WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 19, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
43
19 December 1969
No. 0401/69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 18 December 1969)
VIETNAM
Communist forces are widely reported to be planning
to step up military pressure, especially in the
southern half of South Vietnam, sometime before the
holiday cease-fires, but their actions; may be lim-
ited in scope and intensity. President Thieu, mean-
while, has recently lashed out hard at. his critics
amid a new flurry of coup rumors.
AN OPEN DOOR IN CHINA?
Peking's initially favorable response to US efforts
to resume diplomatic contacts with China may open
the way for a resumption of formal Sino-US talks.
CLOSING DOOR?
The departure of the two top members of the Soviet
delegation from the border talks in Peking may fore-
shadow an attempt by the Soviets to lower the level
of their representation if the discussions remain
deadlocked.
PYONGYANG HOSTS HIJACKED SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER
The hijacking of a South Korean airliner marks but
another round in the continuing war of words and
deeds between the two countries.
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
51;011"
Europe
SOVIETS ENTER WEST EUROPE'S NATURAL GAS MARKET
Moscow is assuring itself of a significant role in
the developing West European market for natural gas.
GOVERNMENT CHANGE CONSIDERED IN ITALY
Prime Minister Rumor has suggested returning to a
coalition government.
DISARMAMENT IS HIGHLIGHT OF UN MEETING
The smaller states apparently intend to continue
to prod the superpowers to take further disarmament
measures.
NEGOTIATIONS ON NORDIC ECONOMIC UNION CONTINUING
The participants have agreed to postpone the effec-
tive date of the union, but negotiations on the
project will not be suspended.
SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
ARAB SUMMIT FACES DIFFICULT ISSUES
The second Arab summit conference since the war of
June 1967 will concentrate on increased military
preparedness and the battle against Israel.
LIBYA'S PRO-EGYPT REGIME TAKES HARD STAND IN BASE TALKS 21
Libya has demanded that all US forces be withdrawn
well before the end of 1970, and the British have
been forced to agree to withdraw their forces by 31
CONFUSION STILL REIGNS IN DAHOMEY AFTER ARMY COUP
The divided army continues to hold protracted dis-
cussions in an attempt to organize a new government
following its ouster of the Zinsou regime nine days
ago.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 23
ATTEMPTED COUP SQUASHED IN PANAMA
A period of readjustment and reorganization is in
prospect as a result of the abortive coup against
government strong-man General Torrijos this week.
GUATEMALAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN PROCEEDS AMID TERRORISM
The government party's attempts to build public
confidence in the electoral process could be
undone if Communist subversives continue to im-
plement their plans for terrorism.
TEACHERS' STRIKE IN ECUADOR CHALLENGES VELASCO
President Velasco and striking teachers are at
loggerheads over the tenure of the minister of
education.
SECRET
Page i i i WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
The new government will replace the interim admin-
istration that has governed since the serious riots
on the main island of Curacao last May.
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
SECRET
Last week the long-closed door between the United States and Com-
munist China eased open a crack as diplomatic representatives of the two
countries met in Warsaw. Peking's quick response to the US proposal to
renew contacts that were broken off in early 1968 holds promise that formal
talks might be resumed and is another example of China's expanding diplo-
matic horizons. An important reason for China's action may be its desire to
play on Russian fears of a Sino-US rapprochement and thus put pressure on
Moscow to be more conciliatory over border problems.
On the battle front in South Vietnam the Communists are planning a
"highpoint" to take place before the holiday cease-fire periods begin. The
level of activity, however, is expected to be limited in scope and intensity.
Communist forces have made only slight inroads in their latest round of
attacks against government positions in the Plaine des Jarres front in north
Laos. A North Vietnamese hit-and-run commando raid against Xieng
Khouang airfield, however, inflicted some substantial troop and equipment
losses. Intensive enemy logistics activity also indicates that broader offensive
thrusts may soon be in prospect.
The shadow-play war between North and South Korea was agitated last
week by the hijacking of a South Korean airliner. Pyongyang, surprised to
find itself the possessor of a Japanese turboprop that had been leased to
South Korea, recovered sufficiently to claim that the pilots had defected in
righteous protest against President Pak's puppet clique. Despite earlier re-
luctance, South Korea apparently has decided to use the channels of the
Korean Military Armistice Commission to help secure the return of the plane
and passengers.
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
VIETNAM
Another "Highpoint" in the Works
The Communists plan to step
up military action again before
the upcoming holiday cease-fire
periods, but their efforts proba-
bly will be limited in scope and
intensity. Allied military and
pacification forces and key lines
of communication are most fre-
quently mentioned as primary tar-
gets. Some reports also suggest
that selected urban centers will
be struck, especially in the
Mekong Delta area.
ent is greatest in the southern
half of South Vietnam, particu-
larly along the Cambodian bor-
der. Up to four North Vietnam-
ese regiments are now in the
vicinity of northwestern IV
Corps. Elements of the Commu-
nist 9th Division are deployed
in northern Tay Ninh Province,
and the 5th and 7th divisions
are maneuvering in Phuoc Long
Province north of Saigon.F
a late December "high-
point" will be conducted in north-
ern III Corps and in the northern
delta. Repeating a theme set
forth in other intelligence re-
ports,
the Communists intend to make
the delta a major battlefield
during the current winter-spring
campaign. The destruction of
two major highway bridges near
Can Tho on roads linking agri-
cultural areas with Saigon late
last week may have been an opening
step in the enemy's new drive
in the delta.
The threat posed by enemy
main-force combat units at pres-
South Vietnam: The Government
Responds to Its Critics
President Thieu has taken
an uncompromising public posture
against some of his political
opponents during the past week
amid a flurr of coup rumors
in Saigon.
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
Thieu has spoken out three
times in recent days against
left-wing political opponents
who are advocating a coalition
government or a "middle way"
for South Vietnam as a means of
ending the war. The President
asserted that "there is no third
way" to choose between the Com-
munists and South Vietnam's al-
lies, implying that he would act
against those who advocate such
a position if they go beyond
verbal protests. Thieu clearly
intended this tough language as
a warning to opponents such as
Senator Tran Van Don, General
Duong Van "Big" Minh, and the An
Quang Buddhists, all of whom re-
cently have increased their ap-
peals for some sort of negotiated
settlement to the war.
Thieu also lashed out at
three Lower House deputies whom
he has accused of supporting the
Communist cause. The President,
who is seeking House action
against the three, suggested that
if the Lower House fails to act,
"the armed forces and the people"
might take care of the problem.
These remarks probably will not
increase the already slim chance
that the Lower House will remove
WSaigon
Can Thd,
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
North Vietnamese Regiments
Threatening Northern Delta
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 100
miles
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
the three deputies from office
but may well further inflame
relations between the executive
and the legislature.
SECRE'T'
Pap- 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRVI
AN OPEN DOOR IN CHINA?
Peking's serious concern over cently have been reported voicing
Soviet military and diplomatic serious concern over the possibil-
pressure, together with China's ity of Soviet-US "collusion" against
growing interest in -sounding out China, and Peking may hope that
the US position on bilateral is- meeting with the US will ensure
sues and Asian problems, has Washington's neutrality in the
prompted an initially favorable Sino-Soviet dispute while increasing
Chinese response to US efforts to China's diplomatic flexibility for
resume diplomatic contacts with international maneuver against Mos-
Peking. Following a somewhat dra- cow.
matic US initiative early last
week, the Chinese charge in War-
saw agreed to receive the US am- Moreover, a number of high-
bassador on 11 December and held ranking Chinese officials during
a cordial, one-hour meeting with I recent months have expressed un-
him. This was the first high- usually candid interest in Wash-
level diplomatic meeting between ington's new policy in Asia, par-
the two sides in almost two years, ticularly in Vietnam. Peking un-
and it may open the way for a re- doubtedly would like to assess
sumption of the formal Sino-US from closer range future US inten-
talks in Warsaw, which have been tions in the area. Chinese of-
suspended by Peking since early ficials have cited evidence of "new
1968. thinking" in Washington on Asian
problems.
Peking probably sees a number ,
of indirect benefits in talking Hints of this attitude can be
with the US, although the Chinese seen in Chinese propaganda. Al-
almost certainly have little expec-1 though maintaining a generally tough
tation of significantly improved J anti-US line, Chinese commentary on
Sino-US relations. The long-stalled the US' Asian policy has been more
Sino-Soviet border talks in Peking, interesting for what it has not said
which are now at least temporarily than for its customary cliche-ridden
suspended, have done little to attacks on other subjects. Specifi-
lessen China's overriding concern cally Peking has refrained from de-
over the Soviet military presence precating US moves to ease US trade
along the frontier. By playing and travel restrictions to China and
on the chronic Russian fear of a Washington's continued calls forre-
Sino-US rapprochement, the Chinese newed talks in Warsaw. Moreover,
probably hope to worry Moscow a few recent propaganda statements
enough that the Soviets will adopt have highlighted changes in US pos-
a more compromising attitude over ture in Asia and have stated that
border problems and reduce its pres- Washington has become "more passive"
sure against China. At the same toward China in recent years.
time, several Chinese officials re-i
SI: At ET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
oirlul:.1 I
A CLOSING DOOF;?
The departure this week for
Moscow of the chief and deputy chief
of the Soviet delegation to the
Sino-Soviet border talks in Peking,
ostensibly for the current Supreme
Soviet session, follows two months
of apparently fruitless negotia-
tions. The departure of the two
Russians came against a background
of pessimistic Soviet reports of
lack of progress, and an apparent
Soviet desire to reduce the discus-
sions to a lower level. The Chinese
announcement of the move carefully
reported that the delegation would
be gone about one week and that the
talks were "temporarily recessed in
their absence." This may be a thinly
veiled threat that the talks will
break down completely if the two
Russians do not return to Peking.
The Soviets have announced no time-
table for their return.
Reports that the Soviets had
intended to recall Kuznetsov have
circulated for the past month. A
well-informed Soviet official told
US diplomats last week that the ques-
tion of reducing the negotiations to
a lower level was then being dis-
of negotiation at the deputy minister
level were enough.
The Chinese are reported to have
refused to progress beyond a demand
that there be a troop withdrawal
from border areas and from Mongolia.
The Soviets may believe that Kuz-
netsov's return to Moscow will em-
phasize their serious concern over
the deadlocked issue, and they may
send the deputy minister back for
one more try before replacing him.
In publicly announcing the departure,
Moscow sought to make clear the con-
tinuing nature of the talks by em-
phasizing that the remainder of the
Soviet delegation is still in Peking.
Continuation of the talks appears
to be the one common objective of
both. sides and there still may be
time for a compromise if the level
of representation is a crucial is-
sue at this time. At the least, 25X1
neither side wants to be responsi-
ble for the cessation of negotia-
tiorLs. Peking has clearly been
nervous about Soviet military in-
tentions and probably feels less
apprehensive while talks are in
progress. The Russians know that
the discussions have probably been
a major factor in keeping the bor-
der quiet for the past several months,
and would like to see that situa-
cussed in Peking, and that two months !tion continued.
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
SEC:RE 1`
f YONG'.'ANG HOSTS HIJACKED SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER
Pyongyang was apparently
caught completely by surprise when
it found itself on 11 December
playing host to the world's latest
hijacker and his prize, a South
Korean commercial airliner. The
only North Korean comment on the
incident came two days later in
a brief domestic broadcast that
attributed the hijacking to the
"righteous uprising" of the pi-
lots protesting "US imperialist
aggressors and the Pak Chong-hui
puppet clique." This appears to
have been a hastily contrived
"filler" to buy more time for
Pyongyang to decide how to handle
the situation.
Not only was the whole af-
fair apparently a surprise to
North Korea, but the regime was
anxious to avoid compounding its
seriousness once the deed was done.
The South Korean Government,
despite its anger, has reacted
with restraint and is trying
to resolve the incident via diplo-
matic channels. Retaliatory ac-
tion apparently has been ruled
out as being a serious error from
both the military and the politi-
cal standpoint. For help in re-
covering the plane and its pas-
sengers, Seoul has turned to the
International Red Cross and has
also sought assistance from sev-
eral countries. South Korean of-
ficials have not yet asked the
US to request a meeting of the
Korean Military Armistice Commis-
sion. Although such a meeting
would provide direct contact with
the North Koreans, Seoul is anx-
ious to avoid open US involvement,
both because of pride and because
many officials feel .his would
only stiffen North Korea's stand.
Details of the actual cir-
cumstances of the hijacking are
still largely unknown.
A similar incident that
occurred in 1958 was resolved in
less than a month through the
mechanism of the International
Red Cross and the Military Armi-
stice Commission. The North
Koreans, however, never did re-
turn the plane and insisted on
releasing the passengers only to
a South Korean representative,
thus forcing direct contact be-
tween the two governments. The
South Korean representative was
obliged to sign a receipt that
included reference to the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of
Korea. Some such concession al-
most certainly will be required
in the present situation to ob-
tain release of the passengers.
Pyongyang probably will also in-
sist on working through the Ar-
mistice Commission, because this
arrangement gives North Korea an
independent standing whereas South
Korea is technically subservient
to the US senior representative.
Such a setting for negotiations
provides important advantages for
the North in the constant jockey-
ing for status between the two
countries.
4F.CR I:i
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMMAIIY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECREE.']`
Page 10 WEEKLY SCMiMM1Y 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
SECRET
The current phase of SALT is approaching an end. The US and Soviet delegations are
near agreement on the joint communique, although the time and place for the next round of
talks have not been settled. Meanwhile, Soviet-Egyptian talks in Moscow were probably not
as satisfactory as some Arabs have claimed. Although Moscow gave official support for the
Arab commando groups and probably promised the UAR more arms, the Egyptians did not
obtain the kind of political support they had hoped for. Moscow reaffirmed its intention to
press for a political settlement in the Middle East, thus rebuffing Cairo's apparent efforts to
win Soviet support for a harder line.
Initial reports on the current Supreme Soviet session reveal the smallest increase in the
explicit defense budget since 1965. This is consistent with the image of moderation the
Soviets are attempting to project at the preliminary talks on SALT. The low rate of growth
planned for industrial production gives little hope for improvement in the disappointing
economic performance this year.
There was heavy political activity in the northern tier countries of Eastern Europe this
week, mostly in response to the Brandt government's Eastern policy. Poland promised to
answer by the end of the month Bonn's proposal for political talks. Hungary let it be known
it would like to take advantage of the present clima-re to initiate long-range economic talks
with West Germany, and Czechoslovak party boss Husak laid down his conditions for future
political talks with Bonn.
In the Balkans, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev's visit earlier this month to
Yugoslavia left relations worse than they were before. On the other hand, Albania agreed to
provide textbooks to the Yugoslav University in the Kosmet, which caters to the Albanian
minority there. Meanwhile, Romania made known its disappointment with NATO's cool
response to the Warsaw Pact's European security conference proposals. Bucharest considers
such a conference essential to its independence.
The UN General Assembly adjourned its 24th session this week. Among the resolutions
approved during the final week were one on the Soviet omnibus international security
proposal, two on outer space, and four on peaceful uses of seabeds.
The Council of the European Communities has been meeting most of this week to
discuss new financing arrangements, upon which the members are trying to agree by 31
December. There has been little apparent progress, and many observers suggest that the
council may have to "stop the official clock" if the deadline is to be met. The EC
Commission's recently revised proposals for giving the Communities their "own resources"
and for increasing the powers of the European Parliament will play an important part in the
discussion.
The UK this week asked that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) set up a
safeguards committee at its Board of Governors meeting in February. As the time for
implementing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) draws near, the IAEA must establish its
position on nuclear safeguards arrangements to be concluded pursuant to the
treaty
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
SECRET
WEST GERMANY CONTINUES EASTERN POLICY SOUNDINGS
The Soviet Attitude
The focal point this week
of Chancellor Brandt's continu-
ing pursuit of rapprochement with
the East was the second meeting,
on 11 December, between Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko and
Bonn's ambassador in Moscow on
a possible renunciation-of-force
agreement. In contrast with
their earlier, tacit encourage-
ment of Brandt's initiatives,
the Soviets now seem to be adopt-
ing a more distant posture. The
Soviet press has yet to comment
on the talks, and has recently
sounded a more insistent note
in its demands that Bonn prove
its good intentions with deeds.
The failure of both the Soviets
and the West Germans to comment
in any detail on the progress of
the talks to date suggests that
they may be proving more diffi-
cult than had originally been an-
ticipated. The Soviets could
well be balking at accepting
the West German proposal of 3
July as a basis for discussion.
The proposed texts for an ex-
change of statements on the re-
nunciation of the use of force
that Bonn submitted at that time
did not go beyond disavowing the
use of force to alter the exist-
ing situation in Europe. The
proposal avoided any acknowledg-
ment of the legitimacy and im-
mutability of the existing bor-
ders in Europe. This has long
been a prime objective of Mos-
cow's German policy, and the So-
viets may now be insisting that
Bonn formally acknowledge its ac-
ceptance of the "political reali-
ties" in Europe in the text of a
statement.
A number of factors suggest
that the course of the talks will
not be as smooth as Bonn might de-
sire. Even though Moscow at this
time seems interested in keeping
up a dialogue with Bonn, the So-
viets are probably still intent
on driving a hard political bar-
gain. In addition, Moscow prob-
ably will take every opportunity
to remind the West Germans that
it retains the ultimate power
of decision for agreement between
Bonn and its Eastern European
neighbors, despite its present
show of tolerance for bilateral
contacts. Moreover, the Soviet
negotiating position probably
reflects the need to mollify the
hardliners--both in Moscow and
in East Germany--who still har-
bor doubts about the idea of
talking with the West Germans.
In fact, given the welter of con-
flicting interests which the So-
viets must take into account in
formulating their European pol
icy, Moscow may eventually find
it necessary to slow consider-
ably the current trend toward
dealing with Bonn. Neverthe-
less, it is unlikely to risk tor-
pedoing the Moscow talks.
Bonn's Attitude
Bonn is apparently willing
to make sizable concessions in an
effort to score major gains in its
SLC;RFT
Page 12 'EEKLY SUM MARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
Eastern policy, but Brandt is
neither willing nor able to accept
all possible Soviet demands. For
example, he is believed willing to
recognize the postwar borders of
Poland and East Germany to the ex-
tent of concluding renunciation-
of-force agreements applied ex-
plicitly to the territory of these
states. He will not, however, go
so far as to give a "definitive
acceptance" of the borders since
this would require abandoning
Bonn's basic claim that there
should ultimately be a peace
treaty with Germany that perma-
nently fixes its borders.
Moreover, while already ac-
knowledging the existence of two
German states, and indeed calling
for binding agreements with East
Germany, Brandt maintains that re-
lations between the two Germanies
have a special quality and that
Bonn cannot give full recognition
under international law. Al-
though perhaps disappointed at the
initial stand, Bonn officials
still seem hopeful about the fu-
ture of the talks. They will be
particularly anxious to discover to
what extent progress in talks
with one East European state de-
pends on progress in negotiations
with others. In any event, even
should the Moscow talks on re-
nunciation of force progress very
slowly, Bonn will hope for a
tolerant Soviet attitude toward
its anticipated early bilateral
political talks with the Poles
and possibly with the East Ger-
mans.
Berlin
Reaction to the new aide-
memoire presented to the USSR by
the three Western Allies this
week may shed light on how coop-
Page 13
erat.ive the USSR will be. The
Western proposal of talks aimed
at easing the situation in Berlin
complements the current West Ger-
man drive to improve relations
with the USSR and Eastern Europe.
Moreover, both Bonn and Washing-
ton tend to regard concrete steps
to improve the situation in Ber-
lin or to improve all-German re-
lations as essential to their
participation in the Soviet-pro-
posed European security conference.
East German Attitudes
Meanwhile, the East Germans
have moved to engage Bonn in direct
talks. The parliament on 17 Decem-
ber authorized both the State Coun-
cil and the government to take the
necessary measures for "conduct-
ing relations" with West Germany.
The following day a letter ad-
dressed from Ulbricht, Chairman
of the State Council, to President
Heinemann was delivered in Bonn.
This message presumably discussed
the initiation of talks. Another
letter from Premier Stoph to
Brandt may be in the offing.
The parliament's resolution
did not mention preconditions for
beginning talks, nor did Ulbricht
in his long speech on 13 December.
The East Germans have indicated,
however, that they want negotia-
tions to result in agreements
that are valid under international
law. Ulbricht and other East Ger-
man leaders have also rejected
the idea that East-West German
relations can be of some special
type.
Because Bonn and Pankow seem
far apart concerning the possible
legal nature of eventual agree-
merits, no early breakthrough
should be anticipated even if
high-level talks do begin.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
SECRET
With Poland and other East-
ern states 'about to follow Mos-
cow's example in negotiating bi-
laterally with, the Federal Re-
public, the East German actions
probably are defensive in nature.
During his speech, Ulbricht took
the rare tack of acknowledging
that Bonn wishes to begin negotia-
tions with Warsaw. His remarks
suggest that he was talking to
Warsaw, and that the East Germans
remain piqued by the Polish pro-
posal that Bonn sign a formal
treaty recognizing the Oder-Neisse
border.
His comments also suggested
that the East Germans were willing
to await a proposal from Bonn to
begin talks. The fact that the
East Germans seized the initiative
may indicate that they believe it
urgent that they meet with the
West Germans before the Poles and
others do.
Polish Attitude
Polish Foreign Minister Jed-
rychowski has indicated again that
Warsaw will continue to pursue
its own interests. He stated
last week that Poland will reply
in a positive fashion by the end
of December to Bonn's proposal
for political negotiations, and
hinted that Warsaw will accept a
renunciation-of-force agreement
so long as it can claim that the
agreement amounts to de jure rec-
ognition of the Oder-Neisse. Jed-
rychowski also emphasized that
the conclusion of West German -
Polish talks need not await devel-
opments in East-West German rela-
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
SOVIETS ENTER WEST EUROPE'S NATURAL GAS MARKET
Moscow has made a major break-
through in sales of natural gas to
Western Europe after several years
of off-and-on negotiations. Long-
term agreements have been reached
with Italy and West Germany on the
exchange of gas for large-diameter
steel pipe, and further discus-
sions with France are planned.
The USSR and Italy signed an
agreement on 10 December involving
the delivery of Soviet natural gas
beginning in 1973. Deliveries are
expected to total more than 100
billion cubic meters over a 20-
year period. The USSR will re-
ceive a credit of some $200 mil-
lion from Italy for the purchase
of pipe and other equipment needed
for the expansion of Soviet natu-
ral gas pipeline systems. Al-
though details on the price of So-
viet gas are not yet clear, Mos-
cow apparently lowered its price
to Italy below that already agreed
on for sales to Austria and West
Germany.
Earlier this month, Moscow
concluded a 20-year agreement with
a West German firm for the delivery
nal contract is expected to be By the time Soviet deliveries to
of natural gas to Bavaria. A fi- from Siberia and Central Asia.
concluded in January specifying !West Europe begin in the early
Soviet deliveries of gas beginning 1970s, natural gas imports from
with 500 million cubic meters
in late 1973 and increasing to a
maximum level of three billion
2ubic meters annually within six
years. Deliveries of Soviet gas,
even at peak level, however, will
supply less than 10 percent of
Germany's annual energy consump-
tion.
The USSR and France also have
agreed in principle to conclude
a similar gas-pipe deal. Although
many matters, including price and
quantity must be worked out before
final. accord is reached, recent
press reports indicate that de-
liveries of Soviet natural gas to
France would start around 1977
and eventually reach a peak de-
livery rate of about 2.5 billion
cubic meters annually. In ex-
change, the Soviets would receive
credits amounting to $180-200 mil-
lion for the purchase of steel
pipe. The pipeline through West
Germany would facilitate delivery
to major French consuming areas.
These deals are particularly
advantageous to the USSR because
they provide Moscow with Western
credits for the early delivery of
pipe and other equipment needed
to spur the lagging construction
of oil and gas pipeline networks
I Iran scheduled to begin next year
and increased flows from Afghanis-
tan will more than offset gas ex-
ports to Western Europe. Moreover,
these deals come at a time when
Soviet hard-currency earnings from
petroleum deliveries to the West
I appear to be leveling off.T____1
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
GOVERNMENT CHANGE CONSIDERED IN ITALY
Recent bomb explosions in federations have not yet come to
Milan and Rome and the resulting an agreement with management ex-
casualties have increased specu- cept in the state-owned sector.
lation about an early change in I The strike pattern this year has
government. The minority Chris- led to a greater total loss of
tian Democratic government, in- output than in the disruptive ne-
stalled last August, had been in- gotiations of 1962-63 although
tended to serve until regional losses in time worked are less..
and local elections could give a Labor productivity increases in
new reading on popular attitudes recent years, however, appear to
toward the various political par- i be sufficient to permit substan-
ties. These elections are now tial wage raises of 25-30 percent
expected to take place in March over the next three years with
or April. only marginal effect on Italy's
competitive position in world
I markets.
In reaction to the explo-
sions, Prime Minister Rumor on Another factor in the uncer-
15 December met with the secre- tainty surrounding the Rumor gpvern-
taries of the Christian Demo- ment has been a continuing discus-
cratic, Socialist, Unitary Social- sion of the possibility that the
ist, and Republican parties that Communist Party may gain a greater
made up the center-left coali- role in Italian political life.
tions of recent years. This was Such speculation is central to
the first time the party secre-
taries had met since the Social-
ists divided into two political
differences between the two So-
Ls-
cialist parties. Recently a di
agreement among Italian Communists,
parties last July. The leader- which resulted in the ouster of
ship of the four parties agreed I new left" leaders, highlighted
to look into Rumor's proposal that the preference of one important
they return to a coalition.
An atmosphere of instability
has surrounded the Rumor govern-
ment, fostered by the continua-
tion of a series of short strikes.
Although several of the most im-
portant labor contracts have now
been signed, the metalworkers'
faction of the party for follow-
ing Soviet direction, while an-
other prefers revolutionary ac-
tion. Both positions are repug-
nant to most Italian non-Communist
leaders, and discussion of their
working more closely with the Com-
munists has thus been curtailed
Y.li;,. 16 WEEKLY St: M:MARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
DISARMAMENT Is HIGHLI-GHT OF: UN MEETING
The 24th UN General Assembly
session, which completed its work
this week, considered a number of
resolutions on disarmament issues.
Many of them indicate that the
smaller states intend to continue
to prod the superpowers to take
further measures.
The Assembly voted 82-0 in
favor of a Mexican draft resolu-
tion calling upon the superpowers,
as an urgent preliminary measure
during the Helsinki talks, to ne-
gotiate a moratorium on further
testing and deployment of new of-
fensive and defensive strategic
weapons systems. The US and the
USSR abstained, having supported
in the political and security com-
mittee a Dutch amendment that was
rejected by a narrow margin. That
proposal called on all nuclear
weapon states merely to refrain
from actions prejudicial to the
success of SALT.
A Swedish draft resolution
challenging the US contention that
the Geneva Protocol
of
1925
does
not ban the use of
tear
gas
and
herbicides in war was adopted
80-3 by the General Assembly.
Only Portugal and Australia joined
the US in opposition; most West
European countries abstained.
Only a last minute East-West
agreement permitted a nonpreju-
dicial disposition of the several
draft treaties on chemical and
biological warfare (CBW). All
were referred to the Geneva dis-
armament talks, with specific and
equal citation of the Soviet draft
CBW convention, which lacks veri-
fication measures, and the British
draft convention, which is re-
stric-:ed to controls on bacterio-
logical weapons.
The US and the USSR were
among the 34 co-sponsors of a
resolution on the proposed treaty
limiting the use of seabeds for
military purposes. Approved
116-0 in the General Assembly,
the resolution returns the treaty
to the Geneva disarmament confer-
ence and requires its resubmis-
sion to the Assembly in 1970.
This is considerably less than
the endorsement the superpowers
had hoped for when the treaty was
presented at New York in late Oc-
tober. The Soviets have yet to
reply to the US suggestions for
revisions designed to gain Cana-
dian and Argentine support for
the treaty.
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
,RVT
NEGOTIATIONS ON NORDIC ECONOMIC UNION CONTINUING
As a concession to Finnish
internal political considerations,
the governments of Denmark, Nor-
way, and Sweden agreed to post-
pone the date for bringing the
proposed Nordic Economic Union
(NORDEC) into being, but the four
governments will not suspend ne-
gotiations on the project.
Prior to the meeting of the
Nordic prime ministers late last
week, Finnish Prime Minister
Koivisto had advised his Scandi-
navian counterparts that lack of
unity within his government pre-
vented further Finnish participa-
tion in the negotiations at least
until after the March parliamen-
tary elections. In addition he
questioned the validity of the
NORDEC scheme in the light of the
European Communities (EC) deci-
sionto reopen discussion of the
Danish and Norwegian applications
IHE THREE LITTLE PIGS AND THE WOLF
for membership. The Danish and
Norwegian response to Koivisto
was a reaffirmation of the NORDEC
idea, if necessary without Fin-
land, and a call for adherence
to the original negotiating time-
table, which aimed for presenta-
tion of the treaty to the Febru-
ary meeting of the Nordic Council.
Faced with the possibility
that these differences might se-
riously damage the project, Sweden
persuaded the Finns to call a
meeting of the prime ministers.
After heated debate they agreed
to relax the negotiating time-
table. In addition, the prime
ministers reiterated that NORt)EC
was an independent concept with
unique economic and social value
for all four countries and was
not merely a cloak to cover entry
into the EC, as some Finnish op-
ponents have maintained.
The prime ministers' deci-
sion not only relieves the Finns
of embarrassment arising out of
their pre-election political in-
fighting, but also shores up the
Norwegian and Danish governments'
positions against their Social
Democratic opponents. The lat-
ter have strongly backed the
NORDEC idea and have frequently
charged their governments with
a desire to sidetrack the proj-
ect and substitute entry into
the EC. The postponement of the
deadline also gives the four
governments another chance to
avoid a dispute building up over
Swedish insistence that a com-
mon external tariff be intro-
duced from the outset.
s1 CRE'i'
I'.rt'I 18 WEEKLY S 21MAIiV"
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
or'_. xcr, I
Shooting along the Middle East cease-fire lines has continued this week at about the
normal rate. Egyptian claims of inflicting heavy losses on the Israelis along the Suez Canal
have been refuted by Tel Aviv.
A new wave of anti-Americanism appears to be building up in Turkey. Unions of
striking leftist schoolteachers have demanded that Peace Corps volunteers leave Turkey, and
student groups demonstrating in support of the teachers are planning anti-American demon-
strations during the current visit of the US Sixth Fleet to Izmir. In possibly related
incidents, an attempt was made to dynamite the American Officers' Club in Ankara, and a
US Air Force bus was attacked by student demonstrators in Istanbul. A Turkish official has
advised Americans in Turkey to "lie low" for the next few days. Turkish leftists seize almost
any opportunity, such as discontent and fleet visits, to attack the US presence in Turkey.
Greek Premier Papadopoulos, in his speech to the nation on 15 December, charged that
pressure against Greece in such organizations as the Council of Europe was really an effort
to bring back former Greek politicians. The tone of the speech was unyielding and indicated
the regime's unwillingness to bow to foreign pressure.
The UN Security Council this week extended the mandate of the UN peacekeeping
force in Cyprus for six months. Secretary General Thant reported that a resolution of Greek
Cypriot - Turkish Cypriot communal differences is "still not in sight," and that there was no
alternative to the extension.
In India the Congress Opposition Party's All-India Committee will convene on 19
December in Gujarat State, an old-guard stronghold. The meeting will provide the clearest
indication to date as to whether the smaller opposition group has significant strength
throughout the country or whether its support is simply confined to local pockets. Political
activity has slowed considerably in recent weeks because both factions of the party have
avoided a confrontation.
Emperor Haile Selassie's latest attempt to get Nigerian peace talks started has broken
down over a procedural question. A Biafran delegation arrived in Ethiopia on 16 December,
following a public statement by General Ojukwu that he had been assured that the talks
would not be held within the framework of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
which has consistently backed federal Nigeria. A federal spokesman then insisted that any
talks must be under OAU auspices, however, and the Emperor himself publicly linked the
negotiations to the OAU. The Biafran delegation left Addis Ababa, having scored a
propaganda victory by appearing eager to negotiate.
Dahomey's divided army officers this week continued their search for a political
accommodation that will give the country at least a modicum of stability. The return from
exile of three ex-presidents, each of whom has an important regional power base, is likely to
make the task more difficult.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
),?.k 11%.r, 1
ARAB SUMMIT FACES DIFFICULT ISSUES
25X1
The Arab summit meeting
scheduled to convene on 20 Decem-
ber in Rabat is unlikely to re-
solve the dilemmas facing the
Arabs.
It now appears that virtually
all of the heads of the Arab
states will attend the coming con-
ference. The meeting is slated to
concern itself primarily with
strengthening the Arab military
posture against Israel. The tone
of the summit promises to be mil-
itant because all Arab states are
increasingly skeptical about a
political solution to the Middle
East impasse. There will be some
pulling and hauling even on this
issue, however, as the more mod-
erate Arabs such as Jordan attempt
to keep the door open for a peace-
ful solution if future circum-
stances warrant.
Specific military measures
to be discussed may include such
things as attempts to improve the
joint Arab commands, larger mili-
tary commitments by states more
remote from the front lines, and
closer coordination between the
Financial problems also will
probably be one of thornier issues
I'at?r 20
SIi.CI
The fedayeen,
which will probably be represented
at the summit by Yasir Arafat
head of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization and Fatah, will prob-
ably also press for greater finan-
cial and political support.
The US will almost certainly
be the target of considerable
verbal abuse from all the partic-
ipants. More tangible expres-
sions of Arab displeasure with
the US may also be discussed, such
as diplomatic or economic sanc-
tions, but they are not likely to
be particularly effective even if
agreed upon.
A side issue that could cause
further discord at the meeting is
the recent border fracas between
Saudi Arabia and Southern Yemen.
The Southern Yemeni foreign min-
ister has been making the rounds
of the Arab states, apparently to
drum up support for his country.
The problem may be discussed at
the foreign-minister level prior
to the summit, but Saudi Arabia's
King Faysal will probably fight
to keep the subject out of the
summit.
WEEKLY SUNINIABY 19 Dec 69
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECKE"1'
LIBYA'S PRO-E6YPT REGIME TAKES HARE) STAND IN BASE TALKS
Libya has been negotiating
with the US and the UK this week
on the status of their bases in
the country. In discussions with
the US over Wheelus Air Base, the
Libyan delegation, headed by junta
leader Qaddafi, rejected a US pro-
posal to phase withdrawal from the
base over a one-year period. The
Libyans asserted there was no jus-
tification for a continued US
presence in the country. They de-
manded that all US forces be vol-
untarily evacuated well before the
end of 1970.
the fact that withdrawal will per-
mit the building of a "new" rela-
tionship between the two coun-
tries.
Domestically the Qaddafi re-
gime appears uneas over its se-
curity position.
. Charges were made during the
negotiations that the US had used
Wheelus to train Israelis as well
as to engage in smuggling and sab-
otage. An incident in which a
Wheelus schoolteacher was involved
in smuggling out a Libyan Jew was
specifically mentioned.
The discussions with the UK
were equally harsh. The Libyans
opened the talks by stating that
the sole purpose of the negotia-
tions was. to arrange for the im-
mediate withdrawal of all British
troops. The Libyans refused to
discuss side issues. In the sec-
ond session the British proposed,
and the Libyans accepted, a with-
drawal date of 31 March 1970. The
Libyans reportedly will allow some
noncombatant British troops to re-
main after that date to complete
the evacuation of British military
installations. The communique is-
sued at the end of the talks, how-
ever, noted at British insistence,
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
sI i;i l{. I
CONFUSION STILL REIGNS IN DAHOMEY AFTER ARMY COUP
Cotonou remains in a state
of general confusion as Dahomey's
divided military attempts to sort
things out. The return from exile
of three civilian ex-presidents
adds to the muddle and the poten-
tial for long-term instability.
Little has been heard from
the three-man military directo-
rate that was formed late last week
following the ouster of President
Zinsou. The triumvirate is headed
by Lt. Col. De Souza, whose sole
qualification seems to be that
he is least offensive to various
army factions. The other members
are Lt. Col. Kouandete, ringleader
of the coup, and Lt. Col. Sinzogan,
an ambitious and opportunistic
All ministers in Zinsou's
government, who had initially
agreed to stay on, resigned this
week. They had earlier taken
advantage of the disarray in the
military by refusing to cooperate
unless Zinsou was released. Zin-
sou was freed on 13 December., Al-
though the ministers claimed their
resignations were to protest the
army's refusal to discuss with
Zinsou the reasons for the coup,
they reportedly feared they were
about to be sacked by the army.
army officer who commands the gen-
darmerie. Kouandete, who suffered The three civilian ex-presi-
a setback when he was not named to 1 dents--Maga, Apithy, and Ahoma-
head the junta, retains his key
position as army chief of staff,
but he appears to be losing ground
as discussions among the officers
continue.
degbe--have returned to Cotonou
and have been met by large crowds,
despite an army ban on public
demonstrations. They are ex-
pected to meet soon with army
leaders to discuss the formation
The military remains divided of a provisional government that
over a number of issues, including I presumably would make prepara-
demands from some officers that tions for elections. These three
former president Alley, Kouandete's ambitious and mutually -antago-
archrival and predecessor as chief nistic politicians, each of whom
of staff, be released from jail.
A key armored unit has quit Coto-
has an important regional power
base, have rarely been able to
nou in disgust and has returned agree, however. Their presence
to its base in a nearby town. The in Cotonou at this time makes all
unit's former commander, a brash the more difficult the task of
young officer who played a major working out a political accommoda-
role in the army take-over in 1967 tion that will give Dah
that toppled General Soglo, is semblance of stabilit
reportedly en route to Cotonou
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
SECRET
Panamanian strong-man General Omar Toff Jos, on returning in triumph
to Panama City after foiling of an attempt by dissident officers to topple
him from power described the unsuccessful coup as "subversion" and
promised a full investigation of the matter. Coup leaders Colonels Ramiro
Silvera and Amado Sanjur have been jailed. Torrijos is apparently trying to
avoid further dividing the National Guard, however, and any additional
arrests will probably be highly selective.
In Guatemala, a spate of violent incidents over the past week may relate
to Communist intentions to create tension during the presidential election
period. At least six police officials and two terrorists have been killed in two
gunfights in Guatemala City, and a prominent rightist politician has been
assassinated.
In Chile, rumors of coup plotting have diminished for the present.
Court-martial proceedings against retired General Roberto Viaux ended with
the recommendation that he be exiled for 18 months for leading an army
mutiny in October. Officers charged with him received minimal punishment,
but several probably will be involuntarily retired.
The month-long teachers' strike in Ecuador has flared into violence.
Striking teachers, with student support, are attempting to bring down the
minister of education. Clashes between demonstrators and police, in addition
to an announcement by military leaders in support of presidential strong-arm
measures to break the strike, have lessened chances for a peaceful settlement.
A government announcement on 17 December extending the Christmas
vacation, however, may afford a cooling-off period.
The Portuguese Government has recalled its charge d'affaires from
Havana as a result of an incident in which a Cuban Army captain was
captured while operating with a guerrilla force against Portuguese Guinea.
Apparently no decision has been made to break diplomatic relations, how-
ever.
In Brazil, former President Arthur da Costa e Silva died on 17 Decem-
ber. His successor, General Emilio Medici, who was selected by the top
military command following Costa e Silva's stroke in late August, has
proclaimed a week of mourning for the former chief executive.
SECRET
Page 2 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
SJ;(:RFT
ATTEMPTED COUP SQUASHED IN PANAMA
Panamanian strongman General
Torrijos has survived the first
significant challenge to his
authority and, in fact, appears
to have emerged stronger than
before.
The attempt to oust Torrijos
from his position as Commandant
of the National Guard and de
facto head of government occurred
last Saturday evening while he
was on a pleasure trip to Mexico.
The coup attempt was organized by
Chief of Staff Colonel Sanjur,
who had the support of the Deputy
Commandant, Colonel Silvera. Both
officers had begun to fear they
were losing influence with Tor-
rijos and apparently took this
pre-emptive step to protect their
positions. They probably were
also genuinely concerned by Torri-
jos' appointment of leftists and
progressives to cabinet positions.
Torrijos returned to Panama
late Monday night and successfully
rallied his supporters in the
western provinces. When word of
his return reached Panama City,
loyal troops moved on Guard head-
quarters and arrested Sanjur and
Silvera. By Tuesday evening,
Torrijos was back in the capital
where he exuded confidence dur-
ing his televised press confer-
ence.
Although calm has returned
to Panama, leftist extremists
may try to keep the pot boiling
been trying to avoid further di-
vision of the country or the
Guard, and wholesale arrests
have not been made.
Torrijos, however, has
A period of readjustment and
reorganization will follow as
Torrijos attempts to consolidate
his position. Changes in the Guard
hierarchy and in the government
are likely in the next few weeks.
Colonels Silvera and Sanjur will
be tried for subversion. Colonels
S .C`,KF:T
Pact- 24 WEEK!X SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
SECRET
Pinilla and Urrutia, the titular
leaders of the Provisional Junta
Government who went along with
Torrijos' ouster, have been con-
fined to the Presidential Palace
but have not been removed from
office as yet.
Torrijos' distrust of the
oligarchy has almost certainly
been reinforced by indications
that members of the oligarchy
supported his ouster. The general
will probably go ahead with plans
to form an official party that
would exclude the traditional
oligarchy-dominated parties from
participation in the political
process. As part of this attempt
to build a civilian base of sup-
port, Torrijos had been planning
to organize a government-control-
led labor federation with com-
pulsory union membership. Be-
fore his Mexican trip, Torrijos
had backed off from this proposal
under stiff business and labor
opposition, but he may not be as
willing to compromise now as he
was before the ouster attempt.
Torrijos' new confidence in
the domestic front may be matched
SECRET
Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Coup Plotters Colonels Sanjur and Silvera
by a more aggressive approach in
foreign policy. Although there
is no indication that he will do
anything to jeopardize continued
foreign investment, he may be
more willing to tackle the full
range of policy issues with the
US. These include renewal of the
Rio Hato base agreement, the Canal
treaties and the acquisition of
additional military equipment.
Rumors have been circulating that
the US Government was somehow
involved in Sanjur's attempted
coup, and the US Embassy believes
that this could have a complicat-
ing effect on US-Panamanian re-
lations.
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
SIJ:R1:."7`
GUATEMALAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN PROCEEDS AMID TERRORISM
The governing Revolutionary
Party (PR) is displaying growing
confidence as the presidential
campaign progresses. Terrorist
incidents in Guatemala City,
however, may be the beginning of
the Communists' effort to dis-
rupt the electoral scene.
Buoyed by a recent poll
showing a substantial lead over
opposition candidates, the PR's
standard bearer, Mario Fuentes
Pieruccini, has pledged pub-
licly his intention to decline
the presidency if he fails to
win a plurality of the popular
vote in the election on 1 March.
If no presidential slate obtains
an absolute majority, the elec-
toral law requires the legisla-
ture to select between the two
slates that received the most
ballots. Fuentes has also un-
dercut the opposition parties'
contentions that the election
will be fraudulent by request-
ing President Mendez Montenegro
to ask the Organization of Amer-
ican States to send a team to
observe the election.
A resurgence of terrorism in
Guatemala City over the past week,
however, is undermining the aov-
ernment's attempt to build public
confidence in the electoral proc-
ess. The Cuban-oriented Rebel
Armed Forces (FAR) has made a
series of retaliatory attacks on
security officers for the kill-
ing of two FAR members in a
shoot-out on 12 December. The
police are nervous and frustrated
by the attacks, in which six of
their number have died. The po-
litical situation has become un-
settled since the assassination
on 17 December of rightist leader
and candidate for mayor of the
capital, David Guerra Guzman.
Unless the government makes a
strong and effective response
to the terrorist threat, the
possibility of an extralegal
counterattack from rightist ex-
tremists will grow.
Meanwhile, a band of FAR
guerrillas in the northwest Con-
tinues to evade counterinsurgent
forces that have been pursuing
t them since late November. The
guerrillas apparently have suf-
fered some casualties, but none
has been captured as yet.
I
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
bii Kr I
TEACHER'S STRIKE IN ECUADOR CHALLENGES VELASCO
Striking teachers and the
Velasco government appear headed
for a showdown over whether the
minister of education will keep
his job.
The month-long strike for
the minister's removal and the
payment of back salaries, which
has closed 75 percent of the
country's public schools, flared
into violence last week despite
efforts by President Velasco to
deal tactfully with the teachers,
who traditionally enjoy consider-
able public support. In an un-
usual display of moderation,
Velasco tried to end the strike
by announcing on 1 December that
he was borrowing from next year's
budget to pay teachers delinquent.
salaries. Despite this offer,
the tenure of the minister of
education remained the central
issues and the strike continues.
SECRET
Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY
The growing number of clashes
between teachers and student dem-
onstrators and the police have
added to public pressure for the
minister's removal while at the
same time hardening the govern-
ment's stand into what Velasco
has termed a principle of author-
ity. The President has received
the public support of his mili-
tary leaders, who have let it be
known that they would sanction
strong-arm measures to break the
strike. The government's announce-
ment on 17 December that the
Christmas vacation will be ex-
tended may afford a cooling off
period.
During past attempts to gov-
ern Ecuador, Velasco has not been
prone to compromise. It appears,
however, that a peaceful settle-
ment cf the strike calls for just
this course.
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
SV[,R F'I'
POLITICAL STALEMATE BROKEN IN NETHERLANDS ANTILLES
A government finally has
been formed after months of inten-
sive political wrangling. The
new government will replace the
interim administration that has
governed since the serious riots
on the main island of Curacao last
May forced the resignation of Min-
ister-President Kroon and his cab-
inet. Former Finance Minister Er-
nesto Petronia, who will head the
been awarded two ministerial posts
for cooperating in the formation
of the government. The DP and the
PPA, which are both relatively
moderate--will receive three cab-
inet seats each. The inclusion
of the Workers Front in the new
government should reduce the
chances of a recurrence of seri-
ous disorders, but discontent in
the labor movement will continue
new government, has been trying to because of high unemployment and
form a coalition since the elec- the lack of adequate government
tions on 5 September in which no I social wel-fare programs.
party received a majority. The
coalition is composed of the Demo-
cratic Party (DP), its traditional There will be no easy or
ally the Aruba Patriotic Party rapid solution to the island's
(PPA), and the Workers Front. economic and complex political
ills. If the new government is
to ensure stability, it will have
The Workers Front, a leftist I to develop new policies.
party formed after the riots, has
SECRET
Page 28 WEEKLY SUMN1AR1 19 Dec 69
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927A007500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/11/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07500040001-7