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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007600020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 23, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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`moo, Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Colombia to Hold Its Last Election Under the National Front
Secret
N2 37
23 January 1970
No. 0354/70B
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COLOMBIA TO HOLD ITS LAST ELECTION UNDER THE NATIONAL FRONT
On 19 April Colombia will hold general elections for the last time under the
National front system of government. As the election date draws nearer, the
Liberal and Conservative parties, the two major political organizations that make
up the Front, are becoming increasingly disunited, principally over what dissident
politicians consider the imposition of Misael Pastrana as the official Front candi-
date. It is the Conservatives' turn to occupy the presidency, and although Pastrana
is a Conservative, he was handpicked by Liberal President Lleras. Many Conserva-
tive politicians believe he?will make a weak president, thus opening the way for a
Liberal victory in 1974. The serious schisms in these two parties may add to the
growing dissatisfaction among the population, which has become weary with an
artificial arrangement that often only allows them to approve a candidate, not
choose him. Political stability probably will deteriorate as election day approaches.
The "Grand Coalition," as the National
Front is often called, will end in 1974, 16 years
after its establishment. It has been a unique insti-
tution for Colombia and, indeed, for the world. It
was designed in 1957 to force the country's two
largest and bitterly antagonistic political parties,
the Liberals and the Conservatives, to stop their
politically motivated violence and to share power
and office. The experiment was viewed by its
formulators as a means to educate Colombians in
the art of political compromise and to inculcate
in the people the most difficult aspect of demo-
cratic political culture-the acceptance of the
legitimacy of opposition. The coalition was also
viewed as a means to retain real power in the
hands of the social and economic elite while
furthering Colombia's economic development.
The major feature of the Front, as set forth
in constitutional amendments, was that the presi-
dency would alternate between the two parties
and that there would be parity for both in all
public elective bodies, executive departments, and
Special Report
administrative posts. One of the advantages of
alternating the presidency purportedly was that
over a 16-year period it would serve to educate
the populace in democracy by accustoming
Colombians to seeing the presidency shift peace-
fully between political parties. Decisions made by
the legislative bodies required a two-thirds vote
(recently changed to a simple majority) for pas-
sage, thus presumably forcing bipartisan coopera-
tion on all legislation.
Over the years the coalition has succeeded in
many of its aims. Most importantly, it has
brought political peace, no small accomplishment
in view of the fact that perhaps 100,000 or more
people lost their lives in politically inspired vio-
lence from 1948 to 1958. Moreover, the Front
has helped to build political consensus and sta-
bility, and has restored a large measure of politi-
cal liberty. Economic progress has been favorable,
especially since late 1960, and in the past two
years President Lleras has been able to bring bal-
ance-of-payments difficulties under control and
to reduce inflationary pressures. The country has
entered a period of political stability and
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economic growth (around six percent in the past
two years) under the National Front system.
A price has been paid for these accomplish-
ments, however. An increasingly high rate of
voter abstention has meant that the government's
claim to a solid popular base has become less and
less credible. Factionalism among the political
parties has also been a serious and persistent prob-
lem. Elections have made it obvious that there are
important segments of the party faithful who do
not subscribe wholeheartedly to the idea of join-
ing forces with ancient enemies but who instead
long for predominance.
Under the Front, only the two major parties
can legally participate in the elections. These par-
ties, however, are composed of various factions
that are in effect separate parties. For example,
the Conservative Party is divided into two major
factions, the Ospinistas (named after former presi-
dent Mariano Ospina Perez), and the Lauro-
Alzatistas (made up of the followers of ex-
president Laureano Gomez and Gilberto Alzate).
In addition, other parties such as the National
Popular Alliance and the Liberal Revolutionary
Movement of the People-MRL del Pueblo-(the
Communist Front) can run slates by calling them-
selves Conservatives or Liberals. It has always
been legally possible for a group that is opposed
to the concept of the National Front to win a
majority in a general election. Such an outcome
would call into question not only the particular
composition of the government, but also the fate
of programs formulated by both parties. As a
result, the main issue in past elections has cen-
tered on the continuation of the Front.
CHOOSING THE FRONT CANDIDATE
Until last summer, former ambassador to the
US Misael Pastrana was the favorite presidential
candidate of the two major parties and enjoyed
Special Report
the firm backing of most of the party leaders.
After he returned to Colombia in mid-September,
however, Pastrana's political image suffered from
a series of faux pas made by him and his backers.
For example, Pastrana's prestige dropped along
with that of President Lleras, his sponsor, when
Lleras misjudged the degree of public interest in
charges of influence-peddling made by dissident
Liberal Senator Vives against two key members of
the Lleras administration. Although the President
put his full prestige behind the two men, subse-
quent investigations forced both to resign.
Mariano Ospina, the leader of the majority
faction of the Conservative Party, also miscalcu-
lated. He concealed his preference for Pastrana in
hopes of holding a free convention that would
merge all factions and arouse interest in the selec-
tion of a candidate. But in the process, Ospina
allowed several men with regional strength to run
as favorite sons, fully expecting that they would
later rally to Pastrana at Ospina's request. Ospina,
however, lost control of the convention, which
was held in early November. Five minor candi-
dates formed a "syndicate" to stop Pastrana, and
on the first ballot, Atlantic Coast favorite
Evaristo Sourdis won more votes than Pastrana
but fewer than the required two-thirds majority.
In a second ballot Pastrana and Sourdis tied.
Conservative leaders were unable to compro-
mise, so both names were proposed to the Liberal
convention, which also had to approve the candi-
date. On 5 December the Liberals finally chose
Pastrana as the official candidate, but almost 100
of the 600 delegates to the convention walked
out in protest against this prearranged selection.
The dissidents threatened to organize a "popular"
convention to pick their own candidate, but this
convention has not yet materialized. Many of the
dissidents favored maverick Conservative Belisario
Betancur, who had been selected by his own
"popular" convention in late October.
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Pastrana has emerged as a rather unimpres-
sive candidate. He has been guilty of many serious
errors in his effort to win the support of party
leaders and of the general public, and he does not
have a regional base of political support. He has
never been elected to any office, and he looks
more like a middle-of-the-road bureaucrat than a
dynamic political leader. Many view him as a
"puppet" of the establishment.
At least three candidates other than Pastrana
will participate in the coming elections, all under
the Conservative Party label, as required. The
most formidable is ex-dictator General Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla, leader of the National Popular Alli-
ance (ANAPO), a rightist political grouping that
opposes the National Front system. The dema-
gogic ANAPO, which was formally organized in
1961, has participated in presidential and congres-
sional elections since 1962, aiming its appeal at
the middle and lower classes. Rojas' supporters
are mainly from certain sectors of the urban poor,
retired military personnel and government
employees, segments of the rural population, and
other groups that benefited from Rojas' presi-
dency from 1953 to 1957. More recently, Rojas
reportedly has picked up the support of various
political groups, including the Communists and
other leftists.
There are indications that dissident Senator
Vives and his followers are forming a new politi-
cal movement to support Rojas' presidential
ambitions.
Yves will be a valuable addition to
the Rojas camp and will draw voters who oppose
the government's Front candidate. Rojas has also
been told by some of his followers that he has the
almost unanimous support of retired non-
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commissioned officers-a not at all unlikely de-
velopment.
Evaristo Sourdis was not a real presidential
contender before the Conservative convention. He
does not have as much political support as the
convention vote would indicate because iiis
strength is based primarily on the anti-Pastrana
vote. Nevertheless, Sourdis can count on votes
from Atlantic Coast areas, and a group of over
100 Conservative leaders recently issued a declar-
ation of support for his candidacy. Most of them
are from the coastal departments and represent
the majority of the syndicate that supported him
during the abortive Conservative convention, but
he has picked up support in other areas as well.
Belisario Betancur could be Pastrana's most
dangerous opponent. His "popular" convention in
late October was an indication of mounting dis-
content within Conservative ranks, especially re-
garding the long domination of the party by the
Ospina family. He enjoys the support of the
Union of Colombian Workers, the country's
largest labor organization. This is significant in
itself because the democratic labor movement has
never before become involved in a presidential
election. Betancur also has the support of the
small Social Christian Democratic Party and its
youth group and of former President Valencia.
Although Betancur was not successful in his drive
to become the Front's official candidate, he has
accepted the platform for the next administration
agreed to by the leadership of both parties. Betan-
cur has run a much more professional campaign
than has the Front's standard-bearer, and he ap-
pears to have more genuine popular appeal. In his
campaign appearances, his charisma has gained
him widespread support from the middle classes
and the labor elements.
23 January 1970
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The political turmoil that surrounded the
selection of a presidential candidate is more than
just a protest against the National Front. It is
symptomatic of a political system that has been
led by a small number of wealthy, powerful men
for more than a generation. The observance of the
20th anniversary of the Bogotazo (when popular
Liberal leader Jorge Gaitan was killed, on 9 April
1948, and the bloody political violence began)
brought home to some the realization that most
of the names in the news on that infamous day
still dominate Colombian politics-Ospina, Lleras,
and others. New and fresh faces in the traditional
parties are a rarity, not because the "grand old
men" have won out against challenges, but be-
cause such challenges have rarely occurred. The
traditional parties have no mechanism for training
and pushing promising young leaders. This situa-
tion drains the parties of their vitality and reduces
their appeal to the young.
Electoral participation has decreased steadily
since the plebiscite in 1957, when the National
Front system was approved. In the congressional
elections of 1968, the most recent, only about 34
percent of the eligible voters exercised their right.
a
0
0
v
1957 1958 1958 1960
Liberal
. Plebiscite . Congressional
972401-70 vote vote
Special Report
Voter abstention is indicative of the apathy
exhibited by a majority of Colombians toward
the political process that keeps them from exer-
cising a free choice. Part of the explanation for
this apathy can be found in the narrow confines
in which political activity is conducted. The two
traditional parties historically have been elitist
and personalistic in character, and the loyalties of
the masses of ordinary Colombians who call
themselves Liberals or Conservatives have usually
been toward the parties regardless of specific poli-
cies.
There are indications already that leftist
extremist students are forming nationwide com-
mittees to encourage even more abstentionism in
protest of the "establishment." Another group
made up of dissident Roman Catholic priests
wants its followers to boycott the elections be-
cause it considers them a fraud perpetrated by the
country's ruling oligarchy in order to maintain
the status quo and to continue exploiting the
poor and oppressed.
On the other hand, because of the lively
competition, voter participation may increase.
The political infighting and the wide choice of
candidates make the election attractive to those
p 010 NO
lm IN,
?
,rte
F
-48.8 36.9? % 42.1
P
1962
Conservative
1964 1966 1966
Liberal
Presidential IF, K/
,,0
,pro, Registered OEM Actual
vote
23 January 1970
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that have complained in the past that the presi-
dent was preselected. Furthermore, both the
presidential and legislative elections will be held
on the same day, which has not been the case in
the past.
The small Colombian Communist Party is
already marshaling its supporters to vote, inas-
much as this is the first election in which other
than the two major parties could participate at
the municipal and departmental levels.
The circumstances surrounding the election
make it clear that a strong president will be of
paramount importance if the National Front is to
be kept intact until it must be disbanded in 1974.
Certain Conservative politicians believe that the
country is not ready to return to full democratic
processes and are urging that the Front be ex-
tended. Liberal Party leaders oppose such a sug-
gestion because their party is the largest in the
country and they stand to gain the most in open
elections.
The plethora of presidential aspirants may
well keep any one of them from receiving a large
popular mandate. Even more so than in the past
few years, however, the new president will be
Special Report
faced with a hostile or often noncooperative
congress and coalition because the losing candi-
dates will have large numbers of supporters in
elective legislative positions.
Only a strong president will be able to en-
sure Colombia's continued economic develop-
ment and political stability. Renewed political
activity by all parties at the municipal and depart-
mental levels in the April election will result in an
increase in anti-Front activity. Moreover, during
the next four years, elements of the Liberal and
Conservative parties will desert the Front and will
resume normal political activity, which could lead
to a renewal of politically inspired violence.
If the new president is unwilling or unable to
deal forcefully with such a development, there
may be mounting pressure within the military for
a take-over of the government. The military prob-
ably would rule until another arrangement such as
the Front could be established. In any event, it
appears that whoever emerges victorious will have
a difficult presidency. Should Pastrana win, he
would govern with the full support of the Na-
tional Front machinery, but even so, his presi-
dency probably would be the most difficult in the
Front's history.
7- 23 January 1970
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
IMMEDIATELY Af
Q u n
Secret
44
23 January 1970
No. 0354/70
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(Information as of noon EST, 22 January 1970)
VIETNAM
Communist forces in the South are being hampered by
the pacification program and will make further at-
tempts to undercut it. In Saigon, Senator Tran Van
Don continues his political maneuvering. Hanoi's
economic plan for 1970 has upped priorities for pro-
ducing consumer goods.
Page
COMMUNISTS IN LAOS PREPARE FOR NEW VENTURES
Chinese Communist road building may be pushed to the
Mekong River this dry season.
PEKING SMILES AS TALKS WITH US RESUME
Peking's positive approach to the Warsaw talks, which
reopened on 20 January, may reflect a desire to de-
velop the dialogue with Washington further.
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Europe
SPAIN AND USSR PREPARE FOR CLOSER RELATIONS
A recent meeting between a Soviet Foreign Ministry
official and the Spanish foreign minister enhances
the possibility that some form of relations will be
established between the two countries.
MOSCOW IS SENSITIVE ON STRATEGIC ARMS ISSUE
The Soviet press has treated the preliminary round
of strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) as a suc-
cess, but Moscow continues to be wary of possible
US missile developments.
NATO STUDIES FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE
A special working group is getting down to cases in
defining ways in which opposing military units of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be scaled down while
retaining a balance of forces.
FINNISH COMMUNISTS AGREE TO COMPROMISE
The liberal and conservative wings of the Finnish
Communist Party have reached an elaborate compromise
averting a final split in the party.
EASTERN EUROPE MUTES MILITARY SPENDING PLANS
The smaller increases in spending may be due in part
to the cyclical nature of expenditures for military
imports.
ROMANIA OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT
Premier Maurer has indicated cautious confidence in
Bucharest's ability to discharge its obligations to
the pact without compromising its independence.
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Middle East - Africa
NIGERIAN REOCCUPATION OF BIAFRA PROCEEDING
The federal government has encountered no serious
security problems in the former secessionist enclave,
but General Ojukwu has not yet given up the Biafran
cause.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
LATIN AMERICAN NAVIES MOVING TO ACQUIRE MODERN SHIPS 27
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru are well along in
their plans to obtain new ships for their navies.
These purchases may improve the rather limited capa-
bilities of the fleets involved, but they will not
do much to change the navies' respective strengths.
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COSTA RICAN ELECTIONS APPROACH
Jose Figueres appears to have the lead over fellow
ex-president Mario Echandi for the presidential elec-
tion on 1 February. The bitter campaign has led to
coup rumors, and there may be postelection violence.
CUBAN SUGAR HARVEST OFF SCHEDULE
Castro has admitted that the 1970 sugar harvest is
falling somewhat behind schedule. Workers will have
to intensify their efforts in order to prevent fur-
ther delays, which seem inevitable.
FRICTION CONTINUES BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND GUYANA
Guyanese nervousness about Venezuela's intentions in
deploying troops to the Guyana border, along with the
proximity of the armed forces of the two countries,
could result in border incidents.
COLOMBIA TO HOLD ITS LAST ELECTION UNDER THE NATIONAL FRONT
The general elections on 19 April are scheduled to
be the last under the National Front system, which
has brought political peace and economic development
to the country. The Front's presidential candidate,
Misael Pastrana, is already running into trouble;
with three other candidates participating, the out-
come is in doubt.
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The Chinese Communists exhibited an unusually positive approach to
the Sino-US talks that reopened this week in Warsaw by having their
diplomats and officials abroad show a warm and forthcoming attitude
toward their US counterparts. Chinese officials had emphasized prior to the
meeting in Warsaw on 20 January that Washington's commitments to the
Nationalist government on Taiwan would continue to be the central issue for
the Communists, but they left the impression that Peking does not intend to
use the Taiwan issue as an excuse to make the talks overly difficult at this
time. The Chinese probably judge that even hints of Sino-US accommoda-
tion will greatly alarm the Chinese Nationalists. Peking also would hope to
aggravate Soviet fears of a Sino-US rapprochement.
The pacification program in South Vietnam is seriously affecting the
efforts of some Communist forces to procure and transport foodstuffs and
supplies. Two recent Liberation Radio broadcasts urged Communist cadre to
take advantage of the Tet holidays to do missionary work among the people
in government-controlled areas and called for renewed attacks on the pacifi-
cation program. The tone of the broadcasts suggested that the Communists
believe they face an uphill fight to roll back pacification and recapture
people they once dominated.
North Vietnamese comments on Hanoi's economic plan for 1970 sug-
gest that efforts this year are to be focused on increasing the production of
food and consumer goods. Hanoi's intention apparently is to reduce both the
massive foreign inputs that have been necessary in the past few years and the
grumbling among its citizenry about the lack of significant improvement in
their circumstances since the bombing stopped in 1968. Reconstruction of
heavy industry has been assigned a secondary priority, reflecting in part
North Vietnamese fears that the US bombing might be resumed.
Chinese Communist road building in north Laos may be pushed to the
Mekong River this dry season. Communist survey teams have been observed
placing markers south of Muong Houn, and the Pathet Lao are quoted by
local villagers as saying the road will be completed to Pak Beng, which is just
north of the river, in 1970. On the military scene, government guerrillas have
been pushed out of important positions covering approaches to the Plaine
des Jarres in recent days, and the Communists now have a nearly unimpeded
route for bringing men and supplies to the southeastern edge of the
Plaine.
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VIETNAM
Communist forces in the South
apparently will direct much of
their effort during their spring
campaign toward trying to undercut
Saigon's pacification program. The
direction taken by enemy activity
that is expected to heighten around
the Tet holidays (6-8 February)
will provide some measure of the
enemy's concern on this matter.
Continuing references to the
disruptive effects of pacification
on enemy attempts to procure and
transport foodstuffs and supplies
have cropped u 7
\ supply elements
from the North Vietnamese 18th Reg-
iment were particularly concerned
about moving rice from the coastal
lowlands through pacified areas to
Communist base camps in the moun-
tains
the west.
the goal of scheduled offensive
operations is to secure food
sources along the coast in the
northern provinces, which have re-
cently been denied to the Commu-
nists by the pacification program.
Two Liberation Radio broad-
casts late last week tend to but-
tress the claims of officials in
Saigon
/hat the recent advances
made in pacification are curtail-
ing the enemy's ability to operate
in more and more areas. The radio
commentaries, which stressed the
need to restore Viet Cong access
to the people in rural areas, in-
Page 2
cluded some very defensive passages.
They urged Communist cadre to take
advantage of the Tet holidays to do
missionary work among the people in
government-controlled areas and
called for renewed attacks on the
pacification program. The tone
of the broadcasts suggests that
the Communists believe they face
an uphill fight to roll back paci-
fication and recapture people they
once dominated.
Most Communist exhortations
catalog various weaknesses and
problems that the cadres are ex-
pected to redress in order to im- 25X1
prove their performance, but such
propaganda sermons do not usually
admit that Saigon has been doing
an effective job. One of the re-
cent broadcasts, however, acknowl-
edged the destruction of some of
the enemy's infrastructure and revo-
lutionary organizations. Pacifica-
tion, according to the broadcast, 25X1
has "nibbled away at liberated areas,
actively built up the puppet admin-
istration in rural areas," and ex-
tended the scope of Saigon's author-
ity over "sources of manpower and
material supply." The other refer-
ent broadcast, by using such terms
as "regain" and "protect," strongly
suggested that the Communists ac-
knowledge that their need is to re-
coup losses rather than merely to
increase their holdings.
Although these recent broad-
casts indicate the enemy's con-
tinuing desire to mount some kind
of military challenge to the paci-
fication program, equally strong
propaganda attention was paid to
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pacification last fall without any
military follow-up.
Political Manuevering in
South Vietnam
Senator Tran Van Don has ac-
celerated his efforts to organize
and lead a political opposition.
At the same time, he has felt con-
strained to defend himself from
thinly veiled charges by President
Thieu that he and his associates
are not true nationalists but
neutralists whose actions and
programs play into the enemy's
hands.
On 16 January, Don announced
the formation of the "People's
Bloc" in the National Assembly.
He probably hopes that it can serve
as the basis of a broad political
organization to support his own
political ambitions. Don must run
for re-election to the Upper House
later this year, and he is prob-
ably also looking forward to the
1971 presidential election. This
is suggested by his recent efforts
to gain the support of other oppo-
sition figures for the creation of
an antiregime coalition.
Don has been careful to spell
out that the new assembly bloc is
strongly anti-Communist, that it
would never consider a coalition
government as a means to end the
war, and that South Vietnam should
not disengage itself from the free
world. He has reiterated, however,
that South Vietnam's relations with
the West must be on the basis of
equality. These remarks were made
in rebuttal to several recent
speeches by Thieu castigating
political opportunists in the
country. The President charged
that politicians and organizations
that play on the theme of neutral-
ity or advocate a "third force"
were helping the Communist cause,
and he demanded that good nation-
alists "exterminate" all such move-
ments.
Meanwhile, Don's present po-
litical organization, the National
Salvation Front, has charged that
the government, on Thieu's orders,
is preventing it from registering
as a legal political party. The
Interior Ministry is reportedly
holding the organization's appli-
cation until further information
regarding the front's membership
is provided. The front insists
that such information is not re-
quired by the political parties
law. The chairman of the Upper
House Judiciary Committee has
promised to look into the matter,
and a public airing of this dis-
pute could prove embarrassing to
the government and could generate
sympathy for Don's opposition
stance.
In another political develop-
ment, labor leader Tran Quoc Buu
has formally withdrawn his Farmer-
Worker Association from the Lien
Minh front in anticipation of
transforming the association into
a political party. Buu's new
party may join the progovernment
National Social Democratic Front
if Buu can negotiate a satis-
factory arrangement with Presi-
dent Thieu. Buu has generally
been progovernment, and there is
little chance he would join an
opposition movement, especially
if he could not control it.
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North Vietnamese Economic
Planning
Hanoi's economic plan for
1970 gives increased emphasis to
the production of food and consumer
goods as the main task in the com-
ing year. Although few details
are available, this is the thrust
of two speeches in early January
by North Vietnam's vice premier
and leading foreign aid negotia-
tor. The war received a large
play in these speeches, but it
was not emphasized as the coun-
try's main task as it had been
in the past few years. The re-
pair and expansion of the vital
supply lines to the South were
also soft pedaled, reflecting im-
provements already made in this
sector in 1969.
Efforts in 1970 are to be
focused on increasing the coun-
try's ability to feed, clothe,
and house its people without so
much reliance on the massive for-
eign inputs that have been neces-
sary in the past few years. Such
emphasis is possible now that re-
pair of bomb damage to the major
lines of communication has been
essentially completed. This em-
phasis also reflects an awareness
by the leadership that more must
be done to improve the living con-
ditions of North Vietnam's hard-
pressed citizenry. Whereas the
North Vietnamese people seemed to
endure privation, inconvenience,
and hardship with some equanimity
in the bombing years, there is in-
creasing evidence that they are
grumbling about the lack of sig-
nificant improvement in their cir-
cumstances since the bombing
stopped in 1968.
The Communist leadership ap-
parently is not ready to launch an
across-the-board recovery plan. Re-
construction efforts in heavy in-
dustry, a target of the US bombing
program, have been assigned a sec-
ondary priority. Delay in start-
ing reconstruction in this area
probably reflects North Vietnam-
ese fears that the US bombing pro-
gram might be resumed.
Hanoi's greater attention to
domestic needs also has leadership
implications. The matter of pri-
orities for the war in the South
versus priorities for domestic
programs in the North has long
been debated within the North Viet-
namese politburo. In the early
1960s these two objectives were
officially given equal weight, but
with the US bombing and interven-
tion in South Vietnam, the balance
shifted heavily toward the war.
Once the bombing stopped, some
North Vietnamese began to speak
out for restoring the balance by
putting more effort into correct-
ing internal problems and deficien-
cies. Politburo member Truong
Chinh is the most prominent figure
identified with this view, and
any hint that his views have be-
come policy in the post-Ho period
would strengthen the impression
that he is the single most power-
ful leader in Hanoi today.F___1
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Northern Laos: Current Situation
Muong 1 b
Houn
Pak z ~yc~
Bong 17a~
Communist survey tea
,-"yti, _ observed iorea
THAILAND
ng
Xier g o
Khgyt
y y le
P , o~tjpps_iast ,
in Ny an Va ey
ntiani,
THAILAND
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Communist controlled
territory
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COMMUNISTS IN LAOS PREPARE FOR NEW VENTURES
Chinese Com-
munist road construction will be
pushed beyond Muong Houn this
dry season. A government patrol
operating in the Nam Beng Valley
in early January observed a Com-
munist survey team placing mark-
ers some 17 miles south of Muong
Houn, and local villagers claim
that the Pathet Lao have stated
that the road-will be completed
to Pak Beng some time in 1970.
some vil-
lagers from the Muong Houn area
are being rounded up by Pathet
Page 7
Lao authorities and sent to Mu-
ong Sai for construction train-
ing. There was earlier evidence
that the Chinese used local vil-
lagers and North Vietnamese in
their road building southwest of
Muong Sai.
On the military front, gov-
ernment guerrillas have been
pushed out of blocking positions
near the Nam San Valley in re-
cent days, allowing the Commu-
nists nearly unimpeded movement
of men and supplies toward the 25X1
southeastern edge of the Plaine
des Jarres.
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PEKING SMILES AS TALKS WITH US RESUME
The 135th session of the War-
saw talks held on 20 January was
preceded by an obvious effort by
Chinese diplomats and officials
abroad to show a warmer attitude
toward the US. This unusually
positive approach by the Chinese,
while not necessarily promising
sudden or important progress in
the talks, clearly reflects Pe-
king's desire to continue and
perhaps further develop the dia-
logue with Washington.
mean--
while, Chinese military attache''s
at receptions in Paris and Warsaw
last week greeted and shook hands
with their US counterparts--the
first such friendly encounters
ever to take place between these
officials.
Page 10
Despite such atmospherics,
the Chinese are certainly not pre-
pared to retreat from their basic
position that Taiwan is an in-
alienable part of China. Never-
theless, by striking an understand-
ing posture the Chinese may hope
to encourage some US flexibility
over this key issue. At any rate,
the Communists probably judge that
even hints of Sino-US accommoda-
tion will greatly alarm the Chi-
nese Nationalist regime and sow
discord between Taipei and Wash-
ington. Indeed, the resumption
of the talks in Warsaw has already
raised hackles on Taiwan; this
week a prominent Taipei newspaper
that reflects government views
branded the talks as an "adven-
ture in American opportunism."
Peking's forthcoming approach
also is prompted in large part by
its desire to aggravate Soviet
fears of a Sino-US rapprochement
and to increase China's interna-
tional leverage in its dispute
with Moscow.
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Some curious editorials and articles have recently been appearing in
Pravda and Izvestia on abstract problems of leadership and decision-making.
No one article does more than hint ambiguously at difficulties in these areas
and each could be read as referring solely to local leaders. Cumulatively,
they are beginning to suggest increased tension and politicking among the
top leaders. With the exception of Premier Kosygin, most of them have been
out of sight for several weeks.
25X6
Tito is preparing to leave this weekend for a month's tour of nonaligned
states in Africa, seeking to establish a counterweight to the USSR and the
US. Prior to departing, he consulted with Romanian Premier Maurer on using
the concept of European security as a means of lessening Soviet pressures on
their respective states. He also sent his foreign minister to Hungary as part of
the effort to re-establish the close ties that were frayed by the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The Council of the European Communities this week reopened debate
on some of the basic problems of community financing, supposedly resolved
last month. The French have reconsidered their previous agreement to
increase budgetary powers for the European Parliament and want to keep
budgetary control firmly in the council's hands.
High on the agenda of the UN General Assembly's outer space commit-
tee, which met this week, is an attempt to complete the space liability
convention on rules for compensating damages resulting from space-related
accidents. Other key topics will be the US proposal for international co-
operation to perfect techniques for surveying earth resources, and a study of
the feasibility of internationally controlled satellites broadcasting directly to
individual nations.
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SPAIN AND USSR PREPARE FOR CLOSER RELATIONS
Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez
Bravo's meeting at the Moscow air-
port last month with Soviet For-
eign Ministry division chief Kova-
lev may well enhance the possibil-
ity that some type of subdiplo-
matic relations will be established
between the two countries. A basic
shift in Spain's foreign policy
orientation is unlikely, however.
Although the Spanish Foreign
Ministry insists that the meeting
on 26 December was not prearranged,
many Spanish and other observers
are skeptical. Moscow had been
advised that Lopez Bravo was on
an SAS flight over the Soviet Un-
ion to attend the Philippine presi-
dential inauguration. The plane,
expected to refuel at Tashkent,
came down at Moscow, and the meet-
ing took place during the three-
hour stopover. Madrid says the
diversion was due to the weather,
but the SAS manager in Moscow at-
tributes it to "unspecified rea-
sons."
Spanish sources have taken
divergent attitudes toward the
meeting. An officially inspired
story in Pueblo said the USSR had
asked for an exchange of high
diplomatic functionaries. The
press also gave great play to the
favorable publicity accorded the
stopover in the foreign press and
quoted predictions of diplomatic
relations in the near future.
The Madrid government may be-
lieve that building up the trip's
importance will help Spain in com-
ing negotiations with the US by
dangling the possibility of a for-
eign policy realignment. The cov-
erage may also be linked to Ma-
drid's effort to make Spain seem
more acceptable throughout Europe,
thereby improving its chances for
an agreement with the European
Communities.
On the other hand, the US
Embassy in Madrid reports that
the Spanish Foreign Ministry
seemed to minimize the signifi-
cance of the visit, possibly to
soften the impact on old-guard
military officers and in Falange
political circles.
For over a year, Soviet and
Spanish officials have had dis-
creet contacts to discuss marine
and fishery agreements and the
exchange of press offices. Dur-
ing 1969, they concluded an agree-
ment making port facilities of
each country available to merchant
vessels of the other. Spain's
further contacts with Moscow will
probably follow along the lines
Madrid has used in improving re-
lations with three other East
European countries. First, "non-
official" interbank payment ar-
rangements to cover trade transac-
tions were concluded; next, cul-
tural contacts were encouraged;
and then formal commercial and
consular relations were estab-
lished and diplomatic status was
accorded the head of the consular
mission. Full diplomatic rela-
tions with these countries are
still under consideration.
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MOSCOW IS SENSITIVE ON STRATEGIC ARMS ISSUE
The Soviet press has described
the preliminary round of strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT) as a
success. Moscow continues to be
wary, however, of a possible US
commitment to an expanded ABM de-
fense, and of US progress in devel-
oping a multiple independently tar-
geted re-entry vehicle (MIRV). At
the same time, the USSR may be
building a case to use against the
US should the talks fail or become
hopelessly bogged down. At the
very least, it is playing to the
galleries with the expectation that
the US will adopt a more forthcom-
ing attitude when the talks resume.
Recent Soviet news commentary
suggests that the USSR is becoming
increasingly sensitive to US politi-
cal trends on the ABM issue. The
military newspaper Red Star re-
sponded to Defense Secretary Laird's
remarks on 7 January regarding the
possible expansion of the Safeguard
system by citing the New York Times
warning that this could exert a
"negative influence" on the forth-
coming SALT round in Vienna and
might prove "excessively provoca-
tive" to the USSR. Pravda and
Izvestia have also criticized the
Secretary's statements as evidence
that the US military-industrial
complex is firmly against any meas-
ures aimed at curbing the arms
race, but they failed to echo Red
Star's explicit warning. The So-
viet Foreign Ministry press chief
implied on 13 January that Laird
was trying to "create obstacles"
for the talks.
There has been far less public
comment on MIRV, but the Soviets
diligently report US domestic op-
position to the development of mul-
tiple re-entry vehicles. TASS noted
on 9 January that MIRV testing could
create a "serious obstacle" for fur-
ther talks. More recently TASS re-
ferred to a MIRV moratorium as the
"single most important issue" con-
fronting the American people after
the war in Vietnam.
The Soviet press has long
charged that certain US circles fa-
vor ABM and MIRV systems in order
to maintain military "supremacy"
over the USSR. The current arti-
cles imply that ABM and MIRV are the
two US programs causing Soviet dis-
armament experts the most difficulty
at this time. The USSR has long
maintained that acknowledgment of
its strategic equality with the US
is a prime requisite for success in
the talks, and it certainly wants
to deter the US from deploying weap-
ons systems that would appear to
suggest a measure of technological
superiority.
During the last three years,
the Soviet regime has appeared to
be of more than one mind with re-
gard to SALT. Some recent Soviet
commentaries have discussed opposi-
tion to arms control in a manner
that appears to be obliquely criti-
cal of Moscow's own military indus-
trial complex in the context of dis-
armament problems. The military
press, on the other hand, continues
to deny the existence of such a So-
viet interest group. Thus, the de-
bate in Moscow over SALT apparently
continues, although somewhat muted.
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NATO STUDIES FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE
A special NATO working group
convened on 22 January to renew
the Allied effort to develop a
negotiating position on possible
force reductions by members of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. By 20
April the group will attempt to
produce illustrations on ways in
which opposing military units
might be scaled down to reduce
the risks and costs of the pres-
ent confrontation and still main-
tain a balance of forces.
The working group's assign-
ment is the result of decisions
made at last month's meeting of
the NATO foreign ministers in
Brussels and looks forward to the
next ministerial meeting to be
held this May in Italy. It rep-
resents an intensification of the
Allied preparations, begun in
June 1968, for eventual East-
West talks on this subject. So
far the Soviet Union has not in-
dicated its readiness to partici-
pate in such negotiations.
Last week the senior politi-
cal advisers of the North Atlantic
Council provided the predominantly
military working group with fresh
guidelines for developing illus-
trations of the probable course
of events if NATO were to choose
one of two approaches as the
basis for entering into an agree-
ment with the pact on force re-
ductions. The first approach as-
sumes that the withdrawal of mil-
itary units on one side would be
effected in direct proportion to
the reduction of the same sorts
of units on the other side. The
second approach acknowledges that
variations in the structure and
capabilities of opposing forces
makes directly proportional with-
drawals impractical, but assumes
that mutual and' undiminished se-
curity can be achieved by non-
equivalent reductions.
Under the first approach the
working group has been instructed
to examine two possibilities--
a 10-percent reduction of ground
forces on both sides, and a 30
percent reduction of ground and
associated air forces. The with-
drawals would apply to both in-
digenous and foreign units sta-
tioned in West Germany, Belgium,
and the Netherlands, as well as
in East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia.
The political advisers were
less explicit in their instruc-
tions regarding the second ap-
proach, reflecting its complexity
and the doubts of some of the
Allies that the East would accept
this concept. This skepticism
arises from the assumption that
under this approach the Commu-
nist countries would have to
withdraw a greater number of
forces than would NATO. Never-
theless, the group was asked to
consider a range of Allied reduc-
tions in central Europe in ex-
cess of 10 percent and the cor-
responding but unequal withdrawals
that might be expected of the
Warsaw Pact.
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FINNISH COMMUNISTS
After nine months of difficult
negotiations under heavy Soviet
pressure, the liberal and conserva-
tive wings of the Finnish Communist
Party (FCP) have reached an elabor-
ate compromise, thus averting a
final split in the party. In view
of unresolved differences between
the factions, however, the agree-
ment may prove to be short-lived.
The dispute between the wings
broke out dramatically at the
party's congress last April when
conservative delegates stalked out
in protest against the liberal
makeup of the new central commit-
tee. The conservatives then flouted
party discipline by setting up a
network of organizations parallel-
ing those of the FCP and by issuing
a newspaper of their own. Much of
the conservatives' invective was
aimed at the compromises on social
and economic policy laboriously ar-
rived at by the FCP leadership with
the other political parties in the
center-left government coalition.
The FCP leadership was also berated
for its refusal to back down from
its condemnation of the Soviet in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia and for
"revisionist" deviations from the
principles of Marxism-Leninism.
The liberal leadership at first
refused to deal with the conserva-
tive dissidents. After repeated
admonitions from Moscow, however,
the liberals submitted a series of
proposals to end the dispute. The
conservatives rejected each pro-
posal in turn until Moscow advised
them recently that it could no
AGREE TO COMPROMISE
longer tolerate their continued in-
transigence. Negotiations then
were quickly concluded. Under the
terms of the compromise, the con-
servatives will receive minority
representation on an enlarged party
central committee and politburo,
and will be awarded a specially
created vice chairmanship. They
will also be allowed to continue
publishing their newspaper. They
will be obliged, however, to dis-
solve their network of parallel or-
ganizations, accept the continu-
ance in office of the elected lib-
eral leaders, and support FCP par-
ticipation in the center-left gov-
ernment.
Despite protestations by lead-
ers of the two wings that a small
step has been taken toward achiev-
ing party unity, it is generally
acknowledged that the compromise is
only a tactical device designed to
facilitate the FCP's efforts in the
March parliamentary elections. The
conservatives anticipate eventual
liberal retaliation for their op-
position activity, regardless of
the extent to which they partici-
pate in the election campaign. On
the other hand, the liberals fear
that the conservatives will at-
tempt to use their newly won party
offices to radicalize party poli-
cies, thus damaging the party's
chances for staying in the govern-
ment following the elections. Once
the elections are out of the way,
it seems likely that the fundamental
differences between the two groups
will again emerge to threaten party
unity.
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East European Warsaw Pact coun-
tries apparently are following the
Soviet Union's lead by announcing
more modest increases in their mili-
tary budgets for 1970 than was the
case last year. The increases,
which range from 6 to 12 percent,
are proportionately larger than the
one-percent increase announced by
the USSR, however. Yugoslavia, not
a member of the Warsaw Pact, plans
an increase of 14 percent, slightly
larger than last year's. The mili-
tary budgets in all these countries
account for approximately the same
percentage of total budgets as in
1969.
Although smaller than those in
1968, the increases in military
spending indicate that the Warsaw
Pact governments intend to continue
with plans to modernize and upgrade
their military arsenals. The
smaller increases may be due partly
to the cyclical nature of expendi-
tures for imports of military equip-
ment. That is, the introduction of
new models occurs over a span of
some years, with purchases, deliv-
EASTERN EUROPE MUTES MILITARY SPENDING PLANS
1969 Planned 1970 Planned 1969 Percentage
Budgeted Military Expenditures (in local currency)
eries, and payments for military
hardware spread unevenly, rather
than at a constant rate. Expendi-
tures, therefore, would rise sub-
stantially in some years and rela-
tively little in others. Moreover,
these governments may be heeding So-
viet advice to play down defense
spending in view of the ongoing SALT
talks.
Stated military budgets are be-
lieved to indicate the general trend
of defense expenditures in Eastern
Europe, although they are not com-
prehensive statements of all mili-
tary-related expenditures. The ma-
jor categories included in the overt
defense budgets are outlays to pay
military personnel, to procure equip-
ment and supplies, and to cover main-
tenance costs for equipment and
buildings. Expenditures for mili-
tary research and development, which
are not a major component of mili-
tary spending in Eastern Europe,
probably are hidden elsewhere in the
budget.
Military Expenditures as
1970 Percentage Percentage of Total Budget
*This percentage is much higher for Yugoslavia expenditures, and does not include investment
because Belgrade's federal budget actually accounts expenditures
for little more than half of total government
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Real increases in military
spending are a result of increased
costs for more sophisticated equip-
ment and the higher expenses associ-
ated with operating and maintaining
more advanced equipment. Some of
the East European countries also
have granted pay raises to their
military personnel. Moreover, in
the past few years, the USSR has in-
creased its pressure on Warsaw Pact
members to contribute more heavily
to pact operations.
For the second consecutive
year, Hungary and Romania have
planned the largest proportional in-
creases in defense spending among
the Warsaw Pact countries. Hungary,
whose forces have not been among the
most highly mechanized in Eastern
Europe, may be attempting to improve
its military position. Romania
probably is continuing with its ef-
forts to develop a larger indigenous
military equipment manufacturing in-
dustry and is procuring more sophis-
ticated equipment from the USSR.
ROMANIA OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT
Premier Maurer has attempted
to put Romania's relationship with
the pact into perspective and to
head off undue speculation in Wash-
ington. In a recent conversation
with US Ambassador Meeker, Maurer
said that Romania's participation
or nonparticipation in pact maneu-
vers should not be misread or exag-
gerated. He added that Bucharest's
allies have shown considerable
understanding for Romania's reser-
vations on such maneuvers. The
premier's remarks stand in sharp
contrast with the gloomy picture
Romanian officials painted a year
ago, when they feared Warsaw Pact
intervention.
Bucharest still has not re-
solved the problem of discharging
its obligations to the pact with-
out compromising its carefully
nurtured independence. It last
hosted maneuvers in 1962 and most
recently has limited its partici-
pation to token forces and observ-
ers. Although Maurer avoided say-
ing that pact maneuvers would be
held in Romania this year, he did
not deny the possibility and even
advanced a rationale for them,
should they occur. He reaffirmed
his country's opposition to such
maneuvers, but added that forces
in the pact and in NATO are work-
ing to strengthen their respective
blocs. Romania, he contended "is
actually working in the other di-
rection, but its geopolitical po-
sition necessitates taking a real-
istic course." Maurer was quick to
add that should Romania host maneu-
vers, they would be limited and
carefully controlled to ensure the
prompt departure of all foreign
troops.
In early December, General
Constantine Popa, the deputy chief
of staff, indicated that the sub-
ject of maneuvers in Romania was
under discussion.
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Bucharest might accept maneuvers
involving a limited number of for-
eign troops. Like Maurer, Popa
stressed that this possibility
should not arouse alarm.
Maurer explicitly stated that
Romania's vital interests are at
stake in moves toward European
detente that might result from any
Soviet-US talks. The Ceausescu re-
gime is haunted by the fear that
such talks could result in de facto
recognition of the Brezhnev doctrine
that a solely Soviet sphere of in-
fluence exists in Eastern Europe,
thus giving Moscow a free hand to
deal with Romania. In the com-
munique' following Maurer's visit of
12-16 January to Yugoslavia, the
Balkans' two maverick Communist
states strongly appealed for a Eu-
ropean detente based on respect for
the sovereignty and inte rit of
all states.
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Israel is continuing its campaign to cause domestic trouble for Egypt's
Nasir by striking military targets in the Nile Delta area, lately hitting only
nine miles from Cairo. In addition, it is making almost daily air strikes
against Egyptian positions along the Suez Canal and the Red Sea coast. In a
somewhat different fillip on the 22nd, Israeli forces attacked and occupied
an Egyptian island in the Gulf of Suez.
On its border with Jordan, Tel Aviv again displayed sensitivity about its
potash plant at the southern end of the Dead Sea. In response to two rocket
attacks by fedayeen over the past weekend, the Israelis launched a mech-
anized/armored force on a 20-hour "combing" operation inside Jordan. The
number of casualties is not known, but Amman reports that, in addition to
fedayeen, both Jordanian and Saudi regulars were engaged.
Meanwhile, Jordan's foreign minister has been holding discussions with
Egyptian leaders in Cairo, presumably as a preliminary to King Husayn's
scheduled arrival on 5 February. Arab leaders of the so-called "confronta-
tion" states plan to hold a "little summit" in Cairo following the Husayn-
Nasir talks, probably to consider defense matters and, perhaps, recent US
proposals for peace.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, Libya's ruling military junta tightened its
control of the government by naming its leader, Colonel Qaddafi, as prime
minister and defense minister, and by appointing four more of its members
to the cabinet. In Iraq, an abortive coup on 20 January has resulted in a
number of summary executions and has put a further strain on Iraqi-Iranian
relations. Baghdad accuses Tehran of complicity in the affair, and each
country has expelled the other's ambassador.
The Nigerian Government has encountered no serious security problems
in its occupation of Biafra and is continuing to express a conciliatory
attitude toward the conquered secessionists. The food relief distribution
system has been disrupted by the federal occupation, but official reporting
does not indicate that civilian refugees are being mistreated on any signifi-
cant scale.
In East Pakistan, a clash at a mass political rally on 18 January resulted
in at least two deaths and hundreds of injuries. Further disorders subse-
quently occurred as students and leftists in Dacca sponsored a week of
meetings, demonstrations, and general strikes in memory of last ea's
successful agitation against the unpopular regime of Ayub Khan.
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SECRET
Aircraft storage, l
7 Jan ?
97328 1.70 l~ -
HUCKSTEP
Military base,
18 Jan
A, Ce;r?
o
SECRET
TEL ELKE9IR
Commando and logistics base,
land 13 Jan
1staeli commandos cut
power and electric lines
along Suer-Cairo road,
17 Jan
Israeli Airstrikes in the Cairo Area
7-18 January
Major road
4 Airfield
_5_
Miles
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ISRAEL STEPS UP THE ACTION
This week Israeli bombs fell
closer to Cairo than ever before.
Tel Aviv thus apparently hopes both
to hamper the Egyptian military ef-
fort and to injure Nasir's position
as leader.
On four separate occasions
since 7 January, the Israelis have
hit at Egyptian military installa-
tions in the Nile Delta area, com-
ing as close as nine miles to
Cairo. The targets included mili-
tary bases as well as storage
areas for weapons and ammunition.
While maintaining their almost
daily air strikes against Egyptian
positions on the Suez Canal and
along the Red Sea coast, the Is-
raelis also struck to within 36
miles of Cairo along the main
Suez-Cairo highway, cutting power
and telephone lines, and hitting
other targets.
Military factors are only
part of the motivation behind the
new Israeli tactic. Politically,
the most important objective is
almost certainly to create domestic
Page 2 3
turmoil that Tel Aviv hopes will
bring about Nasir's downfall. For-
eign Minister Abba Eban, usually a
very careful diplomat, admitted pub-
licly last week that he thought the
chances for peace would be 50 per-
cent better "with Nasir gone." And
Prime Minister Golda Meir recently
told an Israeli interviewer that
she "would not shed a tear" if the
Egyptian people changed the regime
in Cairo.
The Egyptian reaction is not
yet clear. Apparently, many Egyp-
tians have already braced themselves
for a protracted struggle, and thus
stoically accept the occasional
blows they must suffer. This has
been the theme of official govern-
ment pronouncements, which contin-
ually exhort the populace to re-
main steadfast in the face of Is-
raeli provocations.
Raids near Cairo, but outside
the city proper, will probably not
elicit any dramatic Egyptian re-
sponse. Cairo knows its forces
are still militarily inferior, and
it has been reluctant to risk the
large loses inherent in spectacu-
lar military actions. Nasir may
well be satisfied to continue har-
assing Israeli forces in the Sinai,
though possibly increasing the rate
somewhat. Internal pressures stim-
ulated by the Israeli raids, how-
ever, could eventually force him
to make some out-of-the-ordinary
military response. In the mean-
time, the Egyptians will take what
solace they can from their occa-
sional small successes, and Cairo
will continue to play up the real
or imagined losses inflicted on
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NIGERIAN REOCCUPATION OF BIAFRA PROCEEDING
The federal government has
encountered no serious security
problems in the former enclave,
and has continued its concilia-
tory attitude toward the conquered
secessionists. General Ojukwu,
meanwhile, evidently has not
given up the Biafran cause.
There is still no good infor-
mation on what has happened to the
approximately 40,000 secessionist
soldiers. It seems likely, how-
ever, that most have gone into the
bush or have shed their uniforms
and joined the refugees. Any
groups of soldiers with access to
arms caches could continue to pre-
sent a security problem to the
federal forces for some time.
Large numbers of civilians
have returned to towns controlled
by federal troops and many others
have been seen moving freely along
the roads. Official reporting
does not support allegations that
these civilians have been mis-
treated on any significant scale,
although some incidents of rape
and looting have occurred. The
physical condition of the civil-
ians varies from relatively good in
the northern sector to poor in some
parts of the south. The food re-
lief distribution system in the
south has been disrupted by the
federal occupation, and the actions
of some undisciplined federal troops
have made relief transport difficult,
if not impossible, in some areas.
General Effiong, the former
Biafran chief of staff who sur-
rendered in Lagos last week, has
now returned and is working to
reassure the secessionists of
their safety. Effiong and the
civilian leaders who accompanied
him to Lagos are cooperating with
Ibo officials who had been ap-
pointed earlier by the federal
government in putting together
a civilian administration for the
area.
Last week, General Ojukwu
issued a statement claiming Bia-
fra would survive and calling for
an international force to prevent
"genocide." He probably is try-
ing to keep alive the concept of
Biafra as well as to retain some
organizational framework in the
hope that the federal occupation
will go badly.
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Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
High-ranking officials from all Latin American nations will convene in
Caracas early next week for a meeting of the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council's Special Committee. The delegates will be discussing trade,
aid, commerce, and US policy toward Latin America, and a ministerial-level
meeting may follow.
Efforts to normalize relations between El Salvador and Honduras are
continuing. Bilateral talks between the two feuding states are to begin on 26
January in San Jose, Costa Rica. The negotiators are expected to discuss the
border and immigration problems as well as restoration of trade and
diplomatic relations, but an early settlement seems unlikely. Very limited
progress has been made in related Central American Common Market nego-
tiations. The economics ministers' meeting on 9 January was unproductive,
and another meeting is scheduled to begin on 12 February.
Frustration over continuing Communist terrorism in Guatemala City is
causing dissension among government officials, and military unity seems to
be coming under increasing strain. President Mendez has removed Minister of
Government Sosa and has made some military command changes because of
the officers' suspected disloyalty. The continuing shifts of military posts 25X1
may add to the general discontent within the armed forces.
Security police in Paraguay have arrested a number of persons sus-
pected of plotting against the Stroessner government. Most of those arrested
are members of the Colorado Popular Movement, a non-Communist dissident
group. Without the support of the military officers in command positions,
there would be little prospect of unseating the President, but the government
is taking no chances.
In the Dominican Republic, President Balaguer's purges in the gov-
erning Reformist Party have resulted in a formal party split. Santo
Domingo's Mayor Lluberes, who was recently suspended from the Reformist
Party for one year, has led his followers into a newly recognized party that
will support Vice President Lora in the presidential election scheduled for
May. Other dissidents probably will follow Lluberes, but Balaguer apparently
believes it is an acceptable political cost for making the organization com-
pletely responsive to his wishes.
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SECRET
LATIN NAVIES BUYING NEW SHIPS
Argentine carrier "25th of May"
British Oberon-class submarine
British Leander-class destroyer
British Daring-class destroyer
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SECRET
LATIN AMERICAN NAVIES MOVING TO ACQUIRE MODERN SHIPS
Four major Latin American
countries are well along in their
plans to acquire new ships for
their navies. Although these pur-
chases may improve the rather lim-
ited capabilities of the fleets in-
volved, they will not do much to
change the navies' respective
strengths.
All major combat ships in the
naval inventories of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Peru are of US
or British manufacture, and most
were built during or shortly before
World War II. The navies are ori-
ented toward national defense and
antisubmarine warfare, but their
major operational efforts in recent
years have been devoted to partici-
pation in exercises with other na-
vies and to maintaining a close pa-
trol of foreign fishing fleets.
Joint exercises, especially those
that include the US, have made the
shortcomings of the Latin American
warships obvious, and each of the
navies has pressed for newer and
more modern equipment.
The most ambitious program is
that of Argentina. In 1968, Buenos
Aires purchased an aircraft carrier
from the Netherlands to complement
its existing carrier. The new car-
rier, the "25th of May," has been
modernized to include a steam cata-
pult and a canted deck, and Argen-
tina is now interested in equipping
it with A4B aircraft from the US.
Both Argentine carriers and Brazil's
carrier are sister ships of British
manufacture dating from World War
II.
In addition, Argentina has con-
tracted for two West German subma-
rines, which will be assembled with
German help at Argentina's Rio San-
tiago naval base. The government
will probably purchase one or two
type 42 British destroyers, a new
design that Britain has yet to put
into operation.
Brazil is also involved in an
ambitious program to improve its
antisubmarine warfare capability.
The Brazilians are interested in
buying at least five new destroyers,
possibly the Koln class from West
Germany, and have already contracted
for two Oberon-class British subma-
rines. Brazil had originally tried
to arrange a deal with the US for
five additional US Bronstein-class
destroyers, some of which would
have been built in Brazilian ship-
yards. The Brazilians apparently
now have changed their minds.
Both Chile and Peru are also
buying from the British. Chile will
get two Leander-class destroyers and
two Oberon submarines. In 1972,
Peru will buy two older (and cheaper)
Daring-class destroyers as well as
two Oberons, all for 1972 delivery.
Each of these countries watches
its neighbors closely, and often
uses the rationale that it must buy
new equipment to keep pace with the
others, especially if there is a tra-
ditional hostility between them (for
example, Chile fears Argentina, and
Peru is wary of Chile). Neverthe-
less, the upgrading of the navies,
like the series of aircraft pur-
chases over the last two years, has
not changed the relative strengths
of the fleets. The new ships, like
the new airplanes, will replace ob-
solete craft that can no longer be
maintained efficiently.
SECRET
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SECRET
COSTA RICAN ELECTIONS APPROACH
The presidential election
on 1 February will pit two ex-
presidents against each other.
At the moment, Jose "Pepe" Fi-
gueres of the National Liberation
Party (PLN) appears to have the
lead over Mario Echandi of the
governing National Unification
(UN). The array of minor parties
in the contest, however, may deny
either of the major candidates
the required 40 percent plurality
and seems almost certain to cost
the PLN the majority it has en-
joyed in the legislature for 16
years. If no candidate receives
at least 40 percent of the vote,
a runoff election will be held in
April.
Public indifference to the
mudslinging campaign is indica-
tive of the youthful electorate's
impatience with the old politi-
cians who have long dominated
the political scene and whose
personal antagonisms date back
to the civil war in 1948. Both
Figueres and Echandi were nomi-
nated by tactics that split their
parties and accelerated motion
toward party realignment. UN
defector Virgilio Calvo is in
the current race with his new
National Front Party, and PLN
dissident Rodrigo Carazo plans
to organize a new political
group later this year. The bal-
loting, therefore, promises to
end the 20-year pattern of an
electorate closely divided be-
tween supporters and opponents
of the PLN.
Another significant feature
of the campaign and a potential
cause of postelection violence
is the participation of an openly
identified vehicle for Communist
candidates, the Socialist Action
Party. Right wing groups have
threatened an armed uprising in
the event the Communists win
representation in the legisla-
ture
Costa Rica will probably
weather the postelection storm,
but the breakup of the large
parties and the likely inclusion
of Communists in the legislature
may make for a particularly
difficult period. The next
chief executive is likely to
have only the qualified support
of a fractured party, and pas-
sage of legislation will require
opposition cooperation which will
be hard to secure following the
bitterly contested election.
Page 2 8
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bhuKh I
CUBAN SUGAR HARVEST OFF SCHEDULE
Castro has admitted that the
1970 sugar harvest is falling
somewhat behind schedule. Pro-
duction of the second million
tons, due on 18 January, was
achieved on the 19th, and even
if the workers intensify their
efforts, further delays are likely.
In a progress report on the
effort to produce a record ten
million tons, Castro stated that
heavy rainfall in several prov-
inces during the first week of
January caused delays. He showed
particular concern over the low
production figures for Oriente
and Camaguey provinces, tradition-
ally abundant sugar areas, for
which he blamed "subjective" fac-
tors. He demanded increased ef-
forts to achieve daily production
norms, and emphasized that delays
this early in the harvest will be
increasingly difficult to make up,
as the most arduous phase is yet
to come.
The tone of Castro's report
was more somber than his previously
0 (tuba : Timetable for 197010 million ton sugar harvest
z Dale Achieved
9
97332 1-70
optimistic statements. In Decem-
ber, for example, he claimed the
harvest was a full day ahead of
schedule and enthusiastically pre-
dicted that the final goal would
be achieved on time. He now seems
convinced, however, that a letdown
in worker discipline is delaying
the harvest, warning that "soft
people who fold up at the first
difficulty" will not be tolerated.
Foreign delegations have
gone into the canefields for prop-
aganda purposes. Small groups
of "canecutters" have been sent
to Cuba from several Communist
countries to show solidarity with
the Cuban revolution, and diplo-
matic personnel from the Soviet,
Bulgarian, and Romanian embassies
in Havana have performed "sym-
bolic" cane-cutting tasks. The
Venceremos Brigade, a delegation
of 216 US leftist liberal youths
given wide coverage in Cuban news
media, has finished its six-week
stint of cane harvesting and re-
portedly will be replaced by a
similar group in early February.
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FRICTION CONTINUES BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND GUYANA
Venezuela has deployed troops
to the Guyana border, probably as
a show of force as well as a con-
tingency move. Two army battal-
ions have been ordered to the
area by the minister of defense.
The troop movement would
put Venezuela in a favorable po-
sition should it decide to take
military action against Guyana.
There are no indications, how-
ever, that President Caldera is
planning action against Guyana
at this time.
The build-up is probably de-
signed to complement Venezuelan
diplomatic pressure to extend
the life of the Venezuela-Guyana
Border
Commission.
The commis-
sion,
established in
1966 to
re-
solve
the dispute involving
Vene-
zuela's claim to three fifths
of Guyana's territory, is sched-
uled to end next month. The
disputants then have until June
to settle the matter, or the case
goes to the United Nations
secretary general for his deci-
sion. Venezuela lacks confidence
in its case and is seeking an
extension of the commission,
but Guyana believes that further
talks would be fruitless.
Hawkish elements in Vene-
zuela, including some of the mil-
tary, have despaired of a peace-
ful settlement of the claim in
their favor and have been urging
forceful seizure of the disputed
territory. Guyana sent a protest
note to Venezuela on 21 January
refering to the troop build-up on
the border as a threat to her se-
curity and requesting clarifica-
tion of the action. Guyanese
nervousness about Venezuela's in-
tentions could combine with the
proximity of armed forces of the
two countries to produce border
incidents.
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virvi~ir i
TRINIDAD
AND
TOBAGO
rtTuGupita
erro Bolivar "'VENEZUELA~?,.
LajParagua
La
Escalera~
Jurnatu
Yenezuele
~5.
Orinduik
GEORGETOWN
Springlaads
Nieuw
Nickerie
GUYANA
Iona,
Voneauela claims and occuplerall ?f Ankoko Island.
Guyana claims eastern half of Ankoko Island.
ANKOKO ISLAND
(ISLA ANAcOCO)
SECRET
Area?
Letheni
Isherton
SURINAM
r,a7
-
o.
Area
clairried by 4
Ne heriands -
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Secret
Secret
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