WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008000040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
44
.
2 July 1970
No. 0377/70
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(Information as of noon EDT, 1 July 1970)
Page
Communist China: Flaying the Imperialists . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Cambodia: Keeping the Heat on the Government . . . . . . . . . . 5
Laos: The Threat to the South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Czechoslovakia: Party Moderates Win a Round . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Warsaw Pact: New Proposal Designed to Attract NATO . . . . . . . 9
Yugoslavia-USSR: Ribicic-Kosygin Talks Prove a Standoff . . . . . 11
International Labor: Still Split over Eastern Contacts . . . . . . . 11
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Jordan: Further Concessions to Fedayeen . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Arab States - Israel: Battle joined? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
India: A Major Cabinet Reshuffle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Argentina: New Chief Executive Discusses Goals . . . . . . . . .
16
Violence Enters Chilean Electoral Campaign . . . . . . . . .
17
Cuba: Contacts Expanding in Latin America . . . _
1 R
Guyana's Border Difficulties . . . . _ . . . . _
20
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Vietnam
Hanoi's wholesale recall of its diplomats is
the latest sign that the Vietnamese Communist
leaders have recently completed a major review of
war strategy and are ready to brief the envoys on
North Vietnam's future course in Indochina. The
last such recall took place in May 1969, soon
after the politburo had finished a similar review.
Broad guidelines developed during the latest
round of decision-making in Hanoi already are
filtering down to Communist units in South Viet-
nam. A recently captured document, for example,
contains indoctrination themes based on a new
politburo resolution that probably was issued
sometime in April. It reflects a sober Communist
view of the situation following Sihanouk's ouster
in Cambodia. Like other recent Communist state-
ments, it also suggests that Hanoi foresees more
hard fighting and hence more use of North Viet-
namese troops as a result of the widened war in
Indochina.
Thicu Issues Cambodian Guidelines
I n a televised speech on 27 June in Saigon,
President Thieu elaborated on the fairly cautious
military policy toward Cambodia that he has been
developing. He avoided committing the South
Vietnamese Army to open-ended operations in
defense of Cambodia, and promised only that
each request for help from Phnom Penh would be
studied individually. Thieu clearly believes that
the main burden of Cambodia's defense must rest
with the Cambodians themselves and that outside
assistance must be provided by other non-Com-
munist countries as well as by South Vietnam.
Thieu is alert to the danger that South Viet-
namese forces will become overextended in
Cambodia, and he emphasized that South Viet-
nam's capabilities to help are modest. He prom-
ised continuing assistance in disrupting Commu-
nist supply systems, however, and he expressed a
determination to prevent the Communists from
re-establishing secure bases in Cambodian ter-
ritory bordering South Vietnam.
The President said that "minimum forces"
would be temporarily stationed at specific places
in Cambodia for the purpose of facilitating the
repatriation of Vietnamese refugees. His formula-
tion serves a dual purpose; it helps to allay do-
mestic criticism that Saigon is doing too little to
assist Vietnamese who have been mistreated by
the Cambodians; and it may also help to disabuse
Phnom Penh of any notion that Saigon is
planning to undertake more extensive operations
in defense of Cambodia.
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All Quiet on the Political Front
The Thieu government appears to be making
some progress in its efforts to calm agitation in
Saigon. During a Buddhist funeral procession last
weekend, Saigon police quickly dispersed two
different groups of antigovernment militants
before they could start demonstrations. Some
extremist Buddhist and student leaders reportedly
had been making plans for a large-scale demon-
stration during the funeral, and they probably
hoped to provoke a violent clash with police. As
on several similar occasions in recent weeks, how-
ever, the extremists apparently were unable to
mobilize large numbers of protesters.
Meanwhile, Senator Don, one of the most
prominent antigovernment political leaders, may
be taking steps to rejoin the "loyal opposition."
Don arranged for a private meeting with President
Thieu recently, and he now seems to be
exploiting their discussions to give the impression
that his brand of opposition is politically ac-
ceptable to Thieu. The senator is claiming that he
and Thieu agreed that misunderstandings between
them had been created by Thieu's aides. More-
over, Don alleges that Thieu agreed with him that
an opposition bloc is necessary and that the Presi-
dent even advised him to stand for his Senate seat
again in the elections in August.
Don's effort to identify himself with Thieu
probably reflects his realization that his attempts
to gain US support for a bid to replace Thieu have
failed, and that he may not even be re-elected to
the Senate if the government strongly opposes
him. Thieu, however, may not be receptive to a
bid by Don to rejoin the "loyal opposition." The
President continues to denounce politicians such
as Don who have promoted "defeatist" third-
force movements.
Large turnouts reported in elections for
provincial and municipal councils throughout
South Vietnam last Sunday probably reflect an
extensive effort by the government's administra-
tive apparatus to get out the vote. Election day
passed quietly in most of the 44 provinces and six
cities, as the Communists made only a few scat-
tered attempts to disrupt the voting
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Communist China: Flaying the Imperialists
The Chinese last weekend made use of the
occasion of the twin anniversaries of the Korean
War and the US "occupation" of Taiwan for a
grandiose appeal for Asian solidarity. Widespread
celebrations were held in China for the first time
since 1966. Peking gave lavish treatment to a
visiting North Korean delegation and sent a high-
powered delegation of its own, led by Army Chief
of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, to take part in the
celebrations in Pyongyang. This is the highest
ranking Chinese delegation ever to participate in
festivities connected with the Korean War.
The rounds of diplomatic activity, speeches,
and commentary on the occasion suggest that
Peking has in mind something more than a simple
display of its improved relations with Pyongyang.
Rather, the Chinese staged the celebrations in the
context of over-all Asian unity against "aggres-
sion" by the US, Japan, and the USSR. An
authoritative editorial on 24 June, for example,
called on all peoples of Asia to unite and drive the
US out of Asia and to resist the expanding influ-
ence of the US-backed Japanese "militarists." The
article claimed further that the Soviets are "col-
laborating" with the US and "fraternizing" with
Japan even as the Asian peoples are engaged in a
"fierce struggle" against them.
Against the theme of US "aggression and
occupation" of South Korea, Peking also loudly
voiced its indignation over the US presence on
Taiwan. Commentaries attacked Washington's de-
fense treaty with Taipei, alleged that the US
supports nationalist raids on the mainland, and
denounced intrusions into Chinese air and sea
space by US military forces-all sensitive bilateral
issues that Peking had been playing down since
the resumption of the Warsaw talks last January.
Referring to these talks, Huang Yung-sheng on 27
June emphasized-for the first time in over a
year-that a relaxation in Sino-US relations is at
present "out of the question." Peking also criti-
cized the renewal of the US-Japan Security
Treaty from the broader aspect of its threat to all
of Asia, accusing Japan of blindly supporting US
activities in Asia and blaming Tokyo for inter-
fering in Indochinese affairs.
These harsh harangues appear to be pri-
marily an attempt to exploit Moscow's cautious
and reticent approach to developments in
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Cambodia: Current Situation
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Communist-controlled
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ioq tors
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Indochina by playing on anti-US themes, which
are well received in both Hanoi and Pyongyang.
Nevertheless, Peking's neighbors show no sign of
agreeing with its charges against Moscow. The
Chinese, for their part, still are not prepared to
commit themselves to a direct role in Indochina,
nor are they likely to encourage North Korean
"adventurism" in South Korea. Throughout the
celebrations, for example, Peking never made
reference to the Sino North Korean Defense
Treaty.
Although the erection of an Asian Commu-
nist "united front" appears to be in the vanguard
of Chinese considerations, Peking additionally
may have concluded that Washington, preoccu-
pied with events in Indochina, has put the ques-
tion of Sino-US relations on the back burner.
Moreover, the US incursion into Cambodia may
have strengthened the hand of those elements in
the Chinese leadership who have argued against
negotiations with the "imperialists." The Chinese
are well aware, however, that basic power realities
in the Moscow-Peking-Washington triangle remain
unchanged. Chou En-lai, for example, recently
told that the Warsaw
talks have been only "temporarily" postponed
because the situation in Cambodia makes discus-
sions with the US impolitic at this time.
Cambodia: Keeping the Heaton the Government
Lon Nol has evacuated Labansiek and Bo-
kheo, the last two government outposts in the
northeast. Samrong, provincial capital of Oddar
Meanchey in the northwest, is reported to be
surrounded by Communist forces, and govern-
ment units in the rest of the province and in
neighboring Preah Vihear Province are withdraw-
ing toward Thailand. The capital of Preah Vihear
was abandoned on 20 June.
The Communists also continue to attack
scattered government positions in the provinces
around Phnom Penh. A Joint South Vietnamese -
Cambodian Army task force succeeded in reach-
ing the government's main supply depot at Lovek,
in Kompong Chhnang Province, which had been
surrounded and attacked by enemy troops for
almost a week. South Vietnamese troops regained
Krang Lovea, thereby reducing enemy pressure on
the only rail link between Phnom Penh and Thai-
land.
To the west of the Cambodian capital, some
Communist forces remain positioned along Na-
Page 5
tional Route 4 leading to the important seaport
of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville). Kompong
Speu, the provincial capital straddling Route 4,
was hit by a series of enemy attacks. Meanwhile,
northeast of Phnom Penh, a combined Cam-
bodian - South Vietnamese force recaptured the
Mekong River village of Prek Tameak, 15 miles
from the Cambodian capital. Two battalions of
South Vietnamese Marines have moved to new
positions east of the Mekong as close as six miles
to Phnom Penh to thwart any plans to attack the
city from the east.
In the political arena, the government has
decreed a general mobilization of all citizens be-
tween 18 and 60 years of age, who are required to
join either the military or auxiliary defense or-
ganizations. This move apparently was a psycho-
logical ploy to impress the population that Cam-
bodia is fighting for its survival. Concurrently it
announced the take-over of all economic re-
sources "necessary" for national defense in an
apparent effort to shore up the sagging economy
and to allow for a more efficient allocation of the
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country's dwindling resources. These steps will
help to patch up the government's relations with
dissident National Assembly deputies who have
blamed it for the deteriorating military and eco-
Laos: The Threat to the South
The military situation remained largely un-
changed this week as the Communists confined
most of their activity to harassing fire. Aided by
extremely poor weather, enemy units hit govern-
ment positions at Long Tieng and nearby areas
with rocket and artillery fire on 27 and 28 June,
but did no serious damage. The Communists em-
ployed similar tactics on the Bolovens Plateau and
continued to tighten their grip in the vicinity of
Saravane. A few outposts changed hands during
the week, but these had little effect on the rela-
tively stable situation in the north or on the
erosion of the government's position in the south.
Communist military intentions in the
months just ahead remain unclear, but the most
likely area for significant action is still the far
south. This is the area through which the North
Vietnamese presumably will be moving an in-
creased quantity of supplies and men to support
their new operations in Cambodia. Hanoi may
also regard the south as the most convenient place
to put pressure on Vientiane to negotiate on
terms favorable to the Communists.
nomic situation and who have criticized the gov-
ernment for failing to take more strenuous meas-
ures to overcome its problems.
the Communists 25X1
are striving to control the Route 13 - Mekong
River transportation corridor. Among the centers
they allegedly will attack are Khong Sedone,
Souvannakhili, Champassak, Ban Soukhouma,
and Khong. In the Thai border areas west of these
towns, Pathet Lao units reportedly have been told
to gain control of villages, harass government out-
posts, and be prepared to interdict Route 10,
which runs between the border and Pakse.
The city of Pakse, which lies at the conflu-
ence of the Mekong and Se Done rivers, has also
been mentioned as a Communist target. Rather
than taking Pakse, however, the enemy may at-
tempt to isolate it and to control the Route 13
and 23 junction east of the town.
during the rainy season.
Se Kong River axis, and preparations are under
way to make greater use of at least this waterway
Whether the Communists need to control all
of southern Laos-which would be the result if
they undertook the kind of offensive the reports
suggest-to support their Cambodian operations is
by no means clear. They already have an un-
derused supply system along the Route 16/110 -
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. NORTH
Long
Tung'
?
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Jul 70
Ban
S ?"khou
San Karaj
,Pass
Communist-controlled territory
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Czechoslovakia: Party Moderates Win a Round
On balance, party leader Husak appears to
have strengthened his position during last week's
central committee plenum. His strong defense of
party policies and his energetic appeal for party
unity seem to have deflated his conservative
opponents and won him majority support in the
leadership.
In his keynote speech, Husak emphasized
the success the party has had in re-establishing its
control over the country's affairs. He claimed that
any deviation from present policies would
jeopardize further progress toward "normaliza-
tion." In a direct attack on his conservative
critics, Husak described their opposition to his
selective purge campaign as an obstacle in the
common struggle against the nonconformists. He
stressed that only through tighter discipline could
the leadership complete the party reorganization,
a prerequisite to dealing with the country's
pressing economic and social problems.
Although on the offensive, Husak is fully
aware that he remains vulnerable to his critics.
The expulsion from the party, prior to the
plenum, of Alexander Dubcek, apparently over
Husak's opposition, was a strong reminder of the
influence the conservatives can bring to bear. His
calls for continued, although measured, scrutiny
of recalcitrant liberals indicate his sensitivity to
charges of laxity.
Husak gave no ground on matters he con-
siders critical to his moderate programs. He de-
nounced conservative demands for rigged mass
political trials and indicated he would put a time
limit on the party purge program. The qualifiers
he felt obliged to make about political trials,
however, suggest there may yet be some. Husak
also reiterated his leniency toward ex-liberals who
are willing to atone for their mistakes and toe the
party line.
Husak's main message was that the time has
come to phase out the political infighting and
devote the party's energies to substantive prob-
lems of "reconstruction." By focusing attention
on such constructive pursuits as the solving of
chronic labor inefficiencies and inflationary pres-
sures, he has probably succeeded in blunting tem-
porarily the thrust of his political opponents. The
latter also are targets of popular resentment be-
cause of the faltering economy. Such a strategy is
not without its perils, however, as these issues
have proved virtually insoluble in the past. Never-
theless, as depression and apathy take hold of the
population, continued poor economic perform-
ance is not likely to lead to unmana eable politi-
cal problems for several years.
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Warsaw Pact: New Proposal Designed to Attract NATO
The Warsaw Pact proposals on European countering opposition to Soviet proposals for a
security, released on 26 June, seem tailored to conference on European security (CES). The
promote the twin objectives of taking the initia- proposals were contained in three documents
tive on East-West issues away from NATO and of adopted by a meeting of Pact foreign ministers in
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Budapest on 21-22 June. Along with a rehash of
the proposals made at the Prague ministerial
meeting in late 1969, the documents contain sev-
eral innovations.
The most interesting new element was a
guarded offer to discuss the reduction of "foreign
armed forces" in Europe in a body that would be
established at a CES or in "any other" acceptable
forum. The offer is the first, albeit indirect, Pact
response to the most recent NATO proposals on
mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).
Although the Pact formulation is vague and does
not mean a commitment to talks with NATO, it
will probably be received favorably by a number
of NATO members.
Other features of the documents also seem
aimed at outflanking opposition to an early CES.
The call for creating a permanent organ to deal
with problems of European security is a twist to a
British proposal to establish a standing committee
on East-West relations. Other features of the Pact
initiative, including a suggestion that cultural rela-
tions and environmental issues are proper subjects
for inclusion on a CES agenda, are also designed
to maximize the proposals' appeal in the West.
The latest approach probably will be suf-
ficient to rebut, for the time being, criticism from
some Western quarters that the bloc is unwilling
ROMANIA - WEST GERMANY: Romanian Pre-
mier Maurer visited Bonn last week-the first time
since 1945 that a Communist head of government
has done so. He appears to have received much of
what he wanted, including a partial rescheduling
of Romania's debts and an agreement to talk
about facilitating more West German investment
in Romania. Both of these will help alleviate
pressures on Romania's flood-stricken economy.
to discuss specific problems at a CES. This argu-
ment had been used by some NATO members to
support a "go slow" approach.
The Eastern European members of the Pact
apparently believe that the document will provide
impetus to the East-West dialogue on European
security issues and are pleased with the change of
emphasis to a discussion of real issues and the
stress on proceeding in a manner "acceptable to
all."
The Poles feel that the tone of the memoran-
dum complements their initiatives on European
security and leaves room for talks about their
specific proposals, such as regional disarmament,
at a later stage. The Hungarians welcome the
potential benefits accruing from their prominent
role both in preparing the Pact proposal and co-
ordinating future Western responses. The Roma-
nians regard the document's flexibility in dealing
with different points of view as an important
victory, although they remain wary lest any coun-
try try to turn a CES into bloc-to-bloc negotia-
tions that might ignore the interests of smaller
European states. Pankow probably is pleased with
the document's treatment of East Germany and
West Germany as coequals but may be worried
about the prospect that discussions might lead to
a reduced Soviet military presence in Eastern
Europe.
The two sides also agreed to cooperate in eco-
nomic ventures in third countries. The details of
Maurer's private talks with Chancellor Brandt are
not known, but apparently there were no major
political surprises; the main topics were European
security and Ostpolitik. Both Brandt and Presi-
dent Heinemann accepted invitations to visit
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Yugoslavia-USSR: Ribicic-Kosygin Talks Prove a Standoff
The communique issued at the conclusion of
Yugoslav Premier Ribicic's June trip to the USSR
expresses hope for improved relations between
Belgrade and Moscow but gives no indication that
progress was made in settling their differences.
The 1955 Belgrade declaration proclaiming
respect for sovereignty and noninterference in
each other's affairs as the basis for Yugoslav-
Soviet relations was again reaffirmed. Although
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had acknowl-
edged the declaration last September while in
Belgrade, Yugoslav-Soviet relations deteriorated
sharply in the first half of this year.
The US Embassy in Moscow reported that
the political talks soured when Kosygin expressed
Moscow's right and obligation to "defend the
gains of socialism" and Ribicic rejected this con-
cept. For his part, Ribicic needled his host with
an account of the successes of Yugoslav economic
and social reforms and reiterated Belgrade's re-
solve to defend the country and its national Com-
munist system against all adversaries.
Similarly, there was no spirit of compromise
in the initial phase of the economic talks. Soviet
Gosplan Chairman Baybakov reportedly de-
manded that Yugoslavia imitate other Eastern
European states and invest in Soviet raw material
production if it wants additional shipments of
Soviet oil and other raw materials. Ribicic said
that Yugoslavia has no "extra" investment capital
and that, in any case, oil is available elsewhere.
Despite this exchange, Ribicic declared that
Yugoslavia remains interested in industrial and
technological cooperation, and working-level talks
were held on the subject of long-term economic
cooperation and trade promotion. More to the
point, Yugoslavia still is concerned with clearing
up the $34-million Soviet debt in the bilateral
clearing account, and will probably try again to
arrange for settlement of trade debts in converti-
ble currency.
As yet there is no information on whether or
not Ribicic concluded an arms deal. The previous
Yugoslav-Soviet arms agreement expired in June,
and there are indications that the two have been
exploring the possibilities for a new agree-
International Labor: Still Split over Eastern Contacts
At a meeting in Geneva last week, an AFL-
CIO delegation reaffirmed the US federation's
intention not to seek reaffiliation with the Inter-
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU). This group-the leading international
organization of non-Communist unions since
World War II-now presumably will have to come
to grips with the financial, organizational, and
programing problems left by the AFL-CIO pull-
out, and face up as well to the contentious prob-
lem of East-West labor exchanges.
The AFL-CIO withdrew from the ICFTU in
1969 in a controversy over the latter's handling of
Page 11
a request for affiliation from the United Automo-
bile Workers (UAW) following the UAW's with-
drawal from the AFL-CIO. The basic irritant in
AFL-CIO/ICFTU relations, however, has been the
US federation's opposition to growing contacts
between labor unions in Western and Eastern
Europe. A number of ICFTU members, particu-
larly unions in the European Communities, have
lately been under internal pressure to step up
such contacts. On the other hand, dismay over
the erosion-in fact, if not yet in principle-of the
traditional ICFTU policy against fraternization
with the East has led several of the more conserv-
ative members to lobby fervently but unsuccess-
fully for the return of the AFL-CIO.
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Andre Bergeron, the leader of France's
Workers' Force who has been in the vanguard of
the lobbyists, and others obviously fear that fur-
ther discussion of the issue will either result in
sanctioning the East-West efforts of the German
and Italian unions in particular or will weaken
Western solidarity in the trade union movement.
Whether in fact a return of the AFL-CIO would in
itself shift the tide away from the traditional
ICFTU position is open to serious doubt, how-
ever. The US Embassy in Bonn notes, for ex-
ample, that the German Trade Union Federation's
(DGB) joint activities with Communist labor or-
ganizations, having become an integral part of
Bonn's over-all effort at rapprochement with
Eastern Europe, may be expected to continue.
Despite the desire of federations such as the
DGB to pursue contacts with the East, there does
not seem to be much enthusiasm, even on the
part of Communist-dominated unions in Western
Europe, for a recent Soviet proposal that an all-
USSR: A recently issued joint party and govern-
ment decree authorizes the transfer of men and
machinery to agriculture at the expense of other
branches of the economy in order to ensure a
successful 1970 harvest. It also provides for spe-
cial wages and bonuses to those participating in
harvest and transport work. A similar decree
EGYPT-USSR: President Nasir arrived in Mos-
cow on 29 June for a visit that had been rumored
for weeks. He' was accompanied by his foreign
minister, war minister, and several other officials.
He was also reportedly joined on 30 June by
Foreign Ministry negotiator Muhammad Riad,
who flew directly from New York to the Soviet
Union.
European trade union conference be convened.
For the moment, at least, the Communist-domi-
nated unions in Italy and, to a lesser extent,
France seem more interested in strengthening
their influence within Western European labor
councils. Whether or not the continued absence
of AFL-CIO influence at the international level
will hasten a fusion of non-Communist and Com-
munist unions in Western Europe is difficult to
say. This trend, which has moved in fits and starts
for several years, is probably more closely related
to progress in industrial integration within the
Common Market and political balances within its
member countries than to pressure from the US
federation.
In any case, it seems likely that the ICFTU,
without the AFL-CIO, will become more Europe-
oriented, and that the ICFTU's regional organiza-
tions in other areas will become even weaker than
they are now.
issued last June resulted from official concern
over crop prospects after an unusually severe win-
ter, but the outlook for this year's crop appears
more favorable. It is possible that the current
decree reflects a desire to achieve an exceptional
harvest in this, the last year of the five-year
plan.
The meetings in Moscow will probably in-
clude talks with Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin,
Gromyko, Grechko, and others. Topics discussed
will probably include the recent protracted series
of Israeli bombing attacks against Egyptian mili-
tary targets along the Suez Canal, as well as the
latest US political initiative, which is under con-
sideration in Cairo. Nasir may also take advantage
of the trip to undergo a physical examination by
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oi,vn.L., 1
Jordan: Further Concessions to Fedayeen
The composition of the new cabinet and the
dissolution of the army's special branch are clear
indications that King Hlusayn is going to great
lengths to conciliate the fedayeen-even at the
risk of further alienating the army.
The new prime minister, Abd al-Munim al-
Rifai, was deputy premier and foreign minister in
the last cabinet. A weak and unassertive adminis-
trator given to compromise rather than action,
Rifai has been functioning as the regime's chief
apologist and negotiator in dealing with the
fedayeen. Fatah chief Yasir Arafat is thought to
have acquiesced in the choice of Rifai-who is a
dove on the fedayeen question-and in most if
not all of the King's cabinet selections. Five of
the new ministers are profedayeen or strong advo-
cates of Palestinian rights. The remainder of the
17-man cabinet consists of technicians, conserva-
tives, and apolitical personalities.
The cabinet's first act on taking office was
to establish a ministerial committee under the
prime minister to work with the four-nation
mediation group formed at the Tripoli summit
conference. Significantly, four of the five com-
mittee members are strong supporters of the
CYPRUS: Voters in both Greek and Turkish
communities go to the polls on 5 July in Cyprus'
first parliamentary election in ten years. Five po-
litical parties, plus a number of independents, are
presenting 141 candidates for the Greek-Cypriot
community's 35 parliamentary seats. Two center
parties, the United Party and the Progressive
Movement, are expected to capture nearly all the
seats allotted to the Greek-Cypriots, although
their failure to agree on a plan to pool their
representation gives the Greek-Cypriot, Moscow-
lining AKEL. party a chance to seat several of its
nine candidates.
fedayeen-almost guaranteeing that any nego-
tiated settlement emerging from the recent crisis
is not likely to impose effective controls on feda-
yeen action.
The army, which no doubt has been viewing
these developments with considerable concern,
must have become more apprehensive following
the announcement on 29 June that the army's
special branch had been dissolved and its chief
arrested. The special branch-a staff section with
an internal security function-has been a particu-
lar target of fedayeen suspicion and hostility. Last
April the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) announced that it had un-
covered a conspiracy involving the organization in
which former army chief Sharif Nasir planned to
assassinate both PFLP leader George Habbash and
Yasir Arafat; the special branch, it was alleged,
had been set up specifically to carry out the plot.
King Husayn presumably believes that his
recent efforts to rally the loyalty of the army
have been successful. A series of concessions to
the fedayeen, however, is likely to make the army
increasingly difficult to restrain.
The Turkish Cypriot community is fielding
43 candidates for 15 parliamentary seats and is
also holding an election for its Communal Cham-
ber. All candidates support the policies of the
Turkish-Cypriot spokesman in the intercommunal
talks, Rauf Denktash. No political parties, as
such, are represented. When formed, the Turkish-
Cypriot parliamentary bloc can be expected to
continue its boycott of the national parliament
while awaiting developments in the intercom-
munal talks that could lead to a resumption of
joint sessions.
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= SECRET
./'LEBANON
Israel i-contro!led areas following
June 1967 hostilities
Beirut
S Y R I A
*Damascus
AN HEIGHTS
rank/
artiiery batI
ISRAEL-, f
Israeli air strikes a
Syrian military ca
25-26 June
Tel Aviv