WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A008000010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 12, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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W
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
4
12 June 1970
No. 0374/70
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(Information as of noon EDT, 11 June 1970)
Page
FAR. EAST
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Saravane Falls: Tremors Reach Vientiane . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Soul-searching in Seoul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Thailand: Insurgents Sock It To 'Em . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Seabeds: US Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Czechoslovakia: Party Purge Under Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
IAEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Italy: Elections Bolster Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
USSR: Stance on Middle East Hardens . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Arab-Israeli Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
17
Fedayeen: Unification? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
18
Jordan: Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
19
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Dominican Republic - OAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
20
Panama: Relations with US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
22
Argentina: Junta Ousts President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
22
Cuba: Aid to Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
25
AFTERMATH OF ELECTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
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Vietnam
The North Vietnamese National Assembly
met in Hanoi "recently," according to the Viet-
namese news service. Convening of the assembly
is an unusual event, and the latest session could
have important implications for the course of the
war.
The assembly is supposed to meet twice a
year, but it has never done so. It rarely convenes,
in fact, unless the leadership is seeking a legisla-
tive rubber stamp for a new policy decision. It
met briefly last September to commemorate Ho
Chi Minh's death, but its most recent substantive
session was in May 1968, just after the Paris talks
opened. Before then it met in April 1966, after
the leadership had engaged in a lengthy review of
the problems posed by increased US participation
in the war, and in April! 1965, when the bombing
of North Vietnam began.
Not all the public pronouncements from the
most recent session are available yet, and analysis
of the meeting's purpose is necessarily somewhat
speculative. Most of the statements at hand seem
to be pretty standard fare-certainly nothing that
would justify calling the assembly into session.
There are a few hints, however, that the meeting
was held to endorse a more militant line on the
war. This comes through most clearly in some
passages of the report delivered by Pham Van
Dong. The recent period of relative ease for the
North Vietnamese people, Dong seems to be say-
ing, is now over, and they must once again expect
to make heavy sacrifices in support of an even
larger effort in the south.
Saravane in Laos, and continued pressure in sev-
eral parts of Cambodia-are already visible. On
the other hand, there is no firm evidence that the
Communists intend to abandon the low-risk,
small-unit tactics within South Vietnam that they
have followed for almost two years. The level of
activity may rise, however. The Communists
probably do think there may be a favorable op-
portunity to test South Vietnamese forces in a
major engagement in Cambodia, and they no
doubt will continue to throw their weight around
there.
The closing phase of the Communist spring
campaign took place late last week with a flurry
of shellings followed by only a few ground at-
tacks. The attacks took place in I, II, and IV
Corps against military and urban targets, resulting
in generally light casualties and damage.
Enemy forces also marked the opening days
of April and May with similar upsurges, but the
scope and intensity decreased with each suc-
ceeding phase. This probably is because of in-
creased supply and personnel difficulties, as well
as allied pre-emptive measures. Other spurts of
localized military action are expected in the
coming days as some tardy units conduct their
final "spring" attacks and others begin their an-
nual "summer" offensive operations.
Hanoi's injunctions during the past year that
the Communists must play for time and prepare
for a long, drawn-out struggle have been reflected
in the activities at the lowest levels of the Com-
munist organization in South Vietnam in the past
few months.
Neither the depth nor the direction of this
commitment to a more militant line is yet clear.
Some of its fruits-the capture of Attopeu and
During this period, Communist regular mili-
tary units have risked significant ground assaults
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only against targets in remote areas. There have
been a large number of small-scale enemy attacks
against rural government outposts, however, par-
ticularly in the provinces along the central coast
and in the delta. Throughout South Vietnam,
most of these small attacks and harassments are
being carried out by local Viet Cong forces, many
of them now reinforced with North Vietnamese
soldiers. In addition, there has for some time been
a trend toward "downgrading" part of the Com-
munist main forces to operate as local forces and
even as guerrillas, although the extent of this
process is difficult to measure.
A Liberation Radio broadcast of last Feb-
ruary on military strategy was unusually explicit
in acknowledging that small-unit actions are not
aimed at achieving decisive military results but at
undermining allied pacification efforts, conserving
Communist manpower and material, and at en-
hancing the Communists' staying power for the
long haul.
These tactics now seem to be bearing some
fruit. It is apparent that, at least in certain areas
of the South, the Communists have overcome
some of their basic shortcomings by re-establish-
ing and solidifying local organizations and getting
new subversive assets in place.
In northern Thua Thien Province, despite
earlier Communist losses of personnel and ma-
terial and the continued large presence of allied
forces, the Viet Cong have managed to keep some
assets in the province's populous lowlands; they
apparently are once again trying to build up their
subversive apparatus. Although their main-force
military performance in northern I Corps as a
whole has been unimpressive, the Communists
retain much of their organizational cohesiveness,
and guerrilla and terrorist activity is picking up.
In the western highlands of II Corps, the
Communists over the past several months have
stepped up their political and guerrilla warfare.
Security in the villages of Kontum and Pleiku
provinces is declining
In the coastal II Corps provinces' the
enemy s efforts to erode[
rode security have also had
some success. In Phu Yen Province, the Commu-
nists have been conducting an extensive political
warfare campaign for months, and the govern-
ment is not yet dealing effectively with it despite
the edge it enjoys in military strength and in
financial and material resources.
In the southern part of the country, the
Communists apparently still have not recovered
from setbacks to their local organization in much
of III Corps but attacks and shellings against rural
government outposts have increased in numbers
and intensity in several IV Corps provinces. The
number of enemy-initiated incidents in populous
Dinh Tuong Province was higher in April than at
any time since the Communist offensive at Tet,
1968.
Throughout South Vietnam the increased
activity of local and guerrilla forces has gone hand
in glove with increased subversion of the Regional
and Popular Forces and heightened terrorism
against the People's Self-Defense Force, the gov-
ernment's village militia. Communist terrorists
have been more active since at least late March
and the number of such incidents in April was the
highest since early 1968. Previously, there had
been a downward trend of terrorist incidents for
about a year, although the Communists at the
same time demonstrated greater selectivity and
effectiveness in assassinating rural government
the Communists are placing more
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emphasis on penetrating the government at the
local levels. One method is by covertly running
their own candidates for elective village and ham-
let offices wherever they can. After the most
recent round of such elections, a number of suc-
cessful candidates were subsequently removed
from office by the government for alleged Com-
munist sympathies.
South Vietnam is considering a larger mili-
tary role in Cambodia as a result of Vice President
Ky's visit to Phnom Penh last week. President
Thieu reportedly reacted with his usual caution to
several of the tentative agreements for greater
military cooperation concluded between Ky and
the Cambodian leaders, and he can be expected to
set limits on Saigon's actual commitments in
order to avoid overextending South Vietnamese
resources and in the hope of extracting maximum
US support.
Ky's delegation and the Cambodians report-
edly agreed that the South Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) would establish a base at Neak Luong on
the main highway between Saigon and Phnom
Penh and that both governments would have
reciprocal rights to operate freely up to 16 kilo-
meters (approximately 9.6 miles) on either side of
their common border. According to Vietnamese
Foreign Minister Lam, however, ARVN does not
intend to extend itself too far inland from the
border area except for occasional temporary
forays.
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Cambodia: Current Situation
THAILAND
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=Hompone
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Phoumrn, IIIe
Government controlled location
Communist-controlled location
Communist controlled
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Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Jun 70
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wat A P Communists isofaj@d
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Spau
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b_EU.KV_1 NW
Cambodia
The government's hold in the countryside
continues to slip as the Communists press attacks
in the north and northeast. I n the north, the
unexpected attack on the capital of Siem Reap
Province moved the enemy offensive to within 90
miles of the Thai border. Government forces re-
captured one of the airfields on the outskirts of
Siem Reap after three days of heavy fighting, but
the Communists have occupied the sacred ruins at
Angkor Wat. The bold attack on Siem Reap in-
dicates that the Communists are willing to extend
their presence, however thinly, deep into the
Cambodian countryside and are intensifying their
effort to isolate and strangle Phnom Penh.
In Preah Vihear Province, the Communists
have isolated the provincial capital through their
control of most of Route 12 between Kompong
Thom city and the Laos border, and they ap-
parently now occupy one and possibly two key
towns in the province. To the south, South Viet-
namese air strikes have enabled government forces
to retain control over Kompong Thom city after a
week's heavy fighting. Government troops have
also reportedly reopened Route 6 between
Kompong Thom and Sierra Reap.
The presence of allied forces in Cambodia
has prevented the Communists from making even
more substantial gains against the badly out-
classed Cambodian Army. The Communists prob-
ably have also been hampered by the lack of
support from the Cambodian populace. Thus far,
enemy units have minimized their supply and
logistic problems by choosing to avoid pitched
battles, but these weaknesses could become in-
creasingly inhibiting as the Communists expand
their area of operations.
The presence and activities of South Viet-
namese Army troops in Cambodia continue to
inspire hostile comments from important Cam-
bodian officials who fear that clashes may yet
occur between South Vietnamese and Cambodian
troops. Vice President Ky's recent visit to Phnom
Penh, however, may have had a calming effect.
Ky's frank statements about the new Phnom
Penh - Saigon relationship reportedly were re-
assuring to Cambodian officials and students. His
delegation allegedly returned to Saigon with Cam-
bodian requests for a continued, large-scale South
Vietnamese military presence. The South Viet-
namese are probably elated by Lon Nol's desire
for extensive assistance, but the Thieu gov-
ernment probably will limit commitments to
those measures for which it believes it can secure
US backing.
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Saravane Falls: Tremors Reach Vientiane
The long-anticipated attack on Saravane
came this week, giving the Communists a victory
that may have more political than military signifi-
cance. The town had been isolated and accessible
only by air since November 1968, and nearly all
of the populace had been evacuated before the
enemy's battalion-sized force struck on 9 June.
Possession of Saravane is more convenient than
critical to the Communists, inasmuch as they al-
ready had effective control of the road network
between Muong Phine and Attopeu.
Like Attopeu, however, Saravane was in gov-
ernment hands when the Geneva Accords were
signed in 1962, and the recent loss of these two
provincial capitals suggests that the Communists
have elected to up the ante in Laos. These devel-
opments may also be used by some Laotian mili-
tary and political leaders to press their view that
Province capital fails
Pakse.
the country's neutral posture should be aban-
doned.
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has been
under increasing pressure in recent weeks to ap-
point rightist politicians to cabinet positions re-
served for Communists. A resolution calling for a
declaration of national military emergency has
been introduced in the assembly. Some rightist
leaders, moreover apparently abetted by the
South Vietnamese ambassador, have been dis-
cussing the possibility of Laos' joining an anti-
Communist alliance with other Southeast Asian
governments. The fall of Saravane will strengthen
arguments for these measures.
Elsewhere in south Laos, the fighting this
week was a continuation, although somewhat
heightened, of the jousting for position on the
southeastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau that
has been going on since the fall of Attopeu. Some
Laotian commanders believe that the loss of Sara-
vane signals a new wave of enemy attacks in this
region, with the Communists attempting to ex-
tend their control through Paksong and Pakse in
order to open Routes 23 and 13 as a supply line
to Cambodia. Such a campaign would appear un-
necessary, however, because the Communists al-
ready have adequate logistic routes to the south
and because Paksong and Pakse are centers for the
illicit supply operations-run by prominent south-
ern military and political leaders-that provide
enemy units with rice and other supplies.
In the north, Vang Pao's drive on Ban Na has
made some limited progress, but at the expense of
heavy casualties. An enemy counterattack on 4
June virtually eliminated one Meo battalion and,
although the ground lost in this action has been
retaken, it is clear that the Communists intend to
hold the territory they control south of the Plaine
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Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 Jun 70
-.- Conmunist-cootroiled territory
Contested territory
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Soul-searching in Seoul
South Koreans generally are unhappy at the
prospect of reduced US involvement in Asia and
what this could mean for Korea. The Seoul gov-
ernment in the past has attempted to alleviate this
concern by adamantly opposing any reduction of
US troops in South Korea. Although the issue
remains a highly charged one, there are tentative
signs that the Pak regime now is beginning to
adjust to a prospective cutback in US troop
strength in the country, which presently stands at
about 57,000 men.
Recent government-inspired press commen-
tary suggests that President Pak may be adopting
a more flexible line. An editorial in the govern-
ment-owned Seoul Sinmun linked US troop with-
drawal to assurances oi: "automatic" US inter-
vention in the event of an armed attack from the
Communist North, to the modernization of South
Korean forces, and to US financing for the con-
struction of a Korean small-arms factory. Other
leading newspapers subsequently adopted a simi-
lar line. The English-language Korea Times carried
a long article emphasizing the need to build up
South Korea's forces to compensate for any drop
in US troop strength.
Prospects are, however, that any shifting of
gears by Seoul on the troop issue will be reluctant
and protracted. Pak can be expected to bargain
hard for every US soldier taken out of Korea and
to attempt to delay a cutback as long as possible.
Recurring incidents such as last week's seizure of
a South Korean patrol craft by the North Koreans
will be used by Pak to strengthen his bargaining
hand. Such incidents also provide the opposition
an opportunity to accuse the President of neglect-
ing the nation's security, a charge Pak wants to
avoid in his campaign for re-election next year.
For example, in an obvious ploy following this
latest incident, Pak claimed that any reduction in
US troop strength could invite a North Korean
"miscalculation" that might lead to another
Communist China: There is mounting evidence that selected chiefs of mission have been
recalled to Peking for high-level consultations. The Chinese charge to Burma returned last
week, and the Chinese ambassadors to Pakistan, Sweden, France, and Romania returned
apparently within the last two weeks. These consultations undoubtedly have been called
to bring China's key representatives abroad up to date on developments in Indochina and
to provide policy guidance; the envoys will probably also be instructed to follow up on
Peking's recent diplomatic and propaganda offensive in Indochina. The meetings are
bound to include briefings on broader foreign-policy topics. The gathering almost
certainly does not mean that the Chinese are about to alter their strategy in Indochina.
Rather, it is another good indication that Peking intends to press what it considers its
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Thailand: Insurgents Sock it to `Em
Government operations to dislodge tribal in-
surgents from traditional border strongholds in
the north are meeting stiff resistance. The insur-
gents ambushed a road-construction crew operat-
ing in Nan Province near the Lao border late last
month, killing five highway workers as well as five
members of a border-police platoon providing se-
curity for the mission. Additional casualties were
suffered when government forces subsequently
attempted to recover abandoned equipment. The
action occurred in the general area where the
Communists thwarted an army sweep operation
in early April, inflicting numerous casualties and
destroying or damaging several helicopters.
The tough insurgent response to government
efforts to re-establish a presence in this area is
further testament to the high value the Commu-
nists place on this sector, which they regard as
"liberated" territory. By contrast, the govern-
ment's performance, both here and elsewhere in
the north-particularly in troubled Chiang Rai
Province-is evidence that Bangkok continues to
underestimate Communist strength and that it is
not committing the necessary military resources
to contain the insurgent threat.
The insurgents are also having some fresh
success in the northeast, where their fortunes had
been on the decline for the past two years. Assas-
sinations, armed propaganda meetings, and other
indicators of bolder insurgent activity have risen
substantially in the past few months. More im-
portantly, the Communists appear to be making
some progress in strengthening their village sup-
port base, one of the primary objectives the insur-
gents set for themselves at their annual strategy
sessions earlier this year.
NORTHERN iDUUMAreas of Insuplene
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Seabeds: US Initiative
The response to President Nixon's proposal
that coastal states renounce claims to the natural
resources of seabeds beyond a water depth of 200
meters-slightly beyond the average extent of the
continental shelves-has so far been generally
favorable. Two Latin American states have al-
ready officially rejected the initiative, however,
and several others from that region will probably
join them. The Soviets, moreover, oppose a key
feature of the proposal.
Under the US scheme, an international re-
gime would be set up to exploit resources beyond
the 200-meter line for the benefit of the world
community. Coastal nations, however, would be
trustees of the zone between that line and one
farther out that marks the end of the continental
margin and the beginning of the deep ocean floor.
For acting as trustees, they would receive an extra
share of revenues derived from the zone.
Observers at the UN believe the US initiative
has boosted hopes for progress in the August
meeting of the General Assembly's seabeds com-
mittee. Committee discussions heretofore have
been marked by clashes between coastal and land-
locked states and by the concern of developing
countries that their ability to exploit the seabeds
is greatly disproportionate to that of the super-
powers.
Those South American states that have nar-
row continental shelves are unhappy, because a
200-meter line would limit the area they could
exploit nationally. Peru and Ecuador have of-
ficially rejected the US plan, and Chile's foreign
minister has publicly denounced it. They have
received support from other Latin American na-
tions who regard the scheme as an indirect threat
to their claims of extensive territorial waters.
Moscow has not yet responded directly, but
it remains opposed in principle to the creation of
an international regime to govern peaceful uses of
the ocean floor. The Soviets, however, are very
eager to secure international agreement limiting
maritime claims, and may see the US proposal as
a step forward.
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USSR : Dissidence
On 29 May Soviet police, accompanied by a promptness with which he was examined and
psychiatrist, arrested Zhores A. Medvedev, a dis- declared sane may have resulted from the speed
tinguished biologist who has published criticisms with which other eminent scientists protested his
of Soviet political conditions. The unprecedented arrest. It is now reported, however, that a second
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examination resulted in a decision to extend
Medvedev's hospitalization to a month instead of
a week. The charge of insanity, not the threat to
his scientific research, appears to have triggered
the protests. Last year, his dismissal from the
Institute of Medical Radiology in Obninsk was
effected without protests from his colleagues.
Medvedev's arrest marks a new stage in the
regime's controlled repression of dissidents. The
only similar case in which such direct action has
been taken against an eminent scientist involved
the arrest and detention in a psychiatric hospital
of Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin in 1968. The im-
portant difference is that Yesenin-Volpin's arrest
was a consequence of his protests over the
Ginzburg-Galanskov trial; he was not the regime's
primary target. The significance of this latest de-
velopment apparently has not been lost on the
scientists. Their reaction is probably typified by
the observation of physicist Igor Tamm that "not
one honest and principled scientist will be sure of
his own security if similar grounds can bring
about his own repression."
With the exception of Roy Medvedev,
Zhores' twin brother, and Aleksandr Tvardovsky,
former editor of Novy Mir, the cultural intel-
ligentsia have apparently not been active in pro-
testing Medvedev's arrest, probably because their
ranks have been thinned by earlier regime action.
They are probably sympathetic, however, to
many of the ideas of physicist Andrey Sakharov,
who did protest the arrest, and has for several
years advocated changes in the Soviet system.
The recent appearance of political programs
marks an important turning point in Soviet dis-
sidence that may force the regime to act more
boldly in suppressing advocates of change.
Medvedev's books have been critical of the Soviet
political system and the lack of freedom of dis-
cussion. This spring Sakharov, Roy Medvedev,
and physicist V. Turchin addressed a "letter" to
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny recommending
that the party carry out a democratic reform,
including freedom of discussion, as a cure for
Although the drama has not been played
out, Medvedev's arrest may be a warning to
scientists, particularly Sakharov, and other dis-
sidents that the Kremlin's patience is wearing thin
and that, if pushed, the regime will sacrifice
something on the scientific side for the sake of
political security.
Poland - West Germany: The latest, three-day round of political talks held in a warm
atmosphere of cautious optimism, ended in Bonn on 10 June with an agreement to meet
again in Warsaw in the second half of July. Warsaw radio announced that the two sides
have ended the first phase of their exchange of views and have agreed to begin discussion
of an agreement to normalize relations. This suggests that the round was successful in
achieving its limited aims of consolidating the progress made so far on the border issue
and related questions, while awaiting developments in the Federal Republic - Soviet talks
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Czechoslovakia: Party Purge Under Fire
The Communist Party's five month old has been heavily criticized by prominent con-
membership-card exchange program, designed to servative members who claim it is failing to rid
purge the party of politically unreliable members, the party of liberal, reformist elements.
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A number of these conservatives, including
the director of the exchange program, have pub-
licly called for more stringent efforts to identify
and oust those members not totally committed to
the party line. These critics consider willingness
to support the 1968 Soviet invasion a main touch-
stone of a member's reliability.
The purge program was put into high gear
last January, following the ouster of the top lib-
eral party leaders, Intellectuals have come under
the heaviest fire. The leadership and the rank and
file at all levels have come under scrutiny, and in
some districts entire party organizations have
been dissolved.
about half the functionaries in the national party
apparatus have been purged, as have approxi-
mately one third in the regional and nearly as
many in the district party organizations. As a
result, the remaining members who are not fully
in agreement with the leadership are intimidated
and effectively muzzled.
The number of those ousted, however, repre-
sents only a small percentage of the total mem-
bership, and has not approached the magnitude
the party hard liners favoring an elite organization
would like. Under Dubcek, the party's rank and
file swelled to a total of 1.7 million, of whom
200,000 to 300,000 are believed to have resigned
since the invasion. Approximately half of the
remaining membership has thus far been screened.
Reportedly the party leadership would like to
wind up the program by the end of 1970. A
special central committee plenum scheduled this
month will discuss the status of the membership-
card exchange program.
Husak has so far resisted demands for mas-
sive expulsions, as this would weaken his support
and could lead to further vengeance. With con-
tinued Soviet backing, he appears to be in a
strong enough position to weather the storm. He
is apparently seeking to counter the attack by
applying pressure on the conservatives themselves.
Recent articles have appeared in party journals
warning against "extreme voices from the left"
and factionalism, which was cited as being in-
compatible with party membership.
Although criticism of the exchange program
reflects the steadily mounting political pressures
that have been applied on Husak and his col-
leagues by the more orthodox conservatives, it
does not yet represent a serious challenge to his
Romania: The Romanians have served notice that recent flood damage in no way alters
their determination to continue an independent economic policy. Party chief Ceausescu
has reiterated this in recent speeches, and in accepting flood relief from both Communist
and non-Communist countries he has told several ambassadors that the aid is accepted
with no political strings attached. Nevertheless, when the full extent of economic losses is
calculated, this may prove a difficult position to maintain. Damage to industry, the
transportation network, and a decrease in agricultural production will affect domestic
supplies and reduce export earnings. The Romanian people, who already are contributing
money and labor, may have to accept rationing or other hardships until the economy can
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IAEA
Two meetings critical to the future of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
commenced at the agency's headquarters in
Vienna this week. Both revolve around the
IAEA's role in implementing the provisions of the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent non-
nuclear-weapon states adhering to the treaty from
diverting fissionable material from peaceful to
military uses.
A special committee established in April by
the 26-nation IAEA Board of Governors to con-
sider the position the agency should take in nego-
tiating the required safeguards agreements is now
convening for the first time. The East European
nations have indicated that they will press for
strict compliance with the IAEA's so-called draft
model agreement, which gives the agency com-
prehensive inspection responsibilities. Members of
the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM), on the other hand, oppose any
agreement that would infringe on EURATOM's
own safeguards system. Japan, citing the risk of
industrial espionage in international inspection
arrangements, does not want EURATOM states to
receive a privileged status on inspections.
Within EURATOM, the stalemate continues
over a mandate for the opening of negotiations
with the IAEA on safeguards. French Foreign
Minister Schumann made it clear at a EURATOM
Council meeting last month that his country
believed any agreement reached with the IAEA
would make EURATOM subject to outside inter-
ference. In France's view, such a result would not
be consistent with the EURATOM treaty, and
Paris would therefore no longer feel bound by
EURATOM's safeguards procedures. Since the
meeting, there have been no signs that the French
intransigence is softening. Attempts to resolve the
issue are being made, but some sources have sug-
gested that a compromise may not be reached for
several months.
Another question of primary concern for the
safeguards committee is the problem of financing
the inspections. France and India, two countries
that have not signed the NPT, probably will de-
mand that nations being inspected pay the safe-
guards costs, a position unpalatable to countries
with many nuclear facilities to be examined by
the IAEA. The US has voluntarily offered to
place its installations under safeguards and may
come under pressure to pay the sizable cost such
inspections will entail.
The Board of Governors itself is also meet-
ing. One of its chief concerns is the impasse over
competing Italian and Soviet schemes to expand
the board, a measure deemed desirable in view of
the significant new role to be played by the
IAEA. The two proposals differ principally on the
question of whether Italy and West Germany,
both EURATOM members, should be granted
ermanent seats on the board.
WEU: The ministerial session of the Western European Union (WEU) last week in Bonn
saw France's return to the organization after more than a year of self-imposed absence.
The French returned on the understanding that enlargement of the European
Communities (EC) will not be discussed in WEU and that the member governments will
agree in advance on subjects considered appropriate for WEU discussion. France's return
added a positive note to the ministerial meeting, which otherwise was dominated by
uncertainty concerning what role WEU will be able to play in the future now that
European integration apparently is on the move again within the framework of the
EC.
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Italy : Elections Bolster Coalition
The results of the regional and provincial
elections on 7 and 8 June reinforce the center-left
coalition in Rome. The public's reaffirmation of
confidence in the center-left will relieve pressures
that had been building for inclusion of the power-
ful Italian Communist Party in the national gov-
ernment.
The four coalition parties won 58.2 percent
of the regional vote and 58.5 percent of the
provincial vote. This is a considerable improve-
ment over the 55.4 percent polled in national
elections in 1968. Returns from the local elec-
tions, held simultaneously, are incomplete.
Within the coalition, the Christian Demo-
crats appear to have sustained a slight loss, while
the smaller parties-the Socialists, the Unitary So-
cialists, and the Republicans-gained. The
strengthening of the smaller parties is a stabilizing
factor and one likely to increase government at-
tention to economic and social reforms, including
the long-delayed divorce legislation that the Vati-
can has opposed.
Perhaps the most serious economic problem
facing the government is the continuing rise in
prices. The cost of living for the first four months
of 1970 was 5.2 percent above that of a year ago
and, among prices for consumer goods, those for
food are rising fastest.
Labor unrest, which is exacerbated by a con-
test for power between organized labor and ex-
tremist proponents of "worker power" through
wildcat strikes, has made control of inflation dif-
ficult. The government now seems to have im-
proved its position for the task.
The Communists' strength dropped a trifle
and their Proletarian Socialist allies lost signifi-
cantly in comparison with the 1968 elections.
Nevertheless, three regions in the middle of the
country-Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Um-
bria-are likely to have Communist-dominated
governments. The two extreme leftist parties won
a majority in Emilia-Romagna and, with Socialist
support, would have a majority in the other
USSR: Stance on Middle East Hardens
The Soviet Union greeted the third anniver-
sary of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war with a clear
hardening of its public line on the Middle East
and a more uncompromising stand at the nego-
tiating table.
As bilateral talks resumed in Washington and
the US considered more aircraft for Israel, TASS
loosed a broadside on 6 June warning that the
Soviet Union could not be "blackmailed" into
concessions by US threats to deliver additional
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aircraft to Tel Aviv. The TASS commentator
noted that such methods have never worked
against the USSR and hinted that the Soviets
would answer new US deliveries with like moves
of their own, commenting that the US is "not the
only state on which the Middle East balance of
power depends."
On 31 May, Pravda issued the toughest
Kremlin interpretation yet of the November 1967
UN Security Council resolution, setting the
"speediest" Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories as a precondition for a settlement. The
article also said that a settlement must be "with-
out any concessions to the aggressor." At the
same time, the Soviets have retreated on some
important points in the four-power talks at the
UN. Moreover, Moscow has publicly asserted that
the views of the Palestinian resistance must be
considered in any political settlement .
Soviet propaganda has also belabored the
danger to Israel's existence posed by Tel Aviv's
own policy. On 6 June, TASS claimed that Golda
Meir and her cabinet were "pushing Israel to
suicide through military ventures." A week ear-
lier, the government news agency warned in an
official statement that Tel Aviv's policy was
"fraught with dangerous consequences, for Israel
itself, above all."
At the same time, official TASS statements
and press articles have been laced with pledges of
additional Soviet aid to the Arabs in order to
"regain territory lost in the six-day war." On 31
May, Pravda again cited Brezhnev's comment of
several weeks ago that Israel must be "compelled"
to withdraw its troops and cease its provocations.
The Soviet press recently has taken up the theme
of renewed Arab military capability and confi-
dence, and has claimed that Israeli military supe-
riority is "coming slowly but surely to an end."
Moscow's strident propaganda line, its
greater rigidity in negotiations, and its continued
military deployment make it clear that the So-
viets are trying to turn up the heat on Israel.
Indeed, the USSR appears to have opted for a
policy of steadily increasing the political, psycho-
logical, and military pressure to wring concessions
from Tel Aviv and thereby obtain a political set-25X1
tlement on Arab terms. The real danger, however,
is that these pressures will go too far and trigger a
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Arab-Israeli Activity
Military activity on all the Arab-Israeli fron-
tiers continued high all week, highlighted by con-
tinued Israeli heavy bombing of the Egyptian side
of the Suez Canal, and another outburst of ac-
tivity on the Israeli-Syrian front.
Israeli Chief of Staff General Bar-Lev de-
scribed Israel's actions against Egypt as a shift
from retaliation to continuous military activity to
"counter war by war." He said Tel Aviv's goal was
to prevent and postpone a war and to achieve a
situation as near as possible to a cease-fire. He was
not optimistic, however, and expressed the view
that a cease-fire would probably not obtain even
if the Soviets held their involvement at the cur-
rent level or if they reduced it. Nasir, he charged,
did not appear to want one.
While the Israelis tank of a Cairo-mounted
war across the canal, they do not really believe it
possible-at least now. Their main concern con-
tinues to be Soviet intentions in Egypt. The im-
portant factor, Bar-Lev contended, was whether
the USSR would become even more embroiled in
the canal war. Like other Israelis, Bar-Lev called
on the US to put some curbs on further Soviet
involvement and re-stressed Israel's own determin-
ation "to fight the Soviets if necessary to defend
the canal line."
Israel has claimed that its bombing attacks
have cut road access to Port Said at the head of
the canal, following two successful Egyptian com-
mando attacks launched from that area last week.
The interdiction also served as a demonstration of
Israel's determination to assert military su-
premacy in the area even when-as in this case-its
actions may impinge on Soviet interests. Israeli
spokesmen say that the supply of food and water
to the port, where Soviet ships are stationed, has
been impeded.
General Bar-Lev in a later interview denied
that Israel had decided to drop for all time its
deep penetration raids into Egypt; he indicated
that these remain an Israeli option. Prime Minister
Golda Meir made an unusually defensive state-
ment indicating that Israel would engage the Sovi-
ets only if they operated on the Israeli side of the
canal. For the present, it appears almost certain
that Tel Aviv, in order to avoid provoking Mos-
cow and Washington, will not undertake deep
penetration raids. It seems likely that Tel Aviv
will try as long as possible to keep alive the Mos-
cow - Tel Aviv "unwritten understanding"-no
deep raids by Israel in exchange for no Soviet
SA-3s along the canal.
Israel's other three borders were quieter than
the canal front, but Arab irregulars and regulars
continued their cross-border shellings and opera-
tions. A series of guerrilla attacks from Lebanon
brought Israeli artillery responses, and in reply to
another shelling of an Israeli settlement near the
Lebanese border, Israeli aircraft bombed and
strafed "Fatah-land" on the slopes of Mount
Hermon. Lebanon had formally recorded in the
UN its complaint of Israeli actions in southern
Lebanon-the shelling, and more importantly, the
continued Israeli patrolling on Lebanese territory.
Syria chose this week for one of its rare
practical demonstrations of Arab militancy and,
following a visit by Libyan Premier addafi-who
has been touring the Arab states urging more
concerted action against Israel on the eastern
front-an extended firefight broke out between
the Syrians and Israelis in the Golan Heights.
Damascus made some grandiloquent claims re-
garding Israeli casualties, settlements damaged,
and Israeli aircraft shot down, but Israel admitted
to only 11 wounded.
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Fedayeen: Unification?
The 11 major fedayeen organizations agreed
last weekend at a meeting in Cairo to establish
unified military and political bodies under the
aegis of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The membership of the new political body, a
27-man central committee, has not been identi-
fied except for its chairman, Yasir Arafat. The
supreme military command is intended to train,
direct, and coordinate all guerrilla forces. Details
of the session, which had to be extended several
days, were conspicuouslly absent from the Arab
press, suggesting that the fedayeen groups still
have not reached final agreement on implement-
ing their decisions.
Fatah's consent to the creation of these
bodies-which will result in some loss of its con-
trol over the Palestine Liberation Organization-
was impelled by a desire not to lose its financial
subventions.
Fatah lead-
ers reportedly also have begun to realize that
among young militant Palestinians their organiza-
tion presents the image of a conservative group
tied to conservative Arab states, and they are
eager to take what steps they can to attract or at
least hold young Palestinians to their organiza-
tion.
Fatah leaders apparently believe that by
yielding some power they can prevent to some
degree any further splintering of the fedayeen
movement. In any event they seem confident that
they can retain control of the new central com-
mittee. The new political body, however, appears
to be collegial in nature and Fatah might have
difficulty in dominating it. The central com-
mittee's membership includes the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization's Executive Committee, the
chairman of the Palestine National Council, the
Palestine Liberation.Army commander, three rep-
resentatives of independent Palestinian organiza-
tions, and the 11 major fedayeen organizations,
each of which has equal representation.
The success or even the relative importance
of the new bodies depends to a large degree on
whether or not the more extreme groups led by
George Habbash's Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine (PFLP) agree to subordinate
themselves. The PFLP has already challenged the
new military command's authority to control
fedayeen activities, stating that the PFLP reserves
the right to carry out independent operations
such as its past terrorist attacks on US and Israeli
aircraft. After reportedly touching off the latest
clash between the Jordanian Government and the
fedayeen, the PFLP further defied the central
committee by announcing its refusal to observe
the cease-fire the committee arranged on 10
June.
Upper Volta: Upper Voltans will go to the polls this weekend on a referendum for a new
constitution drafted by the army, which has long promised to return power to civilians by
early next year. All political parties have called for a "yes" vote, despite provisions for
General Larnizana to continue as president and for army men to hold one third of the
cabinet positions during a four-year transition period. The draft is virtually certain to be
approved, thereby moving Upper Volta a step closer to nominal constitutional govern-
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Libya: In Libya, final evacuation ceremonies took place at Wheelus Field on 11 June
when the US handed over the huge air base to the Libyan Air Force. Earlier, the
appearance of armed Libyan airmen at the base during several "alerts" had raised fears
that the base might be seized by force prior to the handover, but these failed to
materialize. The British evacuated their army base and airfield in early April, so the
Wheelus evacuation leaves a small British naval mission as the sole remaining Western
military mission in Libya. The final ceremonies signal the beginning of a new and perhaps
difficult period in Libyan-US relations. The course of the still-unresolved oil negotiations
and Premier Qaddafi's actions during his continuing grandstand tour of the Arab
countries may provide indicators on the future of these relations.
Jordan: Crisis
A cease-fire announced late Wednesday was
still being generally observed as of the morning of
11 June, although there were continuing reports of
sporadic firing.
The fighting between Jordanian Army units
and the fedayeen apparently was touched off on
6 June by an exchange between a Jordanian sol-
dier and three fedayeen. Intense fighting followed
on the 7th in and around the refugee camp at
Zarqa, 15 miles northeast of Amman. Scattered
incidents occurred on Monday throughout the
country, and by Tuesday fighting had spread to
Amman and to other major Jordanian cities.
Casualties appear to have been heavy on
both sides, with the fedayeen reporting that at
least 400 commandos and civilians had been
killed. Jordanian Army casualties were probably
less than those of the fedayeen. One American,an
assistant US Army attache, was killed.
An earlier cease-fire agreement between King
Husayn and Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) leader Yasir Arafat: concluded on 10 June
was apparently ignored by government troops.
The Marxist-oriented Popular Front for the Lib-
eration of Palestine (PFLP) also refused to recog-
nize the earlier agreement and announced its own
cease-fire conditions that included the dismissal
of senior Jordanian Army commanders. As of 11
June, the PFLP continued to occupy two Amman
hotels and was holding some of the occupants,
including a number of Americans, as hostages.
The latest cease-fire arrangement is reported
to include commitments by each side to return
their respective forces to their bases and to release
all those detained since the beginning of the crisis.
The apparent acceptance by the government of
this new agreement may have resulted at least in
part from increasing pressure on Husayn by other
Arab leaders to stop the shedding of Arab blood.
In any event, the latest cease-fire may not
prove any more viable than its predecessors. As
late as early afternoon of 10 June, the central
committee of the PLO was still insisting on the
dismissal of three high-ranking army officers, in-
cluding the King's uncle-terms that Husayn
would find difficult to accept. Even if the King
should succeed at arriving at a compromise with
the more moderate fedayeen organizations, the
radical groups-particularly the PFLP-might not
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Dominican RepubI c - OAS
The cancellation of plans to hold the Gen-
eral Assembly of the Organization of American
States in Santo Domingo this month because of
leftist protests removes some short term problems
for the Balaguer administration but makes it even
more likely that leftist radicals will continue to
use violent tactics against the administration.
The decision, taken on 6 June by the per-
manent OAS delegates in Washington, was an
outgrowth of the uneasiness generated by weeks
of student-led demonstrations throughout the
country. At least five persons were killed during
the disorders, and the recent kidnaping of a
wealthy industrialist's son probably made the
OAS delegates even more wary of the potential
for violence during the scheduled six-day confer-
ence. The formal announcement rescheduling the
conclave for 25 June in Washington was delayed
until this week in order to allow the Dominicans
time to fashion some face-saving explanation.
The Dominican Government publicly main-
tained that it could guarantee the safety of the
OAS delegates, and no cosmetic announcement,
therefore, will conceal the fact that it is bowing
to leftist pressure. The decision to shift the site
removes one irritant in government-opposition re-
lations and may have a temporary calming effect.
Over the long run, however, the left will be
buoyed by what it will regard as an unqualified
victory and it will be even more prone to use civil
disorder to exert pressure on the administration.
Juan Bosch, the leader of the major opposition
Dominican Revolutionary Party, had led the at-
tacks against the OAS meeting, and its cancella-
tion will boost his local political stock.
The OAS question, however, presented the
left with a rare, nationalistic issue that permitted
it to gain support across the political spectrum
because of the still bitter memory of the OAS-
sponsored intervention of 1965. With the interna-
tional spotlight now removed from Santo Do-
mingo, the Balaguer government will be less reluc-
tant to deal firmly with any further attempts to
promote disturbances. The next target for opposi-
tion attacks probably will be the inauguration of
Balaguer on 16 August, but it is unlikely that the
left will be able to promote any sort of united-
front protests.
NOTE
Venezuela: President Caldera returned home with heightened prestige after his visit to
the US last week. Venezuelan media coverage has been extensive and virtually unanimous
in praise of the trip. Venezuelans generally seem to take pride in the dignified manner of
their president and in the frankness with which he espoused their interests. Caldera's
appreciation of the cordiality accorded him and his party apparently is shared by the
majority of Venezuelans. The announcement of increased Venezuelan access to the US
petroleum market for the next six months is viewed both as evidence of the effectiveness
of Caldera's effort and as an indication of the good will of the United States. I
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Guatemala: Rightist revenge for Communist terrorism has raised fear of widespread
repression in the intellectual community. The torture and murder of a university profes-
sor, presumably by the rightist terrorist group "Ojo por Ojo" (eye for an eye), have
evoked indignation in educational and other liberal circles.
El Salvador - Honduras: The two governments signed an agreement last week on
demilitarization of their common border at a meeting of the Central American foreign
ministers in Costa Rica. This agreement if implemented would set the stage for resump-
tion of bilateral talks on re-establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations, as well
as for the discussion of the border dispute and the problem of Salvadoran migration to
Honduras. Attention would also shift to reviving and revising the Central American
Common Market. The economics ministers of the five member countries are expected to
meet soon to work out an agreement governing the operatio
complete restructuring of the organization can be negotiated.
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Panama: Relations with US
Relations between Panama and the US have
encountered new strains as the deadline nears for
extending an agreement that would permit the US
to continue using Rio Hato, a major military
installation outside the Canal Zone.
ing to organize a coup. Even though in this
instance Torrijos is glad to be rid of the prisoners,
he undoubtedly remains frustrated by the con-
tinued availability of the Zone as a safehaven for
political opponents of his regime.
Early this week, three National Guard colo-
nels who led the abortive coup attempt against
General Torrijos last December escaped from jail
and sought asylum in the Canal Zone. These
officers have been a persistent problem for Gen-
eral Torrijos. They still have some support within
the Guard, and they were not brought to trial for
fear of further dividing the officer corps.F_
The Panamanians initially made strong repre-
sentations to the US for the return of the fugi-
tives and Lakas, concerned about Totrijos'
reaction, even told US Ambassador Sayre that he
might be removed from office if the men were
not recovered. Torrijos had only recently gotten
over his anger at the failure of the US to facilitate
the extradition of a top Arias aide who fled to the
Zone last February after unsuccessfully attempt-
Argentina: Junta Ousts President
The three-man military junta that ousted
President Juan Carlos Ongania this week has
promised to end "one-man government" and re-
turn to some form of democracy.
The junta, under the chairmanship of the
commander in chief of the navy, Admiral Gnavi,
Nevertheless, the Panamanians have recently
attempted to improve relations with the US. Last
month the government appointed a new ambassa-
dor to the US after the post had remained vacant
for five months, and only last week it passed up a
ready-made opportunity to put pressure on the
US. Ambassador Sayre had sought clarification of
a statement by the Panamanian charge in Wash-
ington indicating that his country is interested in
the return of Old France Field, an increase in the
sugar quota, and an annual rent in return for the
extension of the Rio Hato Base Agreement. Presi-
dent Lakas strongly reaffirmed his government's
intention to extend the agreement when it expires
in August, adding only that he expects the US to
reciprocate by agreeing to a number of Pana-
manian requests.
Although Panama will continue its efforts to
have the colonels returned, it now appears less
likely that the Panamanians will jeopardize rela-
tions with the US on this issue. The matter will
remain an irritant, however, and should any other
incidents involving the US arise, chances for
extension of the Rio Hato Agreement without
prior concessions would become doubtful. 25X1
?
has promised to name a new president-perhaps a
civilian-by 19 June. In the meantime, the junta
has requested most cabinet members to stay on
until their successors have been chosen.
Ongania's troubles with military leaders had
been building for some time. Frustration over
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Carlos Alberto Rey
Commander in Chief Air Force
recent labor and student unrest and the upsurge
of terrorism that culminated in the kidnaping of
former president General Pedro Aramburu
heightened military displeasure with the Presi-
dent. Military leaders criticized the government
for bungling the investigation into Arambuiu's
abduction and for its seemingly do-nothing ap-
proach to current problems.
Alejandro Lanusse
Commander in Chief, Army
SF,C,RET
Predro A. J. Gnavi
Commander in Chief, Navv
Although the junta has made a vague corn-
mitment to restore "democracy" over the next
few years, it is still not clear how the milita y
intends to achieve this. Early elections are un-
likely because the country is unprepared for there
and there is no popular demand.
Speculation now is centered on the junta's
choice for president. Several names have been put
forward, including retired generals Pistarini and
Guglialmelli, and civilians Caceres Monie and Con-
rado Etchebarne, ministers of defense and justice,
respectively. Whoever is chosen will be subordi-
nate to the military leaders, especially to General
Lanusse, who will dominate the formulation and
execution of the new administration's policies.
Caceres Monie has said that the 1966 Act of
Revolution-the governing law of the land-will
be amended to make the three-man junta a "co-
government" partner with the new chief execu-
tive. He has emphasized, however, that the
changes contemplated will be within the frame-
work of a presidential system.
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the nation's unions by electing new leaders
throughout the country are not likely to be
greeted with enthusiasm by Peronist labor leaders,
who had hoped for a continuation of the Ongania
government's policy of rapprochement. If the re-
ports are true, the more volatile elements in the
labor movement will probably react strongly.
The ouster of President Ongania marks an
unfortunate turning point in the country's efforts
to achieve political stability and orderly economic
development. An attempt by the junta members
to co-govern with perhaps a figurehead president
is almost doomed to failure and will probably
result in increased restiveness among disaffected
groups and, ultimately the re-emergence of a
the mili-
tary is studying three possible forms of govern-
ment-rotating the presidency among the three
junta members for one-year terms; appointing a
prime minister who would run the country but
could be replaced in case of discontent; or
appointing a figurehead president, probably a ci-
vilian, who would let the junta run the nation.
Thus far, the Argentines have remained gen-
erally apathetic about Cingania's ouster and show
no strong feeling for or against the junta. Opposi-
tion political groups and the Peronist-dominated
labor movement have generally refrained from
comment. They are probably waiting to see what
policies the new administration will institute. Re-
ports that army leaders backing General Lanusse
have prepared a plan "to remove from politics"
strong-man government. 25X1
Cuba: Aid to Peru
Fidel Castro's ostentatious efforts to aid the
victims of the recent earthquake in Peru are de-
signed to improve his image in the hemisphere
and to tempt the Velasco administration into
moving closer 'to Havana.
On 3 June, Castro began an "airlift" that so
far has brought about 12 planeloads of plasma,
medical supplies, and other types of assistance to
Lima. The flights have also carried more than 100
passengers, many of whom are doctors, nurses,
and other medical personnel. In addition, a
motion-picture team has been dispatched to the
disaster area. Because of the absence of formal
ties between the two countries, arrangements for
the relief shipments were made through the local
office of the Cuban press agency.
One of the first persons to arrive from Ha-
vana was Castro's minister of public health, Helio-
doro Martinez Junco. The presence of such a
high-ranking official to oversee Cuban aid is Cas-
'tro's way of dramatizing his "humanitarian" con-
cern for the earthquake victims. After inspecting
the disaster area from the air, Martinez Junco
conferred with Peruvian officials on relief require-
ments and will probably return to Havana shortly
to brief Fidel on the situation.
Castro's attitude toward the Velasco admin-
istration since last July has been one of cautious
optimism regarding its "revolutionary" potential.
The earthquake has provided Castro with an op-
portunity for open contact with the Peruvians as
well as for an excellent propaganda campaign
throughout the hemisphere. Castro could try to
convince Latin Americans, for example, that it
was Cuban competition that caused the US to
make massive aid contributions to Lima. The con-
siderable publicity given by the Cuban press to
the appearance of Castro and President Dorticos
at a Havana hospital to donate blood for Peru and
the subsequent propaganda campaign will prob-
ably also help Castro at home. -
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Aftermath of Elections in the Dominican Republic
Secret
N2 44
12 June 1970
No. 0374/70A
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AFTERMATH OF ELECTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
On 16 August a democratically elected administration in the Dominican
Republic will succeed another for the first time in history. Scarcely more
than four years after a near civil war shook the country, the Dominicans
returned incumbent Joaquin Balaguer to the presidency with a majority in a
peaceful and relatively honest election held on 16 May. Measured against the
chaos of 1965, the holding of contested and free elections was in itself a
significant political stride forward. Balaguer's impressive victory in the five-
r-nan race has reinforced his control of the government, at least in the short
run.
The victory, however, was a personal triumph for Balaguer; the fledg-
ling political system that emerged after the assassination of long-time dic-
tator Trujillo in 1961 is showing signs of strain. The major opposition party
and the only legitimate political representative of the left, the Dominican
Revolutionary Party (PRD), refused to participate formally in the-elections,
charging the government with repression. The bitter political aftertaste of
the 1965 revolution is still evident in its revolutionary mouthings. The PRD
has undergone some withering of its organizational base, and possibly of its
popular following, and has now forsaken even the semblance of a loyal
opposition. As evidenced during the campaign, other parties, even of the far
right, would be willing to cooperate with the PRD should they see an
opportunity to oust Balaguer. Under these circumstances, the President will
continue to rely on the armed forces as an essential political prop.
Because of his popular and military support, Balaguer is one of the few
Dominicans capable of achieving a modicum of political and economic
progress while maintaining stability. It is less than certain, however, that
even he will be able to complete another four-year term successfully. He is a
master at controlling demands for political and social change, but he does
little to accommodate them. His convincing election win, and the consterna-
tion and disorganization it has caused his foes, probably will provide him
some respite from political attack after the inauguration in August. During
his term, however, he is likely to be faced with continuing, and probably
increasingly violent, problems of public order. His programs, designed both
of necessity and political inclination to preserve order rather than to pro-
mote progress, will be under mounting attack. Not even the most ambitious
programs are likely to stem the growing and massive unemployment in the
cities-a reservoir of disenchantment upon which the left hopes to feed.
Special Report - 1 - 12 June 1970
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The elections themselves were practically
anticlimactic after a campaign during which all
opposition groups threatened to withdraw; Bala-
guer quit his office in an unprecedented move to
keep several parties in the race; the leader of the
left, former president Juan Bosch, returned after
three and a half years of self-imposed exile only
to reinforce his party's decision to abstain; and
one presidential candidate, Garcia-Godoy, died.
About 60 persons were killed as a result of cam-
paign violence.
The campaign centered on personalities
rather than on programs. The opposition attacked
Balaguer on grounds of "continuismo," claiming
that his re-election, although constitutionally per-
missible, was morally repugnant to a majority of
the people. They charged that re-election repre-
sented a reversion to Trujilloism (Rafael Trujillo
had held the country in a dictatorial vise from
1930-1961 and Balaguer had served in his govern-
ment for many years). Balaguer, as is his custom,
accepted opposition charges without comment
and appealed to the people to renew his mandate
so that he might complete unfinished programs.
Military support for Balaguer, although pervasive,
stayed within the bounds of Dominican political
propriety-if only because the armed forces were
confident that he could win easily without arm
twisting.
Special Report
Opposition efforts attracted headlines but
had limited public impact. The final electoral
tally gave Balaguer some 650,000 votes. His
closest competitor, Vice President Lora, lagged
400,000 votes behind. Lora benefited to some
extent from half-hearted support from the PRD.
Former General Wessin y Wessin, even farther to
the right than Balaguer or Lora, attracted only
150,000 votes. The two participating representa-
tives of the center and left, the Social Christians
(PRSC) and the National Conciliation Movement
(MCN), attracted only about 50,000 votes each.
None of these parties has a very bright future.
Both Lora's and Wessin's organizations repre-
sented personal campaign vehicles not designed
for longevity. Their fate is tied to the personal
fortunes of their leaders. The PRSC will continue
its dogged struggle to gain national prominence,
but it seems unlikely that the party will make any
startling gains. The MCN, with the death of Gar-
cia-Godoy, its only well-known leader, probably
will wither away.
Balaguer's personal victory was buttressed
by overwhelming congressional and municipal ma-
jorities. The President's supporters won 26 of 27
senate seats, 60 of 74 seats in the house of depu-
ties, and 75 of 77 mayoralties. On the basis of
percentages and elective seats, Balaguer's 56-
percent majority was an impressive victory and a
stunning disappointment for his foes; both Lora
and Wessin registered their public "surprise" at
the results. The contest clearly illustrated that
there is no individual on the center or right who
approaches Balaguer's national stature.
The total number of ballots cast, however,
fell about 200,000 votes short of the total in the
1966 elections despite a significant increase in the
number of eligible voters. The percentage of par-
ticipating voters (about 61 percent) contrasts
with that of 1966 (74 percent) and 1962 (67
percent), and Balaguer's 645,000 total was more
than 100,000 votes short of his 1966 tally.
The PRD has used these figures to calculate
an abstentionist vote of some 700,000-larger
than any individual candidate's total-which it
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1,700,000
purctber volt it 1,900
,000
0 c:~ aaaox .> wse a mare 1 1
al RosUT+s ay
?Rvformist Party (PR)
Dominican FCevoIy~tiowy Party
Democratic InStto
ratio'n Movement
ArA
Demo (t ation M ent
?SE(CION DE'L EL GUAYO,
MUNICIPIO DE GUAYUBIN
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claims is indicative of its continued and growing
strength and of Balaguer's declining popularity.
For a number of reasons, such claims are not
persuasive. Popular interest in the recent elections
cannot compare with that generated in either of
the last two contests. In 1962, the country's first
free elections were being held after decades of
Trujillo dictatorship, and campaigning was
lengthy and extensive. In 1966, the elections took
place after a civil uprising had generated world-
wide interest and the contest had pitted the coun-
try's dominant political figures-Balaguer and
Bosch-head on in essentially a two-man race. A
comparatively small vote this year was consistent
with slow-starting campaigns and the widespread
expectation that Balaguer would win. PRO ab-
stention, although significant, was only a con-
tributing factor to the low turnout.
The PRD stand is also somewhat undercut
by the election results in the capital, where its
strength is the greatest. The popular incumbent
mayor, a former member of Balaguer's Reformist
Party who broke with the President and ran on an
opposition ticket, received outright PRD support
but lost a close race to the President's mayoral
candidate. Balaguer himself amassed a surprising
plurality in the Santo Domingo environs, an area
where he lost badly in 19,66.
The President's opponents are impugning the
results in a number of areas, but their charges are
pro forma. The Central Electoral Board is un-
likely to uphold the accusations, which would
not, in any event, alter the over-all picture of an
impressive Balaguer victory. Wessin's and Lora's
initial threats to retaliate for the "massive fraud"
were also made for the record, as they lack the
political or military muscle to back their bluster-
ing. OAS observers present during the balloting
gave the elections a clean bill of health.
Given the relative stamp of approval ac-
corded Balaguer's administration by the elections,
no significant policy or personnel changes are
Special Report
expected. Although the President may shuffle his
advisers somewhat, familiar faces will soon reap-
pear, and policy, centralized in the President's
hands, will remain essentially unaltered.
A new political party, the National Youth
Movement (MNJ), also backed the President for
re-election and contributed 47,000 votes to his
win. Some of its members, even though they
supported Balaguer as the only realistic choice to
lead the country, are younger and more idealistic
than the old guard in the President's Reformist
Party and are optimistic that they will be able to
effect policy changes in the new administration.
They probably will be disappointed. The MNJ
was in part a creature of Balaguer's own making,
to serve as an auxiliary campaign vehicle in case
the feuding that occurred last year in the Reform-
ist Party got out of hand. It is doubtful that
Balaguer regards it as much more than a tempo-
rary political expedient.
The President has announced that his new
administration will be a "government of concilia-
tion." This probably means that, as in 1966, he
will offer some government posts to opposition
party leaders. As was the case four years ago, it is
quite likely that some of his foes, once they have
finished licking their electoral wounds, will accept
the proffered positions. In addition, there has
been speculation that a new constitutional
amendment may be passed to provide congres-
sional seats to losing presidential and vice-presi-
dential candidates. Such a move would be in
keeping with Balaguer's "open-door" political
policies and would cost him little.
None of these gestures, however, is likely to
be translated into a meaningful role in the govern-
ment for the opposition. For the most part, Bala-
guer's opponents have evinced little interest in the
more constructive aspects of opposition leader-
ship. The President has helped to reinforce this
tendency by riding roughshod over opposition
legislators and by relying on the military as the
ultimate political deterrent.
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No major shake-up in the military seems
likely. Balaguer has every reason to be satisfied
with the armed forces' performance, despite the
political problems his overzealous, antileft secu-
rity forces occasionally cause him when their
Balaguer's "apolitical" military: a provincial
military fort decorated for the campaign
more brutal acts are publicized. Balaguer has, in
any event, been relatively successful in side-
stepping responsibility for the acts of what he
terms "uncontrollables." Some of the military
commanders who blatantly interfered with politi-
cal campaigning in their areas were temporarily
removed after Balaguer stepped down from the
presidency, but they are once again in place. Any
military changes following the inauguration prob-
ably will be an extension of the President's policy
of using transfers to balance off rival military
cliques.
Balaguer probably iregards his policies as suc-
cessful and, viewed from his perspective after
years under Trujillo, progressive. His extensive
public works program, assailed by critics as a
piecemeal effort instead of the sweeping changes
necessary for "meaningful reform," has been a
Special Report -5
successful political expedient and has held down
discontent. Balaguer's modest land reform pro-
gram compares favorably with Bosch's efforts
early in his term in 1963, and Balaguer gets every
inch of political mileage from such efforts. Even
in the cities, where problems are insurmountable
over the short term (unemployment is now 25-30
percent), Balaguer's combined emasculation of
opposition unions and his promotion of business
and foreign investment have made for steady, if
unspectacular, economic growth uninterrupted by
costly strikes. Labor dissent has focused on the
administration's austerity program, but the Presi-
dent's pledge to ease controls and allow wage
increases may also give him further breathing
room in the urban areas.
Economic prospects over the short term are
favorable, with GNP expected to rise about six
percent annually over the next two years. US
assistance has played an important part in the
economic revival since the dislocation of 1965,
and continued high US import quotas for the
sugar crop will be necessary for substantial
growth. A good share of the credit for the im-
provement, however, belongs to the administra-
tion for establishing a stable political climate and
promoting investment opportunities. The ex-
pected economic progress will help to ease some
of the political pressure on Balaguer.
The Threat to Stability
The voting made evident that the center and
right, including business interests and the mili-
tary, remain generally satisfied with Balaguer's
performance. The conservative dissenters, such as
Lora and Wessin, succeeded in demonstrating
only that they presently do not have the re-
sources necessary to undermine Balaguer. A se-
rious threat to the government would require the
participation of the right, but before the military
would consider an alternative to Balaguer, the left
would have to cause public order problems se-
rious enough to strain the armed forces' capa-
bilities. The forces on the left recognize this, and
their strategy is designed to galvanize the right
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Pre-election PRD-supported rally in Santo Domingo
into action. Open dissent comes primarily from
labor, the Communists, and Bosch's PRD.
Labor violence, aggravated by slum pressures
in the capital, is a persistent danger. Minor work
stoppages by the transport unions, which are sub-
ject to significant leftist influence, have been a
handy political tool for Balaguer's foes. His ene-
mies, however, have not been able to move from
such walkouts to a more widespread strike. The
left, including the PRD, no longer can claim the
strength in union circles that it had a few ears
ago. Balaguer
is willing to use
the military to raid the headquarters of recal-
citrant union chiefs in order to head off antigov-
ernment activity.
The Communists suffer from a constantly
splintering leadership that prevents their move-
ment from achieving full effectiveness. An excep-
tion has been the recent activities of the Domini-
can Popular Movement (MPD), a violence-
oriented group numbering about 300, which al-
Special Report -6-
6 -
most
most certainly was responsible for the successful
kidnaping and ransoming of the US air attache in
March. It has also carried out most of the recent
military and police assassinations. The MPD and
other Communist groups, utilizing hard-core
cadres and calling on some student support, have
proved they can cause substantial public order
problems and initiate bloody encounters with po-
lice. They will probably continue to do so, but
their capabilities limit them to hit-and-run tactics.
With Balaguer in power for another four years,
the Communists may find that a hardened atti-
tude on the part of the military, which is no
longer subject to the public scrutiny it received
during the campaign, will force them into a more
defensive posture. Balaguer has been able to close
off their student support on several occasions by
shutting schools without stimulating serious pro-
tests.
The PRD remains the major opposition po-
litical force, if only because of the other parties'
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poor electoral performances. It can still rely on
substantial support in the urban areas, which no
other opposition party can do. In the capital of
Santo Domingo, a PRD-supported rally attracted
the largest crowd of the entire campaign, even
though the party was not running. There was
some truth to PRD allegations that the govern-
ment refused to issue demonstration permits to
the party for fear of the crowds it might draw. So
long as the magnetic Bosch remains at the party's
helm, the PRD will continue to be a potentially
explosive force.
Juan Bosch--explaining
the "Dictatorship with
Popular Support" Thesis
The party has moved increasingly to the left
in recent years, a trend that is likely to continue.
Party policy at present is ill-defined and is drift-
ing toward Bosch's radical "Dictatorship with
Popular Support" thesis for want of a clear alter-
native. This thesis rejects representative democ-
racy as a failure in Latin America and promises
the establishment of a vague, popular dictatorship
that will represent the masses.. The party now has
removed itself from the legitimate political arena
for at least the next four years; the realization
that the party probably could not have defeated
Balaguer under any circumstances undoubtedly
played a part in its decision to abstain. Publicly,
the party reasoned that its candidates would have
been harassed by the military, probably de-
frauded of votes, and in any event not allowed to
take office if it had won. The military's antago-
Special Report
nism toward the PRD, however, has not changed
markedly since 1966, when the party ran candi-
dates, and the decision to withdraw is reflective
not of altered conditions but of the party's frus-
tration and drift to the left. The unrealistic ab-
stentionist policy, which seems to lead to a politi-
cal dead end, in conjunction with the return from
self-imposed exile of party leader Bosch, has
raised serious doubts about the party's ultimate
intentions.
Bosch's unexpected return has been at-
tributed both to a deal with the Communists to
help lead a revolution and to a bargain with
Balaguer to help him win re-election. Neither ex-
planation is convincing. More likely, the many
party appeals calling on him to return as the only
person capable of leading the party and the na-
tion in a time of crisis struck a responsive chord
in the egotistical Bosch. The PRD leader, how-
ever, found the Dominican situation considerably
less tense than the revolutionary fever pitch he
had been led to expect while in Europe.
Bosch's newly imposed leadership, like the
man, has been filled with contradictions, and the
party is still groping for an answer to its internal
problems. The decision to abstain, a vacillating
affair that was not uniformly enforced, garnered
only questionable prestige for the party, and re-
sulted in no patronage. Bosch's presence has to
some extent papered over the growing rift be-
tween party radicals and moderates, but only
temporarily. Soft liners, including many of the
party's prestigious members, must be decidedly
unhappy with PRD strategy. They may remain in
the party for want of any other place to go, but
they are likely to withdraw increasingly from
party activities. Younger radicals, also restive, are
dissatisfied with Bosch's long-term, theoretical ex-
planation of the coming revolution.
From a tactical point of view, it will be
increasingly difficult for the PRD to avoid close
contact with the Communists. Over the past 18
months there has been increased cooperation be-
tween the PRD and several Communist parties at
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almost all levels. Although Bosch has warned that
the party must not drift into the illegal Commu-
nist circle and fall victim to the political snare the
government has set, it seems likely that the trend
will continue. Like the Communists, the PRD
now lacks legitimate representation and will be
forced to try to incite and focus on popular
discontent in order to make political capital and
provide a forum. Other avenues are limited. The
party could attempt to revive its atrophied labor
bureaus and other pressure groups, but it is likely
to have little success in these areas because it now
lacks sources of patronage and finance. The
PRD's decision to abstain from municipal elec-
tions in 1968, along with its subsequent loss of
the municipal government: in Santo Domingo and
its accompanying patronage, has been one of the
very reasons for its dwindling labor support.
If Bosch transfers his radical philosophizing
into formal PRD policy, he will hand the govern-
ment the excuse it needs to crack down on the
party. Balaguer has refrained from any open move
against the PRD, preferring to utilize his divide-
and-conquer tactics rather than risk unifying the
party and possibly stirring up its popular support
with an overt move. If he intends to step down in
1974, however, he will want to leave the PRD in
as weak a position as possible and with little
chance of winning an election. Given the pro-
clivity of many of the military chiefs to regard
the PRD as little better, than Communist, the
party may find that its decision to operate out-
side the formal political arena has opened it to a
greater risk of repression.
Bosch remains one of the keys to PRD for-
tunes. Whether he will remain in the country is
problematical. He has never distinguished himself
in administrative or organizational matters, and
when the election fever permanently subsides af-
ter the August inauguration, he may once again
find the mundane task of running an out-of-
power party for four years a bit tedious. If he
again decides to leave the country, no matter
what the ostensible reasons, both his prestige and
that of the party will suffer. The PRD is not apt
to disappear as long as it has the mystique of
Bosch and the revolutionary rhetoric of 1965 to
call upon; indeed, Dominican political parties
need little more than the name of a famous per-
sonality to survive. The party's prospects are
clouded, at best, however. The possibility of an
internal split has been enhanced by recent events,
and Bosch's departure could hasten a break be-
tween dissatisfied younger radicals and some of
the party's old guard. Even if the party remains
intact, it is bound to lapse into organizational
disarray.
With the elections behind, Balaguer's frus-
trated opponents quickly turned their attention
to the OAS General Assembly meeting, which was
scheduled to be held in Santo Domingo in late
June. The left, led by Juan Bosch, kicked off the
protests against the conclave, and almost all polit-
ical groups outside the government joined in the
anti-OAS chorus. Student-led demonstrations re-
sulted in almost daily casualties and, in the face
of further violence, OAS representatives decided
to move the meeting to Washington. The decision
to shift the site removed a short-term irritant
from government-opposition relations and should
have a temporary calming effect. Over a longer
period, the left will be buoyed by what it regards
as an unqualified victory, and it will be even more
prone to use civil disorder to exert pressure on
the administration.
Like the OAS meeting, Balaguer's inaugura-
tion on 16 August will be an almost inevitable
target of protests, but these are likely to be more
vocal than violent. With the international spot-
light now removed from Santo Domingo, the
Balaguer government will be less reluctant to deal
firmly with any further attempts to promote dis-
order.
Possibly the greatest threat to the adminis-
tration is the unorganized popular dissatisfaction
with the political system. The increased dis-
gruntlement has been most apparent among
Special Report -8- 12 June 1970
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youth. Secondary school disturbances have been
mounting, and the level of student violence is
higher than at any time :since the 1965 crisis. In
part, this has been due to the catalytic effect of
the elections, but it is also symptomatic of a
deeper trend. Cities in the interior, not normally
affected by the political life centered on the capi-
tal, are being drawn into the political system.
Santiago, the nation's second largest city and
traditionally a quiet bastion of conservative busi-
ness interests, was the site of some of the most
serious military-civilian clashes during the cam-
paign. The trend is evident in the countryside as
well, highlighted by more frequent land seizures,
some increased activity on the part of the church,
and similarly an alienation of youth. This aliena-
tion probably also contributed to this year's low
voter turnout.
Thus far, however, dissatisfaction remains
organizationally adrift. There has been no wide-
spread flocking to the PRD banner in the cities,
and peasant unions remain small and ineffective.
Moreover, as long as the opposition concentrates
on personalities rather than programs and ex-
hausts its resources in revolutionary rhetoric, the
dissent probably will remain disturbing but amor-
phous. As such, it appears to be a manageable,
short-term problem.
Special Report
Balaguer begins his new term with impressive
credits that should, at the very least, bring him
some respite from serious political attack. The
all-important military, if not ideologically com-
mitted to constitutional government, is nonethe-
less ready to stick with a winner. Balaguer will
not hesitate to use the security forces as a repres-
sive weapon, despite the probability of increased
civilian and military casualties, in order to control
the extreme left's expected attempts to incite
disorder. The President's popular mandate is im-
pressive under the circumstances. His opponents
on the right have been temporarily chastened by
their poor showing, and the leftist PRD will have
to solve its tactical problem of how to operate
while in political limbo before it will constitute a
serious threat. If the present divisiveness in party
ranks is any indication, much of the PRD's ener-
gies may be dissipated in internal feuding. Despite
these assets for the administration, the party's
decision to operate outside the legal political
framework means that the government's public
order problems, already significant, probably will
increase during the next four-year term. 25X1
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