WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OSD review completed
State Dept. review
completed
i
?! f IR (0
q,~k-Aq W-1
Secret
45
8 May 1970
No. 0369/70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
(Information as of noon EDT, 7 May 1970)
VIETNAM: TEMPORIZING IN HANOI
The Communists have sharply denounced the US mil-
itary moves in Cambodia and over North Vietnam, but
they have stopped short of any decisive new course
of action either on the battlefield or at the Paris
talks. In Saigon, the Thieu government faces a
threat of new disturbances from student and Buddhist
groups, and some despondency in its own ranks may
incline the regime toward a tougher stance.
SIHANOUK FORMS HIS GOVERNMENT IN EXILE
The formation of Sihanouk's new government in exile
hardens the break between the Communists and the Lon
Nol regime.
CHINA FOCUSES ATTENTION ON CAMBODIAN DEVELOPMENTS
This year's celebrations in Peking were held amidst
heightened national attention to the latest develop-
ments in Cambodia. Mao Tse-tung and heir Lin Piao
appeared for the first time in over six months, while
the featured guest was Prince Sihanouk.
USSR REMAINS NONCOMMITTAL ON INDOCHINA
Publicly the USSR is still marking time on Indochi-
nese developments. Privately, however, the Soviets
may be using their influence with the North Viet-
namese to counsel restraint and moderation.
COMMUNISTS CONTINUE PRESSURE IN SOUTH LAOS
Communist forces continue to be active in south Laos.
OSD review completed
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Page
1
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
MALAYSIA WORRIED ON ANNIVERSARY OF 1969 RIOTS
The government is showing considerable nervousness
as the anniversary of last year's postelection com-
munal riots approaches.
SLOW ECONOMIC GROWTH FRUSTRATES NORTH KOREANS
Slow economic growth prevents North Korea from spend-
ing as much on defense as it would like, and delays
fulfillment of its economic plan.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 13
USSR RESUMES NORMAL MILITARY AID DELIVERIES
The USSR arms supply effort, which focused on Egypt
during March, has returned to a normal pace. Arms
shipments now have resumed to include other recip-
ients.
BREZHNEV ENHANCES ROLE AS "PRIMUS INTER PARES"
The Soviet leadership has presented a more collective
image this week, although Brezhnev continues to press
his advantage.
SOVIETS SEE CZECH FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS TRIUMPH
Moscow regards the new Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship
treaty as a vindication of the invasion and of the
principles of the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine."
ARMS CONTROL TALKS RECESS
The seabeds treaty will receive priority treatment
when the Geneva talks resume on 16 June.
SINO-SOVIET TALKS REMAIN ON DEAD CENTER
Top Chinese and Soviet leaders have restated their
commitment to the Peking talks, but officials on
both sides state flatly that no significant progress
has been made.
SOVIETS SQUANDER NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL
Pressing for increased current production, the USSR
engages in wasteful practices that reduce prospects
for future output.
SECRET
Page i i WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
ROMANIA COURTS THE ARABS
The Romanians have made a strong bid in recent months
to improve their poor relations with the Arab world.
Middle East - Africa
ISRAEL PROCEEDS CAUTIOUSLY WITH SOVIETS IN EGYPT
Israeli officials have been restating their concern
over the Soviet presence in Egypt, underlining the
caution with which they view the risks of a confron-
tation and urging a strong stand by the US toward
Soviet encroachment in the Middle East.
NASIR ISSUES APPEAL AND WARNING TO US
In a lengthy May Day speech Nasir appealed to the US
to order Israel to withdraw from the occupied ter-
ritories for the cause of peace and warned against
any further US aid to Israel.
ARMY-FEDAYEEN CLASHES IN JORDAN T^TEAKEN KING'S POSITION 24
Fighting last weekend between Jordanian troops and
commandos has reinforced earlier fedayeen charges
that the regime is plotting to assassinate commando
leaders, thus further eroding King Husayn's already
shaky position.
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT INSTALLED IN DAHOMEY
A new government of "national union"--headed by the
country's three key civilian politicians, with north-
erner Hubert Maga as "first among equals"--has little
chance of bringing long-term stability to this trou-
bled West African state.
NEW TENSIONS IN US-SOMALI RELATIONS
The expulsion of five members of the US Embassy in
Mogadiscio on trumped-up charges has quickened the
downward drift in US-Somali relations.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
BRAZIL SECURITY FORCES HIT TERRORISTS
Military and security forces have carried out major
operations against terrorist groups.
CUBA AND SUBVERSION: OLD STRATEGY, NEW TACTICS
Almost every Latin American republic has felt Fidel
Castro's interference in the form of subversion and
armed struggle at least once. The involvement has
ranged from direct participation by Castro himself to
the supplying of arms and ammunition. The great ma-
jority of Castro's efforts have failed, however. De-
spite the setbacks, he has adopted revolution as a
way of life and there are no signs that he plans to
reject it.
RENEWED VIOLENCE LIKELY IN GUATEMALA
President Mendez has allowed the state of siege, im-
posed following the assassination of German Ambassador
von Spreti, to lapse despite an increase in terrorist
violence.
TRINIDAD FACES A NEW POLITICAL CLIMATE
A government shake-up and new legislative programs
are likely in the wake of black power dissidence and
the recent army rebellion.
EL SALVADOR ADOPTS A TOUGH LINE
The Sanchez government is adopting a new and tougher
approach to domestic and foreign politics.
SECRE'T'
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
The Thieu government in Saigon finds itself so overloaded with prob-
lems of political discontent that it is unable to deal effectively with all of
them at once. Various opposition leaders and groups are acting boldly in the
face of the government's hesitancy to take more repressive measures. A
number of top officials are weighing in with gloomy prognostications, the
police forces have been unable to cope with the daily pace of demonstra-
tions, some violent, and the government has had to return several battalions
of regular troops to Saigon, both because of the political turmoil and
because of an increasing threat of Viet Cong terrorism in the capital.
Off-balance because key lines of authority are not working, the Thieu
government may be facing a real crisis.
On the military front, activity reached substantially higher levels last
week in I and IV Corps, perhaps indicating the beginning-of the second phase
of the Communists' spring offensive, but also possibly representing a Com-
munist effort to divert allied attention away from sweep operations inside
Cambodia.
The allied operations aimed at Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia
have so far not encountered sizable numbers of enemy forces, but have
uncovered large quantities of supplies. Communist military headquarters
elements have apparently been able to relocate fairly rapidly to avoid the
allied sweeps.
Deeper inside Cambodia, the Communists continue to press hard on the
Cambodian Army. Two provincial capitals were reportedly captured late in
the week, and the Communists are still blocking several major transportation
routes between Phnom Penh and the eastern and southern borders of the
country.
On the international scene, Hanoi reacted to US military thrusts into
Cambodia and bombing of certain targets in North Vietnam by boycotting
the session of the Paris talks scheduled for 6 May. Peking's denunciation of
the US moves did not imply any larger role for China in Indochina, but did
contain a sharp personal attack on President Nixon. Communist China also
announced the formal severance of relations with Cambodia and in the same
breath recognized the newly formed Cambodian government in exile, Siha-
nouk's first major step toward an attempt to re-establish himself in Cam-
bodia.
The Indonesian-initiated Asian conference on Cambodia now is sched-
uled for 16-17 May in Djakarta; 12 nations (all non-Communist) of the 21
invited have agreed to attend. Although there is little prospect that the
conference will have any practical effect on the over-all Cambodian situa-
tion, it probably will generate a degree of international political support to
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
VIETNAM: TEMPORIZING IN HANOI
Hanoi has temporized so far in
its public reaction to the allied
ground operations into Cambodia and
the US air strikes against targets
in North Vietnam. The Communists
boycotted the plenary session of
the Paris talks on 6 May, but said
that they would return to the table
next week unless the bombing con-
tinued. Their failure to rupture
the conference completely after
threatening for months to do so
shows Hanoi's reluctance to close
off any political options.
The Communists' propaganda re-
action to the new allied moves is
in the same cautious vein. They
lashed out at Washington for the
ground and air attacks, but care-
fully avoided committing themselves
to forceful retaliation. They
also have made some general threats,
but concrete decisions on their fu-
ture course are yet to be made.
Hanoi has contended that the air
strikes violate Washington's
"pledge" in November 1968 to halt
all bombing of the North. This
could mean that the Communists,
in turn, no longer feel constrained
about large-scale use of the De-
militarized Zone or attacks on ma-
jor South Vietnamese cities.
Hanoi's slight delay in rec-
ognizing Sihanouk's "government in
exile" may be caused by the same
instinct to temporize. The North
Vietnamese extended recognition to
the new "government" a day after it
was announced, but only after six
countries, including China, already
had weighed in. Unlike the Chi-
nese, Hanoi has not yet announced
withdrawal of its remaining per-
sonnel from Phnom Penh.. Thus, even
at this late hour, the Vietnamese
Communists seem to be reluctant to
close off completely the possibil-
ity of dealing with Lon Nol and his
associates.
One of the reasons for Hanoi's
caution may be difficulty in con-
certing with Peking and Moscow.
Party First Secretary Le Duan's pro-
longed stay abroad suggests that
difficulties have cropped up. He
has been away for three weeks and
the Polish press reports that he
took a side trip to Warsaw, leaving
there on 6 May. His absence from
Hanoi at such a critical time
strongly suggests that the Vietnam-
ese are being pulled in different
directions by their principal al-
lies, with Peking pressing mili-
tancy and Moscow counseling modera-
tion.
It is also possible that Hanoi
has been sufficiently surprised by
the turn of events in Indochina that
it needs some time to sort out all
of the implications and to make new
decisions. This process, however,
probably would not impair the Com-
munists' ability to react rapidly
in tactical battle field situations.
Communist Military Reactions
Communist battlefield reactions
to the US and South Vietnamese oper-
ations against their long-held sanc-
tuaries in Cambodia have varied, but
no major efforts to stand and fight
or to counterattack have developed.
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
Although there was little di-
rect confrontation with Communist
combat forces during the opening
stages of the allied sweep opera-
tions, ground fighting picked up
as the week progressed and the op-
erations were enlarged. Cumulative
casualties as of 7 May show more
than 3,000 Communists killed in
contrast to South Vietnamese losses
of 162 killed and 840 wounded. Amer-
ican casualties totaled 37 killed
and 79 wounded. Additionally,
enemy losses included the seizure
of more than 4,000 weapons and
1,000 tons of rice.
Inside South Vietnam, increased
enemy activity in IV Corps last
weekend may have signaled the be-
ginning of the anticipated "second
phase" of the Communists spring cam-
paign. The enemy effort gained mo-
mentum early in the week with some
strong rocket and mortar attacks
against US facilities, but they were
not as intense as those in the early
April upsurge. The pattern of prep-
arations for this phase suggests
Mortars, recoilless rifles, SKS carbines, antiaircraft
guns, and light machine guns captured by ARVN
units in Parrot's Beak area.
Page 3
that there will be less coordina-
tion than the previous month, with
attacks taking place as each unit
completes its local preparations.
In some areas, moreover, enemy of-
fensive plans may have been thrown
off schedule or altered as a result
of the allied cross-border opera-
tions or other pre-emptive actions.
Higher levels of enemy action
will probably continue well into
May. Plans for renewed hostilities
by enemy forces in the central
coastal provinces, to get under way
on 7-8 May, were revealed in a re-
cently captured document.
Throughout much of the country
the enemy's local force units could
step up the tempo of shellings and
small-scale attacks on very short
notice. In addition, first-line
combat units are in a position to
threaten certain allied bases and
urban centers, especially in north-
ern Quang Tri Province just south
of the Demilitarized Zone, in cen-
tral Thua Thien Province, and in
the coastal lowlands of Quang Nam
and Quang Tin provinces. In II
Corps, Communist forces are mostly
concentrated near allied Special
Forces camps in the international
tri-border area. Although many of
the enemy main forces in III Corps
are preoccupied with allied opera-
tions, they could launch attacks
designed to divert attention away
from the allied operations in east-
ern Cambodia. Most of the major
enemy units in the delta provinces
have avoided contact with South Viet-
namese forces and apparently are
not ready for large-scale ground
operations in the immediate future.
SECR F'1'
WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
CAMBODIA - SOUTH VIETNAM: Current Situation
Saravagek
THAILAND
Stung Treng /
Reportedly captured
by Communists
LKratie Senmonorom.
s"r/{hhlo'tg;~
e. ~ "Take
~ommumsrs
maintain pressure
Government i-.__....(
regains; control ??, MY Yung Tau
Tho
?a Nang
VC/NVA base area along
Cambodian border
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
Violence and Pessimism
Increase in -Saigon
The government moved strongly
this week to head off renewed dis-
turbances by student and Buddhist
groups, and its actions will prob-
ably engender new charges of re-
pression. Following an emergency
cabinet meeting, at which officials
expressed concern that Communist
agents might be able to exploit po-
litical unrest in Saigon, the gov-
ernment ordered all schools and uni-
versities in the Saigon area closed
indefinitely. There had been indi-
cations that militant student lead-
ers in Saigon were gaining control
of the antigovernment protests and
were organizing further demonstra-
tions.
Another serious situation may
develop out of a clash between two
antagonistic Buddhist factions for
control of a key pagoda in Saigon.
The government is already being ac-
cused by the militant An Quang sect
of having intervened on behalf of
its rival. The possibility of
further violence between the Bud-
dhists represents a new and poten-
tially explosive problem for Thieu
government, which has indicated that
it is prepared to use force if neces-
sary to maintain control.
A mood of discouragement now
appears to be developing in some gov--
ernment circles over President Thieu's
inability to deal effectively with
corruption is 25X1
widespread among high-ranking South
Vietnamese military officers, but
since Thieu must retain their sup-
port to remain in office, his hands
are somewhat tied in trying to cope
with public dissatisfaction over 25X1
their activities.
President Thieu also appears to
be somewhat discouraged about the
prospects for his regime. He has
recently registered strong disap-
pointment in the performance of
some key ministries, and there ap-
parently has been a loss of mutual
confidence between the President and
some of his key lieutenants.
growing popular discontent.
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
SIHANOUK FORMS His GOVERNMENT IN EXILE
"The Royal Government of Na-
tional Union" organized by Siha-
nouk in Peking this week is a
blend of experienced politicians
and energetic leftists. The new
government is nominally under the
direction of the "National United
Front of Cambodia," which is
chaired by Sihanouk, and it prob-
ably will continue to function
for the time being in the Chinese
capital.
Penn Nouth, a prominent Cam-
bodian politician who has acted
as prime minister in past Sihanouk
governments, was picked to head
the new government. Nouth's po-
litical prestige and his loyalty
to Sihanouk made him the logical
choice for the position, but be-
cause of age and poor health he
is likely to be only a figure-
head. As expected, a number of
well-known Cambodian leftists
were given key cabinet portfolios,
including national defense, in-
terior, and information. These
individuals, three of whom were
leading members of the National
Assembly until Sihanouk's 1967
purge forced them to flee Phnom
Penh, at one time had some fol-
lowing among the youth and in-
tellectuals in Cambodia. The
fact that they were not present
for the government's unveiling
in Peking suggests they may ei-
ther be in Hanoi or with Com-
munist forces fighting in Cam-
bodia.
The Chinese quickly endorsed
the new government and then an-
nounced the rupture of diplomatic
relations with the Lon Nol regime.
Although Hanoi and the Viet Cong
also have recognized Sihanouk's
government, they have stopped short
of severing their slim diplomatic
ties with Phnom Penh. The Soviet
Union has not yet taken a position
on Sihanouk's government.
In Phnom Penh, meanwhile,
the Lon Nol government apparently
intends to break diplomatic re-
lations with the Provisional Rev-
olutionary Government and resume
relations with Saigon. The Cam-
bodians are also moving to im-
prove relations with Thailand,
but at a slower pace.
On the military front, (see
map on page 4) government forces
continue to fare badly in their
engagements with Communist troops.
The Communists are still threaten-
ing to cut Phnom Penh's overland
access to the southern and eastern
provinces. Their reported capture
of the capitals of Kratie and Mon-
dolkiri provinces were their most
significant and bold military
moves to date. In addition, they
captured the strategic Mekong
River ferry crossing at Neak Lu-
ong, some 30 miles south of Phnom
Penh. Initial efforts by the Cam-
bodian Army to retake Neak Luong
were unsuccessful. Government
troops regained control of the gulf-
port town of Kampot, but Communist
elements reportedly still had the
southern towns of Takeo and Angtas-
som surrounded.
The Cambodian Army commander
of the southern border provinces
recently told a South Vietnamese
general that morale was low in
the Cambodian Army and that he
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
was pessimistic about the over-
all situation. He claimed that
the Communists were succeeding
in isolating towns and securing
a firm hold in rural areas. He
asserted that many village and
hamlet chiefs in Svay Rieng Prov-
ince were Communists, and others
in Kompong Cham Province who re-
mained loyal to the government
were being killed by the Com-
munists.
In an effort to boost mor-
ale, the government recently is-
sued a communique asking its
troops to hold on for another ten
days, after which time the Com-
munists, according to the communi-
que, will be unable to keep fight-
ing. The message also noted that
aid for Cambodia is coming from
everywhere, particularly from
ethnic Cambodian troops recently
flown into Phnom Penh from South
Vietnam.
US military operations in
Cambodia will almost certainly
improve the spirits of the lead-
ers in Phnom Penh and help con-
vince hard-pressed Cambodian Army
units that their situation is far
from hopeless. Additionally, in
the international sphere, the
forthcoming mid-May Asian confer-
ence of non-Communist nations on
Cambodia should help generate 25X1
more political support, and pos-
sibly some materiel aid for the
Lon Nol government.
CHINA FOCUSES ATTENTION ON CAMBODIAN DEVELOPMENTS
This year's May Day cele-
brations in Peking were held
amidst heightened national atten-
tion to the latest developments
in Cambodia. Party chairman Mao
Tse-tung and his designated-heir
Lin Piao made public appearances
for the first time in over six
months, while the featured for-
eign guest was Norodom Sihanouk.
On the domestic side, the
celebrations revealed no major
changes in China's ruling line-up,
but several important leaders
failed to show and Peking has
offered no explanation for their
absence. The most notable absen-
tee among the politburo members
was Peking boss Hsieh Fu-chih,
who may be ill or out of the cap-
ital on some assignment related
to his additional duties as min-
ister of public security. Aside
from the few puzzling absentees
from the top leadership ranks,
the most interesting feature of
the turnout was the unusually
large number of officials in at-
tendance who were identified as
members of the Peking-based mil-
itary, party, and government
machinery. Their presence sug-
gests that some of the positions
in the central departments and
ministries that were decimated
during the Cultural Revolution
are now being filled.
For Sihanouk, Peking's May
Day festivities were sandwiched
between the conclusion of the
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
Indochinese summit conference
and his announcement on 5 May
of the official formation of his
government-in-exile. Predictably,
the Chinese loudly acclaimed the
conference, declaring at the same
time that the Chinese "resolutely
oppose" efforts to utilize the
UN or "any other international
organization or conference" to
settle the Cambodian problem.
The Chinese also blasted the
Soviets for UN Ambassador Malik's
encouragement of new Geneva-type
consultations on Indochina and
wrote off Indonesia's planned
Asian conference on Indochina.
The Chinese role in the
Indochina summit conference was
almost certainly far larger than
public disclosures suggest. Pre-
mier Chou En-lai himself was
probably in attendance, and may
have urged a more militant line
than that finally adopted by the
publicly identified conferees.
Peking obviously is attempting
to play the "people's war" card
with respect to the Indochinese
situation; its negative attitude
toward any sort of negotiations
on the issue may have made it
more difficult for Hanoi to con-
sider such a ploy. The Chinese
have probably pledged increased
materiel support to the actual
combatants in Indochina, but
there is no indication that
Peking plans to intervene in
the conflict itself.
Peking wasted little time
in formally recognizing Sihanouk's
newly formed Royal Government of
National Union. In making the
announcement, Premier Chou En-lai
declared that Peking had officially
severed diplomatic relations with
Phnom Penh and was withdrawing
all staff of the Chinese Embassy
and Chinese experts." The Chinese
ambassador in Phnom Penh subse-
quently met with Cambodian lead-
ers and an arrangement was appar-
ently worked out for reciprocal
withdrawal of Cambodian diplomatic
personnel from Peking. This is
the first time Peking has taken
the initiative in breaking rela-
tions with another state. The
move probably was in train for
some time and flows logically
from previous Communist actions
and pronouncements.
Peking's initial reaction
to President Nixon's speech on
30 April and to US bombing raids
in North Vietnam on 1 and 2 May
has been relatively restrained.
The official government statement
contained a "stern warning" against
US provocations and reiterated
China's amorphous pledge to pro-
vide "powerful backing" for the
Indochinese people in their war
against the US. Peking, however,
did not commit itself to a direct
role in Indochina, but instead it
seemed to imply that the Indo-
chinese could handle the situa-
tion by themselves.
Peking saved its best punches
for personal assaults on President
Nixon. The Chinese described him
as a "god of plague and war" and
an "executioner whose hands are
dripping with the blood of the
Indochinese people." The Presi-
dent was also described as a "ma-
licious war criminal" and the US
as being "unscrupulous, truculent,
and treacherous." These attacks
represent China's most virulent
commentary against the US in sev-
eral months, and suggest that Pe-
king may use the forum of the
Sino-US Warsaw talks later this
month to further castigate US pol-
icy in Indochina.
SECRET
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
USSR REMAINS NONCOMMITTAL ON INDOCHINA
Authoritative Soviet state-
ments early this week made clear
Moscow's concern over the trend
of events in Indochina. On 4 May,
the Soviets took the unusual step
of calling a press conference to
dramatize their opposition to
President Nixon's announcement of
30 April.
Premier Kosygin personally
read the text of a government
statement denouncing US air raids
on North Vietnam and "interven-
tion" in Cambodia. The statement
contained Moscow's strongest per-
sonal attack on the President to
date. The Soviet Premier took
pains to stress that US activity
in Indochina is contributing to
a worsening in US-Soviet relations,
but he did not go beyond previous
pledges of support for Hanoi.
Kosygin refused to be drawn
out on the question of the legit-
imacy of the present government
in Phnom Penh. Now that Sihanouk
has formed his "government-in-
exile" and Hanoi and Peking have
recognized it, however, Moscow
may soon feel compelled to follow
suit. Kosygin also spoke nega-
tively on immediate prospects for
a diplomatic solution in Indo-
china, saying that "this is not
the time for meetings, but for
actions." He also promised that
Moscow's "comprehensive aid" to
Vietnam would be reviewed in the
light of the current situation.
The press conference and the
fact that the Soviet Premier per-
sonally delivered the attack on
the President's policies were
undoubtedly meant to underline
the seriousness with which current
US actions are viewed. There is
little indication, however, that
Moscow feels a need at present to
commit itself to any dramatically
new course of action.
Moscow's attitude seems guided
by the notion that only China or
the US can hope to profit from a
widening of hostilities in Indo-
china. The Soviets may now be
counseling Hanoi to avoid prema-
ture overreaction to Washington's
latest moves, but the USSR will
not fall far out of step with
North Vietnam's ultimate reaction.
The Soviets seem also to be re-
surrecting various proposals for
united Communist action in aiding
Vietnam. There have been a few re-
cent propaganda broadcasts which
suggest that the Soviets have re-
vived this line. These proposals,
like those following the intensi-
fication of the conflict in 1965,
have probably been raised primarily
for the purpose of blackening
China. The broadcasts themselves
are cast in such a way as to be-
tray Moscow's probable view that
Peking is likely to be no more
receptive than it was in 1965.
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
COMMUNISTS CONTINUE PRESSURE IN SOUTH LAOS
The Communists followed up
the capture of Attopeu town in
south Laos with a number of at-
tacks against government bases
and outposts on the Bolovens Pla-
teau. By 6 May, however, all of
these positions were back in gov-
ernment hands, including the
principal fire base overlooking
Attopeu town. The provincial
capital itself remains under Com-
munist control.
Enemy forces also launched
a rocket attack against Pakse,
the site of the southern military
region headquarters. No physical
damage resulted, but the raid in-
,1 --8ouonr
f' -.:Long
Plair)e
Sain, Thongo,Jarrres-.
Long Tieng
creased apprehensions about Com-
munist intentions in the pan-
handle. Local Laotian commanders
claim to have evidence of substan-
tial enemy troop movements into
the Toumlane Valley and the Bol-
ovens Plateau.
There is some evidence that
the Communists may increase the
threat to the provincial capital
of Saravane. Some unusual enemy
troop movements, have been re-
ported in areas north and west
of the town, and handbills were
distributed in Saravane announc-
ing that it will be seized by the
Communists on 20 May. Similar
warnings appeared in Attopeu be-
fore it was attacked.
In the north, the Communists
confined their activity to in-
creasing pressure on the Bouam
Long outpost north of the Plaine
des Jarres and launching an in-
effective rocket attack against
Long Tieng. Government forces
have regained some high ground
within rocket range of Long Tieng
and Sam Thong. They believe the
enemy is having increasing dif-
ficulty getting enough food and
ammunition. An assault on the
Meo strongholds remains as a real
possibility, but the Communists
could have elected to postpone
this undertaking in favor of
consolidating their hold on the
Plaine.
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
MALAYSIA WORRIED ON ANNIVERSARY OF 1969 RIOTS
The Malaysian Government is
displaying considerable nervous-
ness as the anniversary of last
year's postelection communal riots
approaches on 13 May. Although
there is no evidence that any
group is planning disturbances to
mark the occasion, government of-
ficials are trying to damp down
rumors that trouble will break
out.
Last week Prime Minister
Rahman announced that the govern-
ment is "ready and capable" of
tackling any incident that might
occur "before, on, or after 13
May." Another official has de-
nied stories that government of-
ficers have been refused leave
during the first part of May.
The government has issued curfew
passes and other contingency pre-
cautions appear to be under way.
At least seven persons have been
arrested recently on charges of
rumormongering, and shopkeepers,
most of whom are Chinese and In-
dian, have been officially warned
not to heighten Malay resentment
by raising prices if people start
to stockpile food in anticipation
of trouble.
Last year, when political
campaigning was in full swing,
the atmosphere was more highly
charged than it is at present.
The 1969 riots resulted in the
killing of over 150 people, mostly
Chinese, and a state of emergency
was imposed on the country. The
government's efforts over the past
year to assuage racial tensions
and return the nation to a condi-
tion in which parliamentary elec-
tions could be resumed have been
low key and unimpressive. If any-
thing, the country has become more
polarized, with the Chinese lying
low, the radical Malays unhappy,
and the government only marking
As was the case last year,
the Communists, and by associa-
tion the Chinese population in
general, are being billed as the
potential source of trouble. The
setting of booby traps attached
to Communist flags and the dis-
tribution of Communist pamphlets
that took place in late April
throughout West Malaysia were
designed to mark the 40th anni-
versary of the Malayan Communist
Party. But more important, the
organizational ability demon-
strated by these actions has
added to the government's worries
at this time. Even the prime
minister, in the past more fair-
minded toward the Chinese commu-25X1
nity than many of his Malay col-
leagues, has been making anti-
Chinese statements.
The government appears fully
ready to handle most incidents
that might occur, but widespread
disturbances would sorely tax the
security forces. In the event
of trouble, the predominantly
Malay forces would be tempted to
delay intervention in situations
where their Malay compatriots are
getting the best of it. Whether
or not the Communists become in-
volved in any outbreaks this year.
the Chinese would again be the
losers.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
SLOW ECONOMIC GROWTH FRUSTRATES NORTH KOREANS
Despite intense pressures from
Premier Kim Il-song, the North
Korean economy is not growing fast
enough to allow an increase in al-
ready high defense expenditures,
nor is it increasing the chances
of successfully winding up a plan
that has dragged on embarrassingly
into its tenth year.
Finance Minister Choe Yunsu,
in his budget message to the Su-
preme People's Assembly on 20
April, avoided output claims for
1969. His figures indicate that
revenue and expenditures fell even
further behind plans than is usual
for North Korea. Revenue increased
six percent instead of the 19 per-
cent planned, and expenditures
grew by five percent instead of
24. The disappointing performance
of the economy was attributed to
unfavorable weather conditions
and a cut in consumer-goods prices.
Defense expenditures have
been the subject of intense propa-
ganda since 1966, particularly so
after the Pueblo and EC-121 inci-
dents. Last year, Pyongyang
called for another step-up in
absolute defense spending, al-
though as a percentage of total
state revenues it was to remain
at the 30-31 percent in force
since 1966. Pyongyang did not
meet the 14-percent increase
planned for 1969, apparently be-
cause the share of funds devoted
to defense had already been near
the maximum supportable by the
economy. Defense spending is
planned to remain at 31 percent
of total expenditures in 1970,
but, on the basis of the planned
rate of budget growth, absolute
defense spending is expected to
rise by 23 percent.
Kim I1-song has insisted
that economic growth under a so-
cialist system can reach 15--20
percent annually, but the North
Korean economy in recent years
has been growing only at an esti-
mated four to five percent a year.
This rate is less than half South
Korea's growth rate, a comparison
that North Korea finds extremely
disconcerting.
Economic development in North
Korea slowed considerably in the
middle 1960s following Soviet ces-
sation of economic aid because of
Pyongyang's alignment with China
in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The
aid cut-off was one of the primary
reasons for failure of the orig-
inal 1961-67 plan. An extension
of the plan to 1970 was adopted
in order to gain more time to
achieve the more important goals.
The Soviet Union resumed
economic aid during 1968. About
30 million dollars was probably
drawn on credit that year and
another 30-40 million dollars is
estimated to have been provided
in 1969. Nevertheless, prospects
for achieving the major goals of
the current plan remain uncer-
tain. Pyongyang, however, no
doubt will proclaim success when
the plan nominally ends in Sep-
tember and a new five year plan
SECRET
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
Soviet propaganda shifted into high gear this week following President
Nixon's announcement that US troops had moved into Cambodia. A series
of strident press and radio commentaries directed at the President personally
and at Washington in general was capped on 4 May with nationwide mass
meetings and an unusual press conference by Premier Kosygin. Moscow's
concern about the situation in Indochina prompted Kosygin's appearance.
Ile bitterly asserted that US activity there has contributed to a worsening of
Soviet-US relations.
In answer to a direct question on the future of SALT, Kosygin charged
that the recent US actions "do not strengthen mutual trust, without which it
is very difficult to hold the talks." (In Vienna, Deputy Foreign Minister
Semenov echoed Kosygin's remark, but did not let the issue interfere with
the conduct of the talks themselves.) Another sensitive area in US-Soviet
relations, the Middle East, was mentioned. Kosygin virtually admitted that
Soviet pilots were in Egypt, but did not specify their role. Judging by
Kosygin's remarks on China, Moscow believes the occasion called for down-
playing its problems with Peking. Kosygin said nothing critical and signaled a
Soviet desire to continue the Peking talks.
Kosygin's criticism of the President by name was something of a
turning point in itself and suggested that Moscow's opposition to the policies
of the Nixon administration will now be voiced more stridently. That this
new hostility coincided with the signs of Brezhnev's strengthened position in
the leadership suggests that the forces at play in Moscow might now favor
some hardening of their line in dealing with Washington. It is unlikely,
however, that such an approach will lead soon to any drastic changes in
Soviet policy toward SALT, the Middle East, or China. In each of these
areas, Moscow's policy has all along been based on fundamental calculations
of risk and opportunity.
East and West German officials met in Bonn this week to prepare for
the summit meeting in Kassel. One day prior to the meeting, East German
Premier Stoph wrote to Chancellor Brandt criticizing Bonn for claiming that
East German citizens are subject to West German law and for opposing East
German attempts to join international organizations. Stoph's language and
that used in describing the letter in the press, however, implies that Stoph
still intends to meet Brandt on 21 May.
Ireland's Prime Minister Lynch unexpectedly cracked down this week
on hard liners in the cabinet who have opposed Dublin's dovish policy on
Ulster. He expelled the agriculture and finance ministers and willingly
accepted the resignation of a third. Lynch obviously had advance support of
most members of his party in parliament and they gave full backing to his
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
USSR RESUMES NORMAL MILITARY AID DELIVERIES
Soviet seaborne military de-
liveries to Communist and non-
Communist arms clients have re-
sumed following an unprecedented
month-long interruption while at-
tention was riveted on the intro-
duction of SA-3 surface-to-air
missile equipment into Egypt. Ne-
gotiations for military assist-
ance, however, continued through-
out that period and resulted in
another deal with Iran. Talks
also were held with Cuba, Paki-
stan, and Nigeria.
During the halt in military
shipments to other arms clients
mil-
itary equipment, including SA-3s,
arrived in Egypt. The shipments
included ZSU-23-4 self-propelled
antiaircraft guns and a new radar
designed to provide early warning
against low-flying aircraft that
recently appeared in Egypt. Nei-
ther type of equipment had been
observed before outside the USSR
or East Europe.
During the past month Soviet
deliveries to Egypt have returned
to a normal pace and have included
15 SU-7 fighter bombers, 15 MI-8
helicopters, and a large number of
assorted trucks. Routine military
deliveries also have been resumed
to other Middle East and third
world clients.
number of 130-mm. artillery pieces,
together with the related prime
movers and ammunition. These and
antitank rockets and miscellane-
ous ground forces equipment are
valued at some $30 million. 25X1
In early April, Soviet De-
fense Minister Grechko received a
large military delegation from
Cuba headed by minister of the
Armed Forces Raul Castro. The
composition of the delegation sug-
gests that talks may have covered
arrangements to provide updated
military equipment for air defense.
Last year, after almost a year's
hiatus in military deliveries to
Havana the USSR introduced 1.70
new 130-mm. artillery pieces and
replaced some SA-2 equipment.
Recently, Moscow announced
a scheduled visit in June of Paki-
stan's president. High on that
agenda will be discussions on
whether military equipment remain-
ing to be shipped under a 1968
agreement, including tanks and
guided missile patrol boats, will
be shipped. Pakistan also may
seek expanded arms deliveries.
The intensive effort to aug-
ment Cairo's defensive capabili-
ties did not preclude talks with
other arms aid partners. The So-
viets concluded an agreement with
Iran in March for a substantial
SECRET .
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
BREZHNEV ENHANCES ROLE AS "PRIMUS INTER PARES"
General Secretary Brezhnev con-
tinues to press his advantage on the
Soviet domestic political front.
There are signs, however, that at
least some of his colleagues are at-
tempting to ensure that this not un-
dermine the principle of collective
leadership.
Brezhnev was again the regime
spokesman at the May Day celebration
and his "collected works"--1964 to
1970--are due to be published later
this year. His growing public pre-
eminence was also underscored by the
preliminary Pravda report on nomina-
tions of mem elf the politburo to
the new Supreme Soviet to be elected
on 14 June. Although each member
stands for election in only one dis-
trict, he traditionally receives ad-
ditional honorary nominations. The
number he receives provides a good
reading of his relative political
standing in the hierarchy.
1970 1966
(25 April, Pravda) (24 April, Pravda)
Brezhnev
17
Kosygin
8
Podgorny
6
Suslov
4
Kirilenko
4
Pelshe
2
Polyansky
2
Shelepin
2
Shelest
2
Voronov
2
Mazurov
1
Brezhnev 19
Kosygin 13
Podgorny 8
Suslov 4
Shelepin 2
Kirilenko I
Mazurov 1
Pelshe 1
Polyansky 1
Shelest 1
Voronov 1
Brezhnev, when compared to the
last election in 1966, is set off
more distinctly from Premier Kosygin
and President Podgorny, and the lat-
ter two are now close to equality.
Consistent with other signs over the
past year, party secretary Kirilenko
has risen in the listing and now ri-
vals Suslov. Shelepin, predictably,
has dropped back.
The one surprise is the blatant
slighting of Mazurov, a first deputy
premier and former Belorussian party
boss. His poor showing supports
earlier evidence that Brezhnev may
have been playing politics with the
Belorussian party organization. Brezh-
nev's four-day visit to Minsk in
March and the inclusion of the pres-
ent Belorussian party chief, Masherov,
on the Brezhnev-led delegation to the
treaty signing in Czechoslovakia, may
be an attempt to wean away Mazurov's
provincial support. Mazurov has
been
critical o Brez nev s leadership
and has been rumored as a likely
25X1
successor to Kosygin.
25X1
Rumors that Kosygin will step
down due to poor health continue
to circulate
his unprecedented
televised press conference this
week on Southeast Asia and his par-
ticipation in the delegation to
Prague has helped to restore a
semblance of collective leadership.
There is some evidence that
Brezhnev's dominance has been a
source of controversy and concern
within the politburo. In his Lenin
anniversary speech on 21 April, Bre-
zhnev defined collective leadership
in a self-serving manner. When the
speech appeared in the press the
following day, however, a sentence
had been added which brought his
remarks into line with standard
formulations on the subject.
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
SOVIETS SEE CZECH FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS TRIUMPH
The principle of "socialist
internationalism," which Moscow
used to justify its intervention
in Czechoslovakia, has received
its most impressive endorsement
to date in the new Soviet-Czech-
oslovak friendship treaty.
The treaty formally requires
the two signatories to take ac-
tion in defense of socialist in-
stitutions wherever they may be
threatened--the chief tenet of
the so-called"Brezhnev Doctrine"--
and implicitly commitsthe Czech-
oslovaks to fight with the USSR
in a war against China. It also
commits Prague and Moscow to act
to strengthen mutual cooperation
in all spheres of relations. The
language is forceful enough to
reinforce the fears some Eastern
Europeans have had about the
treaty.
The importance that the So-
viets ascribed to the treaty is
indicated by the composition of
the delegation sent to Prague for
the signing on 6 May. It was
headed by party General Secretary
Brezhnev and also included Premier
Kosygin, politburo member Shelest,
candidate politburo member Mash-
erov, central committee secretary
Katushev, and Foreign Minister
Gromyko. In addition, Soviet
chief of staff General Zakharov
was on hand at the head of a
large military delegation.
Almost every member of this
assemblage played a key role in
the events of 1968-69 that put
an end to the liberal reform move-
ment in Czechoslovakia. Both Kosy-
gin--who reportedly had been cool
to the intervention--and Katushev
conducted crucial negotiations at
that time with the Czechoslovaks.
Shelest, the Ukrainian party chief,
who reputedly was one of the loud-
est advocates of the intervention,
took part in the crucial Dresden,
Warsaw, and Bratislava meetings that
preceded the invasion. General
Zakharov was vital in the planning
and execution of the invasion it-
self.
For these Soviet leaders, the
treaty serves to vindicate the in-
tervention and to undercut critics
within the Communist movement and
even within the Soviet party. As
politburo member Kirilenko noted
last month, "everyone can now see"
that Soviet policies were "fully
justified." Brezhnev himself is
probably the chief beneficiary of
the treaty. He reportedly had been
a target for criticism because of
his handling of the Czechoslovak
crisis, and he is likely to use
this belated justification of his
policies to advantage.
Czechoslovak leader Husak has
also gained. The Soviets are ob-
viously content with his perform-
ance as the chief architect of
the "normalization." The Soviet
delegation treated Husak with con-
spicuous warmth during its stay,
in effect giving him another strong
endorsement. Husak will undoubt-
edly use it to strengthen his po-
sition against his domestic crit-
ics.
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
ARMS CONTROL TALKS RECESS
The US-USSR draft treaty to
limit the use of seabeds for mili-
tary purposes remains the best
hope for substantive progress at
the 1970 Geneva disarmament talks,
which recessed last week after
more than two months of frus-
trating discussion of the key
issues. Following several weeks
of intensive review in the cap-
itals, the 25 conferees will re-
sume their talks on 16 June in
an effort to show some success
before the fall session of the
UN General Assembly.
In their revised version of
the treaty, the superpowers took
into account most of the criti-
cisms raised during the past year.
Dissatisfaction with the Moscow-
Washington positions on some
maritime issues could, however,
become so strong as to prevent
a Geneva endorsement of the treaty.
Sweden heads a lengthy list of
nations that want the text to
include a reference to "appro-
priate international procedures"
as one method of verifying com-
pliance with the treaty prohibi-
tions. Moscow opposes such an
addition, regarding it as an
opening that could result in an
international regime that would
also govern peaceful uses of the
ocean floor. A meeting this
week at Montevideo of nine Latin
American states that claim a 200-
mile limit of their territorial
waters could determine the ex-
tent to which that subject will
further muddy the treaty's pros-
pects.
There has been no movement
toward agreement on either of the
principal options for controls
on chemical and biological weap-
ons (CBW) : the Soviet draft
CBW convention and the British
draft BW treaty. Most of the
Geneva conferees continue to
favor action that would deal with
both CW and BW, but they do not
regard the Soviets' verification
mechanism--appeal to the UN Se-
curity Council to investigate
suspected violations--as an ade-
quate response to their concern.
The Italians have secured
the creation at Geneva of an in-
formal nine-nation working group
on general and complete disarma-
ment (GCD), whose members include
NATO, Warsaw Pact, and nonaligned
nations, but exclude the three
nuclear powers represented at
the talks. The working group is
unlikely to offer a substantive
GCD proposal soon. Moscow re-
cently indicated a revived inter-
est in GCD, but it is believed
that the Soviets would not want
such activity to divert attention
from the primary issues before
the conferees--CBW and the sea-
beds treaty.
Another disarmament subject,
a comprehensive ban on nuclear
tests, probably will not be ac-
corded much time until the direc-
tion of the SALT talks becomes
clearer. Should the Geneva con-
ferees be unable to show substan-
tial progress in any arms control
area, there may be demands for
a convening of the UN Disarma-
ment Commission, an unwieldy
entity certain to serve as a
focal point for grievances against
the superpowers 25X1
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
SINO-SOVIET TALKS
Top Chinese and Soviet lead-
ers have again expressed their in-
tention to continue the Peking
talks despite the lack of signifi-
cant progress during the past six
months. The talks have apparently
been in recess since the departure
of chief Soviet negotiator Kuznet-
sov for the Lenin centenary cele-
brations in Moscow, but he probably
will return to Peking shortly to
resume the discussions.
Chairman Mao, in an apparently
cordial conversation at the Peking
May Day ceremonies, told the dep-
uty head of the Soviet delegation
that China wished the talks to re-
sume "as soon as possible" and
gently prodded the Soviets as to
when Kuznetsov would return. So-
viet Premier Kosygin, in his sur-
prise news conference on 4 May,
indicated that the Soviets plan to
continue the talks, and voiced the
opinion that both sides were inter-
ested in reaching a settlement.
REMAIN ON DEAD CENTER
Despite these relatively con-
ciliatory comments, however, offi-
cials on both sides have flatly
stated that no significant: progress
has yet been made. Kuznetsov him-
self told a Western diplomat that
stories of Soviet troop withdrawal
from the border were without founda-
tion and that Moscow would not con-
sider making such a move unilaterally.
In addition, the Chinese charge
in Moscow said in late April that
Peking has not given agrement to So-
viet Ambassador-designate Stepakov
and has no present intention of ap-
pointing its own ambassador to Mos-
cow. Another Chinese official has
confirmed that Peking views the
Stepakov appointment as a ,possible
Soviet attempt to downgrade the ne-
gotiations. The Soviets, in turn,
have indicated they may seek Chinese
approval for shifting the talks to
Moscow. Peking, however, will prob-
ably be reluctant to accede to such
a move.
SOVIETS SQUANDER NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL
Continuing Soviet efforts to
boost current petroleum output have
resulted in serious losses of na-
tural gas and crude oil. Failure
to realize the full potential of
older producing fields is beginning
to impinge on export capability and
makes the Soviet need to develop
new fields more imperative.
In the Mangyshlak Peninsula,
natural gas that was obtained as a
by-product of crude oil was flared
off as waste instead of being uti-
lized or recycled into deposits to
maintain pressure. As pressure de-
clined, numerous wells ceased pro-
ducing. The Soviets finally in-
jected seawater into the deposits
in an attempt to increase pressure
and avoid costly pumping. The
Mangyshlak oil, however, is highly
viscous, and the seawater cooled
the oil until it solidified and be-
came unrecoverable. As a result, a
large portion of the Mangyshlak oil
reserves, which approximated the re-
serves on Alaska's North Slope, was
lost, as were the great quantities
of gas that were wantonly burned.
Similar mistakes have been made
in Belorussia, where a newspaper re-
cently scored petroleum producers
for flaring 350 million cubic meters
of natural gas during the last five
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
NOR_' i/
CAUCASU$i
years. Crude oil has had to be
pumped prematurely at a number of
wells because of declining pressure,
and pumping will be required at still
more wells in the near future.
At one Belorussian deposit, many
wells are idle because of mechanical
problems, and production from active
wells has been increased. This ap-
proach will result in fulfillment of
the current production plan but will
reduce ultimate recovery of oil from
this deposit alone by some 100,000
metric tons.
Tremendous waste of crude oil
and natural gas also has occurred
in the immense Urals-Volga and West
Siberian fields and elsewhere. Many
unrecoverable pockets of oil have been
formed by improper water injection.
Last year some 10 billion cubic me-
ters of gas, about one fourth of
all the gas produced in conjunction
with oil in the USSR, was flared.
Moreover, such waste is continuing.
In many cases, the exposure of scan-
dalous waste reportedly has led only
to unfulfilled promises that short-
comings will be corrected.
A number of factors contribute
to the Soviets' profligate treatment
of their petroleum resources. The
incentive system induces maximum
production in the short-run regard-
less of technical requirements and
long-run consequences. Soviet pe-
troleum technology and equipment are
not up to Western standards. More-
over, responsibility for oil and
gas extraction is divided between
two ministries, resulting in fre-
quent failure to apply the best
techniques available for exploit-
ing associated deposits of oil
and gas.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
ROMANIA COURTS THE ARABS
Romania has made a strong bid
in recent months to improve its re-
lations with the Arab world, par-
ticularly with Egypt.
The Romanian Government has
never fully recovered its political
standing in the Arab world since it
refused to join the USSR and the
other Warsaw Pact countries in
breaking relations with Israel af-
ter the June 1967 war. Romanian-
Arab relations fell to a new low
last August when Bucharest raised
its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv
to embassy level. Widely consid-
ered a coup for Israel, the move
was denounced by Arabs and Commu-
nists alike. Iraq recalled its
charge and Egypt recalled its am-
bassador, while the Sudan and Syria
broke relations entirely.
The Romanians still insist on
implementation of the 1967 UN reso-
lution as a solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, but since early
this year they have been at pains
to demonstrate limited support for
the Arab cause in other ways. Bucha-
rest staged an international day of
solidarity with the Arab people on
25 January. In February the au-
thoritative party daily Scinteia
condemned the Israeli bombe g of
the Egyptian civilian factory at
Abu Zabal. Visits to Cairo by a
Romanian trade union delegation in
February and by Foreign Trade Min-
ister Burtica in March were empha-
sized in the Romanian press as evi-
dence of Bucharest's friendly in-
tentions. Finally, in a speech to
the Romanian parliament later that
month, Foreign Minister Manescu ap-
pealed for a "full normalization" of
relations with all Arab countries,
and significantly, did not mention
Israel.
Nevertheless, the problem that
probably touches the most sensitive
Arab nerve has been the emigration
of Romanian Jews to Israel. This
emigration had totaled several thou-
sand yearly, but was abruptly cut
off following the June 1967 war.
In October 1968 it was reportedly
allowed to resume in trickling num-
bers. Reports conflict on whether
such emigration is still under way,
but in view of Romania's other moves
toward reconciliation with the Arabs,
it is doubtful.
The Romanians probably feel
that their policy of neutrality and
friendship with all has become some-
what lopsided in the Middle East in
favor of Israel. Moreover, while
they are apprehensive about the con-
sequences of deeper Soviet involve-
ment in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
they do not want to be isolated as
anti-Arab. By extending a friendly
hand to Cairo now they hope to re-
establish their credentials in the
Arab world without seriously endan-
gering their good relations with
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
Israeli claims and Egyptian reports since mid-April have pointed to a
larger and more autonomous role by Soviet military personnel in Egypt, but
to date there has been no evidence of an aerial engagement between Soviet
and Israeli pilots. Israeli officials this week reiterated their concern over the
Soviet presence, but indicated they would proceed cautiously in an apparent
hope that direct Israeli clashes with Soviet forces could be avoided. Tel
Aviv's concern over the increasing casualties being inflicted by Egyptian raids
has so far been manifested only in a higher level of air attacks in the
immediate area of the Egyptian cease-fire lines.
Egyptian President Nasir's May Day speech included an appeal to the
US to force Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories or at least to
refrain from providing additional support to Israel. Nasir termed this a "final
appeal for the sake of peace in the Middle East," and warned that further US
augmentation of Israel's military superiority would affect US-Arab relations
for decades to come.
Political violence in the Indian state of West Bengal has gained nation-
wide publicity as Naxalites-pro-Peking Communist extremists-have been
staging hit-and-run demonstrations in the Calcutta area. "President's Rule"
(control from New Delhi) was imposed on the state last March, and although
the security situation is not likely to get out of hand, the stepped-up
violence is a cause for concern.
The launching of the Chinese space satellite has intensified the debate
in India on acquiring nuclear weapons, but the government still denies it has
any intention of going nuclear.
Celebrations for the third anniversary of the Greek military coup of 21
April 1967 began Sunday following the Greek Orthodox Easter week.
Premier Papadopoulos reaffirmed more confidently than ever the regime's
policy of returning to constitutional rule only when the country is ready.
Security for the celebrations was very tight, and no incidents have yet been
reported.
Zanzibar and East Germany have apparently reached an impasse over
new trade and aid agreements after more than a month of negotiations,
The Zanzibaris have long been dissatisfied with the poor
quality of East German goods and services.
President Milton Obote of Uganda announced that his government
would purchase a majority interest in nearly all of the country's industries.
This nationalization will affect several US companies that have small invest-
ments in oil distribution, banking, and insurance.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
ISRAEL PROCEEDS CAUTIOUSLY WITH SOVIETS IN EGYPT
The Israeli Government has con-
tinued to express its concern over
what it claims to be growing Soviet
involvement in Egypt and has sought
to raise international alarm, par-
ticularly in the US. At the same
time, Tel Aviv, while avoiding at-
tacks deeper into Egypt and possible
contact with Soviet pilots, contin-
ued to mount heavy air attacks along
the canal and the Gulf of Suez. The
Israelis have restated their will-
ingness for a cease-fire and peace
talks, but have shown growing irri-
tation with the increasing number of
Israeli casualties along the canal.
These have been approaching the lev-
els of the summer of 1969, which at
that time obliged Israel to step up
its attacks on Egypt.
Prime Minister Golda Meir and
two top Israeli military officials,
Minister of Defense Dayan and chief
of staff General Bar-Lev, have all
manifested Israeli reluctance to get
involved with the Soviets in Egypt,
but have emphasized Israel's de-
termination to fight to defend it-
self and to resist any attempts to
force them from the present cease-
fire lines. Mrs. Meir said that
Israel was not at war with the So-
viet Union and had no plans to fight
one "but we will not run away if it.
(war) becomes necessary for self-
defense." Dayan, in a speech to
students in Haifa, said that Is-
raeli armed forces had had no air
clashes with the Soviets and hoped
they would not. He claimed that Is-
rael halted its deep penetration
raids around Cairo because "they had
served their purpose," but added--
perhaps more significantly--"now
that the Russians have entered the
Page 2 2
area, we prefer to wait and see what
we shall be able to do." Reflecting
the Israeli desire for a solid show
of US support in the new situation,
Dayan said he would like to see the
US "as a real tiger with teeth...
stand up to the Russians." Dayan
also sounded what might be a warn-
ing when he charged that Soviet air
defense support was enabling Nasir
to seize the initiative along the
canal; he noted that the Israeli
casualty rate had jumped from 9
killed and 47 wounded in March to
27 killed and 62 wounded in April.
Bar-Lev, in a briefing given
to visiting US National War College
students, also stressed Israel's
current cautious posture. Asked
what Israel was going to do about
the Soviet pilots, Bar-Lev was non-
committal and said only that the
Israeli armed forces were gathering
all the information they could on
the Russians. He claimed that the
Soviet and Arab aim was to force a
peace settlement on Israel that
would put it back to the pre-June
1967 borders. The chief of staff
insisted that Israel would maintain
the status quo until there was a
chance for "real peace." Also pres-
ent was the Israeli director of mil-
itary intelligence, General Yariv,
who said that Israel did not take
lightly the international complica-
tions involved in the presence of
Soviet pilots and would exercise
caution. But he averred that Is-
rael would act to defend its exist-
ence and said what Israel needed
now was hardware, especially air-
craft, and a US "deterrent posture"
toward the USSR.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
Israeli officials have this
week repeated their desire for a
cease-fire and a peace settlement.
None of these statements indicates
any change in Israel's legal require-
ments for a settlement and may have
been designed largely for domestic
and international consumption. Note-
worthy of Israeli thinking was a re-
cent public opinion poll on the
question of the future of the occu-
pied Arab territories. Over 60 per-
cent of the Israeli citizens ques-
tioned expressed opposition to the25X1
return of any territory whatsoever,
and only nine percent were ready to
NASIR ISSUES APPEAL AND WARNING TO US
In a lengthy review of the Arab-
Israeli confrontation before an as-
semblage of workers on May Day, Na-
sir appealed to the US to order Is-
rael to withdraw from the Arab ter-
ritories it occupies and warned that
a harmful united Arab reaction would
result from any new US aid commit-
ments to Israel.
Nasir called on President Nixon
to order an. Israeli withdrawal, and
if this were not possible, at least
not to give any new political, mili-
tary, or economic aid to Israel.
Nasir characterized his speech as a
"final appeal for the sake of peace
in the Middle East." Following the
speech, Egyptian officials person-
ally conveyed Nasir's "peace appeal"
to the French and the British ambas-
sadors.
Nasir has often criticized US
support for Israeli "expansionism,"
and the Egyptians have frequently in-
dicated they believe that the US has
the power or influence to force Is-
rael to do its bidding. Nasir's
speech thus follows the usual Egyp-
tian line, but goes somewhat further
in addressing the plea to President
Nixon personally and in conveying
the appeal to other interested par-
ties. No new concessions or fresh
approaches to the Arab-Israeli im-
passe were offered by Nasir, however.
In conjunction with his appeal
for peace, Nasir made an apparent
bid to head off any further US aid
to Israel. He warned that if the
US took another step to confirm 25X1
"Israel's military superiority,"
it would affect US-Arab relations
for years.
In his address, Nasir did not
directly mention Israeli and US
charges that Soviet pilots flying
operational missions have increased
the USSR's military commitment to
Egypt. He did, however, refer to
a recent "political propaganda cam-
paign against the USSR," and charged
that it was designed to hide the
fact that the Egyptians were now
taking the initiative militarily
and was meant to open the way for
a "new escalation of US assistance
to Israel." F -1 25X1
SECRET
Page 2 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
ARMY-FEDAYEEN CLASHES IN JORDAN WEAKEN KING'S POSITION
The clash last weekend be-
tween Jordanian troops and com-
mando elements, coming on the
heels of fedayeen charges that
Jordan is plotting to kill com-
25X1 mando leaders, has further eroded
King Husayn's position.
Saturday's incident was
touc e off when a small Fatah
unit began lobbing shells across
the Jordan River near the section
of the East Ghor Canal that is
now under repair. After the Is-
raelis returned fire, Jordanian
Army units moved against the
fedayeen in an effort to impose
a cease-fire. Two Jordanian sol-
diers and one commando were re-
ported killed. Elements of at
least three fedayeen organizations
in the area then attacked the Jor-
danian troops; in the ensuing
fighting, the commandos' camps
were destroyed and their arms
and provisions seized.
The Palestine Armed Strug-
gle Command (PASC), coordinating
body for five of the major fed-
ayeen organizations, immediately
cited the army's action as fur-
ther proof that army leaders are
plotting to crush the fedayeen
movement. Earlier, one of the
commando groups had announced that
it had foiled a plot by Sharif Na-
sir, the head of the army, to assas-
sinate Fatah's Yasir Arafat and
George Habbash, leader of the
Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine. The PASC called
on Jordanian soldiers to resist
their commanders and prevent the
army from being turned into a
"force for the protection of
enemy settlements and installa-
tions." According to press re-
ports, however, commando leaders
subsequently held an all-night
session with army commanders in
an attempt to stave off any new
flare-ups.
Nevertheless, the incident
seems to have confirmed growing
suspicions among the fedayeen
and their supporters that the
regime has been cooperating with
the Israelis to keep the cease-
fire lines quiet and to extermi-
nate the commandos. Much caustic
criticism of the King and of
Sharif Nasir is apparently be-
ginning to circulate throughout
the country, and the more radical
commando groups are distributing
broadsides playing up Sharif Na-
sir's assassination plot. FI
SECRET
Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT
A new civilian government of
"national union" in Dahomey, com-
plete with a three-headed presi-
dency, was sworn in this week,
but it holds little prospect for
bringing long-term stability to
this coup-ridden former French
colony in West Africa.
The joint presidency is
manned by the country's three ci-
vilian political kingpins and
chief regional spokesmen--Hubert
Maga, Justin Ahomadegbe, and
Sourou-Migan Apithy. They suc-
ceed an inept and divisive mili-
tary triumvirate that has kept
Dahomey in a state of near chaos
for the past five months. Maga,
a northern leader who was the
country's first president, is
"first among equals" and premier;
that role is supposed to rotate
among the three presidents every
two years. Cabinet ministries
have been apportioned among sup-
porters of the three presidents
and of former president Zinsou.
Former President Soglo toasts three other
former presidents-Apithy, Maga, Ahomadegbe-
who make up new "national union" government.
Page 2 5
INSTALLED IN DAHOMEY
The final agreement on the
new government came only after
the army had applied heavy pres-
sure on civilian politicians,
including a threat that they might
find themselves out of the pic-
ture completely if they did not
arrange a compromise.
Given the depth of the mutual
hostility among the three presi-
dents as well as their conflicting
political ambitions, it is highly
unlikely that the compromise will
last for long. Moreover, even
if the government survives its
own built-in divisions, there are
a number of unresolved conflicts
within the military, and between
the military and civilian leaders,
which could explode at any moment.
At the center of the most
pressing of these disputes is
the question of the future status
of the army chief of staff, Lt.
Colonel Kouandete.
Meanwhile, the incoming gov-
ernment has already been threatened
with a general strike by workers
and students demanding immediate
and drastic tax reductions. Their
challenge could lead to the early
crumbling of the fragile new
structure 25X1
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
NEW TENSIONS IN
New tensions have arisen be-
tween the US and the military regime
in Somalia, and relations seem
likely to worsen. In late April
the Supreme Revolutionary Council
(SRC) rounded up a collection of
civilians and military personnel
and charged them with plotting
against the government. General
Korshel, a vice president of the
SRC and a former police commander,
was accused of masterminding the
plot. Following Korshel's arrest
and a propaganda campaign that
stressed the involvement of an "im-
perialist" power, five members of
the US Embassy in Mogadiscio were
expelled for alleged involvement
in the conspiracy.
The expulsion of the Americans
suggests that some government offi-
cials may have been aiming more at
creating new irritants between the
US and Somalia than at countering
local coup plotting. No informa-
tion has yet emerged to shed any
light on the plot itself or on the
few Somalis thus far identified.
Reports have long confirmed the
existence of disaffection and pe-
riodic plotting, but it is unclear
if those arrested were part of a
conspiracy or were merely known dis-
sidents who were jailed to put them
out of circulation.
Even less clear is General
Korshel's part in the plot. Despite
the regime's contention, Korshel
seems ill suited to the role of
ringleader. He had few assets to
contribute to a serious plot, having
little influence outside the coun-
cil or with his colleagues. He was
a reluctant participant in the army
Page 2 6
US-SOMALI RELATIONS
take-over last October and joined only
after being threatened with arrest.
Since then, his position has been
shaky at best, and he apparently
was retained on the SRC partly by
virtue of his senior rank and partly
to give the appearance of army and
police cooperation.
On the other hand, during his
long tenure as a top police official
before the coup, Korshel was closely
involved with the US police train-
ing and assistance program. Although
Korshel may have been in contact with
some dissidents, it also seems prob-
able that linking him with the plot
may have been prompted by some SRC
members as a convenient way of dump-
ing him from the council and impli-
cating the US. At least one source--
an article datelined Mogadiscio that
appeared in an Italian Communist
publication--hinted at such a pos-
sibility by stating that US repre-
sentatives are involved in police
training and alleging that the plot
was organized by police.
Sentiment favoring a break with
the US is known to exist among some
of the young nationalist officers on
the SRC. Although it is not clear
who is behind the current anti-US
campaign, US-Somali relations have
drifted steadily downhill since the
army seized power in October 1969.
The army has long been hostile to
the US for its role as an arms sup-
plier to Ethiopia and as a close
supporter of ousted prime minister
Egal. Somali suspicion of the US
has already led to the expulsion of
the Peace Corps in December 1969,
and this latest incident may nudge
both countries closer to a break.
SI,CRE1'
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
The May Day holiday passed peacefully in most of Latin America, and reaction
to President Nixon's speech on Cambodia has been limited. Communists in Vene-
zuela attempted to organize anti-US demonstrations, but there was little trouble.
Fidel Castro's statement on 22 April that Cuba will always be ready to have
closer military ties with the USSR and Raul Castro's prolonged visit to the USSR,
where fie received an unusually warm reception, underline the continuing improve-
ment in Soviet-Cuban relations. In addition, Soviet naval vessels that took part in a
recent exercise in the Atlantic may visit Havana over the weekend and then engage
in maneuvers in the Caribbean.
Delegations from nine countries that claim maritime jurisdictions to a 200-mile
limit are scheduled to finish a week of deliberations in Montevideo today. Among
the subjects discussed were denuclearization of the seabeds and a Latin American
position on the US-USSR proposals for a Law of the Sea convention. The results of
the discussions are likely to be incorporated in a "Declaration of Montevideo," to be
issued at the close of the conference.
In the Dominican Republic, President Balaguer still appears to be a strong
favorite to win re-election in the contest on 16 May. Election-related violence and
last-minute threats by some of the opposition parties to withdraw have dominated
the headlines, but opposition efforts do not appear to have eroded Balaguer's
strength seriously. The major opposition party, led by Juan Bosch, is still abstaining
and refusing to support any candidate. Even Bosch has publicly admitted that his
party cannot halt the President's re-election effort. Bosch is likely to continue to cry
"fraud" and claim that the election is a farce, a theme other opposition parties can
be expected to pick up.
The mutiny by the Haitian Coast Guard last month continues to spark arrests
and ousters of middle-level civilian and military personnel, but there has been no
widespread purge or bloodbath, as many expected. The government, in fact, has
shown some concern for its public image and has officially denied that any
executions have taken place. A further shake-up may still occur, but President
Duvalier seems satisfied that he can count on the loyalty of the majority of the
armed forces.
Colombia remains calm, and the curfew restrictions have been further modified
in Bogota and removed entirely in other areas. Preliminary returns in the congres-
sional contests suggest that National Front candidate Pastrana will lack a majority
and will have to form a coalition if lie is to govern effectively. The final recount of
the presidential vote may take as long as another month.
Presidential inauguration ceremonies will be held today in Costa Rica for Jose
Figueres, who previously held office from 1953 to 1958. Many foreign delegations
are expected to attend, and the possibility of embarrassing demonstrations cannot
be ruled out.
SECRET
Page 2 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
BRAZIL SECURITY FORCES HIT TERRORISTS
Military forces and security
units have dealt severe blows to
terrorists in southern Brazil. The
principal target was the Popular
Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR), which
has been responsible for many major
terrorist operations during the
past two years.
The security forces' current
campaign was largely made possible
by leads obtained from suspects in
the attempted kidnaping of US Con-
sul Curtis Cutter in Porto Alegre
on 4 April. The abduction was planned
by the VPR and coordinated with other
terrorist groups. When this attempt
failed, they selected other targets,
including the West German ambassador,
another US consul, and several Bra-
zilian military officers and govern-
ment officials. These plans were
frustrated by the arrests of sev-
eral important terrorists in Porto
Alegre, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao
Paulo. Two of the four members of
the national command of the VPR were
captured, another committed suicide,
and only the organization's leader,
renegade army Captain Carlos Lamarca,
remains at large. In addition to
many bank robberies and thefts of
arms, the VPR was responsible for
the assassination of a US Army Cap-
tain in Sao Paulo in October 1968
and the kidnaping of the Japanese
consul general in that city last
March.
25X1
t e government 25X1
has mounted a joint operation of
army, air force, and state police
units to locate training bases of
the organization in a remote area
of southeastern Sao Paulo State
close to the border with Parana.
Near the town of Jacupiranga, mili-
tary forces found two sites that
the VPR intended to use for guer-
rilla training. The troops also en-
countered a band of VPR militants,
and among those captured was Darcy
Rodrigues, a former army sergeant
who deserted with Lamarca and was
one of his chief lieutenants.
SECRET
Page 29 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
RENEWED VIOLENCE LIKELY IN GUATEMALA
Guatemalan President Mendez
has allowed the state of siege,
imposed following the assassina-
tion of German Ambassador von
Spreti, to lapse despite an in-
crease in terrorist violence.
Mendez' action suggests that his
government will not undertake
large-scale counterterrorist ac-
tions in the remaining weeks of
his administration.
The FAR has decided to con-
tinue its terrorist activities
both in Guatemala City and in
rural areas. On 29 April, left-
ist terrorists in Guatemala City
Page 30
SI CRET
tried to kill one of Arana's body-
guards; a policeman was killed in
the attempt.
President Mendez has been
reluctant to deal strongly with
the leftist threat because of his
desire to conclude his term of
office on 1 July peacefully. He
also apparently wants to place
the burden of solving the ter-
rorist problem on the incoming
Arana administration. His atti-
tude probably will give the right-
ist counterterrorists even more
reason to act.
The activities of this clan-
destine unit may result in the
loss of many innocent lives and
add to the increasingly tense
situation. During the last pe-
riod when such a unit was active,
mutual retaliation was the rule
rather than the exception.
11'I~:[?hl.Y SU\I\J AHY 8 May 70
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
TRINIDAD FACES A NEW POLITICAL CLIMATE
Confidence in the government
has been severely shaken by the
recent disorders, and cabinet
changes will probably soon take
place. The government also ap-
pears likely to present new legis-
lation in an attempt to dramatize
its awareness of the need for
social and economic change.
The arrest last weekend of
the ringleaders of the army mu-
tiny, which erupted on 21 April,
finally ended the drawn-out re-
volt. The rebellion, coming on
the heels of weeks of unrest fo-
mented by black power dissidents,
had threatened to topple the ad-
ministration of Prime Minister
Williams. Since the arrests,
government spokesmen have re-
fused to divulge any of the de-
tails surrounding the mutiny,
but it appeared to stem primarily
from complaints about internal
conditions in the regiment.
Some of the officers, who are
scheduled to stand trial for
treason later this month, may
also have been sympathetic to
the black power cause.
of his chief ministers, a young
cabinet official regarded as a
spokesman for the black nation-
alist wing of the PNM, has also
tarnished the party's image.
Williams has tried to re-
coup some of his lost political
ground by promising a "drastic
reconstruction of government" and
vowing "to support unequivocally"
the claims of blacks to social
justice and economic dignity. De-
spite the rhetoric, Williams' new
programs are thus far vague. Ear-
lier in the year, he tried to
counter the demands of black
power advocates by prescribing
an additional 5 percent tax on
corporations and individuals in
high tax brackets and by imme-
diately creating 1,600 new jobs.
Even these specific efforts had
little impact, in part because un-
employment, estimated at 15 per-
cent of the work force, appears
to affect mainly secondary school
dropouts who are unwilling to ac-
cept the common laboring jobs of-
fered.
Prime Minister Williams, who
has held power since 1956, has
probably now incurred political
liabilities that could shake his
party's long-time dominance.
Williams' personal political
stock, upon which the Peoples'
National Movement (PNM) has been
highly dependent, has undoubtedly
dropped as a result of his inabil-
ity to head off the black power
movement or to take early deci-
sive action against the muti-
neers. The resignation of one
Williams will probably call
elections late this year or early
in 1971; the current parliamentary
term expires next year. The prime
ministers' difficulties may be
complicated by a political opposi-
tion that recently has shown new
signs of life. Although his foes
are still splintered, Williams
will have to present some practi-
cal programs in coming months if 25X1
he is to stave off a serious ero-
sion of his party's strength.
SECRET
Page 31 WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
EL SALVADOR ADOPTS A TOUGH LINE
The Salvadoran Government ap-
pears to be adopting a new and
tougher approach to domestic and
foreign politics. In an obvious
effort to set the political tone
for the last two years of the San-
chez administration, the government
is taking steps to restrict politi-
cal opposition. El Salvador con-
tinues to take a tough stance
against Honduras, as well.
Although the government was
careful to avoid incidents before
the congressional and municipal
elections on 8 March, it made clear
that its patience with student dis-
sent was wearing thin. Concerned
that terrorist successes in neigh-
boring Guatemala might inspire Sal-
vadoran student or extremist groups
to resort to violence, the govern-
ment served notice after the elec-
tion that it would deal harshly with
any further public disorders.
Despite its landslide victory
in the elections, the government has
not made any conciliatory gestures
to the opposition parties. Ignoring
Christian Democratic charges of
election fraud and voter coercion,
the administration has treated the
electorate to a practical demonstra-
tion of its new get-tough policy.
Itannulled the mayoral victory of
a candidate from a minor leftist
party, which had been used as an
electoral vehicle by the Communists,
and later used military reservists
to break up a peaceful rally of the
same party.
Recently, there have been indi-
cations that the National Guard com-
mander and intel-
ligence chief, Gen-
eral Medrano, is
interested in run-
ning for the presi-
dency in 1972 with
President Sanchez'
support. This sug-
gests that the tough
line will continue
and even grow in
intensity. Me-
drano, a dedicated
anti-Communist, is
not above precipi-
tating leftist violence in order to
win popular support.
Medrano has also supported a
tough policy toward Honduras. He re-
portedly is responsible for the cur-
rent disruption of traffic along
the Pan American Highway and has been
uncompromising in his refusal to re-
move National Guard troops from the
border areas--a major stumbling block
in the way of the creation of a de-
militarized zone.
The Salvadorans recently became
aware of reports that Honduras had
acquired jet fighter aircraft and
they now fear that a surprise attack
is planned. A number of defensive
measures have already been taken and
restrictions have been placed on the
movement of US Military Group person-
nel. The restrictions may be aimed
at masking a repositioning of army
units
SECRET
Page 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Cuba and Subversion: Old Strategy, New Tactics
Secret
N9 45
8 May 1970
No. 0369/70A
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PL-LASE f i?TUR-N TO
-'i cy J,I r '
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SJ LKr;"1'
CUBA AND SUBVERSION: OLD STRATEGY, NEW TACTICS
Fidel Castro has been involved in subversion and armed struggle in varying degrees
ever since the Cayo Confites expedition in 1947. Almost every Latin American Republic
has felt his interference at least once. His involvement has taken many different forms
ranging from direct personal participation, as in the abortive Cayo Confites adventure
against dictator Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, to the supplying of tons of arms
and ammunition, as in Venezuela in 1963. His efforts have consistently met with failure,
with the single exception of his war against former Cuban president Fulgencio Batista.
Even then it took two attempts before Batista was ousted. Despite his many setbacks, he
has adopted revolution as a way of life, and there are no signs that he plans to reject it as
a basic tenet of his personal philosophy. His tactics might change because of the
circumstances peculiar to a particular situation, but the fundamental precept seems
immutable.
Castro's predilection for armed struggle as the main road to political power has
brought him into conflict with many of the Moscow-oriented Communist parties of
Latin America and even with some orthodox Communists in Cuba. His domestic critics
are too timid and too few to constitute a serious problem; they are handled in typical
Castro steamroller fashion through public denunciation followed by various forms of
banishment. The foreign parties, however, have the ear of the Soviet Union, Cuba's most
important benefactor, and are less easy to silence. Party leaders, many of whom were
well-established disciples of Marx and Lenin long before Castro began dabbling in
politics, view the Cuban dictator as a latecomer to the Communist movement and as an
arrogant, self-appointed oracle of revolutionary doctrine. Castro in turn thinks of them
as ossified theoreticians corrupted by the soft life and blind to political reality. On
occasion, Castro has been willing to accommodate Soviet reaction to complaints from
Latin American party officials by agreeing, as he did in 1963 and 1964, to allow the
local Communist party leaders to determine the road-peaceful or nonpeaceful-to
power in their respective countries. Such agreements, however, have been honored only
for relatively brief periods of time and Castro invariably has returned to cramming his
guerrilla tactics down their throats.
When Castro's most carefully conceived guerrilla venture-Che Guevara's operation
in Bolivia-met disaster in late 1967, party leaders throughout the hemisphere could
scarcely restrain an audible sigh of relief. In their eyes, Castro's theories of violent
revolution had at last been proved wrong. A toning-down of propaganda and a hiatus in
Havana's support of guerrilla warfare operations suggested that Castro had finally
recognized his folly and was adopting a change of strategy. This hope, however, has
proved to be false. Evidence of the past two years shows clearly that Castro clings as
strongly as ever to his theories of armed struggle and violence. His tactics have changed,
but his strategy remains the same. Moreover, armed struggle and violent revolution seem
to be such basic elements in Castro's psychological make-up that they will probably
remain Cuban policy for as long as he is in power. But whatever Castr 's theories, a
variety of factors will tend to make him selective in his support of revolutionary groups.
Special Report - 1 -
8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
The capture and execution of Che Guevara
in October 1967 and the subsequent destruction
of his guerrilla group in Bolivia caused Fidel Cas-
tro to pause and reflect at length on his policy of
exporting revolution. The Bolivian fiasco, which
was merely another in a long string of fruitless
and costly Cuban adventures in subversion, was a
particularly disastrous setback because the nu-
cleus of the guerrilla group consisted of 16 vet-
eran Cuban combatants-three of them members
of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Commit-
tee-who were hand-picked and led by the man
whom Castro considered the most experienced
and daring guerrilla warfare tactician in Latin
America. The group was theoretically the best
team that Havana could field.
The startling lack of success in Bolivia be-
came apparent to Castro when he finally gained
access to Guevara's campaign diary in the spring
of 1968. Castro found out that, far from estab-
lishing a viable guerrilla front, Guevara's band was
constantly on the run, was barely able to survive
the harsh terrain, and was unable to recruit Boliv-
ians through his highly touted tactic of "armed
propaganda." The circumstances of the defeat
indicated to Castro that a rethinking of Cuba's
strategy was in order.
Special Report - 2 -
In addition, a hard look was taken at the
Interior Ministry (MININT), which is charged
with carrying out foreign intelligence operations
such as the Bolivian affair. A reorganization of
MININT was initiated in mid or late 1968 at the
same time a similar process was set in motion in
the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
(MINFAR), another government branch deeply
involved in subversion. That this shake-up was
long overdue became even more apparent when a
series of defections of key personnel shook
MININT in 1968 and 1969.
The revamping of MININT included both
personnel and structural changes. In July 1968,
the first vice minister of the armed forces, Major
Sergio del Valle Jimenez, replaced Major Ramiro
Valdes Menendez as interior minister. (Valdes,
who had directed the ministry since 1961, was
not in disfavor, however; after completing a
lengthy high-level course of politico-military stud-
ies, he assumed in January 1970 the position that
del Valle had previously vacated.) Major Eddy
Sunol Ricardo, a member of the party's Central
Committee, who had often been used by Raul
Castro as a trouble shooter, was named to the
newly created post of MININT vice minister for
political work. The first vice minister, Major
8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
Manuel Pineiro Losada, who also functioned as
the chief of the foreign intelligence apparatus
(DGI), retained the DGI under his general com-
mand but turned over direct responsibility for its
management to Major Joaquin Mendez Com-
inches, a former comrade-in-arms of Raul Castro.
Pineiro's title is now first vice minister and techni-
cal vice minister. Major Jose Abrantes Fernandez,
who as chief of the Department of State Security
(DSE) was charged with counterintelligence and
security responsibilities, apparently was "kicked
upstairs" and has been identified since last Sep-
tember as vice minister and chief of the general
staff. Like Pineiro, Abrantes presumably still has
the DSE under his command but may have turned
over direct control to an as yet unidentified in-
dividual.
room for doubt concerning Cuba's continued ad-
herence to armed struggle and violent revolution.
At the conference of the Economic Commission
for Latin America held in Lima in April 1969,
Rodriguez answered Venezuelan charges that
Cuba was still supporting guerrillas by saying that
"Cuba has the conception that for the develop-
ment of the revolutionary process of most of the
countries of Latin America, armed struggle is the
fundamental instrument. We continue to hold to
that conception." To those delegates who talked
of resuming relations with Cuba if the Castro
regime would publicly reject export of the revolu-
tion, Rodriguez replied: "Cuba is not going to
change its position to enter into relations with
any Latin American government."
Both the reorganization of MININT and the
reassessment of Cuba's policy of subversion were
probably completed by late 1969 or early 1970.
There apparently never was any intention of dis-
carding armed struggle; the reappraisal seems to
have addressed only the problem of how and
when to employ it.
With Fidel Castro's almost total preoccupa-
tion with domestic problems, Minister without
Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez emerged as a
key spokesman for the regime on foreign policy
matters after late 1968. His statements leave no
Special Report
The new MININT hierarchy consists of (from left to
right) Majors Pineiro, Abrantes, Mendez Cominches,
and Leyva and Captains Pupo, Aguilera, and Franco.
In an interview published in a leftist Chilean
magazine in September 1969, Rodriguez sought
to clarify "Cuba's position with respect to the
revolutionary struggle in Latin America," which
he said had "often been the object of inexact
interpretations...." He said: "Cuba conceives of a
`continentalization' of strategy. That strategy is
based fundamentally on the use of armed struggle
and, in particular, guerrilla warfare in the major
part of the countries of Latin America, but it
does not exclude other forms of revolutionary
violence or even of nonviolent political struggle."
He characterized as remote and difficult, how-
ever, the possibility of attaining power without
violence or previous armed struggle. Regarding
8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
the situation in Chile, he derided the decision by
leftist political parties to attempt to achieve
power through democratic elections and said that
"Chilean revolutionaries must be prepared for a
struggle in which violence will be the decisive
element, even in the case of their obtaining power
by the nonviolent electoral road."
More recently, the Cuban press agency
Prensa Latina reported that, in conversations with
newsmen at the United Nations in New York in
March, Rodriguez said that "Cuba supports the
liberation movements in Latin America...this is
not only our right but our duty."
Finally, on 22 April, on the 100th anniver-
sary of the birth of Lenin, Castro himself
staunchly reaffirmed in definitive terms his com-
mitment to support the subversion of other gov-
ernments by violence: "Cuba has never nor will it
ever deny support to the revolutionary move-
ment. This is not to be confused with support of
any fake just because he is using the name of
revolutionary... .That type of pseudorevolutionary
can expect no aid from Cuba, of course. But
revolutionaries like Che, willing to struggle to the
final consequences, ,:willing to fight, willing to
die-they will always be able to count on Cuba's
help .... But one-must not worry about our posi-
Special Report
tion toward the revolutionary movement. So long
as there is imperialism, so long as there are people
struggling, willing to fight for their people's lib-
eration from that imperialism, the Cuban revolu-
tion will support them."
It is the Cuban subversive effort in Latin
American countries that has been the most
affected by Castro's policy reassessment. One re-
sult was the reduction or complete withdrawal of
support from groups-such as those in Venezuela
and Colombia-that have demonstrated. incom-
petence and leadership weaknesses culminating in
Venezuelan guerrilla chieftain Douglas Bravo lost
Castro's support.
8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
br,k-lKJI I
a splintering of the local revolutionary movement.
By early 1969, for example, all Cuban guerrilla
advisers in Venezuela had been recalled to Havana
and material support had been reduced so much
that several guerrilla leaders complained publicly.
In his speech of 22 April, Castro admitted that
Cuban support had been withdrawn from groups
that had constantly performed poorly, but he
made it quite clear that he would back those that
produce concrete results.
Another outcome of the reassessment was a
fundamental change in revolutionary theory.
Previously, the Cubans had maintained that the
guerrilla unit in the rural areas, basing its support
on the peasants, was the focal point of the revolu-
tionary movement. Units in urban areas func-
tioned only in support of the rural guerrillas. In
revising this concept, Castro seems to have real-
ized-probably as a result of Guevara's experience
in Bolivia-that the peasant in the countryside is
basically a conservative individual with a rela-
tively low degree of political consciousness and
therefore a poor prospect for recruitment. Castro
thus has apparently adopted a more flexible doc-
trine in which the students and workers of the
cities-who have a greater political awareness and
a more liberal bent-initiate the revolutionary
process by means of urban terrorism, later moving
to the rural areas to start the second-or guerrilla
warfare-stage.
Carlos Fonseca Amador, president of the
pro-Cuban Sandino Front of National Liberation
(FSLN) in Nicaragua, described the new theory in
early 1969 in a critique of previous FSLN opera-
tions: "Under conditions in Nicaragua-more or
less the same as Latin American countries gen-
erally-the center of action of the revolutionary
war has to be the countryside. However, the role
that the city should play also has particular im-
portance, since in the first stage of the struggle
Special Report
the city must provide the countryside with the
most developed cadres in order to direct the or-
ganization of the political and military, detach-
ment. Generally, the urban revolutionary cells can
be developed more easily in the first stage. Such
elements include the revolutionary sector of the
workers, the students, and a certain strata of the
petit bourgeoisie." Havana, which described
Fonseca Amador as "one of Nicaragua's finest
sons," gave its imprimatur by publishing the cri-
tique in Tricontinental magazine in late 1969.
The same theory appeared again in Tricon-
tinental in April 1970 when Carlos Marighella's
Affm
Castro looked upon Carlos Marighella as the most
promising guerrilla leader in Latin America.
8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SJ C.~KE'f
"Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" was pub-
lished. Marighella, the Brazilian terrorist leader
who was killed in a police ambush in Sao Paulo
on 4 November last year, originally wrote the
"minimanual" last June but apparently had for-
mulated his ideas of the revolution in Brazil two
years prior when he made his break with the
Brazilian Communist Party. Although Triconti-
nental acknowledged that Marighella had written
his article with the specific case of Brazil in mind,
it claimed that the "minimanual" has a "special
importance" and that it "will become one of the
principal books of every man who, as a conse-
quence of the inevitable battle against the bour-
geoisie and imperialism, takes the road of armed
rebellion."*
Marighella himself had explained his thesis in
an interview granted last September to a repre-
sentative of a French publication. "Under the
present conditions of dictatorship in this country
(i.e., Brazil)," he said, "propaganda and educa-
tional work is possible, a priori, only in the cities.
A number of mass movements, particularly those
organized by students, intellectuals, and certain
groups of militant unionists, have established a
climate politically favorable for a tougher strug-
gle, by which I mean armed actions. All the
antidemocratic measures taken by the govern-
ment. . .have created a climate of revolt... .The city
contains all the objective and subjective condi-
tions necessary for a successful guerrilla war. But
out in the countryside the situation is markedly
less favorable. This means that the war in the
rural districts will have to come after the war in
the cities, which will play a distinctly tactical
role. Besides, the comrades who go out to fight in
the countryside will already have undergone their
baptism of fire in the urban struggle. The very
bravest of them will be sent out into the coun-
try."
Special Report
Marighella, Fonseca Amador, and other rev-
olutionaries are unanimous in support of Castro's
conviction that the local Communist parties have
failed to recognize the validity of armed struggle
and have been reluctant to put it into practice.
The footdragging and sometimes outright treach-
ery of the local Communist parties on this point
have long been a sensitive issue with Castro. He is
particularly bitter toward the Venezuelan Com-
munist Party, which he believes sabotaged the
guerrilla effort in the mid- l960s, and the Bolivian
Communist Party, which he largely blames for
Guevara's downfall. Although his last major state-
ment on the subject was made almost two years
ago on the occasion of the publication of Gue-
vara's diary in Havana, there is ample evidence
that his sentiments have not changed as a result of
the policy reappraisal. At the Moscow conference
of Communist parties in June 1969, for example,
the Cuban observer, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, ac-
curately reflected Fidel's views when he chal-
lenged a portion of the proposed conference re-
solution that stated that "the Communist and
Workers Parties head the democratic forces and
maintain on high the banners on the anti-im-
perialist struggle, fight selflessly and courageously
for the demands of the masses and for the attain-
ment of revolutionary changes...." Rodriguez
acidly charged that "in our opinion, that image
does not correspond to reality with regard to
certain Communist parties in Latin America" and
then chastised parties that "underestimate the
dangers of imperialism" and "bourgeois reform-
ism." Although Rodriguez' criticism of the Latin
American Communist parties was rather mild
when compared to some of Castro's bitter dia-
tribes, the forum in which Rodriguez delivered
the rebuke indicates clearly that the so-called
"thaw" in relations between the parties and
8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
Havana is pure fiction. Castro withdrew aid from
certain guerrilla groups not to placate the local
Communist party chieftains but because the guer-
rilla groups were so ineffective for so long that
Castro lost faith in their ability and desire "to
make revolution." To use Castro's own words:
"They had the opportunity to start and conduct a
revolution; they did indeed have the opportunity
and they fumbled it." Furthermore, he has flatly
stated that he plans to continue support for "rev-
olutionaries like Che," which is just the type of
activity that earned him the condemnation of the
parties.
The new importance given to armed struggle
in urban areas as a result of Castro's policy
reassessment raised questions in the minds of
many revolutionaries because it seemed to con-
flict with the theories expounded by Jules Regis
Debray in Revolution Within the Revolution? In
this treatise-much publicized by Havana-Debray
discussed at length basic guerrilla warfare doctrine
as he understood it after a year of study in Cuba.
Although Debray wrote the essay, its concepts are
generally accepted as being those of Castro and
Guevara. Thus, the high value now placed on
urban struggle compared to the low value place
on it in Revolution Within the Revolution? leaves
Castro vulnerable to charges of inconsistency in a
matter of life-and-death importance to revolu-
tionaries who are putting his theories into prac-
tice. Juan Antonio Blanco, an instructor in the
Department of Philosophy at Havana University,
for example, admits, in the October 1969 issue of
the Cuban theoretical journal Pensamiento
Critico, that "Debray, for reasons very well
known, is closely tied to our country and our
ideas about the problems of Latin America. A
criticism of his essay Revolution Within the Rev-
olution? is in part, a criticism of our own ideas."
Special Report
To absolve Guevara, Castro, and even
Debray himself of any inconsistency, however,
Blanco explained further: "Despite the fact that
Debray tries to summarize the basic ideas of Ma-
jor Guevara and Fidel Castro, this does not pre-
vent certain personal viewpoints, or a poor or
simply brief statement of some aspects, from
causing different interpretations which do not
always have to coincide with Debray's own
thought." When it was first published in 1966 in
Havana, Debray's essay was highly touted by the
Cubans as an important work "for those who
know that `the duty of every revolutionary is to
make the revolution.' " Blanco claimed three
years later, however, that "Debray was not trying
to write a manual of guerrilla warfare or a socio-
logical treatise on the Latin American revolu-
tion."
In a further effort to disabuse the revolu-
tionary faithful of any misconceptions about the
theories in Debray's book, Havana published in
Pensamiento Critico in August 1969 a preface
that Debray had written more than two years
earlier for the French edition of the book. Debray
wrote that the purpose of his book was "to seek a
maximum of revolutionary efficiency," and he
then warned the reader to avoid "any definitive
conflict between theory and practice.... Let the
combatants figure out for themselves the theory
of their fight..."
An article in the January 1969 issue of Tri-
continental also tried to disentangle Debray from
the results of his writings. The "acritical mechan-
ical application" of Debray's theses by some
Latin American revolutionary circles, said the ar-
ticle, was "something Debray himself did not
intend to happen." The article then goes on to
explain why the Tupamaros National Liberation
Movement in Uruguay is so successful in waging
armed struggle in spite of the fact that Debray
claims in his book that in Uruguay "there are no
8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
immediate prospects for armed struggle." So, in
the fashion of George Orwell, Debray wrote what
he didn't mean and his manual on revolution is
not a manual after all.
The de-emphasis of Debray's theories means
that Havana has become more flexible in its ideas
on how the armed struggle should be applied and
not that the importance of the basic doctrine has
dwindled. The de-emphasis happens to come at
the same time that Havana has decided to with-
hold support from lackluster guerrilla groups and
when a series of disasters involving pro-Castro
revolutionaries has caused the Cubans to slacken
the flow of support until the situations of various
leaderless groups clarify. These disasters include:
the jailing of Nicaraguan FSLN chief Carlos
Fonseca Amador in Costa Rica last September for
bank robbery; the killing of Carlos Marighella-a
most promising guerrilla prospect-by Sao Paulo
police last November; the death in prison last
November of the pro-Castro secretary general of
Panama's Revolutionary Unity Movement, Floyd
Britton; the death last September of Guido "Inti"
Perero Leigue, the survivor of the Guevara de-
bacle who succeeded in regrouping Che's National
Liberation Army (ELN) in Bolivia; and the killing
of Gerald Brisson and many other leaders of the
Cuban-supported Unified Party of Haitian Com-
munists.
Although the three Cubans who survived
Guevara's defeat in 1967 eventually went back to
Havana, and the Cubans serving with guerrillas in
Venezuela had returned home by early 1969,25X1
Havana is apparently still willing to send Cubans
to Latin America for special operations under
certain circumstances.
Evidence of Cuban support in the form of
arms or money is extremely difficult to produce,
particularly in view of Havana's exhortation to
guerrilla groups to demonstrate their independ-
ence by robbing banks or other businesses and by
buying or stealing arms locally. Marighella found25X1
this to be a successful tactic and claimed that he
had never received arms or financial aid from the
Cubans.
Assistance to rebel groups continued even
during the period of policy reassessment. Several
of Marighella's followers had been trained in
Cuba,
Special Report
Cuban support of subversion is not confined
to Latin America. Although Havana's involvement
- 9 - 8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
SECRET
in clandestine activities in Africa has declined
considerably since the mid-1960s, Castro has
sought to maintain contact with Marxist-oriented
guerrilla organizations targeted against white Afri-
can governments. In a speech at the UN General
Assembly on 8 October 1969, Cuban ambassador
Ricardo Alarcon said: "Cuba reaffirms her com-
plete support for the struggle of the African
peoples for their full national independence and
proclaims her militant solidarity with the libera-
tion movements of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and
Mozambique, and with the oppressed African
peoples in South Africa, Namibia, and Zim-
-babwe." What type of support Alarcon referred
Cuban instructors are reportedly helping to train
African guerrilla units such as this MPLA detachment
pictured in Havana's Party newspaper.
to became evident the following month when
Portuguese military units in Portuguese Guinea
captured a Cuban army officer serving with an
African guerrilla band operating out of the neigh-
boring Republic of Guinea.
Actions of both the MPLA and the PAIGC
receive prominent play in the Cuban press, and
red carpet treatment is extended to any leaders of
the movements that visit Cuba. For propaganda
support, PAIGC war communiques are regularly
forwarded to Havana by the Cuban Embassy in
Conakry for publication in the party newspaper.
The MPLA maintains a permanent repre-
sentative in Havana for close liaison. Cuba also
maintains loose contact with the Liberation Front
of Mozambique (FRELIMO), but this tenuous
relationship seems to have cooled somewhat since
the assassination early last year of FRELIMO
President Eduardo Mondlane.
The new emphasis on urban terrorism has an
important side benefit for Cuba. Bank robberies,
Special Report _10- 8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
payroll holdups, raids on gun shops, and attacks
on small police or military posts have provided
various guerrilla groups with more than enough
money and weapons for their operations. Kid-
napings for ransom have also proved richly re-
warding for guerrilla groups in Guatemala, Colom-
bia, and Uruguay. Demanding the release of polit-
ical prisoners in exchange for kidnaped diplomats
or other high-level political figures is another pop-
ular tactic of terrorist organizations.
Although Castro is undoubtedly aware that
his own diplomats serving abroad are vulnerable
to terrorist attacks, he has made no attempt to
renounce publicly the kidnaping or assassination
of foreign service officials. In fact, when 13 of the
15 prisoners released by Brazil in exchange for US
Ambassador Elbrick chose to travel to Cuba for
asylum, Castro was on hand at the airport and
saw to it that they got red carpet treatment upon
arrival. A warm welcome was also given to four of
the five prisoners freed in exchange for the Jap-
anese consul general in Sao Paulo and to 19 of the
20 Dominicans freed in a trade for an attache of
the US Embassy when both groups sought refuge
in Cuba.
The Cuban press has been outspoken on the
subject. A radio commentator in Havana, for ex-
ample, called the kidnaping of Ambassador El-
brick "the most brilliant action carried out re-
cently," while Tricontinental of December 1968
characterized the assassination by pro-Castro re-
bels of US Ambassador Mein in Guatemala City as
"punishment well deserved." Similarly, Verde
Olivo, the Cuban military weekly, reported the
assassination by the same rebel group of.two US
military officers in Guatemala in January 1968 as
being "the only language that the native oligarchs
and their patrons, the Yankee imperialists, under-
stand."
The Cubans until 1969 had always under-
played the importance of urban terrorism in the
revolution of 1957-58. The guerrilla war in the
mountains had always dominated accounts of the
overthrow of Batista. Last August, however,
Pensamiento Critico published the text of a talk
given in closed session to Latin American journal-
ists in 1967 by Major Faustino Perez, the man
who directed Castro's urban apparatus during the
war. Perez' remarks were probably released be-
cause by 1969 the policy reassessment had indi-
cated that added importance was to be given to
urban terrorism in the revised revolutionary
theory. Perez' historical review closely paralleled
the theses expounded by Fonseca Amador and
Marighella. His reason for employing terrorist
tactics is simple: urban terrorism creates a "situa-
tion of insecurity in the so-called economic
classes.. .who are going to feel that their base is
shaky and are themselves going to be thinking of
the necessity of change, the necessity that this
situation cannot continue.... A state of general
opinion in the people favorable to change will be
created. In other words, even those who are not
revolutionaries realize that this cannot continue
and will assume an attitude favorable to change."
RAW MATERIALS FOR REVOLUTION
Perez laid great stress, as did Marighella and
Fonseca Amador, on the participation of students
in the revolutionary process. Students have a de-
veloped political consciousness, a certain lack of
caution, and have the fitness of youth. The vio-
lence that students have precipitated throughout
both North and South America in the past few
years has apparently impressed Castro with re-
spect to revolutionary possibilities. In late 1969,
he initiated plans to resurrect his old student-
front group, the Continental Organization of
Latin American Students (OCLAE), which was
formed in Havana in 1966 to act as a support
apparatus for the Guevara adventure in Bolivia.
OCLAE has lain dormant since Guevara's failure,
but last December its permanent secretariat in-
vited to Havana a select group of student leaders
Special Report - 1 I -
8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
SECRET
in several Latin American countries who favor the as Camilo Torres, the Colombian priest who
Cuban position on armed struggle. joined the ELN and served under arms with the
guerrillas until killed in combat in 1966. Another
Colombian and former priest, German Guzman
Campos, who maintains that "revolution is the
only way," so impressed the Cubans that he was
invited to the Havana Cultural Congress held in
January 1968. In January 1970, Radio Havana
characterized as "one of the most significant
phenomena in Latin America in recent times" the
"growing participation of some of the progressive
Catholic clergy in the struggle of the peoples." A
month later, the Cubans, apparently searching for
another Camilo Torres, gave considerable press
Camilo Torres is Castro's
example of the ideal
rebel priest.
The Cubans are also favorably impressed by
the growing tide of sentiment within the Catholic
Church for revolutionary social and economic
changes. Havana's propaganda contains heavy
doses of material on members of the clergy such
Special Report -12- 8 May 1970
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
vL V S &J y
play to the reported arrival in the ranks of the
Colombian ELN of Father Domingo Lain, a
Spanish priest who was expelled from Colombia a
year ago for interfering in the country's internal
affairs. Castro has commented favorably on the
revolutionary clergy several times in his speeches
and probably looks on cassocked rebels as having
excellent potential for guerrilla support activities
such as those carried out by various religious
orders in Brazil in conjunction with Marighella's
terrorists.
THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE
Castro will continue to support subversion
abroad but is now being much more cautious as
to whom he should support and what type of
support is to be supplied. If the situation were
particularly promising, he would not hesitate to
send money, arms, or even Cuban advisers, but
the rewards would have to be commensurate with
the risks. He seems to have learned that exporting
Cubans to lead a foreign revolutionary movement
is counterproductive, and he will probably de-
pend on foreign nationals who have the charisma
and aggressiveness of a Carlos Marighella to pro-
vide the necessary leadership. He will not insist, as
he did with disastrous results in Bolivia in 1967,
that he control the revolutionary movement, and
he will probably be satisfied to confine Cuban
participation to support and advice. He is showing
signs of being parsimonious with financial and
material assistance, urging revolutionaries to sus-
tain themselves by means of holdups, bank rob-
beries, and similar actions that have become so
prevalent in Latin America in the past year.
He will exert special care in situations like
that in Peru where military officers seem to be
making a genuine effort to institute fundamental
economic and social changes by means of na-
tionalization and agrarian reform. In such cases,
he will soft-pedal violent revolution to avoid up-
setting the applecart. He considers the case of
Bolivia a special one, however, and will oppose
the Ovando government no matter what changes
are instituted. Castro blames Ovando for the exe-
cution of Guevara and seems to be intent on
exacting revenge. Honorato Rojas, the Bolivian
who led Guevara's rear guard into a fatal ambush
in August 1967, has already been liquidated by
the ELN, and the same fate has apparently been
decreed for Mario Monje, the now-imprisoned
Bolivian Communist Party official who refused to
aid Guevara, and for Ovando himself.
The bulk of Castro's support for revolution-
aries will probably consist of propaganda and the
training of recruits in guerrilla warfare and special
operations techniques. Candidates for training
will probably be screened much more closely than
in the past, and this policy may result in a drop in
quantity but an improvement in quality.
Castro will establish and maintain liaison
with, and support, those groups that are willing to
engage in armed struggle for the overthrow of
their native governments but will be less dogmatic
when it comes to the fine points of revolutionary
theory. He now recognizes that each country has
its peculiarities and that the Cuban experience
cannot be repeated in other countries unless his
general theories on revolution undergo consider-
able revision. He will continue to scorn most of
the established Communist parties in Latin Amer-
ica and will seek out those revolutionary leaders
who are willing to apply in their respective coun-
tries the general guidelines of urban terrorism (to
create the proper revolutionary climate), guerrilla
warfare (to provide a combat nucleus for con-
fronting the forces of repression), and the
people's army (to overthrow the government,
seize power, and continue the revolution's eco-25X1
nomic and social phases). Castro is a compulsive
rebel and will probably remain committed to vio-
lent revolution.
Special Report - 13-
SECRET
8 May 1970
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A007900020001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5
Next 21 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/04/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07900020001-5