FAR EAST THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007600050001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Austria's Government Faces an Electoral Test
Secret
State Dept. review completed
N! 43
13 February 1970
No. 0357/70A
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AUSTRIA'S GOVERNMENT FACES AN ELECTORAL TEST
With the parliamentary elections on 1 March, Austria may be coming to
the end of its first one-party government since 1945. As the race entered its
final four weeks, Chancellor Klaus' People's Party appeared to be running
neck and neck with its former coalition partner, Bruno Kreisky's Socialists.
This position in itself represents some success for Klaus, because his party
suffered a succession of losses to the Socialists in provincial and local
elections during most of its four-year term in office. Most observers doubt
that either major party will win a majority of seats in parliament, as the
People's Party did in 1966, and even more believe that the People's Party is
more likely than the Socialist Party to win a plurality.
A coalition, therefore, seems likely. It might take the form of a renewal
of the People's Party - Socialist "Grand Coalition," which, governed Austria
from 1945 to 1966 and, in the view of many, impaired Austria's democracy.
Or it might be a People's Party coalition with the small right-wing Liberal
Party, which could polarize politics and lead to domestic difficulties. In
either event, Klaus probably will retire, for he has vowed not to lead the
People's Party in a coalition government.
The Austrians will be going to the polls for
the eighth time since the end of World War II to
elect the 165-seat lower house (Nationalrat) of
parliament, and thus indirectly determine the
shape of the next government. The principal con-
tenders are the moderate, Catholic-oriented Peo-
ple's Party (OeVP) and the increasingly centrist-
minded Socialist Party (SPOe). They have dom-
inated Austrian political life in one guise or
another for much of the past century and, for
most of the last 25 years, have split about 90
percent of the vote. Unusual interest this time
also focuses on the small right-wing Liberal Party
(FPOe), which has been making noticeable in-
roads, mainly at the expense of the OeVP, in
provincial and local elections since 1968.
Unlike the upper house (Bundesrat) of par-
liament, whose 50 deputies are elected by, and
represent, the nine federal states, the Nationalrat
is elected by universal suffrage of all citizens age
19 or over. Voting is compulsory in Nationalrat
elections in only two of the states, but voter
turnout has nevertheless run between 93 and 97
percent in each of the parliamentary elections
since 1945. For election purposes, Austria is
divided into 25 election districts, and seats are
allocated according to the size of each district's
population. As in most West European countries,
the assignment of seats by party after an election
is a two-stage process. The first assignment is
performed by the election commissioners in each
district. They divide the total valid vote by the
number of the district's seats plus one to deter-
mine the number of votes necessary to obtain a
single seat. The total valid vote of each party is
then divided by this quotient to establish how
many seats it has won. For the second stage, the
commissioners of four or five combined, or re-
gional, districts then pool the residual votes and
Special Report
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distribute the remaining unassigned seats propor-
tionally among the parties. To qualify in this
second stage, a party must have secured at least
one seat in the first, or district, allocation, a
requirement that denies splinter parties national
representation unless they are strong in one elec-
tion district.
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Until 1966, Austria had not had a single-
party government since World War II ended in
1945, but instead had been governed by a succes-
sion of People's Party - Socialist "grand coali-
tions." From 1945, continuing at least until the
end of the occupation ten year later, there were
several major reasons for the coalition. The Aus-
trians were conscious of the need to stand to-
gether to fend off encroachments by the Soviet
occupation authorities. The two parties also be-
lieved that economic recovery could best be
pursued through such cooperation, and they
wanted to forestall a resurgence of party rivalries
that had led to open civil war in February 1934,
and thence to a Catholic party dictatorship until
1938. Following the state treaty and the end of
the occupation in 1955, the grand coalition con-
tinued, chiefly because the Austrian people had
become used to it and neither major party could
obtain a parliamentary majority.
The grand coalition relied on an understand-
ing that all important policy decisions would be
made by a bipartisan committee, a procedure that
reduced the role of parliament to that of confirm-
ing extraparliamentary decisions. A similar ar-
rangement, known as Proporz, governed patron-
age; key public jobs were doled out in proportion
to each party's seats in parliament. Inasmuch as
the People's Party was always the stronger of the
two in this period, it always held the chancellor-
ship while the Socialist Party held the vice chan-
cellorship. Each party bargained with the other
Special Report
for those ministries in which it was interested,
with a tacit understanding that one party would
control each ministry with a minimum of inter-
ference from the other. Certain important min-
istries, such as foreign affairs and defense, would
be shared, with the minister being drawn from
one party and his deputy, also with cabinet rank,
coming from the other.
Strains, however, increasingly beset the coa-
lition in the early 1960s. In the 1966 elections,
the People's Party won an absolute majority in
the Nationalrat for the first time in 13 years but
still offered to reconstitute the "Black Red" coa-
lition. The Socialists, however, decided to accept
the almost forgotten role of opposition party
rather than return to the coalition on the basis of
the reduced Proporz offered by the OeVP. As the
first one-party government got under way, a rela-
tive calm in political affairs prevailed until the fall
of 1967, largely because the Socialist Party was
undergoing an identity crisis. Even before the
1966 election, the party had been split between
moderate elements, led by Bruno Kreisky, wish-
ing to reform the party's image, and the tradi-
tional class-oriented elements, represented by
chairman Bruno Pittermann. The belief that the
party's losses had been due to decreased public
confidence because of this quarrel gave renewed
impetus to the Kreisky forces, which in January
1967 succeeded in replacing Pittermann with
Kreisky. With their house in order, and not having
to share the burdens of government, the Socialists
were able in local election campaigns that fall to
exploit the public's growing concern over the
economic slowdown that had begun in late 1966,
and the OeVP's real or alleged shortcomings as
the government party.
Following Socialist successes in several elec-
tions, Chancellor Klaus in January 1968 shook up
his cabinet in an effort to refurbish his govern-
ment's image in time for elections that spring. He
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Socialists increased their share of the vote in the
Burgenland provincial elections in late March, and
again in a series of four local elections later that
year, though their gain was somewhat behind the
1967 rate. Last year, there were signs that the
People's Party was coming back. Socialist strength
grew in two of four provincial elections, and the
party did well in all three local elections. The
People's Party, however, increased its voter
strength in one provincial and one local election.
The most surprising development was the gains of
the minor parties, notably the Liberal Party, in all
but one of the 1969 elections.
replaced the foreign minister and the vice chan-
cellor, both of whom had been criticized by the
press about the continuing, frustrating stalemates
in the dispute with Italy over the South Tyrol and
about Austria's efforts to strike an arrangement
with the European Communities. He also ap-
pointed new ministers of interior, trade, and
finance, and created the office of state secretary
for information in the belief that the govern-
ment's decline at the polls was partly the result of
its poor public relations.
The shake-up, however, little more than a
face-lifting, failed to stem the Socialist tide. The
Special Report
There are no great issues dividing the Aus-
trian people, and the major parties have been
unable to develop hard-hitting campaigns. All the
parties promote such goals as educational reform,
more housing construction, and increased social
security benefits. All proclaim, furthermore, that
they can carry out these programs more eco-
nomically and efficiently than the others.
Most of the major problems facing the Peo-
ple's Party in 1967 and 1968 have evaporated, at
least for the moment, leaving Klaus in his best
competitive position since becoming Chancellor
in 1966. On the domestic scene, the economic
slowdown ended in 1968, and real GNP growth in
1969-over five percent-was higher than before
the slowdown. People's Party candidates are also
claiming credit for the party for the near-full
employment situation, for having protected the
Schilling during the international monetary crises
of 1968-69, and for the renewed vitality of the
export industries. Although vulnerable on the
touchy issue of inflation, they stress that the rise
in prices last year, about three percent, was below
other major growth indexes.
In foreign policy also, the People's Party is
taking credit for progress-to some extent
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fortuitous-in resolving the country's two most
vexatious problems, the South Tyrol dispute with
Italy and the quest for some form of association
with the European Communities. In the former
case, Austrian and Italian negotiators reached
agreement last fall on a package of concessions
granting the German-speaking population of the
South Tyrol a large measure of autonomy, and on
an "operations calendar" for implementing the
package over a four-year period. On the other
problem, Austria's hopes of achieving an interim
agreement giving Austrian exports easier entry
into Common Market countries, pending a more
definitive arrangement, were boosted when De
Gaulle's retirement seemingly opened the way to
a more affirmative French attitude. Prospects
were further improved when Italy, as a result of
the South Tyrol agreement, lifted its veto on the
Community's consideration of the Austrian ques-
tion.
The People's Party also hopes to benefit at
the polls from the decision by the US and the
USSR to meet in Vienna when they resume the
strategic arms limitation talks on 1 April. Aus-
trian governments over the years have con-
sistently viewed Austria as a "bridge" between
East and West, both because of its neutral status
and because of its historic ties with Danubian
Europe. These pretensions received a severe jolt,
however, from the Soviet-led invasion of Czech-
oslovakia in 1968, and from subsequent Soviet
charges of Austrian complicity in the Czech-
oslovak "counterrevolution." Although the in-
vasion and the outrage most Austrians felt have
not been forgotten, the superpowers' choice of
Vienna as the site for negotiating on a major
world problem allows Austrians to glory in their
"bridge" role.
The Socialist Party has been unable to de-
velop any issues that promise to attract large
numbers of voters and is relying upon its "winner
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image" of the past two years to carry it to success
in March. Its tactics are, on the one hand, to
challenge the governing party's record, using the
theme that the People's Party promised much but
delivered little, and, on the other hand, to offer
an alternative program for progress in the 1970s.
Kreisky, a personally engaging leader, has worked
hard since 1967 to make the Socialist Party at-
tractive to all classes of society. He has emphat-
ically denounced cooperation with the Commu-
nists and has moved far enough toward the center
of the political spectrum to wean away some
elements of the People's Party left wing in pro-
vincial and local elections.
The party's unity behind Kreisky's leader-
ship, however, has recently shown signs of be-
coming unglued, raising again the possibility that
internal strains may frighten away some voters, as
happened in 1966. Despite Kreisky's objections,
the party's powerful Vienna organization placed
his old nemesis, Pittermann, on the list of candi-
dates for parliament. The party has also tended to
nominate other well-known figures, in contrast to
the People's Party and the Liberal Party; they are
trying to appeal to voters by nominating new-
comers to national politics. The Socialist Party's
program has also been labeled by some observers
as too esoteric to capture the imagination of the
electorate.
The Liberal Party, the perennial minority
and opposition party since its founding in 1949,
approaches the election with unusual optimism,
because of its successes in recent local elections.
Its announced goal is to double its present six
seats in the Nationalrat, and Liberal Party leaders
are hopeful of being invited to participate in a
government coalition.
Essentially a protest party, the Liberal Party
is promoting itself as a "clear alternative" to the
major parties in its program titled "Formula '70."
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As recent elections have suggested, however, the
Liberals can realistically hope to win votes only
from the People's Party. The leadership's decision
of 16 January to go into coalition only with the
People's Party was clearly designed to woo voters
who were dissatisfied with the People's Party and
who hesitate to switch to the Liberals only be-
cause this might lead to a Socialist Party govern-
ment. Liberal Party leaders are generally optimis-
tic because observers estimate that the percentage
of "undecideds" is unusually high-about 10 per-
cent-this year, whereas it is traditionally about
five or six percent before an election. The Lib-
erals also think they will benefit from the fact
that about 10 percent of the electorate this year
will be voting for the first time.
None of the splinter parties is given much
chance of winning even one district, essential to
qualify for parliamentary representation. The
Communist Party (KPOe) has lost support
steadily since 1945, and has not had parliamen-
tary representation since 1959. Although the
party publicly condemned the Czechoslovak in-
vasion, it fared abysmally in the 1969 elections
and is currently riven by internal strife.
Franz Olah's Democratic Progressive Party
(DFP) is not expected to equal its 1966 showing,
when it won about 3.3 percent of the vote but
not enough in any one area to claim a seat in the
Nationalrat. The DFP is a splinter socialist group
founded by Olah after he was expelled from the
Socialist Party in 1964 for financial irregularities.
Strongest in the Vienna region, the DFP polled
about seven percent of the vote there in the 1966
election. In the municipal elections last spring,
however, it won only 5.2 percent of the vote,
partly because of the impact of Olah's belated
trial.
Special Report
Because of the paucity of glamorous issues,
the campaign and the election are very much a
test of personalities. Both major parties are well
represented by candidates with considerable ap-
peal, particularly the leading contenders. Chan-
cellor Klaus, widely regarded as the most popular
politician in Austria, imparts a good, solid father
image, and Kreisky, an excellent speaker and a
polished debater, quickly establishes rapport with
his audiences.
Kreisky, however, is Jewish, and many ob-
servers question whether a party led by a Jew can
win a majority in Austria. The 1966 electoral
campaign, in contrast to this one, degenerated
into exchanges of personal insults climaxed by
DFP leader Olah's anti-Semitic denunciations of
Pitterman and Kreisky. Although party leaders
this year are seeking to avoid a repetition of 1966
by forswearing personal attacks, some people who
voted Socialist in provincial and local elections
may turn elsewhere in order to keep Kreisky out
of the Chancellor's chair.
Another enigma stems from the neo-Nazi
image of the Liberal Party. The image goes back
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to 1949, when former supporters of the 1938-45
Anschluss with Germany were prominent in
founding the party. Although the Liberal Party
remains on 'the right wing of the political spec-
trum, many observers believe the party no longer
deserves its earlier reputation, but few deny that
most Austrians still regard it as being on the
fringes of legitimacy. People's Party leaders re-
acted strongly to the decision by Liberals to join
in a postelection coalition under certain con-
ditions, apparently fearing that this prospect
might drive the party's left wing into the Social-
ists' arms.
Ancillary to the campaign is the debate
whether Austrian democracy is better served by a
single-party government or a coalition. Increasing
numbers of articulate Austrians favor a one-party
government. The well-known correspondent Otto
Schulmeister, writing in the influential Viennese
independent paper, Die Presse, labeled a recon-
stitution of the Grand Coalition "the worst that
could happen" at Austria's present stage of de-
velopment. A poll conducted last year revealed
that the number of People's Party members pre-
ferring single-party government jumped from 43
percent to 51 percent between 1968 and 1969,
and that the same preference, while still held by a
minority, was growing among Socialist Party
members.
The leaders of the major parties are, of
course, committed to seeking an "absolute major-
ity" victory by which they would have the op-
portunity of establishing a single-party govern-
ment. Indeed, Klaus maintains that a Grand Coali-
tion is valid only in time of national emergency,
contending that in normal periods, the interplay
between governing party and opposition breathes
life into the democratic process. So outspoken is
Klaus on this point that it is widely assumed that
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he will step down if the party wins only a plural-
ity.
As the campaign passed mid-point in late
January, the two major parties appeared to be
running a tight race. Although the Socialists
seemed to be well ahead in the months before the
campaign officially opened, most observers now
believe that the People's Party will lose its major-
ity but retain a plurality, that the Socialists will
improve their 1966 record, and that the Liberals
will gain only a few seats. The formation of the
postelection government, however, may not
necessarily take into account the public's views
on coalition and single-party governments, and
may hinge on how strong a showing is made by
such leaders as Klaus who have taken strong
stands on this issue.
There is little doubt that a People's Party
majority victory would lead to a reconstitution of
the Klaus government, which has ruled for four
years. Should the party win only a plurality,
Klaus' successors would probably lead the party
into a coalition with either the Socialists or the
Liberals, rather than retreat into parliament as the
opposition party.
The choice, in this situation, between the
Socialists and the Liberals might be difficult. If
the Liberal Party does well, raising its Nationalrat
representation to about 10 seats, People's Party
leaders might be tempted to form a coalition with
it in order to keep the Socialists out of the
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government. Many leaders in the People's Party,
however, including respected Finance Minister
Koren, believe that this mini-coalition would fur-
ther polarize Austrian politics and endanger eco-
nomic progress by alienating the labor movement,
which, until now, has been relatively constructive
and moderate. As in the past, these advocates see
a Grand Coalition as the only guarantee for sta-
bility and progress.
Special Report
Should the Socialist Party win a majority, its
leaders conceivably could induce Kreisky to lead
a single-party Socialist government. Chances are
better than even, however, that if the Socialists
win either a majority or a plurality, Kreisky will
opt for a Grand Coalition with the People's Party.
What is less certain, however, is whether that
party would accept a position subordinate to the
Socialists.
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
13 February 1970
No. 0357/70
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(Information as of noon EST, 12 February,1970)
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 1
VIETNAM
Military and political activity in South Vietnam
dropped to low levels for th ''YTet holidays.
COMMUNISTS ATTACK IN LAOS PI
North Vietnamese troops.-have launched their long
awaited counteroffensiy-e against Lao Government
guerrillas in the Plaithe des Jarres.
PHNOM PENH PUTTING PREP ISURE ON VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS 6
Phnom Penh's planed moves to pressure the Vietnam-
ese Communists ipto reducing their military presence
in Cambodia provably will be affected adversely by
inherent goverthaental weaknesses and the rescheduled
visit of North' Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van
Dong.
PHILIPPINE STUENT DEMANDS WIN LIMITED RESPONSE
PresidentMarcos made some personnel changes that
satisfied the students and public but to regain
their confidence to any degree he will have to fol-
low up with social reforms of greater significance
than those of the past.
PEKING BEGINS FIRST NATIONWIDE BIRTH CONTROL PROGRAM
Peasant conservatism remains the greatest barrier,
however, and population growth is unlikely to fall
below 15 million annually for the foreseeable fu-
ture.
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Europe
GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS RESUME
Priority is expected to be given to the US-USSR
draft seabeds treaty when the talks resume on 17
February.
SOVIETS AND YUGOSLAVS RETURN TO MUTUAL HOSTILITY
Tension has surfaced in relations between Belgrade
and Moscow after a brief hiatus.
INTELSAT CONFERENCE FACES TOUGH PROBLEM
A dispute between the U$' and several European coun-
tries over how INTELSA'Y should be managed could pre-
vent the conference once again from approving defin-
itive arrangements fg"r the organization.
FRAMEWORK FOR NORDIC UN:1ON APPROVED 15
The prime minister$ of the Nordic countries have
agreed in principYe to a treaty, and aim for ratifi-
cation by July.
I
SOVIET LEADERS CALL /FOR DISCIPLINE IN ECONOMIC WORK 16
The leadership) reacting to the disappointing eco-
nomic performa ce last year, has launched a cam-
paign for gre ter discipline. The resulting recrim-
inations and isagreements could eventually affect
the careers f many involved.
POLISH CONSUMER DUE FOR CONTINUED BELT-TIGHTENING
Priority will again be given to the production of
heavy industrial goods, to the detriment of housing
and consumer goods and services.
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FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY DEMOTES LEADING LIBERAL
The removal of left-wing maverick Roger Garaudy from
the central committee and politburo was one of the
highlights of the Congress that renewed a call for
left-wing unity against Pompidou's government.
AUSTRIA'S GOVERNMENT FACES AN ELECTORAL TEST
With parliamentary elections due on 1 March, Chancel-
lor Josef Klaus' People's Party is fighting to retain
its majority and thus continue the country's one-
party government, the first since 1945. Many observ-
ers believe a coalition will be necessary again, pos-
sibly a repetition of the "Grand Coalition" with the
Socialists that governed Austria from 1945 to 1966.
Klaus considers a coalition useful during a national
emergency but suffocating to the democratic process
during peace time. Bruno Kreisky, his principal op-
ponent, believes governing is best accomplished by
sharing responsibilities between major parties.
BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES ON THE DEFENSIVE
Prime Minister Eyskens' coalition has managed to sur-
vive but new challenges, as well as the continuing
antagonisms dividing the Flemish and Walloon commun-
ities, are testing its ability to last until its
mandate expires in 1972.
Middle Last - Africa
NERVOUSNESS INCREASES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Nervousness over the Middle East situation increased
last week as activity in both the military and polit-
ical sectors continued at a high level. Conferences
at a Cairo meeting of Arab chiefs of state came up
with no new Arab strategy, but indirectly threatened
Western oil holdings.
LIBYAN JUNTA IS DIVIDED OVER QADDAFI'S POLICIES
Libyan junta leader Qaddafi is facing opposition with-
in the junta as a result of his policy of sending
Libyan troops to Egypt. The trial of two of his form-
er colleagues may further inflame feeling against him.
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NIGERIA TACKLES MANY PROBLEMS IN IBOLAND
The federal government has made a good start at re-
habilitating the former Eastern Region, but much
remains to be done.
TURKEY INCREASING CONTROLS ON OPIUM PRODUCTION
Cultivation of the opium poppy in Turkey has become
one of the most pressing issues in US-Turkish rela-
tions. The prospect for tighter controls this year
appears to be good, but the chance of total elimina-
tion seems slim.
Western Hemisphere
LATINS SEEK A NEW LOOK AT CUBA
Chances are increasing that some governments, led by
Chile, will bring pressure on the US and other mem-
bers of the OAS to discuss formally the lifting of
restrictions against Cuba.
OUTLOOK IS FAVORABLE FORINEW COSTA RICA GOVERNMENT
Jose "Pepe" Figueresi, resounding victory in the pres-
idential race and his National Liberation Party's
retention of a legislative majority in the general
elections promise that the government to be installed
on 8 May will be strong.
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North Vietnamese troops in Laos began their long awaited move into
the Plaine des Jarres on I1 February. The immediate enemy thrust was
against Lao Government guerrillas who have been blocking Route 7, the
northeastern gateway to the Plaine, since last August. Preliminary reports
disclose that the Communists suffered heavy casualties and that government
forces were holding their positions. The Communists have also attacked
government positions in the central panhandle and near the capital of
Attopeu Province. These moves, as well as a Communist buildup off the
western edge of the Bolovens Plateau, fit the Communists' strategy of tying
down government troops over a wide area of:the country.
Only a few terrorist incidents disturbed the Tet holidays in Saigon;
elsewhere in South Vietnam military activity was limited to the usual
cease-fire pattern of firing incidents and small patrol skirmishes. It now
appears that post-Tet operations by the Communists probably will seek to
maintain only enough military pressure to keep some heat on the pacifica-
tion program. The North Vietnamese were represented by the third ranking
member of their delegation at this week's session of the Paris talks. Ha Van
Lau, who represented Hanoi at recent meetings, has returned to Hanoi after
almost two years in 'Paris. Although Le Due Tho's presence in Paris has
produced no change in Communist tactics, both Tho and Xuan Thuy, the
delegation's head, remain in the French capital.
Philippine President Marcos lost a significant amount of political
ground because of his testy reaction to recent student demonstrations
against election irregularities and corruption, and in favor of broad social
reform. Marcos bought some time with his belated and grudging moves to
meet student demands but the nation has seen his leadership falter. He
believes he can ride out his current difficulties, but his personal inclinations
and his ties to the oligarchy appear to rule out the meaningful reforms that
would be necessary to eliminate the causes of Philippine discontent.
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A Quiet Tet
The Tet cease-fire period
passed quietly for the most part
throughout South Vietnam. Only
a few terrorist incidents dis-
turbed the holiday in Saigon,
and elsewhere military activity
was limited to the usual pattern
of firing incidents and small
patrol skirmishes. Apprehension
about Communist intentions dis-
,/. NORTH VIETNAM
A U[Mii. i FARMED ZONE
",.. .Hue
?> A Shau Vallley
LAOS
VIETNAM
played by some of the civilian
population just prior to Tet
had largely dissipated by the
time the celebration tapered off
on 9 February.
4 50
MILES
Plans by Viet Cong local
force and guerrilla troops to
carry out additional phases of
harassing attacks in the near
future have been reported in
many parts of the country. Some
of the enemy's larger main force
units also are stirring and ap-
parently getting set for action,
particularly in the A Shau Valley
west of Hue, along the Cambodian
border in III Corps, and in the
delta. The evidence increasingly
suggests, however, that these big
units will not be committed in
major operations until sometime
later in the spring-. Meanwhile,
the enemy probably will seek to
maintain only enough military
pressure to keep some heat on
the pacification program.
In the delta, for example,
local Viet Cong forces are pre-
paring for their usual monthly
surge of shellings within the
next week or so, but they are
not likely to get a great deal
of support from any of the five
North Vietnamese regiments that
have reinforced the delta since
last summer. The northern units
still appear to be largely pre-
occupied with problems of infil-
trating into the interior of the
delta and learning to operate in
the unfamiliar and often exposed
terrain.
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Tho in Paris, Lau to Hanoi?
North Vietnamese politburo
member Le Duc Tho has stayed on
in Paris after attending the French
Communist Party congress, but his
presence has produced no change
in Communist tactics in the talks.
He has remained out of the spot-
light except for his address on
5 February to the congress.
The speech itself merely re-
iterated Hanoi's standard line
that it is up to Washington to
determine whether the war goes
on or is settled at the conference
table. Tho said that a rapid
and unconditional US withdrawal
would lead to a "prompt restora-
tion of peace," but that if the
US elects to ride with Vietnami-
zation, the Communists will fight
on "at all costs."
There have been no indica-
tions when Tho plans to return to
Hanoi, but the second-ranking
North Vietnamese delegate to the
talks, Ha Van Lau, left for Hanoi
on 11 February. Unlike Xuan Thuy,
the delegation's head, and Tho,
its high-ranking "adviser," Lau
has been in Paris since the talks
began. He has been a key figure
inside and outside the conference
room and filled in at the weekly
plenary sessions when they began
boycotting them.
Lau probably is going on home
leave and also to carry the delega-
tion's views to the leadership. Mean-
while, a relatively junior member
of the delegation led Hanoi's team
at the 12 February session of the
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Communists Launch Offensive
Contested )krritory
Limit of area claimed under
Gommunist and Neutralist
control, June 1962
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Communist-coehtrolled territ\ry
VIETNAM
Ban
Tang
Val
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COMMUNISTS ATTACK IN LAOS
The Communists launched their
long anticipated counteroffensive
against government forces on the
Plaine des Jarres ~n 11 February.
The main enemy thrust is
being directed again
forces at the junctio
t guerrilla
7 and 71. Some govern
of Routes
ent posi-
tions in this area hav
doped, but air strikes
guerrilla troops in repu
ave aided
sing at-
a of
tacks in the immediate ar
the road junction.
Meanwhile, on the Plain:
General Vang Pao's forward hd d-
quarters at Xieng Khouang Air
field, southwest of Nong Pet,
so came under heavy artillery
and infantry attacks. As of 12
February, the airfield was un-
damaged and still under govern-
ment control. The enemy,lost
some 75 killed in trying to seize
the airfield while government
losses in the early'fighting were
slight. One North Vietnamese
prisoner captured during the ini-
tial attack.bn the airfield said
the enemy attack force consisted
of about 800 troops. Other pris-
oners claim that elements of
three North Vietnamese divisions
are participating in the offen-
sive.
Although Vang Pao had hoped
to make the capture of the Plaine
as difficult and expensive as
possible, rapid loss of key ter-
rain overlooking the area could
upset such plans.
In southern Laos, North
Vietnamese forces, including at
least one battalion-sized unit,
began a series of attacks on 10
February on, the government-held
airfield.at Ban Tang Vai in east-
ern Savannakhet Province. The
five government companies at the
airfield have thus far withstood
enemy artillery and infantry as-
saults.
Elsewhere on 10 February,
Communist forces launched small
attacks against government posi-
tions in the central panhandle
nd near the capital of Attopeu
Province. Local government com-
ma"kders are concerned that an
eneiy buildup off the western
edgepf the Bolovens Plateau poses
a threat to the Mekong village
of Souvthnakhili. These moves
fit the Communists' strategy of 25X1
tying down government troops and
do not appear, to forecast larger
attacks.
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PHNOM PENH PUTTING PRESSURE ON VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
Acting Prime Minister Matak's
ambitious plans to pressure the
Vietnamese Communists into reducing
their military presence in Cambodia
probably will achieve only limited
success but may accelerate the de-
terioration in Phnom Penh's rela-
tions with the Communists.
Meanwhile, in the northeast,
Cambodian Army units have continued
their current campaign to try to
regain,some control over Communist-
and insurgent-controlled areas in
Ratanakiri. Although the army is
not likely to risk attacking any
large enemy units in the area,
`their activities may cause tempo-
rary dislocations of some Commu-
nist forces. Moreover, Phnom Penh
evidently has issued orders to all
Cambodian province chiefs that Com-
munist troops will be kept on the
move and prevented from establish-
ing permanent or semipermanent
bases of pperations in Cambodia.
The military pressures against
the Communists probably will real-
ize only scant success, due in part
to the inherent weaknesses of the
army. Additionally, Matak's inten-
tions are likely to be affected ad-
versely by the rescheduled visit
of North Vietnamese Prime Minister
Pham Van Dong to Phnom Penh some-
time soon. Dong's visit will give
the Vietnamese Communists an op-
portunity to deal directly with
Sihanouk. The latter is apt to
be more receptive than Matak would
be to suggestions Dong may make.
25X1
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PHILIPPINE STUDENT DEMANDS WIN LIMITED RESPONSE
President Marcos has bought
some time with his belated and
grudging moves to meet student de-
mands. Student disorders over the
past two weeks were aimed largely
at election irregularities, corrup-
tion, and the nee` for broad social
reform. The Philippine nation saw
Marcos' leadership falter in his
testy reaction to the student chal-
lenge, and his aura as a national
hero has dimmed.
Stung by the unprecedented de-
gree to which he was the target of
the students, Marcos initially re-
acted by dismissing their protests
as part of a Communist plot. He
later realized that the students
had a considerable measure of pub-
lic sympathy, and made limited cqn
cessions. By stating that govern
ment personnel changes last week-
end were designed to respond "to
the clamor for change," Marcos has
tried to create an appearance of
moving to meet popular demands for
responsible government.
The removal of the Philippine
Constabulary chief, hose role in
election abuses last November made
him particularly resented, has met
with wide approyal. His dismissal
has led to demands for action against
two other blatantly corrupt politi-
cal associates of Marcos, and the
president stay find it expedient to
sacrifice. them. Reassignments
within the cabinet have elevated
several` men of proven ability who
are generally respected as competent
technocrats, contemporary in their
approach. To regain public confi-
dence to any degree, however, Marcos
will have to follow up the new ap-
pointments with social reform efforts
of greater significance than past
half-way measures.
The student demonstrations the
last week of January were unique in
their level of violence. Another
new factor was that the demonstra-
tors directed .their attention to na-
tional political issues rather than
to parochial student grievances.
Aside from the minor personnel
shuffle, Marcos has responded to
student demands with standard tac-
tics of trying to divide the oppo-
sition, this time by pitting stu-
dent moderates against the student
:left. In doing so, however, he may
succeed only in weakening the mod-
erates. Although the radicals tem-
porarily patched up long-time in-
ternal rivalries to demonstrate
unity against Marcos, this facade
is already showing cracks. An
anti-Marcos attitude was still evi-
'dent in generally peaceful demon-
strations on 12 February, but the
sr?outing of some anti-US slogans
suggests that Marcos has been suc-
cessful in deflecting some atten-
tion from his administration's
shortc6znings to the US.
Although Marcos appears to feel
besieged for the moment, he has pri-
vately expressed a belief that, bol-
stered by a loyal military establish-
ment, he can ride out his current
difficulties over the next few months,
His personal inclinations, influenced
by ties to the oligarchy, appear, how-
ever, to rule out meaningful reforms
that would be needed to eliminate the
causes of Philinni nP di cr-nn1- nt
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PEKING BEGINS FIRST NATIONWIDE BIRTH CONTROL PROGRAM
Peking has started a new birth
control program which for the first
time is aimed at reducing rural as
well as urban population growth.
The rural population presently con-
stitutes some 85 percent of the
national population. The govern-
ment, however, still has not fully
shed its Marxist and nationalistic
inhibitions about population con-
trol. The new program, like its
predecessors, must therefore limp
along, handicapped by lack of fan-
fare in propaganda media.
The last ineffectual effort,
which expired during the Cultural
Revolution, had been limited
chiefly to large cities. A grad-
ual buildup to a new birth control
program became discernible during
the second half of 1969. Medical
personnel, formerly concentrated
in urban areas, were transferred
en masse during 1969 to the coun-
tryside, many to run treatment cen-
ters established for a new peasant
medical insurance system. It was
obvious, although not stated by
the press, that the transfers were
making available to the country-
side the medical skills needed to
administer a contraceptive program.
Furthermore, peasants drawn to the
treatment centers for medical care
would be ideal subjects for pros-
elytizing on birth control. Peas-
ant conservatism is still the
greatest barrier to the practice of
birth control.
By November, the Shanghai
press had begun a series of an-
nouncements revealing that in the
city and in the large rural area
under municipal jurisdiction, birth
control had been made co-equal with
the eradication of schistosomiasis
as prime public health goals. Tra-
ditional attitudes favoring early
marriage and large families again
were under organized attack. The
week of 25 through 31 January 1970
was declared a "shock week" to pro-
mote a "patriotic movement" for
birth control and late marriage.
The goal was said to be birth con-
trol "carried out in a meticulous
manner reaching each household and
practiced by each individual," a
description which certainly cannot
be applied to any previous birth
control program in China. In all
likelihood, Shanghai has been used
as a testing ground for measures
now being extended throughout China.
Current policy favors a wide
range of means to reduce births.
Intrauterine devices have appar-
ently been chosen as the primary
mechanical means because of their
high effectiveness, ease of manu-
facture, and the relative simplic-
ity of medical administration.
Abortions are actively en-
couraged, even to the point of se-
rious attempts to develop simple
"abortion machines," workable by
personnel with minimal medical
training.
No matter how vigorously birth
control is pushed, population growth
is unlikely to fall below 15 mil-
lion annually for the foreseeable
future. China now has a population
of over 800 million. Moderate suc-
cess in birth control, however,
along with improved food-raising
technology and increased agricul-
tural investments could aid in keep-
ing the food-population problem man-
ageable.
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Reports and rumors about new Soviet assistance for the Arabs in their conflict with
Israel ballooned during the week. Speculation on Soviet intentions ranged from new
diplomatic initiatives to the unlikely prospect of installing ballistic missiles in Egypt. Soviet
diplomats and propagandists are emphasizing the gravity of the situation, directing most of
their remarks at the US and what they characterize as the dire consequences that would
follow any new US military aid to Israel.
Moscow replied this week to the two-month-old Allied note on Four Power talks on
Berlin. The Soviets said they were ready to begin discussions in West Berlin next week, but
suggested an agenda that gave short shrift to the main point of Allied interest, access to the
city. Moscow probably hopes to get talks under way, however; if only to maintain a detente
atmosphere helpful to its plans for holding a European security conference.
East Germany's Premier Stoph has offered to meet with Chancellor Brandt in East
Berlin on 19 February or a week later to discuss ways to establish relations under generally
accepted norms of international law. His suggestion avoids addressing Chancellor Brandt's
proposal to negotiate a treaty on the non-use of force. Presumably, the draft treaty which
party chief Ulbricht sent to Bonn earlier will be the starting point for the East Germans.
The efforts of Czechoslovak party conservatives to undermine Husak's power base in
Slovakia have been blocked. With Husak in.nttendance, the Slovak party leadership met on 5
and 6 February to make changes along the lines of the purges carried out earlier in Prague.
Although there was some shifting, no influential pro-Soviet conservatives received top posts,
and several moderates from the Dubcek era were retained.
In a lengthy speech this week, Romania's Ceausescu carefully balanced professions of
loyalty to the Warsaw Pact with warnings that Bucharest will permit no interference with its
control of its military forces. Ceausescu apparently was not ruling out joint pact maneuvers
in Romania in the future, but lie indicated that he fully expects to retain the final say about
who would command such maneuvers, their size and their sco e.
Italian Prime Minister Rumor resigned last week and is now heading a caretaker
government while negotiations continue toward possible formation of a new center-left
coalition.
In a meeting that ended last Saturday, the Council of the European Communities (EC)
reached a compromise on the powers of the European Parliament and agreed to common
marketing policies for wine and tobacco, thus clearing away several obstacles to preparations
for membership negotiations with Britain. The EC's permanent representatives are pro-
ceeding with a report, to be presented at the next Council meeting on 5-6 March, on the
substantive matters surrounding UK entry. The British Government itself released this week
a ,long-awaited white paper on the costs of entry. Prime Minister Wilson emphasized that the
document sought to present a range of economic effects and was not in any sense a policy
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GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS RESUME
The 25 participating members
of the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament (CCD) will reconvene
at Geneva on 17 February. Leading
subjects on the agenda will be the
completion of the draft treaty lim-
iting the use of the. seabeds for
military purposes, the several in-
itiatives on chemical and biological
warfare (CBW) considered at the 24th
UN General Assembly, and-prospects
for achieving a comprehensive nu-
clear test ban (CTB) .
Priority is expected to be
given to the US-USSR draft seabeds
treaty. The treaty was submitted
to the Assembly for endorsement-,last
fall but was referred back to th(V
CCD when opponents criticized t
lack of adequate verification
rangements and claimed the to
nology would jeopardize their/na-
tions' maritime claims. US-Mug-
gested revisions in these eas may
. 90f.
satisfy some of the more in luential
critics, but the proposa have not
yet been accepted by they Soviet
Union.
The principal C40 proposals to
be considered are tl)' draft conven-
tions offered by t USSR and the
UK. The Soviet draft would prohibit
the development, production, and
stockpiling of C W agents and re-
quire the destr ction of existing
stocks. No pr vision for verifica-
tion is included, however. The
British prop?sal--backed by the US--
would ban t1e use of biological
methods of warfare.
In this connection, delegates
to the QCD will be watching closely
the debate in the US Senate on the
Geneva Protocol of 1925, after the
President resubmits it for advice
and consent. At the 1969 General
Assembly. session, Sweden, a CCD
member, secured adoption of a res-
olution--by a vote of 80-3--chal-
lenging the US contention that the
protocol does not prohibit the use
of tear gas and herbicides in war.
The/Geneva delegations will also
be;`interested in the US position
regarding the retaliatory use of
toxins.
The less advanced states are
likely to push hard for a CTB, cit-
ing the Assembly resolution--adopted
by a nearly unanimous vote calling
on all nuclear powers "to suspend
nuclear weapon tests in all envi-
ronments." There appears little
likelihood of agreement, however,
until the crucial question of ver-
ification arrangements is resolved.
Prospects are better for agreement
on a lesser step, a Canadian pro-
po$al for a voluntary exchange of
seismic data.
UN Secretary General Thant
will address the conference on 18
February; it will only be his sec-
ond visit to the Geneva talks.F_
25X1
25X1
While welcoming 25X1
hopeful signs from the SALT talks,
U Thant will support the Assembly
resolution calling on the super-
powers to negotiate a moratorium
on further testing and deployment
of new offensive and defensive
strategic weapons systems.
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SOVIETS AND YUGOSLAVS RETURN TO MUTUAL HOSTILITY
A renewal of polemics has
all but ended the brief period
of relative cordiality between
Yugoslavia and the USSR that be-
gan after Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko visited Belgrade last Sep-
tember. At that time, the two
sides agreed to disagree on the
ideological issues separating them
and tried to establish better
state-to-state relations by call-
ing a halt to mutual press recrim-
inations.
Although Gromyko's trip dem-
onstrated Moscow's desire to im-
prove political relations with
Belgrade, Soviet interest in
maintaining orthodoxy elsewhere
in Eastern Europe has frustrated
Yugoslav hopes for a real cease-
fire in polemics. Moscow has
never stopped its press attacks
on "revisionist" and "nationalist"
concepts pioneered by the Yugo-
slavs, although for the most part
it did stop singling them out as
the target of its criticism. Fur-
ther, Moscow's continuing effort
to reassert its unquestioned au-
thority over the bloc and its
sporadic attempts to meddle in
Yugoslav internal affairs have
been a source of constant irri-
tation.
Moscow's obvious reluctance
to do anything more than paper
over differences has provoked
the Yugoslavs to answer Soviet
criticism with increasing regu-
larity. The latest rejoinder
came on 31 January when radio
Zagreb denounced two recent ar-
ticles in Soviet Russia and Red
Star for defending the so-called
'Brezhnev doctrine"--Moscow's
assumed right to intervene in the
affairs of other socialist states.
Moreover, Belgrade's influential
daily Politika is now running a
series accusing the Soviet party
of rewriting history in such a
way as to put all the blame for
past difficulties in Soviet-
Yugoslav relations on Belgrade.
Moscow has responded sharply to
this with propaganda attacks
against Politika.
Belgrade is most concerned
over Moscow's long range inten-
tions. The Yugoslavs see no
change in Soviet claims to he-
gemony over eastern Europe and
clearly have begun to think in
terms of the political dynamics
which will be set in motion in
the immediate post-Tito period--
particularly the probability that
Moscow will attempt to take ad-
vantage of the unsettled and un-
easy situation. Moreover, this
suspicion and the present tit-
for-tat press exchanges are likely
to lead to a further cooling of
relations, although they did not
prevent the signing of the 1970
trade protocol that provided for
a highly optimistic 20-percent
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INTELSAT CONFERENCE FACES TOUGH PROBLEM
Unless a last-minute compro-
mise is found, the dispute between
the US and various European coun-
tries over how the International
Telecommunications Satellite Con-
sortium (INTELSAT) should be man-
aged may cause the upcoming con-
ference to fail.
The meeting, beginning on 16
February in Washington, is the
second attempt to reach agreement
on definitive arrangements for the
organization and structure of
TELSAT. Last year's conferend
only identified the points on c ich
further negotiations would be nec-
essary: management, voting pro-\
cedures, procurement policy, the
organization's legal personality, and the role of future regional
satellite systems.
In recent months the prepar-
atory committee for the approach-
ing conference has come close to
agreement on most of these issues,
but there has been little` movement
on the stickiest problem--manage-
ment. The US and a number of
other countries wish the technical
management of INTELSAT to stay in
the hands of the Corrimunications
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT),
a US firm. The q X, France, Ger-
many, and others/ however, are in-
sisting on the ',immediate interna-
tionalization;of technical and
nontechnical ;fanagement.
/
The U$//has made it clear that
it will no? compromise on the sub-
stance of the proposal (PC-45) it
presented, with 13 other countries,
to INTELSAT last September. The
proposal, it is argued, already
goes a long way toward meeting
European demands for the interna-
tionalization of INTELSAT's man-
agement. It provides for a sec-
retary geieral with an interna-
tional staff to handle nontech-
nical management functions, and
it leaves totally open the ques-
tion of how INTELSAT should be
technically managed after five
years. Supporters of PC-45 con-
tinbe to believe, however, that
efficiency requires the technical
p(anagement function to remain in
'COMSAT's hands for the immediate
future.
The European countries that
oppose PC-45 have presented a ri-
val. proposal (PC-54) providing
for the immediate internationali-
,zation of management, including
its technical aspects. They ar-
gue that if COMSAT retains its
present role for five more years,
the technical management function
will be even harder to reassign
than it is now. They are also
anxios to complete INTELSAT's
definitive arrangements, consider-
ing then as a precedent for sub-
sequent pace and technical co-
operationventures between the
US and Eurpe.
While negotiations this week
could bring theopposing forces
closer together before the con-
ference opens on i6 February, a
willingness to compromise has not
been much in evidence. Officials
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of the countries that support PC-45,
while expressing dismay at the in-
transigence of the US and other
PC-45 countries, are themselves,
digging in their heels. Some have'--
made it clear that they would
rather see the conference collapse
than accept the PC-45 proposals
in toto. Should INTELSAT once
again fail to reach agreement on
definitive arrangements, the pres-
ent interim arrangements would be
prolonged. Such a result could
give,_new impetus to strictly Euro-
pean endeavors
FRAMEWORK FOR NORDIC UNION APPROVED
The prime ministers of Den-
mark, Norway, Sweden and Finland
have agreed in principle to a
treaty establishing a Nordic Eco-
nomic Union (NORDEC) and intend
to present the final text to their
respective governments in March
for signature.
Negotiations for the treaty
made no progress after the first
draft was completed last July, be-
cause the four governments could
not find mutually acceptable com-
promises on common policies for
agriculture, fisheries, tariffs
and financing. Furthermore, busi-
ness and political circles in Den-
mark and Norway were concerned at
the time that membership in NORDEC
might block their countries' ad-
mission into the European Communi-
ties (EC), which in December de-
cided to reopen discussions that
could lead to enlargement. Fi-
nally, the Finns decided shortly
thereafter, for internal politi-
cal reasons, to withdraw from
NORDEC negotiations until after
the March parliamentary elections.
At this point, some observers
believed that the NORDIC project
was dead.
After a review of the time-
table likely to govern admission
into the Communities, the prime
ministers of Denmark, Norway and
Sweden decided that it was too
early to write off NORDEC and pre-
vailed on Finland to reconsider
its decision. To avoid further
delay, Sweden made considerable
concessions, particularly in the
area of tariff suspensions and
contributions to agricultural and
fisheries funds. To satisfy Fin-
nish concern that NORDEC might be-
come a springboard into the EC, it
was agreed that signatories could
suspend the treaty's application
if any Nordic country were to de-
cide on membership in or associa-
tion with the Communities. Pro-
vision is also being made to study
conditions for Icelandic accession
to the NORDEC treaty.
To meet the 1972 date set for
NORDEC's entry into force, the four
governments intend to forward the
treaty to their respective parlia-
ments for ratification by the be-
ginning of April. If ratification
is completed by mid-year, the
Danish and Norwegian governments
will have demonstrated their
good faith on Nordic integra-
tion to their sizable Social
Democratic oppositions and thus
will be in a better position to
respond to the EC's invitation,
to discuss conditions for entry.
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SOVIET LEADERS CALL FOR DISCIPLINE IN ECONOMIC WORK
The Soviet leadership, re-
acting to the disappointing eco-
nomic performance last year, has
launched a campaign for greater
discipline at all levels, from
workers to ministers. The effort
has the earmarks of a stopgap
measure, however, and there is
mounting evidence of recrimina-
tions and disagreements among So-
viet officials that could even-
tually affect the careers of
those involved.
The campaign is being tied
to the December plenum of the
central committee, at which party
chief Brezhnev reportedly spoke
at length on economic shortcom-
ings. Soviet leaders probably
see the campaign as a useful ex-
pedient to induce managers to ful-
fill their plans, the labor force
to work harder, and everybody to
reduce waste.
The December plenum has been
followed by party and government
meetings to discuss its decisions.
Speeches and articles have harped
on the pervasiveness of bad man-
agement and disregard for plans,
and have warned administrators
to improve their work. A trade
union plenum in late January
passed resolutions prescribing
penalties for loafers, drifters,
and drunkaras, and calling for
frugality on the job.
Recriminations have accom-
panied these meetings, speeches,
and articles. The December plenum
reportedly discussed the failings
of "individual workers." Inasmuch
as the discipline campaign was in-
itiated by the party, much of the
Page 16
blame has been directed against
the government apparatus, includ-
ing individual ministries. At
least one provincial party offi-
cial, however, and perhaps more,
has been demoted for poor economic
leadership.
Officials who are particu-
larly on the spot are those re-
sponsible for carrying out the
1965 economic reform to raise ef-
ficiency by means of material in-
centives. The defensive tone of
articles written by such officials
last fall suggested that they con-
sidered themselves under attack
from both conservative and lib-
eral critics. An enterprise man-
ager has written that the majority
of economic officials now agree
that the reform has not produced
all the expected results.
Many officials trace the man-
agerial abuses attacked in the
discipline campaign to the in-
creased independence of enter-
prises and their preoccupation
with profit. They complain that
enterprises change their product
mix in favor of more expensive
and profitable items, overcharge
on their products, and avoid tech-
nological improvements because of
their cost. The most serious
abuses in their view are the at-
tempts by enterprises to enlarge
their incentive funds faster than
they raise labor productivity.
In contrast, other officials
declare that the heart of the
problem is to implement the 1965
reform more fully, and to add to
it. Izvestia on 30 January be-
rated toad of a planning
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section charged with implementing
the reform, alleging that he ig-
nored cases of noncompliance and
experiments to improve it. Po-
litburo candidate member D. A.
Kunayev in December delivered a
ringing defense of experimentation
against the opposition it'encoun-
ters from "conservative executives."
Some proposals to improve the sys-
tem are receiving high official
and press backing.
POLISH CONSUMER DUE FOR CONTINUED BELT-TIGHTENING
The Polish people have been
told in a politburo directive that
the short-term economic picture
is gloomy and consumer sacrifices
will again be required during
19 70 .
The regime already has an-
nounced that it intends to reduce
labor costs in industry and to
stimulate exports to Western coun-
tries, even if existing shortages
in the domestic market are inten-
sified. Workers fear that strin-
gent economic measures, such as
the recent partial moratorium on
new construction, would result in
reduced jobs and some layoffs.
Last year's disappointing
economic results appear to sup-
port the politburo's pessimistic
assessment of short-run prospects.
National income grew by only 3.5
percent, a rate slower than in
any year since 1962 and below the
modest five percent increase
planned for the year. The slow-
down came about partially because
of a 4.7-percent decline in gross
agricultural production, largely
caused by adverse weather. Scant
progress appears to have been made
in boosting industrial productiv-
ity.
Despite a ten-percent increase
in foreign trade the Poles had no
evident success in expanding mar-
kets for manufactured goods in the
industrial West. These failures
are behind Poland's recent efforts
to secure long-term trade agree-
ments and sizable credit extensions
from Western trading partners, es-
pecially West Germany, Italy, and
France.
Official promises of enforced
austerity can hardly be news to
the hapless Polish consumer. Last
year, he suffered only a one per-
cent increase in real wages. In-
adequate housing still remains the
major problem of the Polish con-
sumer. Moreover, sporadic short-
ages of foods and consumer goods
occurred throughout the year.
Economic policy for 1970 calls
for maintaining a respectable rate
of industrial growth and for
greater efforts to improve the
quality of industrial products.
Curbs on employment, investments,
and construction are to be extended
and more rigidly enforced.- The
Polish consumer will continue to
be short-changed. Emphasis will
remain on production of heavy in-
dustrial goods, especially those
which are salable in Western mar-
kets. Availability of housing,
consumer goods, and services will
not increase appreciably. F
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FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY DEMOTES LEADING LIBERAL
The 19th Congres of the
French Communist Part (PCF)
struck a note of solid ity by
renewing a call for lef -wing
unity against the govern ent of
Georges Pompidou. The tw key
events of the Congress werk a
tough ideological debate wh\ch
resulted in the expulsion o
left-wing maverick Roger Gara dy
from the central committee anc
politburo, and the election of%
a deputy to Secretary General
Waldeck Rochet.
Garaudy, a leading liberal,
intellectual and philosopher of
the party, was relieved of his
position because of his strong
opposition to the pro-Soviet pol'-
icies of the PCF. His criticism
increased substantially after-the
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in August 1968, and he
argued, in a recent book, that
the Soviet model should not be
applied in France. He raised-
the hackles of old-line party
stalwarts by arguing that the
PCF should not concentrate solely
on the working class, but should
acknowledge and exploit the emer-
gence of a major new class of
white-collar wotkers and intel-
lectuals. By allowing Garaudy
to defend his views before the
Congress before expelling him
from his post, the party leader-
ship was evidently working to
prevent him from becoming a mar-
tyr.
The Congress also moved cau-
tiously in deciding what to do
about ailing party Secretary Gen-
eral Waldeck Rochet,
Rather than choose a successor,
the Congress decided to elect
Georges Marchais to the newly
created post of deputy secretary
general. Often rumored in the
past to be too unpopular to gain
this post, Marchais probably owes
his election to strong urging from
Moscow. The Soviet delegate to
the Congress, Kirilenko, gave his
blessing to Marchais by praising
his policy speech and by warmly
embracing him. Most observers
expect Marchais to act now as
the effective leader of the party.
At 49',, he is clearly the leading
contenter to succeed Rochet.
These two developments are
a triumphwfor the conservative
pro-Soviet ]readership of the
party. This.,does not mean that
the PCF now will give up its drive
to form a left-wing alliance, but
rather that the non-Communist par-
ties will find it more difficult
to deal with the PCF.1 At present
all the French parties of the left
hold less than 20 percent of the
seats in the National Assej~ly.
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BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES ON THE DEFENSIVE
A solution to the antago-
nisms dividing Belgium's Flemish
and Walloon communities continues
to elude the politicians. Prime
Minister Eyskens' shaky coalition
has managed to survive thus far,
but new challenges have already
appeared to test its ability to
last until its mandate runs out
in 1972.
The Social Christian - So-
cialist coalition, like its pred-
ecessor, is committed to revise
the constitution to provide
greater autonomy for the two com-
munities. Past coalitions have
not been able to line up neces-
sary support for any proposed so-
lution because of the Flemish and
Walloon wings in each of the three
major parties. Eyskens' latest
effort to find a satisfactory so-
lution by using extraparliamentary
"working groups" failed late last
year.
The Prime Minister has re-
cently hinted at several new ap-
proaches but without much re-
sponse. Some Walloon Social
Christian ministers have threat-
ened to resign from the cabinet
unless a particular solution that
they favor is adopted by mid-Feb-
ruary. They have been talked out
of similar threats in the past
and may well back down again.
But even their threat has been
pushed into the background by a
series of wildcat strikes that
erupted in early January in the
Limburg coal mines. The govern-
ment is concerned by the occa-
sional violence of the strikers,
but even more by agitation at the
mines caused by Flemish militants,
radical students, and antiestab-
lishment clergy.
The Eyskens government will
face another type of challenge
later this year when the issue of
funding public and parochial
schools comes up for renewal.
The 100-year-old struggle, which
historically pits the Social
Christians against the Socialists
and Liberals, was shelved in 1958
in a "truce" that provided some
degree of public financing for
both systems. Some observers
fear that debate over renewing
the "truce" will reopen old wounds.
Eyskens' ability to remain in
power this long has rested on be-
ing able to sidetrack the most
contentious issues, and on the
aversion of the major parties to
a parliamentary split. The small
Flemish and Walloon militant par-
ties advocating outright federal-
ism are becoming more vocal and
many people believe they will
score impressive gains in local
elections this fall. Eyskens'
tactic seems to be to hold his
coalition together until these
elections, in the hope that elec-
toral losses will compel the ma-
jor parties to compromise their
unyielding stance on the more im-
portant problems.
Page 19
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Israel continued the pressure campaign on Egypt with heavy air strikes
along the canal, the Gulf of Suez, and close to Cairo. Egyptian casualties are
increasing. In an Israeli strike against a munitions plant north of Cairo on 12
February about 70 Egyptians reportedly were killed. Rumors and specula-
tion continued in Cairo and elsewhere that the Soviet Union was about to
give Nasir more extensive military help to counter the Israeli raids.
In Jordan armed clashes have broken out between fedayeen_groups and
public security forces. The commandos are testing King Husayn's recent
internal security measures. They are roaming at will in Amma Band roughing
up security personnel. The government is negotiating with the fedayeen, but
the outcome is still uncertain.
The possibility that Iran and Iraq might iron outtheir dispute was even
more remote this week, as each side charged the,-other with provocative
massing of troops along their mutual border. Thy secretary general of the
Turkish Foreign Ministry was in Tehran this wqA to inform Iran of Iraq's
concern over the situation, but he indicated th4f Turkey had no intention of
mediating the dispute.
In Turkey, factionalism within the ring Justice Party has endangered
the stability of the Demirel governmerf. The dissidents helped vote down
the proposed budget on 1 1 February. Y Demirel expels them from the party
as he has threatened, he will have to,cope with a minority government and
may have to resign. s
Indian Prime Minister Gandii suffered two significant political setbacks
during the week. The Suprem/Court voided her popular bank nationaliza-
tion measure, and she lost A a much-publicized battle to force the rival
Congress party from leader4ip in her home state of Uttar Pradesh. As a
result, her prestige has bccth damaged, and for the moment at least, she has
lost the initiative.
Both Rabat and unis are moving firmly to quiet student agitation. In
Morocco, some study is demanding educational reforms have been arrested.
In Tunisia, where s dent demonstrations protested American policy in the
Middle East durin Secretary Rogers' visit, the government is concerned that
the Middle East jsue is being used as a cover for antiregime activities.
Lesotho :remains calm following Prime Minister Jonathan's seizure of
power and the arrest of the main opposition leaders. Jonathan can maintain
his control/ at least temporarily, because Lesotho's 1,300-man police force
has remained responsive to his direction and because he probably can count
on support from South African security forces on the country's bor-
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NERVOUSNESS INCREASES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Military engagements and
political maneuvering continued
apace in the Middle East during
the past week. Israeli and Egyp-
tian air forces mounted strikes
on positions along the Suez Canal
and in the Sinai peninsula, and
the Israelis raided sites near
Cairo. In addition, Egyptian
frogmen sank one Israeli ship
and damaged another. In response,
Israeli bombers sank an Egyptian
minesweeper.
The tempo of the military
attacks seemed to be related to
the meeting of the heads of state
of the "frontline" Arab states
in Cairo last week. The meeting
was designed principally to co-
ordinate Arab military strategy.
The Egyptians probably hoped to
propagandize their offensive ac-
tions, and the Israeli activity,
particularly the air raids near
Cairo, probably was intended to
remind the Arabs of their mili-
tary vulnerability. The communi-
que at the conclusion of the con-
ference contained the usual Arab
rhetoric critical of the US and
Israel and emphasized that the
Arab states have tired of "im-
perialist" exploitation of Arab
natural resources that are con-
verted into aid for Israel. This
indirect threat is at least a
partial sop to those radical Arab
states that have long sought a
larger slice of the oil revenue
from Western oil concessions in
their countries.
The diplomatic activity ex-
tended to Moscow where Yasir Ara-
fat and other fedayeen leaders
are visiting, probably in search
of more direct assistance from
the USSR. The Soviets have fa-
vored the fedayeen with support
for the Arab position in the Pal-
estinian question, but have not
formally recognized them as a
political entity. Any such rec-
ognition or substantial direct
aid still seems remote at this
time.
A minor fedayeen organiza-
tion has claimed credit for a
terrorist incident at Munich air-
port. One Israeli was killed
and ten other persons were in-
jured in the bombing and shoot-
ing incident in which the son of
Israeli Defense Minister Dayan
may have been a target.
The need to control feda-
yeen activities, long a problem
for the moderate Arab state-s, has
again confronted King Husayn of
Jordan. The King has issued a
new set of restrictions which,
if enforced, would severely limit
commando activity against Israel
by fedayeen groups in Jordan.
Husayn has issued such guidelines
before, but has never enforced
his demands. Armed clashes have
occurred in Amman between the
fedayeen and government security
forces. The commandos probably
are testing Husayn's security
measures. The effect of this
strife on the king's position is
uncertain, but the government
is negotiating with the fedayeen
in order to restore calm
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LIBYAN JUNTA IS DIVIDED OVER QUADDAFI'S POLICIES
Serious disagreements have
recentl` arisen among Revolution-
ary Comma Council members over
the pro-Egy tian policies of
council chaiirnan Qaddafi. All
other members ,of the junta have
reportedly protested the sending
of Libyan troops t6_Egypt. The
opposition argues that the domes-
tic unrest that has resulted from
this move offsets any contribu-
tion Libya might make to Arab
war efforts against Israel.
Qaddafi's troubles may oon
be compounded. The trial of two
of his former colleagues, the
former defense and interior min-
isters charged with coup.plot-
ting, is soon to begin. Cyrenai-
can tribal elements, especially
the tribes to which the two men
belong, are likely to view any
harsh punishment with extreme
displeasure. The defendants for
-their part would conceivably use
the trial as a forum to attack
Qaddafi's pro-Egyptian policies.
Qaddafi met Nasir and Sudan's
Numayri in Cairo on 11 February
in the second-of their mini-sum-
mits. Opposed"'as he is by both
civilians and his colleagues,
the junta leader could possibly
seek a respite from criticism by
temporarily playing down his pro-
Egyptian military policies. This
would be indicated if the meeting
was restricted to questions
economic cooperation.
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NIGERIA TACKLES MANY PROBLEMS IN IBOLAND
The federal government has
made great strides in dealing
with the immediate problems in
the former secessionist area of
eastern Nigeria, but much remains
to be done before anything ap-
proaching a normal political and
economic situation is restored
there. General Gowon, meanwhile,
continues to face pressure from
elements who favor a more vindic-
tive policy toward the defeated
secessionists.
General Gowon has still not
named a governor for the Ibo East-
Central State, although a civil-
ian administrator is on the scene
and presumably is working to es-
tablish a state administration.
The Nigerians have mounted a mas-
sive relief program in the former
Eastern Region, and last week well
over a million people there re-
ceived food from Nigerian Red
Cross distribution centers. There
are still some pockets of extreme
malnutrition, mainly in bush vil-
lages near the former administra-
tive center of Owerri where dif-
ficulties in local transportation
persist.
One major problem in the
former enclave results from the
fact that there is still virtually
no Nigerian currency in the area.
Many minority tribesmen in
eastern Nigeria, and certain ele-
ments within the federal regime,
believe that too much is being
Page 2 4
done for the former secessionists.
Probably as a concession to these
elements, Lagos has established
a military tribunal to screen
former secessionist army officers
seeking reinstatement in the
Nigerian Army. The tribunal will
probably decide which officers
were "misguided" into secession
and which were the "misguiders."
There are no indications, how-
ever, that a large-scale purge
is in the offing.
Soviet propaganda is continu-
ing to exploit Nigerian sensi-
tivity about foreign participa-
tion in the relief effort.
Although the costs of recon-
struction will be high, the gen-
eral federal economic picture is
bright, mainly as a result of
the rise in oil production. To-
tal production should hit a rec-
ord 800,000 barrels a day this
month and reach one million bar-
rels a day later this year. An-
nual production at this rate
would provide approximately one
half the amount of revenue called
for in the current federal budget.
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TURKEY INCREASING CONTROLS ON OPIUM PRODUCTION
Cultivation of the opium
poppy in Turkey has become one
of the most pressing issues in
US-Turkish relations; 80 percent
of all heroin currently smuggled
into the US originates in Turkey.
In 1968 the Turkish Government
began a program of gradual reduc-
tion of the authorized'-.poppy pro-
ducing area and this year has
agreed to end production; alto-
gether in 1972. International
efforts, primarily US and ,French,
to convince Prime Ministef.De-
mirel to destroy the current crop
and ban further poppy cultivation
have thus far failed.
Poppy cultivation is a negli-
gible source of income for Turkey.
The total area involved is limited
to only nine of Turkey's 67 prov-
inces, and probably does not ex-
ceed 30,000 acres. Growing areas
generally consist of small, widely
scattered fields. By the end of
1969 the authorized poppy growing
area had been reduced from 21 to
nine provinces and will be reduced
to seven by the end of this year.
Areas of poppy cultic &ion are small, numerous, god geographically scattered-
often in remote and isolated areas, making met iforing and control difficult.
USSR
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TURKEY
Opium Production
Province authorized for poppy
Principle area of cultivation
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About 80,000 farmers are involved
part time in poppy cultivation,
and rely heavily on this crop and
its illegal diversion o supply
cash needed to finance heir other
agricultural activities.`
Turkey produced about, 130
tons of legitimate opium peer year
in 1968 and 1969. An addit*~onal
50 tons per year may have entered
the illegal market. Total irl ome
from both legal and illegal p*o-
duction probably amounts to I\
roughly $4 million per year. Hard
currency earnings from legal ex-`',
port of opium amounted to only 114,
about $1.7 million, or well under
one percent of Turkey's export,
earnings in 1967, but it is o$e
factor alluded to by government
spokesmen and politicians Wien
exports per se are discussed.
The illicit Titkish opium
is either shipped directly to
Marseilles or smi4qgled overland
to Beirut where it is partially
refined and then shipped to Mar-
seilles to be ,.processed clandes-
tinely in several illegal and
highly mobilq laboratories. The
French are cracking down on this
part of the operation. About 60
percent of the illicit Turkish
opium is smuggled into Marseilles
aboard Turkish ships. The French
have threatened to ban all Turk-
ish ships from French ports un-
less this traffic is stopped.
Prime Minister Demirel is
concerned over the opium problem,
but he faces serious problems in
-bringing it under control. The
poppy growing area is a strong-
hold of government support that
might be weakened by a crash pro-
gram to eradicate poppy cultiva-
tion. The Turks generally have
come to accept the gradual attri-
tion of poppy production, but
almost certainly would view any
sudden acceleration of the pro-
gram as the result of US pressure,
a charge the political left cer-
tainly would exploit.
The prospect for tighter con-
trols this, year, therefore, appears
to be good; but the chance of to-
tal elimination seems slim. The
ability of the government to con-
trol cultivation is improving,
but will not really be effective
for at least another six months.
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The pre-Lenten Carnival held the attention of most of Latin America
this week. Political activity was at its usual holiday low point.
The special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Coun-
cil ended on 6 Febru-iry. The most widely noticed reaction was,fo the speech
of Trinidadian Prime`Jvlinister Williams, who gratuitously raised the issue of
the isolation of Cuba.-(See the article "Latins Seek a Nev +-'Look at Cuba.")
The Venezuela-Guyna Mixed Border Commissio? f, due to expire on 17
February, met on 12 February. After four years p(, fruitless meetings, the
Guyanese would like to lit, the commission die -dnd refer the case to the
United Nations secretary general, in accorde with the terms of the
Geneva Agreement. Venezuela, lacking faithjih the legal aspects of its case,
would prefer to continue the talks in some brm.
Although El Salvador and Hopduras have repeated their desire to
maintain communication, efforts t9 restore relations and revive the Central
American Common Market are tajg ng. The meeting of the economic min-
isters of the five member state?>'has liven postponed until 20 February, and
the Hondurans say they will'Iot attend, any meetings as long as Salvadoran
frontier provocations contt"ue. The Salvii,dorans, for their part, now want to
postpone the next sessi9f of the bilateral. talks with Honduras until mid-
March.
Party rifts dQtninated political headlines in the Dominican Republic.
The secretary general of Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party pub-
licly resigned Ire's post. His action, h wever, is an;obvious ploy designed to
elicit widesp,.-dad support and thereby to re-establish his control over bicker-
ing faction.' In the governing Reformist Party the purge of supporters of
Vice Prefdent Lora is continuing. Lora will probably announce his own
withdra:'val from the party soon, in order to be the candidate of another
group%in the presidential election in May.
Castro stated recently that the sugar harvest is still not going well. The
third million ton was produced on 1 1 February, two days behind schedule.
The fourth million ton is to be harvested by 28 February but will probably
be delayed even further because of low cane yields, worker inefficiency, and
transportation difficulties.
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LATINS SEEK A NEW LOOK AT CUBA
A growing number of Latin
American leaders are publicly
urging a reconsideration of Cuba's
present isolation in the hemi-
sphere. The interest being gen-
erated increases the chance that
some governments, led by Chile,
will bring pressure on the US and
other members of the organization
of American States to discuss
formally the lifting of restric-
tions on the Castro government.
The most recent statements
on Cuba's present position were
delivered at the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council meet-
ing in Caracas last week. At the
opening session Prime Minister
Eric Williams of Trinidad-Tobago
said that "no country of the
hemisphere should be disbarred
from participation" in the hemi-
sphere's economic life. Williams
has actively been expanding his
own ties with Cuba, most recently
by an exchange of official tech-
nical missions. In a cautious
response to Williams, Venezuelan
President Caldera argued that the
economic relationship could not
be separated from the political.
He indicated that Venezuela might
favor Cuba's return to the OAS
for the sake of continental soli-
darity only if Castro stopped in-
tervening in other countries.
Havana's response to the lat-
est groundswell of interest in re-
opening ties with Cuba has been
mild. A broadcast last week from
Havana reiterated the usual line
that Cuba could establish rela-
tions only with governments that
"did not subordinate their sover-
eignty to North American dictates."
Although Castro is interested in
widening contacts in the hemi-
sphere and has taken definite
steps in the Caribbean, he has
long disavowed any interest in
again becoming active in the OAS.
Most countries probably would
agree with Venezuela that if re-
sumption of ties with Havana is
discussed it should be only within
the OAS framework. If the present
momentum continues, a formal re-
assessment of Cuba's position may
become unavoidable. One or two
countries may ignore present OAS
restrictions against Cuba and
enter into a bilateral arrange-
ment. This could take the form,
for example, of a trade arrange-
ment such as the reported swap of
Chilean wine for Cuban sugar.
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OUTLOOK IS FAVORABLE FOR NEW COSTA RICA GOVERNMENT
On 1 February the Costa Rican
electorate again handed the govern-
ment to the opposition--a tradi-
tional pattern for the past five
elections. Jose "Pepe" Figueres'
resounding victory in the presiden-
tial race and his National Libera-
tion Party's (PLN) retention of a
legislative majority in the general
elections promise that the govern-
ment to be installed on 8 May will
be strong.
Figueres' landslide victory
surprised even his most optimistic
supporters and represented for him
in particular a personal triumph.
He prevailed over the slanderous
charges of his major adversary,
government candidate Mario Echandi,
and over dissension within his own
party. Figueres' command of 55 per-
cent of the popular vote--a higher
majority than that of his party in
the legislative balloting--indicates
that he retains much of his stature
as the national hero of the 1948
civil war and his mystique as cham-
pion of the common man. There was
a broad reaction against Echandi's
effort to smear Figueres and the
PLN as Communist.
President-elect Figueres
Former President 1953-1958
The PLN's control of 32 of the
57 assembly seats is particularly
significant. It ends the four-year
stalemate between the executive and
legislative branches that endured
throughout outgoing President Tre-
jos' term, and could ensure long
overdue action in the economic and
social spheres. The PLN's indepen-
dence of the minor parties for pas-
sage of legislation should also al-
lay the fears of rightist groups
that the Communists, who won two
seats, will have significant po-
litical leverage.
The PLN and Figueres are ac-
tivist and reformist, and over the
past four years, party study groups
have devoted serious attention to
identifying national priorities
and exploring options for respond-
ing to public needs and demands.
The new government will have the
advantage of a favorable economic
outlook and a well-developed in-
stitutional base on which to build.
Figueres has cited unemployment,
malnutrition, and housing as major
domestic problems and has put for-
ward realistic proposals for meet-
ing them.
The impressive popular mandate
for Figueres and the PLN may stall,
and possibly prevent, the open split
in the party that appeared to many
as almost certain in the pre-elec-
tion period. Nevertheless there
is a vigorous, semirevolutionary
liberal element in the PLN that Fi-
gueres has treated with some contempt
and that might cause him some polit-
ical difficulty during his term if
he decides against courting the dis-
sidents' loyalty.
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Secret
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