WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Sino-Vietnamese Relations Over the Last Two Years
Secret
N?_ 43
19 December 1969
No. 0401/69A
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Chinese and Vietnamese leaders could have been the characters
Samuel Beckett had in mind when he wrote in Waiting for Godot,
"They gave birth astride the grave...." For the'death of Ho Chi Minh
provided the occasion for the infusion of new life into the Sino-
Vietnamese association. Like a distant relative who had been out of
touch, Premier Chou En-lai hurried to Hanoi the day after Ho's death
as if to make amends for not maintaining family relations.
The public breach in Sino-Vietnamese relations that opened
with the beginning of the Paris talks in mid-1968 was indeed closed
with the death of Ho Chi Minh. But Sino-Vietnamese relations are a
part of the hard world of international politics, and there is more
behind this change than a death in the family,
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For years, China and North Vietnam have
been bound together by the war in South Viet-
nam. Hanoi's goal of achieving control of all
Vietnam has coincided with Peking's interest in a
major, clear-cut defeat of the US in Southeast
Asia-a defeat that the Chinese have hoped would
lead to a general lessening of the American
presence in Asia and, specifically, a reduction of
US political and military commitments to nations
adjacent to China. Additionally, a US defeat in
Vietnam or even a continuation of the present
struggle could be used by Peking to demonstrate
the efficacy of a Chinese-style "peoples war" and
to further its ideological case against Moscow.
Political relations between the Chinese and
the Vietnamese Communists have always con-
tained elements of serious friction. a legacy of
historical Chinese imperialism brought up to date
by Hanoi's repeated demonstrations of inde-
pendence during the past several years.
Prior to the overthrow of Khrushchev, how-
ever, the North Vietnamese clearly regarded
China as their primary ally, characterizing their
relations as being as close as "lips and teeth."
Scarcely an issue of North Vietnamese publica-
tions missed taking a swipe at "modern revision-
ism," and no occasion was overlooked to praise
Peking. This attitude on the part of the Viet-
namese stemmed almost entirely from the hard
fact that China offered political and material sup-
port for Hanoi's efforts to take over the South,
whereas Moscow had refrained from all but token
gestures of support.
This unnatural dependence ended when the
Soviet Union first assumed an active role in sup-
port of Hanoi's war effort, allowing North Viet-
nam to strike a balance between Moscow and
Peking. Since then, Hanoi has accepted assistance
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and advice from both but ultimately has charted
its own course. Thus the power and proximity of
China-and even the considerable assistance it has
provided without interruption-have not enabled
Peking to exert what it considers a proper degree
of influence in Hanoi.
The Sino-Vietnamese frictions that might
have been expected as a result of this new politi-
cal equation were exacerbated considerably by
the growing Sino-Soviet conflict and the con-
vulsions of China's Cultural Revolution. Chinese
propaganda began to treat the Vietnam issue as an
object of Sino-Soviet ideological rivalry, an ap-
proach that produced increasing Vietnamese
resentment. Hanoi was also angered and alarmed
by Peking's efforts to export the Cultural Revolu-
tion to North Vietnam's ethnic Chinese commu-
nity-the same "Red Guard diplomacy" that
ruined China's relations with many of its other
friends. In May 1967, the North Vietnamese
party journal went so far as to publish an indirect
but unmistakable personal attack on Mao Tse-
lung and the destructiveness of his Cultural
Revolution.
Despite these frictions, Peking maintained
close relations with Hanoi. Throughout 1966 and
1967 the war in the South was expanding, and
the Chinese used every occasion to encourage a
maximum Vietnamese Communist war effort.
Chinese propaganda treated the 1968 Tet offen-
sive effusively and ecstatically, even though it was
far from the kind of peoples war envisaged in
Maoist doctrine. At the same time, however, the
Chinese became increasingly concerned that
Hanoi, under the pernicious influence of Moscow
and the growing physical pressures of the war,
might not stay the course but might prove willing
to settle for something less than victory. Chinese
propaganda began to lecture the Vietnamese
openly on this subject, exhorting them to shun
"Soviet-US peace-talk plots" and to persist in
protracted war.
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Thus the limitations on Chinese influence
were perhaps most dramatically illustrated by
Hanoi's decision to begin talks with the US in the
spring of 1968. In fact, Peking ma not have been
informed by Hanoi in advance.
In any event, the strong an in-
sistent propaganda line Peking had maintained
against any kind of negotiations was severely
undercut by Hanoi's decision.
With the opening of talks, the Chinese re-
vised their treatment of the Vietnam issue con-
siderably. Posters in Peking supporting North
Vietnam were removed, and small-scale pro-Hanoi
parades and demonstrations-previously a daily
occurrence-were stopped. Formerly numerous
and extensive Chinese radiobroadcasts covering
military activity in Vietnam virtually ceased.
Chinese propaganda continued to attack the gen-
eral concept of negotiations as a US fraud and
hoax, and even refused to acknowledge that talks
were actually under way for some five months.
For its part, Hanoi was forced to adapt to
the change in the Chinese attitude, but attempted
nevertheless to preserve an impression of correct
relations with Peking. For example, North Viet-
namese negotiators traveling between Paris and
Hanoi continued to stop in Peking as well as
Moscow to confer with Chinese and Soviet of-
ficials. Privately, however, the North Vietnamese
were undoubtedly irritated by Peking's behavior.
o icra s occasionally ma e critical statements
about China, something they had previously re-
frained from doing
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The deterioration of relations between Hanoi and
Peking was clearly reflected during the Chinese
National Day celebrations on 1 October 1968.
Chinese leaders virtually ignored the subject of
Vietnam, and, in terms of protocol, ranked the
low-level delegations representing Hanoi and the
National Liberation Front behind even the
Australian Communist Party. Later in the month,
the North Vietnamese had to resort to force to
free some harassed Soviet officials at the Chinese
Embassy in Hanoi.
Despite the obvious strain, Peking was care-
ful to express its displeasure with Hanoi ob-
liquely, so as not to impair its fundamental inter-
ests in North Vietnam. Chinese propaganda did
not criticize Hanoi directly for participating in
the Paris talks, but rather attacked the US and the
USSR for their perfidy in supporting the talks.
Most importantly, materiel in support of the Viet-
namese Communist war effort-including Soviet
shipments-continued to pass through China. Al-
though the withholding of such aid was Peking's
one physical lever on Hanoi short of armed force,
Chinese leaders seemed well aware that an aid
stoppage would only diminish Hanoi's ability and
will to continue the war at a critical stage and
thus would be self-defeating from Peking's point
of view. A new aid agreement was signed in
August 1968, and the Chinese were quick to deny
subsequent Soviet charges that aid shipments
transiting China were being held up deliberately
by Peking.
As reports from Paris began to point toward
some progress in the talks during the fall of 1968,
Peking found public avoidance of the subject in-
creasingly untenable. Finally on 19 October, the
Chinese broke their official silence by reprinting
several 'Western news reports of an imminent US
bombing halt. They later followed up by publish-
ing without comment the official US and North
Vietnamese government statements on the
ort ietnamese
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bombing halt of 1 November and the enlargement
of the talks to include Viet Cong and South
Vietnamese Government representatives. Pri-
vately, Chinese officials continued to denigrate
the talks but admitted that they were unable to
influence Hanoi. During the rest of 1968 and
through the spring of 1969, Peking continued its
indirect criticism of the talks and further indi-
cated its displeasure with Hanoi's policy by
refusing to acknowledge publicly the stopovers in
Peking of North Vietnamese negotiators traveling
between Paris and Hanoi. Chinese publicity for
the war in the South remained at a low level; even
the 1969 post-Tet offensive was ignored.
The inherent difficulties of this ambivalent
policy of supporting and criticizing Hanoi were
again illustrated by Peking's recognition of the
South Vietnamese Communists' Provisional Revo-
lutionary Government (PRG) in June 1969.
Oriented primarily toward Hanoi's negotiating
strategy, the PRG was an instrument for which
the Chinese obviously had little use. On the other
hand, nonrecognition by Peking would have con-
stituted an open break with the Vietnamese Com-
munists, and there is no evidence that the Chinese
ever seriously considered this course. Even so,
Peking managed to convey its misgivings by re-
sponding tardily and by somewhat fudging its
official recognition statement.
Otherwise, there were few revealing events in
Sino-Vietnamese relations in the last months be-
fore Ho Chi Minh's death. The Chinese predict-
ably labeled US troop withdrawals, announced
after the Midway meeting, as a fraud. Though
their congratulatory message to Hanoi on its inde-
pendence day on 2 September was perhaps
slightly warmer in personal greetings to Ho Chi
Minh than was the previous year's message., it still
stressed the standard Chinese line indirectly op-
posing the Paris talks by attacking the US and the
USSR and urging the Vietnamese to carry the war
on to complete victory.
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The death of Ho Chi Minh on the following
day, however, was an occasion for something
more than a routine or automatic response by
Peking. Indeed, Premier Chou En-lai's quick trip
to Hanoi within hours of the North Vietnamese
announcement was an expression of high-level
interest and action, and in fact foreshadowed a
week-long outpouring of condolences and eulo-
gies for Ho Chi Minh throughout China. Even
though the thrust of the attendant Chinese pub-
licity was still aimed at urging the Vietnamese to
turn grief into strength and fight on, China's
over-all response went well beyond the level of
necessary courtesy, and distinctly improved the
climate of Sino-Vietnamese relations.
The attendance of North Vietnamese
Premier Pham Van Dong and NLF chairman
Nguyen Huu Tho at Peking's anniversary day on 1
October further signified improved relations. In
stark contrast with the anniversary day the year
before, the high-ranking Vietnamese representa-
tives were warmly received by the Chinese and
were afforded considerable publicity. The signing
of the military and economic aid agreement also
contributed to the image of renewed Sino-Viet-
namese solidarity. In Hanoi, an impressive array
of the North Vietnamese leadership appeared at
the anniversary reception given by the Chinese
Embassy. Indeed, so that no one would miss the
point, an editorial in Hanoi's Nhan Dan stated
that "the fact that a delegation... led by Premier
Pham Van Dong (went to Peking)... clearly shows
that our people pay great importance to the
friendship and militant solidarity between the
peoples of the two countries, and have made
untiring efforts to enhance it."
More significantly, these signals of renewed
Sino-Vietnamese friendship in the month follow-
ing Ho Chi Minh's death were accompanied by an
apparent softening of Peking's attitude toward
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A death in the Vietnamese family brings a mournful Premier Chou En-lai to Hanoi on 4 September
1969. Flanking him are Yeh Chien-ying, a member of the Chinese Communist Party politburo, and
Wang Yu-ping, Peking's ambassador in Hanoi. Rounding out the front row is the core of the North Viet-
namese politburo: Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap; Premier Pham Van Dong; party first secretary
Le Duan; party theoretician Truong Chinh; and China specialist Hoang Van Hoan. 9694612-69
the Paris talks. After the anniversary on 1 Octo-
ber, Nguyen Huu Tho's NLF-PRG group re-
mained in China long after other major delega-
tions had departed, and subsequent sessions with
the Chinese became occasions for statements by
both sides on the issue of a Vietnam settlement.
At a banquet on 8 October for the Vietnamese,
Chou En-lai for the first time publicly addressed
the question of a settlement by declaring that the
unconditional withdrawal of all US troops was
the sole correct basis for ending the war. Nguyen
Huu Tho's reference to the NLF-PRG's ten-point
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peace plan in a speech at the same banquet was
rebroadcast the next day by Chinese news
media-the first public Chinese acknowledgment
of any Vietnamese Communist plan for a political
settlement. A joint communique issued after talks
between the same men on 15 October reiterated
Peking's agreement that the unconditional with-
drawal of US troops was the crux of any settle-
ment. By containing individual as well as joint
statements, however, the communique also
clearly revealed continuing differences in em-
phasis 'between the two sides, the Vietnamese
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reiterating the correctness of their ten-point peace
plan and the Chinese stressing protracted war.
As the South Vietnamese group departed
China after nearly three weeks of lavish Chinese
hospitality and publicity, North Vietnamese
Premier Pham Van Dong arrived back in Peking to
resume talks with Chou En-Iai, after seeking aid
and good will on a tour of Eastern Europe and
the USSR. In Peking, Chou and Pham exchanged
speeches at a banquet on 23 October, .and another
joint communique on Vietnam was issued on 25
October. Though the communique was virtually
identical to the one issued on 15 October, Chou
appeared to go further in his speech by omitting
the standard Chinese call for the Vietnamese to
persevere in protracted war until final victory.
Instead, he expressed the belief that the Viet-
namese would overcome all difficulties along their
"road of advance"-a vague formulation that
could sanction various military or political moves
by Hanoi.
By introducing something other than Pe-
king's standard emphasis on protracted war, Chou
in effect injected some flexibility into China's
tactical stance regarding the Paris talks. In so
doing and in supporting Hanoi on the issue of an
unconditional US withdrawal, Peking has im-
plicitly become the champion of Hanoi's maxi-
mum demands in Paris without committing itself
to the talks per se or to any lesser terms the
Vietnamese might be tempted to accept. Al-
though Peking could, if it chose, now support a
settlement at Paris based on lesser terms, the shift
in its position to date by no means signifies a
lessening of its interest in seeing a maximum
defeat inflicted upon the US.
Indeed, at least for the present, Peking seems
to have concluded that mutual concessions lead-
ing to a settlement are not in the offing. After a
delay of about a week, Chinese propaganda
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portrayed President Nixon's speech of 3 Novem-
ber as conclusive evidence that the US intended
to maintain its aggressive policy in Vietnam. The
delay in Peking's response may indicate that the
Chinese attached special significance to this
speech and, consequently, evaluated it carefully
before taking a position. In any case, the eventual
Chinese commentary was extensive, perhaps in-
ordinately so; it even seemed to contain under-
tones of perverse satisfaction that Peking's long-
standing charge of US intransigence had been, by
Chinese lights, validated.
Peking has also endeavored to maintain its
hard-line attitude toward the Vietnam issue by
affording more preferential treatment ' to the
NLF-PRG than to Hanoi. The Chinese described
their talks with South Vietnamese Communist
representatives in October in glowing terms, while
applying friendly but distinctly less effusive ad-
jectives to subsequent talks with North Viet-
namese Premier Pham Van Dong. Additionally,
the NLF-PRG rather than Hanoi was thanked for
its observance of China's 20th anniversary in a
note signed by Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and Chou
En-lai. By so distinguishing between the Vietnam-
ese Communists, Peking is certainly indicating
something less than complete satisfaction with all
elements of the leadership in Hanoi, and probably
is trying to further its interests by paying special
tribute to those at the forefront of the struggle in
the South.
In any event, the improvement in relations
has allowed Peking to play a more active role.
This was demonstrated as early as China's Octo-
ber anniversary day in Peking. Taking advantage
of the presence of high-ranking Vietnamese Com-
munist and Cambodian officials, Chou En-lai ar-
ranged for a meeting between them, apparently to
resolve the interrelated problems of Vietnamese
Communist use of Cambodian territory and
Cambodia's withholding of arms shipments
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destined for the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese
Army. Although details of the meeting remain
obscure, limited arms shipments are apparently
once more reaching the Viet Cong through Cam-
bodia. Cambodian agreement to deliver future
shipments appears to be contingent upon the ful-
fillment of promises made by the Vietnamese
regarding their use of Cambodian territory.
It seems clear that both Hanoi and Peking
were mutually interested in restoring close rela-
tions. Hanoi's point of view appears relatively
clearcut. North Vietnam has consistently wanted
its relations with China to be as friendly as possi-
ble, provided that its independence did not
become the price for such relations. This desire
was made specific by Ho Chi Minh's posthumous
request for Sino-Soviet rapprochement and in-
creased Communist unity.
Because Peking's petulant reaction to the
start of the Paris talks was the major cause for
poor Sino-Vietnamese relations since mid-1968,
the improvement in relations clearly hinged more
upon a change in Chinese attitudes than upon
North Vietnam's behavior. In this respect, the
awkward and unproductive aspects of Peking's
position on Vietnam since mid-1968 are worth
stressing again. Indeed, it is not clear why the
Chinese reacted adversely in the first place unless
they feared that the war might be settled quickly
at Paris. If so, the passage of time and the lack of
any Communist concessions at Paris proved that
such fears were unfounded. At the same time, the
Chinese probably derived some encouragement
from Hanoi's apparent preparations for a lower
level, protracted war as an alternative to a quick
settlement. Thus by mid-1969, the Chinese easily
could have concluded that the eventual outcome
in Vietnam was still uncertain, and that China's
interests were best served by renewing close con-
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tacts with Hanoi in order to influence future
decisions there. This kind of pragmatic evaluation
is in line with the general restorative trend in
Chinese policy since the Ninth Party Congress last
April, and with the professional hand of Chou
En-lai that has since been more evident.
This turn toward realism in Peking meshed
neatly with Ho Chi Minh's death, which provided
not only an opportunity but an extra incentive
for the Chinese to restore close relations with
Hanoi. Indeed, the vacuum caused by Ho's demise
and the inevitable readjustments to be made
among remaining North Vietnamese leaders cer-
tainly contain the potential for the more effective
application of Chinese influence.
As decisions are ap-
proached by Hanoi in the future, it seems reason-
ably clear that the Chinese intend to weigh in
heavily on the side of those opposing a settlement
and supporting a continuation of the war.
The Vietnam war almost certainly looms
large enough in Chinese eyes to warrant special
consideration; nevertheless, the adjustment in Pe-
king's Vietnam policy has also been encouraged
by China's bitter dispute with Moscow. During
the past year Peking has become increasingly con-
cerned over its weak and isolated position vis-a-vis
the USSR and currently is working to improve its
relations with Communist states such as Yugo-
slavia and North Korea as well as Hanoi. Peking's
decision to enter border negotiations with Mos-
cow made its overt opposition to Hanoi's nego-
tiating strategy even more untenable. Indeed, the
Chinese have used their justification for the cur-
rent Sino Soviet border talks as rationalization for
their new approach to Vietnam, maintaining that
their "dual revolutionary tactics" of negotiating
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while resisting Soviet aggression can be applied by
"all revolutionary people."
In important respects, the strained Sino-
Vietnamese relationship that existed from mid-
1968 through the summer of 1969 may best be
viewed as an abnormal period, with the recent
improvement representing a return to normality.
From this perspective, the change in China's posi-
tion does not foreshadow a major new effort by
Peking to create a second front against the US,
either in Indochina or elsewhere, in order to aid
the Vietnamese. For years, the Chinese have
maintained a low profile of active involvement in
Southeast Asia. Chinese support of insurgency has
been limited, partly out of caution vis-a-vis the
US and partly because of the long-term view that
the weaknesses of the various insurgencies have
forced the Chinese to adopt. At this point, there
is little to suggest that either of these basic Chi-
nese considerations has changed.
On the other extreme, Peking's more am-
biguous attitude toward the Paris talks does not
seem to reflect any Chinese willingness that a
compromise settlement materialize at Paris. Al-
though the Chinese now support Hanoi's maxi-
mum demands, they still emphasize protracted
war and continue to demonstrate their disdain for
the Paris talks. Indeed, it seems very likely that
Peking intends to use the opportunity provided
by closer contacts with the Vietnamese to influ-
ence the post-Ho leadership against accepting any
compromise.
The closing of Sino-Vietnamese ranks and
Peking's public support of North Vietnam's terms
for a settlement will obviously benefit Hanoi. The
North Vietnamese, however, still retain their ulti-
mate independence, and their crucial decisions
about the war and the negotiations will undoubt-
edly continue to be influenced more by physical
realities in North and South Vietnam and by US
action than by considerations of relations with
China. Peking's close contacts with Hanoi did not
prevent the North Vietnamese from deciding to
go to Paris in 1968, and the Chinese have no
assurance that improved relations will forestall
future decisions that are equally unpleasant to
them.
In short, basic tensions will probably remain
beneath the surface of Sino-Vietnamese relations
while the war continues and its outcome remains
in doubt. So long as Peking does not increase its
physical involvement in the war, relations be-
tween Hanoi and Peking are more likely to reflect
major developments than to cause them. In this
respect the end of the war should prove a water-
shed from Peking's point of view, because rela-
tions with Hanoi would tend to lose the special
significance that the war against the US has lent
them to date. Of the various possible outcomes in
Vietnam, the Chinese would be faced with, a par-
ticularly difficult decision if the war were ended
by a compromise in which South Vietnam's po-
litical future was uncertain and the US retained
ties with the Saigon government. Indeed, Peking's
ambivalent attitude toward Vietnam from mid-
1968 to mid- 1969 probably serves only as a mild
rehearsal for the searching reappraisal that Peking
would undergo in such circumstances.
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