WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
WOUN VL
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
4 ?,
13 March 1970
No. 0361/70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 12 March 1970)
Far East
THE WEEK II ; PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
The govern
against Lo
having a re
tionists. A
ent's successful prosecution of its case
r House Deputy Tran Ng6c Chau is presently
training effect on oiier leading opposi-
forcing the goernment to wick draw new taxes on news-
exception to this; food of caution, how-
the tactics of the Saigon press in
Page
1
PHNOM PENH IS SERIOUSLY ALLENGING SIHANOUK'S POWER
Sihanouk considers t obviously government-inspired
attacks on Vietnamese communists in Cambodia a chal-
lenge, and he is returnng to Phnom Penh ahead of
schedule for a showdown.
CHINA'S ABSENT LEADERS
Chinese Communist Party Chairmai Mao Tse-tung and his
designated: heir Lin Piao have on e again slipped into
the shadows.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
EAST GERMANS INTENSIFY INDOCTRINATION OF POPULACE
The East Germans are again displaying concern over
the political reliability of the people and Are in-
tensifying ideological work among the masse
FANFANT-.,CHOSEN TO TRY TO END ITALY'S CRISIS
Presi-dent Saragat, in another attempt to void call-
ing early parliamentary elections, has c osen former
premier Fanfani to explore the possibilities of form-
ing a new government.
STUDENT UNREST IN PRANCE FLARES UP AGAIN
The student discontent that flared iito violence last
week at Nanterre is not likely to mushroom into a
major social crisis,-but the unresy' will continue to
be a major problem fo't the Pompidou government.
HUNGARY REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC REFORM
Economic reforms are to becontinued and more closely
linked with democratization of:> ungarian life.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES PLAN FOR THE
,j The members of the European Communities have moved 12 forward in their discussions of British entry,
strengthened political ties, and mo4etary union, but
have made no progress on agricultural surpluses.
AIR SAFETY MEASURES UNRESOLVED
Wide support for any specific form of inI ,,rnational
action on civil aviation safety appears unlikely be-
fore May.
Middle East - Africa
ISRAEL AND FEDAYEEN PUT SQUEEZE ON LEBANON
The government of Lebanon is again caught between
unbridled fedayeen activities on its southern borders
and the threat of Israeli intervention. The problem
is made more acute by the prospect of elections sched-
uled for later this year.
SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
INDIA'S PARLIAMENT MEETS ON BUDGET
By setting a careful legislative course, Prime Min-
ister Gandhi has avoided serious challenges tIr~her
minority government, but she must still stee'around
some difficult issues.
MAKARIOS RETAINS CONTROL IN CYPRUS
President Makarios n&W can curb or eliminate his po-
tential rival and postpone or manipulate this year's
parliamentary elections' Further attempts on his
life remain possible, however, and relations with
Greece could deteriorate.%,_
FURTHER UN ACTION AGAINST RHODESA MAY COME
Black African states may gairisbapproval in the UN
Security Council:for the manda ory closing of all
diplomatic missions in Salisbur` and the severing
of communication links with the smith regime.
Western Hemispher`
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
FORMER DICTATOR MAY WIN UPSET IN COLOMBIAN ELECTIONS
With barely five weeks left before the general elec-
tions,former dictator Rojas Pinilla's chances for
an upset victory appear to be increasing.
GOVERNMENT WINS VICTORY IN SALVADcA AN ELECTIONS
The landslide victory of thefficial government party
in last Sunday's congression and municipal elections
removes the threat of military `intervention.
ARGENTINE PRESIDENT MOVES TO FdRESTALL-LABOR UNREST 28
Two recent actions appear;/to be aim~1 primarily at
farm hands and other low- aid workers'in the provinces,
where local labor leaders are wary of the relationship
developing between national labor leaders and the gov-
ernment. _1 -
URUGUAYAN PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FORM BATTLE LINS 29
An unsuccessful attempt by the Uruguayan leg lature to
strip the President Of his emergency powers au urs for
yet another year of conflict between the legis1 tive
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
Talk of peace negotiations took over the Laotian scene this week. T
Lao Communists=,proposals broadcast by Hanoi radio on 6 March, thorkh
repeating old demanpds, contained specifics that have prompted the Royal
Laotian Governmenl.and its allies to consider them seriously. In edition,
Pathet Lao head Souphanouvong is sending a message to Souvanna- houma,
Laotian prime minister'gnd half-brother of Souphanouvong, presumably as a
follow-up to the peace proposals. There are still, however, numerous impedi-
ments to an actual conveying of talks aimed at settling the: differences be-
tween the various participants in the war. Pending this, the fighting goes on,
with the North Vietnamese posing an increasingly serious threat to General
Pao's headquarters at Long TieiIg.
With the obvious prompting'-,of elements in the Cambodian Govern-
ment, a mob of students and othhuk s sacked tie Vietnamese Communist
embassies in Phnom Penh on 1 1 Marc, The dnionstrators followed this up
the next day by rampaging into Viet ame~c sections of the city. These
activities have produced the most seriou risis to date between Sihanouk
and conservatives in the cabinet led l Qeputy Prime Minister Matak.
Sihanouk has reacted sharply to this fjst Overt challenge to his long-held
domination over the conduct of foreign affaie. About to leave Paris on a
swing through several Communist countries, Sih ouk curtailed the trip and
is returning ahead of schedule to Phnom Penh to 'onfront the government
leaders who have been slowly moving to limit his po er.
The war in South Vietna?eithis week continued t be relatively quiet.
In one respect, however, tll Communists are contining to make their
presence felt. Enemy forced=are offering an increasingly st~ challenge to the
pacification program in s Veral parts of the country. A nflinber of attacks
have caused setbacks in~ocal areas and serve to remind the focal populace
that the Communists ar still around in force.
{
The leadership g i Communist China is continuing to demapstrate its
desire to conduct the nation's business out of public view. Mao Tse-tung and
Lin Piao have bee)i absent now for five months, and several other top leaders
have not appeared publicly for varying periods. Although Mao may yell be
slowing down, .there are no reports that he is sick. Presumably he contiiues
to be active behind the scenes, dealing with various domestic and infer-
national problems.
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
~. t MS. 4~tt KKAN+1
HOA
J UVEN f }
PN LIU . a LaF#=- - j
rvin
t )N -,rt~, `` 1 rrFU
SECRET
MILES
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
VIETNAM
The Communists seem to be
offering an increasingly stiff
challenge to the pacification
program in several parts of the
country. Enemy forces struck
hard at three government out-
posts on 9-10 March, overrunning
one position in Phu Yen Province
on the central coast and another
near Can Tho in the delta. A
second outpost in Phu Yen came
under heavy Communist pressure
but held out. The government's
Territorial Security Forces lost
35 dead and 42 wounded in the ac-
tions; there were no reports of
any enemy losses. Also last week,
a number of other government out-
posts in the delta and south of
Da Nang in I Corps were hit hard.
base areas in western IV Corps.
The specific missions of these
highly trained forces are not
known, but they should consid-
erably improve the capabilities
of the five enemy regiments and
other replacement troops that the
Communists have shifted from III
to IV Corps since mid-1969.
M, yea Do=mot, cxn t-o Ch au Case
case, some of President Thi
most prominent political opp
nents appear to be adopting
more cautious position.
Attacks such as these cause
setbacks to local pacification
programs even though the general
level of fighting country-wide con-
tinues low and most of the enemy's
big units remain in rear base
areas. The assaults are also
calculated to remind a signifi-
cant part of the rural population
that the Communists, despite their
many problems, are still a force
to reckon with.
The Communists are also con-
tinuing to shift combat forces
from III Corps to the delta.
Prisoners and ralliers captured
recently say that three main
force sapper battalions, which
formerly operated under the Com-
munists' Central Office for South
Vietnam northwest of Saigon, now
are trying to infiltrate into new
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040601-5 I
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
Although many members of the
National Assembly have denounced
the government's handling of the
Chau case, it has had little ap-
parent effect on government-
backed legislation thus far. The
Upper House passed the govern-
ment's high priority land reform
bill by a substantial majority
last week and sent it back to
the Lower House for further ac-
tion. It will probably still be
some time before the program is
enacted, although the Lower House
is scheduled to take up the bill
again next week.
The Saigon press, meanwhile,
has not let the recent atmosphere
deter it from confronting the
government over a matter it con-
sidered of vital economic inter-
est: a new tax decree, which
among other things, would have
doubled the cost of imported
newsprint. The press threatened
to engage in repeated strikes,
reportedly with support from the
powerful Vietnamese Confederation
of Labor. This caused the gov-
ernment to back down and revise
its decree by revoking the con-
troversial tax. The conciliatory
action suggests that President
Thieu wishes to avoid any further
appearance of repression at a
time when he has been receiving
adverse publicity over the Chau
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
PHNOM PENH IS SERIOUSLY CHALLENGING SIHANOUK'S POWER
Sihanouk is returning to Cam-
bodia to reassert his authority in
the wake of unprecedented attacks
against the Vietnamese Communist
embassies in Phnom Penh. The sack-
ing of the North Vietnamese and Pro-
visional Revolutionary Government
diplomatic installations by thousands
of students caps a period of growing
anti-Communist sentiment and has
produced the most serious crisis to
date in Cambodia's relations with
Hanoi and the Viet Cong.
There is no doubt that the at-
tacks, which protested the presence
of Vietnamese Communist troops on
Cambodian territory and the forth-
coming visit of North Vietnamese
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, were
government inspired. The assaults
in the capital were preceded and
followed by anti - Viet Cong demon-
strations in several provinces, and
portions of the Vietnamese community
in Phnom Penh also were objects of
mob actions. The attacks received
the unanimous support of a special
session of both houses of the Cam-
bodian legislature, which passed a
declaration asking the government
to take all measures necessary im-
mediately to solve the problem of
Viet Cong infiltration.
The Cambodian chief of state
has curtailed his scheduled visits
to Prague, Moscow, and Peking and
notified the Queen that he is re-
turning to Cambodia to call for a
referendum, asking the people and
the army to choose between himself
and "those personalities" who or-
ganized the sieges on the embassies
on 11 March. He threatened to step
down if he loses; he has used such
threats in the past to quiet domes-
tic criticism.
Sihanouk's decision to return
abruptly is a clear sign that he
interprets these events as a strong
challenge to his authority. Sihanouk
and the government have been at odds
for some time, but the assaults on
the Vietnamese represent the first
overt attempt by the government to
undermine his foreign policy. Al-
though Sihanouk has led the criti-
cism of Vietnamese Communist ac-
tivities in Cambodia, he has taken
some pains to avoid pressing the
Communists too far.
It is still not clear what gov-
ernment leaders hoped to achieve by
the attacks. By playing on tradi-
tional Cambodian animosity. toward
the Vietnamese, they may have wanted
to confront Sihanouk on an issue on
which popular opinion would be
against him. They may also, how-
ever, have miscalculated Sihanouk's
reaction. Until now, the govern-
ment's strategy has been to limit
Sihanouk's power slowly and care-
fully. They must now decide whether
to meet Sihanouk head on or give
ground. Much will depend on how
hard Sihanouk presses them and
whether individuals like Deputy
Prime Minister Matak, who has led
the anti-Sihanouk forces, calculate
that they can count on firm and con-
tinuin su ort from those forces.
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
CHINA'S ABSENT LEADERS
Chinese Communist Party
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his
designated heir Lin Piao have
once again slipped into the shad-
ows. This time they have been
publicly inactive for five months.
In fact, aside from three cere-
monial appearances in October
1969, they have been out of the
public eye since last April and
May, when they appeared in con-
nection with the Ninth Party Con-
gress.
it appears that
infrequent public appearances
have become a style of leadership
in China. Although Chou En-lai
and several other leaders have
appeared frequently, about one
half of the politburo has failed
Huang Yung-sheng
Ch'en Hsi-lien
Chang Chun-ch'iao
Li H sten-nien
Hsieh Fu-chih
SECRET
Page 10
to make a public appearance yet
this year.
Adding to the impression of
aloofness from Mao is the fact
that he has entirely stopped
turning out "latest instruc-
tions," pronouncements which
played such an important part in
Peking's propaganda during the
Cultural Revolution. The last
such instruction was originally
issued in September as a National
Day slogan without attribution to
Mao, but later propaganda des-
cribed it as Mao's own composi-
tion.
Despite his public inactiv-
ity, Mao may be very active be-
hind the scenes. He presumably
is following the Sino-Soviet bor-
der talks closely and he may also
be receiving various provincial
leaders in private, as he has over
the past several years.
Public Activity of the Politburo Members (as of 10 March 1970)
Currently
Active
Hsu Shih-yu Chiang Ch'ing
Tung Pt-wu Yao Wen-yuan
Wu Fa-hsien Li Tso-p'eng
Ch'iu Hui-tso
Li Te-sheng
Chi Ten -k'uei
Out 4-5 Months
Mao Tse-turg
Lin Piao
Liu Po-ch'eng
Chu Te
Yeh Chun
Yeh Chien-yin
Li HsUeh-feng
Wang 'ung-hominy
Approved For Release 2008/10/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
SECRET
Moscow has published its most authoritative statement on SALT since
the end of the Helsinki talks. A Pravda "Observer" article on 7 March
emphasized Soviet concern over recent US decisions on defense-particularly
the plan to expand Safeguard-but did not tie success at the forthcoming
Vienna\negotiations to repudiation of these programs. On the same duty,
Pravda al o carried an article that could be read as a sign that SALT has
caused disreement in the Kremlin. The article reminded the military of its
subordinatidc to the will of the party.
25X1
The Poles this week ,videnced new interest ip'their recessed economic
negotiations with the West, Germans. Foreign Trade Minister Burakiewicz
reviewed for the record concessions that Warsar! expects from Bonn before a
long-term trade pact is signed. oming as they.=`did on the eve of the resumed
political talks, Burakiewicz's statements suggest that the Poles, despite fre-
quent disclaimers, realize that fie poliilcal and economic talks are in-
separable and are attempting now'',o cpfivey to Bonn the impression that
success depends upon its being more e;~ible.
Romanian diplomats are invitipg ah European countries to send foreign
ministry representatives to Bucha,est soN for a "preliminary" conference
on European security. The Romi iians pro ably do not have much hope of
pulling this off, and indeed, jheir proposa\has been met with reserve in
Vienna and London, but suclf`an initiative keens alive Bucharest's hope for a
conference that would serve to nullify Moscoo's claims to a right to inter-
vene in the internal affair's of Warsaw Pact cct rntries. The Russians will
probably be annoyed at`the Romanian initiative,,, ,but will not be able to
oppose it publicly.
Spanish Foreigt'Minister Lopez Bravo will be in 'ashington on 17 and
18 March for preliminary talks on the future of the USpanish bases agree-
ment, which exp`fes next September. He may unveil the Spanish price for a
continuation of the agreement.
The USSR has accepted the US request to resume discussions at the
expert level next week on the three articles of the draft Laww ,of the Sea
convention developed by the superpowers. The meeting will probably be
devoted-'to studying their separate findings of what nations support the draft
and to discussing their proposed replies to UN Secretary General Thant's
qugry concerning an early convening of a Law of the Sea conference'The
superpowers' call for a 12-mile limit to territorial waters may run into sub-
stantial difficulty, as Chile, Ecuador, and Peru are seeking Latin American
bloc su ort for a 200-mile limit.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
.7t_',*,rcr, 1
EAST GERMANS INTENSIFY INDOCTRINATION OF POPULACE
The East Germans are again
displaying concern over the po-
litical reliability of the people
and are intensifying ideological
indoctrination among the masses.
Although there is little overt
opposition to the regime, Pankow
appears concerned over the lack
of popular ideological fervor and
commitment.
As in the past, East German
party (SED) cadres are paying par-
ticular attention to the youth
whom they accuse of aping Western
"pop culture," of refusing to be-
come involved in regime-sponsored
programs, and of being influenced
by the New Left ideologies. Of-
ficial warnings are continually
made about "Western unculture,"
which Pankow believes could in-
fluence people to oppose party
policies. A recent article in a
party publication charged that
this could lead to "open counter-
revolution as, for example, in 1968
in Czechoslovakia."
To counter Western influence,
Pankow is vigorously trying to chan-
nel young peoples' energies and to
curb unrest by making "concessions"
in areas such as music and fashions,
while increasing its efforts at
ideological indoctrination. The
regime is also reducing drastic-
ally the amount of free time avail-
able to the young by conducting
obligatory premilitary training
and using "youth brigades" on con-
struction projects. More young
SED members are being directed
to take over leadership positions
in local youth organizations to
combat the growing unwillingness
of members to participate in re-
gime-approved activities. The SED
recently distributed to students
a 30-page questionnaire obviously
designed to detect "deviationist"
tendencies, particularly those
concerning Pankow's policy toward
Bonn.
Intensified ideological work
is also going on in the factories.
Here, too, party cadres are encoun-
tering apathy and open grumbling.
Even the military appear to have
encountered problems in their ideo-
logical work. Minister of Defense
Hoffmann recently called on the
armed forces to rid themselves of
"illusions concerning the imperial-
ist opponent."
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY, 13 Mar 7 0
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
FANFANI CHOSEN TO TRY TO END ITALY'S CRISIS
Following former premier Aldo
Moro's decision on 11 March not to
undertake formation of a new gov-
ernment, President Saragat has
turned to another former premier,
Amintore Fanfani, in yet another
attempt to avoid calling early
parliamentary elections. Fanfani
has accepted "the task of making
necessary contacts for the forma-
tion of a new government."
In view of the failure of ef-
forts so far to form a four-party
center-left coalition, Fanfani is
likely to try for an all-Christian
Democratic government with support
of the other center-left parties.
Such a government would allow tem-
pers to cool as each of the par-
ties decides on its future course.
It would also presumably permit
preparations to go forward for the
regional and local elections this
spring.
All the issues that have kept
the center-left parties apart re-
main, among them those on which
feeling has recently been partic-
ularly intense: the Vatican's
open challenge of the divorce law
now pending in parliament, and the
question of defining what support
the government may accept from
Communists in parliament on impor-
tant questions. The two Socialist
parties differ on guarantees to be
required before forming tactical
alliances with the communists in
local governments. Some Christian
Democrats prefer an all-Christian
Democrat government, which would
allow their party more cabinet
seats. Their left wing, however,
prefers an exclusive two-party
coalition with the left-wing So-
cialist Party. Finally, any
leader trying to form a govern-
ment is hindered by the conflict-
ing leadership ambitions of other
politicians who do not want to
boost their rival's chances.
Thus the government crisis is
prolonged both by the issues and
by the political maneuvering of
the so-called "political class."
Even if parliament were to be dis-
solved and new elections called--
and President Saragat has been de-
termined to avoid this if at all
possible--there is no assurance
that the electorate would clarify
the political scene in ways that
would lead to a new more stable
center-left coalition. If Fanfani
fails to form a government, how-
ever, Saragat will have few alter-
natives but to a call for arlia-
mentary elections.
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
SECRET
STUDENT UNREST IN FRANCE FLARES UP AGAIN
Discontent on France's trou-
bled Nanterre University campus
erupted last week into the largest
student-police confrontation since
the May-June crisis of 1968. Or-
der has been restored and the
school reopened, but leaders of
the UNEF (National Union of French
Students), France's most powerful
student union, this week called
for "a campaign for a massive and
spectacular boycott" of student
elections scheduled for next month.
Such statements, and the activities
of the far-left student groups
that sparked last week's conflict,
are likely to increase tension both
at Nanterre and throughout the
French university and secondary
school system.
Public opinion in France is
especially sensitive to the latest
outburst because it was students
from Nanterre who launched the
1968 student-labor crisis. In
general, most Frenchmen deplore
the activities of campus radicals,
but among the moderate student ma-
jority there is enough sympathy
for the dissidents to prevent any
concerted action against them.
Ironically, the present cha-
otic situation in French universi-
ties is largely the result of re-
form efforts initiated by De Gaulle
after the 1968 upheaval. De
Gaulle's education minister, Edgar
Faure, pursued the government's
reform program--which was aimed
at decentralization and student
and faculty participation in uni-
versity affairs--vigorously and
won the praise of many students.
When Pompidou took office last
June, however, Faure was replaced
by Olivier Guichard, a man less
committed to reform ate.--out of
touch with student problems.
The unrest at Nanterre may
spread to other campuses in the
spring, and this will force the
Pompidou government to devote more
attention to what is known in
France as the "youth problem."
The government's first line f
dei\ense is a police force th
spebial components trainee and
specially equipped to cofront
the students, but any 1 ng-range
solutio to unrest in yhe uni-
versitie will requir a more
vigorous xecution reform
legislation already enacted by
the National ssemby. The broader
problem affec ng he government
is a widesprea feling, both among
students and wor -ers, that the Fifth
Republic's system is so inflexible
that only direct a tion tactics
bring results.
French history i replete
with examples of events repeating
themselves and at some p int the
May-June crisis of 1968 m be re-
played. Unless student an labor
unrest is deeper than most bserv-
ers believe, however, no major
explosion will disturb France:!s
social.peace this spring. Ner-
theless, scattered student demon-
strationsri-the sprin should not
be ruled out.
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
HUNGARY REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC REFORM
Premier Fock, in a recent
speech to the National Assembly,
emphatically affirmed Hungary's
determination to continue the
economic reform program (NEM) and
to link reforms more closely with
"democratization" of Hungarian
life.
In order to mollify critics
of reform, including those from
the USSR, he denied that the NEM
violates socialist practices and
indicated that its tempo will con-
tinue to be governed by circum-
stances. Fock side-stepped cer-
tain recent criticisms of the
NEM by attributing many difficul-
ties to the weakness of govern-
ment officials in the bureauc-
racy. He stated that the regime
will not transfer the blame for
difficulties in implementing the
reform to enterprises nor react
by restricting their rights and
authority.
A major objective of Hun-
gary's economic policy is improv-
ing the standard of living. The
goal is to increase real per cap-
ita national income at an annual
rate of five percent and to in-
crease the availability of con-
sumer goods. Fock criticized
the uneconomic use of labor and
called for increased discipline
as a critical step in raising
productivity. At the same time
he claimed that a high level of
employment will be guaranteed
despite the planned closure of
inefficient plants and a reduc-
tion in construction of new en-
terprises.
Housing remains a serious
problem despite overfulfillment
of 1969 construction plans in
that area. Budapest still hopes
to build one third more dwellings
during 1971-75 than in the cur-
rent five-year period.
Plans to increase trade and
other forms of cooperation with
both socialist and nonsocialist
countries are in the making. Pur-
chases of licenses and formation
of joint enterprises with non-
socialist countries are slated
to increase. For the first time
in several years, Hungary in 1969
had a trade surplus with both so-
cialist and capitalist countries
as well as as surplus in its bal-
ance of payments.
In line with further imple-
mentation of the NEM program,
state subsidies will not be given
to enterprises deemed inefficient
by the regime. The development
of industry is to be more selec-
tive, with power, chemicals,
aluminum processing, and petro-
leum refining among those to be
expanded.
The Hungarian regime has
been able to live with its re-
form program for two years with-
out backing down. It is not yet
clear, however, whether the NEM
is going to pay off in ways that
really count--increased effi-
ciency, economic growth, and a
relatively higher standard of liv-
ing for the average Hungarian.
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES PLAN FOR THE FUTURE
The members of the European
Communities (EC) have moved forward
in t ei.r discussions of British en-
try, strengthened political ties,
and monetary union, but have made no
progress on agricultural surpluses.
Th,EC Council, in talks last
week on "N common EC position for en-
try negot ations, has tentatively
agreed tha the length of the trans-
ition periot for new members--the
time to be pepmitted for adjustment
to the EC--sho"1ld be the same to
adapt both agricultural and indus-
trial markets.,ut the Council said
that the period's.ength could not
be fixed without casultation with
the applicants. The ,,British will
welcome a chance to di cuss the
length of the period, b want quick
access to the EC industrial market
and a longer period of times to adz
just to the inevitable highe" ag
cultural prices. The Six also-,
to approach political coop ation
in the context of enlarge ent. The
report is unlikely to to k the Six
into any particular pr9ram, but it
might reveal their i linations
with regard to futu foreign policy
and defense cooper tion.
s
Movement ward closer inter-
nal policy co dination will be en-
hanced if t EC members follow up
their rece commitment in princi-
ple to mo eetary union with feasible
program--not an easy task. France,
favo an initial emphasis on mone-
tar policy coordination that would
simulate harmonization of economic
olicies generally. Germany and
Belgium maintain that coordination
of such policies is needed in con-
cert with coordination of monetary
policies. A committee of experts
will study the various approaches
and recommend a plan by the end of
May.
informed about any talks on p lit;-
cal ties, but that they wou not
be able to participate in em un-
til later in the accessio process.
The foreign minist rs' discus-
sion of political coop ration, which
would specifically e end to the
foreign policy and bssibly defense
spheres, was repor edly business-
like, without the usual clash be-
tween "nationals s"and"supranation-
alists." A wor ing group of high-
level foreign ministry officials is
to report byate May with a defi-
nition of Political unity" and ways
to achieve it. The EC members have
directed their foreign ministers to
report before the end of July on how
Time is getting short for the
EC to set new price levels for the
1970-71 crop year that could help
educe agricultural surpluses. The
agriculture ministers have not been
abh to agree on the Commission's
prop's al designed to accomplish
this jective. Though all the gov-
ernment. are willing to buy part of
the propsal, they have not been
able to ag'ee on price decreases
for commodities that most affect
their own farmers. The agriculture
ministers will4gain attempt to set
new price levels-next week, and may
also discuss the long-term shape of
the common agriculture policy.
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
AIR SAFETY MEASURES UNRESOLVED
Interna'ional measures to
deal with the\problem of civil
aviation safet_have been the
subject of intehsive discussion
in recent weeks,but wide support
for any specific aproach is
still lacking. Agr1oement on any
kind of comprehensiv& program is
unlikely before a May\meeting of
the assembly of the 116vmember
International Civil Aviaion Or-
ganization (ICAO) or a special in-
ternational conference thaw month
under ICAO auspices.
This week the executive Cpm-
mittee of the International Air,,
Transport Association (IATA), thV
airlines' organization, called or
the airports of the world to pro-'
vide "all appropriate means" to
ensure the physical protection of
passengers and aircraft. Under
the guidance of IATA Director Gen-
eral Knut Hammarskjold, the com-
mittee drafted a "security action4
program" that will be presented,"
to the May ICAO meeting.
Earlier in the month, the
intergovernmental European Civil
Aviation Conference took similarly
tepid action after two days of
debate at an emergency/session in
Paris. The 19 delegartes could
only agree to support the convening
of the ICAO Assembly and to call
on their governmejits to establish
"airport security committees" to
counter sabotage and hijacking
attempts.
The Swiss and the Austrians
have beenthe primary proponents
of both alternatives for an ICAO
meeting-in May. The ICAO Council
may choose one of the alternatives
next week. The US has picked up
little support for its call for/
an urgent convocation of the
ICAO's committee on unlawful'n-
terference. The May meetin5v'is
likely to result in adoption of
a resolution urging earl -and
widespread ratification.f the
1963 Tokyo Convention?=only 21
ICAO members are nowa'parties to
it. This conventiph requires a
nation in which ''hijacked plane
lands to restor " control of the
plane, passes, crew, and cargo
to the aircraft commander and to
facilitate .its onward flight. A
new conveption is being developed
within AO to make hijacking a
punishle offense, and its terms
may bo'extended--under pressure
frorp~Zthe IATA and other sources--
to-,include air bombings and to
~_- . ..u~ .~~~ U altl~ca mucn
suport for its separate initiative
that places the issue on the agenda
of the current session of the UN
Human Rights Commissions. The
Arabs hae warned that they would
emphasize the Israeli raids on
the Abu Zal metal factory and
Beirut airpo,,Vt in any commission
deliberation',qn the subject.
N
Israel has'T told the US that
it will push to have airlines of
countries that either encourage
or do not dissociate themselves
from crimes agains 'aircraft denied
use of internationa - airports.
Arab transport worke'. , in turn,
have threatened to re use to ser-
vice planes of airline whose
countries adopt measure' against
Arab aviation com anies
SECRET
ovide for some accord on air-
ort security measures.
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
The tempo and weight of Israel's military strikes against its Arab
'
s apparent self-imposed
neighbors dropped somewhat in the past week. Israel
paus6 included an extended halt in air strikes against targets in Jordan, but
even Fiore noticeable was the let-up against Egypt. Although the Israelis
broke a~lull of several days in air strikes across the Suez on 12 March, they
have not bit close to Cairo since 26 February.
Announcement From both Iraqi and Kurdish spokesmen have pro-
claimed an end to th Kurdish rebellion. Baghdad had been discussing a
solution with Kurdish r\eseptatives for sonic time, but the Kurds had been
resisting the governmen. A similar agreement in 1966 proved fragile
and broke down comple68.
The political situation in urkey remains muddled. Although Prime
Minister Demirel probably will rec 've a_ new vote of confidence this week-
end, the narrow margin will not pro h S)tc strong government. Meanwhile, a
new wave of militant anti-Americans' may be forming as young radicals,
possibly Maoist-oriented, continue the\. student rallies to generate more
revolutionary fervor.
Ceylonese Prime Minister Senanayake's at N ounccment that Parliament
will be dissolved on 25 March has climinatedthe need for a scheduled
by-election and has created speculation that elect ns for a new parliament
will be held in late May,. Senanayake's United Natio , all Party now appears to
hold a slight lead over the leftist opposition coalition. Elimination of the
by-election precludes the risk of his party suffering a ychological blow by
losing in what has been a bellwether district.
The sixth conference of Maghreb economic ministA , which was to
have opened ,in Rabat on 10 March, was apparently for doed by the
Algerians when the Libyan delegation failed to show. The meters were to
have signed a "charter" integrating the economics of the four Na th African
countries.-The Libyans have long believed that the others L~byan oil
revenues as a means to finance intra-Maghreb economic development.llgeria
has committed its own oil revenues to such cooperation and was unwilling to
go ahead without Libyan participation.
Jacques Foccart, France's primary operator in African affairs, will
arrive in Congo (Kinshasa) on 16 March for discussions with President
Mobutu. Mobutu may use the visit to seek support from Paris for his efforts
to isolate the radical regime in Brazzaville. Foccart, for his part, may play on
Mobutu's fears of Brazzaville in order to extend French presence in Kin-
shasa.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
25X6
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
ISRAEL AND FEDAYEEN PUT SQUEEZE ON LEBANON
Israel is keeping pressure
on the Beirut government for new
curbs on fedayeen activities
across the Lebanese-Israeli bor-
der.
Over the past two months the
fedayeen have moved down from the
eastern region and permeated the
central and western sectors of
the border, giving them easier
access to Upper Galilee.)
To back up their series of
warnings to Lebanon--including
threats to establish a "no-man's
land" in depth in southern
Lebanon--Israel carried out a
cross-border raid the night of
6-7 March. An Israeli force
destroyed seven buildings in the
village of Ayta ash Shab and
warned the villagers of future
reprisals if they continued to
assist the fedayeen. Earlier,
Israeli forces had clashed with
Arab guerrillas in the same gen-
eral area, but on the Israeli
side of the border near Shetula.
Israel also claims to have killed
five fedayeen on 8 March west of
the Israeli settlement of Zarit
in the central sector.
on Lebanese soil.
The fedayeen issue has ag-
gravated the deep divisions
within the Lebanese body politic;
these splits will become even more
serious as the presidential elec-
tion approaches in late summer.
Lines have already been drawn
within the cabinet and the elec-
torate between opponents of the
fedayeen and their supporters.
In general, Lebanese Muslims--who
probably constitute more than half
the population--support the feda-
yeen wholeheartedly. The Chris-
tians, on the other hand, though
strongly anti-Israel, are more
concerned about preserving the
independence of Lebanon from the
rest of the Arab Muslim world.
They want to avoid Israeli retal-
iation against Lebanon, because
this could result in the presence
of troops from other Arab states
SECRET
Page 2 0 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
25X6
25X6
25X6
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
Fedayeen Activity Increasing
along Israeli-Lebanese Border
Tel Aviv-Yafo*
SECRET
SYRIA
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
SECRET -.
INDIA'S PARLIAMENT MEETS ON BUDGET
The traditionally acrimonious
budget session of the Indian Parlia-
ment has gotton off to an unusually
mild start. Prime Minister Gandhi,
anxious to deprive her political
enemies of a strong controversial
issue to use against her, has
steered a careful legislative
course. On the whole, her proposals
have been less far reaching than
the fanfare attending the creation
of her "new and radical" Congress
Party last fall had led the con-
servatives to expect. At the same
time, her programs appear "progres-
sive" enough to mollify the "young
Turks" in her party who had earlier
criticized her for not building so-
cialism fast enough.
The budget for the fiscal year
beginning 1 April, which Mrs.
Gandhi, as her own finance minis-
ter, presented to Parliament on
28 February, was only mildly ex-
pansionary. She told the legis-
lators her aim was to "reconcile
the imperative of growth with con-
cern for the well-being of the
masses." The budget does not
really provide much of a stimulus
for increased economic growth,
however.
Mrs. Gandhi's suggested rev-
enue measures are only marginally
different from those accepted last
year, but it is possible that Par-
liament will still balk at approv-
ing all of them. Both the govern-
ment and the legislature will prob-
ably be able to reach an agreement
because, at this juncture, neither
side appears anxious to create con-
ditions that could topple the gov-
ernment and risk the expense and
uncertainties of a new election.
The budget session does not ad-
journ until May, however, and Mrs.
Gandhi will need to continue to
move cautiously. Elections for one
third of the seats in the upper
house of Parliament are scheduled
for the beginning of next month.
Mrs. Gandhi's faction now controls
less than half of the state legis-
latures whose members, in turn,
elect the deputies in the upper
house. Her faction's strength in
that house, therefore, is almost
certain to decline. Legislative
initiative rests mainly with the
lower house of Parliament, but up-
per house members can block legis-
lation if the lower house is closely
divided.
Meanwhile, tensions building
on other fronts are likely to put
additional strains on the govern-
ment while Parliament is in session.
Violence has been on the increase
in the Communist-dominated state
of West Bengal and the government
there is in danger of collapse.
Such an event would put Mrs. Gandhi
under pressure to recommend "presi-
dent's rule" for West Bengal. She
has been reluctant to intervene,
however, because historically such
a move has tended to deflect the
public's irritation away from in-
ternal state troublemakers toward
the central government. Her con-
cern for maintaining potential sup-
porters among Communist legislators
in New Delhi is also an inhibiting
factor, but she may ultimately opt
for a limited form of "president's
rule" in the hopes that a cooling-
off period might lead to the suc-
cessful formation of an alternative
government.
SECRET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927A007700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
NIAKARIOS RETAINS CONTROL IN CYPRUS
President Makarios has again
emerged "'4s the paramount leader
after the-,unsuccessful assassina-
tion attempt against him on 8 March.
With thousands of Greek-Cypriots
demonstratir\g support for him in
the streets &nd with messages ex-
pressing horrkr at the attack com-
ing in from alb quarters, Makarios
has at least teporarily recovered
the prestige lo -4,-t during the months
of gradually increasing political
fragmentation in the Greek-Cypriot
as Greek-Cypriot spokesman in the/
long drawn-out intercommunal t9.lks
and his withdrawal from poli `cal
life. This might not be ary'unwel-
come development for Malyrios, but
it could spell the end/f the dia-
logue between the Grey Cypriot and
Turkish-Cypriot con Unities, which
has at least helpplft to preserve a
shaky truce for,,, any months.
Makar'os may also choose to
use theP erage the present situa-
tion g, es him by again deferring
parl'ementary elections promised
for- his year in order to avoid the
rl. k they would have of diffusing
is own authority. He could also
insist on his own arrangement for
apportioning parliamentary seats
among the several progovernment
parties.
Although such moves might gain
Makarios temporary political advan-
tages, they will not diminish the
danger of future attempts on his
life by the several groups of de-
termined and dangerous enemies who
mow consider him a traitor to the
use of union with Greece (enosis).
e are other developments which
He also now has the opportun-
ity to undercut his om-y potential
political rival on the?'sland, Pres-
ident of the Chamber of eputies
Clerides, whose popularity had been
greatly enhanced by his viorous
during Makarios' visit in Jay
openly connecting Clerides $th the
can move against him indi,ectly by:
making use of Clerides ''Political
Georkatzis. Several;5f the persons
arrested after the Mooting were
associates of Geo- atzis
If Majearios or any of his close
advisers'iove too strongly against
the able but touchy Clerides, how-
ever,-,they could bring about the
latter's oft-threatened resignation
cou Q grow out of the assassination
atte
proble
t that would pose long-range
tions o
tempt of'
for Makarios. Any revela-
the complicity in the at-
ainland Greek officers
serving onCyprus would increase
the polariz ;tion between pro- and
anti-enosis ~~ements on the island,
SECRET
Page 2 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
and could contribute t he deteri-
oration of relation ith Athens.
There was most certainly
Turkish-Cypr' t involvement in t
assassination attempt Both Turk-
ish and Turkish -C lot authorities
have deplore e act publicly and
have ado a policy of watchful
wai .
FURTHER'UN ACTION AGAINST RHODESIA MAY COME
Black African states may
gain approval in the UN Security
Council for the mandatory closing
of all diplomatic missions in Salis-
bury and the severing of communi-
cation links with the Smith regime.
Following Rhodesia's shift to re-
publican status last week, however,
most Western countries with con-
sulates have already announced that
they will close their missions,
following the US lead.
The acceptance of the African
proposals will depend on the will-
ingness of the African delegates
to moderate their present draft res-
olution, and of the UK and US to
acquiesce in a ban on communica-
tions.
include postal service, tses
special problems fgr-s--SUS, which
maintains-post-9T service even with
e jstnam .
ent draft is unacceptablep ,irrarily
because it condemns tlitish for
refusing to use e to end the
Rhodesian re ion. The UK might
suppor communication ban, or at
le,"not oppose one, in a more mod-
`- "L t-s ' Twelve
council members have indicated they
would probably support such sanc-
tions.
Only South Africa and Portugal
are expected to keep their missions
open no matter what action the UN
takes. Prime Minister Ian Smith,
however, probably believed, as did
the black African states, that the
US consulate was the key to Rho-
desia's chances of obtaining de
facto recognition. Its closure,
therefore, is a strong psychologi-
cal blow to the Smith overnment.
SECRET
Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
A week ot_relative political quiet in Latin America was punctuated by
sporadic inciden of terrorism and student demonstrations, with the threat
that more of theme can be expected. In El Salvador the government par
won an unexpectedndslide victory in elections last Sunday.
Another government-student clash \ pp'ars likely in Ecuador unless
President Velasco is prepared to work ou a compromise on the issue of
student premilitary training. Velasco's hapd-lr e stand may make a solution
to this thorny problem particularly difficult t achieve. Students are also
striking and demonstrating in Colombia to force he government to reopen
the National University in Bogota.
Reaction by the press to t i'c Peruvian Governnknt's expropriation of
two opposition newspapers col, inued to be strongly c ktical of the Velasco
regime. The opposition pressts now questioning the "re olutionary govern-
ment's" aims and is chargin%that Peru is moving "toward ictatorship."
In Panama, the rey rcussions of deposed President Ari ' unsuccessful
plot to overthrow the nta government have begun to affect Ii-Panamanian
relations. Normal p. ice liaison between Canal Zone authores and the
National Guard ha/already been disrupted as the Panamanians y to press
the US to extra Pe an Arias aide who sought asylum in the Zon~after he
failed to find su'port for the coup attempt.
Venczula and Guyana began direct negotiations on their borderrob-
lem this week. Both sides hope to work out an agenda for a meeting between
the foreign ministers of the two countries, but the atmosphere following last
month'Yexchange of fire by border troops and the heated di lomatic exp.
change at the UN is not conducive to much progress.
SECRET
Page 2 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
FORMER DICTATOR MAY WIN 'UPSET IN COLOMI"iAN ELECTIONS
With barely five weeks to PresidentrLleras' concern
go before the general elections about recent evelopments is evi-
on 19 April. former dictator Gen- dent. Late/ last week he broke
eral Rojas
an upset vice
ry appear to be in-
creasing.
The governmt's fear of an
upset was heighte
a demonstration in
military reservists
Rojas. Rojas contin
large crowds everywhe
and can count on the s
ogota by 10,000
s to draw
e he goes
port of
the lower
a significant segment o
classes in large urban aXeas, such
as Bogota and Cali, which could
be the key to the electiorN The
campaign of Pastrana, the rty'
official candidate, on the c`theet
hand, remains lackluster and
still comes across as an une4l'
citing bureaucrat.
A Rojas victory woulc'be a
serious blow to the Naticifial Frori
his commit ent not to become in-
volved inthe elections and made
several blistering attacks against
the agi g ex-dictator. Other Front
r
leade
belatedly awakened to the
threat of a Rojas victory, have be-
gun an intense campaign against
him6-=by recalling his "bloody dic-
taorship." These attacks are
b ing made in hopes of frightening
he upper and middle classes so
!badly that they will vote for Pas-
trana.
If these tactics work, and
Rojas comes to believe that he will
lose the election, it is possi-
ble that he will reach an agree-
ment with maverick Conservative
candidate Belisario Betancur. Such
an alliance probably would assure
a Rojas victory. In any event,
Rojas is now 70 years old and can
which was created in 19-56 follow- \ be expected to make every effort
ing Rojas' overthrow. finder the to achieve the presidency, since
Front the country's tw major par- \ this probably will be his last op-
ties, the Liberals anal Conserva- ortunity.
tives, were to alter}(ate the pres-
idency until 1974. /It is the Con- Student rallies and strikes
servatives' turn ar)d Rojas, al- in upport of demands to force the
though necessarily/running as a gov4nment to reopen the National
Conservative, opposes the concept UnivArsity in Bogota have further
of the Front. If Rojas is elected, cloud
he probably will abrogate many of This
the present economic and social bode w
programs and thereby endanger the
country's political stability, so
painstakingly built up since his
overthrow in 1957.
d recently by
d the political situation.
pe of activity does not
1 for peaceful elections,
especial; y if the government is
forced tck engage in repressive
measures.%
SECRET
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
GOVERNMENT WINS VICTORY IN SALVADORAN ELECTIONS
The
official
landslide victory of the
government party in last
Sunday's congressional and municipal
elections removes the threat of mil-
itary intervention. Although Presi-
dent Sanchez will have to contend
with charges of voting irregularity
raised by the opposition Christian
Democrats, primary attention will re-
turn to the country's development
problems and to the festering quar-
rel with Honduras.
Incomplete returns indicate
that the government party has won
more than 60 percent of the congres-
sional seats and has control of lo-
cal governments in 12 of the 14 de-
partments. The "victory" over Hon-
duras last July and the continued
border incidents worked in the par-
ty's favor, but government pressure
on the voters may also have been a
factor in the unexpectedly good
showing. The Christian Democrats
SECRET
Page 2 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
will probably try to discredit the
government by claiming that it used
harassment and coercion to ensure
victory. Nevertheless, the order-
liness of the election process and
the absence of violence will sharply
limit the ability of the opposition
to embarrass the government.
Both the Christian Democrats
and members of the economic elite
will be closely monitoring the gov-
ernment's attitude toward land re-
form and revision of the banking law
and labor code. In the pre-election
period, the government tentatively
accepted the legislative reform pro-
gram begun last November after the
Christian Democrats joined with dis-
sident members of the government
party to overthrow the unprogressive
assembly leadership. President San-
chez will probably be convinced
that there are political advantages
in a continued commitment to reform,
but he may wish to moderate the pace.
With elections out of the way,
the Salvadoran Government will prob-
ably wish to resume bilateral talks
with Honduras in an effort to im-
prove relations. Prompt resumption
of negotiations, however, may be
difficult, because the Hondurans
are still upset about a border clash
last week and by Salvadoran refusal
to return the body of one of their
soldiers . r _a.--
quisition of a squadro.,.ef " -86K
jet fighters wilrm oubtedly raise
tensions i---t Yie area and spur Sal-
vad eif efforts to acquire jet air-
One positive factor, how- 25X1
ever, is the current indirect ne-
gotiation to establish a demilitar-
ized zone along the frontier.l-
ARGENTINE PRESIDENT MOVES TO FORESTALL LABOR UNREST
The government is maneuvering
to prevent a new eruption of labor
unrest this month as workers return
from summer vacations. Two recent
moves appear to be aimed primarily
at farm hands and other low-paid
workers in the provinces, where so-
cial and economic conditions are not
good and where local labor leaders
have little sympathy for the rela-
tionship developing between national
labor leaders and the government.
On 27 February the government
unexpectedly announced the creation
of a social services fund to extend
medical benefits to more than six
million workers. The money col-
lected, which is expected to be
about $200 million annually, will be
controlled and allocated at the na-
Page 2 8
tional level by the unions them-
selves. The government obviously
hopes that the decree will blunt ex-
pected pressures for an inflationary
wage increase and buy additional
time for the administration's eco-
nomic stabilization program. Simi-
larly, the naming of former Peronist
Felipe Sapag as governor of the in-
terior province of Neuquen, a post
he had held previously, is appar-
ently intended to quiet labor unrest
in that province and win the support
of Peronist labor leaders for the
labor confederation now being cre-
ated by the Ongania government.
It is questionable, however,
whether the government's tactics
will succeed. Farm hands, railroad
workers, and other minimum-wage
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
workers who benefited most from the
Ongania government's wage conces-
sions last year will probably be
content for the present. Problems
could come, however, from the more
volatile and better organized in-
dustrial workers. Before 1967 they
were accustomed to receiving annual
wage increases that exceeded 30 per-
cent--a rate that ran ahead of in-
flation. Real wages fell in 1967-68,
but recent hikes have amounted to
about 11 percent, just a little
more than the cost of living rise.
Nevertheless, many workers believe
that their wages still are lagging
behind cost of living increases,
especially since the recent rises
in public transportation fares and
basic food prices..
If provincial labor leaders
begin agitating for wage increases,
national leaders may adopt a more
militant stance to preserve their
own influence and position with
union members. By seizing the in-
itiative, giving labor leaders a
large slush fund to administer,
Ongania apparently hopes to outma-
neuver the more militant labor
leaders and bolster the position
of those leaders who favor cooper-
ation with the government.
URUGUAYAN PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FORM BATTLE LINES
An unsuccessful attempt by the
Uruguayan legislature last week to
strip the President of his emergency
powers augurs for yet,another year
in which the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government will
battle to establish their relation-
ship under the Constitution of 1967.
This document, which brought back a
strengthened executive after 15
years of rule by a nine-man council,
sterity measures. Congress, under
threat of being dissolved by the
President, has grudgingly acquiesced
in the President's use of these
powers.
A3 eh ce:"`h CD is---de
to carry out his policies a l-' ro-
grams , he seems to . a:vt-Tittle con-
ception of,,.he leadership role of
a president in developing support
is the latest round in Uruguay's (1--?for nati.omaL.:p_olic:ies. Last month
struggle in the 20th Century to find j he abruptly used the emergency pow-
a form of government that will pro- ers to take over the traditionally
vide effective administration while autonomous secondary and vocational
avoiding a dictatorship.
President Pacheco has made free
use of the emergency powers of the
constitution, both to implement his
economic recovery program and to
control the widespread adverse reac-
tion from labor to accompanying au-
schools, which have been a center of
extreme leftist opposition to his
government. . This move, which the
people, do not support despite a gen-
eral acknowledgment that public edu-
cation is deteriorating, provoked a
strong congressional reaction. On
5 March, the permanent commission of
SECRET
Page 29 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
SECRET
the now-recessed General Assembly
lifted the President's emergency
powers, but Pacheco promptly re-
fused to accept the legislators'
action.
When the General Assembly con-
venes in mid-March, the struggle
between the executive and legisla-
tive branches will
SECRET
Page 30 WEEKLY SUMMARY 13 Mar 70
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5
Next 25 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/10/01: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07700040001-5