FAR EAST THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007600040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 5, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
6 February 1970
No. 0356/70
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(Information as of noon EST, 5 February 1970)
VIETNAM
Celebrations in Hanoi of the North Vietnamese Com-
munist Party's 40th anniversary did little to estab-
lish the real power positions of-,individuals in the
post-Ho hierarchy. In South Vietnam, many politi-
cians are becoming more active-in anticipation of
next fall's Upper House elections.
PEKING UPS THE ANTE ON RECOGNITION
Ottawa and Rome's talks wth Peking on recognition
have become stalemated 4ecause of Chinese intransi-
gence.
COMMUNIST FORCES STILL BUILDING UP IN NORTH LAOS
The prime minister's public proposal to "neutralize"
the Plaine des Jarres may play some role in determin-
ing both the scope and timing of Communist military
moves.
PHILIPPINE STUDENTS PROTEST MARCOS' POLITICAL AIMS
President Marcos was obviously shaken because last
weekend's bloody riots were aimed at him personally,
but there is no good evidence that the disturbances
will result in any progressive changes in administra-
tion policy.
Europe
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GATT'S 26TH GENERAL SESSION WILL BE A TEST OF WILLS
The manner in which the 26th General Session of GATT
deals with serious trade questions will test the
determination of members to retain the momentum of
trade expansion.
HELICOPTER CARRIER MOSKVA ENDS ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENT
The Soviet helicopter carrier returned to the Medi-
terranean after a 20-day deployment in the Atlantic
where inclement weather prevented any ASW training
exercises for most of the time.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNDER HUSAK
Party first secretary Gustav Husak is molding the
country's institutions into instruments of his own
power, while refurbishing Czechoslovakia's image in
the Communist camp. As long as the country moves
toward orthodoxy, Husak will continue to be Moscow's
man in Prague. He will understand that if he falters,
Moscow's gratitude for past services will hardly buy
him continued Soviet support. Husak has monumental
problems: he must guard against conservatives bent
on undermining his authority, solve economic and
social problems, and effect some reconciliation with
the people alienated by his subservience to the Rus-
sians and the repressive measures he introduced to
Middle East - Africa
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SOVIETS TRY NEW MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE
Moscow's diplomatic demarches in London, Paris, and
Washington probably represent the opening move in a
new effort to relieve Israeli military pressure on
Nasir.
EASTERN EUROPE OFFERS LIMITED MARKET FOR MIDDLE EAST OIL 21
Recent barter arrangements will result in only a
small flow of oil to Eastern Europe. for several years
but Middle East national oil companies will have the
chance to get a foothold in the oil market.
NEW POLITICS AND OLD PROBLEMS IN KENYA
The parliament elected in December may mark the be-
ginning of a new "political era in Kenya, or at least
a new phase in the era dominated by Jomo Kenyatta.
Sixty two percent of the National Assembly are new
members, younger and better qualified than their pred-
ecessors, and well aware of their tribes' interests.
Bitter tribal rivalries remain, however, and Kenyatta
and his Kikuyu clique still hold the reins of power.
One of the most important problems is whether anyone
can succeed Kenyatta without setting off a disastrous
ALGERIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS SHIFT SLIGHTLY
During the past few months, a perceptible cooling has
occurred in Algeria's relations with the Soviet Union
while those with France have improved. Nevertheless,
good relations with Moscow as well as with Paris con-
tinue to be very important to Algiers.
SECRE'T'
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Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
SUBVERSIVES THREATEN GUATEMALAN ELECTION
Communist terror tactics continue to disturb the
political scene as the elections on 1 March near,
but at this point all legitimate political forces,
including the military, seem determined to uphold
the electoral process.
DOMINICAN OPPOSITION ACCELERATES CAMPAIGN
Last week's widespread student disturbances, virulent
politicking, and charges of government repression
have set the tone for the turmoil that will charac-
terize political life from now until the presidential
election in~?May.
HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR GROPE TOWARD COMPROMISE
Clashe% along the border hamper movement toward nor-
malization of relations.
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Celebration of the 40th anniversary of North Vietnam's Communist
Party brought forth a display of unity in Hanoi but left the real alignment of
power in the post-Ho hierarchy ambiguous. Le Duan played the leading role
as party first secretary, but his speech, the major exposition of the day, laid
out no new policy lines. To a great extent, he stuck to policies that have long
been apparent and for which other leaders have been the principal spokes-
men.
Politicking has increased in Saigon in anticipation of next fall's Upper
House elections. Many political relationships, both friendly and hostile, are
apparently no longer being taken for granted, and imaginative political
initiatives may be tried. President Thieu has decided to prosecute in absentia
two Lower House deputies accused of having contacts with the Communists.
Thieu may be on somewhat shaky ground, however, in basing his action on a
Lower House petition calling for the lifting of the deputies' parliamentary
immunity. Many deputies will resent the arm-twisting it took to get three
quarters of them to sign the petition, and one opposition group plans to ask
the Supreme Court for a ruling on the constitutionality of Thieu's action.
The military situation near the Plaine des Jarres in north Laos remains
relatively quiet, but it could heat up with little notice. Communist forces
have been on the move southeast and northwest of the Plaine, and the
enemy commanders may be delaying their offensive until they can move on
several fronts simultaneously. Prime Minister Souvanna's proposal to
"neutralize" the Plaine may have some effect on both the scope and timing
of Communist military moves, however. To the northwest, the Communists
have intensified their efforts to bring the entire Nam Beng Valley under their
control. It now appears that the Chinese road builders will try to reach the
Mekong River during the current dry season.
Philippine President Marcos has sought to obscure the genesis of last
week's bloody student riots against his political ambitions. He claimed that
the Communists were trying to mount a coup. Some powerful families in the
Philippine oligarchy who share the students' antipathy toward Marcos'
ambitions appear willing for their own reasons to accept the President's
charges at face value. The specter of a Communist menace will make it easier
for these families to resist the economic and social reforms that are necessary
for further national growth, but which would weaken their tight control of
the country.
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VIETNAM
The celebration in Hanoi of
the 40th anniversary of North Viet-
nam's Communist Party brought
forth a display of unity by the
presence of all party leaders ex-
cept those currently out of the
country. Party First Secretary
Le Duan emerged as the most prom-
inent figure for the first time
since Ho's funeral, but he carved
no new ground for North Vietnamese
policy when he gave the major
speech of the day. In this, his
first broad policy statement in
more than two years, Le Duan for
the first time publicly endorsed
changes in Hanoi's policies that
have occurred in the past year
and a half.
Le Duan now seems to be personally
on board with current policies,
but his appearance does not ex-
plain his relative obscurity dur-
ing the past two years, and espe-
cially during the post-Ho period,
nor the fact that he has not been
a leader in policy shifts and in-
novations in that same period.
Tet Holidays and the War
The Communists, in an effort
to usher in the Tet holidays with
a credible display of military
muscle, launched widespread har-
assing attacks against targets
largely in the northern half of
South Vietnam early this week.
Le Duan emphasized the need
for more attention to building up
the North, and he echoed other
North Vietnamese Communist state-
ments calling for a more gradual
approach in the South. He prom-
ised no success without many more
years of fighting, but he also
stressed the importance the Com-
munists attach to tactical flexi-
bility, both on the battlefield
and in negotiations.
Neither the contents of the
speech nor Le Duan's re-emergence
did much to clarify the real power
positions of individuals in the
post-Ho hierarchy. The speech
was an exposition of policies that
have long been apparent and for
which other leaders have been the
principal spokesmen. Moreover,
it was almost mandatory that the
party first secretary have a lead-
ing role on this occasion in order
to support the regime's assertions
of unity and continuity of policy.
Allied field forces and mili-
tary bases, as well as South Viet-
namese territorial security forces
supporting the pacification pro-
gram, bore the brunt of more than
100 enemy shellings, sapper raids,
and guerrilla strikes. Key urban
centers remained generally free
of enemy action, except for light
mortar attacks against a few pro-
vincial capitals in the delta and
some increase in terrorism in the
Saigon area.
In these attacks the enemy
lost some 500 killed as a result
of superior allied firepower.
Nearly one quarter of the losses
occurred in two significant ground
battles. One involved a battalion
of South Vietnam's lst Division
with an equivalent force of North
Vietnamese regulars near the De-
militarized Zone in a test of
"Vietnamization." The other was
a sapper battalion action against
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SI UKJ 1
Cease Fire Periods - February 1970
1800
pacification forces along the
northern coastal plain.
Guerrilla, sapper, and local
force units spearheaded the latest
round of attacks, perhaps in an
effort to buy more time for first-
line main force combat units to
prepare the battlefield for heav-
ier actions later in this year's
the Communists will probably
respect the cease-fire periods de-
clared for Tet, they also warn of
the strong possibility of wide-
spread, coordinated attacks un-
folding in its wake.
D? lcking Pick-s--Up in Saigon,,
Many of South Vietnam_-" key
political leaders are becoming
more active in anticipation of
next fall's Upper House elections,
and a few seem to=be re-examining
some of the most basic aspects of
their political positions.F
pr si ent -Thieu also appears
to be taking a fresh look at his ,
political alliances. He report-/
edly has given some considerati.6n
to revitalizing the moribund Lien
Minh front in an effort to pet-
suade labor leader Buu and his
following to remain affiliated
with this progovernment organi-
zation. Moreover, Thieu_is ap-
parently planning to give active
backing to a slate of senatorial
candidates chosen by the almost
equally moribund National Social
Democratic Front after a half
year of relative indifference to-
ward that group.
many relationships, both friendly
and hostile, are no longer being
taken for granted and that imag-
inative political initiatives
may be essayed before the elec-
tions next fall. Talk about de-
ve-loping new political alliances
is cheap in South Vietnam, how-
ever, and at this point there
are no solid indications that
lasting new relationships are
likely to be built.
Even those opposition ele- 25X1
ments who are widely regarded as
natural allies remain extremely
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eeTrt?ou's--Uowa`rd any overture for
closer cooperation in the coming:
campaign. Senator Don, for ex
ample, hosted a dinner for an im-
pressive array of such politi-i
cians last month, but the popular
General "Big" Minh was conspcu-
ously absent and those present
remained true to form, unable to
agree on the leadership or sup-
port needed to form a viable po-
litical alliance. Don, however,
reportedly still hopes to get his
alliance off the ground this year.
Vice President Ky, meanwhile,
reportedly is looking to the Up-
per House elections as a barom-
eter by which he can chart his
Page 4
own course for the 1971 presi-
dential elections. Ky expects
next fall's elections to provide
a clear indication of President
Thieu's standing with the people,
and he believes that anything
less than a clear-cut victory
for progovernment slates would
remove Thieu as a serious candi-
date for re-election. Although
the vice president has privately
indicated that he will not openly
support any senatorial candidates,
some reports suggest that he may
work behind the scenes to organ-
ize a:candidate list as one step
in along-range challenge to Thieu
the next presidential elec-
This week President Thieu
a1-Bo ordered a military tribunal
to proceed with the prosecution
of two Lower House deputies ac-
cused of supporting the Communists.
Thieu decided to act after he re-
ceived official word that three
fourths of the deputies had signed
a government-sponsored petition
calling for the lifting of the
parliamentary immunity of the two
men. The President's action may
place new strains on his relations
with the National Assembly. It
took considerable arm-twisting to
persuade such a large number of
deputies to sign the petition,
and an opposition group plans to
ask the Supreme Court to rule on
the constitutionality of taking
legal action on the basis of the
petition. Thieu's decision to
bring the two deputies to trial
reflects to a great degree the
personal prestige he has staked
on this case.
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PEKING UPS THE ANTE ON RECOGNITION
Overshadowed by the talks
in Warsaw and Peking, Communist
China's talks with Canada and
Italy concerning recognition are
continuing, although with little
prospect of immediate success.
Ever since the talks began last
year at Canadian and Italian in-
itiative, the Chinese have main-
tained an intransigent position
that has stalled both negotia-
tions. This intransigence re-
flects Peking's current assess-
ment of Nationalist Chinese vul-
nerability as well as a determi-
nation to reject anything smack-
ing of a "two Chinas" arrange-
ment. None of the parties has
sought an excuse to break off
the discussions. Canada and
Italy apparently intend to hold
periodic meetings with the Chinese,
.hoping to find some compromise
formula on recognition.
Specifically, the,:=talks have
bogged down over Peking's refusal
to accept a formula aimilar to
that by which the French in 1964
agreed to recognize the Communist
regime as the sole legitimate gov-
ernment of China. Peking demands
that Ottawa and Rome do this and
recognize its territorial claim
to the island of Taiwan as well.
Canada and,Italy have indicated
they are willing to recognize Pe-
king as the sole government of
China and to support the Commu-
nists' case in the United Nations,
but hey:have thus far remained
strongly opposed to accepting Pe-
kirig's claim to sovereignty over
swan. They believe that such
faction would jeopardize future
trade and other info,,mal contacts
with Taipei, and mere importantly
might complicate,=their relations
with the US.
The Chinese, nevertheless,
consider that they are negoti-
ating from a position of strength
and have--much to gain by stick-
ing toy their optimum demands.
Peking is well aware that a num-
berof other Western states, in-
clVding Belgium, Luxembourg and
Austria, will probably follow
,Ottawa and Rome's lead in estab-
lishing ties with China. The
loss of support of such a sizable
bloc of Western states, particu-
larly on Peking's current terms,
would severely undercut the cur-
rent international position of
the Chinese Nationalists as the
government of China, and more im-
portantly, would discredit any
future attempt by Taipei to as-
sume a position as the government
of an independent Taiwan.
Peking also bases its uncom-
promising position on its current
view of US China policy and on
the recently resumed dialogue with
the US at Warsaw. The Communists,
currently engaged in probing the
amount of US accommodation on Tai-
wan, are, of course, reluctant to
demonstrate much flexibility of
their own in regard to this cen-
tral issue. On the other hand,
Peking no doubt judges that if it
succeeds in gaining Canadian and
Italian recognition on its harsh
terms, future US efforts to promote
any sort of two Chinas solution
will be severely circumscribed.
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COMMUNIST FORCES STILL BUILDING UP IN NORTH LAOS
Prime Minister Souvanna's
public proposal on 31 January
to "neutralize" the Plaine des
Jarres may play some role in in-
fluencing both the scope and tim-
ing of Communist military moves
in north Laos. The solicitous
attitude of the North Vietnamese
charge in Vientiane in following
up Souvanna's proposal on an of-
ficial level suggests that Hanoi
is interested in sounding out the
Lao Government, rather than re-
jecting Souvanna's initiative out
of hand. By holding open the pos-
sibility of further discussions
on the proposal, Hanoi may hope
to gain a temporary respite from
heavy air strikes and give its
forces more time to improve their
military position.
Meanwhile, the military sit-
uation remains relatively quiet
near the Plaine des Jarres, but
it could heat up with little no-
tice. In recent days-government
patrols have reported sizable
numbers of enemy troops moving
southeast of the Plaine. The
Communists know that General Vang
Pao is sensitive to troop move-
ments which could pose a threat
to his headquarters area, the
home of many thousand Meo refu-
gees. They may hope to force Vang
Pao to pull back some troops that
have been disrupting Communist
supply movements along Route 7
since late August.
Government patrols also have
sighted a multibattalion North
Vietnamese force moving toward
the Plaine from_a point some 20
miles to the northwest. Some
troops told a ,local villager they
were headed.for Muong Soui, which
has become an important tactical
airstrip for government forces.
Hanoi may be holding back
its offensive against the Plaine
until all its forces are in posi-
tion and able to move on several
fronts simultaneously. This would
help explain the enemy's apparent
reluctance to take greater advan-
tage of its overwhelming numerical
superiority in clearing some of
the government's more isolated
and lightly defended outposts
near the Plaine.
To the northwest, the Pathet
Lao are intensifying their efforts
to bring the entire Nam Beng Val-
ley under Communist control. The
Pathet Lao have been moving new
units into the valley since last
summer and now significantly out-
number the government troops.
The government's presence has
been reduced to one major outpost
some eight miles west of Pak Beng.
The timing of the Pathet Lao cam-
paign, which has been gaining mo-
mentum since the capture of Pak
Beng in April 1969, suggests that
it was undertaken, at least in
part, to facilitate the Chinese
road building project. Pathet
Lao propagandists have told local
villagers that a road will be
built to Pak Beng this year.
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TNAM
?, intensify
-n -'s veiiey 4
-N 65
~
Pak r m ~eCA 2uang p n ,es disruptin
ien Ne Prabang aoP f r~ knest supaiv
MK KO,ti i' movement move rnents
:,?ve rn nienc Muong -
Northern Laos:
Long*
T14 Ail Akin:- f I v I13'lieng
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Current Situation
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PHILIPPINE STUDENTS PROTEST MARCOS' POLITICAL AIMS
President Marcos was obvi-
ously shaken because last week-
end's bloody riots were aimed at
him personally, but there is no
good evidence that the disturb-
ances will result in any progres-
sive changes in administration
policy. Marcos has sought to ob-
scure the genesis of the demon-
strations by charging that the
violence outside the presidential
palace was part of a Communist
plot to take over the government.
Student members of pro-Communist
organizations did help fan the
rioting that broke out on 30 Jan-
uary, but the student protestors
were attacking Marcos' ambitions
to perpetuate his presidency, not
attempting to bring down the gov-
ernment.
There may have been as many
as 20,000 involved in the demon-
strations and at one point an at-
tempt was made to storm the palace
gates. Guns were fired by both
sides and four students were killed
and over 100.injured. The rioting
became so serious that Marcos fi-
nally called in the armed forces
chief of staff to direct operations
to end the demonstration.
Marcos' alarmist allegations
may/have temporarily undercut
some powerful families in the
Philippine oligarchy who, with
the students, are against any
move by Marco to pack next year's
constitutional convention. These
politically ambitious families ap-
pear to have accepted the allega-
tions about a Communist plot as a
means'" of maintaining the status
quo' Most members of the Philip-
pine oligarchy have been unwilling
to accept the economic and social
reforms that are necessary to fur-
ther national growth, but which
would weaken their tight control
of the country. Marcos' depend-
ence on these important families
makes it less likely than ever
that he will push for any mean-
ingful reforms.
The students and others op-
posed to Marcos' ambitions will
probably consider as an empty and
expedient promise his press state-
ment on 2 February that he would
not seek a third term even if the
constitution were altered. The
students now realize they have
a certain amount of political
muscle and will probably continue
to agitate against Marcos and may
become radicalized in the process.
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Soviet policy makers continued this week to divide their major atten-
tion between the Middle East and West Germany. The notes delivered to
Paris, London, and Washington were clearly intended to encourage Western
pressure on Israel to stop the bombing of Egypt. On Germ
,A matters, the
Soviets kept the dialogue going with Brandt's emissary,-In Moscow but
seemed primarily interested in probing for West Germ4rf concessions. The
USSR and Romania took pro forma notice of the 22nd anniversary of their
friendship and assistance treaty, but neither side merftioned that the treaty
expired two years ago and that the Soviet leaders have not made any
decision about going to Bucharest to sign a new Qrfe.
Tito has moved from Tanzania to Zambia on his African tour, plugging
hard for his pet project, the nonaligned preparatory conference tentatively
set for Dar es Salaam in mid-April. So far Tito is no doubt pleased with the
results of his talks, but a wide variety' of views awaits him when he meets
with leaders of Libya, Kenya, Ethiopja the Sudan and Egypt.
Hungarian party boss Kadar has returned home from East Germany,
without reconciling his positive responses to Brandt's Eastern policy with
Ulbricht's negativism. Kadar -also indicated that there were still differences
about Hungary's liberal economic reform and about a reorganization of the
CEMA trade system.
The good persoi l relations between Chancellor Brandt and President
Pompidou were reinforced by Brandt's visit to Paris on 30-31 January. In
one of the regular biannual Franco-German meetings, Brandt obtained strong
French endorsement of his efforts to improve relations with the East. The
two leaders emphasized moving ahead with efforts to expand and develop
the European Communities, but neither seemed to think that extensive
supranational powers for the European Parliament are a priority matter.
The Nonproliferation Treaty will enter into force next month. The
Board,of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency will meet on
24 February to consider procedures for negotiating safeguards agreements
with nonnuclear adherents to the treaty. UN Secretary General Thant will
address the Geneva disarmament committee on 18 February, probably
calling for action on the proposed seabeds treaty and for a moratorium by
the superpowers on further testin and e yment of new weapons sys-
tems.
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GATT's 26TH GENERAL SESSION WILL BE A TEST OF WILLS
The contracting parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) will face a number of
serious international trade ques-
tions when the 26th General Session
of GATT opens on 16 February. Many
members are concerned about the re-
cent proliferation of regional pref-
erential arrangements negotiated
by the European Communities (EC)
that are threatening to undermine
the most-favored-nation principle,
basic to GATT's foundation. Some
GATT members will also try to launch
an attack on nontariff barriers
(NTBs), which, with the gradual re-
duction of world tariffs, have been
increasingly recognized as a major
obstacle to world trade expansion.
Regional preferential arrange-
ments are generally considered not
to be consistent with the GATT un-
less they are intended to lead to
a free trade area or customs union,
and involve a substantial portion
of the trade between the parties to
the agreement. Attention currently
centers on EC preferential agree-
ments with Morocco and Tunisia,
which each country considers vital
to the continued expansion of their
exports. Neither agreement satis-
fies the GATT requirements. The
greater concern, which will be dis-
cussed at an informal high-level
meeting at the session, is the EC's
intention to conclude similar agree-
ments with Spain and Israel, details
of which are being worked out. Ne-
gotiations between the EC and some
Arab states are also anticipated.
This trend has made more ur-
gent the idea of a generalized pref-
erence scheme between all the devel-
oped and less developed countries
as an; alternative. The generalized
rn,-tmti nn w ll nQt be on
the formal agenda, but GATT Direc-
tor-General Long would like the mem-
bers to discuss informally how such
a system could be accommodated with-
in the GATT rules. Less developed
countries are anxious that some
plan be formulated, but there is
little agreement on how to approach
the problem. There are particularly
wide gaps between the US and EC po-
sitions. The GATT discussions are
not expected to serve any construc-
tive purpose until the developed
countries agree on a common approach.
Long will ask the members to
agree not to introduce any new NTBs
and to arrange first-phase negotia-
tions later this year or early in
1971 to remove existing ones. The
members may not be ready, however,
to take such firm action on this
widely varied assortment of trade
restrictions, including explicit
quotas, import deposit requirements,
and the American selling price.
Long would also like the members to
address the problems associated with
declining prices in the interna-
tional commodity market, and will
propose the setting up of consulta-
tion mechanisms to maintain more
"orderly" marketing. Although the
members are unlikely to come up with
any concrete plans, they undoubtedly
will desire to continue to study
this serious problem.
The session opening on 16 Feb-
ruary is widely expected to provide
a test of GATT's ability to find
new ways to promote international
trade expansion after the last tar-
iff reduction negotiated in the
Kennedy Round takes effect in 1972.
The current outlook does not appear
too promising.
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HELICOPTER CARRIER MOSKVA ENDS ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENT
The Soviet helicopter car-
rier Moskva and her two ASW es-
corts returned to the Mediter-
ranean on 4 February after a 20-
day deployment to the Atlantic.
Heavy weather prevented the
ships from carrying out ASW train-
ing during most of the period,
but an exercise was held with a
diesel submarine off Portugal on
2 February. The submarine was
part of a Northern Fleet force
of seven submarines, a submarine
tender, and an oiler that is re-
placing a similar force in the
Mediterranean.
During the eight-hour ASW
operation two to four helicopters
from the Moskva continuously
hovered over the submarine some
17 miles away. The helicopters
used their dipping sonar equip-
ment but did not drop detection
buoys.
This was the Moskva's first
deployment into heavy seas. In-
clement weather battered the
ship and its two escorts dur-
ing the first two weeks in the
Atlantic but they did manage to
conduct refueling operations.
Earlier, while transiting the
Mediterranean, the Moskva had
suffered minor structural dam-
age to equipment mounted on the
bow.
The strength of the Mediter-
ranean squadron will swell to
some 46 ships during the turn-
over period, but probably will
drop to about 13 surface combat-
ants, ten submarine, and ten sup-
port ships by the end of next
week. A Sverdlov-class cruiser
which served as the flagship
of the group coming down from
the Northern Fleet did not en-
ter the Mediterranean and is re-
turning to home waters.
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SECRF'I'
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The Israelis are keeping pressure on Nasir with more air strikes deep
into Egypt. This week, they struck a radar site on the Mediterranean to the
north of Cairo and a military installation on the Nile some 200 miles south
of Cairo. The strikes are not only producing some serious defensive problems
for Nasir, but are also causing concern in both Western and Eastern capitals.
After last week's raids close to the Egyptian capital, Moscow began new
diplomatic initiatives aimed at curbing the Israelis and may be considering
new military support as well.
Along the Syrian-Israeli border, a flurry of conflict broke out in the
Rafid area of the Golan Heights. Neither damage. nor casualties were heavy,
although Israel lost another aircraft. The clash erupted after a lone Syrian
MIG sonic-boomed Haifa, apparently in retaliation for past Israeli sonic
boomings of Damascus. The Israelis expressed the belief that Syria's in-
creased aggressiveness was meant to enhance its image prior to the meeting in
Cairo on 7 February of the so-called Arab confrontation states-Syria,
Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Iraq.
Nigerian politicians are beginning to meet and maneuver in anticipation
of an eventual return to civilian rule; although most of them probably realize
that the military government does not intend a hasty change-over. General
Gowon is maintaining his conciliatory policy toward the conquered seces-
sionists, but he is probably facing increasing pressure from elements who
believe the Ibos are being given too much in the way of relief aid. Lagos'
extreme sensitivity about foreign participation in this effort was highlighted
last week by its expulsion of a US official concerned with relief matters.
The political stalemate in Dahomey is now well into its second month.
Top military officers met on 19 January in an attempt to break the impasse,
but agreed only on the reintegration of military personnel who had been
discharged or imprisoned for political reasons. One of those reinstated was
Lt. Colonel Alley, a former chief of state who is now the most senior officer
in the army.
West Pakistan Governor Nur Khan's surprise resignation last weekend
may have been triggered by President Yahya Khan's concern over increasing
violence in the country and his dissatisfaction with Nur's handling of recent
communal rioting in West Pakistan. Nur's replacement, Lt. General Attiqur
Rahman, apparently is under instructions to crack down on troublemakers; a
number of arrests have already been made.
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SOVIETS TRY NEW MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE
Moscow's diplomatic demarches
in London, Paris, and Washington
early this week probably repre-
sent the opening move in a new ef-
fort to relieve Israeli military
pressure on President Nasir. The
Soviets probably hope that their
show of concern will encourage the
British, French, and US to press
Israel to stop the bombing of
Egypt.
If this initiative fails,
and Israeli military action con-
tinues to embarrass Moscow and
its Egyptian client, the Soviets
may be forced to make some hard
decisions entailing serious risks
to their position in the middle
East. They may be tempted to
make some dramatic political or
military moves to help Nasir out
of his predicament. Nasir's de-
sire for some strong assistance
probably prompted his reported
visit to Moscow last month.
The choices for Moscow are
difficult. The USSR is unlikely
to try to halt the Israeli raids
by making concessions in the
four-power negotiations on the
Middle East. ,-The Israelis are
as intransigent as ever about the
terms for a settlement, and it
would be political suicide for
any Arab leader to agree to the
kind of concessions that might
attract Israeli attention. The
Soviets might undertake new diplo-
matic moves at the UN and in Wash-
ington. These, however, would
not be aimed at obtaining a set-
tlement, but only at isolating
Israel.
The Soviets are also unlikely
to look upon new arms supplies to
Nasir as a satisfactory alterna-
tive. The Egyptians have been
manifestly incapable of handling
their present holdings competently,
and new materiel--to be effective--
would require the commitment of
Soviet personnel to combat duty.
It is doubtful that Soviet concern
over Nasir's condition has yet
reached the degree that would com-
pel Moscow to take such a risk.
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9.th.e-r---ohhoi.ces of action are
similarly unpalatable. An ulti-
matum to Tel Aviv to leave Egypt
alone would risk having Israel
call the Soviet hand. The Soviets
who tend to overestimate US influ-
ence over Israel, might consider
more threatening diplomatic ap-
proaches to the US, but this could
seriously disturb the progress 6E
US-Soviet relations in such criti-
cal areas as strategic.. arms limi-
tations.
A final alternative would
be to temporize. Moscow can try
to persevere, givingNasir more'
Page 19
of the same kind of political and
military support he has had; mean-
while hoping he can some-how ride
out the storm. -Israel, however,
seems capable of keeping the USSR
indefinite-Ty in this serious bind.
The only easy way out for
the Soviets is an unlikely Israeli
decision to stop the bombing.
Without this, Moscow will have to
determine whether to undertake a
new diplomatic tack of some sort,
risk a military undertaking, or
stall. So far, the Soviets seem
to be turning first toward a dip-
lomatic initiative.
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Pipeline
Existing
Proposed
CYPRUS
Nicosia
R K E Y
aGazTnteP
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HOms
TripOIW
LEBANON
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Sid ,, f,
UNi ED
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RE BLIC
t
Suez. nsraer occwnem
ISRA
Tel Aviv Yafo,
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Osul% Irbil
Baghdad
R A
INorlh Rumaila
~Ilf leld PERSIAN
KU Pk
~(uwait GULF
\- NEUTRAL f
ZONE
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bLUKJi I
EASTERN EUROPE OFFERS LIMITED MARKET FOR MIDDLE EAST OIL
Recent East European barter
arrangements with the Middle East
for oil will result in only a
small flow for at least several
years. National oil companies
of the Middle East states wel-
come these opportunities, how-
ever, to get a foothold in the
oil market.
Moscow now supplies about
85 percent of the 35 million tons
of oil required by Eastern Eu-
rope, except Romania which is a
net exporter of oil. Commitments
made to East European countries
in return for investment in So-
viet industry probably ensure
that the USSR will remain their
major supplier at least through
the mid-1970s. Both the USSR and
Eastern Europe are expanding the
existing pipeline network so
about 45 million tons of Soviet
oil can be delivered in 1975.
At that time an additional 10-15
million tons per year probably
will also be delivered by sea.
Faced with oil production
problems and a dependency on oil
sales to Western countries for
substantial hard currency earn-
ings, the USSR has encouraged
East European countries to de-
velop other sources of supply.
These countries are participating
in a number of long-term deals
calling for the delivery now of
industrial goods and technical
services that can be paid for
later with oil shipped by na-
tional oil companies in the Mid-
dle East. Hungary will send
$15 million worth of machinery
and equipment to Iraq for the
development of the North Rumaila
field where the USSR also is in-
volved. Recently, Czechoslo-
vakia agreed to provide equip-
ment, valued at $32 million, for
constructing a refinery at Basra.
Both Czechoslovakia and Hungary
also have agreements with Iran
which they have recently reaf-
firmed.
The closure of the Suez
Canal complicated the delivery
of oil to Eastern Europe. The
construction of pipelines is be-
ing considered by some Arab
countries and could relieve this
situation. A new trans-Israeli
line paralleling an existing one
that has carried small amounts
of Iranian oil for transshipment
to Romania is about to go into
operation and may be used to
transport more Iranian oil des-
tined for Eastern Europe.
Czechoslovakia and Hungary
find their landlocked positions
to be a major obstacle to im-
porting oil from the Middle East.
A pipeline to those countries
from the Mediterranean Sea across
Yugoslavia has been discussed for
several years but probably could
not be operational before 1974.
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ALGERIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS SHIFT SLIGHTLY
During the past few months,
a slight but perceptible cooling
has occurred in Algeria's rela-
tions with the Soviet Union while
those with France have improved.
Nevertheless, good relations with
Moscow as well as with Paris con-
tinue to be very important to Al-
giers.
The zenith of Algerian-So-
viet relations and the nadir of
Algerian-French relations occurred
nearly simultaneously early last
year. A long-term trade agree-
ment with the USSR had been con-
cluded, involving the sale of
large amounts of wine that had
glutted the Algerian market after
France deferred its purchases for
domestic reasons. During early
1969, many prominent Soviet of-
ficials, including President Niko-
lai Podgorny, visited Algeria, and
Algerian Foreign Minister Boute-
flika and other high-level Alge-
rians went to the USSR.
Since then, the number of
Soviet visitors has declined. In
recent months, there has been more
grumbling in Algeria than usual
over the quality and content of
Soviet military and economic aid,
and the Algerian press has been
far less effusive in praising Mos-
cow's assistance.
A principal factor contrib-
uting to Algerian coolness to-
ward the USSR was the improve-
ment in relations with France.
Last summer, negotiations were
concluded for the purchase from
France of 28 Fouga-Magister jet
aircraft, the first major effort
by the Boumediene regime to di-
versify its sources of military
aid, over which the USSR had en-
joyed a near monopoly. Subse-
quently, the French foreign min-
ister, who visited Algiers last
fall, indicated that Paris was
willing to resume its wine pur-
chases. The expectation of re-
gaining this traditional market,
involving both a better price
and payment in francs, made the
wine deal with the Soviets less
attractive. As a result, the
Algerians may have sought some
adjustments in terms and quanti-
ties during trade talks in Moscow
last month.
Improvement in intra-Maghreb
relations also diverted Algerian
energies from their earlier close
association with the Soviets. The
Algerians collaborated closely
with their more moderate neighbors
during the recent Islamic and Arab
summits, and with Morocco in its
rapprochement with Mauritania.
O th
lati
r developments affecting e -
Xns 4-1,
wi th
marked
activiti
developmen
tr
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parti arly in the
e state petro-
ry\and numerous con-
"s awarded b West European
Japanese groupb's.
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 Feb 70
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WESTFRN HEMISPHERE
Talk of reintegrating Cuba into the inter-American system, and elec-
tions past and future dominated the news from Latin America this week.
The ministerial-level meeting of the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council, which is being held in Caracas, Venezuela, provided the
forum for the discussions on Cuba. Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad-
Tobago emphasized the need for hemispheric solidarity, especially in the
economic sphere, and urged consideration of an end to the "economic
boycott" of Cuba and a resumption of trade. Williams was careful to
distinguish between full membership for Cuba in the. OAS as opposed to
participation in the economic activities of the inter-American system. Presi-
dent Caldera of Venezuela made a balanced but clear response to Williams'
statements, arguing that it is not always possible to separate economic and
political factors.
These statements follow closely on recent declarations by other Latin
American officials calling for a re-examination of the basic reasons for
excluding Cuba. The foreign ministers of Chile and Peru recently voiced
similar sentiments, as have the three major candidates in the Chilean presi-
dential election. Although all the statements specify that Cuba must adhere
to accepted international practices, they demonstrate a growing interest in
bringing Cuba back into the inter-American system.
In general, many countries feel there is no reason for not trading with
Cuba, inasmuch as they have relations with other Communist countries.
Moreover, the statements come at a time when some leaders may be feeling
some domestic pressure to express their independence of the United States.
Fidel Castro has recently shown some interest in commercial ties with
other Latin nations, particularly those in the Caribbean, but he has stated
that before discussions can even begin, the Latin American countries must
repudiate the OAS sanctions.
On the electoral scene, Costa Rican opposition leader and former
president Jose "Pepe" Figueres won a landslide victory in the elections last
Sunday. His National Liberation Party also increased its majority in the
national legislature. Unofficial returns indicate that the Socialist Action
Party, a Communist front, won two seats in the legislature, which may
provoke trouble from elements of the extreme right.
In Chile, persistent animosity and distrust between the Communist and
Socialist parties keep cropping up during the process of organizing Salvador
Allende's presidential campaign. At issue is the control of local committees
being set up by the leftist-Marxist electoral front. The determination of the
Communist leaders to play a major role in the front is in line with their
expressed opinion that, in Chile, a popular front is currently the best means
of acquiring a "platform of power." Election campaigns are continuing to
arouse interest in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and
Colombia.
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SUBVERSIVES THREATEN GUATEMALAN ELECTION
Communist terror tactics
continue to disturb the political
scene as the elections on 1 March
near. President Mendez is under
mounting pressure to go beyond
the minimum steps he has taken
for increased security.
The assassinations last
week of a well known journalist
and of a right-wing former judi-
cial police chief revived public
apprehension, which had ebbed
with the restoration of consti-
tutional guarantees on 15 Janu-
ary. A wealthy industrialist
has been kidnaped and several
bombing incidents have occurred
within the past two weeks.
President Mendez once more
proclaimed a state of precaution,
providing the lowest form of
emergency powers for the security
forces, with a proviso that nor-
mal political activity is not
inhibited. He also installed a
new team to direct the national
police and named former minister
of defense General Rolando Chin-
chilla to the ministry of govern-
ment, probably to exhibit further
motion in the security field.
The president has resisted
"unleashing" the police in a
major anti-Communist effort be-
cause previous counterterror
programs added to the level of
over-all violence. The govern-
ment Revolutionary Party (PR)
believes that an increase in
terrorism represents the great-
est threat to its election
chances. The PR presidential
candidate, Mario Fuentes Pier-
rucini, is expected to win un-
less a major Communist thrust
enhances the appeal of the right-
wing National Liberation Move-
ment's Col. Carlos Arana. Arana
has a reputation as the commander
who rid the northeast of Commu-
nist guerrillas.
ilAt this point all the
legitimate political forces, in-
cluding the military, seem de-
termined to uphold the electoral
process. If the Communists mount
a serious offensive, however,
Mendez' reluctance to respond
forcefully would no longer re-
main acceptable to the armed
forces.
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DOMINICAN OPPOSITION ACCELERATES CAMPAIGN
Last week's widespread stu-
dent disturbances, virulent poli-
ticking, and charges of govern-
ment repression have set the tone
for the turmoil that will char-
acterize political life from now
until the presidential election
in May.
Dissident groups used the front
page publicity on recent disap-
pearances of several opponents of-
the Balaguer government to initi,_
ate student protests around the"'
country. Secondary school stu-
dents, responsive to Communis'?-
led organizations, came out.;;'n
large numbers, and police Were
faced with disorders in mast
cities. In clashes betw(ten uni-
versity youths and security forces
in Santo Domingo,, four,--students
were wounded. Continued assassina-
tions of army personnel--the
latest on 3 February--have made
security forces eager to do battle
with leftists in _?eneral, and
further incidents between students
and police are likely.
Charges .of repression will
continue to-headline the opposi-
tion campai4n; some allegations
are justified. Coercion and in-
timidation have long been legit-
imate tactics in the Dominican
Republik, and the president has
few qualms about dealing with
the q,~position in a high handed
manri6r. Balaguer probably does
not' need strong-arm methods to
but he is well aware that
e more formidable his position,
the more certain he is of con-
tinued military backing. In
turn, the opposition is shifting
its attention to intrigue and
plotting in an attempt to gain
its ends, believing that Balaguer
can,.=easily win an election.
The leadership of Juan Bosch's
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD),
the major opposition party, al-
ready views a coup rather than
elections as the more realistic
long term means of gaining power.
In a speech last month, PRD Sec-
retary General Pena Gomez all but
ruled out official electoral par-
ticipation by his party if Presi-
dent Balaguer runs. Although a
final decision will be made later
by a national convention, the
speech predicated participation
on the "remote possibility" that
Balaguer will not seek re-elec-
tion. Former General Wessin's
Quisqueyan party, the leading
antigovernment force on the right,
has also turned its attention to
plotting rather than campaigning.
At present, however, the
various parties have few military
allies. Civilian supporters of
the PRD are capable of inciting
serious urban riots, but they
would be unable to sustain a re-
volt. The military, the all im-
portant factor in the Dominican
equation, is still firmly with
Balaguer. So long as the Presi-
dent maintains order and appears
to be headed for another term, he
is unlikely to suffer serious de-
fections among his military sup-
porters.
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HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR GROPE TOWARD COMPROMISE
The halting movement toward
normalization of relations between
El Salvador and Honduras contin-
ued last week as bilateral talks
got under way. The relative calm
along the border was shattered,
however, by the first clashes of
any significance since last sum-
mer's five-day war.
Bilateral talks began in
Costa Rica on 26 January. Al-
though Honduras had previously
insisted that discussion of the
border dispute precede discussion
of other issues, a more flexible
approach was finally adopted.
Both delegations agreed to con-
centrate first on humanitarian
matters, such as exchange of
mail and family visits, and to
consider the more difficult prob-
lems at a later time. The meet-
ings recessed on 30 January and
are scheduled to resume on 23
February.
With peace negotiations just
beginning, a series of clashes
between Salvadoran and Honduran
troops has caused concern on
both sides. The incidents re-
sulted in fewer than a dozen cas-
ualties, and apparently stemmed
from active patrolling along the
undefined border. Neither gov-
ernment permitted them to be
blown out of proportion by the
mass media.
Although further lashes
would ha a des 1lizing effect,
the possibi is remote that
they wout ea irectly to a
major o6tbreak of ostilities.
Unlike last summer, when atrocity
stories abounded, no deeply emo-
tional issues have yet arisen.
Moreover, the OAS decision to in-
crease the number of military
and civilian observers will prob-
ably help to keep the lid on.
Nevertheless, continued incidents
would strengthen the hand of
those who, for political or na-
tionalistic reasons, have opposed
compromise. With Salvadoran con-
gressional elections scheduled
for 8 March, and with certain
Honduran leaders interested in
dispensing with the 1971 presi-
dential elections, each govern-
ment is particularly sensitive
to criticism of its handling of
relations with the other. Should
the border problem inflame public
opinion, either side could be
forced to adopt a tougher stance
and the success of the bilateral
talks would be severely jeopar-
dized.
Continued problems would
also impede efforts to revive
the Central American Common Mar-
ket. The economics ministers of
the five member states will meet
on 12 February to work out a
modus operandi that would allow
the market's executive organs to
resume formal operations. Hon-
duran intransigence prevented
progress at the first meeting on
9 January, and its position at
the upcoming meeting will provide
a reliable indicator of its in-
terest in ending the crisis at-
mosphere that has pervaded the
market.
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Secret
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*Vwf Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Czechoslovakia Under Husak
Secret
N2 44
8 February 1970
No. 0356/70A
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNDER HUSAK
Party first secretary Gustav Husak is beginning to mold Czechoslovakia's institutions into instruments of his own
power. He is not in full control yet, but since taking over from Dubcek last April, he has steadily asserted his position,
most recently at last week's party central committee plenum, which approved sweeping leadership changes. At that
meeting, Husak put his own man into the powerful post of Czech regional party chief. In the process, he engineered the
transfer of his potential rival, Lubomir Strougal, to the job of federal premier, thus removing him from his party power
base. Husak also indicated that he intends to satisfy Soviet demands while trying to avoid a full reversion to Stalinist
practices.
Husak has been building up to this stage of affairs gradually. He succeeded in bringing relative stability to the
leadership and imposed measures that produced a period of at least surface calm in the country. He accomplished this by
forcing the party to adopt a "middle-of-the-road" political course similar to that instituted by Janos Kadar in Hungary
after the 1956 revolt. In addition, he has once again thrown a veil of secrecy over policy making and politics and restored
party and police control over society. Under Husak's leadership, virtually all of the demands made by the USSR since the
invasion have been met. Czechoslovakia's image in the Communist camp has been refurbished, and a strong public
endorsement has been won from the Soviet Union and most of the other invasion powers.
Husak's next task is to put down some deeper domestic political roots. Apparently encouraged by Soviet support,
he now plans to complete "normalization" of domestic affairs and of relations with the Warsaw Pact governments this
year. To do so, however, he and his colleagues must reckon with a number of political, economic and social problems that
could delay this process. Husak will eventually have to assert his authority over conservatives in the leadership who will
attempt to press him into more orthodox policies, as well as over the even more extreme conservatives who are seeking
control of the regional party apparatuses in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia. He must also quickly solve
problems that could ultimately jeopardize the economy and with it, his position. Finally, his willingness to serve the
Russians has widened the gulf between the party hierarchy and the population, and Husak is faced with popular
alienation and passive antiregime dissidence, especially among students, workers, trade unionists, and intellectuals.
Special Report - 1
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Gustav Husak has unquestionably put his
stamp on the Czechoslovakia of today. A bril-
liant, dynamic, and sophisticated individual,
Husak has been one of the most controversial
figures in Czechoslovak politics for over 20 years.
Less than 15 months after Dubcek replaced
Novotny in January 1968, Husak became the first
intellectual since Lenin to head a ruling European
Communist party.
Husak was born 10 January 1913 to a
Slovak peasant family in Dubravka, near Brati-
slava. Having earned a doctor of laws degree and
subsequently joining the Communist party, he
was in his 30s when he became head of the Slovak
government. He had already gained the reputation
of a brilliant political tactician who knew how to
exploit the weaknesses of his adversaries.
Arrested and imprisoned by the Gestapo
when World War II broke out, Husak was released
almost immediately, reportedly through the inter-
vention of Alexander Mach, then minister of
interior in the Slovak regime that was collabo-
rating with the Nazis. Husak was later accused of
"red fascism" because of his friendship with
members of the collaborationist regime and
because he later intervened to help lighten Mach's
postwar sentence for treason.
Husak played a key role in the Slovak na-
tional uprising in 1944 and, at the same time,
developed a growin reputation as an ardent
Slovak nationalist.
Special Report
Gustav Husak
Party First Secretary
Emerging in the postwar period as a major
political figure, Husak was criticized for tolerating
the excesses of the security police and for his
severe repression of national minorities, particu-
larly Hungarians living in Slovakia. Following the
Communist coup in 1948, Husak became em-
broiled in the ensuing power struggle that led to
Czechoslovakia's Stalinist era. Accused of "bour-
geois nationalism," he was expelled from the
party in 1951 and subsequently arrested. In April
1954, he and four others were tried on trumped
up charges of treason, sabotage, and espionage,
and Husak was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Released in 1960, Husak lived quietly, partly
because Novotny was cognizant of his potential
for sowing disunity within the party, and partly
because Husak himself had no desire to serve the
regime. Husak was officially rehabilitated and
readmitted to the party in 1963, and for five
years was employed as a "scientific" worker in
the Slovak Academy of Sciences. In a recent
speech, Husak said that he had turned down the
post of deputy premier in 1964, in the wake of
the disastrous economic recession of the year
before.
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Although his stature within the Slovak re-
gional party had grown remarkably, Husak appar-
ently played only a minor role in the Slovak
drive, spearheaded by Dubcek and Vasil Bilak, to
remove Novotny from power during the final
months of 1967. In fact, it was not until
Brezhnev washed his hands of the affair, and the
majority of the party leadership lined up against
Novotny, that Husak offered his support to
Dubcek in what he has described as a "Christmas
letter."
In April 1968, three months after Dubcek
replaced Novotny, Husak was named deputy pre-
mier in charge of "the great Slovak dream": fed-
eralization of the country. This plan was designed
to give the Slovak minority greater rights and
near-equality with the more populous Czechs by
dividing the country into separate Czech and
Slovak republics with their own distinct national
governments drawn together under a minimal
federal government apparatus in Prague.
In July 1968, a month before the Soviet
invasion, Husak became embroiled in a heated
dispute with his Czech colleagues over whether
the Slovaks should be given parity on the federal
level. Most Czechs believed that the principle of
"majority rule" should apply on the federal level,
and looked for the extraordinary party congress,
then set for 9 September, to settle the argument.
The Slovaks-and Husak-appeared headed for
certain defeat on this issue, and the invasion
oddly enough, benefited Husak by allowing him
to preserve considerable leverage in asserting
Slovak claims.
Husak's preoccupation with federalization
also revealed that, as a result of his imprisonment
during the 1950s, he had developed a more
benign attitude toward the national minorities. A
Special Report
bill granting greater rights to all minority groups,
appended to the federalization legislation, was
drafted during 1968 under Husak's guidance. In
addition, he seemed to display a more tolerant
attitude toward the religious communities during
this period.
On other reforms of Dubcek, however,
Husak from the beginning expressed reservations.
Although he lauded the idea of "democratiza-
tion," including fewer restrictions on the mass
media, he criticized Dubcek's Action Program for
generating "incorrect views." As Husak saw it,
there were three main dangers: (a) that the liberal
organizations might develop a nonsocialist
philosophy that could attract a large popular fol-
lowing; (b) that among opinion makers "radi-
calized Philistines" could emerge who considered
that the entire system under Novotny had been
bad and must be changed and, (c) that there
could be a resurgence of the dogmatists who
wanted a simplistic return to rule by force.
Husak's resurgence as one of the country's
most influential politicians began almost im-
mediately after the invasion in August 1968. He
was a member of President Ludvik Svoboda's
delegation that went to Moscow to negotiate the
release of Dubcek and the other leaders who had
been taken prisoner. During the talks, Husak is
said to have argued cogently and forcefully; he
apparently impressed his Soviet counterparts who
began a dialogue with him that has continued to
the present.
Husak's increasing influence also prompted
the "illegal 14th party congress," held clan-
destinely in a Prague factory on 22 August, to
elect him to the presidium and central committee.
Following his return to Czechoslovakia, Husak
dominated the "extraordinary" Slovak party
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congress on 26-29 August and was elected Slovak
party first secretary.
Shortly thereafter Husak delineated his
policy of "realism" and became the foremost
spokesman for "normalization"-broad com-
pliance with Moscow-as the only possible course
in the face of military occupation and the threat
of a blood bath. Husak was the first Czechoslovak
leader to characterize the Moscow Agreement of
26 August, the official catalog of Russian
demands, as an "honorable solution." Signifi-
cantly, he subsequently dissociated himself from
the preinvasion leadership and criticized the re-
sults of Dubcek's reforms, particularly the un-
controlled mass media, the undisciplined party
dissidents and unruly students. He also declared
the 14th party congress invalid and called upon
Dubcek and other leaders to do the same.
The motive for Husak's apparent transforma-
tion and his uncompromising support for "nor-
malization" appears to have been a combination
of pragmatism and opportunism. His stress on the
bilateral character of the Moscow Agreement sug-
gests that he expected that the Soviets would not
make any significant concessions to Prague until
after their demands had been met. In particular,
Husak probably had been assured by the Soviets
that he could go ahead with federalization. Some
of Husak's comments also suggest that he believed
that Soviet occupation forces eventually would be
withdrawn.
Husak's strong leadership in the aftermath of
the invasion-Dubcek appears to have relied
heavily on him-and his dialogue with numerous
Russian visitors led to widespread speculation as
early as September 1968 that he was being
groomed as Dubcek's successor. In the next three
months, however, Husak restricted his activities
to finishing work on the federalization bill,
streamlining his own Slovak party leadership, and
Special Report
tightening control over the Slovak people. At the
same time, he became the central figure in an
informal coalition of Slovaks and moderate as
well as conservative Czechs within the central
party apparatus who were disenchanted with
Dubcek's ineffective and essentially anti-Soviet
leadership. As a result, Husak's "group" and its
ideas prevailed at the November 1968 party
plenum that elected a new "centrist" leadership
and adopted a "realist" political line, in effect
isolating Dubcek.
After this, Husak came more and more into
prominence and Dubcek faded into the back-
ground. Serious anti-Soviet riots in late March
1969 embroiled the Czechoslovak leadership in its
most grave crisis after the invasion. The Russians
apparently demanded that Dubcek be ousted and
a new leadership formed that could exercise effec-
tive control of the population. There are indica-
tions that Moscow had threatened to bring addi-
tional troops into the country if the changes were
not carried out.
Husak took advantage of the situation. He
reportedly rallied the despairing leadership and
allegedly was instrumental in constructing a new
regime whose members were more acceptable to
the Soviets. Husak was nominated for the post of
party chief by Dubcek after the latter agreed to
step aside, and, on 17 April 1969, he received an
overwhelming majority of central committee
votes. Moscow's role, or lack of it, in Husak's
ascendancy is still unclear. It seems most likely
that the Soviets gave tentative approval, since
they probably considered Husak the strongest
leader in Prague and because they undoubtedly
had determined that his alleged Slovak "national-
ism" and his authoritarianism could work to their
advantage. The Russians probably also realized
that, if necessary, the uncharismatic Husak would
be much easier to replace than Dubcek.
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HUSAK'S POLICIES
"If ..Novotny managed everything, including the
economy, bureaucratically, Dubcek did not
manage at all. "
Prague Radio, 3 January 1970
Since Husak took over, he has sought to
avoid the divergent excesses of the Novotny and
Dubcek regimes. Most of the leadership's policies,
in fact, have reflected Husak's preoccupation with
"normalization" and in effect are less bloody but
just as repressive as those employed by Novotny,
if not more so. Husak's policies thus far are di-
rected toward four basic goals: 1) to unify the
party and restore its "leading role"; 2) to estab-
lish and maintain an effective system of control
over the populace and all social organizations;
3) to remove the disruptive influence of "anti-
socialists," i. e., the liberals and moderates who
have played an influential role since the Dubcek
period; and 4) to regain the confidence of the
leaders of the invasion powers and other socialist
allies.
Husak does seem intent on preventing a re-
turn to the pre-January 1968 political setting, but
First Secretary Secretaries Other Members of
the Secretariat
Gustav Husak (S) Vasil Bilak (S) Miroslav Moo
Jan Fojtik
Alois Indra
Frantisek Penc
his role in each policy formulation is difficult to
evaluate. Many of his immediate goals are
identical with those of the ultraconservatives who
are putting pressure on him. Further, Husak's
responses to various pressures suggest that he is
guided more by pragmatism than by principle. His
actions to date have been reflexive, designed to
stabilize his own position and to reassure the
Soviets that he can control the situation and cope
with domestic problems.
In the short time he has been in office,
Husak has initiated extensive personnel changes at
all levels of the party, government, and social and
economic organizations. The first phase of the
purge installed "realists" sympathetic with
Husak's concepts in place of the liberals and
moderates associated with Dubcek. The con-
servatives were largely untouched because of their
rapport with the Soviets. Since April 1969, some
organizations have been reshuffled a second time,
for the most part because the regime was dissatis-
fied with officials who were dragging their feet in
implementing leadership directives. During the
party plenum last week, several prominent leaders
were ousted from the party presidium, which
CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY (KSC) (as of 18 January 1970)
- Leaders who subscribe to
an essentially more orthodox
political philosophy than Husak
Special Report
(S) Slovak
New Appointees
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Vasil Bilak (S)
Peter Colotka (S)
Evzen Erban
Gustav Husak (S)
Antonin Kapek
Josef Kempny
Josef Korcak
Jozef Lenart (S)
Jan Filler
Lubomir Strougal
Ludvik Svoboda (Honorary)
Candidate Members
of the Presidium
Frantisek Barbirek
Dalibor Hanes (S)
Vaclav Hula
Alois Indra
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indicates that even those holdovers from the
Dubcek era who had fallen in line with Husak's
"realism" are no longer acceptable.
Under an elaborate party card exchange
program now under way, district party officials
are screening local party functionaries, and party
central committee commissions are investigating
the rank and file. Husak has declared that all
party members must support his policies or get
out. Last week's plenum set up a 12-member
commission, dominated by prominent pro-Soviet
conservatives, to oversee the program. This sug-
gests that the regime will comply with the Soviet
request that the Czechoslovak Communist party
be substantially reduced.
Husak is purging "antisocialists" by re-
moving them from their jobs and expelling them
from the party. Up to now, the party leader has,
however, been willing to give virtually all dissi-
dents one last chance to fall in line before facing
censure. Despite conservative pressure, Husak has
continually stressed-most recently on 29 January
at the party plenum-that there will be no "show
trials." A few outspoken intellectuals, such as
national chess champion Ludek Pachman and
television commentator Vladimir Skutina, have
been arrested, but most of the prominent progres-
sives still in the country have not. Dubcek, for
example, was recently assigned as Czechoslovak
ambassador to Turkey. Other key liberals, such as
former National Assembly president Josef
Smrkovsky, are still free, although he and others
in similar straits have had an extremely difficult
time finding suitable employment.
POPULATION CONTROL
Party leader Husak has firmly curbed public
displays of antiregime or anti-Soviet sentiment.
When threatened with potential disturbances, the
authorities have put the security police on alert,
Special Report
SECRET
ONHIS ROLE AS DEPUTYPREMIER UNDER DUBCEK
"Last August 1 was deputy premier I knew absolutely nothing about
things... Gradually, bit by bit, one got to know of various things, and for the
first time my eyes were opened a little when in October we were in the Soviet
Union for a conference-Dubcek, Cernik and 1-and when during his several-
hour speech Comrade Brezhnev began to recapitulate the entire story. This
lasted for several hours, and...Dubcekcould not even say boo. That is when my
eyes were opened. I say that the whole affair was not fair play." They (the
Russians) now hold against me the fact that at the Slovak congress (28-29
August 1968), 1 backed Dubcek wheal said: 'ifDubeek fallsI will go to.' Yes,
it is true, I said so, under the circumstances I knew at that time.:.. And this is
how it is with all of us here, I think." (25 September 1969)
ON REFORM
"The basic concept of post-January policy remains even today the starting
point for forming the party program even though it must be theoretically
extended, corrected slightly in many- aspects, and made more concrete and
gradually implemented." - - -
(25 September 1969)
ON REPRESSIVE POLICIES
"We regard all the temporary measures, unavoidable for restoring order,
and strengthening state power, for putting a stop to economic disintegration
and primarily for restoring the unity and action capacity of the party, as an
unavoidable precondition for being able in the future to implement these
positive tasks whkh could not be realized after January 1968... "
(25 September 1969)
ON WORKING WITH PEOPLE
"Real sensitivity is needed for work with the people. We are not butchers.
Our parry is no slaughterhouse. This is work involving living people-sensitive
people-where mind and feelings play a role ....The policy of the Communist
Party is not Carried out by the sword. Education isnot a question ofslashing,
not a question of revenge... not a question of a personal settling of accounts. "
(25 September 1969)
ONPARTYPURGE
"The Communist Party is a voluntary association of people thinking the
same way. He who does not think the same way need not be in the party. And
he who wants to fight it cannot be in it Dead souls in the party are of no use
to us; however, even less so are souls who are hostile to the party.... This is not a
raid on party members.... We do not want to lose even one single honest party
member.
" (5 January 1970)
ONSHOWTRL4LS
"...there are no forces either in the party leadership or inthe -central
committee that would be striving for a return to the fifties, for distortion and
violation of laws. Our party will not degrade itself to framing show trials... "
(29 January 1969)
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reinforced them with additional security forces
and military units, and made thousands of preven-
tive arrests. When large-scale demonstrations
occurred throughout the country on 21 August
1969, the first anniversary of the invasion, the
security forces were able to maintain control with
tear gas, water hoses, truncheons and a strong
show of military force. No Soviets were involved
in putting down the demonstrations.
In the aftermath of the demonstrations, the
government announced that people arrested for
"opposition" in the future will face severe punish-
ment and loss of civil rights. A legal punishment
rarely used since the early 1950s was revived:
"prohibition of residence." This measure calls for
banishment from one to five years for a wide
range of offenses, and could again become a
common alternative to imprisonment.
Husak has restricted travel in and out of the
country in an attempt to curtail Western in-
fluences, to close the escape hatch for dissidents,
and to minimize the number of defections of
badly needed scientific and technical personnel.
The flow of traffic from the West into Czecho-
slovakia has been reduced, the number of Western
news correspondents in Prague restricted, Western
broadcasts jammed, and the sale of many Western
newspapers and periodicals prohibited. Dubcek's
numerous legal guarantees of due process and
individual rights undoubtedly will be ignored, in-
asmuch as the wide-ranging powers of public
prosecutors have been restored.
As a result, the public has been cowed.
Husak, consequently, has lost the support of
many who originally considered him preferable to
any other but Dubcek. This change in attitude is
responsible for passive resistance in the form of
worker slowdowns, absenteeism and sabotage.
Special Report -7
SECRET
CULTURE AND EDUCATION
Cultural policy has become increasingly re-
pressive, suggesting that Husak has no qualms
about going even further than Novotny in at-
tempting to corral the recalcitrant intellectuals.
He has stifled the mass media by restoring censor-
ship, abolished the more outspoken progressive
publications, and ousted prominent journalists,
editors, commentators, and media administrators.
In addition, party committees headed by arch-
conservatives have been set up to police the mass
media. Husak has promised that censorship even-
tually will be abolished, but this is unlikely until
the presence of censors in the editorial offices is
superfluous.
The regime now exercises strict control over
the cultural community by dealing directly with
individual dissident intellectuals, rather than
through their unions. Some unrepentant progres-
sives have had their passports withdrawn. The
government has been empowered to exercise
greater control over the unions themselves by
closely supervising their funds and restricting
their publishing activities and contacts with
Western counterparts.
Dissenting unions are being threatened with
expulsion from the source of their organizational
strength and finances, the Communist-controlled
National Front. Organizations dropped from the
front are considered illegal and are automatically
disbanded. In early January 1970, the front
rescinded the membership of the motion picture
and television artists' association and warned five
other cultural unions to change their attitudes or
face a similar fate. To fill the vacuum created by
the dismissal of many progressive writers, the
Czech and Slovak ministries of culture intend to
organize "groups" of reliable writers.
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Strict state control of education was re-
imposed on 1 January 1970. In a complete
reversal of policy, the Czech and Slovak ministers
of education have been empowered to appoint
and recall academic administrators and professors,
and to create, abolish, or reorganize educational
and scientific institutions. Political reliability has
again become a prerequisite in the hiring of teach-
ers and in the admission of students to the uni-
versities. Disciplinary commissions are being set
up to deal with student radicals, and political
indoctrination, beginning this month, will be
intensified within the academic community.
The situation appears to be less repressive in
Slovakia than in the Czech lands, where so-called
"antisocialism" is more deeply rooted and where
an orthodox minister of education is determined
to stifle all student activity outside the classroom.
He probably is attempting to prevent the students
from organizing any mass demonstrations such as
those that developed in late April 1969, when
20,000 students in 20 universities protested the
ouster of Dubcek. The minister has also ordered
all student and faculty publications discontinued
until they can be evaluated and then reissued
individually on a probationary basis.
implementing federalization at different speeds,
at a time when tandem cooperation between the
two groups is vital. Consequently, federalization
has strained relations between the two nationali-
ties. To eliminate one problem, the regime last
week abolished the federal post of "state secre-
tary," removing a bureaucratic level that had been
created to give the minority Slovaks equal repre-
sentation in the Czechoslovak cabinet.
Husak also has had second thoughts on fed-
eralizing the party. Such a federative arrange-
ment-previously planned for next year-would
strengthen the Czech and Slovak regional parties.
In all likelihood it would enable the numerically
stronger Czech party bureau to dominate federal
party meetings, including the next party congress.
The party leader is well aware that such a devel-
opment would allow the politician who runs the
Czech party to increase his power, and to isolate
Husak from his own power base in Slovakia. To
prevent this, Husak told the party plenum last
week that he plans to recentralize party authority
in Prague. He explained his retreat on this issue
by emphasizing that national rivalries already had
impeded policy making and had blocked imple-
mentation of the few decisions reached. Husak
may also have been responding to Soviet com-
plaints that federalization of the party would
have a divisive effect on the leadership.
Now that Husak has moved to Prague, his
enthusiasm for federalization of all national organi-
zations has diminished. Federalization of the gov-
ernment, when introduced on 1 January 1969,
was incomplete and confused, and the program
now poses both short and long-term problems.
After one year of federalization, there still has
been an inadequate delineation of responsibility
and of chains of command. The system has re-
vealed a shortage of qualified Slovak officials for
federal posts, as well as an inadequate organiza-
tional arrangement in the Czech lands. To
complicate matters, the Czechs and Slovaks are
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The program to rehabilitate former political
prisoners who suffered unjustly during the 1950s, a
reform that Husak originally endorsed whole-
heartedly, is still in progress, but its pace has
become monumentally slow. A central committee
"white paper" justifying the program was pro-
duced under the direction of presidium member
Jan Piller. It has been shelved, undoubtedly be-
cause it implicates both the Soviets and promi-
nent Czechoslovak conservatives. Dissenting dog-
matists, moreover, have caused the removal of
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Federal
6overnment
Presidium
Premier and
5 Deputies
Ministers
State Secretaries
and
Heads of Central
Agencies
Federative Arrangement of Czechoslovak Government (introduced 1 January 1969)
MINISTRIES AND
CENTRAL AGENCIES
Foreign Affairs
National Defense
Finance
Foreign Trade
Interior
Labor and Social Affairs
Planning
Agriculture and Food
Industry
Press and Information
Postal Services and
Telecommunications
Prices
Technology and
Investment Promotion
Transport
CZECH SLOVAK
GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT
CABINET CABINET
Nalional Presidium Presidium
and and
Ministries Ministers
1 1
17 Ministries 15 Ministries
6 Central 9 Central
Agencies Agencies
These federal
ministries are
independent
of national
governments
These federal
ministries and
committees
share powers
Hand coordinate
with appropriate
national government
ministries and
agencies
some judges for allegedly exonerating individuals
guilty of treason.
Some security officials have attempted to
intimidate applicants for rehabilitation by sub-
jecting them to intense personal investigations
and by interviewing many of them in the same
room in which they were brutally interrogated in
the early 1950s. Prior to his recent removal,
former Czech party chief Strougal, who served as
interior minister under Novotny, blocked a Czech
government bill regulating rehabilitation, and, late
Special Report
Chairman
Deputy Chairman
Presidium:
(40 members; 20 from Chamber of
People and 10 Czechs, 10 Slovaks
from Chamber of Nations)
CHAMBER OF CHAMBER OF
PEOPLE NATIONS
(Original National
Assembly
converted;
200 deputies
elected on
representative
basis)
(150 deputies;
75 each elected
by Czech and
Slovak National
Councils)
COURTS
(PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT)
Office of the Czechoslovak
Prosecutor General
Federal Supreme Court
CZECH SLOVAK CZECH SLOVAK
NATIONAL NATIONAL COURTS COURTS
COUNCIL COUNCIL
Office of Office of
Presidium Presidium Czech Slovak
Prosecutor Prosecutor
1 t
r
Czech Slovak
Supreme Supreme
Court Court
in 1969, public prosecutors appeared to have be-
gun a concerted campaign to limit the number of
acquittals.
The overriding priority of political issues
since Husak became party chief last April caused
decisions on several major economic matters to be
postponed. A party plenum that would address
the economy was postponed from October 1969
until last week. This session originally was slated
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to deal almost exclusively with the nation's
serious economic difficulties, but the agenda was
expanded to include many political questions.
Husak faces formidable economic problems.
He must try to stabilize and give direction to the
economy and oversee increased efforts to restore
work discipline. During the past two years the
Czechoslovak workers received sizable wage in-
creases despite their failure to increase produc-
tivity. The resultant pressure on consumer goods
supplies was a major factor in increased inflation.
In 1970 the Husak government will continue
a restrictive, anti-inflationary policy, charac-
terized by the Czechoslovaks as economic "con-
solidation." Anti-inflationary measures intro-
duced earlier include stringent controls on wages
and prices. Having failed to get a large Soviet
loan, the government now plays down the impor-
tance of external aid, claiming that better use of
available economic resources must provide the
means for overcoming serious problems. Alarmed
at the waste of resources in capital construction,
central authorities are determined to concentrate
in 1970 on priority projects and to retain tighter
control over investment funds than they did in
1969. Central control of the economy will be
strengthened, as will supervision of plan imple-
mentation.
The government will rely increasingly on
administrative measures to tackle the serious
problem of sagging labor productivity. On 1 Janu-
ary the government amended the labor code to
provide strict penalties for absenteeism, loafing,
and violation of wage regulations. An amended
penal code provides for more rapid prosecution
for misdemeanors such as theft of property and
currency speculation. It seems certain that most
of the economic reforms discussed in the Dubcek
era will not be carried out, although enterprises
Special Report
may continue to have some small freedoms ob-
tained since January 1968.
THE CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGE
Husak's "normalization" drive has inad-
vertently played into the hands of prominent
conservatives within the party and considerably
strengthened the conservative group as an influ-
ential pressure bloc.
On the surface, the chaotic power struggle
between factions that has characterized Czecho-
slovak party politics in recent years appears to be
over. Husak has virtually wiped out the vast web
of recalcitrant progressives as an effective opposi-
tion. The most prominent hard liners, mindful of
Soviet support for Husak, have found it expedient
to fall into line. What is left of open "opposition"
to Husak would seem to be a lightweight con-
tingent of conservative extremists, who do not
enjoy overt Soviet support, seeking to influence
Husak's "realist" policies, which thus far have
been acceptable to Moscow. Much more impor-
tant is the growing opposition composed of
Novotny's followers. They are particularly effec-
tive in the provinces, in the military, and at
secondary levels in the party apparatus in Prague.
On the surface they support Husak, but they also
appear to be playing a waiting game, building
positions of power and preventing Husak from
too much moderation. They probably are en-
couraged by developments at last week's party
plenum. Three prominent conservatives who
served under Novotny replaced three moderates
on the presidium, which suggests that Husak may
no longer enjoy a decisive majority on the party's
ruling body.
Husak's present strength is largely attribut-
able to Soviet support. If the Soviets were to
withdraw their endorsement, the conservative
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Alois Indra
Conservative Leader
roup near the top probably would be available to
Moscow as an alternative leadership. Perhaps the
most influential of these conservatives is Alois
Indra, who now serves as party secretary in charge
of personnel appointments to the top levels of the
government, and social organizations. Indra, one
of the few leaders said to have been forewarned
of the Soviet invasion, was Moscow's first choice
to head, a "collaborationist" regime. Despite his
recent open support for Husak, Indra has
engineered the elevation of a number of like-
minded conservatives into the federal government
apparatus. He probably still is Moscow's candi-
date for party leader if Husak should falter badly.
At last week's party plenum, Indra was elevated
to alternate membership on the party's ruling
presidium, a post in which he can more effec-
tively breathe down Husak's neck.
Another prominent conservative, Vasil Bilak,
is presently a presidium member and party secre-
tary in charge of foreign affairs. An adversary of
Husak, Bilak has maneuvered his way back into
the Slovak party central committee from which
he was expelled as an alleged "collaborator"
shortly after the invasion.
Vasil Bilak
One Husak Adversary
Josef Kempny
Regional Party Boss
Special Report
Power-seeking conservatives presently at-
tempting to establish a power base in the party
apparatus of the Czech lands of Bohemia and
Moravia may run afoul of their new overlord,
Josef Kempny. As first secretary of the powerful
Czech party bureau, Kempny has in effect be-
come the number two man in the Czechoslovak
Communist party. Kempny is known to hold dog-
matic views on some issues, but he has no popular
following and owes his present stature to Husak,
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SOVIET SUPPORT FOR HUSAK
"Comrade Husak..(is) an outstanding political figure, a loyal son of his people.. a man of great
courage. " Brezhnev Speech, 27 October 1969
POLISH PRESS ON GOMULKA AND HUSAK
"(They are) two Communists whose biographies are strikingly resembling, who have made great
contributions to the present historic shape of Poland and Czechoslovakia ...men of unflinching
principle... Glos Pracy, 26 May 1969
HUNGARIAN MEDIA ONHUSAK
The Czechoslovak party has a leader who has proved by his views and activity so far that he
is able and ready to solve the grave problems of Czechoslovak society. "
Radio Budapest, 18 April 1969
whom he probably will support. Moreover,
Kempny probably will not be as vulnerable to the
pressures of conservative extremists as his pred-
ecessor, Strougal. This fact could be crucial to
Husak's power in the future because Kempny, as
Czech party chief, now is in a position to control
the majority of delegates to the next party con-
gress. If the Czechoslovak party ever is federal-
ized, a Czech bloc could dominate the central
party apparatus in Prague.
The conservatives, who now control the key
portfolios in the party secretariat, also have
created political and social mass organizations
that have potential use as a threat to Husak. Such
groups include a social-political mass organiza-
tion, the Left Front, and ideologically approved
youth and cultural associations. In addition, the
hard liners have gained virtual control of the
police and security apparatus. The conservatives
as a group, however, do not appear to be unified
on a common political philosophy, and there have
been reports of conflicts among their key leaders,
especially over the question of pro-Soviet orienta-
tion. This could prevent them from becoming an
effective coalition in the immediate future.
Czechoslovak foreign policy is the exclusive
domain of the archconservatives. Husak seems to
stay out of it. Bilak serves as party secretary for
relations with other parties, and Pavel Auersperg,
a dogmatist who formerly served under Novotny,
heads the party central committee's department
for foreign affairs, which controls the Foreign
Ministry. Indra, the party secretary for personnel
assignments in the government, has in part been
responsible for a purge in the Foreign Ministry as
well as for the recall of liberal and moderate
ambassadors who aligned themselves with
Dubcek's policies and decried the Soviet invasion.
Foreign Minister Jan Marko is a moderate, but he
has no influence in policy matters.
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Czechoslovak foreign policy under Husak
largely reflects the goals of Moscow. Prague's
"initiatives" have primarily been confined to a
successful campaign to improve relations with the
invasion powers. Under Husak, the Czechoslovaks
have parroted Warsaw Pact statements on dis-
armament, European security and East-West de-
tente, most recently supporting the SALT talks in
Helsinki.
Husak personally has long been suspicious of
the motives of the West in general and the US in
particular. Czechoslovakia, under his leadership,
probably will take only small steps, after con-
sultation with Moscow, toward improving bi-
lateral relations with the West. In one of his rare
foreign policy statements, Husak in December
indicated that Prague hoped to expand trade with
the West Germans, but he made all the old de-
mands on Bonn, including renunciation of the
Munich agreement from the beginning, before any
further rapprochement could become a reality.
The Soviets, initially wary of Husak, ulti-
mately gave him their full official endorsement
when he and other top Czechoslovak leaders
visited Moscow in October. The turning point in
the Prague party leader's relations with the Rus-
sians appears to have been his blunt suppression
of the nationwide demonstrations on the first
anniversary of the Soviet invasion. Conservative
leader Indra spent most of August in the USSR,
probably discussing contingency plans with the
Soviets in the event that the anniversary demon-
strations got out of hand. After the anniversary
passed without significant incidents, Indra pub-
licly offered his support for Husak's politics.
Shortly thereafter, the Soviets underlined their
endorsement by awarding Husak the medal of
"Hero of the Soviet Union."
Czechoslovakia's relations with the other in-
vaders have improved, but in varying degrees.
Hungary and Poland have gone out of their way
to demonstrate their preference for the Husak
leadership over a more orthodox regime. Both the
Hungarians and the Poles have expressed concern
that Czechoslovakia not return to a Stalinist
system of rule, undoubtedly worried about the
spillover effect in their countries. In December,
after Kadar visited Prague to assess the situation
for himself, the Husak regime for the first time
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stated explicitly that it had studied the Hungarian
"solution" in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising
and would adopt those measures applicable to
Czechoslovakia.
The East Germans were less than enthusias-
tic about Husak's election, for they doubtless
hoped that one of the archconservatives who was
lobbying for more orthodox policies would re-
place Dubcek. Gradually, however, Pankow has
come around to offering Husak a qualified ap-
proval. Relations are still cool, however, as they
are with Bulgaria.
Czechoslovakia's relations with Romania and
Yugoslavia have improved only slightly since the
invasion. Leaders of both countries have given
verbal support to Husak's efforts to forge a stable
leadership and to bring domestic calm to the
country. Both were committed to Dubcek, how-
ever. Husak, in turn, coldly reciprocated by ad-
vocating increased cooperation with these two,
but only within the framework of the Warsaw
Pact and CEMA.
Czechoslovakia's present leaders can count
on Soviet support for the immediate future. As
long as Czechoslovakia continues toward ortho-
doxy, Husak will probably be their man in
Prague. If, however, it should look as if he were
losing control, the Soviets would probably fore-
sake him for Indra and even more orthodox poli-
cies.
In the longer run, however, Soviet support
will not by itself be enough to sustain him in
power. Husak will need to do more than maintain
control over the restless population and a disen-
chanted party. At a minimum, he will have to
introduce positive programs designed to improve
the standard of living and to overcome worker
Special Report
apathy or passive resistance. He will have to win
back the intellectuals and the young on terms
they are reluctant to accept. Since he has chosen
to follow Kadar as a model, the outlook for a
significant lifting of the repressive aspects of his
policies is long term and gradual. It has taken
Kadar more than a decade to achieve a minimal
reconciliation with his people; it may take Husak
at least as long.
The Czechoslovaks clearly expect to com-
plete "normalization" of the domestic situation
and of relations with the Soviet Union during
1970. This in essence would mean the purchase of
Soviet trust, and probably is an optimistic esti-
mate. Husak has indicated that Prague and Mos-
cow will renew their bilateral friendship treaty on
9 May, the 25th anniversary of the Soviet libera-
tion. The pact, according to Husak, will reflect
the "new contemporary situation and the higher
degree of mutual collaboration." A long period of
a satellite relationship, at least in foreign policy
and economic matters, thus seems to be envis-
aged. During the year, the regime must find solu-
tions to its immediate political and economic
problems in order to demonstrate to the Soviets
that it can continue to provide strong effective
leadership and extend the domestic calm over a
longer period of time.
First among these problems is Husak's need
to strengthen his control over the party leader-
ship. Husak or his rivals, therefore, can be ex-
pected to engineer relatively significant changes in
the party and government leadership as they
jockey for power. Every leader is vulnerable to
attack from one side or the other. For example,
Husak's decision last week to retain the instru-
ments of power in the central apparatus in
Prague-at the expense of federalization-may
alienate some of his supporters in his native Slo-
vakia. The difficulty will be to effect such
changes without seriously disturbing domestic
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tranquility. Husak's second political problem will
be to gain responsiveness from lower levels. This
will be a long term affair.
During the plenum last week, the party cen-
tral committee streamlined the federal govern-
ment apparatus in an effort to cope with its
economic problems. Five ministers and one dep-
uty premier with expertise in economic and tech-
nical fields were included in a revamped cabinet.
Nevertheless, prospects for significant stabiliza-
tion of the economy in 1970 are not good. The
leadership admits that meat supplies for the popu-
lation will remain inadequate at least until fall,
and it is unlikely that supplies of other consumer
goods can be increased adequately. Nevertheless,
some improvement can be expected if the regime
succeeds in enforcing its ceiling on wage increases
and if investment construction outside housing is
kept at the low level planned. Longer range at-
tempts to make Czechoslovak industry efficient
will be sacrificed for the immediate goal of a
resumption in industrial growth rates, particularly
in producer goods branches. The government now
is more closely linking prospects for improve-
ments in worker's living conditions to increased
productivity. The leadership hopes that incentives
combined with increased discipline will be ade-
quate to produce the desired results. In foreign
trade, Czechoslovakia will become increasingly
dependent on the USSR and, as a result, will
lessen its ties with the non-Communist countries.
In 1971, the regime plans to cap the nor-
malization drive by holding a party congress and,
afterwards, national elections. Regime officials
are hoping that if they can successfully carry
these off, the Soviets will allow them more free-
dom in conducting their own affairs.
Special Report
For the longer run, Husak has promised re-
laxation. He has characterized the repressive poli-
cies he has imposed on society as "temporary,"
but, at the same time, some of them have been
given the force of law. In the next few years,
Husak will continue to proceed cautiously, and
the rigid controls he has imposed probably will
remain in effect indefinitely. In the last analysis, a
loosening or tightening of controls in Prague may
be determined by such external influences as a
change in leadership in Moscow or detente be-
tween East and West.
The Soviets, for their part, will concentrate
on consolidating their hold on Czechoslovakia.
Eventualy they may be willing to grant Husak a
longer leash. For example, the Soviets have ap-
proved, at least pro forma, Husak's plan even-
tually to introduce the "positive program of Jan-
uary 1968." The Czechoslovaks hope that this
means that some limited reforms may gradually
be implemented. Potential Czechoslovak reforms,
like those introduced in Hungary in the years
following the 1956 uprising, probably will have to
be, at least initially, confined to improving the
standard of living and the "quality of life" with-
out jeopardizing the party's monopoly of leader-
ship.
cow.
Some Prague officials are still hopeful that
the Soviets will eventually demonstrate their sup-
port of Husak by making at least a token with-
drawal of occupation troops and granting a sub-
stantial hard currency loan. The USSR, however,
is not likely to remove any troops as long as it
considers the Czechoslovak armed forces to be
unreliable. A hard currency loan at present is
equally out of the question, as long as the stand-
ard of living in Prague is higher than in Mos-
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
New Politics and Old Problems in Kenya
Secret
6 February 1970
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5LlIKL I
NEW POLITICS AND OLD PROBLEMS IN KENYA
Kenya, until last July a much-heralded model of African stability and progress,
has emerged intact from six months of serious unrest and political crisis. Tribal
tensions have subsided, and the violence set off by the assassination of Tom Mboya
has ended. The country's first national parliamentary elections in December were
conducted honestly and served as a safety valve, allowing the people to express their
discontent by electing their own representatives.
Over 60 percent of the next parliament will be newly elected members. This
new parliament may mark the beginning of a new political era in Kenya, or at least
may begin a new phase within the era dominated by Jomo Kenyatta, now nearly 80
years old. The other two of the three most prominent politicians of the past six
years are gone; Tom Mboya is dead, Oginga Odinga imprisoned.
The bitter rivalries that provoked the crisis remain, however. Kenya's leadership
is still in the hands of President Kenyatta and his clique from the Kikuyu tribe. This
group, which rarely demonstrated much sensitivity during the past several months,
faces many serious problems. One of the most important of these is the succession
after Kenyatta dies: how to make the transition while avoiding a disastrous tribal
conflict.
President Jomo Kenyatta announced early in
1969 that his country's first general elections
would be held within the next few months. Many
observers believed that these elections-if hon-
estly conducted-would be a good test for
Kenya's three competing political groups. A par-
ticularly bitter struggle was expected between
two of these, the rival factions within the ruling
Kenya Africa National Union (KANU).
One faction within KANU was led by
Kenyatta's advisers. A long-range goal of these
Kikuyu politicians was to ensure that their tribe
would continue dominant. They took this posi-
tion not only because Kikuyu hegemony provided
them the perquisites of office, but also because
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Jomo Kenyatta
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Tom Mboya
they believed that the tribe-Kenya's largest and
the leading force in the nationalist struggles, in-
cluding the Mau Mau revolt-should naturally
hold first place in independent Kenya.
The other KANU faction was based largely
on opposition to Kikuyu hegemony. It was or-
ganized by Tom Mboya, a brilliant politician and
the party's secretary as well as minister for eco-
nomic development. Mboya was a member of
Kenya's second largest tribe, the Luo, whom the
Kikuyu consider their foremost rivals; he did not
have much Luo tribal support, however. Never-
theless, through excellent organizing and good
financing, he had welded a genuinely multitribal
alliance.
The third major political group was the
Kenya People's Union (KPU), the only formal
opposition party, led by Oginga Odinga. Once a
close associate of Kenyatta, Odinga formed the
KPU in 1966 after Mboya and the Kikuyu estab-
lishment combined to drive him and other left
wingers from KANU.
The KPU had a strong follow-
ing in uo areas, owever, and Odinga hoped that
L
the elections would give him an opportunity to
make gains in other parts of Kenya.
'These hopes and the conflicts of early 1969
were overwhelmed in the series of events that
followed; by the time elections were finally held
in December, the Kenyatta forces were free of an
effective opposition. The assassination of Mboya
on 5 July by a Kikuyu, whose motivation remains
unknown, completely disorganized his followers,
and his faction disintegrated. Odinga attempted
to make political capital of the suspicions among
many non-Kikuyus that the assassin had been
hired by the Kikuyu establishment. In retaliation,
the government imprisoned Odinga and banned
his party.
The election campaign was thus stripped of
any semblance of nationwide competition be-
tween opposing blocs, and local issues dominated
the contests in most constituencies. There was no
lack of enthusiasm for the elections, however;
over 600 candidates competed for the 158 seats
in what was technically the KANU party primary.
Oginga Odinga
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(After the KPU was banned, the primaries be-
came, in effect, the general elections, and every
registered voter was permitted to vote if he
wished.) The candidates waged vigorous cam-
paigns in most areas, exploiting such local issues
as dissatisfaction with incumbents who had spent
more time enjoying the good life in Nairobi than
in making contacts with their constituents, or
who had failed to bring economic development
projects into their home area.
In the final count, only 54 incumbents re-
tained their seats. Significantly, all members of
the Kikuyu clique were returned by their fellow
tribesmen. Only in the Luo tribal areas was there
clearly an anti-Kikuyu cast to the vote. All the
Luo incumbents were defeated, presumably be-
cause the voters felt they had cooperated with the
Kikuyu-at least by association-after the assassin-
ation. 25X6
TWO OLD PROBLEMS: TRIBAL RIVALRIES
AND SUCCESSION
Sixty-two percent of the National Assembly
will be new members, most of them younger and
better qualified than their predecessors. Neverthe-
less, basic problems persist. The elections may
have eased tensions by providing an outlet for
pent-up emotions, but tribal rivalries and suspi-
cion are still prime factors in Kenyan politics.
Nearly all the members of the National Assembly
represent tribal constituencies, and all are well
aware of the need to defend their tribes' interests.
The people, moreover, have high expectations for
better health services, educational facilities, and
economic opportunity. In many areas, there is a
clamor for more and better land. The government
lacks the resources to satisfy these demands, how-
ever, and the process of parceling out what is
available for economic development is further
complicated by intertribal competition.
Special Report
Underlying and complicating many of the
political struggles is the question of presidential
succession.
Finding a successor is difficult because no
other leader combines his qualifications-age and
dignity, a history of nationalist endeavor, speak-
ing ability, and, most importantly, acceptability
to the Kikuyu as well as the other tribes. Never-
theless, members of the establishment have ex-
pressed their determination to maintain their po-
sitions after Kenyatta is gone. Because there is no
Kikuyu with sufficient national popularity to be a
natural successor, they had apparently settled on
Daniel arap Moi, a member of the Kalenjin group
of tribes
Since the e ections, owever, e suc
picture has become more cloudy. Moi managed to
retain both his parliamentary seat and the vice
presidency, and still appears the most likely can-
didate if Kenyatta dies in the immediate future.
Nevertheless, his succession to the presidency is
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SUDAN
) IST'I ANOS
ET H II 0 P I A
Mega
UGANDA
!'~ lfarb QO
Eldoret
EASTERN I
KENYA
O National capital
0 Province capital
Province boundary
Railroad
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Ji A. 1c. J2 I
Moi's tribal background pre-
c udes his admission to the inner circles of the
Kikuyu clique; they would probably prefer a
Kikuyu who would be more reliable, by tribal
definition, as president.
There are rumblings that Moi will even be
challenged for the leadership of the Kalenjin
group by politicians critical of his subservience to
the Kikuyu. If Moi loses control of the Kalenjin
bloc of votes, he would no longer be a credible
candidate. Although Moi's prospects thus seem to
be faltering, none of the other possible Kikuyu
candidates appears to be acceptable to the other
tribes. It remains to be seen whether the Kikuyu
will designate another candidate or whether one
of the younger politicians will be able to establish
a genuine national popularity and challenge the
clique's candidate.
TWO NEW PROBLEMS: THE MILITARY IN
POLITICS AND UNDERGROUND OPPOSITION
The possibility that the military might be-
come involved in politics is an entirely new factor
that has developed as a result of the tribal ten-
sions and government actions since Mboya's assas-
sination. Bred in British traditions, Kenyan Army
officers had shown little interest in politics. More-
over, with one Kikuyu exception, all the top
officers are Kambas, a tribe that was traditionally
tolerant of the Kikuyu.
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The government has been concerned over
military loyalties. If the military attempts to in-
tervene, the Kikuyu reportedly plan to rely on
the General Service Unit, a tough paramilitary
police force, as a counterpoise. There is little
evidence, however, that the unit could or would
oppose the army.
The banning of the KPU has created still
another problem for Kenyatta's government.
While the party was legal, it provided haven for
leftists who opposed the government's pro-West-
ern alignment and its conservative domestic poli-
cies. The left opposition was, therefore, easily
identified. With the KPU now illegal, it will be
more difficult to identify opposition elements
that may attempt to form an underground organi-
zation or to take over the ruling party from
within.
Kenya's new parliament has yet to meet, but
there are already some signs of what direction
Kenya's politics will take in the next few months.
The recent announcement of cabinet appoint-
ments suggests that President Kenyatta does not
intend to make any basic policy changes. All the
old-line Kikuyu were appointed to cabinet posts,
although the portfolios were reshuffled. The cabi-
net and immediate subcabinet were again stacked
in favor of the Kikuyu, more particularly
Kenyatta's southern Kikuyu fellow clansmen.
A return to serious unrest in the next several
months seems unlikely. The public's sense of sat-
isfaction from the election outcome should allow
Kenyatta a political honeymoon period. With
Kenyatta in control, however, there is little likeli-
hood of any meaningful solution to the tribal
problem. The Kikuyu are not ready to give away
any power, and Kenyatta's mental flexibility will
decrease further with old age. On the other hand,
bickering will undoubtedly increase as the newly
elected non-Kikuyu members, attempting to ob-
tain economic help for their areas, run into the
intransigent Kikuyu ministers. Although these
and other intertribal problems should continue to
be worked out in political forums, an occasional
tribal flare-up would not be surprising.
The next major political milestone is likely
to be reached when Kenyatta dies. Whether
Kenya will be able to make the transition without
destructive tribal violence remains open to ques-
tion.
Special Report
SECRET
6 February 1970
Approved For Release 2009/03/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007600040001-6
 Approved For Release 2009/03/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07600040001-6
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/03/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07600040001-6