WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007900030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900030001-4
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
NAVY review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Not referred to CBO. Waiver
applies.
Secret
4T
15 May 1970
No. 0370/70
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900030001-4
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(In~,Qrmation as of noon EDT, 14 May 1970)
SECRET
CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SUFFERS MORE MILITARY SETBACKS
The Communists are expafi ing their operations along
the eastern border.
VIETNAM
Hanoi has decided on a toughzxesponse to the allied
operations in Cambodia and has',recalled its top
negotiator at the Paris talks. Continued inability
to meet political and economic prpblems may lead to
cabinet changes in Saigon. US ancl-,,South Vietnamese
forces in Cambodia have uncovered 1`'',rge quantities
of supplies but have engaged few Communist troops.
COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE STILL FOCUSING ON SOUTf LAOS
The Communists continue their efforts toclear gov-
ernment forces from the southeastern edge=-pf the
Bolovens Plateau. They appear to be trying-further
to undermine already low government morale bye claim-
ing that certain provincial capitals will soorLbe
attacked. }
Guerrilla operations are on the rise in the north
and in mid-south regions. The security situation
is especially bad along the northern border with
Laos.
THAI COMMUNIST INSURGENTS INCREASE ACTIVITY
COMMUNIST CHINA TAKES OVER TANZANIAN MILITARY PROGRAM
With the departure of Soviet and Canadian advisers,
Peking has started work on long-term projects such
as a naval base and an air defense "system."
SECRET
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SUHARTWS INDONESIA
Indonesian President Suharto, who visits Washington
on 26-,27 May, has cautiously and patiently set out
to restructure the economic and political institu-
tions that his predecessor, Sukarno, left in ruins.
Despite the steady progress made so far, Indonesia
still face's enormous problems. Suharto and the army,
however, intend to remain in power until economic
Europe
SOVIET - WEST GERMAN TALKS RESUME
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and West German envoy
Bahr resumed their talks in Moscow this week amid
signs that Soviet insistence,_on unequivocal West
German recognition of postwar'borders and the divi-
sion of Germany will slow progress toward agreement.
ILO FACES SUCCESSION PROBLEM
The four-man contest to succeed David Morse as head
of the International Labor Organizat1on could have
considerable impact on both the direction and effi-
ciency of its operations.
FRENCH GOVERNMENT MOVES TO DEAL WITH SCATTERED VIOLENCE
In the wake of recent violence on the partV..f stu-
dents and small shopkeepers, the National Ask,embly
has passed harsh legislation that introduces Vie
doctrine of collective responsibility.
YUGOSLAV PARTY LEADERSHIP TIGHTENS DISCIPLINE 15
The Yugoslav party presidium expressed concern folk
some of its programs when it met on 22 April, and '\,
ended by calling for tighter discipline among party'-;
members.
SOVIET SHIPS VISITING FOREIGN PORTS
Soviet naval ships have been making a number of for-
eign port calls since exercise "Ocean" was concluded
earlier this month.
SECRET
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SECRET
USSR BECOMES AN EFFLUENT SOCIETY
The recent drafting of water--pollution legislat
and a willingness to participate in internatio l
meetings on the environment :illustrate Mosc 's
growing concern, but solutions will not comeasy.
GOMULKA ASKS FOUR-POWER ENDORSEMENT OF BORDER
The Poles want the four powers to endors, any border
accord they may reach with Bonn.
DETENTE AND DEFENSE: THE ISSUES OF THE
The meeting of the foreign minister
ance members in Rome on 26-27 May
in which NATO's detente image ca
out jeopardizing the security o
ministerial may mark some adva
valid answers to the importan
Alliance in a decade that ma,
change in Europe's security,
TO MINISTERIAL
of the 15 Alli-
1 consider ways
enhanced with-
the Alliance. The
e in the search for
questions facing the
see considerable
ISRAEL MAKES STRONG MI TARY THRUST INTO LEBANON
Israel has descri d its military thrust into south-
ern Lebanon earl this week as a combing and screen-
ing operation d' ected exclusively against the feda-
yeen. Casualt' s on both sides were said to be
light.
FEDAYEEN GROUPS ORM NEW COORDINATING BODY
If the new established central committee of the
Palestine iberation Organization proves to be more
than mer y a paper entity, it could affect the
positio of Yasir Arafat and other fedayeen leaders
by ushe ing in a period of collective leadership.
RELIGIOUS REACTIONARIES PROTEST IN AFGHANISTAN
Cons rvative religious leaders have had some success
in pposing the government's modest modernization
p gram, and they may be encouraged to take to the
reets again to demonstrate their political power.
SECRET
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SECRET
IRAN. KING NEW LOOK AT KURDISH SITUATION
T \recent agreement between the Baathist regime of
Ir e and the rebelling Kurds has forced Tehran to
reas ss its relations with the tribesmen.
Western Hemisphere
CUBA MAY ELIMINA RIVATE FARMS
The Castro reg appears to be losing patience with
the owners of s l farms and may take action against
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT HEA FOR RE-ELECTION VICTORY
President Balaguer i xpected to win re-election on
16 May by a comfortabl `,margin .
RADICALS REMAIN IN BOLIVIAN INET
Despite military pressure remove the radicals,
President Ovando made only 'nor personnel changes
in reorganizing the cabinet.
CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS TAKE ANOTHER OK AT BLACK POWER 29
A majority of the Caribbean gove ments are reasses-
sing their positions toward Black ower following
SECRET
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C tmmunist military forces and insurgents are now on the offensive in
areas the~ ughout Indochina. The Cambodian Government has been giving
ground in''~he face of expanding Communist drives not only in many areas of
the country .fast of the Mekong River, but also in some areas in the west and
north. There\s no evidence that allied operations along the South Viet-
namese - Cambodian border have seriously impeded greater Communist
activity in the e nbodian interior. The Djakarta conference on Cambodia
(16-17 May), whd e participants generally are pro-Western, will probably
offer little more thaw, moral encouragement to the Phnom Penh government.
A number of indictors suggest that North Vietnam intends a tough
response to US policy inntndochina. Xuan Thuy, Hanoi's top negotiator in
Paris, has left for home, al. Viet Cong delegate Madame Binh may leave
soon. Further, North Vietnatpese party first secretary Le Duan's unusually
warm reception in Peking, after his cool send-off from Moscow, strongly
implies that Hanoi has reached policy decisions that are in keeping with
Peking's hard-line approach.
In South Vietnam the Communists have increased their attacks in the
northern provinces and have shelled Stdgon and several other government
centers farther south. These Communist, raids come at a time when the
Saigon government appears under increasingg,, strain in carrying out its day-to-
day duties, and when a political crisis is buif ing. Prime Minister Khiem may
be on the way out after less than a year in office.
The Communists in Laos have been concentiting their offensive efforts
on clearing government forces from the southeastern edge of the Bolovens
Plateau. The recent upsurge of Communist activity',kin South Laos has begun
to rattle government leaders, and the Communists e playing on the pes-
simism within government ranks by circulating rumors t4 at certain provincial
capitals in the south will soon be attacked.
Communist guerrilla operations are also on the rise in -the northern and
mid-South regions of Thailand. The security situation has deteriorated
especially along the northern border with Laos. The Thai Gi ernment has
had some success in joint operations with Malaysia against Ma ysian Com-
munists based in southern Thailand, however. Several insurgent camps have
been uprooted. _
The anniversary of last year's communal riots in Malaysia passed most
without incident this week. Stringent government security measures\pre-
vented any serious trouble. Nevertheless, two Chinese died. as a resultlof
Malay-initiated incidents, and the country remains a racial tind
box.
SECRET
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Cambodia
THAILAND
KOMPONG GRAM
pong
KT
am
A[gRgnB{ Takhmaty Pr ney
Jf';Yag
0 P Q.N G
U
ke
O tAK 1 I
Y
g 7
~~ P80 IIIEM
SECRET
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CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SUFFERS MORE MILITARY SETBACKS
Communist operations are
keeping Cambodian Army troops off
balance and restricting the gov-
ernment's overland access to its
eastern, northern, and southern
provinces. Communist inroads in
these provinces, as well as else-
where, indicate that allied opera-
tions along the South Vietnam bor-
der have not impeded greater Com-
munist activity in the Cambodian
interior.
Phnom Penh appears to be
growing more concerned over the
deteriorating situation in Kom-
pong Cham Province, where Commu-
nist forces reportedly have been
moving westward in recent weeks.
Enemy troops have attacked sev-
eral towns in the province and
have cut roads and telephone wires.
In the adjacent province of Kratie,
whose capital was captured by the
Communists on 6 May, local reports
claim some Communist forces are
moving north toward Stung Treng
Province, but thus far no major
attacks have been reported in
that area.
In the south, the Communists
are still surrounding and attack-
ing the towns of Angtassom and
Takeo, and they also have cut the
main roads north and south of the
two towns. In Kampot Province,
the government still holds the
provincial capital, but scattered
enemy attacks have been reported
along the coast. Increased Commu-
nist activity was also reported in
Kompong Speu Province, where the
closure of the main road between
Phnom Penh and the key seaport of
Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) appar-
ently is the primary objective of
Communist forces there.
The Communists suffered one
significant military reverse during
the week, however, when South Viet-
namese Marines regained control of
the Neak Luong ferry south of Phnom
Penh. Western journalists reported
that some North Vietnamese Army
troops were among enemy casualties.
It is doubtful that the Cambodians
can hold this position without the
continuing presence of South Viet-
namese forces.
In Peking, meanwhile, Sihanouk
has postponed his return to Cam-
bodia. He said during a recent
television interview there that
"resistance fighters" in Cambodia
had told him to wait for better
conditions before joining them.
In a message addressed to his
"army," Sihanouk said he was en-
trusting the management of "lib-
erated areas" to three leftist
ministers of his recently formed
"Royal Government of National
Union" who he claimed were already
in Cambodia.
On the political front, Phnom
Penh and Bangkok have agreed to re-
sume full diplomatic and commercial
relations, and it appears likely
that the Lon Nol government will
soon follow suit with Saigon. Hanoi
and the Viet Cong have decided to
withdraw their few remaining dip-
lomats in Phnom Penh. They did not,
however, follow the Chinese Commu-
nist example and announce a formal
break in relations.
SECRET
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SECRET
VIETNAM
After its initial temporizing
and indecision in the wake of US
actions in Indochina, Hanoi has
now begun to take a stand. The
Communists recalled their top
negotiator Xuan Thuy from Paris
on 11 May, and Viet Cong delegate
Madame Binh is expected to leave
later this month. Some Communist
staffers will probably continue
to attend the weekly sessions,
but the Communists obviously do
not expect worthwhile negotiations
in this forum for some time. Hanoi
has also underscored its rejection
of recent proposals for wider con-
sultations on all of Indochina.
Moscow's treatment of North
Vietnamese party first secretary
Le Duan when he departed after
three weeks of high-level talks
with the Soviets on 9 May sug-
gests that Hanoi has opted for
a tough stance. The atmospherics
surrounding his departure intimate
that Moscow--which has always
counseled moderation--was ex-
tremely displeased with the line
Hanoi has chosen to follow. TASS
described Le Duan's discussions
with Brezhnev as merely an "ex-
change of opinions on Indochina,"
and the Vietnamese leader was al-
lowed to depart without any ges-
ture of support or any formal
farewell ceremonies.
Whatever decisions Hanoi has
made obviously have been well re-
ceived in Peking. Instead of
ignoring Le Duan, as has fre-
quently been the case in the past,
Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and a host
of other leading military and
party figures turned out to wel-
come him when he arrived. The
implication is strong that the
North Vietnamese have moved in
a direction that will bring in-
creased material and political
support from China for their
policy in Cambodia.
The South Vietnamese
nt's inability to come
h problems such as stu,
and inflation is hu
workng relations among
cial and could lead to,
ganiz~tion of the cabi
Ministk,r Khiem, in pa
has beg\ n to talk of
because of differenc
Presidenf. Thieu and
economic policies.
tried to gloss ove
with Khiem,,at le
moment.
SECRET
overn-
grips
ent un-
ting
ey offi-
icular,
esigning
s between
imself over
Thieu has
any friction
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SECRET
reform or rectify such regime
malpractices is pending. Because
the Saigon government has a large
stake in preserving the forms of
constitutional government, partic-
ularly now that it is under in-
tense pressure from a number of
hostile sources, it will be hard
put not to abide by the court's
rulings.
Meanwhile, both student and
An Quang Buddhist leaders have
taken steps to control their an-
tigovernment agitation in order
to avoid further suppression by
the regime. The students report-
edly have initiated a three-day
truce in demonstrations in Saigon
following the government's ban on
disruptive meetings and demon-
strations. While Saigon schools
are closed, however, some student
activists have gone to other ci-
ties to help organize student pro-
tests. Although the An Quang
leadership holds the government
responsible for its clash with
rival Buddhists, they have ad-
vised the faithful to heed only
the directives of a moderate An
Quang spokesman and not the calls
to action of younger, more mili-
tant monks.
The government has been
thrown further off balance by
recent Supreme Court rulings
striking down tax decrees of the
executive branch and declaring
the organization and procedures
of military field tribunals to be
unconstitutional. The court has
also signaled that it may soon
rule that the celebrated trial
and conviction of Lower House dep-
uty Tran Ngoc Chau is invalid. The
usually cautious Supreme Court
seems to be attempting to strengthen
its role under the constitution
and to be moving away from its
past practice of avoiding deci-
sions that might adversely affect
governmental policies and pro-
grams. Nevertheless, the court
has been careful to announce its
decisions at a time when National
Assembly legislation that would
Allied Operations in Cambodia
US - South Vietnamese forces
in Cambodia have encountered rela-
tively little ground fighting,
but they have seized large quan-
tities of Communist arms and am-
munition and have temporarily dis-
rupted the enemy's command and
control facilities.
Most of the main force Com-
munist troops and headquarters
elements in Cambodian sanctuaries
have fallen back and dispersed
to avoid the allied operations.
As a result, many supply depots
have been abandoned by the Com-
munists, and the allies have cap-
tured considerably more munitions
in the raids than were seized
inside South Vietnam during the
past year. Enough rice has been
captured to feed 30,000 enemy
troops for more than three months25X1
SECRET
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SECRET
Meanwhile, in South Vietnam,
the Communists have increased
their attacks in the northern
provinces and shelled Saigon
and several other government cen-
ters farther south. Communist
sappers and artillerymen attacked
numerous targets in southern I
Corps, including a thrust into
the provincial capital of Tam
Ky that caused heavy casualties
and damages. Sporadic heavy
fighting between allied units and
North Vietnamese regulars also
continues in and around the
large Hiep Duc refugee center
south of Da Nang.
It appears likely that the
Communists intended the recent at-
tacks to be a country-wide effort
similar to the upsurge in early
April, but enemy units located
in the southern half of the coun-
try could not participate as
planned because of their preoc-
cupation with allied raids into
their rear base areas in Cambodia.
SECRET
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COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE STILL. FOCUSING ON SOUTH LAOS
The Communists have again cap-
tured the principal artillery base
overlooking Attopeu town as they
continue trying to clear government
forces from the southeastern edge
of the Bolovens Plateau. Govern-
ment guerrillas remain in the area,
however, and are regrouping in an
effort to retake the position.
The recent upsurge of Commu-
nist military activity in the south
has begun to rattle government lead-
ers. King Savang has instructed
the chief of the armed forces to
hold the Bolovens Plateau at all
costs. Such admonitions usually
have little effect on the army's
performance, but they do reflect
the concern of the top leadership.
Ban Na.`'Tha'T1e`n,
.BIsang -
adtion~lon~tian~j
emunn, 1be~eni~s~
nvo _, 962
n pencodantateds
e
Palos tlia o
The Communists appear to be
capitalizing on the pessimism within
government ranks. Employing pres-
sure that is more psychological than
military, they are circulating re-
ports that the provincial capital
of Saravane and Paksong will soon
be hit. The.government announced
that the threat to Saravane neces-
sitated the evacuation of depend-
ents, and by 12 May it had resettled
some 2,700 civilians in the Mekong
town of Pakse. 25X1
reports
of substantial new enemy orces con-
verging on Saravane remain uncon-
firmed, but it is estimated that
the Communists have upwards of
1,000 troops in the area. The Sar-
avane garrison numbers less than
600 army, police, and armed civil-
ian personnel, and it is expected
to fall quickly if the Communists
apply even light pressure.
In the north the military sit-
uation remains quiet. The absence
of a major Communist move against
Long Tieng in recent weeks has given
a needed boost to the morale of the
Meo defenders. Civilians have be-
gun to filter back into the Long
Tieng Valley, and the base hospital
has reopened.
Vang Pao has positioned almost
1,300 troops in the hills immedi-
ately north of Tha Tam Bleung and
has plans to push north into an
enemy staging area near Ban Na. The
guerrillas may run into considerable
opposition if they move this way,
however. The North Vietnamese have
been rotating fresh troops into for-
ward positions near Ban Na.
Page 7
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 May 70
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THAI COMMUNIST INSURGENTS INCREASE ACTIVITY
Communist guerrilla opera-
tions, which have been moderate
so far thip dry season, are on
the increas'-e. The major threat
remains in tke remote north and
north-central,,provinces, where
a force of som 1,600 insurgents
continues to erode the govern-
ment's positions along the Lao
border. The security situation
is especially bad ia. portions of
Nan and Chiang Rai provinces,
where guerrillas have'Iiarassed
several army outposts,'gorcing
the evacuation of at least one.
Bangkok has sought to ase
guerrilla pressure by the hevy
use of air and artillery strikes.
An army sweep operation last math
into an insurgent stronghold nea\
the Lao border in eastern Nan
Province met with disastrous re-
sults, however. The guerrillas
shot down two government heli-
copters besides managing to over-
run several government base camps
and inflicting a number of casual-
ties on Thai regulars. The op-
eration was sparked by a growing
number of reports that the-insur-
gents were trying to seize and
administer whole village6 in this
region.
The security suation is
more favorable in e northeast,
where the Communists are still
on the defensive. The enemy's
much-heralded dry-season offen-
sive has not materialized, a de-
velopment that may further under-
mine the wavering morale of many
rank-and-file guerrillas, as well
as the appeal of the insurgency
to villagers. Guerrilla incidents
involving the assassination of in-
formants and ambushes of local
security teams remain endemic to
the northeast region, however.
Communist, guerrillas in the
mid-South region have sharply in-
creased their activity in recent
months, particularly in the prov-
ince of Ph4 thalung. The govern-
ment's cot'hterinsurgency apparatus
has not ~ffade any meaningful ef-
fort todideal with the marked de-
terior/tion of security in this
area As a result, police are
rel.:tant to wear uniforms; travel
to utlying villages by. provincial
aidistrict officials is reported
Id be at a standstill; and local
fficials appear uncertain about
V to cope with increased guer-
e counterinsurgency picture
is con derably brighter in the
southerrneaches of the peninsula,
where acts ity by the Malayan Com-
munist Terr ist Organization has
been at a fa ly low level. In
recent weeks j 'nt ground and air
operations by Ba gkok and Kuala
Lumpur have uproo d several in-
surgent base camps long the Ma-
laysian border, ,one f which was
believed to have been the head-
quarters of the terror?sts 12th
"regiment."
SECRET
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Thailand: Insurgent Activity
Insurgents repel government
operation
Security situatio
improving I
Uhono
Ratchathani
Nakhon
Ratchavm
a Prachuap
Khvi Khan
,~~5~(JTH*
Area of Insurgent Activity
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COMMUNIST CHINA TAKES OVER TANZANIAN MILITARY PROGRAM
Pekiriggnow is virtually the
sole provide',_of military aid and
training to Tanzania, following
the departure of-soviet and Cana-
dian advisers earlythis year. A
small group of East GbKman advis-
ers in Zanzibar, however=",.. still
shares naval training acti ties
with the Chinese.
the provision of a .undetermined
number of aircraf . An unknown
number of Chine military con-
struction exp is arrived in the
early part the year, reportedly
to begin rk on the military air-
With the elimination of So-
viet and Canadian advisers, work
has begun on several long-term
projects. A naval base is berg
constructed, with Chinese aist-
ance, near Dar es Salaam. he base
is part of a $10-million iavval de-
velopment program towa which the
Chinese are providin assistance
of some $4 million Agreed to in
late 1968. In ea.y 19 70 , over
100 Tanzanians 4nt to China for
a long-post d, one- to two-
year naval e gineering and tech-
nology cou e. Peking has also
started wdrk on an air defense
"system7'that reportedly will in-
clude the construction of an air
base, the training of pilots, and
SECRET
Dar es Salaam dates back to
Chinese military assistance
September 1964, when a small con-
ingent of advisers was sent to
iliarize the army with the
new hinese small arms that had
been livered under the first
contrac signed in February of that
year. Si ce that time, agreements
totaling o r $12 million have been
signed for m itary hardware in-
cluding small ms, antiaircraft
guns, medium tan , patrol boats
and landing craft, and an assort-
ment of other milit y-related
equipment. Part of t attraction
of Chinese military ai is Peking's
willingness to supply eq ment
free of charge, or, at mos on
liberal credit terms. 25X1
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Early in the week, Moscow made public a telegram from Premier
Kosygin to Cambodian Prince Sihanouk, the text of which omitted the
formal recognition the latter has already received from Hanoi aifa Peking.
Kosygin's telegram appears to be a holding operation to permit the Russians
to ? decide whether to throw full support to Sihanouk despite his growing
depern4ence on Peking. It will be difficult for the USSR to continue out of
step witls, Hanoi for long on a policy matter of this importdnce. Meanwhile,
Sino-Soviet.border talks presumably began again follov ing the return to
Peking of Moscow's chief negotiator, Kuznetsov.
In the UN,`-the US was the primary target:of what was probably
Moscow's most abus''iye attack in that forum in sejeral years. Soviet Ambas-
sador Malik charged that under the pretext of outside threats, "the boots of
the American military if chine are trampling *fie soil of Cambodia and the
Israeli cutthroats are blindlyand bloodily copying their teacher."
French-Cambodian relations are steadily deteriorating. The French have
cut off arms shipments to Phnori enh
Official French opi n is markedly pro-Sihanou ut no
move to recognize his governmen_ f=in- ile is likely because of the large
number of French nationals and; investn'Wnts in Cambodia that would be
endangered by such a move.
No substantive details _, are yet available n the proceedings of the
three-day CEMA Council session in Warsaw, whi was slated to close on 14
May. Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz told the openi session that economic
integration and cooperation were to be examined, a he stressed the need
for improved relations among CEMA countries. Creati of an international
investment bank, price reforms, and economic relations ith Western coun-
tries were among subjects to be discussed. The Polish p s has called the
debates "lively" and "controversial."
The Council of the European Communities (EC) this Neck made
significant progress toward the beginning of entry negotiations wthe UK,
Ireland, Denmark, and Norway. It decided to hold a formal openin session
with all four applicants in Luxembourg on 30 June, to be followed July
by an exploratory working session with the British.
Irish Prime Minister Lynch has weathered the political storm e
gendered by the cabinet upheaval last week. His party's acceptance of hi
nominations for cabinet posts made vacant by dismissals and resignations
guarpntees that he will win a vote of confidence scheduled for the 15th.
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The focus of Bonn's Ost-
politikreturned to Moscow, as
Sovi-'et Foteign Minister Gromyko
and West Gman negotiator Egon
Bahr met on1 May for the first
time in almost two months. Fol-
lowing the pattdrn of earlier
meetings, the two`iegotiators
had little to say after the
session beyond indicating that
they would meet again dater this
week. Nevertheless, it'-was ap-
parent that the talks are-.,still
mired in "preliminaries," A;1d
fall well short of actual treaty
drafting.
Bahr apparently had hoped
that his previous round with
Gromyko in March would allow
the two sides to move on to th
negotiation of a treaty draft
This proved unrealistic, how
and there has been no sugge ion
that Bonn this time expect dra-
matic progress. In fact,,~ there
have been no indications/that Mos-
cow has any intention
down the demands that
peded progress so fa
equivocal West Ger
of the postwar re;
German borders
sion of Germany
scaling
ave im-
As before,
aining un-
an recognition
ignment of
Obviously with the aim of
putting pressure on the Germans,
the Soviets continue to insist,
both publicly and privately, that
West German concessions on the
territorial question are essen-
tial preconditions to any agree-
ment or normalization rela-
tions between Bonn a Moscow
or any of the other arsaw Pact
states. The week efore Bahr's
return to Moscow. the Soviet
ambassador to ance told a press
conference t the Soviets will
"tolerate n revision whatsoever
of the pos ar realities." His
point wa echoed in an article
on 8 M by Soviet Defense
Minis r Grechko.
ast month the Soviet ambas-
or in West Germany told the
ambassador--evidently assuming
is words would be passed to the
West Germans--that Gromyko would
begin to find the talks a waste
of time unless Bonn soon offered
ome "specific concessions."
T %e flexibility that Bonn has
shin in its talks with Warsaw
on the Oder-Neisse border prob-
ably has encouraged the Soviets
to hope-that Bonn may be brought
to give"way on the general issue
of border:.
In spite'-of the difficulties,
Bonn appears firm in its resolve
to continue itpursuit of detente
with the Soviets;.and the East Eu-
Germans want to as
ropeans. In part
of firm Soviet backi
scheduled meeting bet
for Brandt and East Ge
Stoph in Kassel on 21 M
g for the
een Chancel-
an Premier
also aware that the concl"
the relatively fast-movin
Bonn is
sion of
talks
with Warsaw is dependent it large
measure on developments in Moscow.
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ILO FACES SUCCESSION PROBLEM
The retirement of US citi-
zen David Morse after 22 years
as directoi-general of the Inter-
national LabQr Organization (ILO)
has led to a hot, four-way con-
test over the succession. The
ILO's governing board presumably
will elect one of the four an-
nounced candidates at next week's
special session, and the outcome
could have considerable impact on
both the direction and efficiency
of ILO operations.
The ILO was founded in 1919
under terms of Part XIII of thi
Versailles Treaty. Seeking to
improve conditions of labor by
international cooperation and
agreement, the ILO is based on
the so-called tripartite pri i-
ple--i.e., the representativ s
on the policy-making insti tions
are selected by the emplo ers,
workers, and member Bove nments.
In recent years e princi-
pal thrust of the ILc s work has
been directed at th problems of
the less developeq/countries.
Last year, for ex&mple, the ILO
launched the Word Employment
Program to encourage ILO members
to make their-national develop-
ment programs" provide work oppor-
tunities and adequate incomes for
a broader stratum of their popu-
lations.-The Soviets have also
taken a--greater interest in ILO
affairs recently, seeking higher
positions in the ILO staff but at-?
tacking the tripartite principle.
The leading candidate to suc-?
ceed Morse is his chief deputy,
C, W. Jenks of the UK, who has
been with the ILO since 1931.
In view of Jenks' age, many gov-
erning board members"favor his
election only to complete the
balance of Morse'.` term, which
expires in Sept fiber of 1973.
to secure i rregional support
for a youn -r man, which is pres-
ently lack ng.
P is, however, is strongly
backi g French national Francis
Bla ard, another Morse deputy.
chard's age would permit him
accept re-election to a full
en-year term in 1973, and the
French also argue that it is time
for the promotion of a "Latin"
candidate after the lengthy ten-
ure of the "Anglo-Saxon" Morse.
Two candidates have emerged
rom the less developed regions.
A,tthird Morse deputy, Albert
Ted odjre of Dahomey, recently
annonced his interest in the
positkon. African ILO members
previotqs ly had been thinking in
terms oi~, the 1973 election, but
concern at someone other than
Jenks migh% selected now has
prompted an acceleration of
Teveodjre'sandidacy.
A fourth c ndidate, Uruguay's
ILO representati e Hector Gros
Espiell, like Tev odjre, prob-
ably would seek to.ocus ILO ac-
tivity to an even giVater extent
on the less develope regions.
Moscow's inclinationsn XL dis-
pensing the significant bloc of
votes it controls on thd'govern-
ing board are not clear as this
point, but it will opt foZ the 25X1
candidate it regards as most
likely to support Soviet citi-
zens for high posts.
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-RENCH OVERNMENT OYES TO DEAL WITH 3C TERE VIOLENCE
Over the past two months,
there has been\enough scattered
violence on the-part of student
radicals and econbTnically threat-
ened small shopkeepers to provoke
a strong "law and order" reaction
in France. In this cf'imate, the
National Assembly recency passed--
by a massive majority--e remely
harsh legislation that wou,,d in-
i n ro=-P ompF d' s mi n s to r o f
ed- fcTf, accent for the absence
of moderate o osition to student
riots like ose at Nanterre Uni-
versity in arch 1970.
troduce for the first time &4, doc- pro
trine of collective responsibility "1
of demonstrators present at th0,
scene of a violent confrontatioi*r~.
This action is a tacit ad-
mission that France's far-reach-
ing university reform program,
adopted in the fall of 1968, has/
not had the desired effect of calm-
ing France's troubled campu
.:
s
f= m u--governmen no
logepor b.fxtly tom-
mitted.to, the goals of the ,968
reform program, and to datA has
not been willing to commi;? the
funds'-."`necessary even to,1irovide
adequate physical faci pities and
teaching staff for Frnce's rap-
idly expanding student population.
Fc ,tie- evernfeent, as wall
as ,, fQx the future`. f French higher
educat, n,- this 'rit p 1ls se-
It was precisely the conditions
created by ladk of facilities and
personnel that allowed radical
groups to gain widespread support
among the majority of moderate stu-
dents during the student-labor
crisis in May 1968. Thy -- =^
conditions, now combined with the
lack-of leadership -andT uriderstand-
s it moves quickly to
'e conditions _t rough an
tj.ve and well-financed im-
tatjon, of.. the 1,96_e,,_ reform
am, the govefft-ieit's present
and order" reaaetion will. prob-
y only incre tt `f^f a:l student
mpathy"for the radicals. T7r""any
-, scattered student strikes and
occasional flare-ups of violence are
likely to continue over the next few
`years.
these\c
depend'
frontations will
on the go
f
ob ab ly
ment's
handlin(X of
sity cri s th
of the rad c
are presen
concerte ma
e aut
unless
a s moll provoc
a
on in such`way
a major inci-
Even so, such i cidents are
not likely to lead to nother so-
cial crisis on the orde of .he
one of May 1968, primari because
French labor is in no moo for
massive strike action. As ong
as students remain isolated -rom
other numerically significant yRso-
cial groups, they do not pose`a
serious threat to the Pompidou
government.
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n the activities
he radical groups
action ~possible
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YUGOSLAV PI,,--TY LEADERSHIP TIGHTENS DISCIPLINE
The Yugoslav party prasiccium
seems to believe its programs may
be headed for trouble, especially
because of opposition within the
party bureaucracy. At a meeting
on 22 April, the presidium adopted
a resolution calling for the re-
juvenation of party discipline
in an effort to motivate the whole
population to identify with the
country's controversial self-man-
agement system. Under this sys-
tem, councils are elected by the
workers and given the power to
manage their enterprise's own af-
fairs.
The presidium's action is
partly an attempt to breathe new
life into the "liberal" resolu-
tions and statutes adopted at
the 9th party congress in March
1969. These provided for the
opening of party jobs to better
qualified young people as a part
of the process of revitalizing
the party leadership. Following
the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
party decisions were readily ac-
cepted as a wave of patriotic
fervor swept the federation. The
momentum of those days is now
gone, and there is once again a
general recognition that party
members must ensure that the ac-
cepted party line is incorporated
in the decisions of the self-man-
agement councils.
management system" by Yugoslavs
both in and out of the party.
There is even suspicion among
some leaders that the Soviets are
behind this dissidence. The presid-
ium resolution is aimed at such
opposition, specifically requiring
that everyone take a stand. Neu-
trality will not be tolerated.
Specifically, the presidium
is intent on ensuring that uncom-
mitted members be rotated out of
party jobs and that the economic
reforms be reoriented to lessen
the gap between the rich and poor
regions of Yugoslavia. In addi-
tion, the party leadership is in-
terested in fostering an expansion
of self-management under enlight-
ened party guidance, and in a
democratization of the party's
reorganization and its manner of
doing things.
Although unity is the key-
note of the plan, it will be
easier to talk about than to
achieve. There is no hint how-
ever, that a party purge is un-
der way. How party members are
to work for self-management with-
out increasing the party's role
in day-to-day decision-making
has not been explained. There
is, however, a sense of urgency
about tightening discipline. This
is probably in anticipation of
Tito's death or retirement, a time
In recent months there has
been some opposition to the "self-
that many Yugoslavs feel is not
far off.
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SOVIET SHIPS VISITING FOREIGN PORTS
Ships of the Soviet Navy
have been making a number of for-
eign port calls since the conclu-
sion of exercise "Ocean" earlier
this month.
The latest good-will visit
began on 14 May when two anti-
submarine ships and two diesel
submarines arrived at Cienfuegos,
Cuba. These units, which had
been operating in the Caribbean
for a week, will use Cuban fa-
cilities for replenishment.
The ships and two TU-95
naval reconnaissance aircraft
that flew from the USSR to Havana
on 13 May may conduct additional
operations with a nuclear-powered
cruise missile submarine sighted
south of Cuba yesterday. Some
of these operations may take place
in the Gulf of Mexico. TU-95s
provide reconnaissance and tar-
get information to missile-armed
ships in Soviet naval exercises
and may do so for these ships if
they conduct missile exercises.
A similar group of ships that op-
erated in the Caribbean in 1969
had no aerial support.
A small squadron from the
Baltic Fleet recently concluded
a five-day visit to Cherbourg,
France, to commemorate VE day.
Similar courtesy visits were
made to Algiers and Casablanca,
and on 13 May two guided-missile
ships and a tanker called at the
Nigerian port of Lagos.
Exercise "Ocean," followed
by such a high number of foreign
port visits, reflects Moscow's
continuing effort to demonstrate
the world-wide political and mil-
itary utility of the Soviet Navy.
USSR BECOMES AN EFFLUENT SOCIETY
The Soviets are becoming
aware that environmental problems
are in inevitable concomitant of
industrial development and that
their economic system is not im-
mune to these problems. The re-
cent drafting of water-pollution
legislation and a willingness to
participate in international meet-
ings on the environment illus-
trate their growing concern. Al-
though their pollution problems
are not yet as serious as those
of the industrial West, solutions
will not come easy.
In the past, the Soviet lead-
ership has been relatively unre-
sponsive to the pleas of conser-
vationists. An example is the
12-year battle to save the unique
flora and fauna of Lake Baikal
from destruction by pollution
from wood-pulp mills. A decree
finally adopted last year for-
bids logging in much of the area
and requires lumber enterprises
to install purification equip-
ment.
A Soviet agriculture offi-
cial recently claimed that the
government's failure to pursue a
coordinated conservation policy
has resulted in "immense" damage
to the country's natural re-sources.
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Here we are trying to breed fish in conditions
closest to nature.-Krokodil, Soviet satirical magazine
He accused the government of ig-
noring wind and water erosion,
water pollution by industrial
and municipal waste, overcutting
of forests, excessive use of chem-
cials in agriculture, and air pol-
lution.
Press articles have identi-
fied water pollution as the coun-
try's most critical environmental
problem. Pollution of the Volga
and the Caspian Sea, a result of
offshore oil drilling and con-
tamination by shipping and indus-
trial sewage, threatens to wipe
out the caviar-producing sturgeon
Irrigation projects and hydroelec-
tric dams also have caused the
water levels of the Caspian and
Aral seas to drop, raising their
salinity and destroying plant and
animal life.
The most recent evidence of
government action to stop this
environmental mismanagement is a
draft law to protect lakes and
rivers from pollution. Violators
will be liable to prosecution,
and authorities will be able to
shut down the polluting facili-
ties. Various officials have
urged that a comprehensive con-
servation program be included in
the upcoming five-year plan (1971-
75). On the international front,
the Soviets have participated in
various ecological conferences and
are currently helping to plan a
global network of stations
equipped to monitor changes in
the earth's environment.
The Soviets traditionally
have been good at launching cam-
paigns but less successful in
their effective implementation.
Cleaning up polluted areas and
preventing further pollution
would require tremendous alloca-
tions of resources. Competition
over resources is already keen,
with the military, agriculture,
industry, and the consumer con-
stantly fighting for larger al-
locations. The antipollution
forces are probably too weak and
unorganized to get even a finger
in the pie.
Furthermore, enterprise man-
agers are unlikely to sacrifice
fulfillment of production targets
in order to introduce antipollu-
tion technology. Finally, the
slow development of and the dif-
fusion of innovations, largely the
reasons for the USSR's present
technological lag behind the West,
will also retard antipollution
technology.
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GOMULKA ASKS FOUR-POWER ENDORSEMENT OF BORDER
Polish party leader Gomulka
has in efKect called on the four
wartime al
publicly to
ies to be prepared
eclare their accept-
cord on the Oder-
ance of any a
Neisse border
at Warsaw may
Speaking on 9
reach with Bonn.
May in Wroclaw, G
iterated that Pola
wishes to
ith Bonn,
but that unqualified 'lcecognitio
of Poland's postwar frtiers,
not merely "respect" for them
is the point of departure.\
Despite his public piton
that the borders agreed b at Nts-
dam are final, Gomulka 46s been
fully aware of the rig of the
four powers to a fina voice in
delimiting Germany 's frontiers.
He now appears to b seeking a
commitment from th four govern-
ments that when d if a Polish -
West German bord or agreement is
reached, they wf11 declare their
intent to incorporate it into any
future peace treaty.
Gomulka's statement implic-
itly endorses the formula pre-
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sente last week by the French
Gove nment to visiting Polish
For ign Minister Jedrychowski,
wh responded favorably and of-
f red to sound out the Soviets.
rance planned to present the
proposal to the US and UK in
Bonn this week.
With optimism growing in
Warsaw that a bilateral border
agreement can be reached, the
fourth round of the Polish - West
German talks is slated to convene
in Bonn on 8 June. Bonn's For-
eign Minister Scheel reportedly
is planning to open the session
to lend "solemnity" to the occa-
sion. While he is in Bonn, Po-
and's chief negotiator, Deputy
eign minister Winiewicz, is
scftv,quled to meet with Chancellor
Brandt. Bilateral economic ne-
gotiat"1-Qns, stalled since last
January, ?\.,may also be resumed
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The Israeli thrust into Lebanon earlier this week brought only a
temporary lull in fedayeen harassment. Some 12 hours after Tel Aviv's
troops withdrew, the fedayeen shelled two Israeli` settlements along the
border. Israeli's Deputy Prime Minister Allon has already threatened to strike
Lebanon again if the fedayeen attacks continue. Along the Suez Canal,
action'., was relatively restrained (luring the -early part of the week, but
Wednesday and Thursday saw a renewal of artillery duels and air action.
Egypt lost two MIG-21 s, and several otherrif its planes were damaged.
The UN's Relief and Works Age lcy (UNRWA) will defer most of its
planned cuts iii, service to the refuga camps of the Middle East. The move
had been proteslyd bitterly by Jo ?.:anian and Lebanese officials, who feared
it would facilitate-fedayeen recr tment. UNRWA faces a large deficit if the
cuts are delayed fo -Jong, and ospects for a favorable response to a special
The UN Security uncil approved independence for Bahrain this
week, ending Iran's 150 -old claim to the Persian Gulf island. The Shah
had agreed in advance. /to ar ept the findings of Secretary General Thant's
representative, who r, ported at most Bahrainis preferred independence to
association with Irafi
r
Dahomey's iew civilian gover ent of "national union" was installed
without incidexft last week, and a t eatened general strike has not mate-
rialized. The regime is not likely to s ive over the long term, however,
given the depth of the country's proble and the mutual animosities of the
three presidents.
Spdradic Muslim-Hindu rioting still con ues in India following the
initial outbreak on 7 May in a town near Bomb ; so far, 106 people have
been-`killed. Militant Hindu groups have been bl ed for heightening the
already tense communal feelings, and security o I 'cials now are taking
e Pensive precautions to forestall rioting in Bombay roper during an up
rf minn Musli
h
lid
m
o
ay
An apparent attempt by Ceylon's leftist oppositionpalition to dis-
credit Prime Minister Senanayake's United National Party (UV) appears to
have been largely ineffective. With elections scheduled for 27 My, the UNP
and its allies now seem to be leading in contests for 77 of the 1'S1 elective
seats, and 19 more are considered tossups; the opposition is credited with
only 42 seats, while independents and others lead in the remainirrgl races.
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Bet
Ehe'a
Haif
S
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Al Quftaytirah
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ISRAEL MAKES STRONG MILITARY THRUST INTO LEBANON
An Israeli armored force--
probably no larger than two bat-
talions at the most--made a heavy
foray into the southeastern Leba-
nese districts of Marjayoun and
Hasibayyah early on 12 May. The
action followed a marked step-up
in activity during the previous
week by Lebanese-based Arab guer-
rilla units against Israeli border
communities, climaxed by the kill-
ing of four civilians in the set-
tlement of Qiryat Shemona. The
Israeli strike came after several
warnings to the Beirut government
and to the fedayeen of imminent
retaliation if the terrorist ac-
tivity was not halted.
Tel Aviv has given only
scanty details of the operation,
but has flatly denied Arab and
fedayeen claims of heavy fighting
and large numbers of casualties.
Israeli officials have sought--
perhaps for image-making pur-
poses--to depict the foray as a
limited one aimed at capturing
some guerrillas and destroying
their bases. They described the
action as both a "combing" and a
"screening" operation. An Israeli
spokesman said that 30 guerrillas
had been killed, 11 taken pris-
oner, and some vehicles and 40
buildings destroyed. These numbers
seem light: in an area believed to
contain 1,500 to 2,000 fedayeen.
The fedayeen themselves claim they
resisted valiantly and success-
fully, and the Israelis have ad-
mitted by implication that they
Page 2 1
met more resistance than was ex-
pected.
Lebanese communiques on the
other hand, made no reference to
fedayeen involvement in the foray.
Lebanon publicly and privately
claimed that it engaged the Is-
raeli force with its own army,
destroyed some Israeli tanks, and 25X1
suffered casualties.
Syria made a token show of
support for the fedayeen--and
lost three MIG-17s in the proc-
ess. Other Arab states, while
giving strong vocal support,
stayed clear of the Israeli force.
Iraqi artillery in Jordan shelled
Israeli positions along the bor-
der, but Iraqi forces did not
enter the fighting in Lebanon.
President Nasir's contribution
was to send his army chief of
staff to Beirut with a message
for President Hilu.
Lebanon has officially ac-
cused Israel of escalating ten-
sions along the border and of
using isolated fedayeen incidents
as a pretext for aggressive pur-
poses. n a mPPting with.-..the
Bttg... Four ambassat s President
Hilrned that the ,~. rk could
spell the end for policies of
moderation in the. _.%-.arch for a
solution to the Arab-Israeli im-
passe.
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FEDAYEEN GROUPS FORM NEW COORDINATING BODY
The 11 major fedayeen organ-
izations announced on 6 May the
formation of a new central com-
mittee within the structure of the
Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO). Membership will include
the PLO Executive Committee, the
chairman of the Palestine National
Council, the Palestine Liberation
Army commander, and representa-
tives of the various fedayeen
groups as well as of a number of
independent, nonmilitary Palestin-
ian organizations. The unified
military command, set up in Amman
last February, will be dissolved
and its functions will be absorbed
by the new committee, which is to
determine common military and po-
litical policies.
According to an unconfirmed
Syrian press report, the 11 feda-
yeen organizations are to be al-
lotted one seat each on the new
committee. If this is true, it
represents a concession to the
head of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, George
Habbash, and other leaders who
have refused to join any such uni-
fied grouping unless each organi-
zation had equal representation.
This insistence on collegiality
stems from fears that any other
system would lead to eventual dom-
ination by Fatah. Since Fatah
first gained control of the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization in
February 1969, it has in fact
sought to do just that.
Acceptance of the equal rep-
resentation arrangement by Fatah
would be something of a blow to
Yasir Arafat's pre-eminent posi-
tion.
Fatah,
o course, retains contr o of both
the Palestine National Council and
the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion's Executive Committee, and
may seek to make the new central
committee subservient to these
other entities.
This would be opposed by Hab-
bash and the leaders of the other
organizations, who will probably
attempt to use the central com-
mittee as a collegiate grouping
that would act as a counterweight
to the two bodies already con-
trolled by Fatah. Moreover, the
statement issued by the fedayeen
when they announced the formation
of the central committee under-
scored the fact that the new body
is to play "the command role in
the resistance movement."
The coming months could there-
fore see the emergence of a col-
lective leadership in the fedayeen
movement and the gradual eclipse
of Yasir Arafat. The possibility
remains, however, that the new
body will be merely another paper
organization and that each feda-
yeen group will continue to go
its own way, cooperating when it
is to the group's advantage: and
disregarding anythin considered
disadvantageous.
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RELIGIOUS REACTIONARIES PROTEST IN AFGHANISTAN
In sharp contrast with the
agitation for progessive reform
troubling many countries, Afghan-
istan is currently experiencing
demonstrations by ultraconserva-
tive religious elements opposing
the government's cautious program
of social and political change.
Afghanistan's Muslim elders--
the mullahs--have long disapproved
of King Zahir's efforts to nudge
his kingdom into the twentieth
century. Their discontent has
been fed by periodic leftist
street disorders in Kabul and by
the government's indecisive and
ineffective response to the "rab-
ble." Nevertheless, since 1929--
when they helped topple a previous
regime in Kabul--the mullahs have
rarely given vent to their dis-
pleasure with the government.
Their sporadic, localized out-
bursts of violence in outlying
areas have been handled fairly
easily by the authorities.
The election last fall, how-
ever, returned a parliament more
conservative and more rurally
oriented than its predecessor,
and the mullahs may have inter-
preted this as a go-ahead to carry
their protests to Kabul. Govern-
ment cooperation with the Soviet
Union on the Lenin centenary cele-
bration in Afghanistan in late
April provided the specific oc-
casion for mass demonstrations.
The mullahs' demands ranged from
suspension of a leftist newspaper
to a ban on women appearing in
public without the veil. Rumors
abounded that elements in the gov-
ernment had initially encouraged
the demonstrations in order to
balance leftist protests but that
the situation had then gotten out
of hand.
As mullahs from the provinces
began moving toward Kabul, offi-
cials voiced fears that they might
clash with leftists celebrating
May Day. Security precautions
in the capital were the heaviest
in recent history, the authori-
ties being fully aware that, in
this devoutly religious country,
melees involving the mullahs are
far more explosive than other
disturbances.
The mullahs relinquished the
streets to the leftists on May
Day, but subsequently resumed
their protests. Tensions began
to lessen, however, when it ap-
peared that the government had
reached an agreement with the
mullahs.
Moreover, the crisis is tak-
ing its toll. Executive-legisla-
tive relations have been exacer-
bated by the refusal of the prime
minister and his cabinet to ap-
pear before the Lower House for
questioning, and rumors are cir-
culating that the government may
fall. Leftists are again demon-
strating, which could provoke
further clerical reaction. Most
importantly, the mullahs have re-
minded the government that they
still exercise real political
power. Official policy over the
next few months will be shaped
with this very much in mind.
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IRAN TAKING NEW LOOK AT KURDISH SITUATION
The peace concluded on 11 March
between the Baathist government of
Iraq and the rebelling Kurds has
forced Iran.into a re-evaluation of
its relations with the tribesmen.
The Iranians are aware that previous
agreements reached by the Iraqis and
Kurds since 1945-..:have resulted in
nothing but renew4d hostility. How-
ever, the Iranian 1clief that the
Soviet union was ins\rumental in the
present settlement has now added a
new and--for Iran--a si1ister facet
to the problem.
Some high-level Iranis be-
lieve that the announced agement
c
ti
ons
tutes merely a cease-fi'te,
and that Kurdish distrust of the
central government continues. e
to the Kurds tends to substantiate,
thi
th
i
s
es
s. A number of Iranians,
however, interpret the cease-fire
as creating in effect two autono-
mous sections of Iraq, and the im-
plications of this are causing worry
in Tehran.
Although the role played by the
USSR is still unclear, the Iranians
are extremely suspicious of Soviet
motives and believe that the Rus-
sians have promised to assist the
Kurds in forming an independent state
that would include Iranian Kurdistan.
This independent Kurdistan would re-
ceive Soviet economic and military
aid, they fear, and would eventually
come under Soviet control. The Iran-
ians have a vivid memory of the Kurd-
ish Mahabal Republic of 1946 that,
Page
supported but not spo by Mos-
cow, appeared for a ime capable of
maintaining its in ependence.
The Irania s are particularly
jumpy because f the possibility
that Baghdad ill use the Iraqi Kurds
could als `yutilize exiled former
u~
SAVAK chef Telmur Bakhtiar's knowl-
edge 9t Iran's security organiz-
ations`to initiate insurgent oper-
aticzs in several isolated Iranian
presvinces. Tehran's nervousness is
evidenced by its recent, continu-
ng military build-up in this area.
Despite his agreement with the
Iraqis, Kurdish rebel leader Bar-
zani continues to express sincer-
ity and loyalty to the Iranians,
Iranian aid to Barzani's forces
has been halted, however, and con-
tact is being maintained only at a
low level. Most Iranians have lost
confidence in Barzani~
W le the Iranians are still
in the ocess of determining the
amount a kind of future aid, if
any, they could provide, the
Iraqi Kurds,they have begun to
pull out vulrttrable personnel
from Iraqi Kui ish areas. Never-
theless, they a e unlikely to
abandon the idea f somehow being
able to foment a bellion within
T ,
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There has been very little reaction in Latin A rica outside of Cuba to
,military developments in Cambodia. In Venez 1a Communist youths,
iitpstly high-school students, sponsored some monstrations but caused
Iittt&,,trouble.
Ficfiel~ Castro's strong reaction to the st recent operation by Cuban
exiles prob .bly is intended to divert at ntion from the faltering sugar
harvest and ti promote closer military t' s with Moscow. Castro no doubt
realizes that his~10-million-ton goal for e sugar harvest cannot be met, and
he may plan to be the exile attac as an explanation. Armed Forces
Minister Raul Castro-.bas just conclu d a lengthy visit to the Soviet Union,
where he probably negbliated for a itional Soviet military aid. Charges that
the exile attacks are being launc d from and sponsored by the US were
probably used in these talks, Fo the second time in less than a year, Soviet
naval units are visiting Cuba."-.
In Brazil security force renegade
army captain Ca s Lam3rca.
Authorities now plan an all-out
operation to destroy mareas organization.
Late last week,=the nine Latin American nations attending the terri-
torial-limits conferr ce in Uruguay signed thee `Declaration of Montevideo,"
reinforcing their aims to jurisdictional rights to the waters, seabeds, and
subsoil up to 200 miles from their shores. The cjeclaration contends that
coastal states hive the right to establish the limits c their territorial waters
and to set regulations for their use. A larger conference is scheduled for this
summer to draw up a common position for use at any i ernational meeting
on the law of the sea.
Guyana is moving to extend its control over existing foreign invest-
ments. Prime Minister Burnham has notified the major bauxiia companies
that the government is seeking equity participation in their operations. The
extent of participation desired is unclear, but one company fears that a
controlling interest will be required. Guyana now requires a 51-per-cent
minimum of Guyanese participation in all concessions to be granted in4the
future for the exploitation of natural resources.
Private Canadian-US discussions are continuing on preparations for an
international conference on the Arctic. Both sides are agreed that a confer-
ence should be limited to consideration of pollution control and navigational
standards in Arctic waters. No formal date has yet been set pending further
talks, and the participation issue is still under consideration.
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CUBA MAY ELIMINATE PRIVATE FARMS
There are signs that the Cas- j More direct criticism of the
tro regime is losing patience with
the owners of small farms and may
be contemplating action against
them. A desire for more effi-
cient land management and dissat-
isfaction with the farmers' per-
formance in the 1970 sugar har-
vest seem to be the main reasons
for the government's attitude.
Any attempt to repossess the
small farms, however, will prob-
ably be engineered with considera-
ble caution. The farmers, who with
their families number over a mil-
lion, constitute an important seg-
ment of the population, and the
regime will probably have to
sweeten the nationalization meas-
ure with some type of compensation
to avoid alienating such a key
group. If the 200,000 small farms
are nationalized, a few taxicabs
and some coastal fishing boats
will be the only remaining pri-
vately owned enterprises in Cuba.
Although the peasants in many
areas have been continually reluc-
tant to participate fully in the
government's political campaigns
and economic schemes, the first
sign of official exasperation with
small-farm owners was voiced by
Fidel Castro during a speech in
December 1969. In discussing the
mechanization of agriculture, Cas-
tro complained that "small land-
holding is not a proper method of
exploiting the land; it is pre-
historic. . It is not a na-
tural method because small plot
ownership is not consistent with
technology. . Modern technology
and highly productive machinery
require expanses of land."
small-farm owners began to appear
early this year when the provin-
cial press and radio in Matanzas,
Las Villas, and Oriente provinces
laid partial blame for harvest pro-
duction problems on the farmers
and their poor attendance record
in the canefields. In one munic-
ipality, for example, only 50
of the 200 peasants available
showed up in the fields to cut
cane. One provincial party offi-
cial cited poor preparatory politi-
cal work by the government-con-
trolled National Association of
Small Farmers (ANAP) as the rea-
son for the farmers' recalcitrant
attitude.
Government thinking may have
been indicated last January when
ANAP president Jose Ramirez headed
an agricultural delegation to the
USSR to study collective farms.
In a speech Ramirez said, "Al-
though there have been great eco-
nomic and sociopolitical changes
among our peasants and rural work-
ers, we must state that we are
only beginning the transformation
of our agriculture."
The only positive action
against the small-farm owners so
far has occurred in the past. few
Ives occ is being confiscated. If
this practice draws only mild reac-
tion, the government may make more
drastic moves. An indication of
the government's policy may appear
on 17 May, Peasant's Day, and the
eleventh anniversary of Cuba's first
agrarian reform law, or on 26 July,
when Castro is expected to deliver
a major speech. x
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in certain provinces
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DOMINICAN RESIDENT HEADED OR HE-ELECTION ICTORy
President Balaguer is ex-
pected to win re-election on 16
May by a comfortable-margin de-
spite shifting opposition politi-
cal alliances and cont uing po-
litical violence.
It is doubtful that th& op-
position parties can overcome-
Balaguer's lead, even if last-min-
ute agreements result in an out-
right political alliance between
some of the parties or in further
abstentions. Balaguer's advan-
tages as an incumbent, his mili-
tary support, and the general
public's respect for his work
over the last four years have
put him in a commanding positi
The negotiations among oppos
groups, which are designed
a common candidate, have
but the maneuvering is m
dicative of the parties
ual weakness than of
tential strength. 0.
which should provi
against expected
n.
ion
find
ntinued,
e in-
individ-
eir po-
observers
he contest,
e some buffer
Juan Boscl;''s major opposition
Dominican Rev(lutionary Party (PRD)
which is ab gaining from the elec-
tions on g>unds of repression,
is giving /lukewarm support to Vice
President. Lora for the presidency.
Althouvhl, PRD spokesmen continue to
dissociate themselves publicly
fF91f,or "the elections, local party
oizations reportedly are work-
i Lora. PRD leaders have
said they will not t6'rce their
followers to abstUh from voting,
and Lora's ticker, despite its
rightist tinge,. ppears to them
to be the leaf offensive option.
Althh Balaguer needs only
a plural' y of votes to win, he
wants Majority in order to avoid
being ssailed by the PRD and
othe as a minority president.
If e receives less than 50 per-
c t of the vote, it will encour-
ge the opposition to attempt to
oJst him. If the vote in the
ci"tj_es--where Balaguer is not
popu3ar--is low because of PRD
abstention, the President stands
a good chance of equaling the 57
percent-*,
otal he achieved in 1966.
At that tens, however, he faced
Bosch in a .essentially two-man
race.
whi
Pre-election violence,
has contipued at a
tively
three doz
wounded in
`gh level,,, with
persona ki
Although the C
ties on elec
lence prob
the ball
do not
jor e
po
on day`;
y will not
ing. The Comm
eem to be plannin
ort; instead, they a
hope that some of the
-ition parties will attempt ',o
st Balaguer before the August\
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RADICALS REMAIN IN BOLIVIAN CABINET
The first cabinet crisis
since President Ovando took over
the government last September was
ended--at least temporarily--when
a new cabinet was announced on 12
May. The cabinet submitted its
collective resignation on 10 May,
presumably to give the President
a free hand to implement an admin-
istrative reorganization of the
various ministries.
Labor Minister Rolon was t
prime candidate to be replaced
SECRET
following the government's total
failure to control or even to in-
fluence events at the national
congress of the Bolivian Labor
Central (COB), which finally
closed this week. Ovando had
been seeking organized labor's
support for his "revolutionary"
government, but the COB congress
took a distinct antigovernment
line. The military's old enemy,
the fiery labor leader Juan Lechin
who has been exiled from Bolivia
for most of the past six years,
was permitted by Ovando to re-
turn to Bolivia and was elected
to the top COB leadership posi-
tion. In addition, a resolution
was passed demanding that Bolivia
be made a socialist state.
and Information Minister Bailey.
plan to force the iasue or even
move against Ovando if he does
not soon take steps to replace
or at least curb the influence
of Minister of Energy Quiroga
It was in the name of the
armed forces that the Ovando gov-
ernment came to power, and many
of the top leaders have since be-
come disenchanted with the course
the government has taken. The
civilians Ovando appointed to
give his cabinet a revolutionary
image are being blamed for the
government's drift to the left
and even for the antigovernment
and antimilitary line of the COB
congress. Military leaders, there-
fore, have demanded the removal
of the leftist civilians and may
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CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT BLACK POWER.-
In the aftermath of the Trin-
idad disorders last month, a ma-
jority of the Caribbean governments
are reassessing their public posi-
tions toward Black Power and are
adopting more stringent controls
over its proponents.
Many of the Caribbean leaders
are concerned that events similar
to those in Trinidad could disrupt
the peace and prosperjty of their
states if they permit militants to
agitate and preach racial violence.
There is general agreement that
Trinidad's Prime Minister Williams
waited too long before trying to
exercise control over Black Power
elements whose demonstrations 'and
subsequent arrest led to the recent
unrest. As a result, the goveri
ments appear to be less relu giant
to limit the activities of Back
Power elements and more reo(dy to
risk political attack frojft radi-
Prime Minister Williams
(Trinidad and Tobago
cals ~'fi the in-
terelt of appeal-
in9einstead to
b oader politi-
al sentiment
and preserving
public safety.
Some governments
also seem to be
more concerned
about the poten-
tial loss of
tourist revenues
than the politi-
cal risk involved
in confronting
the militants.
Prhne Minister Barrow
(Barbados)
TBarbados,
the to for the
seg6nd Regional
Back Power Con-
._ erence scheduled
for 9 to 12 July,
Prime Minister
Barrow has pro-
posed legislation
that would make
it a criminal of-
fense to preach
violence or racial
hatred. He also
intends to prevent
nonnationals from
11participating in the country's po-
litical activity, requiring offi-
cial clearance of all speakers and
topics before permission to hold a
meeting is granted. Barrow is ap-
parently determined to maintain the
,.position that militants should not
ke banned from Barbados but con-
tolled after they get there. Last
weep Stokely Carmichael was detained
at tie airport, then permitted to
stay Overnight, but was not allowed
to spear. at a political rally in
his honor,
Many other Caribbean leaders
are also relctant to give in to
the demands of='?;the radicals. Ja-
maican Prime Minister Shearer has
said that he will"-deal harshly
and rapidly with anX incipient an-
archistic developmen`t,. Recently,
some of the smaller i-ands have
manifested their conce? by banning
travel of the more promi'ent Black
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Suharto s Indonesia
Secret
N2 14
15 May 1970
No. 0370/70A
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SECRET
Suharto, president of Indonesia for three years, will visit the United
States officially and for the first time from 26 May to 2 June. He is expected
to discuss the Cambodian situation and Southeast Asian affairs generally,
and probably hopes to reach agreement on a modest military acquisitions
program that has been under consideration for some weeks. He will express
his appreciation of past US economic assistance, and, as a means of main-
taining the so-far favorable climate in Washington toward aid to Indonesia,
will talk with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and speak to the
National Press Club.
The 49-year-old Suharto has placed his stamp of caution and prag-
matism on his administration. He has eased forward on a number of prob-
lems while consistently maintaining priority on economic improvement.
Indonesia under Suharto continues to make progress on the difficult tasks of
economic rehabilitation and is preparing for national elections in mid-1971.
The proscribed Communist Party, which remains under strong government
pressure, is scattered and ineffective.
Although ultimate government control is in the hands of the army,
civilian participation is considerable and effective, particularly in the eco-
nomic sector. The army considers it necessary to perpetuate its political role
at least until economic recovery has been achieved, and will seek to do so in
the coming elections and to reinforce its position with civilian alliances.
Although Indonesia follows a nonaligned foreign policy, its interna-
tional relations in recent years have been weighted toward the West, from
which it receives critically needed financial assistance. Largely because of
Indonesia's strongly anti-Communist domestic stance, relations with the
USSR and Eastern Europe have been correct but cool in the post-Sukarno
era; ties with China were suspended in 1967, and prospects for an early
resumption of diplomatic relations are poor.
Other than continuing negotiations for economic assistance with both
non-Communist and Communist nations, Indonesia's principal international
objective is to develop its influence in Southeast Asia. Major facets of this
policy have been the founding and subsequent support of the five-member
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Djakarta's recent initiative that
resulted in the scheduling of an Asian conference on Cambodia.
Special Report - 1
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SECRET
Suharto's rise from poor boy to the top
ranks of army and political leadership is still fairly
unusual in Indonesia, yet not much attention is
paid to it. Suharto seems to be accepted for what
he is-a disciplined, reliable, capable individual.
He cannot inspire the colorful copy that former
president Sukarno did, but there seems to be
general satisfaction that he does not.
with the rank of lieutenant colonel, and then
began a steady and quietly distinguished rise in
independent Indonesia. By 1963 Suharto had
been appointed to the second most senior post in
the army as head of the Strategic Command, a
combat-ready strike force. It was logical that he
should assume temporary leadership of the army
when the Communists launched their abortive
coup on the morning of 1 October 1965, kid-
naping and later murdering army commander
General Yani and five other generals.
Suharto was born of humble parents in a
Central Java village in 1921 and spent a childhood
eventful chiefly for being shuttled from relative
to relative after his parents' separation. In June
1940, bored with his job as a bank clerk, Suharto
volunteered for the Dutch colonial army, and
remained in the armed forces under the Japanese.
He fought effectively against the Dutch, emerged
Special Report
When President Sukarno, who had been in-
volved in planning the Communists' antiarmy ac-
tion, instructed army leaders to nominate three
candidates for the position of army commander,
they submitted only one name-Suharto. Al-
though Sukarno regarded Suharto as "too stub-
born and too anti-Communist," he had no
- 2 - 15 May 1970
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~r.uicr, i
alternative but to install him as army commander
and did so on 16 October 1965.
As head of the developing new Indonesian
leadership, Suharto believed that his major tasks
during the following year and a half were to
maintain the cohesiveness of the army, crush the
large Communist Party, and so reduce President
Sukarno's power and prestige that he could be
quietly and peacefully removed from office. Su-
harto accomplished all three objectives, the last in
an elaborately phased program, which at the time
was criticized by many of his supporters as need-
lessly slow. Perhaps it could have been done more
rapidly without disruptive consequences, but Su-
harto's schedule gave him and his military and
civilian colleagues time to sort out some of Indo-
nesia's economic and political complexities and to
ease the transition from the old order to the new.
On 12 March 1967, the Indonesian Congress
unanimously passed a decree declaring Sukarno
"no longer capable" of fulfilling his presidential
duties and naming General Suharto acting presi-
dent. A year later, on 27 March, Congress elected
him to a five-year term as full president.
Suharto's initial image after the 1965 coup
as a strong and resourceful albeit cautious leader
has remained valid. He has shown strength and
resourcefulness in dealing with the nation's urgent
economic and security difficulties. In approaching
the baffling problem of the domestic political
situation, he has demonstrated cautiousness. The
severe economic deterioration and the threat of
Communist resurgence both demanded action,
and these urgent requirements provided both a
valid and a convenient rationale for imposing,
until recently, a partial moratorium on political
activity. Given the fragmented state of Indo-
nesia's political party system, the task of charting
the way toward a predominantly civilian govern-
ment that would be representative, non-Com-
Special Report
munist, and still stable is indeed formidable. Su-
harto's caution, which his critics see as needlessly
stalemating the political situation, probably stems
from a variety of reasons. These include a basic
distrust of politicians, the need to feel his way,
the priority given economic improvement, and
the lack of a clear idea as to how to restructure
and redirect the still-immature Indonesian party
system from its present fragmented and parochial
base to one along program-oriented lines.
Suharto has made no effort to disguise the
fact that the army is the major political force in
Indonesia and his own chief support. He and his
colleagues feel strongly that it is the only organi-
zation capable of administering the country dur-
ing this period of economic rehabilitation and
political reorganization. It is the only cohesive,
nationally organized group in the country, its
loyalties are nationally focused, and with the
passing of time, it has increasingly avoided the
regional and ethnic divisions that afflict those
civilian organizations aspiring to a national role.
When General Suharto, then still commander
of the army, assumed the presidency in March
1967, the Indonesian Army achieved greater and
more effective participation in government than
ever before in its 25-year role of nation building.
Although Suharto has since relinquished com-
mand of the army, he remains the minister of
defense and as such is commander in chief of the
armed forces. In the 23-man cabinet the army
holds three other portfolios, and the navy and air
force hold one each. The military, particularly the
army, is well represented in all departments at
subministerial levels and in industrial and agricul-
tural state enterprises. Army officers serve as gov-
ernors in 14 of the nation's 26 provinces, and
junior officers and noncommissioned officers
hold a substantial proportion of subprovincial
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jobs down to the village level. Military appointees
constitute 18 percent of the membership of par-
liament and congress, and hold approximately
half of the nation's ambassadorial posts.
Suharto and the army uphold the doctrine
of the military's "dual function": the military
must participate actively in the nation's political
and economic life, as well as provide its defense
and security force. Politically, army leaders seek a
middle road between what they regard as the
"free-for-all" parliamentary democracy of the
1950s and former president Sukarno's subsequent
authoritarian rule. This middle way would permit
significant popular participation but would retain
a strong central leadership and a major political
role for the army.
In the economic sector, the army vigorously
argues that economic improvement is a prerequi-
site for political stability and a necessity in count-
ering a future renascent Communist Party. Su-
harto himself is an especially dedicated supporter
of this line, but he has entrusted the formulation
of economic policy not to the military but to a
group of talented and well-trained nonparty ci-
vilians.
From the beginning of his leadership role in
October 1965, Suharto has worked to develop a
united military team and to eliminate interservice
rivalries. Although the navy and air force are
much smaller than the army (army-250,000,
navy-48,000, air force-30,000), Suharto has con-
sistently included the two smaller services in the
military's national role.
A military reorganization announced in Oc-
tober 1969 and gradually being implemented pro-
vides for centralized Department of Defense auth-
ority over the three services and for an integrated
command down to the provincial level. The chain
of command runs from Suharto through six inte-
Special Report
grated theatre commands. The change increases
Suharto's personal control over the armed forces
and should make for a more flexible andrespon-
sive instrument for carrying out the military's
functions.
In directing national life and interpreting the
role of the military, Suharto has insisted on the
observance of legal forms, has tried to listen to
the civilian voice-although this effort is some-
times obstructed by the military around him-and
has displayed sensitivity to civilian charges of
"creeping militarism" and corruption. These traits
of sensitivity, caution, and tolerance have inclined
Suharto to pursue a considerably more liberal
administration than could have developed under
more authoritarian military personalities on the
scene. Although he is unwilling to diminish the
army's ultimate authority-fearing any one of sev-
eral results such as political instability, a turn
toward an Islamic state, or Communist resur-
gence-he nevertheless strongly believes that the
military bears heavy responsibilities not to misuse
its power and authority.
For example, when students demonstrated
against rising prices early this year, Suharto or-
dered that not a shot be fired and that cabinet
ministers meet with and answer the students'
questions. He has told military com-
manders-who, because of Indonesia's economic
predicament and budgeted funds, are compelled
to engage in fund-raising activities for troop wel-
fare-that these activities must be truly directed
toward this purpose and not be "obstacles to
national development." On the whole, his ap-
proach to government indicates a continuing in-
tention to avoid military authoritarianism yet to
maintain the ascendency of the military as it
guides the nation in achieving economic develop-
ment and political modernization.
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Although the army is clearly predominant,
civilians hold a number of important posts in the
cabinet, bureaucracy, and legislature. Those hold-
ing the more responsible positions, however, are
nonparty technicians or individuals with little po-
litical support. Political party members, who had
hoped that the downfall of former president Su-
karno would restore the parties to greater influ-
ence, find that although they have a larger voice
than during the last years of Sukarno's rule, their
present position falls far short of aspirations.
There are seventeen civilians, eight of whom
are members of political parties, in the 23-man
cabinet, and civilians predominate in the ap-
pointed congress and parliament. Suharto has en-
couraged these two bodies to carry out their
constitutionally prescribed functions (congress
makes policy and parliament legislates), and they
have indeed from time to time provided a check
on the executive. Suharto has urged the army to
respect and support civilian officials in the prov-
inces.
At the same time, however, Suharto relies a
great deal on a few military colleagues for advice
on day-to-day affairs, a fact that tends to insulate
him from civilian views other than those of the
economists. The inefficiency of the bureaucracy,
moreover, has caused Suharto to rely consider-
ably on the army hierarchy for administrative
assistance.
Suharto shares the army's distrust of po-
litical parties in general and, in particular, of
Moslem parties, which account for a plurality of
the electorate. This distrust stems from the na-
tion's experience with parliamentary democracy
(1949-1956), the parties' irresponsibility during
those years, their concern for acquiring greater
power rather than for achieving national goals,
Special Report
and the series of unstable coalition cabinets that
characterized that period. The military's par-
ticular negativism toward Moslems is rooted in its
memory of the fanatical Darul Islam movement,
which tried to establish a theocratic state by
armed force for more than ten years before it was
crushed. The army also remembers that the
Masjumi, the modernist Moslem party dissolved in
1960, supported the 1958 provincial revolt, an-
other crisis that the Djakarta government had to
settle by military force. Reinforcing these fears is
the suspicion that all faithful Moslems, militant or
not, want to replace Indonesia's secular society
with a Moslem state. Of the three major parties in
Indonesia-the Moslem Scholars (the party of
traditional Moslems), the Indonesian Moslem
Party (modernist and successor to the Masjumi),
and the secular National Party, the army clearly
prefers the secular Nationalists.
The parties to a considerable extent have
earned the army's lack of confidence. As organi-
zations, they are poorly disciplined, indecisive,
and unable to formulate a national program. They
tend to be special-interest groups that are ethni-
cally or religiously based. Although within the
parties, particularly the Moslem Party, there are
individuals who have a strong sense of national
purpose, they have so far been unable to translate
this into a program of action. The army's exclu-
sion from leadership roles, of some of the very
individuals in both the Moslem and National par-
ties who might stimulate a healthier development,
however, merely perpetuates the present stagnant,
unproductive atmosphere pervading the parties.
The army is currently trying to develop an
organization of functional groups as another ci-
vilian vehicle for political support for the Suharto
regime. Functional groups (youth, intellectuals,
labor, women) have long been an element of the
Indonesian political scene, and the civilians in
parliament theoretically are about evenly divided
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Indonesia
SOUTH
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between functional group representatives and
those of political parties. These groups have had
many purposes over the years, but one of them
consistently has been to give legislative support to
the executive as a counter to opposition from the
parties. The army's intended vehicle, the Joint
Secretariat of Functional Groups (SEKBER
GOLKAR), as presently constituted is a loosely
coordinated group of organizations with no sig-
nificant political experience. It is being reor-
ganized, restaffed, and groomed to participate in
the 1971 elections.
Modernizing civilian groups, mostly compris-
ing individuals unaffiliated with the political par-
ties, see SEKBER GOLKAR as possibly offering
the opening wedge for the restructuring of the
political party system. If SEKBER GOLKAR can
indeed be transformed into a political party, it
could develop into a broadly based organization
neither dependent on one region nor having only
a narrow religious appeal. Its candidates would
ideally run on a pragmatic platform of economic
improvement and social progress. It is unlikely
that in the year remaining before elections
SEKBER GOLKAR can become a major party,
but if it can develop even a small but firm base
and a successful working relationship between the
army and some nationally focused civilians, it will
have achieved a good deal.
PROGRAMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS:.
ECONOMY, SECURITY, POLITICS
The primary domestic policies of the Su-
harto administration are continued economic im-
provement, the prevention of a Communist resur-
gence, and movement toward representative,
stable, non-Communist government. Given the ex-
treme economic deterioration caused by Su-
karno's economic excesses and neglect of basic
needs, the Suharto administration has made im-
pressive progress in pursuing these policies. The
Special Report
major achievement has been to bring the galloping
inflation of the early post-Sukarno years to a halt.
In April 1969, a modest five-year development
program was launched. The program, which calls
for an expenditure of roughly US 4.5 billion
dollars, is small in terms of the nation's size and
needs, but its goals were determined on the basis
of Indonesia's capabilities and the estimated avail-
ability of funds. The plan emphasizes agriculture,
the achievement particularly of self-sufficiency in
rice, improved transportation and communica-
tions facilities, and public services.
Although all recovery targeted for the first
year of the plan was not achieved, some signifi-
cant gains were registered. Rice production was
up in 1969, and most of the main roads in Java
were improved. Export earnings increased, and
imports-which also increased-showed a sub-
stantially higher proportion of capital goods and
raw materials in 1969 as compared with consumer
goods than in previous years.
Indonesia's economic recovery is being un-
derwritten by a group of Western nations and
international organizations with the US and Japan
as principal donors. Since 1966, this group has
pledged more than $1.5 billion. These same na-
tions have also annually postponed payments on
debts that Indonesia negotiated with them during
the Sukarno era. They now have tentatively
agreed on a longer term rescheduling of amortiza-
tion that would permit repayment over a 30-year
period, with no interest during the first 15 years.
The Soviet Union, Indonesia's largest single
creditor, renegotiated debt payments in 1966, but
so far has refused to arrange a longer term re-
scheduling. It may be willing to do so now that
Western creditors have agreed on terms.
The Suharto government welcomes foreign
investment. In the past three years, it has signed
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some 30 oil exploration contracts and over 165
other contracts-chiefly in mining and forestry-
with foreign companies. Eventually these invest-
ments will benefit Indonesia but only after the
long period necessary for exploration and survey
work. The biggest hope for a quick return is the
oil industry, which already nets the government
substantial foreign-exchange receipts.
On Vie debit side, Indonesia starts its de-
velopment from a low base with a lamentably
deteriorated infrastructure and a society oriented
toward conformity rather than change. Manage-
rial and technical inadequacies are hampering im-
plementation of the development plan. There is
virtually no effective entrepreneurial class beyond
the small Chinese minority. The country's most
fundamental problems-a rapidly growing popu-
lation and unavailability of land-resist early solu-
tion, and for the present largely negate economic
growth. The problem is particularly acute on Java
and Madura, where 65 percent of the population,
now estimated at 118 million, occupies seven
percent of the nation's land area. Family planning
is only beginning and on a very small scale.
Suharto and many of his civilian and mili-
tary colleagues believe the latent appeal of the
left can be defeated only through an improved
living standard for the average citizen. While giv-
ing priority to its long-term economic program,
the government maintains a tight intelligence-
security effort against Communist Party remnants
and has continued to screen military and civilian
organizations for Communist elements.
The party, crushed in 1965, suffered a sec-
ond calamitous defeat in 1968 when it failed in
an effort at military resurgence in East Java and
lost most of its postcoup leadership. The party's
present active strength cannot be calculated, but
it is roughly estimated that about 1,000
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Communists still maintain organizational ties and
that a far smaller number are engaged in or-
ganized work. Active cadres appear to fall into
two groups, both of which are pro-Peking in the
sense that they see the ultimate need for armed
struggle. The larger faction, for the present, how-
ever, preaches peaceful rebuilding, while the
smaller demands an immediate paramilitary ef-
fort. Small groups are reportedly engaged in
minor terrorism in Central Java, but whether they
are acting out of conviction or have undertaken
banditry primarily for economic survival is not
known.
The government faces a problem on what to
do with imprisoned Communists who now total
67,000, some of whom have been in prison since
1965. These individuals represent a financial bur-
den and an international embarrassment in that
their continued incarceration has drawn wide-
spread criticism. The government has released
about 4,000 of the some 26,000 Communist pris-
oners who had little status in the movement, and
plans to release more this year.
The better indoctrinated Communist prison-
ers, about 11,000, are gradually being resettled in
agricultural colonies either in "closed villages" or
on remote islands. The hard core, some 5,000,
will remain in prison and eventually will be
brought to trial. Another 27,000-presumably
those more recently arrested-have yet to be
thoroughly interrogated, and no determination
has yet been made as to their status.
As an adjunct to both the security effort and
the economic plan, the armed forces conduct a
civic action program. This is essentially carried
out at the village level, and involves small-scale
road and bridge building and irrigation projects.
The US has given modest support to civic action
and is now expanding its aid program from $5
million to $15 million. Washington's military as-
sistance program will continue to be focused on
civic action, but some combat material probably
will be included.
Despite government misgivings over possible
disruption of the economic development pro-
gram, national elections in mid-1971 now appear
definite, but they are unlikely to result in any
significant change in parliament and congress un-
less the army's plans go drastically awry. The two
bodies will not be completely elected; instead,
their memberships will be chosen by a variety of
methods.
Until last fall, the government appeared to
be moving toward a second postponement of elec-
tions. It argued that such elections would be
costly, that the country needed to concentrate on
economic development, that elections could dis-
rupt the economic program, or that they might
even promote political instability. During a series
of consultations that Suharto held with political
party leaders last October, however, only one
party-the small Catholic Party-took the hint
and agreed that elections should be postponed.
The other eight pressed Suharto to hold elections
on schedule. Apparently on the strength of these
consultations and to the considerable surprise of
the parties, Suharto decided to move forward.
Presumably he believed that, all things consid-
ered, it would be unwise to frustrate the parties
further by another postponement.
In November, parliament finally passed the
enabling legislation; election funds have now been
budgeted, and election committees formed. Some
of the parties, particularly the National Party and
the Indonesian Moslem Party, are actively recruit-
ing. The army is pushing hard in the provinces
with its organization of functional groups
(SEKBER GOLKAR), and in April it put pressure
on the National Party to elect a chairman who
showed promise of being susceptible of army di-
rection.
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The election bills provide for a 460-member
parliament and a 920-seat congress. The govern-
ment will appoint from the military and from
nonmilitary functional groups 100 members of
parliament and one third (307) of the congres-
sional membership. The division between military
and nonmilitary in this appointed sector is set at
three to one. The remaining 360 seats in parlia-
ment will be filled by election, using an elaborate
system of apportioning seats that should give Java
approximately 183 seats and the other islands
177. Parliament sits as a body in congress, and the
remaining congressional seats will be partially
elected and partially appointed.
Present indications are that the government
hopes to prevent the elections from causing either
a major disruption of national unity or a serious
diversion from the economic program. Although
campaigning, as now scheduled, will be permitted
for about ten months, parties have been ad-
monished not to discredit other parties or groups,
not to take issue with the five basic principles of
the Indonesian state (nationalism, international-
ism, democracy, social justice, and belief in God),
not to disturb national stability and tranquility,
and to stress the government's economic develop-
ment program. The military will screen all elec-
tion slates.
President Suharto has suggested that the
nine parties and SEKBER GOLKAR organize
themselves into three groups-nationalist, re-
ligious, and functional-to contest the elections.
If he expects thereby to reduce the number of
slates from ten to three, he is unlikely to succeed.
The parties have "agreed in principle" with Su-
harto's suggestion but so far have shown no will-
ingness to submerge their respective identities.
The army hopes, through the use of
SEKBER GOLKAR and the cultivation of the
National Party, to see the election of a substantial
number of proadministration candidates. These,
with the appointed membership, would give the
government a more than adequate majority in
both parliament and congress and would ensure
Suharto's re-election by the congress in 1973.
Although Indonesia officially espouses a pol-
icy of nonalignment, foreign relations are in fact
oriented toward the non-Communist world. This
follows partly from the government's domestic
anti-Communist position but chiefly from Indo-
nesia's need for foreign economic assistance avail-
able largely from the West and from Japan. Never-
theless, Indonesia maintains correct relations with
the Soviet Union and with other European bloc
nations and has sought assistance from them as
well. Relations with Communist China have been
suspended since 1967 and show no sign of early
improvement.
Other than negotiating foreign aid, Indo-
nesia's principal international interest is that of
developing regional influence in Southeast Asia.
With the largest population in the area, Indonesia
sees itself as the potential area leader, particularly
as Western forces either withdraw or reduce their
presence. For the time being, Djakarta views the
five-member Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN), which it established in 1967 with
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singa-
pore, as the principal vehicle for promoting its
influence. Indonesia has been the most active
member in trying to keep the organization alive.
Indonesia is aware that it needs time to deal
with its domestic problems and to develop the
economic, political, and military base necessary
for the ambitious role it envisions. It is concerned
that the US may withdraw from Southeast Asia
before the area has achieved reasonably enduring
stability and security. At the same time, the
Nixon Doctrine neatly complements Indonesia's
aspirations.
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Foreign Minister Malik's recent initiative,
which led to the scheduling of the 16-17 May
conference on Cambodia, reflects one facet of
Indonesia's regional ambitions. Although genu-
inely concerned over developments in Cambodia,
Djakarta also sees them as an opportunity per-
mitting Indonesia to assert itself.
Djakarta shares Asia's general ambivalence
toward Japan. Although Indonesia needs and en-
courages Japanese economic assistance and invest-
ment, it is concerned over Japan's economic asser-
tiveness throughout the area and over indications
of Japan's increased interest in military power.
Indonesia fears that the US is pushing Japan to-
ward assuming an increased area role at a time
when Tokyo may be becoming less responsive to
US influence.
The Suharto government is gradually becom-
ing more active on the international scene, but
diplomacy remains secondary except as it sup-
ports domestic needs. The government's major
preoccupation continues to be with domestic
problems.
Although the Suharto government harbors
many weaknesses, its progress to date more than
outweighs its defects. The political posturing and
economic neglect of the Sukarno era have long
since given way to quiet, steady action toward
meeting basic economic requirements, to an
awareness of the need for a restructuring of the
political party system, and to the responsible con-
duct of foreign affairs.
Least progress has been made in the domes-
tic political sector. Although the government has
attempted to move toward modernization, it has
been obstructed by the entrenched parties. This
mutual distrust between the military and the par-
ties is more than a military-civilian rivalry. It is
also fed by long-standing religious-secular differ-
ences and ethnically based cleavages within Indo-
nesian society. Ethnic, regional, and religious
loyalties, less submerged now than in the days of
Sukarno's emotionally based supernationalism,
are being more openly expressed under Suharto.
At this time, however, they do not affect Indo-
nesia's very real sense of nationhood or threaten
any dramatic schisms.
The army sees national elections as tending
to encourage, under the present party system, the
centrifugal forces of Indonesian political life. Al-
though Suharto has reluctantly decided to pro-
ceed with elections in 1971, they will be carefully
controlled both to prevent a factionalizing effect
on political life and to perpetuate the army's role.
Suharto's outstanding qualities as Indonesian
leader have been his caution and patient skill in
restructuring Sukarno's Indonesia. Although
dynamic and modernist elements, both civilian
and military, have fretted and criticized, Suharto
has slowed the pace, and has achieved dramatic
changes without rending Indonesia's delicately
structured society. Responsible civilians, both in
the parties and outside them, see no immediate
alternative to the army's present role, but hope
that within ten years enough progress will have
been made to permit a return to a predominantly
civilian government based on a more modernized
political system.
The S u h ar t o government's over-all ac-
complishments to date, although commendable,
are only initial steps toward the economic, social,
and political development required if Indonesia is
to fulfill the needs of its people, avoid political
instability, and achieve the area leadership role to
which it aspires.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Detente and Defense: The Issues of the NATO Ministerial
Secret
N2 15
15 May 1970
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Detente and Defense: The Issues of the NATO Ministerial
NATO Headquarters in Brussels
The role of NATO in both detente and defense is in transition. The
meeting of the foreign ministers of the 15 Alliance members in Rome on
26-27 May is a way station on the road to an uncertain destination in both
areas. Soviet and East European initiatives for a Conference on European
Security-designed to win acceptance of the status quo in Europe-have
found popular appeal in some West European countries. The Allies are
attempting to find ways to respond that will enhance NATO's detente image
without jeopardizing the security of the Alliance. At the same time, they are
embarking on a wide-ranging survey of the defense needs of the Alliance in
the 1970s, set in the context of growing uncertainty in Europe about what
changes will be made in the US commitment to NATO in the future and
what the European reaction should be.
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NATO ................. and the Warsaw Pact
NATO members
Warsaw Pact members
'France is a NATO member, but does not participate in the integrated command structure.
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Determination of the role NATO should
play in the pursuit of detente in general and
European detente in particular is the most im-
mediate question facing the May ministerial. The
NATO ministerial last December steered away
from any new initiatives in the area of European
security, in spite of the desire of a number of
Allies to come up with a more enthusiastic re-
sponse to Warsaw Pact overtures for a Conference
on European Security. The final communique
turned a cold shoulder to the Pact proposal for
early convocation of such a conference on the
grounds that Moscow does not intend that such a
gathering negotiate basic political issues leading to
agreement on a new security arrangement for
central Europe. The convening of such a meeting,
for the Soviets, would be an end in itself: to
confirm the status quo in Europe. The com-
munique reiterated the Allied offer to discuss
specific issues, such as balanced force reductions;
ways to mitigate East-West tensions caused by the
military situation in Central Europe; and im-
proved avenues for economic, technical, and cul-
tural exchanges.
Alliance members were encouraged to pur-
sue bilateral contacts with the East, however, and
the West Germans were specifically supported in
their bid to the Soviet Union for a renunciation
of force agreement. A more forthcoming Allied
position on the security question was left con-
tingent on visible progress in such bilateral ef-
forts, which presumably would demonstrate a
chance for success for broader East-West
initiatives.
Bilateral contacts since last December, al-
though not very productive so far, have helped
convince a number of the Allies that there is
cause to go ahead with a strong NATO overture
to the East on European security. They cite West
Special Report
Germany's negotiations with the Soviet Union
and Poland, the talks between Chancellor Brandt
and East German Premier Stoph, and the recent
agreement between Bonn and Pankow on regu-
lating and improving postal and telecommunica-
tions traffic. This progress, together with the re-
sumption of the SALT in Vienna and renewed
talks on Berlin between the US, the UK, France,
and the Soviet Union, has led to'concern on the
part of some smaller NATO members that
decisions affecting their security may be taken
without their having been adequately heard. A
more ambitious multilateral effort, although it
might have no great prospect of success, would at
least give these countries a forum.
In any case, the prime consideration for
many of these states is their domestic situation.
With East-West detente such a popular issue, these
governments find it politic to deprive their
opposition of the high ground by appearing them-
selves to be working zealously for detente. It is
primarily for this reason that they find US posi-
tions inadequate, particularly on a Conference on
European Security (CES).
MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE
REDUCTIONS
NATO consideration of the European secu-
rity question in recent years has revolved around
the topic of mutual and balanced force reductions
(MBFR). Meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968, the
NATO ministers signaled the Soviet Union that
the Alliance was prepared to discuss MBFR. In,
answer to the growing domestic pressures in the
member states for cuts in defense spending, the
ministers also reaffirmed that the over-all military
capability of NATO should not be reduced except
as part of mutual and balanced reductions with
the Warsaw Pact.
In the spring of 1968, NATO experts had
already drawn up some force reduction models as
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a guide for future discussions in the Alliance and
a possible basis for negotiations at a later date.
Although the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in August 1968 brought NATO's study
of MBFR to a screeching halt and eased domestic
pressures for cuts in defense expenditures, the
20th anniversary session of NATO held in Wash-
ington in April 1969 again announced NATO's
willingness to join with the Warsaw Pact countries
in a search for topics that might fruitfully be
discussed in an East-West forum. The ministers
referred back to the "Reykjavik Signal" on
MBFR, to which the Pact countries had not re-
plied. Work was subsequently resumed on the
MBFR models, and the continuation of this en-
deavor was strongly supported at the December
ministerial that year.
The working group charged with preparation
of the MBFR models has produced five illustra-
tive versions, which after further review are
scheduled to be submitted to the May ministerial.
The models fall into two categories: one sym-
metrical and four asymmetrical. The symmetrical
version envisions NATO and Warsaw Pact force
reductions on an equal basis. The four asym-
metrical versions posit a larger draw-down of War-
saw Pact than of NATO forces to take into
account the Warsaw Pact's advantages, particu-
larly the relative ease of return of its forces to the
central European area.
The models point up but do not resolve a
major difficulty that would be involved in any
attempt to implement MBFR. To be acceptable
to the Soviet Union at all, the proposed reduc-
tions would probably have to be symmetrical, but
this would pose great difficulties for the West.
Moreover, it is not clear how a proposed thinning
out of forces in Central Europe would be related
to strategic arms limitations. The French lately
have been warning that the USSR might try to
use MBFR to obtain a "denuclearization" of the
areas involved.
The Federal Republic last year was generally
dubious about the Warsaw Pact proposals for a
Conference on European Security, and it still
rejects a conference in the form proposed by the
Soviets. Since December, however, West German
policy has taken a new tack. The Germans now
appear ready to countenance movement toward
discussion of European security issues if the main
subject is mutual and balanced force reductions.
A principal reason for this is that Bonn,
more than other NATO capitals, fears that politi-
cal and financial pressures will lead the US Gov-
ernment to reduce its forces in Europe after mid-
1971. No West German Government would wel-
come a weakening of Western forces in Europe
while Warsaw Pact forces remain undiminished.
Yet it would be financially and politically
difficult for Bonn to make direct budgetary con-
tributions to the support of US forces. Another
option, an increase in West German forces, would
not only be costly and unpopular at home, but
would also cause a furor abroad and would ter-
minate Chancellor Brandt's detente policy. This
policy is based on the strong conviction that the
division of Europe must be overcome.
In this situation, Bonn officials view a mu-
tual and balanced force reduction as a desirable
program, both for its own value and for tactical
reasons. If NATO and the Warsaw Pact reduce
their forces at the same time, the US could carry
out a reduction without the Soviets gaining a
preponderance of strength and without the West
Europeans having to make a greater contribution.
It is not clear whether West German leaders be-
lieve that Moscow would actually be interested in
an MBFR centerpiece for a security conference.
They have perhaps been encouraged by the So-
viets' hints that they would consider discussing
the topic, but only at a conference beyond the
first CES. Even if the Soviet response is
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ultimately unfavorable, Bonn probably hopes that
discussions of the possibility of MBFR will reduce
pressure within the US for an American draw-
down. Bonn probably also sees a strong NATO
stand on MBFR as an aid to West German nego-
tiations with the Soviets, and indeed, Brandt and
his colleagues genuinely desire a reduction in
armaments in both Eastern and Western Europe.
The Scandinavian NATO members, Denmark
and Norway, and Belgium and the Netherlands
consistently have been avid advocates of NATO
intiatives on European security. Backed strongly
by public opinion, their governments are eager to
consider anything they believe will advance de-
tente. They support NATO proposals on MBFR
but they really would like to see an affirmative
Western response to the Warsaw Pact proposal for
a Conference on European Security. Although
they believe that MBFR can be accomplished
only in the context of a general European settle-
ment, these countries would certainly go along
with an MBFR initiative in the hope that it would
lead to a conference dealing with the broad range
of European security questions.
A number of NATO countries are prepared
to support a strong initiative on MBFR without
necessarily tying it to a broader meeting. Belgium,
Canada, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg all share Germany's concern about
the ramifications of any US cutback in its com-
mitment to NATO, and therefore regard MBFR as
a possible alternative to increasing their own de-
fense efforts. They also are genuinely concerned
with the promotion of detente, and, without
holding out promises of success that might en-
courage unrealistic popular expectations, believe
that NATO must take some forward-looking
steps.
In addition to supporting a strong MBFR
declaration, the UK is still pushing its proposal
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for a Standing Committee on East-West Relations
(SCEWR) as an alternative to the Warsaw Pact call
for a security conference in the near future. The
SCEWR would provide machinery for more or
less regular contact, exploration, and negotiation
with the East in an attempt to determine if at
some future time a CES might produce mean-
ingful results. This idea, or variants thereof, is
supported by several other members, including
Belgium, Canada, and Italy. The Italians think
that domestic public opinion demands some
initiative toward detente, and a "historic event"
at the Rome ministerial would undoubtedly
please the Rumor government.
One holdout to the desire of NATO's ma-
jority for a significant initiative on detente is
France. Paris objects to anything that smacks of
bloc-to-bloc negotiations and does not like the
idea of MBFR as a topic for an East-West con-
fPr nce.
Nonetheless, the
French Government is studying the MBFR ques-
tion internally to assess its potential impact on
French security and is keeping a close watch on
MBFR developments in NATO. The majority
view, moreover, is not popular with the govern-
ments of Greece, Turkey, and Portugal, which
would prefer to maintain a relatively hard line
toward the Pact's security conference proposals.
They will go along, however, with as forthcoming
an approach as the US will accept.
Moscow may again attempt to nudge NATO
toward a more positive position on the European
security issue. Often in the past the Soviet Union
has convened the Warsaw Pact nations prior to a
NATO ministerial in an attempt to upstage the
Allies. Whether Moscow decides on a repetition of
this procedure or not, no new substantive pro-
posal is expected from the Pact.
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So far it appears that the US will be able to
head off any NATO reference to a Conference on
European Security in the ministerial communique
going much beyond the reserved position taken at
the December ministerial. Any direct connection
between MBFR and a CES can probably be
avoided as well. The pressure is on, however, for a
stronger signal on MBFR, and a number of the
Allies might not be satisfied to see the MBFR
question buried in the body of the communique.
The Germans, for example, favor a separate
MBFR declaration, both to highlight its im-
portance and to permit France easily to dissociate
itself from the MBFR initiative while partici-
pating in the general communique. The Federal
Republic may be able to win significant Allied
support for its claim that anything less than a
separate MBFR declaration would be a step back-
ward from the December ministerial.
ALLIED DEFENSE PROBLEMS FOR
THE 1970s
The NATO members are agreed that while
the pursuit of detente is an important Alliance
priority, the organization must begin in any case
to prepare itself for the uncertainties of the
coming decade. Last March, acting on the sug-
gestion made in President Nixon's foreign policy
report to Congress, Secretary General Brosio pro-
posed that NATO conduct a thorough review of
the military and strategic problems it will face in
the next ten years, taking into account the politi-
cal and economic background as well. Starting
from the premise that all the Allied countries
have a common and equal interest in the defense
of Europe, Brosio recommended for particularly
close attention the enemy threat, the Allied
strategy, the level of forces, the relations between
different kinds of weapons, the nature and effec-
tiveness of deterrence, and the distribution of
efforts among member countries.
Ambassador Gerard Smith (SALT), Secretary
General Brosio, and Ambassador Ellsworth (NATO)
The Allies have not determined. precisely
how this comprehensive review will be handled.
The task is already complicated by France's re-
fusal to participate in the "military aspects" of
the study on the grounds that this would not be
consistent with its position outside the integrated
NATO military command structure. But the
French Government is keeping its foot in the
door with its intention to participate in any "po-
litical" discussions and its willingness to sit in on
military talks. A report outlining the plans for the
study will be presented to the ministerial, and the
Allies will attempt to come up with a substantive
report by the next ministerial meeting in Decem-
ber.
The study is likely to open up all of the
most important problems of the Alliance, ranging
from its strategic theory to the distribution of the
defense burden among its members. The latter is
already on everyone's mind, the Europeans being
fully aware of the possibility of US reductions
later in the decade even if the line is held in the
next few years. But the individual European
states have their own obstacles to any increase in
their share of the burden, and they have not come
to grips with the question of softening their
separate burdens through some form of defense
cooperation.
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The major difficulty and the reason for the
study will in fact be the large number of basic
unknowns. What alternative force structures and
strategies would preserve a valid deterrent? How
will Western Europe's security situation be af-
fected by the Soviets' assessment of their military
requirements or opportunities in the Far East or
in the Mediterranean? What implications will the
SALT hale for NATO? Would limitations on or
reductions in strategic forces without a reduction
in conventional Warsaw Pact forces leave Western
Europe more exposed? Will economic integration
in Europe, including British entry into the
European Communities, provide a context for
European defense cooperation? Could a coopera-
tive defensive effort evolve out of the British and
French nuclear capabilities, and if so, what role in
the effort would the West Germans find accepta-
ble?
THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
The increasing Soviet military activity in the
Mediterranean has continued to concern the Al-
lies. A report has been prepared describing the
general situation and pointing to the threat the
Soviet build-up in the area could pose to NATO's
southern flank. The US would like Allied agree-
ment on some concrete action, such as the estab-
lishment of a special Mediterranean group in
NATO for consultations on the problem and a
broadening of member-state participation in
NATO Mediterranean activities. The report itself
will likely be approved. Beyond that, however,
most ministers may be unwilling to do more than
pledge to consider future additional measures to
enhance NATO security and improve the opera-
tional effectiveness of Allied Mediterranean
forces.
Special Report
COMMITTEE ON THE CHALLENGES
OF MODERN SOCIETY
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In an area of less controversy, the ministers
will note the progress made in the first six months
of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern
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Society (CCMS), NATO's contribution to inter-
governmental efforts to improve the environment.
The Allies, many of whom were dubious about
the the efficacy of NATO involvement in this area
when it was originally proposed by the US, seem
lately to have warmed to the effort. Rapid
progress was made in the planning stage, and a
CCMS meeting this April firmed up plans for
work this year looking toward proposals for gov-
ernmental action in such areas as air pollution,
disaster relief, and road safety.
As the various CCMS projects are about to
get under way, NATO is trying to work out a
policy that would permit nonmembers to par-
ticipate in CCMS activities, or to observe them.
The US had proposed inviting outside participa-
tion to preserve good relations with other organi-
zations working in the environmental field, but
some European members were uneasy about
working in the company of countries whose gov-
ernments they find objectionable, such as Spain.
A compromise has been worked out, however,
whereby outside participation will be judged on a
case-by-case basis, giving any NATO member a
chance to make a specific objection to any pro-
posed participant or observer.
The May ministerial is likely to leave most of
the important questions facing the Alliance un-
resolved, but it may also mark some advance in
the search for answers that will be valid in a
decade that may see considerable change in
Europe's security situation.
In keeping with NATO's pursuit of an image
of detente as well as defense, some initiative on
MBFR probably will be approved and an attempt
will be made again to indicate NATO's interest in
improving East-West relations in a number of con-
crete ways. If there is a response or a premin-
isterial initiative from the Warsaw Pact, it is likely
to be a renewed call for a Conference on
European Security under conditions the Alliance
cannot yet countenance. The more skeptical of
the Allies will continue to insist on the need to
wait for some progress in the various bilateral
Allied efforts. Nevertheless, it is by the means of
such dialogues that the Alliance will arrive at a
realistic assessment of the possibilities for negotia-
tions on basic European issues.
The approval the ministers are expected to
give to the study of the defense requirements of
the 1970s, even if it is not specifically referred to
in the communique, may open the door for the
eventual frank consideration of some of the inter-
nal problems facing the Alliance in the near
future. This may help to mitigate the European
concern about possible unilateral US reductions
in its NATO commitments after mid-1971, but
the Europeans have a long way to go in finding a
means of coping with such an eventuality. Move-
ment toward defense cooperation would not be
easy for Europe for a variety of reasons, including
the uncertainty surrounding future French policy
toward NATO and the lag behind the US and the
USSR in European strategic thinking. The
Europeans are likely to work in the review to
minimize any US withdrawals and to avoid re-
opening the debate on the existing strategy of the
Alliance. Should it appear that this effort will fail,
the Europeans may then be encouraged to devote
more serious attention to the problems of defense
cooperation.
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