WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008000050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 10, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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1%0 Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
ARMY review(s) completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
44
10 July 1970
No. 0378/70
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(Information as of noon EDT, 9 July 1970)
Page
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cambodia: Major Communist Forces on the Move . . . . . . . . . 5
Communist China: In Search of a Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sino-Soviet Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
USSR: Second Brezhnev Program for Agriculture Launched . . . . . . 8
USSR-Romania: Relations Still Cool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Romania: ]Flood Damage Less Serious Than Anticipated . . . . . . 10
Italy: Renewed Search for Cabinet Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . 12
Western Europe: Space Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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Jordan: Government Versus Fedayeen . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Bolivia: Political Crisis Abates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
USSR-Peru: Relief Airlift Commences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Dominican Republic: Crackdown on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . 24
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Vietnam
The Communists are unenthusiastic about
President Nixon's call for serious negotiations.
Hanoi put out a flood of propaganda this week,
berating the appeal for new efforts to get the
Paris talks off dead center as a "peace hoax." As
usual, the North Vietnamese insisted that only
new US concessions could improve the prospects
in Paris. They belittled the appointment of
Ambassador Bruce to head the US delegation as
an attempt by President Nixon to appease his
domestic critics.
These responses may probably be a fairly
accurate gauge of the current mood in Hanoi. The
Communists will certainly try to avoid any sign in
the next few weeks that might suggest a willing-
ness to respond positively. Hanoi has been calling
for the appointment of a new chief of the US
delegation for months, however, and it probably
will send Xuan Thuy, the head of its delegation,
back to Paris both for appearance's sake and to
probe the substance of Ambassador Bruce's in-
structions.
Hanoi was supported by both Moscow and
Peking, with Peking especially indignant at all the
talk of negotiations. The Chinese failed to take
note of4he appointment of a new head to the US
delegation and issued a series of propaganda
lectures to Hanoi toutling the wisdom of pro-
tracted fighting on all three fronts in Indochina.
Reaction in Saigon to President Nixon's
recent statements on Indochina reflects some con-
cern that the US might attempt a peace initiative
that would be inimical to South Vietnam's inter-
ests. Some Saigon papers have linked President
Nixon's remarks on a political settlement, his
suggestion of supervised cease-fires, and the
appointment of Ambassador Bruce as evidence
that the US is launching a peace offensive, now
that the Cambodian operations have been con-
cluded.
Official apprehension over such a move was
reflected in the government's seizure of copies of
ten Saigon newspapers this week for carrying a
Western wire service report of remarks by Secre-
tary of State Rogers suggesting that the Com-
munists might negotiate a settlement based on
proportional representation. President Thieu and
his colleagues have been quite content to see the
talks on dead center. In their view, real negotia-
tions can only hurt the present government and
undercut the anti-Communist effort in South
Vietnam.
More agitation pegged to peace and anti-US
themes are again being planned in South Vietnam
despite a new government crackdown on demon-
strators. Militant students hope to foment dis-
orders that will call for an end to the war.
These militants have had little success to
date in mobilizing large numbers of student pro-
testers, but their growing emphasis on violence,
and on antiwar, anti-US slogans constitutes a
threat the government hopes to neutralize as soon
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as possible. One of the main dangers is that stu-
dent agitators may join forces with other anti-
regime elements who do not fully' support
Saigon's staunch anti-Communist policies. South
Vietnamese officials are said to be concerned by
recent reports that disabled veterans plan to take
up the peace issue, and there continue to be
indications that some militant Buddhist leaders
hope to launch a new peace campaign.
Responding to the danger of further agita-
tion, President Thieu issued a blunt statement last
weekend promising firm government action, in-
cluding the use of military force if necessary,
against any demonstrators who threaten public
order. Thieu made it clear that he was drawing
the line on any activities that might undercut the
war effort. Although his main target was student
militants, Thieu also has ordered stronger meas-
ures designed to end protests by disabled
veterans. Police have torn down some squatter
shacks built by the veterans in Saigon, but the
government probably will continue to act cau-
tiously in dealing with this group because their
problems presumably are viewed sympathetically
by the South Vietnamese Army.
Meanwhile, overt anti-Americanism appears
to be gathering momentum in Saigon. Some
politicians and newspapers apparently agree with
antigovernment students that appeals to this
widely felt prejudice are becoming increasingly
effective. A substantial number of members of
the National Assembly reportedly believe an anti-
American stance will enhance their re-election
prospects and they have begun to criticize the US
openly on the Assembly floor. A similar trend has
developed in the Saigon press.
President Thieu foresees a long war in Cam-
bodia, with the Communists pursuing an in-
surgency in the countryside and harassing Phnom
Penh to keep the government off balance. He told
Ambassador Bunker last week that for the im-
mediate future South Vietnam intends to keep
the Communists out of their former sanctuaries
along the border and that South Vietnamese
troops may set up bases near the Parrot's Beak
and Fishhook areas. In order to facilitate the
continued repatriation of Vietnamese refugees,
another base will be maintained at the Neak
Luong Ferry, where the main Phnom Penh - Sai-
gon highway crosses the Mekong River.
I n an obvious pitch for more US assistance,
Thieu said that one of the most troublesome
problems the South Vietnamese forces have to
contend with is that of providing the Cambodians
with helicopters and other air support
During the winter and spring of 1969-70
blunt references to Communist doubts about the
war appeared frequently in captured enemy docu-
ments. These indicated that the enemy leadership
was greatly concerned about morale and was
making strenuous efforts to prepare the rank and
file for much more hard fighting in the future.
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up Communist activity has blunted pacification
progress and has created greater insecurity in
some areas, but there has not been an across-the-
board change in the situation in the countryside.
Developments in Cambodia have presented the
Communists with a new set of problems and
opportunities in Indochina as a whole, but the
results may not be apparent for a long time.
Moreover, the immediate impact of allied opera-
tions in Cambodia will increase the challenges
facing Communist forces, and thus compound
long-standing morale problems among the rank
and file.
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Cambodia: Current Situation
THAILAND
Battam han ~J
Communlet-controlled location
CommunIst?controlled
a ,~c
Mtue
M "O'NG , CHAM
Kotnpnn `T4nle 8ei Mt
Chanr
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Cambodia: Major Communist Forces on the Move
The Communists have stepped up their
activities in a number of eastern provinces of the
country after a 10-day lull in major fighting. In
the most significant action, the enemy on 5 July
launched a large-scale attack against the district
capital of Saang, 20 miles south of Phnom Penh,
briefly occupying a section of the town. Govern-
ment reinforcements rushed from Phnom Penh,
accompanied by heavy South Vietnamese air sup-
port, helped break the attack. Large concentra-
tions of enemy troops remain in the vicinity,
however.
Little fighting is reported elsewhere but the
enemy may be preparing to launch major attacks
against several provincial capitals. East of Phnom
Penh, sizable enemy forces are reported in Svay
Rieng Province near the provincial capital. To the
north, the government continues to report that
large enemy formations are moving toward Kom-
pong Thom city, the gateway to the northern
provinces of Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, and Oddar
Meanchey. Heavy South Vietnamese air strikes in
the vicinity may be setting back enemy plans to
launch an attack, however. The provincial gov-
ernor, nevertheless, claims his subordinates are
near the "breaking point" as a result of prolonged
enemy pressure.
Page 5
A government spokesman~ claimed that 25X1
the threat of an attack on the city has been
greatly reduced and most major highways into the
capital are open. The last of 4,000 South Viet-
namese troops that were rushed in more than a
week ago to help defend Phnom Penh have been
withdrawn.
On the political front, Lon Nol on 1 July
announced his first major cabinet reshuffle since
Sihanouk's ouster in mid-March. The cabinet
changes were in part dictated by recent National
Assembly criticism of the regime's shortcomings,
and by recognition that too many heavy re-
sponsibilities were concentrated in the hands of
three or four of Lon Nol's most trusted sub-
ordinates. The Cambodian leader remains prime
minister and minister of defense. Sirik Matak
continues as his number one deputy and vice
president of the council of ministers.
Several other influential Cambodian leaders,
however, appear to have lost some political
ground. Yem Sambaur, generally regarded as the
number three man in the country, lost his po-
sition as foreign minister. He remains minister of
justice and in charge of the regime's vital liaison
with the National Assembly. Trinh Hoanh was
dropped as minister of information. A number of
fresh faces have been brought into the gov-
ernment, and this infusion of new blood may help
mollify some of the regime's more outspoken
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Communist China: In Search ofa Party
Peking's difficulty in accelerating the pace of
its campaign to reconstruct the shattered Chinese
Communist party apparatus was affirmed by the
low key celebration of the party's 49th anni-
versary last week. The major pronouncement
marking the event failed to cite even the modest
progress achieved since the ninth party congress
in April 1969 and pointedly avoided outlining
future goals. Over the past year, the regime has
clarified its intent to restore the party to its
leading role, but deep-seated political problems
stemming from the Cultural Revolution continue
to mar the performance of the relatively small
number of party committees formed to date.
There are signs that top provincial authorities are
taking a more active role in the protracted cam-
paign, but neither they nor Peking appear close to
solving key personnel and organizational prob-
lems.
In recent weeks, local media have been giv-
ing increasing attention to the activities of the
so-called provincial party core groups, the pre-
cursors of the party committees that are even-
tually to be formed for each province. Within the
past month the number of provinces that have
officially acknowledged the existence of such
core groups has doubled. Moreover, top provincial
figures are being openly identified with these core
groups, and the groups themselves now are being
portrayed as taking an active part in forming
party organs at the lower levels. As the rebuilding
campaign enters its second year, however, not a
single provincial level committee appears ready to
be formed, a lag made all the more apparent by
Peking's reluctance to publicize the existence of
the core groups in national media.
At this stage, the ability of the core groups
to take the lead in party rebuilding is ques-
tionable. Such problems as persistent quarreling
over membership by former Cultural Revolution
activists, the reluctance of party veterans to assert
leadership, factional infighting, and bitter per-
sonal rivalries are not amenable to rapid solutions.
The approach of the provincial core groups to
many of these dilemmas appears largely confined
to appeals for discipline and to sponsoring in-
numerable political "re-education" sessions
dealing with the role of the party and the duties
of its members. There is also some evidence that
even where party committees have been formed,
they are having difficulty in establishing their
authority.
Coin munist,China: Party Units Announced Since Ninth Party
Congress, April 1969
"Core Group" Number of County
Proytce_ ~hlontt~ Annou~ced~ Levet Cojntnittees
Anhwei
Chekiang
Heilungkiang February 1970
Hunan
Hupeh
Inner Mongolia January 1970
Kansu
Kiangsu
Kirin June 1970
Kwangsi July 1970
Kwangtung February 1970
Liaoning July 1970
Shantung February 1970
Shensi June 1970
*NOTE: Shansi and Tsinghai provinces and Shanghai city established
core groups in 19b7 Of these three, only the Tsinghai core group is
currently being referred to in radiobroadcasts. The other 12 provincial-
level units in China have not yet announced either a core group or
county-level party committee.
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Ultimately, the ability of the provincial
authorities to quicken the pace of party
rebuilding is likely to hinge on the role played by
local military officials. It is increasingly evident
that many of the officers currently holding civil
administrative posts are slated to assume
important positions on the new party com-
mittees. Four of the five leaders identified on the
Shantung provincial core group, for example, are
military men. In Kirin Province, the head of the
Sino-Soviet Relations
The sudden departure from Peking on 30
June of the chief Soviet negotiator, Deputy For-
eign Minister Kuznetsov, has raised some question
about the future status of the deadlocked Sino-
Soviet border negotiations. To avoid the ap-
pearance of a deliberate attempt to disrupt the
negotiations, the Soviets say Kuznetsov departed
because of illness and that Chinese doctors were
consulted before he left. Nevertheless, there has
been no specific indication that Moscow plans to
send Kuznetsov back to Peking. One Soviet of-
ficial would say only that the negotiator's illness
was relatively minor and that he would be "back
to work soon."
At the time of Kuz:netsov's departure from
Peking, Soviet sources also began insinuating that
the Chinese had finally granted agrement to am-
bassador-designate Vladimir Stepakov. A Soviet
official subsequently has said that there has been
only "some development" regarding the nomina-
tion. There has, moreover, been no confirmation
of Stepakov's alleged accreditation from the
Chinese. They have heretofore refused to accept
him primarily becausethey fear Moscow would use
his appointment to downgrade the negotiations to
the ambassadorial level.
Although the top Soviet leaders have pub-
licly admitted that "no appreciable progress" has
provincial revolutionary committee-a pro-
fessional army commissar-has recently been
noted as a leading member of the province's core
group. Thus far, however, Peking has been re-
markably silent on army-party relationships,
possibly because in many locales the military
officials involved in party rebuilding may have
been drawn into the same personnel and policy
quarrels as their civilian counterparts.
been made in the negotiations, they have good
reason for wanting the diplomatic dialogue to
continue at some level. They must find some
satisfaction in the absence of major border clashes
since the talks got under way and they may retain
some hope that protracted negotiations may lead
to a limited accord on the border. In addition, the
Soviets want to maintain the appearance of
stability in their relations with China that the
negotiating process itself tends to foster.
Moscow's apprehensiveness that the appearance
of preoccupation with its "China problem" will
weaken its position elsewhere was recently under-
scored by Politburo member Pol ansk
For its part, Peking also values continuing
the discussions, both as a means to obtain a close
reading of Moscow's intentions toward China and
as a possible deterrent against Soviet military
pressure along the border. Nevertheless, the
Chinese have been unwilling to pursue the dis-
cussions during Kuznetsov's past absences, and
may be reluctant to reconvene the sessions unless
he returns or is replaced by an equally prominent
envoy.
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USSR: Second Brezhnev Program for Agriculture Launched
Party chief Brezhnev introduced a moder-
ately ambitious program for the agricultural
sector in 1971-75 at the two-day party plenum
last week. This was the first part of the next
five-year plan to be announced, and reflects the
leadership's concern for this sector. It does not,
however, indicate a major shift in resource alloca-
tions in favor of agriculture. The question of how
much to invest caused sharp debate within the
leadership this spring and has been a major factor
in the long delay in completing the next five-year
plan. Brezhnev indicated that work on the plan is
still in progress.
Brezhnev promises a substantial injection of
capital investment, including increased deliveries
of machinery from the industrial sector, a large
increase in grain output, greater use of chemical
fertilizers and more land reclamation. He an-
pounced that purchase prices for milk, meat, and
wool will be raised to encourage greater produc-
tion but that retail prices will remain unchanged.
Even though the new output goals are sub-
stantially higher than those set for the present
five-year plan period, the rates of growth required
to fulfill these targets are about the same or even
lower. These goals seem reasonably attainable if
the planned deliveries of materials and machinery
from the industrial sector are fulfilled.
Investment in agriculture over the next five
years is scheduled to grow at a more modest pace
than proposed for or even achieved in the current
five-year period. It appears likely, however, that
agriculture's share of total investment is con-
tinuing its slow growth. Many of the material
input goals, although essentially the same as those
AGRICULTURAL GUIDELINES FOR 1971-75 a
HIGHLIGHTS OF 1971 - 75 PLAN
T. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
Goals Moderately Ambitious
H. INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE
Proposed growth considerably slower
than in 1965. Brezhnev Program; only
slightly slower than 1966-70 perform-
ance
III. RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO
AGRICULTURE
Fertilizer to increase rapidly
Tractor and truck goals almost same
as 1965 Program
Agricultural machinery goal much
higher
Elopes continue to outrun performance
inland reclamation
1961 - 65
Actual
1966 - 70 Plan:
First Brezhnev
Program - 1965
1966-70
Actual b
1971 -75 Guidelines:
Second Brezhnev
Program - 1970
Grain (million metric tons)
130.3
167,0
164.7
195.0
(% increase over previous
7
28
26
18
5-year period)
Meat (million metric tons)
9.3
11.0
11.5
14.1
(% increase over previous
18
18
24
23
5-year period)
Gross fixed investment in agriculture,
including rural housing and services
(% increase over previous 5-year period)
Agricultural investment as percentage
share of total investment
Deliveries from industry:
Mineral fertilizers (million metric tons in
75
terminal years)
Tractors (thousand units)
219
358
294
340
Trucks (thousand units)
84
220
144
220
Gross additions of reclaimed land
(million acres)
a Based on official Soviet figures
b Data for 1970 are based on Soviet plans
c b'stimated; not specified inBrezhnev Report
d L'stimated in old prices; Brezhnev 1970 Report implies 3,000 in new prices
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2,700
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for 1966-70, represent increases over actual
deliveries in the current lperiod.
The new program is similar in scope to the
so-called "Brezhnev program" promulgated in
1965. That program was designed to move agri-
culture out of the doldrums of the early 1960s
by rapidly increasing the supply of materials and
machinery, better cropping practices, and a
variety of incentives for farmers. Much of the
1965 program is now behind schedule. One Soviet
economist claimed that military priorities were
largely responsible for this lag. This problem-
poaching on the agricultural sector-is likely to
continue in the second phase of the Brezhnev
program.
Brezhnev's agricultural report was appar-
ently the only item on the agenda of the plenum.
The failure of the meeting to take up other press-
ing business, such as the scheduling of the 24th
Party Congress, suggests that the central commit-
tee will be called back into session soon. Further-
more, the newly elected Supreme Soviet holds its
organizing session on Tuesday, 14 July, and it has
been the practice in the past for the central com-
mittee to preview the decisions of such a meeting.
Another plenum as early as Monday is therefore
possible.
USSR-Romania: Relations Still Cool
Protocol snubs exchanged between the So-
viets and Romanians during the visit of a Soviet
delegation in Bucharest on 6-8 July were a more
accurate reflection of the state of relations be-
tween their countries than the terms of the newly
signed friendship agreement. The possibility that
the visit and the treaty signing would help
improve relations between the two countries was
eliminated last week when the Soviets announced
that Premier Kosygin would lead their delegation
in place of party chief Brezhnev. Moscow claimed
Brezhnev had a "catarrhal ailment," but his
public appearance at a soccer game in Moscow on
the same day he was expected in Bucharest
seemed designed to underscore Moscow's con-
tinued unhappiness with Romania's political and
ideological "neutrality."
The Romanians responded in kind. The So-
viet delegation-Kosygin, Politburo member
Suslov, and a number of other Soviet officials-
was greeted at the airport by Premier Maurer
rather than party leader Ceausescu. Ceausescu
met with the Soviet delegation only once, thus
making clear Bucharest's displeasure with Soviet
tactics. Ceausescu's behavior on this occasion con-
trasted sharply with his well-publicized meeting
with an official of the independent-minded Italian
Communist Party. There were also reports that
the Romanians acted quickly to reduce the scale
of the public welcome after learning of the Soviet
decision to downgrade the visit.
Despite a two-year delay in signing the new
treaty-which had been initialed in 1968-there
reportedly have been no changes in the original
text. However, Moscow's worsened relations with
Peking allow portions of the 1968 draft to more
accurately reflect Soviet interests now.
The new treaty, which replaces a 20-year
pact signed in 1948, contains an open-ended
commitment to joint defense against attack from
"any state or group of states." This clause appears
in treaties which Moscow has signed since 1967
with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, and
could be interpreted by the Soviets to involve the
Romanians in a Sino-Soviet confrontation. When
this phrasing was approved in 1968, Bucharest
considered it better than that in the original
treaty, in which Germany was specified as the
potential enemy. Bucharest, although not par-
ticularly happy with this language, obviously
judged it unwise to throw open the new treaty for
renegotiation.
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Predictably, there are certain sharp dif-
ferences between this treaty and the Soviet-
Czechoslovak friendship pact signed earlier this
year. The Romanian document makes no refer-
ence to the "common internationalist duty" of
the signatory powers to defend socialism, as does
the preamble of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.
This phrase is at the heart of the "Brezhnev
doctrine," which the Soviets have used to defend
their right to intervene in the affairs of their allies
in the event of a threat to "socialist gains."
Bucharest considers this language directly con-
trary to the Romanian concept of national sov-
ereignty.
Romania: Flood Damage Less Serious Than Anticipated
The severe floods of May and June caused
localized damage to the Romanian economy,
amounting to perhaps only one to two percent of
the national product. Losses in exports and the
need for supplemental imports of industrial
equipment, however, will adversely affect
Romania's balance-of-payments situation vis-a-vis
Western Europe.
Damage to agriculture was greater than to
any other sector. Nearly six percent of total ara-
ble land was flooded and crops were destroyed on
about half of that area. Production of most crops,
however, will depend in large part on how soon
and how much of the flooded land can be
planted, and on growing conditions through Sep-
tember. Livestock losses were relatively small, but
the loss of fodder, inundation of pastures, and
destruction of livestock housing will adversely
affect the productivity of a large number of
animals.
The Romanian diet is likely to be affected,
but food supplies have been supplemented to
some extent by emergency relief shipments from
other countries. Although many people in the
most heavily flooded areas are without housing,
the total number of dwelling units damaged or
destroyed-roughly 40,000-represents less than
one percent of the total housing stock in
Romania and about one fourth the number of
units built in a year.
Rebuilding flood damaged structures has re-
duced stocks of lumber, causing the Romanians
some concern over the recovery of their timber
processing industry, which appears to have been
hardest hit of all industries. For the over-all indus-
try picture, less than one percent of fixed assets
were damaged or destroyed and loss of industrial
materials is believed not to be serious.
The effects of the floods on Romania's bal-
ance of payments may be significant. The damage
will create requirements for some supplemental
imports, perhaps even including wheat, and will
adversely affect Romania's ability to export agri-
cultural and timber products. The balance of
trade with Western countries will be adversely
affected, because the West, which is the usual
main market for Romanian sales of corn, meat,
other animal products and wood, will also be the
probable source of supplementary imports. The
Romanians will not be able to achieve an export
surplus in total trade for the first time since 1965,
as they had hoped, or to reduce sharply the usual
trade deficit with the free world.
The floods probably strengthened the soli-
darity of the Romanian people behind the lead-
ers' policy of national independence, especially
vis-a-vis the USSR. Because the floods do not
appear to have seriously affected the Romanian
economy, they have not given the Soviets any
additional leverage against the Romanians. The
Romanians probably will not look for help from
the Soviets-who did not even provide much
emergency relief-but will instead turn mainly to
Western Europe for increased imports on credit
and for assistance in easing additional strain on
Romania's balance of payments. West Germany
already has agreed to a artial 1st onement of
debt repayments.
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POLAND - WEST GERMANY: A West German
Foreign Ministry team arrived in Warsaw this
week to begin scheduled negotiations designed to
accord de facto consular functions to the trade
missions of both countries. Agreement to initiate
these discussions was reached in late June while
negotiations were being completed on a new five-
year economic pact. Both sides now appear opti-
mistic that the current trade mission talks will be
equally successful, and] will further enhance
chances for significant progress on the crucial
border issue during the next round of the political
talks slated for Warsaw the week of 20 July. The
Poles have made it clear that establishment of
formal diplomatic ties lies at the end of a process
of "normalization" following any border accord.
Meanwhile, the expansion in the functions of the
respective trade missions would be an important
step forward.
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Italy: Renewed Search for Cabinet Equilibrium
The resignation of Premier Mariano Rumor
and his cabinet on 6 July forces the center-left
parties into new negotiations for an agreement on
economic policy and on the limits of acceptable
cooperation with the Communists. This cabinet
crisis, Italy's fifth since the national parliamen-
tary elections of May 1968, promises to be long
and difficult.
The cabinet dissolution came as a surprise to
Italian political leaders; key Christian Democratic
leader Aldo Moro was even absent from the coun-
try on a brief official trip. The premier apparently
believed that intracoalition bickering made it
impossible for the government to continue for
long and preferred a crisis now to an arduous
effort to keep the coalition together a few weeks
longer.
By resigning on the eve of a threatened gen-
eral strike, Rumor hoped to force the Socialists
and the left-wing of his own Christian Democratic
party to accept a hard line on labor agitation and
to frustrate the strikers' demands for fast govern-
ment action on expensive reform legislation. He
may also have hoped to reverse the long-standing
Socialist decision to support Communist-domi-
nated governments in Umbria and Tuscany, two
regions of central Italy where the center-left par-
ties are a minority.
As during the cabinet crisis last February
and March, the present political negotiations will
have as a major element in the background the
threat of early general elections if agreement on a
new cabinet cannot be reached. No party would
be likely to have a significant enough gain in new
elections to obviate the need for a coalition and
hence for interparty negotiation and agreement.
Thus the Socialists in particular may now be more
open to compromise. They are likely to fear a
continuation of the political shift from the right-
wing Monarchist and Liberal parties to the Social-
ists' rivals within the center-left, a marked feature
of the regional and local elections last
USSR - OUTER SPACE: Agreement is no closer
on the space liability treaty, on which a subcom-
mittee of the UN General Assembly has com-
pleted deliberations in Geneva. The Soviets con-
tinue to hold out on two key issues: they oppose
arbitration as a method of settlement, and they
want the law of the launching state to serve as the
basis for claims arising from damage caused by
errant space vehicles. The Soviets have privately
indicated to the US that they could accept
language designed to fuzz these issues, but a
breakthrough before autumn is doubtful.
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Western Europe: Space Cooperation
The West Europeans have been forced to
take another close look at their own national and
cooperative space ventures as a result of the US
suggestion last spring that they participate in
NASA's post-Apollo program. In response to the
US request for ideas on how Europe might play a
part in such projects as the proposed space shuttle
and platform, a number of discussions have since
been held, and a ministerial-level meeting of the
European Space Conference is scheduled later this
month. How the Europeans will finally respond
to the US offer remains unclear, however, and
there is some doubt that they will carry out a
much-needed reorganization of the European
space effort.
At a session of the European Space Confer-
ence last month, France proposed an ambitious
European program tied to an early start of nego-
tiations with the US. The European program
would concentrate on "applications satellites"-
for such uses as communications, meteorology,
and navigation-and woulld include the ability to
launch them. The "conditions" which the French
would set for talks with the US, however, are
designed to ensure that US launchers will be avail-
able until a European launcher has been devel-
oped. They want a written statement assuring the
availability of US launchers and, as added insur-
ance, European participation at a high enough
level to be indispensable to the post-Apollo ef-
fort.
The French proposal is more an extension of
an old argument than an acceptable response to
the US suggestion. It reflects in particular the
long-standing French belief that Europe should
have an independent launcher capability. Certain
other countries, however, would not be bothered
by their dependence on the US for launchers and
would be happy to abandon the expensive Euro-
pean effort in this area. The secretary general of
the European Space Conference has been investi-
gating for some time under what terms US
launchers might be available in the future.
While the French proposal is therefore un-
likely to be accepted in its entirety by the other
European countries, it does contain the two prob-
able components of any future European space
effort: some sort of cooperation with the US,
combined with a more-or-less autonomous Euro-
pean program. If the Europeans can agree among
themselves on what they want, and if they are
satisfied that the US is interested in real collabor-
ation, then prospects are reasonably favorable for
eventual agreement on a US-European program of
mutually beneficial cooperation. For many rea-
sons, political and economic as well as scientific,
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the US would much prefer this over cooperation
with individual nations. From the European point
of view, it would pave the way for a revamping of
existing European space programs which have
long been plagued by technical and budgetary
problems.
On the other hand, past differences, both
among the Europeans and between them and the
US, could prevent this outcome. The disagree-
ments over priorities, the shortages of funds, and
the insistence on identifiable national advantage
from national inputs-which have kept the Euro-
pean Launcher Development Organization in a
state of continuous crisis since it was founded-
are not problems which will disappear overnight.
Nor are the Europeans likely to agree readily to
tie into a joint program with the US if they are
not convinced they will have a "fair share" of the
direction and returns. The difficulty of striking
this sort of bargain has already been amply dem-
onstrated by the prolonged and still unsettled
struggle over the future management of INTEL-
SAT and the role which the US-controlled firm,
COMSAT, should have in it.
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Jordan: Government versus Fedayeen
The government-fedayeen agreement issued
by the four-state mediatling committee contains
substantial concessions by the government and
may fail to win the King's approval.
The agreement treats the Central Committee
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as
the controlling body for all fedayeen organiza-
tions; the government is to contact the Central
Committee on all matters relating to the feda-
yeen-a provision which virtually recognizes the
autonomy of the fedayeen in Jordan.
The government, in addition, agrees to with-
draw all military reinforcements from around the
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*Ow~ 11"W
SECRET
towns involved in the clashes, although it is not
specified whether this is to take place before or
after the fedayeen have withdrawn from or dis-
mantled their own defenses. Finally, the govern-
ment is to dissolve any "armed or unarmed or-
ganization" whose objectives conflict with those
of the fedayeen, and depose "any elements
proven hostile" to the fedayeen. This is almost
certainly intended to refer to the army's special
forces, an elite paratroop group whose clashes
with the fedayeen played a key role in touching
off last month's crisis. As phrased, however, the
agreement is a virtual carte blanche giving the
fedayeen power to dispose of any governmental
institution or member.
For their part, the fedayeen are to submit to
certain restraints on their activities-fewer re-
straints than the King had intended to impose in
his abortive law-and-order decrees last February,
however. They are not allowed to carry arms in
public places, hold armed military demonstrations
or maneuvers with live ammunition in populated
areas, nor establish military bases and cache arms
YEMEN: A period of severe drought in some sec-
tions of the country has caused serious food
shortages. Near famine conditions are reportedly
hreatening as many as one million people out of a
total population of some five million. The most
severe conditions are said to exist in the coastal
plain area where about one third of those affected
live. The head of the US interests section in Sana
reports that there are dead and dying animals in
some areas and that the inhabitants of certain
locales are now subsisting on vegetation normally
in towns. Even assuming that the agreement is in
fact endorsed by both sides, it is far from certain
whether the Central Committee could impose this
kind of discipline on members of the more radical
fedayeen. The agreement almost certainly intends
that enforcement is to be left to the fedayeen
themselves, although it does specify that fedayeen
violating Jordanian law are to be handed over to
the civil authorities.
The King would have difficultry disguising
the fact that the agreement falls just short of
recognizing the fedayeen as being a state within a
state. Although the King and his chief of staff
have apparently succeeded so far in calming the
army's anger at his previous concessions, the dis-
solution of the special forces would be particu-
larly hard for the army to swallow. Army leaders
could well refuse to budge from their positions
around Amman until the fedayeen have dis-
mantled their strongholds within the city, and the
extremist fedayeen groups are likely to balk at
even the modest concessions demanded from
used for fodder. Food supplies have been re-
quested from a number of friendly governments
and agencies, including the UN and the Catholic
Relief Services which sent a representative to
survey the situation. Some favorable responses
have been made, including a $1 million cash grant
from Libya, but even if adequate quantities of
food are obtained, distribution problems will
hamper the government's efforts to relieve famine
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Bolivia: Political Crisis Abates
President Ovando has yielded to military
pressure and agreed to remove the left-leaning
commander of the armed forces, General Juan
Jose Torres. The President tried to remove him
with little public fanfare, but Torres refused to
accept his ouster quietly, thus touching off a new
political crisis in La Paz.
Ovando agreed to remove General Torres by
having his post as armed forces commander abol-
ished in a "military reorganization," but only
after determining that army commander General
Miranda had the full support of unit commanders
for the demand. General Torres was to be re-
moved quietly and given a post abroad, but on 7
July he lashed out at the military high command
and the government in a press interview. Torres
echoed recent charges made by former minister of
mines Quiroga that Ovando was abandoning the
revolution under pressure from the military and
called on General Miranda to resign.
Faced with Torres' apparent decision to
fight his ouster with appeals to the public, the
military high command on 8 July placed troops in
the capital area on alert and met to consider its
next move. This action spurred a flurry of
rumors that General Torres and Quiroga had been
arrested and exiled, and that an overthrow of the
government was imminent. At least some rumors
were put to rest when President Ovando and
General Miranda appeared in public together.
Torres' fate is still not certain, but it is likely
that his removal will be accomplished, and he
may already have been sent into exile in one of
Bolivia's neighboring countries. General Miranda,
with the full support of the army, apparently is
prepared to back up with force his demands that
radicals be removed from the government.
Ovando is aware that he has lost the test of
strength with Miranda, but this wily old master of
Bolivian intrigue appears to have side-stepped his
rivals once again and probably retains some
flexibility of action.
The Ovando government probably will con-
tinue its move toward moderation, and the four
radical civilian cabinet ministers who are anath-
ema to the military may well be removed in the
traditional cabinet shuffle on 6 August. President
Ovando, however, while seeking to move fast
enough to avoid further antagonizing the military,
will undoubtedly continue trying to balance his
moves with a eats to the left. 25X1
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VW SEGRET *00,
CUBA: Castro has made the first changes in his
cabinet in some time. His choices of an engineer
to be the new minister of the sugar industry and
of an army officer as minister of education reflect
the regime's increased use of technicians and mili-
tary men to fill civilian administrative positions.
There have been rumors that a high-level shake-up
was imminent ever since Castro announced on 20
May that the sugar harvest would not reach its
goal. Other changes may be in the offing, if only
to help remove some of the responsibility for this
failure from Castro's shoulders. 25X1
BRAZIL: President Medici has authorized the re-
opening of the last three state legislatures that
were closed following the executive's assumption
of greatly increased powers in December 1968.
Four municipal councils were also reopened as of
Page 20
15 July; these are probably among the few coun-
cils that have remained suspended. The Presi-
dent's actions represent one step forward in his
deliberate program of a limited reactivation of the
country's political-institution s_.
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USSR-Peru: Relief Airlift Commences
The Soviet airlift now in progress is the
largest disaster relief operation of its kind that
Moscow has undertaken outside the USSR. As
such it will help to overshadow Moscow's failure
to respond earlier to the earthquake of 31 May.
Despite the impressiveness of the airlift, the
amount of aid is modest compared to that from
Western donors.
The 61 AN-12 and four AN-22 transports
are capable of delivering a total of 700 tons of
cargo. Flights during July will be made in groups
of six to ten aircraft via Iceland, Newfoundland,
Nova Scotia, Cuba and Colombia.
deliv-
eries will include 100 prefabricated houses, con-
struction material, road-building equipment, and
a fully equipped 200-bed hospital. The hospital
will be served by 75 doctors and medical techni-
cians who, according to Soviet press reports, may
remain in Peru up to two months. Moscow also
will supply several helicopters to assist the medi-
cal teams.
The aid is estimated to be worth about $1
million, but it is modest compared to the $20-30
million in aid that has already been committed to
Peru, primarily by some 20 free world countries.
The US has been the major aid donor providing
over $10 million. Lima probably also views the
Soviet aid as a lure for further Western assistance
for reconstruction of devastated areas.
The use of an airlift instead of a sea delivery,
which is cheaper and less complicated, probably is
intended to attract considerable attention in Peru
and elsewhere in Latin America. It undoubtedly
has improved the Soviet image, which was some-
what tarnished by Moscow's initial failure to pro-
vide assistance. Nevertheless, the impact will not
be sufficient to counteract the improvement in
Peru's attitude toward the US that resulted from
the prompt and large-scale US response to the
Peruvian disaster.
The demonstrative nature of the Soviet ac-
tion probably is intended among other things as a
countergesture to recent US assistance to flood-
stricken Romania. The decision also reflects a
gradual change in Soviet attitudes toward military
regimes. Over the past year, Moscow has regarded
Peru in particular as being the first in a potential
series of opportunities to work with military re-
gimes that take a leftist or "progressive" stance in
their policies. '
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Soviets Begin Airlift to Quake-Stricken Peru
i4N-12
Length 109 ft
Payload 17,000-44,000 lbs
Length 186 ft
Payload 99,000-
176,000 lbs
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SEGRE'l'
Dominican Republic: Crackdown on Terrorism
The Dominican Government has taken
special security measures to cope with the recent
increase of violence in Santo Domingo, and offi-
cial sources indicate that the government is also
attempting to silence leftist opposition. In addi-
tion, President Balaguer has stiffened the penal-
ties for kidnaping and other major crimes.
During the past week special military and
police patrols were instituted in Santo Domingo,
and President Balaguer named his chief military
aide, General Elio Perdomo, as the new head of
the national police. The selection of Perdomo, a
determined and dedicated officer, underscores
Balaguer's recently announced intentions to take
the "most drastic measures" against terrorists and
to clamp down hard, particularly as the
presidential inauguration draws nearer. Since late
June at least eleven killings have occurred, seven
of which have political overtones.
Last week two members of opposition leader
Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD) were shot, one fatally. Bosch has publicly
condemned the attack, and another PRD
spokesman accused the government of irresponsi-
bility. US military sources indicate that the attack
represents the beginning of a military-police cam-
paign to eliminate extreme leftists and to scare
Bosch into leaving the country.
The government's tactics may already be
achieving a measure of success.
group.
In III arch the government re-
leased 2 prisoners in exchange for the US air
attache, who had been abducted by a leftist
CHILE: The strong role long played in Chilean
politics by Communists and leftists has not
averted the development of extremist groups
there.
The ortho ox
Communist Party considers violence as poten-
tially damaging to Marxist Salvador Allende's
good chance of being elected president on 4 Sep-
tember and as directly defiant of their leadership
of the Chilean left. The Communists can hardly
ignore the growing proof that their closest but
uneasiest political partners, the more radical So-
cialists, are supporting the revolutionaries and
egging them on.
CARIBBEAN: A special committee appointed by
the Caribbean Free Trade Association
(CARIFTA) has presented a plan that could result
in government control over many foreign-owned
firms. The plan proposes that the governments
seek equity participation in banking and basic
industries-bauxite and oil-and local capital par-
ticipation of at least 50 percent in manufacturing
Page 24
within the next five years. The proponents of the
plan stress the need to adopt a regional approach
to the problem of achieving greater control over
national economies. Although political coopera-
tion on a regional basis has been largely unsuc-
cessful, economic cooperation has greater appeal
to the member governments, many of whom have
already imposed limited controls on foreign in-
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OAS: The first General Assembly of the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) ended this week
after two weeks of sessions. Terrorism was one of
the main topics of discussion, and the delegates
unanimously approved a resolution branding po-
litical terrorism a "crime against humanity...and a
common crime." The Inter-American Juridical
Committee was ordered to meet within 60 days
to draft proposals to deal with terrorism, especially
kipnaping diplomats, and report its findings to the
OAS Permanent Council within four months.
Galo Plaza and Miguel Rafael Urquia were
re-elected secretary general and assistant secretary
general respectively for new five-year terms
beginning immediately. The Assembly also dealt
with a host of procedural and administrative
problems brought about by the entry into force
of the revised OAS Charter. The General Assem-
bly, the OAS' highest body, was the first such
ministerial-level conference under the new
charter. The next one has been scheduled for
April 1971.
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