists in some areas.
Thieu's gesture probably was prompted by
renewed interest in the negotiations occasioned
by Ambassador Bruce's appointment as the chief
US delegate at the Paris talks. He has little en-
thusiasm for any real movement in Paris because
this might hamstring South Vietnam's efforts
against the Communists and could jeopardize the
present ruling apparatus. Thieu's real attitudes are
probably much better reflected in his periodic
free-swinging attacks on neutralists and advocates
of coalition government in South Vietnam.
The rift between President Thieu and Vice
President Ky is widening. Ky's attacks on the
government, begun in early June, have become
increasingly shrill and suggest he is acting with an
eye on the 1971 presidential elections. He has
publicly accused some cabinet members and some
of Thieu's advisers of corruption, and he recently
condemned the whole national leadership for easy
living and for being incapable of giving the
country social justice.
Thieu usually has not responded in public to
Ky's periodic attempts to capture the limelight
and embarrass the government. This time, how-
ever, the President counterattacked by publicly
describing the 1967 election with Ky as a "forced
marriage" and in effect calling the vice president a
liar.
Ky is well known for his undiplomatic ut-
terances, but he usually does not sustain his
outbursts for very long. Now, however, he prob-
ably calculates that attention-getting statements
will help him if he decides to run in the 1971
elections. Thieu's reaction suggests Ky is hitting
where it hurts, and this may encourage the vice
president to attempt to remain in the public eye
as next year's election approaches.
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Senior government and military officers re-
portedly agree that the affair is hurting the stand-
ing of both the president and vice president.
Officials have privately commented that there
now is a good deal of tension in government
circles and that neither man has helped himself
Australia,
for the 1971 presidential elections. The Saigon
press is following developments closely and has
tried to get generals formerly associated with
Thieu and Ky to comment, but so far they are
keeping quiet and trying to stay neutral in the
dispute.
AUSTRALIA: Australian 'officials expect in-
creased unrest in the territory of Papua - New
Guinea, which they are trying to prepare for
self-government by 1972 and independence pos-
sibly by 1976. Recent dissidence on New Britain
Island, where major violence was narrowly
averted last week, is only part of the total prob-
lem. The territory's population of about 2.5 mil-
lion includes mutually antagonistic tribes that
speak some 700 different languages and dialects
and have no sense of national identity. Among
Australia's principal concerns are the probability
of further politically motivated violence deriving
from both intertribal hostilities and antiwhite sen-
timent; the continued development of at least
three separatist movements; and the increased
polarization of views between conservative high-
landers who oppose early self-government and the
more advanced coastal and island eo les who
favor more rapid political change.
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Communist China: Reopening the Red Schoolhouse
After two years of debate and experimenta-
tion, Peking has opted for a moderate approach in
implementing the Maoist formula for "revolution-
izing" Chinese scientific and technical training.
This course was outlined last week in an article in
the party theoretical journal Red Flag that de-
scribed the resumption of regular operations at
Tsinghua University-China's foremost engineer-
ing school and a one-time bastion of Cultural
Revolution radicalism,. Indirectly admitting that
the cessation of higher education since 1966 has
hampered industrial development and production,
the article suggested that the Tsinghua experience
is to serve as a guide for China's other technical
schools and colleges in rationalizing future aca-
demic and political requirements.
The Red Flag article is the first authoritative
pronouncement on higher education since Mao
Tse-tung's call in July 1968 for a radical revamp-
ing of China's pre - Cultural Revolution university
system. Mao declared that the intellectuals'
"stranglehold" on education must be broken and
that colleges must provide a melding of basic
formal training and practical labor. He ordered
that university schooling be shortened, that the
curricula be drastically revised in favor of more
political and vocational training, and that stu-
dents be drawn from among workers and peas-
ants. Universities were to be placed under the
control of workers and soldiers who were to carry
some of the instructional load, and former faculty
members were to undergo political "re-edu-
cation."
The lengthy delay in working out a specific
program for reformed technical education and
discussions of the Maoist prescriptions in public
media, however, suggest that they occasioned
bitter divisions over the future of higher edu-
cation. In particular, the Red Flag article dis-
closed that the pilot reform program begun at
Tsinghua in 1969 was bedeviled by stubborn
faculty resistance, poor student aptitude, dif-
ficulties in textbook revision, and political quar-
reling. The result was a compromise in which
some Maoist innovations were introduced while
significant concessions were made to accom-
modate the need for higher level academic
training.
Thus, the Red Flag article revealed that
Tsinghua has adopted a more conciliatory atti-
tude toward former professors, a curriculum that
reserves an important place for advanced theo-
retical work, and a period of schooling that, for
some students, goes beyond the time frame set by
Mao. Moreover, the article suggests that Tsinghua
intends to admit more students with better
academic qualifications and lays heavy stress on
improving scientific research and "professional
training."
Despite the go-ahead by Red Flag, the
restoration of higher education throughout China
is likely to be a protracted process, and the ef-
forts to duplicate the Tsinghua program may stir
anew some of the personal and policy quarrels
that wracked Chinese campuses during the Cul-
tural Revolution. Furthermore, the future
prospects of the nearly three quarter million
former college students who have been sent to
labor in the countryside still appear dim. Al-
though Red Flag hinted that some may be
readmitted to school, the majority are likely to
continue their rustication. Some of this year's
crop of middle-school graduates, however, may
enjoy a better fate:
some localities are now holding examinations
to ind the best academically qualified graduates
for university admission.
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Geneva Trade Talks to be Tough
Senior officials of the US, the European
Communities (EC), Britain, and Japan are holding
a two-day meeting in Geneva this weekend to
consider issues that in recent weeks have threat-
ened to develop into an international trade crisis.
The main interest of the other three partici-
pants at the meeting-being held under the
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)-will be the outlook for trade
legislation now pending in the US Congress. Al-
though the Europeans have been encouraged by
the President's promise last week to veto the Mills
Bill if it imposes restrictions on items other than
textiles, they continue to worry about the sort of
trade legislation that will eventually emerge. More
than the direct damage that might be done to
their own textile exports, the Europeans fear that
textile quotas might have the effect of diverting
Japanese textiles from American to European
markets. They are also afraid that similar restric-
tions might be enacted on more significant Euro-
pean exports to the US, especially shoes.
In general, the Europeans are apprehensive
about what they perceive to be a growing protec-
tionist tendency in the US. They believe that
restrictive measures of the type now being con-
sidered might be the beginning of a pattern of
retaliation and counterretaliation which, as a
Dutch official said recently, "could lead to a
deterioration of the entire US-EC relationship."
The new president of the EC Commission, Franco
Malfatti, has similarly stated that a general resort
to import quotas would undermine the entire
world trading system.
EC officials, therefore, are reportedly devel-
oping a "tough line" for presentation at the
Geneva talks. They may well repeat the warning
that if the US enacts restrictive trade legislation,
EUROPE
the EC will consider retaliatory measures against
items imported from the US, perhaps even major
ones like soybeans.
GATT Director Long hopes that, in addition
to the issues cited, a number of others will be
discussed. He thinks the EC's policy of granting
preferences to its associated states and other
nations should be re-examined. Just last week, the
EC Commission was authorized to begin nego-
tiating two new preferential agreements-with
Lebanon and Egypt. The US and EC have been
trying in recent months to bring into harmony
their proposals for a generalized, world-wide
preferences scheme that might ultimately replace
such regional agreements, but they have been
unable to agree on the status of reverse prefer-
ences-those granted to the EC by less developed
countries.
Long also suggests that agricultural policies
could be dealt with, and that the future of GATT
negotiations on tariffs and nontariff barriers
(NTBs) might be considered. The American
Selling Price, an NTB that the US promised to
eliminate during the Kennedy round but not
mentioned in the pending US trade legislation,
will no doubt be attacked again by the Europeans
and Japanese.
Long hopes that similar meetings will follow
the current one, but none of these sessions consti-
tutes negotiations and the most they can be
expected to do is to improve the atmosphere
among the four and to "stop the rot" of in-
creasing trade difficulties, as one official put
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West Germany: Soviet and Polish Talks Proceed
Foreign Minister Walter Scheel flew to Mos-
cow early this week in quest of a renunciation-of-
force agreement. His mission was generally re-
garded as crucial, to the success of Bonn's Ost-
politik. An accord with the Soviets presumably
would lay the basis for similar agreements with
other East European states and also could lead to
an arrangement between the two Germanies. In
the Brandt government's view, these agreements
are necessary preludes to an eventual movement
toward German unification.
Scheel has gone to Moscow with certain
reservations about an earlier draft worked out
between the two countries. These reservations-
which generally are intended to convey a tougher
German stance-apparently represent a concerted
effort by the Brandt coalition, with its slim 12-
vote majority, to broaden its base of support on
Ostpolitik and to improve chances for ratification
of a Moscow accord. The opposition Christian
Democrats, for their part, have declared a mora-
torium on disruptive acts during the Scheel mis-
sion. Their evident purpose is to cast off a grow-
ing image of extreme partisanship.
The Soviets seem willing to listen to Scheel
despite earlier public warnings against any at-
tempt to change the existing draft. They appar-
ently have been unyielding in the early sessions,
however.
On a second front, West German negotiator
Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz spent 23-25 July in
Warsaw attempting to pound out the text of a
reconciliation agreement with the Poles. He an-
nounced that progress had been made, but
UNCODED
differences remained on the key issue of
West German acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line.
According to an official communique, talks will
resume in Bonn in early September, followin the
traditional August vacation period.
UK-EEC: Britain and the European Communities
(EC) have gotten their negotiations off to a good
start by agreeing on how to proceed on substan-
tive issues this fall. A significant decision was
made at the first working session of the negotia-
tions on 21 July to give the EC Commission a
fact-finding role on several negotiating topics. The
most crucial of these is Britain's contribution to
the financing of the EC's Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). Although the British continue to
hope that adjustments will be made to ease their
financial burden, UK negotiator Barber's reitera-
tion at the meeting that Britain would accept the
CAP seemed to reassure the EC somewhat. The
Commission will try to complete preliminary
studies on agricultural and other issues in time for
the next ministerial-level negotiating session in
October, the first meeting at which the UK's new
negotiator, Geoffrey Rippon, will be present. The
ministers will meet twice quarterly after that,
with their deputies convening every two
weeks.
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Soviet Relief Effort to Peru Bogs Down
Moscow continues to experience difficulties
in carrying out its relief airlift to Peru. These have
been well publicized and, along with the tardiness
of the Soviet response-coming more than a
month after the disaster-have robbed the Soviet
effort of much of its political impact.
carrying one of the two hospitals Moscow is sup-
plying and estimated that it could not be replaced
for about a month. This would delay aid plans
because many of the medical personnel already
sent to Peru cannot work in affected areas
without the hospital.
Political cartoons in the Lima press have
depicted the Soviet airlift as a comedy of errors
and even the leftist press has found little in the
airlift to play up. One leftist weekly praises the
Cuban relief effort but notes that the Soviet
announcement of relief for Peru did not come
until after Mrs. Nixon's highly successful trip to
the devastated areas.
The worst setback has been the loss of an
AN-22 over the Labrador Sea on 18 July. The
Soviet ambassador to Peru said the aircraft was
The one-week pause in flights that occurred
after the AN-22 was lost as well as previous
equipment failures and apparent bureaucratic
mix-ups has caused Moscow to fall far short of its
original goal of sending 65 relief flights to Peru in
less than two weeks. Since flights were renewed
on 25 July, six AN-12s have made the trip,
bringing the total number of completed flights to
22:17 AN-12s, 4 AN-22s, and one I L-62 carrying
25X1
ITALY: An increasing number of Communist-
Socialist alliances in local governments highlight
Premier-designate Colombo's key problem in try-
ing to reconstitute on the national level a center-
left coalition to include the Christian Democrats,
the Socialists, the Unitary Socialists, and the
Republicans. The Unitary Socialists insist that the
orthodox Socialists must choose between leaving
the national center-left coalition and breaking
with the Communists on the local level. This
insistence caused the failure earlier this month of
Giulio Andreotti's efforts to form a center-left
government. Socialist-Communist cooperation is
nevertheless going ahead in the governments of
Italy's central regions-Tuscany and Umbria.
Communist-Socialist coalitions have, moreover,
sharply increased in municipal governments since
the June elections.
PORTUGAL: The death this week of former
premier Salazar removes a restraining shadow
under which Premier Caetano's cautious reform
program has been operating. Ultrarightists will
still try to slow down his plans to modernize the
economy and the educational system, however.
The rightists object especially to moves to link
Portugal with the European Communities because
they believe this would weaken Lisbon's ties with
its African provinces.
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SECRE'1' Nwor
The Soviet Economy at Midyear
During the first six months of 1970, the
Soviet economy posted a good recovery from its
poor performance of a year ago. Because eco-
nomic activities were hampered by unusually bad
weather in the first quarter of 1969, the subse-
quent increase in production contains a large ele-
ment of rebound. Production this year has been
stimulated to some degree by efforts to tighten
labor discipline and by campaigns to boost pro-
duction to commemorate the Lenin centenary
and complete the 1966-70 plan period with a
flourish.
According to US estimates, civilian industrial
production was 7.5 percent greater in the first six
months of this year than in the comparable por-
tion of 1969. A year earlier, an estimated increase
of only 5.1 percent was posted. Even if Soviet
industry maintains the 7.5-percent growth rate
for the remainder of this year, however, produc-
tion will not reach the level it would have at-
tained by steady growth at rates achieved prior to
1968. The calculated growth of civilian ma-
chinery output and the officially reported growth
in production of all machinery both slipped from
the rates achieved a year ago. It appears that
output of military-space hardware continues at a
high level, growing at roughly the same rate as last
year.
Although investment in plant and equipment
failed to reach the planned level, commissionings
of state centralized investment projects increased
17 percent. Soviet builders appear to be carrying
out a policy that concentrates effort on impor-
tant projects. In the past, there was a tendency
for the number of projects to burgeon, diffusing
effort and immobilizing capital in uncompleted
construction.
Industrial support for the agricultural sector
was mixed. The midyear increase in production of
agricultural machinery slipped from ten percent a
year ago to seven percent in 1970. Production of
spare parts for tractors and other agricultural
machines, which chronically are in short supply,
showed an absolute decline from last year's level.
The output of mineral fertilizers, however, in-
creased 14 percent.
The agricultural situation is considerably
better than a year ago. Winter crops suffered far
less weather damage than last year, the spring
sowing plan was fulfilled, and harvesting of winter
crops is progressing satisfactorily. On state and
collective farms, cattle herds are at an all-time
seasonal high, and hog numbers have reached
their highest midyear level since 1963. Private
livestock holdings, which account for over a third
of total meat output, probably increased little,
however.
Consumer well-being improved moderately
in the first half of 1970. About 12 percent more
housing was completed by building organizations
than in the first half of 1969. The volume of
retail sales was up eight percent. Sales of quality
foods other than meat showed good increases
from the depressed levels of last year as the up-
ward trend in diet quality apparently resumed.
Money income continued to rise faster than
planned. The value of personal savings accounts
rose at an annual rate of 28 percent during the
half year, indicating a further increase in the
pent-up demand of consumers.
Maritime Issues: Superpowers at Bay
A melange of maritime issues will be raised
at meetings next week of several Latin American
states in Lima and of the UN General Assembly's
seabeds committee in Geneva. Common to both
these discussions, however, are likely to be the
fears of the less developed countries that the
superpowers seek to secure for themselves a pre-
dominant position in the future exploitation of
ocean resources.
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A primary topic on the agenda of the sea-
beds committee will be the US initiative of last
May on peaceful uses of the ocean floor. Under
its terms coastal nations would renounce claims
to sovereignty over the seabeds beyond a water
depth of 200 meters, but act as trustees in an
intermediate zone between that depth and the
end of the continental margin. The margin in-
cludes the continental shelf and the slope from it
down to the deep seabeds. An international
agency to regulate exploitation of the deep sea-
beds and to apportion the royalties it will receive
both from that area and from the intermediate
zone would be created. A number of states find
very appealing the prospect of an international
source of revenues for development, but the So-
viets continue to oppose the creation of any inter-
national machinery. Countries with oil-rich de-
posits in the intermediate zone have also ex-
pressed reluctance.
The US and the USSR, with some help from
the UK, France, and Japan, are pushing for a Law
of the Sea conference confined to three subjects:
a 12-mile limit on claims of territorial waters; free
passage through international straits; and fishing
rights. A majority of the UN members opposed
this limited approach last fall. They favored a
broader conference, including seabeds issues,
which would presumably enhance the bargaining
NPT: Within the coming month most of the non-
nuclear-weapon states that have ratified the Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) are expected to open
negotiations with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) on safeguards arrange-
ments to prevent the diversion of fissionable ma-
terial from peaceful uses. The substantial progress
made by the IAEA's safeguards committee at its
power of the less developed states. Many mem-
bers of the seabeds committee remain inclined
toward a broader conference.
The Latin American states with narrow con-
tinental margins and highly productive fishing
grounds-Chile, Ecuador, and Peru-are especially
upset over the US seabeds initiative and the pro-
posed 12-mile limit, and Argentina and Brazil are
also strongly opposed. Chile, Ecuador, and Peru
are the primary backers of the Lima meeting,
which is likely to produce a statement endorsing a
200-mile limit for territorial waters and the un-
derlying seabeds. Broad Latin American support
for such claims would bolster their position in
scheduled talks with the US in September on
fishing rights.
A US call for a conference on Arctic issues
may also receive an airing at the Lima and Geneva
sessions. Most countries queried to date favor the
convening of such a conference, although they
emphasize the need for adequate time to develop
positions on the complex subjects to be consid-
ered. They are eager to deal both with potential
pollution problems and with the recent Canadian
legislation prohibitin international fishing in cer-
tain areas.
recently completed session has enhanced pros-
pects that these negotiations will proceed more
smoothly than some observers had expected. Par-
ticularly noteworthy at the committee meeting
were the lack of Soviet attacks on EURATOM
and the latter's conciliatory attitude toward a
safeguards agreement equally acceptable to single
states and regional groupings. 1
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MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
Egypt: Nasir's Speech
President Nasir in his speech of 23 July
commemorating the 18th anniversary of the
Egyptian revolution, touched upon three main
themes: the economic achievements of the re-
gime-probably exaggerated-the military situa-
tion vis-a-vis Israel, and Soviet support.
The Egyptian leader began his address by
announcing the completion of the Aswan High
Dam that day and noted that the decision to
build the dam started a chain of events that
eventually resulted in the 1956 war. Nasir claimed
electrical output in the country had risen 1,200
percent since 1952. Turning to agriculture the
President concentrated on the rice, cotton, and
sugar-cane crops but said that total agricultural
production had risen 15 percent since the 1967
war. In the industrial sector he claimed that there
had been an actual increase of 32 percent in
output over the figures for 1966-67.
Warning the Egyptians that they must be
prepared for further battles, sacrifices, and plots,
Nasir briefed his audience on the current military
situation along the Suez Canal. He said that the
army, rather than collapsing as Israel thought it
would, has been rebuilding and is now ready to
return to battle with the Israelis. The Egyptian
leader noted, however, that the struggle would
not center on the ground but rather would take
place in the air as Cairo moved to destroy Tel
Aviv's air superiority. He stated that the Israelis in
the past have had an advantage over the Egyptians
in air warfare because of US supplies of electronic
countermeasure equipment to Israel.
Nasir credited the Soviet Union with playing
a major role in helping Egypt to achieve its pres-
ent state of preparedness. He said that immedi-
ately after the June 1967 war, Moscow had
offered to help rebuild the Egyptian Army. More
recently, after his secret visit to Moscow on 22
January, Egypt began receiving a Soviet air de-
fense system that forced Israel to end its deep
penetration raids into Egypt. He also said US
deliveries of highly sophisticated electronics
equipment had been matched by Moscow's
supply of comparable materiel to the Egyptian
Air Force.
The rest of Nasir's speech was a discussion of
the "state of the nation" in the Arab world. In
retracing developments of the past years, Nasir
touched upon the coups in Libya and the Sudan.
He noted that the revolutionary regimes in both
countries had offered their support to Egypt in its
struggle against Israel and the US. Regarding the
Persian Gulf he warned the UK not to renege on
its promise to withdraw from the area. \] 25X1
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Middle East : Peace Efforts
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banner of the revolution will wave until it flies
over every inch of Palestine." On 27 July, the
central committee of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, meeting under Yasir Arafat, re-
jected both the UN resolution and the US peace
proposal and decided to send delegates to various
Arab capitals to lobby against them, Demonstra-
tions to protest Egypt's acquiescence in the plan
have already taken place in Amman.
Both Egypt and Jordan have accepted the
US peace proposal "without conditions" but have
seized the opportunity to set forth their own
positions on any possible settlement.
In his speech on 23 July announcing his
acceptance of the US initiative, Nasir took pains
to point out that it contained "nothing new."
Nasir said it merely provided for the implementa-
tion of the Security Council resolution of Novem-
ber 1967, which Cairo had already accepted. He
reiterated the usual Arab view that the resolution
calls for Israel's total withdrawal from all oc-
cupied Arab territories and for giving the Pales-
tinians their rights in accordance with other UN
resolutions. Nasir categorized the plan as "no
more than a procedural process," which will "ar-
rive at nothing new because of Israel's frivolous
stand." He castigated the US for abetting Israeli
aggressiveness but declared that he is willing to
see if political action can break the present stale-
mate.
The Jordanian Government's reply-
described by the foreign minister as "unanimous,
positive, and consistent with the reply of the
United Arab Republic"-followed three days
later, apparently after a stormy debate within the
Jordanian cabinet. Although Amman's acceptance
implicitly entails adherence to a cease-fire along
the Israeli border, the government is in no posi-
tion to guarantee that the fedayeen within the
country will follow suit. An attempt to interdict
fedayeen cross-border activity would meet with
stubborn commando resistance and could reignite
the near - civil war that raged for a week in early
June.
Even before Jordanian acceptance was an-
nounced, the fedayeen newspaper Fatah pub-
lished a text of an earlier US plan-which it
claimed to be the current version-and denounced
it as a "charter of slavery." It warned that "the
Page 14
The Egyptian-Jordanian acceptance of the
peace plan has split the Arab world. The Iraqi
Government took the lead in denouncing both
the plan and the resolution, and Radio Damascus
soon chimed in.
Lebanon, Kuwait, and the
Sudan have endorsed the peace move. Saudi
Arabia-which does not want to get involved-has
refrained from public comment
The Israeli Government is delaying its re-
sponse to the US proposals, apparently both for
domestic political and for tactical diplomatic
reasons. Peace proposals always bring to the sur-
face the differences among the several parties
comprising the national unity coalition, and the
US proposals-although essentially procedural
rather than substantive-have apparently had this
effect, particularly in the right-wing Gahal party.
On the diplomatic front, Israel had expected the
Arabs to oppose the US proposals, thus obviating
the need to reveal its own inclination to reject
them. Tactically, the Israelis' delay appears de-
signed to take advantage of the recriminations
among some Arab states over Nasir's and King
Husayn's acceptance and to try to obtain as many
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"guarantees" as possible from the US in return
for a positive response.
Israel has problems with two of the three
main parts of the US initiative to "stop shooting
and start talking." Tel Aviv, already inhibited in
its actions on the Suez front by the extension of
the Soviet-Egyptian air defense system, fears that
the defense complex will be extended further
during the 90-day cease-fire. Israeli leaders are
therefore pressing for some guarantees to block
such a Soviet-Egyptian move. The Israelis would
also probably try to obtain Arab guarantees to get
the fedayeen to obey a cease-fire, if only to stall
and to embarrass the Arab states.
Secondly, the Israelis have always avoided
flatly announcing their willingness to implement
the UN resolution; Tel Aviv insists that the key
phrase in the resolution is not withdrawal alone
but withdrawal to "secure and recognized bor-
ders" established by negotiations. The Israelis
claim that to announce implementation of the
resolution-even if they could do so without a
domestic political crisis--would be taken by the
Arabs as a commitment to full withdrawal, some-
thing the Israelis insist they cannot do. Israeli
leaders say that the present cease-fire lines are not
the "final borders," but at the same time are
adamant that Israel will never return to the pre-
June 1967 borders and that there can be no
withdrawal prior to an agreed peace settlement.
For the Israelis, the resolution is not a directive to
be implemented but a set of principles on which
to negotiate. It is on the third point that Israel
agrees "to start talking." It accepts indirect talks
via Ambassador Jarring, although, as always, it
insists that at some time Arab-Israeli talks must
be direct.
The Israeli's answer to the US proposals will
be heavily qualified, even though they may tout it
as a "positive response." Tel Aviv's leaders feel
obliged to make a positive reply to avoid diplo-
matic isolation and to maintain some diplomatic
maneuverability. At the same time, no one in Tel
Aviv is convinced that Nasir seriously wants
peace; the Israelis therefore believe there is no
need, at least at this time, for a knock-down,
drag-out domestic political battle. The right-wing
Gahal is apparently giving Mrs. Meir some trouble,
but it will probably come around because its
leaders know that she can form a governing coali-
tion without them if she has to.
Tel Aviv can be expected to bargain hard
with the US, to try to show up Nasir's acceptance
as fraudulent, to extract every advantage from
Arab differences, and to move very slowly in
making any deviation from its long-standing
principles on a settlement. At base, the Israelis'
foot-dragging stems from sharp differences with
the US over what their "secure and recognized
borders" should be and their fears that the
stepped-up Soviet involvement in Egypt com-
bined with US pressures is the beginning of a
big-power move to impose a settlement.
At the UN, plans for resuming the mission of
Gunnar Jarring, Secretary General Thant's Middle
East envoy, appear to be taking shape. The
Swedish ambassador to the USSR is currently on
home leave but will be available on short notice
should the Big Four reach agreement on a new set
of instructions for him to use in making contact
with the Arabs and Israelis.
another move,
Thant has called the head of the UN Truce Super-
vision Organization (UNTSO) to New York to
determine what additional efforts UNTSO may be
able to make in policing compliance with any
cease-fire arrangement.
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Li bya: Soviet Arms Deliveries
The USSR apparently delivered its first
direct shipment of arms to Libya on 18 July in
two Soviet freighters. Ever since the coup of
September 1969 the Soviets have been offering
arms to the new Libyan regime, whose present
arms inventories were received almost entirely
from the US and the UK. In early 1970 Libya
made a deal with France for some 100 Mirage jet
aircraft and later received some Soviet-made
equipment, probably from Egypt. The direct
delivery of Soviet arms probably means that the
Soviets will become one of the major arms sup-
pliers of ground forces equipment to the Libyan
military, which numbers fewer than 20,000 men.
The reason for this new Libyan policy is not
clear. The US and the UK, however, have both
had political problems with the new Libyan Gov-
ernment because of their relationship with Israel.
Until 1970 the UK was the chief arms supplier for
Libya; British dealings involved over $40-million
worth of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, small
arms, and naval ships. Several million dollars in
additional equipment may still be delivered, and
the UK is at present locked in a dispute with
Libya over the sale of Chieftain tanks.
The US began its aid to Libya in 1957 with a
grant and sent a Military Assistance Advisory
Group (MAAG) to administer it. Up to 1970 this
aid totaled about $35 million in small arms, tele-
communications equipment, and aircraft. The
mission was reduced to five men in June 1970
when Wheelus Air Base was handed over to the
Libyans. The US is still involved in negotiations
with Libya for F-5 and C-130 aircraft. The po-
litical difficulties arising out of Libyan sensitivity
about the US relationship with Israel, however,
have made the outcome of these deals uncertain.
The French entered the competition in Jan-
uary 1970 when they concluded a contract
covering Mirage aircraft as well as economic and
training agreements totaling possibly as high as
$400 million. From the beginning, however, the
Libyans have proved to be difficult customers,
and the arrangement may not work out as well as
it appeared it might initially.
In July two Soviet freighters unloaded in
Tripoli at least 57 T-54/55 tanks as well as ar-
tillery and other ground forces equipment. The
ships later stopped in Benghazi to unload other
equipment.
Prime Minister Qaddafi, however, told
t e_-press that Libya intends to purchase arms
h
from all quarters "so that it will be indebted to
no one." It seems probable, therefore, that Libya
will continue to buy a certain amount of arms
from the Soviet Union while still continuing to
maintain its agreements with France, and perhaps
the US and UK as well.
Muscat and Oman: Palace Coup
The son of Sultan Said has seized power in
Muscat and Oman,
Said took over e coun ry
in 1932 when the British ousted his father. Since
that time, he had ruled in a conservative and
autocratic manner, not letting the country de-
velop with the times. Even after oil was dis-
covered and state income increased tremendously,
the sultan refused to use the new revenues to
modernize public facilities or to alleviate the
wretched poverty that stifles most of the popu-
lation.
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The British, who have a special treaty rela-
tionship with Muscat and supply it with British
officers and arms, had become increasingly irked
by the sultan's refusal to develop his country.
Most of the population shared this sentiment,
including the sultan's own family, and there had
been several abortive attempts to dislodge him.
On 23-24 July, the sultan's son Qabus, with the
assistance of armed retainers and the support of
other members of the family, seized the sultan,
who was wounded in the legs during the fray. The
army apparently took no part but has accepted
the new sultan, who has promised to use the oil
wealth to improve the lot of the people. The
British, who flew the former sultan to London for
medical attention, recognized the new regime this
week.
The British probably hope, because Sultan
Qabus was educated in England and trained at
Sandhurst that he will be able to combine the
influence of his background with the modernity
of his education to lead Muscat slowly into the
twentieth century. But without trained personnel,
an educated population, or any tradition of pub-
lic service, it will be a difficult task to mold the
primitive and sprawling sultanate into a modern
India: Prime Minister Faces New Parliamentary Session
Prime Minister Gandhi's efforts to balance
progressive and conservative forces and to
strengthen the often sputtering but politically im-
portant bandwagon psychology that her adminis-
tration has created will continue during the cur-
rent session of parliament that opened this week.
The cabinet shake-up in June, in which Mrs.
Gandhi reshuffled portfolios held by senior party
leaders, proved her dominance within her ruling
Congress Party. She also tightened her rein on
governmental functions by removing key depart-
ments, with responsibility for such matters as
personnel and intelligence, from ministerial con-
trol and shifting them to her own cabinet secre-
tariat. These actions have led to some grumbling
within the party about Mrs. Gandhi's alleged dic-
tatorial tendencies, but with national elections
scheduled to take place by February 1972, she
apparently concluded she must ensure her ability
to take a firm hand in preparation for the coming
campaign. There are reports that she also plans to
replace Congress Party President Jagjivan Ram
with an individual who will be even more amen-
able to her control and better able to organize the
party at the grass roots.
Mrs. Gandhi is continuing to try to project
an image of a progressive socialist fighting a reac-
tionary establishment. However, she has had to
walk a political tightrope, carefully balancing pro-
gressive and conservative supporters so as not to
rend completely the delicate fabric of unity of
her party. The present session of Parliament will
probably see a continuation of this balancing act.
The most radical kind of action her government is
likely to take is the abolition of the annual sub-
sidies paid to former princely rulers or the na-
tionalization of general insurance companies-"so-
cialist" moves that have long been anticipated and
are likely to antagonize the fewest people.
Mrs. Gandhi will also use the current session
to further her attack against ideological extrem-
ists. Communal parties, such as the Hindu na-
tionalist Jan Sangh, have been seeking alliances
against her. The prime minister is attempting to
block their efforts by tarring these opponents
with an "extremist" brush, thereby making them
unacceptable as political allies. Even so, an ad hoc
arrangement between the Sangh, the rival Or-
ganization Congress, and the conservative
Swatantra party-with a total of 133
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seats-appears to be shaping up. Such a develop-
ment could be troublesome even though Mrs.
Gandhi's party, with 221 seats in the 522-member
house, can usually count on a regional party, at
least one of the two Communist parties, and
like-minded independents for support on crucial
votes. Her party easily defeated a "no confi-
dence" motion at the opening of the session. The
more extreme of the two Communist parties
voted against her but the motion's defeat was
anticipated from the outset and the Communists
had a safe issue with which to demonstrate their
independence.
Leftist extremists, especially the Naxalite
terrorists, will also come in for condemnation by
the prime minister, but she is likely to save her
harshest words for the communal parties, whose
alliance-making efforts represent a more serious
challenge to the present stabilit and future pros
pects of her government.
South Africa: Vorster to Pursue Pragmatic Policies
The newly elected South African Parliament
is now in session, and the ruling National Party is
expected to concentrate on foreign relations,
partly to deflect opposition criticism of domestic
problems. The basis for this approach probably
will be Prime Minister Vorster's recent trips to
Malawi and Rhodesia and his contacts while on
vacation in Europe. Prospects for improving rela-
tions with the UK will also be a matter of special
interest.
The National Party holds 118 of the 166
seats in Parliament, down slightly from the 123
seats it had before the election. The opposition
United Party has 47 seats (an increase of nine)
and the Progressive Party has one. The National
Party leadership has interpreted the election re-
sults as indicating that the challenge from ultra-
conservative Afrikaner elements has been crushed,
and that the party had erred in concentrating on
the ultraconservatives while neglecting the United
Party.
Vorster, who had never fought an election as
prime minister, apparently now believes he has a
mandate from the people, and that he is in a
stronger position to follow his own moderate
policies. Part of his increased self-confidence
comes from the success of his recent trips. Prior
to his official visit to Malawi in May, he had been
outside of South Africa only once. Within two
months, he had become the most widely traveled
South African prime minister in history. While in
Europe, he met with high-level Portuguese offi-
cials, paid a courtesy call on General Franco, and
also visited France and Switzerland.
Although no concrete benefits resulted from
the trip, Vorster served notice that he will con-
tinue to experiment with his "outward move-
ment" in foreign policy in an effort to break
South Africa out of its isolation. He probably
hopes eventually to have contact with leaders of
even more powerful countries, such as the UK.
South African leaders are greatly encouraged by
the Conservative victory in the UK and the pros-
pects for improving relations with and possibly
obtaining arms from the British.
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Mozambique: New Counterinsurgency Campaign
An unusually strong counterinsurgency cam-
paign by Portuguese military forces in northeast-
ern Mozambique has seriously set back the guer-
rilla operations of the Mozambique Liberation
Front (FRELIMO). In the future, FRELIMO may
face substantially greater obstacles in waging guer-
rilla warfare, but it is likely to retain the bulk of
its popular support and political influence in its
areas of activity.
Since mid-June, Portuguese forces have con-
ducted their first comprehensive and sustained
search-and-destroy campaign. They also have used
for the first time tactical air support and heli-
copters on a large scale in assaulting the northeast
stronghold. As a result, the Portuguese have over-
run many FRELIMO bases and have captured
large quantities of armament and supplies. In ad-
dition, the Portuguese have built at least one base
along the Tanzanian border from which govern-
ment troops can operate against FRELIMO sup-
ply routes.
The northeast has been FRELIMO's main
stronghold and the scene of the heaviest fighting
since the insurgency began in '964. The region is
the homeland of the Makonde, whose tribal struc-
ture has been the basis of the FRELIMO organiza-
tion in the area and whose men constitute about
80 percent of FRELIMO's guerrilla forces. De-
spite occasional raids on FRELIMO bases in the
northeast, Portuguese forces for a long time were
content to concede the remote, mountainous ter-
rain to the guerrillas and to contain the organiza-
tion largely by establishing a belt of governm
ent-controlled fortified villages.
extensive population control program.
Ultimately, a substantial reduction of
FRELIMO influence in the northeast probably
depends on the forcible resettling of the Makonde
in government-controlled villages. The independ-
ent-minded Makonde have tenaciously resisted
Portuguese propaganda campaigns designed to
win them over to the government. The Portuguese
have begun another of these campaigns, but ap-
parently they are not planning to engage in an
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.:. Areas Of I ]euv Icsf
'Inxurpenf activity
If E:I If~1Ef g
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
COLOMBIA - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Presi-
dential inaugurations in Colombia on 7 August
and the Dominican Republic on 16 August could
provide the fuel for violence. In Colombia parti-
sans of ANAPO believe that Pastrana won the
election by fraud and that their candidate, former
dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, is the rightful
president. In the Dominican Republic the major
opposition party probably will limit its activities
to demonstrations against President Balaguer, but
some terrorism sparked by the extreme left could
occur. Both governments probably are capable of
containing any disorders that take place.
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Guatemala: Politics and Terrorism
President Arana, alarmed by continuing ter-
rorist threats and by increasing violence in the
countryside, is pressing for increased US material
and advisory assistance.
Communists are divided over antigovern-
ment strategy, and mutual suspicion between the
two major subversive organizations-the orthodox
Communist Party (PGT) and the Cuban-oriented
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)-has kept cooperative
activity to a minimum. The FAR's intent to con-
tinue violence is at odds with the PGT's efforts to
infiltrate legitimate political groups.
t e party is meeting
increasing aiscontent among its own activist mem-
bers. Hard liners are resisting the PGT policy to
limit violence until the new government's weak-
nesses can be identified. The PGT's line is dif-
ficult to sell to those who realize that they will be
targets when the government responds to FAR
terrorism.
The FAR lately has concentrated on rural
activity, probably for a combination of reasons.
The terrorists want to keep the government off
balance and may also believe that retribution
from rightist counterterrorists is less likely to be
effective in the hinterland.
Despite these problems, ter-
rorist action has continued, particularly in the
western department of San Marcos, where more
than a dozen assassinations have occurred.
The army chief of staff last week referred to
the Mexican border area and the south coast as
the greatest immediate security threat, where ter-
rorist bands are systematically robbing and
murdering at will. In response, the army is
forming a provisional battalion in the area and
reportedly is coordinating operations with
Mexican officials. Both President Arana and
Minister of Defense Vassaux have expressed
concern that Cuba may be preparing new as-
sistance to the terrorists. They are pleading
against any cutback in US material assistance that
might occur because of US commitments else-
Cuba: High-level Personnel and Structural Changes Coming
This year's 26 July speech by Fidel Castro
was remarkable for its somber tone and candid
discussion of Cuba's troubled economic plight.
Castro admitted that his government has been
unable to cope successfully with the country's
complex economic problems and promised major
structural and personnel changes in the Cuban
Communist Party and in the administration. His
stated willingness to adopt measures to improve
the situation may have been stimulated in part by
Soviet urging. Despite his promises, however, he is
unlikely to surrender a significant amount of
power to anyone-Cuban or foreign-and pre-
sumably will continue to play the major role in
deciding Cuba's economic path.
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Castro carefully avoided giving the impres-
sion that personnel changes would be in the form
of a purge. He explained that many leaders were
"exhausted" by their efforts in the sugar harvest
this year, and he thus paved the way for their
replacement without prejudice. The most likely
candidates for removal seem to be Major Faure
Chomon, minister of transport; "old Communist"
Manuel Luzardo, minister of domestic trade; and
Major Guillermo Garcia, Oriente Province party
chief and member of the central committee's po-
litical bureau. Chomon and Luzardo have been
unable to overcome the problems that have con-
stantly plagued their ministries, and Garcia's poor
performance in the harvest apparently caused
Castro considerable disappointment. By avoiding
any implication of disgrace in the removals, Cas-
tro probably hopes to prevent the alienation of
those who are replaced and to escape the embar-
rassment of having appointed incompetents to
high positions. Most of his new appointees will
probably be capable military officers and ex-
perienced technocrats.
The most outstanding innovation announced
by Castro is the creation of the bureau of social
Mexico Outraged Over Hijacking
The Mexicans are outraged by the latest air-
plane hijacking by asylees and are putting pres-
sure on Cuba to extradite the hijackers.
Three Dominicans who had been granted
asylum in May and one Mexican hijacked a Mexi-
can airliner to Cuba on 25 July. The public media
have demanded extradition of the air pirates, and
one widely circulated conservative paper observed
the irony of maintaining diplomatic relations with
a country "which has demonstrated profound
contempt for Mexico"-a reference to Cuba's
habitually ignoring Mexican requests for extra-
dition.
Mexico's indignation is aggravated by its
pride in its role as a haven for the politically
production to coordinate all economic activity
and to develop realistic plans for the economy.
The bureau apparently will replace the present
central planning board and the central com-
mittee's economic commission. Although no ap-
pointments have yet been announced, minister
without portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is a
likely choice to head the bureau if Castro does
not take the job himself. Rodriguez is an "old
Communist" and an experienced economist who
enjoys the respect of both Moscow and Castro. If
he gets the post, he will eclipse Cuban President
Osvaldo Dorticos, one of Castro's key economic
advisers and currently head of both the economic
commission and the central planning board.
The trend toward domestic policies more in
line with Soviet thinking coincides with a similar
improvement in relations with some Latin Ameri-
can Communist parties. The psychological impact
of failing to meet this year's harvest goal despite
an all-out effort seems to have brought home to
Castro the magnitude of Cuba's economic prob-
lems, and he apparently has become more willing
to listen to Soviet advice on both the domestic
and international fronts.
oppressed and as a bridge between Cuba and the
other American republics. The government prob-
ably will draw a strong distinction between po-
litical asylees and common criminals in the future
and is tightening control over asylees still in the
country. It has refused to give asylum to Bolivian
guerrillas now in Chile.
Mexico immediately indicated its displeasure
by refusing to permit a Cuban airliner in Mexico
City to take off until the hijacked Mexican plane
was returned. To increase pressure on Cuba to
extradite the hijackers, Mexico quickly an-
nounced that it was terminating the bilateral air
convention in force since 1954, noting that the
convention is anachronistic. The pact provides
that either party can inform the other of the
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desire to terminate, and if no reply is received
within 14 days, the agreement is automatically
dissolved one year later. Thus the convention will
continue in effect until 11 August 1971. Mexico
left the door open to renew the pact with certain
changes. It is widely speculated that prominent in
a new convention would be a provision requiring
extradition of hijackers or other measures aimed
at halting the piracy fad.
Cuba is unlikely to return the hijackers to
Mexico, where the attorney general is charging
them with everything in the book, including air
piracy, bearing arms, damage to another's
property, and injuries and threats. Bad blood
between Mexico and Cuba on the extradition
issue is of longstanding, and a similar hijacking
incident last summer torpedoed a bilateral hi-
jacking agreement that was ready for ratification.
Although Mexico will not break diplomatic re-
lations with Cuba, the Mexicans now have made
clear that they will get tough when circumstances
permit.
COSTA RICA - EASTERN EUROPE: Costa
Rican President Figueres' open door policy to-
ward the Communist countries in Europe may be
dissipating the traditional Central American aloof-
ness toward the bloc. Salvadoran coffee growers
reportedly now have requested Figueres' as-
sistance in promoting trade negotiations between
El Salvador and the USSR. The Guatemalan for-
Bolivia: Crisis and Confusion
The conflict between leftists and moderates
within the Bolivian Government and the military
reached new levels of intensity this week. Presi-
dent Ovando appeared to be accepting the mili-
tary's approach to solving the student problem in
La Paz, but at the last moment he reversed and
backed the leftists. This act seemed momentarily
to ease the tension that was rapidly intensifying
in student and labor circles, but it put Ovando in
direct opposition to his military leaders.
Students belonging to the conservative
Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) occupied the
main university building in La Paz last week and
ousted the leftist radicals who had been in charge
policy.
eign minister recently indicated that his govern-
ment is considering establishing commercial rela-
tions with some socialist countries to sell surplus
coffee. Central Americans previously have sold
surpluses to Eastern Europe through middlemen,
but Figueres' open bargaining with the Com-
munist countries has probably served to ac-
celerate a departure from the old cold-shoulder
since April. The FSB group apparently had the
support of the military, who hoped to use this
group to remove leftists from control of the uni-
versity and end its use as a center for subversion.
The FSB students were supplied with arms and
the stage was set for a confrontation as both the
right and left made plans for gaining complete
control of the university.
the
President initiated a mediation effort that re-
sulted in FSB students' giving up the building on
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29 July amidst feelings that they had been be-
trayed by the government. The agreement,
worked out through mediation efforts involving
students, faculty, members of the clergy, and
government officials, calls for student elections
on 14 August but returns control in the meantime
to the leftist Revolutionary Council.
Tied to Ovando's wheeling and dealing over
the student crisis was the apparently rigged re-
signation of leftist Information Minister Bailey on
27 July. In announcing his resignation, Bailey
took the military to task for opposing the "revo-
lution," making statements that in retrospect ap-
pear to have been designed to undercut the posi-
tion of the military high command. The following
day Ovando refused to accept Bailey's resignation
and the minister resumed his post.
There is no indication that Ovando co-
ordinated his moves with any member of the
military high command before resolving the
student conflict and reinstating Bailey. Both are
actions directly opposed to the stated desires of
military leaders. In view of their current pre-
occupation with searching for guerrillas, Ovando
may believe he can act with impunity. In addi-
tion, the President may have gained endorsements
for his actions from second-echelon commanders,
thus outflanking the high command.
The differences between Ovando and the
military now appear to have become so serious
that a final reckoning cannot be far off. If army
commander General Miranda and Interior Min-
ister Ayoroa have sufficient support within the
military, they are likely to force a confrontation
with the President in the near future. If Ovando
has picked up sufficient military backing in recent
weeks, however, he is likely to seek the removal
of Miranda and Ayoroa.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Colombia: A New President and a New Political Spectrum
Secret
43
31 July 19 70
No. 0381/70A
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COLOMBIA: A NEW PRESIDENT AND A NEW POLITICAL SPECTRUM
Misael Pastrana Borrero will be inaugurated on 7 August as the fourth and last
president under Colombia's unique National Front system of government. The Front
was established in 1957 following the overthrow of General Rojas Pinilla and was
designed to end the bloody political strife that had wracked the nation for ten years.
The major provision of the Front was for the Liberal and Conservative parties to
alternate the presidency and to retain parity in Congress between them until 1974.*
Last April's election did not evolve as the Front's founders envisioned. There was
widespread opposition within the Conservative Party-whose turn it was to provide a
president-to the imposition of Pastrana as the official candidate by Conservative
former president Ospina. Another factor affecting his candidacy was his close
identification with Liberal President Carlos Lleras. As a consequence, two other
Conservatives, Belisario Betarncur and Evaristo Sourdis, joined the contest, thereby
further splitting the, Conservative Party. Former dictator Rojas Pinilla also ran as a
nominal Conservative.
Rojas linilla's Daughter Being Evicted From First Session of Congress on 20 July
*Constitutional amendments passed in 1968 specify that parity at cabinet level and in other high positions will remain
in effect until 1978.
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31 July 1970
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Pastrana's small plurality-63,557 votes*-attests to the Front's narrow sur
vival. The runner-up, Rojas Pinilla, would have overturned the Front and possibly
plunged the nation into chaos and renewed strife reminiscent of that which caused
his overthrow in 1957. Rojas' followers, led by his politically astute daughter,
Senator Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, and his political movement, the National
Popular Alliance (ANAPO), have charged that Rojas has been denied the presidency
through fraud and claim that he is the rightful president. Since 18 July, Mrs. Rojas
de Moreno has made inflammatory statements emphasizing that her party does not
recognize Pastrana's victory and predicting that "blood will flow in the streets." On
20 July, when the new Congress convened, she accused President Lleras of responsi
bility in the assassination attempt against activist ANAPO Senator Ignacio Vives.
To counter any possible violence, President Lleras declared a state of siege that
remains in effect at this time. Even though there are extensive security precautions
in Bogota, new violence cocld erupt during the inauguration. General Rojas Pinilla
has been recuperating from a serious heart ailment in the United States, and it is
doubtful that he will resume active leadership of the movement. He is, nevertheless,
expected to return before 7 August and probably will hold private "inaugural
ceremonies" in the hope of causing violence or at least embarrassing the new
administration. The armed forces are capable of containing any disorders that may
occur.
Although ANAPO-sponsored demonstrations would be embarrassing to the
newly inaugurated President and serve to cloud the political atmosphere, they
probably would be the least of Pastrana's problems.
The elections on 19 April signaled the end of
an era: the Liberal and Conservative parties are no
longer pre-eminent, and a third party, the Na-
tional Popular Alliance (ANAPO), has become a
major contender on the political scene. Lower
class voters, who had traditionally opted for one
or the other of the major parties, instead suc-
cumbed to Rojas Pinilla's demagogy, and many
voted for hirn.
the majority of the electorate, particularly in the
cities, and was certain that, whatever happened to
Pastrana, it would continue to be the largest party
in Colombia. Instead, voters in the larger cities
and departmental capitals, where Liberalism had
been strong, overwhelmingly supported Rojas.
The leaders of both parties appear convinced that
drastic changes are necessary in the internal struc-
ture and tactics of the parties comprising the
National Front if they are successfully to meet
the ANAPO challenge and regain their pre-
eminence.
The election was a greater blow to the Lib-
erals than to the Conservatives, who already knew
that their party was fragmented. The Liberal
Party complacently believed it had the support of
The loss of effectiveness by the Liberals and
Conservatives, Rojas Pinilla's charisma, the excel-
lent organization and campaign by ANAPO, and
*Pastrana-1,625,025; Rojas Pinilla-1,561,468; Betancur-471,350; Sourdis-336,286.
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the protest against the "establishment" as repre-
sented by the National Front, all contributed to
the Front's near defeat. Pastrana's poor tactics
and his lackluster bureaucratic image also con-
tributed to his poor showing.
As a result, the two major parties are seri-
ously factionalized and political alignments will
not be clear until after Pastrana takes office. The
outcome could be determined for the most part
by the course that ANAPO chooses to follow and
whether the party can hold together when Rojas
Pinilla is no longer politically active. He is now 70
years old and not physically capable of arduous
Special Report
activity. ANAPO must decide who will succeed to
the leadership of the party and who will be the
presidential candidate in 1974. At the same time,
the process of uniting the movement into a fully
operational third party is not an easy task, and it
could lead to the splintering of the heterogeneous
forces comprising ANAPO.
Whether the ANAPO bloc in Congress will
remain united is debatable; individual members
now may be more willing than before to follow a
course of action that will benefit them personally.
ANAPO is expected to organize itself into a
strong opposition in Congress. In that case it
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::)r Ur~'r, l .
Supporters of ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla demonstrating in downtown Bogota
the day following the 1970 presidential elections.
would be in an excellent position to harass the
new administration and solidify support for itself
by posing as the real defender of the people
against the oligarchy. Outside Congress, ANAPO
will be able to organize demonstrations against
the government, incite dissident groups to oppose
the administration, and act as a rallying point for
the forces in Colombian society that are seeking a
mass-based political movement capable of being
the real opposition to the "establishment."
President-elect Pastrana faces great domestic
difficulties when he takes office on 7 August.
Although his victory was legitimate, his plurality
was slim and many persons believe he was elected
by fraud. This situation will deprive him of true
public acceptance and recognition of his legiti-
macy. He will not only be considered president of
a minority in the country as a whole, but he also
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31 July 1970
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will lead a minority in his own fragmented Con-
servative Party. Even the Liberal Party, where he
has his strongest support, is expected to fic-
tionalize further as the realities of the competitive
political situation for 1974 begin to emerge more
clearly. Pastrana will have to utilize all the powers
of his office in a forceful manner if he is to
establish himself as president in fact as well as in
name. His greatest difficulty may come when he
attempts to free himself from the patronizing
influence of his mentors, ex-presidents Carlos
Lleras and Mariano Ospina.
Pastrana's actions during the campaign did
not show him to be a strong leader, and he has
done little to counter that impression. Moreover,
Pastrana lacks definable political support. He will
have to develop rapidly some kind of political
machinery on which he can depend during the
next four years.
Pestra rya
Rojas
Betancur
Sourdis
The decisions that will be made by defeated
Conservative candidates Betancur and Sourdis will
be important to Pastrana's power base. Betancur
has publicly stated that he will not oppose
Pastrana merely for the sake of opposition, but
evidence suggests that he intends to adopt a hard
line toward the new administration. Sourdis has
not yet made a firm decision: much will depend
on what he is able to obtain in the way of
government posts from the Pastrana administra-
tion and whether the individuals under his banner
remain united. Some members of both camps
probably will collaborate with Pastrana even
though Betancur and Sourdis remain in opposi-
tion. Support from individual defectors may give
the Pastrana forces a majority in Congress. In any
event, ANAPO has more than one third of the
seats in the Chamber of Deputies and can block
any legislation requiring a two-thirds vote.
Liberal
Liberals Independent
Con seiv Lives T TAI
2
CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE
Pastrar~a 59
Rotas.... 281,
Eetancur 6
Sourdis-
118
31 94
44 . 72
24'
20
f astranrt lacks three votes in 118 ne ber Senate` to? achieve 50
% plus one. In 210-membe
chamber ha lacks 12 votes for 50% plus one.
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Pastrana's relations with the armed forces
are important for the stability of the government
and the maintenance of public order. He has
military support at present but he cannot afford
to be complacent. Pastrana will have to be de-
cisive; his greatest danger would come from show-
ing uncertainty in the face of a political, security,
or economic crisis. Although the Colombian mili-
tary traditionally has been apolitical, it still con-
siders itself the ultimate defender of the state and
the constitution. It probably would act in the
face of an imminent threat of chaos or anarchy.
Colombia's rapid rate of urbanization is out-
running the capacity of industry to absorb mi-
grants and the young coming into the labor
market, and the ability of government to supply
desired public services. The new administration
must satisfy, or give the appearance of satisfying,
the aspirations of those who consider themselves
suppressed, deprived, or alienated.
In this sense Pastrana probably will be at a
disadvantage as the heir of the "establishment"
against which the protest vote was in part di-
rected. The new government will have to decide
the extent to which it: will sacrifice economic
goals for the sake of political expediency, in its
efforts to gain support among the masses.
Pastrana probably will not be able to continue the
remarkable progress made toward economic re-
covery and the restructuring of the government
undertaken by President Lleras.
Pastrana's personality and his apparent
weakness, added to his lack of political ex-
perience, do not augur well for the new admin-
istration. Nevertheless, he possesses several im-
portant assets. He will inherit an improved
economy from President Lleras, who probably
will support him, at least initially, to ensure that
the programs he began are continued. Although
Pastrana cannot count on a clear and independent
majority in Congress, he will be able to dispense
patronage to those who support him. Properly
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used, this could be the most important factor in
his favor. In addition, the current high price of
coffee and its positive effect on the economy wit'
reflect favorably on the President-elect.
Pastrana has made a point of meeting with
representatives of lower income groups to discuss
their problems since the election. He has called
for cooperation from followers of the other
candidates in a way that suggests that this is not
merely an empty gesture but a genuine effort to
gain favor with those individuals whose desire has
been to support a program of social change. He
has made public statements on the need for social
change to include action in the fields of employ-
ment, housing, health, education, and urban
problems.
Pastrana will be compelled to develop pro-
grams, some of them already under way, to re-
duce unemployment and improve the standard of
living if he hopes to create mass support for his
administration. There is a danger, however, that
the government will overreact to the ANAPO
threat and initiate or acquiesce in unwise meas-
ures and programs that could undermine the
economic and thus the political stability of the
country. Pastrana's reaction to problems that
come to the fore soon will give a clue as to the
nature and possibly the success or failure of his
administration. His initial tests will come when he
chooses his ministers and senior officials and
seeks to implement legislation. At that time, be-
cause of his lack of a majority in Congress, he will
have to present an attractive program that will
receive such broad public support that members
of the Congress will be forced to follow him.
Should he be unable to rule with a hostile Con-
gress, however, Pastrana can call on a time-tested
Colombian solution-he can declare a state of
siege and rule by decree.
All the evidence thus far suggests that there
will be few surprises after Pastrana takes office,
but Colombia's progress during the next four
years probably will be slower than that under
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