WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007900060001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 5, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review
completed
5 June 1970
No. 0373/70
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(Information as of noon EDT, 4 June 1970)
Page
FAR. EAST
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Cambodia: Communists Expand Deeper into the North . . . . . . . . 5
Chinese Road Construction in Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Laos: Action in the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Communist China: The Provincial Elite on Display . . . . . . . . . 11
Burma: Insurgent Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Hungarian-Yugoslav Rapprochement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Swiss Referendum on Foreign Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Romanian Floods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Italian Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Arab States - Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Crackdown on Syrian Dissidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
West African Regionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Malawi - South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Ceylon: Election Surprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Uruguayan Urban Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Guatemalan Dissidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Dominican Republic - OAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Argentine Kidnaping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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It now is clear that the North Vietnamese, in pursuit of their long-range
goal of dominating all of Indochina, have moved rapidly both in reaction to
allied cross-border operations and to take advantage of a weak regime in
Phnom Penh. The Communists have established nearly total control over
northeastern Cambodia, are pressing government forces in adjacent Laos, and
now are in a position to establish new supply routes to the west of the
present ones if they so choose. They are also pushing across the northern tier
of Cambodian provinces, as well as demonstrating their ability to strike close
to Phnom Penh. Another provincial capital has been invaded, and the
Communists are actively engaged in building an indigenous insurgent organi-
zation. The loyalty of many of their Cambodian recruits, however, is
probably only superficial.
The Cambodians and South Vietnamese are still having trouble aetti
The fighting inside South Vietnam remained at an over-all low level this
week, but the Communists again demonstrated their ability to hit where and
when they choose. A sizable flurry of activity occurred on the night of 3
June, perhaps representing a third and final phase of the enemy's "spring"
campaign. Earlier in the week, the Communists, with a fairly small force, had
mounted a dramatic thrust into the mountain resort city of Dalat but they
were easily beaten back. They inflicted heavy casualties in other attacks,
however, one on a South Vietnamese outpost near the DMZ, and one that
penetrated a town in the far southwest.
Action has begun again in northern Laos, as General Vang Pao launched
a drive to extend h`is holdings southwest of the Plaine des Jarres. The
Communists, however, appear to be counterattacking in some strength. This
could indicate an intention to bottle up Vang Pao in the Meo tribal
stronghold at Long Tieng, thus preventing any repetition of the govern-
ment's successful rainy-season offensive of last year.
A series of mammoth rallies throughout China heralded Mao Tse-tung's
support for ousted Prince Sihanouk. The occasion provided the first com-
prehensive picture in nearly two years of China's leadership below the
national level. It now seems apparent that Peking has been able to stabilize
its provincial leadership in most areas, although serious problems still remain
in some. A striking aspect of this fresh view of the leadership is the
continued dominance of local political affairs by China's military.
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Vietnam
The Enemy Picks the Battle Site
Communist units carried out their heaviest
shellings in a month in South Vietnam on 3-4 June,
but the over-all level of fighting in the country
remains generally low. The most effective ground
action occurred in northern I Corps where an
enemy battalion struck a South Vietnamese posi-
tion, killing 43 and wounding 88. At the opposite
end of the country, another Communist battalion
penetrated a district town near the U Minh Forest
but pulled out after killing or wounding nearly 50
South Vietnamese.
The Communist thrust into the mountain
resort city of Dalat late last week was beaten back
with little difficulty, but it did enable the enemy to
grab a few press headlines. Although the attack
may have been staged to draw allied forces from
Cambodian operations, the enemy's commitment
of local guerrillas against lightly defended and
militarily unimportant Dalat was inadequate to
accomplish such a goal.
The effort against Dalat was essentially a
ragtag one by 200 troops, some of whom seized a
number of key buildings while others got lost and
missed their intended targets. To minimize civilian
casualties and damage to buildings, government
forces used tear gas and smoke to rout the attack-
ers, who lost 47 killed as compared to South
Vietnamese casualties of 16 killed and25 wounded.
South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units pur-
suing the Communists in cross-border operations in
Cambodia are developing increased confidence and
aggressiveness. Several high-level South Vietnamese
officers ' " ffi&tttly-commented on the improved
morale and combativeness of the more than 40,000
troops in the ARVN units involved. General Lan,
the II Corps Commander, recently declared that
the Cambodian operations had given the ARVN
47th Regiment a much-needed "shot in the arm."
Previously, many of these same units had operated
in the south largely on the defensive or in reaction
to enemy initiatives, and some returned to their
base camps regularly each night. Their new spirit
may not last after they retjt'in to South Vietnam,
but the battle experience' they have gained may
mean a somewhat greatpff effectiveness than before
in going after the CQihmunists in ground opera-
tions.
At the samftime, elements within the mili-
tary hierarchyn Saigon are not entirely pleased
with the pro Tess of military operations in Cam-
bodia.
Difficult Diplomacy
South Vietnam and Cambodia are holding
discussions aimed at resolving remaining differ-
ences between them following their resumption of
relations last week. A delegation headed by Vice
President Ky and Foreign Minister Lam is currently
in Phnom Penh, and further talks at the "expert"
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level are also to be held. Although agreement on
future military cooperation is likely, the discus-
sions may not go too smoothly regarding such
nettlesome subjects as border delineation, joint
exploitation of the Mekong River, and economic
and commercial agreements.
Antigovernment protest demonstrations in
Saigon by Buddhist, student, and disabled veteran
groups continued to simmer this week, but divi-
sions within the ranks of the protesters, as well as
the government's carrot-and-stick tactics, pre-
vented any serious confrontations. A group of
militant An Quang Buddhist monks held a two-day
hunger strike; they are threatening to engage in
further antigovernment activities if their protests
go unheeded. These monks hope to embarrass the
regime by playing on warweariness and publicizing
demands that the government cease supporting the
rival Quoc Tu Buddhist faction. The An Quang
leadership is not united, however, and_Tri Quang,
the faction's most prominent monk, reportedly has
dissociated himself from theantigovernment activi-
ties. He opposes any direct provocation of the
government and fears that the current activities of
the activist monks will fail to gain any substantial
support for the Buddhists.
Police have been able to disperse student
protesters without violence, and their demonstra-
tions have, for the most part, been unable to turn
out large numbers.
Meanwhile, a small group of disabled veterans
broke up a ceremony last week in Saigon that was
to allocate permanent housing for some of them.
The demonstrators charged that the government
was unwilling to meet their grievances. The govern-
ment believes that this demonstration by the veter-
ans, who had remained quiet for several weeks, was
politically inspired to create trouble for the regime.
Police made no arrests, however, because Prime
Minister Khiem reportedly had ordered that no
-force-- be used against the demonstrators.
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Cambodia: Current Situation
THAILAND
lqatlam bang
eoknmunists
I hemarak - ' . tl 'I 1:
Phoumi v ~~e PHNaM PENH
- .ompon Setb* e
Spec /, Ley i..-Veng
Kompon
ChhnanAp
~Ompong
Captured by Sham
SamronP
~~ty Pura*
y~J
4Government controlled location
i Communist-controlled location
Communist controlled
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Cambodia: Communists Expand Deeper into the North
Increasing numbers of enemy troops have
infiltrated Preah Vihear and Kompong Thom
provinces. There are no firm indications of the
reasons for this westward movement, but one
intention of the Communists could be to open
access to the sizable Vietnamese community near
the Tonle Sap and indigenous insurgents opera-
ting in the foothills of the Chaine des Carda-
momes of southwestern Cambodia. Kompong
Thom city was invested by an estimated 1,000
Communists on 4 June, and fighting continues
there as government troops attempt to drive out
the invading force.
Also on 4 June, the Communists seized the
river village and army camp of Setfo Leu, about
10 miles southeast of Phnom Penh. This is the
closest that enemy forces have come to Phnom
Penh and may have been timed to coincide with
the arrival of Vice President Ky in the capital.
In the northeastern province of Ratanakiri,
steady enemy pressure finally forced the govern-
ment to abandon the town of Lomphat on 31 May
under cover of allied air support. The two govern-
ment battalions previously stationed at Lomphat,
as well as most of the town's civilian population,
moved north under fire to the besieged town of
Labansiek, thus far protected from capture by
regular air strikes. It is probably only a matter of
time, however, until the government's presence in
Ratanakiri Province is completely eliminated.
forces. Farther south, Communist harassing activi-
ties around Svay Rieng town indicate that enemy
units still infest the Parrot's Beak area despite
extensive South Vietnamese operations.
The presence of South Vietnamese troops in
Cambodia continues to create political problems
for the Lon Nol regime. There reportedly is con-
siderable argument between those junior officers
in the army and the bureaucracy who strongly
oppose the use of South Vietnames troops and
those who regard it as an unfortunate necessity.
Cambodian nationalists outside= the government
have also expressed their discontent on this issue
directly to Lon Nol, and anti-Vietnamese posters
have appeared in Phnom Penh. The premier has
not ignored these protests even though military
expediency has caused him to rely heavily on the
South Vietnamese. He expressed his concern over
Saigon's overbearing attitude, and asked President
Thieu to impress on South Vietnamese officials
the need to consider Cambodian sensitivities in
discharging their responsibilities vis-a-vis the war.
South Vietnamese operations cleared Com-
munist units out of Prey Veng city on 1 June and
then swept up the east bank of the Mekong in an
unsuccessful effort to trap retreating enemy
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OEl-Iitr, I
road
New construction
Muong
--'Khoua.?;.
act guilt Motorable limit
68-Apr- 69 i
Muon$ La
~_-Trait ;mprovernent
activity noted ? 2 # Muong Houn
rte' '..,, Va,APy
Pak Bengt?
Nam
-Bac
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oLVIt.L, 1
across,xi e Nam Phak at Muong La.
Chinese activity to the south of Muong Sai
since February has been limited to improving and
surfacing the road to Muong Houn, some 30 miles
from the Mekong. No construction or survey
work has been observed south of Muong Houn.
There has been a steady buildup of construction
camps, storage sites, and AAA positions in the
Muong Houn area, but it is unlikely that, in the
few weeks remaining before the start of the rainy
son, road construction can be extended to the
Meng.
The hinese this year have made trail im-
prove men in widely scattered locales in
northern La Some work has been done
eastward from t Muong Sai junction toward
Nam Bac, and mire activity has been noted in
the Laos-Burma-China order area. No additional
construction to improve Chinese roads in the
Phong Saly area has been observed.
SECRET
Chinesoad Construction in Laos
Rains p bably will suspend most Chinese
road constructs activity in northern Laos in the
where it wil onnect with an existing road from
Dien Bien/hu in North Vietnam. The Chinese,
however Aid complete a large permanent bridge
next few weeks. vertheless, most Chinese con-
struction, security, d air defense forces are
expected to remain in os until work is resumed
late this year.
in Laos. The 52 miles of all-weather r built
during 1969 from the Chinese border at, ene
south to Muong Sai is in good condition-and 11
maintained. A number of constructiou camps an
storage sites along this road have been abandoned
as activity has shifted to the north and south of
Muong Sai.
The road north out of Muong Sai, which will
provide a through route across Laos to North
Vietnam when complfed, has progressed signifi-
cantly, but a motoable road cannot be com-
pleted before the o 'set of heavy rains. A span of
more than 20 mi s separates the motorable limit
of the Chinese ad construction from the point
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Laos: Action in the North
Government units have improved their tacti-
cal position in several sectors of northern Laos
this week. In the Long Tieng area, General Vang
Pao launched a three-battalion drive to retake Ban
Na. The Communists are dug in along the rugged
ridge lines south of Ban Na, and so far they have
frustrated the Meo effort. Ban Na has been a
major Communist staging area south of the Plaine
des Jarres.
North of the Plaine, government columns
moved outside the Bouam Long defensive perim-
eter for the first time in several months. Although
substantial enemy forces are probably still in the
Commun st c pr, ned te?I o.Y
[ Contested te.rmvy
area, the clearing operation encountered only
light resistance. It is too early to predict: that the
threat to Bouam Long has passed, but a North
Vietnamese sergeant captured near the base
claimed that his regiment's orders were to with-
draw if Bouam Long could not be overrun by the
end of May.
In the far northwest, Laotian Army forces
retook the Mekong River town of Pak Tlia, which
had fallen to the Communists on 29 April. The
elaborate air and ground assault, sred-by
, i-ar~#illery from across the border, met little or
! no opposition. Pak Tha is on an important Com-
munist infiltration route into Thailand, however,
and the Laotian Army anticipates counterattacks
n the south, enemy troops reacted sharply
to recent government efforts to establish ambush
sites and mine fields near the Se Bang Hiang
ford on Route 23. An estimated two North Viet-
namese battalions mounted heavy attacks to drive
a 500-man irregular force from the area, sug-
gesting that the Communists attach considerable
importance to maintaining this logistic route to
the south.
Light skirmishing continues on the eastern
edge of the Bolovens Plateau, where Communist
troops are laboring to maintain a foothold. No
new attacks have been reported near the pro-
vincial capital of Saravane, and so far there is no
evidence of increased logistic activity on the Se
Kong River.
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Wang I Appointed Commander,
Tientsin Garrison
Kuo Pang Moved from the Sinkiang
MR to the Lanchou MR, possibly to
become the new MR commander.
Liu Kuang-tao -Shen-yang MR deputy
political commissar assigned to the
Heilungkiang Provincial Revolutionary
Committee.
Chang San sheng, commander of the
66th Army, headed the garrison of
China's third largest city during most
of the Cultural Revolution.
Hsieh Chen hue Appointed Commander,
Shansi MD
With Shansi's two top leaders absent for
over a year now, Hsieh is emerging as the
leading figure in this troubled province.
INNER SHEN-YANG,
MONGOLIA iali~
Wang Pi.cheng . Moved from the
Nanking MR to the post of "first"
deputy commander,K'un-ming MR.
Province boundary
Military Region boundary
Ting Shang Appointed Commander,
Canton MR
After a two year delay, Ting is finally
confirmed in this important South
China regional post.
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Lan I-Hung K'un-ming MR official
assigned to Kweichow Province.
Pu Chan-ya - Canton MR deputy
political commissar assigned to
the Hunan Provincial Revolution-
ary Committee.
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Communist China: The Provincial Elite on Display
The mammoth, nationwide rallies held last
week in support of Mao Tse-tung's statement of
20 May on Cambodia provided the first compre-
hensive public picture of China's leadership below
the national level in nearly two years. The hier-
archy unveiled at the gatherings demonstrated
that Peking has succeeded in stabilizing the pro-
vincial leadership in most areas but in others it is
still attempting to unravel political tangles en-
gendered by the Cultural Revolution. Last week's
turnouts also revealed that the provincial ap-
paratus has filled out considerably since the ninth
party congress in April 1969 and that local gov-
ernment organs continue to be expanded to pre-
Cultural Revolution size despite Peking's avowed
policy of "streamlining" the bureaucracy.
The most striking aspect of this latest leader-
ship picture was its reaffirmation of the con-
tinued dominance by China's military of local
political affairs. In particular, the rallies con-
firmed that major appointments and shifts of
army officers to high-level governing positions are
still occurring. Many of the transfers emphasize
the trend toward greater political control by
powerful regional military leaders over provinces
within their sphere of influence. Thus, high-
powered emissaries from the Canton, Shen-yang,
and K'un-mingMilitary Regions have recently been
assigned major civil administrative responsibilities
in Hunan, Heilungkiang, and Kweichow prov-
inces. Furthermore, Peking Military Region au-
thorities were much in evidence at the rally held
in the capital of Inner Mongolia, adding credi-
bility to previous indications that this region has
been politically and militarily resubordinated to
the Peking Military Region.
Some of the military and civilian officials
who appeared last week had been out of public
view for years and were presumed purged during
the Cultural Revolution. Their reappearance at-
tests to the regime's determination to reinstate
substantial numbers of old-line officials whose
expertise is sorely needed to counter the current
weaknesses in China's local-level administration.
Not only are former bureaucrats returning, but
also many of the departments associated with the
pre - Cultural Revolution government structure
are apparently back in existence. The latest ral-
lies, for example, indicated that in at least two
areas the new provincial-level governments al-
ready have more top-level executives than their
pre-1966 counterparts.
The regime's staffing and consolidation proc-
ess is far from complete, however. Five provincial
heads failed to appear at the latest turnouts, in-
cluding three from long-troubled areas who have
been out of sight for nearly a year. Apparently
the latter are in dire straits politically and may
not be returned to their posts.
In contrast with this clarification of provin-
cial leadership, similar gatherings in Peking this
month have served only to cloud the picture at
the top by providing tenuous signs that some
political maneuvering may be under way within
the ruling politburo. Hsieh Fu-chih, the public
security minister and boss of the Peking munici-
pal government, failed to attend any of the major
rallies held in the capital since May Day and has
now been out of public view since 19 March.
Although there is no firm evidence that Hsieh has
suffered a political setback, it is highly unusual
for such an active politburo member to remain
out of sight so long without an explana-
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Burma: Insurgent Initiatives
Communist insurgents, who ''control a nar-
row strip of land along the, Chinese,border, have
conducted a number of forays outside their
normal area of operations. The Communists
continue to probe government defe ises and
terrorize the populace, although they brobably
are not interested in expanding the territory they
control before the monsoon rains later this month
curtail activity. The government's inability to
prevent these attacks despite army reinforcements
from central Burma emphasizes its tenuous con-
trol over the northeast.
April the insurgents raided the gem-mining center
of Mogok and have been threatening traffic on
the Mandalay-Maymyo road to such an extent
that military escorts now accompany official
travelers. In mid-May some 200 rebels attacked
the railway station in Lashio, the principal city in
northern Shan State, and damaged at least two
locomotives. A group of about 300 Communists
overran the town of Hsenwi and were dislodged
only after repeated efforts by the army. Road
traffic north of Lashio has been brought to a halt
\by intensified rebel activity, with the result that
owns are running out of diesel oil needed to
g berate electricity. The Communists have so far
bl cked attempts to repair destroyed bridges.
'SBecause the government was forced to send
additi~nal troops to the northeast this spring to
counter.: the Communist dry-season offensive,
military ressure on the traditional haunts of the
Burmese Communists in central Burma and the
Irrawaddy Delta has been eased somewhat.
Government operations over the past two years
had generally, disrupted the Communist strong-
hold in this area. Now the Communists in the
delta near Rangoon have begun to increase the
size of their roving bands. In early May, for
example, a rebel force numbering some 300
raided a town in a part of the delta over which
Rangoon believed it had successfully reasserted its
authority. The government, however, probably
remains confident it can handle the very limited
threat this Communist activity poses./
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The third anniversary of the outbreak of the Middle East war has been
accompanied by signs of a hardening in Moscow's position on the question
of a settlement. Soviet propaganda has returned to some of the toughest
formulations yet on the matter of interpreting the UN Security Council
resolution of November 1967. Pravda said earlier this week that any settle-
ment must be achieved "without any concessions to the aggressor" and
called for the "speediest" Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands as
a first step to "open the way" to that objective.
Moscow underlined its groyving discomfiture with the new Cambodian
regime on 30 May by withdrawing its ambassador from Phnom Penh. The
Soviets clearly intended this move as a rebuke to the Lon Nol government's
ties with Saigon and Bangkok, but the Kremlin still is evidently reluctant to
break relations and recognize Sihanouk, whom it views as an unreliable
captive of Peking.
The Soviets reacted to last !,week's NATO ministerial meeting in a
somewhat less negative fashion than might have been expected. Moscow, as
anticipated, criticized that meeting's declaration on mutual balanced force
reductions but also said that there 4were some "interesting" and "construc-
tive" proposals made during the NATO conclave.
During Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Paris this week, the
French apparently resisted pressure to make new moves to stimulate ties
with Moscow. While Gromyko emphasized Moscow's desire for Franco-
Soviet relations to move into a "new stage" in which already "good"
bilateral ties would become "excellent," President Pompidou chose to
emphosize continuity, rather than change, in French policy toward the
USSR. The French are more eager to make progress with the Soviets on the
Middle East and Indochina crises than to initiate or accept new programs of
bilateral cooperation. They are also interested in impressing the Soviets with
the enhanced possibility of a Conference on European Security if Moscow
moves on the German and Berlin problems. Paris, however, thinks the
Gromyko visit was useful in preparing for Pompidou's visit to Moscow in
October.
Soyuz-9, launched on 1 June with two men aboard, continues to orbit
the earth in an uneventful mission. The spacecraft is expected to fly a lone
mission of longer duration than past Soviet manned space flights. The
longest such flight to date was five clays.
East Germany's acting party chief Honecker (Ulbricht still seems to be
in the USSR) has publicly rejected Chancellor Brandt's proposal at Kassel for
the regularization of relations. He characterized Bonn's position as con-
stituting no change from that of previous governments. Like Premier Stoph,
however, Honecker left the door open for further contacts at a later
date.
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Hungarian-Yugoslav Rapprochement
Hungarian Premier Jeno Fock's visit of 2-6
June to Yugoslavia caps a gradual rapprochement
that has been taking place since the Warsaw Pact
intervention in Czechoslovakia. In the broadest
sense, this improvement reflects Hungarian pre-
occupation with maintaining good ties with all of
its immediate neighbors.
While Belgrade's relations with the other
interventionist states have either stagnated or
deteriorated, the Yugoslavs and Hungarians have
slowly and steadily created a modus vivendi
taking into account postinvasion realities. Buda-
pest's moves to restore relations with Tito prob-
ably do not sit well with its more conservative
allies. The East Germans, Bulgarians, and Soviets
have, for varying reasons, demonstrated thinly
veiled hostility for the maverick Yugoslavs. Prior
to the Fock visit, Budapest had been very cau-
tious of any public displays that might highlight
its divergent policy.
The Yugoslavs have welcomed the Hun-
garians' moves and are now touting the relation-
ship as a model, albeit an isolated one, of rela-
tions with Moscow-oriented socialist regimes.
Increased economic ties, expanded contacts
between the foreign ministries, cultural groups,
and front organizations, and the resumption of
active party contacts seem to forecast even fur-
ther improvements. As long as Moscow remains
antipathetic toward Belgrade, however, it is
unlikely that Kadar will resume the very active
personal dialogue with Tito that ended in 1967.
Other important factors drawing the two
countries together are their mutual preoccupation
with economic reforms and wariness of the
"Brezhnev doctrine," which threatens the prin-
ciple of national sovereignty in the area. Fock's
talks with Yugoslav Premier Ribicic undoubtedly
covered these topics.
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Swiss Referendum on Foreign Workers
The all-male Swiss electorate will go to the
polls on 7 June in a national referendum on a
proposal to reduce the number of foreign workers
in Switzerland by a third-to 600,000-over a
four-year period. Ptrbfie -discussion ? of this so-
caliert-'-"Schwarzenbach Initiative" has prodded
the visually stolid Swiss into a bitter controversy.
The proposal was initiated early last year by
Zurich legislator James Schwarzenbach, the lone
independent in Switzerland's 200-member Parlia-
ment, because he believes that the government
has lost control over immigration. To buttress his
view, he emphasizes that in the past decade the
percentage of foreigners rose from 9.5 percent to
over 15 percent of the total population. Schwarz-
enbach argues that the inflow of foreign laborers
and their families overtaxes Swiss schooling, hous-
ing, and transport facilities, and increases the cost
of social and public services.
The initiative specifically calls for limiting
the number of foreign nationals resident in each
canton to 10 percent of the population, with the
exception of Geneva, which would be permitted
25 percent because several international organiza-
tions are located there. Also, certain types of
foreigners, such as seasonal workers, would be
exempted from the legal ceiling.
The anticipated retrenchment in the foreign
labor force plus a shortage of specially trained
Swiss workers are causing concern to a number of
firms. Expulsion of such a large proportion of
foreign resident workers would have a serious
impact on production, particularly in industries
such as construction and hostelry, which make
heavy use of foreign labor.
A number of professional, management, and
labor organizations, and all political parties and
churches have taken strong stands urging rejection
of the initiative, and most public opinion polls
predict a clear defeat for the "initiative." Never-
theless, considerable support exists among the
more conservative elements of the population,
particularly in the German-speaking cantons and
among lower income and older age groups.
In an effort to deflect support from the
initiative and to pacify resentment against for-
eigners, the government implemented new foreign
labor restrictions in March. Through these new
restrictions the annual entry quotas were reduced
by approximately half-to 40,000--and were al-
located by canton, rather than by industries as a
whole. Thus, even if the Schwarzenbach Initiative
fails, these new government restrictions will have
a significant impact on the Swiss economy in the
next decade.
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Romanian Floods
Floods have already caused widespread
damage to the economy, and new flood crests are
expected as late as mid-June.
The full extent of the damage cannot yet be
calculated. Flooding of nearly six percent of the
cultivated land and the late planting of crops will
depress agricultural production and hard-currency
earnings from farm exports this year. Recent esti-
mates by the Romanian Government forecast a
ten-percent reduction in crop production as
compared with 1969 levels, including declines in
corn and wheat of 12.5 percent and 25 percent,
respectively. Reduced livestock and vegetable pro-
duction is anticipated as well. Crop-growing con-
ditions over the next 90-120 days will determine
the final outcome.
A number of smaller industrial plants have
been damaged by the floods, and the industrial
cities of Galati and Braila will be threatened when
the Danube River crests. Flood damage to trans-
portation, housing, and communications already
is extensive. Romanian authorities now fear the
outbreak of epidemics as a result of damage to
water supplies and sanitary facilities.
Fulfillment of Romania's economic plan
for 1970 will be adversely affected. Romanian
party chief Ceausescu optimistically stated last
week that planned industrial targets can be met
and that harvest prospects are "good." The vice
chairman of the Romanian Planning Commission,
however, asserts that the over-all industrial plan
can be met only because increased production in
some sectors will offset losses in others. He states
that plan goals "definitely" cannot be reached in
agriculture. According to the editor of Probleme
Economice, Romania is considering an emergency
one-year plan for 1971 rather than starting its
new five-year plan then.
Non-Communist countries have promised
more relief and have provided it faster than Com-
munist nations have. The United States, the first
country to aid Romania, to date has sent six
times as much aid as the USSR, the last Com-
munist state to offer help.
The obvious reluctance of the Soviets to
grant aid reflects the strained relations between
the two countries. Speculation continues about
the purpose of the visit on 18-19 May of art
chief Ceausescu to Moscow.
Premier Maurer and a high-level Ro-
manian economic delegation subsequently met
with Premier Kosygin, but no communique was
issued and there was no mention of an economic
agreement. There is speculation that the USSR
tried to get Romania to alter its independent
policies as the price for additional Soviet sup-
port.
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Italian Elections
On 7 ari
the country w
125,000 local an
15 new regional cd
go to the polls to fill some
rovincial posts and to choose
cils. The elections will also
ar political attitudes, par-
serve to measure pop
ticularly toward the po
erful Communist party.
The regional councils willke over a num-
ber of the central government's nctions, thus
having a decentralizing effect. Th will have
independent financial resources, and ' 1 assume
some police, welfare, and regional pub works
responsibilities. Although legislation to r elate
the powers of the regions is not to be workecut
until after the elections, cutoff provisions ensu
that delay cannot be prolonged beyond two
years.
Extrapolations from previous election result"
indicate that the governments of three regions .:
the center of the country-Emilia Roma a,
Tuscany, and Umbria-probably will be f on-
trolled by the Communists and their allies/pos-
sibly including the Socialists. Communistidomi-
nated regional governments are also a po ibility
in Liguria and Marche. Elsewhere, the regions will
probably be run by coalitions more or le # follow-
ing the center-left pattern of the national gov-
ernment.
On the national level, the elections have par-
ticular importance as a test of the competitive
political strength of the center-left coalition par-
ties and of the Communists. Voting patterns are
usually stable in Italy, and great weight is given to
gains or losses of even one or two percent. Con-
sequently, small chap e . will have national reper-
cussions, even thou interpretation will be con-
troversial because f inevitable variations in the
vote on the loca; provincial, and regional levels.
The performance of the Unitary Socialist
Party (PSU)b which seceded from the orthodox
Socialists ii 'July 1969 after almost three years of
union, is Particularly important. The PSU said it
seceded Vecause the parent party was too willing
to worli.'with Communists, a charge the Socialists
denied: In any case, the PSU is waging an enthusi-
astic .anti-Communist election campaign, attack-
ing ;both Socialists and Christian Democrats as
leiing too far toward the left.
Should the PSU believe it has improved its
staling over the six percent it polled as an in-
depeent party in 1963, it would insist on recog-
nition * f this enhanced position at the national
level. I argument would be backed by an
implied A (eat that President Saragat, who is
sympatheti to the PSU, might use his con-
stitutional p wer to move up the date for
national parlia entary elections, which must be
held no later tha 1973.
On the other hand, failure of the PSU to
increase its vote sub?tantially would tend to
strengthen the hand of Socialists and left-wing
Christian Democrats who favor some degree of
acceptance of Communist cooperation in regional
government and in the national parliament. Thus
far, as a result of PSU campaigning, the centrist
Christian Democrats appear to have strengthened
their anti-Communist political line.
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8 June, the electorate in most of
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The 5 June anniversary of the stars: of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war will, at
the very least, occasion bitter rhetoric and fervent demonstrations through-
out the Arab world. A good share of this will be directed toward the US and
its policies in the Middle 6,ast.
As the anniversary approached, military action was extremely heavy
along the cease-fire lines, particularly the Suez Canal. Stung by their increas-
ingly heavy casualties, the Israelis hit back with a series of air strikes against
Egyptian positions along the waterway; Cairo lost three more MIG-21s in
mid-week air clashes. Meanwhile, the State Department reports from Cairo
that Nasir, with a growing Number of urgent issues to discuss, may be
planning another visit to Mo?cow in the near future. Also in Cairo, the
various fedayeen organizations'are continuing their efforts-so far without
much success-to create a viable"coordinating body.
The Turkish political situation remains murky but somewhat tense
amid rumors of added pressure n Prime Minister Demirel to resign, and
reports of contingency planning b the military in case the government falls
apart. The likelihood of this ha been lessened by the passage of the
long-delayed budget bill, clearing the way. for other "must" legislation.
Although Demirel's position has ben seriously weakened, if he can hold on
until parliament adjourns in July, lice will have a four-month breather to
recoup.
Nigerian leaders have been considering steps toward an eventual return
to civilian rule, but the country's mappy remaining political and economic
problems would seem to make any sur?ender of real power a long way off.
Although General Gowon recently restiited his desire to return to a purely
military role, he also added-for the fir"ft time-that he would reluctantly
accept the role of chief of state if he were persuaded that the people wanted
him to.
In Congo (Kinshasa), Lovanium Univ'ersity students are commemorat-
ing the anniversary of a clash with security forces on 4 June 1969 in which a
dozen students were killed, The students'\request for an official day of
mourning was rejected, but they were given permission for a campus proces-
sion. Although the plans called for an orderl/, one-day ceremony, security
forces were being held in readiness should disturbances break out.
The Afghan Government this week had to send security forces into
provincial centers to cope with protest demonstrations set off by ultra-
conservative religious leaders. Officials are concerned that such disturbances
could eventually spark tribal unrest. Ironically, the government itself con-
tributed to the problem by its earlier order to the Muslim clergy to cease
their antileftist and antigovernment protests in Kabul and return to their
homes in the provinces.
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Arab States - Israel
Fedayeen Still Complicate Israeli-Lebanese Relations
Tel Aviv Lontinued to send tank patrols into
southern Lebanon this week while villagers in the
area reportedly clashed with the fedayeen in an
attempt to keep them from firing into Israeli
settlements. Other villagers, said to be mainly
Christians,. have erected road blocks and threat-
ened to shoot ?_ommandos trying to enter village
territory. At the same time, however, Minister of
Interior Kamal Jumblatt appears to be softening
the government's ban on the carrying of arms by
Palestinians. In a press statement last weekend, he
said the ban applied only to those Palestinians
unable to prove their membership in a fedayeen
organization. Privately,Jumblatt has pleaded with
fedayeen leaders to demand a little more restraint
from their followers.
Israel's ambassador to Washington, General
Rabin, is pessimistic about Beirut's ability to
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enforce its ban. Noting that the Lebanese Govern-
ment has announced it will not act until 15 June,
Rabin doubts that any fedayeen organization, ex-
cept such relatively moderate groups as Fatah, is
ready to exercise restraint. He especially doubts
Crackdown on Syrian Dissidents
Reports from Damascus suggest that there has
been a government crackdown on Communists and
suspect Baathists. A number of both elements have
been arrested.
The ruling Baath party, the only legal party in
Syria, has tolerated the activities of the Syrian
Communist Party (SCP) and has permitted one SCP'?,
member to hold a cabinet post. The regime now
may believe that the SCP has overstepped its
bounds, however.
Without any popular base of support, the
government is extremely sensitive to criticism or
opposition from any quarter. The arrest of the
Communists may have been sparked by a recent
press article by the party criticizing the Syrian
military, whose support the regime must have. The
article charged that the/1 military bourgeoisie"
enjoys an even better life than do US military
officers, but that this status is not deserved because
of the military's performance during the 1967
Arab-Israeli war. Some observers in Damascus con-
sider the article a direct attack on Defense Minister
Page 21
that the fedayeen would be willing to give up their
bases in southern Lebanon. Rabin stated that Israel
would perforce continue to send out its pa-
trols.
Asad, who may have reacted by instigating the
campaign against the leftists. Asad is a leading-if
not the principal-force in the government and has
significant support among military elements.
There is also speculation that the arrests may
be directed at the Soviet Union for its refusal to
grant increased aid. It might also be that the Soviets
.are pressing the Syrians for faster payment for
previous aid deliveries.
In addition, a number of Baathists and other
`progressives"-both military and civilian-were
arrested for allegedly plotting against the regime.
Iraqi oppositionists were also said to be involved in
this conspiracy.
Whatever the motives behind these actions,
the problems for the leaders in Damascus get no
easier. The Israelis constitute the paramount
problem, but the regime must also deal with a
restless and repressed population. There is chronic
coup plotting-even among members of the ruling
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clique-and Damascus has a less than sfactory
relationship with its Arab brethren, particrly
with fellow Baathists in Iraq. The governme
moreover, realizes that it has become overly de-
pendent on the Soviet Union. For the near term,
West African Regionalism
Regionalism in West Africa has taken a step
into the past with the resuscitation of a long-
moribund customs union and its transformation
into what is the latest of a series of proposed West
African economic communities.
The union, now to be known as CEAO, was
revamped at a summit meeting of seven French-
speaking chiefs of state in Bamako on 20 May. Its
charter calls for cooperation in regional transpor-
tation, trade, and industrial development, and for
the progressive adoption of a common external
tariff. The CEAO's predecessor organization had
called for similar cooperation for more than a
decade without significant result.
The revived union is conterminous with the
old French West Africa federation minus prodigal
Guinea, which is not likely to join. A possible
new member is Togo, which has a different colo-
nial background but now has close ties with its
French-speaking neighbors and with Paris.
The creation of CEAO effectively kills the
projected West African Regional Group, which
Syria seems destined for continued instability and
dependence on the East, despite quiet assertions
in the past that it is eager for a. reopening to the
West
included both French- and English-speaking mem-
bers. This group had been floundering rather aim-
lessly since its creation two years ago, and several
of the former French colonies had avoided it at
the urging of France. Nevertheless, it clearly was a
serious attempt at regional cooperation rather
than a vehicle for the preservation and extension
of special ties among the ex-French states and
between them and the former metropole.
Guinean President Toure, French-speaking
Africa's most outspoken and independent leader,
has privately taken sharp issue with this apparent
reversion to exclusiveness. A promoter of the
West African Regional Group, Toure responded
to his invitation to attend the CEAO conference
by asking why English-speaking Nigeria, Ghana,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone had not been invited.
Tore clearly suspects a French hand behind the
Bamako- meeting.
Some of the impetus for the revitalization of
the old customs union seems to have come from
the poorer interior states-Niger, Mali, and Upper
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West African Economic Community
(CEAO)
98728 6-70
o 400
j
Volta-which stand to gain most from serious
regional cooperation. Ivorian President Hou-
phouet-Boigny may also have played an impor-
tant role, however. Apparently concerned that his
position in the area had been weakened by his
strong support of Biafra during the Nigerian civil
war, Houphouet has in recent months been
unusually active in promoting closer relations
with other west and central African countries. His
personal attendance at Bamako and his ostensible
willingness to bring relatively rich Ivory Coast
into a closer economic arrangement with the
poorer states thus appear politically motivated. In.
any event,- Houphouet is probably acting in close
concert with France, which at least looked with
favor on the Bamako meeting. 25X1
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Malawi - South Africa
The recent visit to Malawi by Prime Minister
Vorster of South Africa marks a high point for
President Banda's long-held policy of cooperation
with white-ruled southern Africa. The Vorster
visit is a serious setback, however, for Malawi's
efforts to improve relations with other black Afri-
can states.
During Vorster's three-day official visit last
week, South African aid to Malawi was un-
doubtedly discussed and new aid agreements may
have been reached although none has yet been
announced. Banda expressed his hope that the
visit would signal the beginning of even closer
relations between the two countries.
Banda is opposed to the racial policies of
white southern Africa, but he considers coopera-
tion with these governments an economic neces-
sity. In December 1967, Malawi established diplo-
matic relations with Pretoria; it is still the only
black African state that has done so. Although
the move was anathema to black African national-
ist sentiment, Banda has since obtained more than
$20 million in loans from South Africa.
The visit will largely negate Banda's attempts
over the past year to improve relations with other
black African states, particularly with neighboring
Zambia and Tanzania. The government-owned
press in Tanzania is once again lambasting Banda
for betraying the trust his people have placed in
him. Moreover, some members of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity have strongly criticized
Banda, and there are unconfirmed reports that a
few members may call for Malawi's expulsion
from the organization because of the Vorster trip.
The President, however, has apparently decided
that the advantages of closer relations with South
Africa outweigh the risk of further isolation from
black African states.
Ceylon: Election Surprise
The overwhelming victory last week of Mrs.
Bandaranaike's United Front foreshadows at least
a moderate trend toward the left in Ceylon's
domestic and foreign policies.
The 90 seats won by Mrs. Bandaranaike's
party, which she may increase by adding six
appointees in the 157-member legislature, repre-
sent the largest majority any party has had since
independence. Bolstering her position are the
seats won by her coalition partners: 19 by the
Trotskyite party and six by the pro-Moscow Com-
munists.
A definitive analysis of the United Front's
landslide is not yet possible, but a basic cause
may have been the coalition's ability to project a
stronger populist appeal than former prime min-
ister Senanayake's party, which suffers from an
elitist image. Mrs. Bandaranaike's campaign
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pledge to increase the rice ration, general frustra-
tions over rising living costs, and continued high
unemployment were probably factors contrib-
uting to the rout. In addition, over 800,000
newly enfranchised young people apparently
voted heavily for the United Front.
Mrs. Bandaranaike and her coalition partners
campaigned on promises to nationalize banks,
control the import-export trade, and grant recog-
nition to East Germany, North Korea, North
Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam. The coalition also
called for suspension of relations with Israel pend-
ing Tel Aviv's compliance with Security Council
resolutions.
Several leftists have been named to impor-
tant ministries, but the significant bloc of moder-
ates in the cabinet could exert at least equal
influence on the prime minister. The Communists
received only a relatively minor portfolio, but the
three ministries given to the Trotskyite party in-
clude Finance and the new one of Plantation
Industries, which presumably will implement Mrs.
Bandaranaike's promise to exert greater control
over foreign-owned tea and rubber plantations.
Among the more pronounced leftist min-
isters from Mrs. Bandaranaike's own party is T. B.
Illangaratne, who will head the Trade Ministry.
Illangaratne held this post during the previous
Bandaranaike government, when he expanded
trade with Communist countries and was the driv-
ing force behind the nationalization of British and
US oil distribution facilities. A possible leader of
the moderates, who are believed to comprise
about half of the cabinet, is Felix Dias
Bandaranaike, a relative of the prime minister and
head of the important Ministry of Home Affairs.
Mrs. Bandaranaike will retain Defense and Exter-
nal Affairs under her own guidance.
Among the factors that could influence Mrs.
Bandaranaike toward relative moderation is her
party's strong majority, which makes it unnec-
essary for her to rely on her Marxist allies for
crucial votes. Moreover, the continuing need for
foreign assistance may require her to avoid unnec-
essarily antagonizing Western aid donors. The
memory of her government's collapse in 1964 as a
result of defections caused by her increasingly
leftist measures might also counsel her on the side
of caution. 25X1
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The Soviet warships that have visited Cuba and have been operating in
the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico during the past three weeks appar-
ently are returning to home waters. Two missile-equipped antisubmarine
ships, two diesel submariines, and a tanker entered the Atlantic through the
Straits of Florida on 3 }June. A submarine tender-probably escorting the
E-II class nuclear-powerred submarine-left the Caribbean through Mona
Passage. During their sta~ in the area, the Soviet ships visited Cienfuegos and
Havana, and cruised into he Gulf of Mexico.
k
Those Latin Americn nations claiming a 200-mile territorial sea are
sure to reject the US proposal to limit national jurisdictions over the
continental shelf to a depth of 200 meters. Peru and Ecuador have already
officially rejected the plar\, and Chile's foreign minister has publicly de-
nounced it. A Brazilian Foreign Ministry official has complained that the
time is not right to discussl_territorial waters withUS officials, particularly
because it would be wider interpreted by Brazilians as yielding to US
pressure on their government. The official rejections and the obvious re-
luctance of other Latin Amer\can nations to accept the US proposal strongly
indicate that their claims to sovereignty over a 200-mile territorial sea are
not negotiable.
Brazilian terrorist leader Carlos Lamarca and three of his followers have
eluded a dragnet set up by security forces in southeastern Sao Paulo State
and have found refuge in the state capital. His escape is a serious blow to the
military, and officers now fear Ike may attempt to regroup his forces in the
city and possibly kidnap a high fficial in order to rescue some of his mans
followers from government custt dy. The renegade army captain and hip
band, who had been the target pf a massive sweep by military and civi
security forces since mid-April, hod evaded the net and had even capture(
some of his pursuers.
Negotiations between El Salvador and Honduras have failed to produc
agreement on demilitarizing the bordAr area, and the foreign ministers of th
five Central American countries are now meeting in Costa Rica in an effor
to end the deadlock. Meanwhile, the ar~,ms race between the two countries
continuing.
In Barbados, the government is trying to force the business communi-
to put more Negroes into managerial positions. Leading businessmen ha,
been told that, unless they voluntarily employ more blacks in high manag
ment positions, the government will introduce legislation to force them
do so. The government believes it needs the cooperation of business
undercut the activities of the militant black power elements.
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Uruguayan Urban Terrorism
Uruguayan military and police forces are
smarting over a series of successful terrorist acts
in Montevideo by the pro-Castro Tupamaros.
Since pulling off the largest bank robbery in
the country's history on 4 April, this small revolu-
tionary organization is presumed to have mur-
dered the police chief in charge of combating
subversion, and on 29 May stripped the naval
security forces of nearly all of their arms and
equipment without firing a shot.
Angered and embarrassed military and police
forces mounted a large search operation in the
capital to recover the equipment. Although none
has been found, several hideouts were uncovered
and in ensuing clashes three terrorists were shot
Guatemalan Dissidence
With the recent ebb in terrorist activity,
both major political groups are preparing for the
reversal of their roles that will occur when the
new government is installed on 1 July.
The Revolutionary Party (PR) of outgoing
President Mendez, which was demoralized by its
defeat in the elections on 1 March, was further
wrenched by a divisive convention on 31 May. A
moderate was elected as the new PR secretary
general, but only after an opposing slate boy-
cotted the convention. Leaders of the dissident
element may challenge the legality of the conven-
tion. The turmoil in the PR will probably encour-
age the small but growing Christian Democratic
Party to try to take over the leadership of the
political opposition.
and nine arrested. In apparent retaliation for
police harshness, the Tupamaros have carried out
three attacks that have wounded three policemen
and two bystanders.
The government's prestige may demand a
shake-up in the military high command. The navy
chief is the most likely to be replaced, but the
newly appointed minister of defense may also be
removed.
As a result of recent events, public recogni-
tion of the efficiency and capability of the Tupa-
maros has increased. They now have a sizable war
chest and can be expected to carry out additional
operations. 25X1
President-elect Carlos Arana may be having
difficulty in composing his cabinet. He recently
reiterated his promise that opposition groups
would be represented in the administration. There
are indications, however, that some of his sup-
porters oppose sharing the spoils and that some
division exists in Arana's camp.
Communist terrorists reportedly still intend
to kill a high-level US official despite the exten-
sive security precautions taken by the US com-
munity. Communist Party leaders are under pres-
sure from the rank and Sileto avenge the killing
of two party members by the rightist counter-
terrorist group, ?`Ojo por Ojo.""Ojo"reprisals may
have contributed to a recent drop in Communist
terrorism, but the violence is likely to increase as
the inauguration draws near.
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The Guatemalan Army has begun a search in
the northwest near the Mexican border for a guer-
rilla group that reportedly has threatened workers
at a chicle camp. The band may be remnants of a
group led by Yon Sosa, one of the original leaders
of the insurgency in Guatemala, who was killed in
Mexico last month by a Mexican border pa-
Dominican Republic - OAS
In the wake of President Balaguer's impres-
sive re-election victory last month, his opponents
have focused on the OAS General Assembly
scheduled for 22 June in Santo Domingo in an
effort to embarrass the government.
Juan Bosch, leader of the leftist Dominican
Revolutionary Party (PRD) kicked off the eam.-
paign last month by warning of major protests,
and his lead has been followed by most political
organizations.
Even some of the more moderate leaders
have added their voices to the growing anti-OAS
chorus. Rightist Augusto Lora, who finished sec-
ond to Balaguer in the presidential contest, has
requested that the meeting be moved elsewhere to
avoid strife. Spokesmen from the moderate left
Revolutionary Social Christian Party and the cen-
trist National Conciliation Movement have voiced
similar sentiments.
The opposition campaign coincides with an
unusually large flow of asylees to foreign em-
bassies. The opposition parties are probably en-
couraging their members to seek refuge and to
charge the government with repression. Bosch and
others have pointed to the asylees as proof that a
proper climate for an international meeting does
not exist. The publicity splash that accompanied
the first wave of asylees has waned, however, and
some individuals have left the embassies volun-
tarily after receiving guarantees of their safety
from the government. The embassies appear to be
processing formal requests for asylum slowly, and
the flow of "political refugees" probably will
taper off.
The wide-ranging objections to the meeting
are in part a reflection of the residual bitterness
occasioned by the OAS-sanctioned intervention in
1965. To a great extent, however, the conference
is simply a handy target for Balaguer's frustrated
opponents after his easy re-election triumph in
May. Despite the publicly expressed misgivings
over the possibility of disorders, protests have
been far more vocal than violent.
Bosch's PRD has the potential to cause
major difficulties, however, and both he and stu-
dent leaders have warned of massive protests if
the meeting is held. Even so, it is doubtful that
leaders will attempt to call out the party faithful.
Government officials have made it clear that
troops will be put into the streets during the
meeting and that large-scale demonstrations will
not be permitted.
The government's prestige is involved in its
offer to host the meeting, and it is unlikely to
withdraw the invitation as a result of leftist pro-
tests. Only considerable pressure from other Latin
governments would prompt it to reconsider its
offer. Most Latin American governments would
like to hold the meeting elsewhere because of the
threat of disruption. None, however, is yet willing
to initiate action to change the site. An OAS
"`advance team" is in the Dominican Republic to
make arrangements for the 22 June meet-
inn 25X1
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Argentine Kidnaping
Politick stability in Argentina received a
sharp blow h -w of a small extremist
group kidnaped a murdered the former presi-
dent of Argentina, tired General Pedro Aram-
buru. Aramburu was ducted on 29 May. The
kidnapers subsequently nounced that he had
been tried and condemne to death for crimes
allegedly committed when e headed a provi-
sional government from 195 1958, soon after
the ouster of ex-dictator Juan P on. On 2 June,
the terrorists announced that Ara uru had been
executed. The US Embassy report that their
military contacts believe that the in der will
have a far-reaching impact, wrenching o en old
wounds between Peronists and the mi itary.
Although more than 20,000 military and po 'ce
personnel searched for Aramburu, no trace of hi
was found.
There are many explanations for the action
against Aramburu, some 15 years after his "al-
leged crimes," but there is no firm evidence
support any circulating thus far. The most lik y
explanation is that the extremists on the Pero ist
fringe acted to thwart the developing dia gue
between Peronists and the Ongania gover ment
that has centered on the reunification of the
Confederation of Argentine Workers.
A second explanation is that re nt rumors
of Peron's failing health may have recipitated
the abduction in an effort to keep ntrol of the
Peronist faithful if and when Pero dies. Present
evidence points to extremist Pero ists, but some
observers maintain that Trotskyi y or other revo-
lutionaries may be responsible Their objective
presumably would have been t undercut govern-
ment stability by a bold mov coordinated with
anticipated disorders on 29 May in Cordoba,
which did not come to pass.
Some other observers do not rule out the
possibility that some ri ist sector of the govern-
ment or within Aram ru's party is responsible,
again probably wit the intent to thwart any
cooperation be een the government and
Peronists.
Whatever he motive, the murder will result
in a strong de and from hard-line elements in the
military fora severe crackdown on all types of
leftist acti ties. This might even extend so far as
the killin by vigilantes of one or more extremist
figures i retaliation for the execution of General
Aramb ru. If the more extreme military decided
to t e the law into their hands, a situation of
mo nting violence between extremists could
overn ent 'spo esmen are now increasing y
prone tblame "foreign extremists" for the
murder.
The pres t situation confronts the Ongania
government th its most serious political
challenge to dat The reaction of the military,
Ongania's main b of power, will be largely
influenced by his h' dling of the matter. The
Ongania government i tressing that it is making
every effort to clarify e circumstances of the
kidnaping and to appreh d those responsible. In
a nationwide address oh 2 June, President
Ongania appealed for national unity. The govern-
ment has announced that capital punishment has
been reimposed for a wide variety of crimes
that the kidnapers will be executed
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