WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007500020001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OSD review
completed
State Dept. review completed
ARMY review(s) completed.
& RECORDS CEi 4Et
WilAGIPi LY PtiLR USE
Z-ax-
.sae. t
Secret
4 4-
5 December 1969
No. 0399/69
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 4 December 1969)
VIETNAM
Opposition politicians are making the most of the
incident at My Lai to embarrass the South Vietnamese
Government and to further their own goals, while
Buddhists, taking advantage of the atmosphere of
protest, are planning demonstrations in support of
their religious, minority, or political aspirations.
On the war scene, there are signs, the Communists
will step up activity early this month, probably
featuring shellings and sapper probes.
SINO-SOVIET TALKS YIELD ONLY WORDS, WORDS, WORDS
The Chinese and Soviets aim harsh words at each
other as the border talks remain deadlocked.
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE MALAYAN PENINSULA
The militant arm of the Malayan Communist Party is
trying to re-establish its bases in northern Malay-
sia.
Page
1
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 9
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL
A number of significant advances in the field of
arms control has occurred in the past two weeks.
They generally are arousing expectations for further
meaningful disarmament measures.
OSD review completed
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SEC R 11-1,
PARTY CALLS FOR SUPERVISION OF YUGOSLAV PRESS
The Communist party has called for increased super-
vision of Yugoslavia's information media through
adoption of new laws to put an end to the "negative
by-products" of the press.
SOVIET FARM CONGRESS ADOPTS NEW CHARTER
This is the first in 35 years and remains a conser-
vative model for the management and operation of the
collective farms.
CONDITIONS FOR AMERICAN DESERTERS IN SWEDEN IMPROVE
The majority of American expatriates seem to be in
the process of being successfully integrated into
Swedish society with the help of a wide variety of
government programs.
'?'iddle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15
BIG FOUR PEACE TALKS RESUME AS MIDEAST STRIFE CONTINUES 16
The Four Power talks on a Middle East peace settle-
ment reopened this week after a five-month recess,
but the Israelis are maintaining their adamant mil-
itary and diplomatic stance.
SOMALIA'S POLITICAL SCENE REMAINS MURKY
Six weeks after the coup, the Supreme Revolutionary
Council is still sorting itself out, but there are
signs that frictions and factions are developing
among the council members.
GROWING OPPOSITION TO LIBYAN JUNTA
After three months in power, Libya's Revolutionary
Command Council is plagued by several challenges to
its position. President Qaddafi, in particular, is
reported to be facing growing opposition.
ELECTIONS SCHEDULED IN PAKISTAN
President Yahya Khan last week outlined a timetable
and laid down guidelines for a return to civilian
rule, steps that -should reduce the pressures that
have been building up against the government.
SE(`,RET
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CRUCIAL ELECTIONS IN KENYA SCHEDULED FOR 6 DECEMBER
The primary elections will determine the Kenya Africa
National Union candidates for Parliament, but the way
they are conducted, as well as the outcome, may in
large measure set the course of future events in
Kenya.
Western Hemisphere
NEW GUERRILLA INCIDENTS OCCUR IN GUATEMALA
The army has mounted a large counterinsurgent opera-
tion in the northwest, where guerrillas have occupied
ATTENTION SHIFTS FROM THE MILITARY TO POLITICS IN CHILE 24
Repercussions from the military confrontation with
the government are diminishing as the presidential
campaign shifts into high gear.
CUBA SEEKS TRADE TIES WITH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
Some countries may be receptive to Cuban initiatives
for closer economic ties.
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The seven-week-old Sino.-Soviet border talks being held in Peking are
not going well. Both sides, particularly the Chinese, have resumed the harsh
war of words, and there is strong evidence that the Soviets have rejected
several Chinese demands. The Chinese, meanwhile, are continuing their
protracted "war preparations" campaign
The
campaign, however, is designed to promote national unity as much as it is to
show the Soviets that China is ready for an attack.
The war in South Vietnam shows signs of picking up, probably with a
new round of enemy shellings and small-unit attacks later this month. On the
political scene in the south, the government has left itself extremely vulner-
able to criticism over its handling of the My Lai massacre case. Opposition
figures and groups, who have been more vocal on a number of matters
recently, are already castigating President Thieu. He, however, is not
expected to move very soon against his more prominent opponents.
In Laos there are signs pointing toward a higher level of enemy activity
in coming weeks. In recent days the Communists have overrun a number of
government positions near the Plaine des Jarres, and enemy troop move-
ments in the south indicate the Communists are preparing for another round
of attacks against government outposts in the Muong Phalane area.
The Cambodian political scene is more disturbed than it has been in ten
years. A number of government leaders are incensed at Prince Sihanouk's
constant interference in the affairs of the cabinet he mandated to run the
country. A public congress later this month could well be the setting for a
showdown between Sihanouk and these government leaders. At this
juncture, however, the outcome of this challenge to Sihanouk's authority is
uncertain.
The New Zealand parliamentary elections on 29 November returned the
ruling National Party to power with about the same small majority, despite a
strong challenge by the opposition Labor Party. Prime Minister Holyoake has
said he would continue to support US policies in Southeast Asia.
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The Critic's Choice: war,
Politics, Religion...
The South Vietnamese Govern-
ment's handling of the affair of
My Lai has left it extremely vul-
nerable to criticism by opposi-
tion elements who have recently
begun to agitate more openly
against the regime. Official
statements have denied that a
massacre took place and have
shown no sense of concern that
the truth be found out. Accord-
ing to the press, a spokesman
for President Thieu stated that
the government classified the in-
cident at My Lai as "an act of
war" and considers the case
closed.
This seeming insensitivity
has provided Senator Tran Van Don
with a ready-made issue by which
he could have embarrassed the gov-
ernment and furthered his politi-
cal ambitions. After conducting
an investigation on the spot, how-
ever, Don said it was impossible
to arrive at a conclusion about
the case now until further evi-
dence is brought out by military
tribunals in the US. Vice Pres-
ident Ky also took exception to
the government's hasty termina-
tion of the case and asked the
Ministry of Defense to conduct
a thorough investigation.
Taking advantage of the con-
tinuing atmosphere of protest,
Buddhist monks of Cambodian de-
scent demonstrated in Vinh Binh
Province in support of an ear-
lier Saigon sit-in. The militant
An Quang Buddhists, moreover,
VIETNAM
now have dropped their extreme
caution of recent months to ad-
vocate a variation of the third
force alternative. One of the
country's smallest and least
known minorities, the Chams, have
also been encouraged by other pro-
tests to plan a demonstration al-
leging government discrimination
against them.
Although the Cambodian monks
were easily dispersed by the po-
lice in Vinh Binh, and there is
considerable doubt that the Chams
can actually generate a demon-
stration, the militant An Quang
Buddhists may again be a problem
for the government. The mili-
tants have apparently chosen to
risk the relationship of con-
strained good will they had de-
veloped with the government and
have defied an official prohibi-
tion against political discussions
at the An Quang Laymen's Confer-
ence held last weekend. Accord-
ing to press reports, the Bud-
dhists restated an earlier posi-
tion that dissociates them from
both the Saigon government and
the Communists, whom they clas-
sify as two warring forces that
do not have the support of the
people.
In an apparent effort to
offset the An Quang meeting, the
Catholic Greater Solidarity
Force--a hard-line, progovern-
ment political party--held a
meeting to condemn both the third
force idea and the enemy's pro-
posals for a coalition govern-
ment. The Catholics paraded past
the US Embassy and for emphasis
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took their anti-Communist banners
to the National Assembly building.
Meanwhile, President Thieu
is minimizin criticism of his
government.
There is evidence that ieu may
take legal action against some
of the lesser opposition activ-
ists, but he probably will not
try to take on any of his more
prominent opponents for the pres-
ent.
The Enemy's Choice: When
and Where
The enemy maintained pres-
sure with shellings and limited
ground attacks during the week.
The heaviest action again took
place more than 100 miles north
of Saigon where North and South
Vietnamese forces are fighting
for control of a remote border
region. There were numerous
signs pointing to another round
of stepped-up enemy activity
early this month, again probably
featuring increased shellings
and sapper probes.
In the Mekong Delta region,
South Vietnamese Army commanders
appear generally confident they
can handle the current enemy
threat, but some are apprehensive
at the prospect of taking on even
more North Vietnamese reinforce-
ments.
The commanding general of
IV Corps recently said that his
forces should be able to defeat
the Communists now in the delta
in a year or two. He claimed
that the two North Vietnamese
regiments and other replacements
sent into the delta during the
summer have found the region
strange and inhospitable and have
been unable to carry out aggres-
sive operations. He was uncer-
tai.n what might happen, however,
if still more enemy troops are
sent into the IV Corps area.
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51E,(:1d E' I'
officers commanding the major
South Vietnamese field units in
the delta also maintain that the
current situation is well in hand.
In northern IV Corps, the appear-
ance of North Vietnamese replace-
ments in Viet Cong units is being
interpreted more as a reflection
of Viet Cong weakness than of new
Communist strength. To the south,
ARVN commanders appear confident
that recent sweep operations have
effectively neutralized the 273rd
Regiment holed up in the U Minh
Forest. They worry about the
situation along the Cambodian
border, however, where the local
South Vietnamese commander has
few regular army units at his
disposal. He says that he could
not stop a strong Communist at-
tack in that area without sizable
reinforcements.
It remains to be seen whether
field-grade officers and their
troops will develop new esprit
or will be shaken if heavy con-
tacts continue and their losses
rise.
The enemy's increasing con-
cern over the situation in the
delta has been evident ever since
last spring when the Communists
began sending large North Viet-
namese troop units into the area
for the first time in the war.
North Vietnamese forces are being
sent into the delta probably
because of the enemy's desire to
build up weakened Viet Cong units
in the region and, as an impor-
tant corollary, regain contact
with the millions of people in
I the area who have been coming
increasingly under the influence
This caution is well war- I of the government. The Communists
ranted. The enemy's winter-spring i probably believe that these objec-
campaign is just getting under tives are critical, either if
way, and enemy forces in some sec-
tors of the delta have only re-
cently become more aggressive.
Several ARVN units have taken
heavy casualties in the past two
weeks.
the war is prolonged or if there
is some break toward a cease-
fire and political settlement
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SINO-SOVIET TALKS YIELD ONLY WORDS, WORD, WORDS
Peking has made its most
harsh and direct attacks against
Moscow since the Kosygin - Chou
En-lai meeting on 11 September.
A congratulatory message to
Tirana on Albania's 25th Na-
tional Day directly condemned
the "Soviet revisionist ruling
clique" and Chinese public com-
mentary has weighed in heavily
against Moscow's "counterrevolu-
tionary collusion" with the US.
This attack and the subsequent
Soviet response, is the most
dramatic indication to date
that the border talks are not
going well.
The new round of Chinese
polemics was capped by Chou En-
lai at a reception the Albanians
gave in their embassy on 29 No-
vember. Chou refrained from at-
tacking the Soviets by name but,
using the well-understood euphe-
mism of "social-imperialism,"
condemned Moscow for its "ag-
gressive ambitions" and called
for full "psychological and ma-
terial preparations" for war.
His remarks were then eagerly
amplified by the Albanian am-
bassador, who accused the "Brezh-
nev-Kosygin clique" of "bloody
provocations" and military
buildup along the Chinese fron-
tier. The uninhibited attack
caused the Soviet bloc diplomats
in attendance to walk out in
Chou's presence. The Albanian
ambassador's blunt remarks ob-
viously had Peking's approval
and Moscow will rightfully in-
terpret them as a deliberate
Chinese effort to resume open
propaganda exploitation of the
border conflict.
Moscow is already edging
close to resuming polemics. A
stinging Radio Moscow commentary
to China on 2 December avoided
direct mention of the Chinese
but was transparently aimed at
recent Chinese propaganda attacks.
Vividly conjuring up the horrors
of nuclear war, it condemned
"modern adventurists" who gener-
ate "war frenzies" in their own
countries and criticize measures
taken by others to ease inter-
national tensions.
The Chinese apparently hope
to place the onus on Moscow by
charging that the Soviets are
using military pressure to force
a new "unequal" settlement on
them. Peking is genuinely nerv-
ous about the border situation,
however, and seems to have little
to gain by breaking off the talks.
Meanwhile, the Chinese are
broadening the scope of their
"war preparations" campaign. / 25X1
Fundamentally,
however, most of what is currently
billed as "war preparations" con-
tinues to be used to promote na-
tionwide unity and unpopular do-
mes ti c programs. 25X1
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k:cn?A--
WEST
MA LA YSIA
fur;
A.- .:rn
GAPOR#
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`ii C Jl\i1
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE MALAYAN PENINSULA
The Communist Terrorist Organ-
ization (CTO), the militant arm of
the Malayan Communist Party, has
stepped up activities since the
May postelection riots in Kuala
Lumpur and is trying to re-estab-
lish bases in northern Malaysia.
Several clashes between the CTO
and the authorities have taken place
in recent months, but the Malaysian
security forces appear capable of
keeping the situation under con-
trol.
After the end of the ten-year-
long emergency in 1960, the CTO was
generally content to lie low in base
camps in southern Thailand, free of
harassment and able to recruit,
train, and re-equip. In early 1968,
it announced plans to move from
"revolutionary" to "armed" struggle.
They instigated attacks on Malay-
sian security groups but met with
little success.
Since early 1969, the CTO has
increased its strength by one
third--roughly from 900 to 1300,
gaining support mainly from the
Chinese, but also from ethnic Ma-
lays in the border area. The ap-
peal to the Malays marks a distinct
change from previous CTO tactics
in which recruiting efforts were
limited almost exclusively to the
Chinese. This appeal to both sides,
in a country where hostility be-
tween Chinese and Malay is endemic
and racial tensions flare quickly,
seems unlikely to be successful at
the present time.
In building their influence
south of the Thai border the Com-
munists are expanding propaganda
and political action and, at the
same time, are attacking Malaysian
security forces to prove their re-
newed militancy. In the propaganda
sphere, a statement from Peking
last August, attributed to the Ma-
layan Communist Party, urged peoples
of all races to overthrow the Rahman
government. The CTO is also sup-
ported by a new clandestine radio
station located in China, which has
been broadcasting similar appeals.
In addition, CTO cadre are appar-
ently using coercion against the
local population to develop logis-
tical and political support.
On the action side, sightings
of small CTO groups have greatly
increased during the past few months
in West Malaysia near the Thai bor-
der, and several major incidents
of violence against security forces
have occurred. The CTO has had the
worst of it in these encounters,
but its increasing presence ties
down much of Malaysia's internal
security apparatus. Should further
racial rioting break out elsewhere
the police and military would be
hard put to handle both problems.
To complicate matters the Thai
authorities, convinced that the CTO
will return eventually to Malaysia,
are more concerned with their own
insurgents than in joint efforts
with Kuala Lumpur against the CTO.
The Malaysians realize they will
have to bear the brunt of the bur-
den.
Sr,CRE1'
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SF CRL'l
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SECRET
The Soviets this week were engaged simultaneously in four highly
important negotiating sessions. In the summit meeting in Moscow they and
their East European allies were grappling with problems concerning Ger-
many, undoubtedly with the East Germans arguing against too rapid an
accommodation with the Brandt government. A renewal of the Warsaw
Pact's call for a European Security Conference is also expected.
In the talks in Peking the Soviets are reported to be meeting stiffer
resistance, as both sides gradually raised the level of public recriminations. In
Helsinki, the Soviets' serious, nonpolemical approach maintained the impres-
sion that they mean business in the arms talks. The other US-Soviet bilateral
discussions-on the Middle East-were suspended as the four powers took up
the subject again through their ambassadors to the UN. The Soviets have not
yet replied to the US settlement proposals of 28 October, but the nature of
their response seems foreshadowed by the negative indications from Cairo.
In its contacts with West Germany, Pankow seems to be escalating its
demands to test the limits of Bonn's proper.sity to make concessions. Talks
on transportation and postal matters now are recessed, in part because the
East Germans do not want to appear too forthcoming toward Bonn in view
of the Moscow meeting with their allies.
The compromise reached at the summit meeting of the European
Communities this week offers hope for progress on admitting new members.
Agreement was reached to work for a settlement on agricultural financing by
the end of this year and to move rapidly toward achieving a common
position before opening negotiations with applicants. There was informal
agreement that such negotiations could start in about six months.
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden plan to present a resolution at the
Council of Europe meeting next week calling for the suspension of Greece
from that organization. The outcome of a vote on this question is not yet
clear.
approved several resolutions on peaceful uses of the seabeds. One, opposed
by both the US and USSR, calls for a moratorium on claims and exploitation
of those portions of the ocean floor lying beyond national jurisdiction.
Another asks the Secretary General to poll the UN membership on the
feasibility of holding a world conference to lay down the limits of national
jurisdiction.
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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL
A number of significant ad-
vances in the field of arms con-
trol have occurred within the past
two weeks, including US-USSR si-
multaneous ratification of the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
West German signature of that
document, and the US statement of
intent to ratify the Geneva Proto-
col of 1925 on chemical and bio-
logical warfare (CBW). These de-
velopments are arousing expecta-
tions about further meaningful
disarmament measures, but some
arms control resolutions which
may be adopted by the UN General
Assembly later this month may not
necessarily advance this goal.
Twenty-four countries now
have completed ratification of
the NPT, which was opened for
signature in July 1968. A total
of 70 other nations have signed
the treaty but have not yet rati-
fied it. The treaty will enter
into force when 19 of these states
finish the ratification process.
This could happen within a matter
of weeks. A number of the former
British dependencies, for example,
have signed the document. They
generally have ratification pro-
cedures similar to that of the
UK--no constitutional requirement
of parliamentary consent--and pre-
sumably could take final action on
short notice. There are 13 states
in this group alone.
Further action by at least
some of the so-called nuclear
threshold countries and the mem-
bers of the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) is also likely
Sweden and Japan, both threshold
nations, have indicated that they
will be acting shortly--Sweden to
ratify and Japan to sign. Bonn,
and the other EURATOM countries,
will not ratify the NPT until
EURATOM has worked out an accept-
able agreement with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency on
safeguards against the diversion
of nuclear fuels to weapons use.
Bonn's signature should facilitate
the opening of negotiations toward
such an agreement.
The most significant of the
several CBW proposals being
floated during the current dis-
armament debate in the UN General
Assembly's political and security
committee are those of the USSR,
Sweden, and Canada. The Soviets
are inclined to press to a vote
their proposed resolution that
praises their draft convention
that would ban the production,
development, and stockpiling of
CBW agents and require the de-
struction of existing stocks.
Sweden has been notably suc-
cessful in securing backing from
a number of the other nonaligned
nations for its proposal that
would have the General Assembly
condemn and declare contrary to
international law the use in war
of all CBW agents, including tear
gas and herbicides. This posi-
tion is not in accordance with
US views on the nonuse provisions
of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
Most Western nations support the
Canadian proposal that would even-
handedly refer all CBW resolutions
proposed at the UN to the Geneva
disarmament talks for further con-
sideration.
'-1]1:C;R]',.1
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Prospects for UN endorsement
of the US-USSR draft seabeds
treaty have been improved somewhat
by the US decision to propose re-
visions of the treaty's verifi-
cation arrangements and certain
of its formulations on applicable
boundaries. Treaty critics had
focused on these sections, and a
treaty so revised could sway a
number of members to support it.
The Soviets have stated privately,
however, that Moscow's review of
the proposed revisions would be
long and complex and may not be
completed before the General As-
sembly adjourns later this month.
A number of the smaller coun-
tries, led by Mexico, have pro-
posed Assembly resolutions in-
tended to prod the superpowers on
disarmament matters. One of the
more troublesome resolutions would
have the Assembly call upon the
US and the USSR to stop further
work on strategic weapons systems
not yet operational. The Dutch
are circulating an alternative
draft that would call on all nu-
clear weapons states merely to
'udic'
refrain from actions pre
to the success of SALT.
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SEC RFT
PARTY CALLS FOR SUPERVISION OF YUGOSLAV PRESS
The Communist party has taken
a first step to increase govern-
ment control of Yugoslavia's in-
formation media. On 26 November
the Executive Bureau adopted a
10,000-word "special document"
advocating new laws to regulate
the media and creation of "demo-
cratic social machinery" to put
an end to "sensationalism, vul-
garity, ideological confusion,
and catering to special interests"
in the press. The document was
the result of extensive debate
in the Presidium, the party's
policy formulating body, during
a meeting last month. The meet-
ing had been called to consider
ways to counter the "negative by-
products" of the unrestrained
press.
The new machinery presumably
would include some form of high-
level news management board to ex-
ercise over-all supervision. Each
publication would set up its own
editorial council that would en-
sure compliance with the objec-
tives set forth in the new law.
Publishers, editors, and individ-
ual journalists would all be
liable for the publication's con-
tent.
This action came after a
series of publications violated,
in the leadership's view, Yugo-
slavia's basic policy objectives.
A Zagreb youth weekly, Pp Express,
for example, was banned recently
by the public prosecutor for carry-
ing articles "seriously detrimen-
tal to public morals and espe-
cially to those of children and
youth." Its features included
"101 Ways to Make Love" and "101
Ways to Avoid the Draft." Although
the Zagreb regional court subse-
quently rejected the ban and only
one issue was actually suppressed,
the government had registered its
dissatisfaction.
In Bosnia, republic party
officials took exception to the
literary magazine Zivot for pub-
lishing attacks against party
officials. Tito himself publicly
condemned the production of a re-
cent play critical of the party's
methods of reshaping the country
after World War II. In the most
serious case, however, the govern-
ment suppressed Literary News for
criticizing the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia on the eve of
a visit to Yugoslavia by Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko. The
newspaper's editorial board was
forced to resign and its editor
was sentenced to six months in
prison for "slandering" a foreign
power.
The Yugoslav press, radio,
television, and theater now is
subjected only to loose post
facto control. The fact tnat the
Presidium debate over the new
guidelines recognized the impor-
tance of freedom of speech to Yu-
goslavia's self-managing society
suggests that even among party
leaders there is a reluctance to
consider formal censorship. At-
tempts to incorporate the Presid-
ium's restrictive recommenda-
tions in new legislation are cer-
tain to raise controversy in the
government's legislative bodies.
Furthermore, the media can be ex-
pected to fight efforts to restrict
its prerogatives.
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SOVIET FARM CONGRESS ADOPTS NEW CHARTER
Last week in Moscow, repre-
sentatives of the USSR's collec-
tive farms "unanimously" adopted
a new model charter, the first in
35 years. Although proposals to
amend the draft were legion, the
ratified document reflects few of
these changes and remains a con-
servative model for the manage-
ment and operation of the coun-
try's 36,000 collective farms.
Such recent agricultural re-
forms as a guaranteed annual wage,
the creation of incentive funds
and a unified system of social
security benefits are incorporated
in the new charter. The charter
also permits private plots and
livestock, inter-kolkhoz coopera-
tive ventures and auxillary enter-
prises on the farm. Elections
may be either by secret or open
ballot, thereby rejecting the sug-
gestion to make the secret ballot
mandatory.
Long-standing controversial
issues that sparked lively debate
after publication of the draft
charter last April have been ig-
nored or subject to compromise.
The demand for a national collec-
tive farm union that would have
usurped some of the decision-mak-
ing powers of the Ministry of Ag-
riculture has been shunted aside
in favor of what appears to be a
less contentious organization of
collective farm councils. The new
councils, to be formed on the na-
tional and local level, apparently
will be only advisory and pose no
threat to continued centralized
control--the chairman of the na-
tional council, already formed,
is also the minister of agricul-
ture.
Another source of controversy,
the form of farm labor organiza-
tion, was completely ignored in
the congress proceedings. The
link, a small well-equipped unit
of labor assigned to one plot or
crop over a relatively long period
of time, is touted by some as
superior to the larger brigade,
commonly the basic unit of farm
labor. This issue has been bit-
terly contested over the past
few years but the charter leaves
the choice of the labor organiza-
tion up to the farm.
A proposal to free production
and marketing from state control
was firmly rejected at the charter
congress. The politburo's expert
on agricultural affairs, Polyan-
sky, stated that the government
will continue to issue procurement
targets for each farm.
The charter is only a model
to be followed on each farm ac-
cording to local conditions and
is vague on many points. Thus,
relatively open discussion in-
spired by the draft document is
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si{ (;R ET
CONDITIONS FOR AMERICAN
Efforts to integrate Ameri-
can expatriates into Swedish so-
ciety are showing signs of suc-
cess.
Of the 294 military absen-
tees and war resisters currently
registered with the Swedish Im-
migration Board, 104 have steady
jobs, 156 are studying, 15 are
unemployed, 12 are under medical
or psychiatric care, and seven
are in jail, mostly for narcotics
offenses. Of those studying,
most are enrolled in language
classes.
The stream of deserters and
draft dodgers began in December
1967 when four sailors left their
ship in Tokyo and traveled to
Stockholm. After some hesita-
tion Sweden decided to grant them
asylum, but on humanitarian, not
political grounds, in line with
a long Swedish tradition of pro-
viding a haven for refugees.
DESERTERS IN SWEDEN IMPROVE
Cub-a, and several West European
countries.
Because most arrive without
skills or knowledge of the Swedish
language, the deserters are ini-
tially employed in positions such
as truckdriver assistants or dish-
washers, and those who cannot
find work are granted $17 a week,
as well as food, lodging, and
clothes. Once the deserter gets
past the initial trauma of life
in exile, he is encouraged to sign
up for any of a wide variety of
programs designed to help him
find a place in society. Implied
in the official policy of swift
integration is a desire to pre"
vent formation of an expatriate
fraternity, highly visible and
capable of embarrassing the gov-
ernment.
A small number of war re-
sisters grouped in the American
Deserters Committee has, with the
assistance of the radical left,
in Sweden, attracted considerable
publicity by refusing to sub-
scribe to the government's ef-
fort to integrate them. Instead
they have taken part in, or pro-
moted, demonstrations, films,
lectures, and other agitational
work in Sweden and the other
Nordic countries.
This activity, coupled with
the publicity given to some de-
serters' scrapes with the law and
their generally alien appearance,
has stiffened the general Swedish
reserve toward foreigners. To
overcome this the State Immigra-
tion Board has undertaken an ex-
tensive community relations pro-
gram.
Of the 378 Americans who
have applied for asylum in the
last two years, 325 were granted
permission to stay, 15 were re-
fused, and another 15 are currently
under consideration. An esti-
mated 30 to 40 left the country
either before or after their ap-
plications were processed, and
an additional number have entered
and left Sweden without coming to
the attention of the police or
immigration authorities. It is
estimated that 148 men defected
from units in West Germany, 142
arrived directly from the United
States, while 20 came from Viet-
nam. The balance came via Canada,
Page 14
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As the Four Power talks on a Middle East peace settlement reopen this
week after a five-month recess, both the Arabs and the Israelis are main-
taining their adamant military and diplomatic stance. Action along the
so-called "cease-fire" lines continues, with the Israelis launching daily strikes
in response to a steady series of minor attacks by regular and guerrilla Arab
forces.
Sudan's five-month-old
RCU moved to protect itself with a series c po itical arrests aimed at
cracking down on antiregime activists. In Somalia, the locus of power in the
six-week-old Supreme Revolutionary Command remained unclearF
Southern Yemeni troops seized a remote Saudi border post on 26
November but were apparently repulsed sever~.l days later. What provoked
the clash is not yet known, but it further complicates inter-Arab relations
prior to the Arab summit meeting scheduled to begin in Rabat on 20
December and billed as an effort to achieve Aral: unity.
In Nigeria, the Biafrans continue to hold back sustained federal attacks
along the enclave's northern and southern fronts. Biafran units are probably
suffering munitions shortages because of the high level of fighting since
mid-November, but there are no signs that federal forces are about to achieve
any major breakthrough.
Pakistan's President Yahya Khan last week laid down general guidelines
for a return to civilian rule and announced that national assembly elections
will be held next October. Although martial law will continue until a new
government is inaugurated--possibly well into 1971-suspicions that Yahya
intends to rule indefinitely have been laid to rest for the time being.F_
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BIG FOUR PEACE TALKS RESUME AS MIDEAST STRIFE CONTINUES
As the Four Power talks on
a Middle East peace settlement
reopen this week after a five-
month recess, the Israelis are
maintaining their adamant mili-
tary and diplomatic stance. They
have taken pains to reiterate
their long-held stand on a set-
tlement--there will be no with-
drawal without direct negotia-
tions with the Arabs. On the
military front, they are launch-
ing daily strikes along the so-
called "cease-fire" lines in re-
sponse to the continuing attacks
by regular and guerrilla Arab
forces.
Israeli Foreign Ministry of-
ficials have been quite vocal in
their opposition to the Big Power
talks. Foreign Minister Eban re-
buffed Soviet criticism of Israel
as the main obstacle to peace by
pointing out that Moscow was so
obviously biased toward the Arabs
that it was unfit to serve as a
peacemaker. A Foreign Ministry
official also took a swing at the
US, noting that although Tel Aviv
agreed with Washington in princi-
ple, there were still wide dif-
ferences between them on the de-
tails of a settlement.
On the military fronts, Is-
rael is striking Jordan and the
Egyptian positions along the west
bank of the Suez Canal on a regu-
lar--almost a "milk run"--bas-is.
These blows are in response to
steady attacks by fedayeen and
regular Jordanian forces along
Israel's eastern border, and to
the continued Egyptian dispatch
of commando teams--and occasional
aircraft--across the canal.
During November, the Egyp-
tians built up a favorable "score"
that seems certain to provoke an
eventual Israeli response, per-
haps even a major retaliation.
The two major unsettled accounts
are the Egyptians' naval shelling
of the north Sinai coast at Romani
early last month and, in particu-
lar, their attack in mid-Novem-
ber against two ships in the port
of Eilat. Although the Egyptian
frogmen's strike at Eilat did no
serious damage, it was a stinging
and embarrassing blow to the Is-
raelis and one that by itself
would seem to warrant major re-
taliation.
Israel, however, has not
embarked on any large-scale op-
eration since it put an armored
force on the west side of the
Gulf of Suez on 9 September and
followed this with a month-long
aerial pounding of the area. The
pause--and it seems certain to be
this rather than any change of
policy--may stem primarily from
the fact that October and Novem-
ber were busy months for the Is-
raelis. Mrs. Meir visited the
US; they conducted parliamentary
elections and are still in the
process of forming a new govern-
ment; they were concerned specta-
tors of developments to the north
during the Lebanese-fedayeen con-
frontation; and they have still
not obtained the release of the
two Israeli passengers hijacked
to Damascus.
Between now and the Arab sum-
mit meeting set for Rabat on 20 De-
cember, however, the Israelis may
again return to the "education" of
Nasir that they began last July.
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Their views on the Egyptian leader
have not changed: they still see
him as the main block to a satis-
factory settlement, and still be-
lieve that things would be better
all around if he were not on the
scene. Given the Israelis' belief
that the military pressure they have
exerted up to now has already been
responsible for some disarray in
Cairo, such as the recent changes
in military commands, they can be
expected to apply additional pres-
sure in the hope that in time they
can remove Nasir himself from the
scene.
SOMALIA'S POLITICAL SCENE REMAINS MURKY
Six weeks after the coup, the
Supreme Revolutionary Council is
still sorting itself out. The di-
vision of responsibility and au-
thority between the civilian cabi-
net and the military remains poorly
defined. The regime is intent on
focusing its efforts primarily on
domestic affairs, but few concrete
steps have yet been taken to con-
front Somalia's age-old economic
and social headaches.
There have been some insights
into the inner workings of the coun-
cil, but the over-all picture of the
new power structure is one of uncer-
tainty and fluidity. No single in-
dividual or group dominates the re-
gime. General Siad, president of
the council, continues to be the
key figure, acting as both head of
state and of government. He holds
his position by virtue of being army
commander, however, and it is ques-
tionable how much authority he ac-
tually has among the council mem-
bers, at least some of whom dislike
him personally. Outside the coun-
cil, he has had some success in con-
solidating his position by neutral-
izing--at least temporarily--several
influential and popular army and po-
lice officers who were potential op-
position leaders.
In the absence of firm leader-
ship, two factions have developed
in the 25-member council and now
appear to be vying for position.
Neither group
is particularly cohesive, however,
and differences based on tribal,
regional, and individual loyalties
are evident, especially among the
younger members.
table?
of shake-up in the regime is inevi-
It is not clear to what extent
either faction is able to influence
decis:'Lons on matters before the
counc_.l. Some friction has already
arisen over particular issues, how-
ever, and this may indicate that
infighting is sharpening. For the
moment, neither group seems to have
a distinct advantage over the other.
In view of their maneuvering, and
of the known opposition to the coup
among some tribal groups, it appears
increasingly likely that some kind
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GROWING OPPOSITION TO LIBYAN JUNTA
Some three months after its sitions in the bureaucracy do have
seizure of power, Libya's Revolu- some means to manifest their op-
tionary Command Council is plagued position, however. Their present
by several challenges to its po- plans call for strikes and other
sition. President Qaddafi, in forms of "civil disobedience" dur-
particular, is reported to be ing December, hoping to bring gbv-
facing growing opposition. Two ernment administration to a stand-
centers of this as yet unorgan- still.
ized dissent--the cabinet and the
former ruling establishment--of- Unlike the other two groups,
fer no serious threat because they I those within the army who oppose
lack the military means to stage ? Qaddafi do not seek a share of
a countercoup. The third disaf-
fected group--elements in the
army and in the junta itself--
does wield some military muscle,
power--they already have that--
but rather are intent on altering
the President's pro-Egyptian poli-
cies.
Most of the discontent in
the cabinet arises from the jun-
ta's unwillingness to share its
direction of government affairs. Most recently, their wrath is
Despite attempts by the prime min- said to have been raised by coun-
i-ster and others to force the coun-I cil discussion of a union between
cil's hand by submitting their Libya, Egypt, and Sudan. Qaddafi
resignations, the officers have and his supporters are apparently
remained firm in refusing to dele- seeking the de facto legitimacy
gate power, claiming that the ci- that unity would confer, but their
vilians cannot be trusted. The opponents fear that such a scheme
junta's patience with the prime would only squander Libya's oil.
minister may be Just about ex- I wealth to finance Egyptian mili-
hausted. i tary ventures.
Members of the former royal-
ist ruling establishment are also
bitter about their exclusion from
the top levels of government. Al-
though some of them may have tribal
support, especially in the Cyrenai-
can area, they lack the military
power needed to challenge the army.
Those who have retained their po-
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ELECTIONS SCHEDULED IN PAKISTAN
In a nationwide broadcast
last week, President Yahya Khan
scheduled national assembly elec-
tions for 5 October 1970 and
laid down general guidelines for
a return to civilian rule. His
long-awaited announcement should
reduce the pressures that have
been building up against the gov-
ernment in recent weeks.
Yahya's speech followed many
days of speculation that an of-
ficial move to end the political
stalemate was imminent. He an-
nounced that the national assembly
elected in 1970 will initially
have a constitution-making role.
If it completes this task within
120 days, it will become the cen-
tral legislature; if it fails, a
new assembly will be elected to
finish the job. Although martial
law will continue until a con-
stitution is authenticated and
a new government inaugurated--
possibly well into 1971--sus-
picions that Yahya intends to
rule indefinitely have been laid
to rest for the time being.
Yahya rioted that a number
of issues such as the parliamen-
tary form of government, an in-
dependent judiciary, and the Is-
lamic nature of the state were
nationally agreed upon and could
be considered settled. He also
announced settlement of several
other important questions--the
basis for national voting and
the form of administration for
West Pakistan--along lines he
believes to be most widely ac-
cepted, thereby simultaneously
removing them as election issues
and appeasing dissident elements.
in regard to West Pakistan, Yahya
declared that the unified state
would be dissolved and he im-
plied that the pre-1956 ethno-
linguistic provinces would be
reinstated--a concession to mi-
nority demands for an end to Pun-
jabi domination. In a gesture
to more populous East Pakistan,
Yahya announced acceptance of
the one man - one vote formula
for national elections. He fur-
ther proposed maximum provincial
autonomy consonant with national
intecrrity, but left specific de-
tails of the center-province re-
lationship to the new assembly.
Yahya also made other at-
tempts to placate his critics.
He announced, for example, that
all martial law restrictions on
political activity would be re-
moved. on 1 January 1970, but he
coupled this with a warning that
violence would not be tolerated.
He acknowledged the gravity of
the country's economic troubles
and pledged to reduce prices and
end food shortages. Calling
upon all Pakistanis to pull to-
gether in a national effort, he
promised to eliminate corruption
among government officials and
vowed to protect responsible
members of both management and
labor.
Yahya's speech initiates a
new phase in Pakistan's political
development. It remains to be
seen, however, if the outlined
plans can stem the tide of labor
unrest, head off new political
agitation, or produce the stable,
democratic government Pakistan
has lacked since its inception.
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CRUCIAL ELECTIONS IN KENYA SCHEDULED FOR 6 DECEMBER
The conduct and outcome of
the primary elections to select
the Kenya Africa National Union
(KANU) candidates for Parliament
may in large measure set the
course of future events in Kenya.
The elections have provoked
much local interest and excite-
ment; more than 600 people are
seeking nomination for the 158
parliamentary seats. Because
President Jomo Kenyatta banned
the only opposition party in Oc-
tober, whoever wins a KANU nom-
ination in the primary will auto-
matically win a seat in the "elec-
tion" to be held on 20 December.
Little violence has developed
during the electoral campaign, but
tribal tensions remain high. Luo
and other smaller tribes are es-
pecially suspicious and distrust-
ful of the dominant Kikuyu tribe
because of the assassination in
July of popular Luo politician
Tom Mboya. A resurgence of oath-
taking ceremonies among the Ki-
kuyu, and the extremely heavy-
handed manner in which the Kikuyu-
dominated government reacted to
tribal dissatisfaction, intensi-
fied this animosity.
Inspite of their bitterness,
and even though KANU is controlled
by Kikuyu politicians, many Luo
and members of other minority
tribes are seeking party nomina-
tions in their areas. Tribal
leaders seem to have decided that
it is of overriding importance to
try to elect capable individuals
who can take tribal grievances to
Parliament.
Important contests will also
occur in the Kikuyu home districts.
Several old-guard Kikuyu cabinet
ministers--including those largely
responsible for the effort of the
past several months to maintain
Kikuyu hegemony--face challenges
from progressive young members of
their own tribe. These younger
politicians, who appear to be more
sensitive to the aspirations of
other tribes, have a good chance
of winning--if the elections are
conducted honestly--because some
of the old-line Kikuyu politicians
have neglected their constitu-
encies since taking office in 1963.
The critical question is
whether Kenyatta and the old-
guard Kikuyu will allow a free
selection of candidates. Al-
though several facets of the elec-
toral law--such as a virtual lack
of a secret ballot--make rigging
The old-guard Kikuyu,
however, may well seek to fix at
least some contests to save their
own seats or to disenfranchise
other tribes. If the rigging does
occur and is done too blatantly,
particularly in the Luo areas, it
will certainly disillusion those
who look to the present primaries
as a chance to vent their griev-
ances through legal, democratic
processes. Such a development
would seriously hamper chances
for any future tribal reconcilia-
tion. Moreover, if the younger
Kikuyu are denied a real run for
office, even the Kikuyu tr*b
be split.
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The Inter-American Economic and Social Committee (IA-ECOSOC) of
the Organization of American States adjourned its Washington meeting last
Saturday, agreeing to resume on 26 January in Caracas. The conference
sessions were long and difficult, and differences between the US and Latin
American delegations as well as disagreements among the Latins themselves
were prevalent. President Nixon's newly stated policy to downplay US
predominance in hemisphere affairs left the Latin Americans, who have long
been followers or reactors to US initiatives, in an unaccustomed position.
They were simply unprepared themselves to take the lead.
The Bolivian Government apparently hopes that its agreement with the
USSR to exchange ambassadors will smooth the way for Soviet technical and
financial assistance. A spokesman for the Soviet technical team currently in
Bolivia to study the mining industry had earlier said that diplomatic relations
were a necessary precondition for any type of Soviet assistance.
The Soviet Union's armed forces newspaper Red Star reported this
week that the USSR is helping to equip Cuba with the "newest weapons and
military equipment." The article, which coincided with the arrival in Havana
of the first in a new series of military shipments, did not specify the types of
weapons to be delivered. Relations between the two countries have warmed
steadily during the past year.
In another development, approximately 150 Americans arrived in
Havana to cut sugar cane in an effort to help Castro fulfill his promise of a
10- million-ton sugar harvest for 1970. The group, named the "We Shall Win
Brigade," is the first of what organizers hope will be about 600 Americans to
travel to Cuba.
In the Dominican Republic, most major opposition political parties for
the first time jointly condemned any re-election effort by President
Balaguer. Their public statement, which warns that the president's re-
election would lead to further violence and chaos, is an attempt to demon-
strate "widespread public" opposition to a second term. Despite opposition
forebodings of violence and recent rumors of prospective coup attempts,
however, Balaguer's recent actions indicate that he will run.
The possibility of terrorist activity in Brazil and Panama has increased.
In Brazil, security officials are expecting trouble on the first-month anni-
versary of the death of dissident Communist leader Carlos Marighella. In
Panama, the government fears that the death in prison of the former leader
of the small pro-Castro Revolutionary Unity Movement, Floyd Britton, may
spur some retaliatory acts by his followers.
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NEW GUERRILLA INCIDENTS OCCUR IN GUATEMALA
An elaborate counterguerrilla
operation has been under way for
the past week following new inci-
dents in Guatemala's mountainous
rur-al northwest. A series of de-
lays in Communist plans to begin
disrupting the electoral campaign,
however, has resulted in a moder-
ate to low level of urban terror-
ism.
On 21 November, three farms
near the Quiche - Alta Verapaz
border were occupied by about 50
guerrillas of the Communist Rebel
Armed Forces. On 26 November,
approximately 24 men occupied a
small village near the Huehue-
tenango-Quiche border. In both
incidents the occupants were sub-
jected to propaganda harangues
and were invited to join the rev-
olution, but no one was harmed.
The raids appear to have been
primarily foraging expeditions.
The band, whose style in two
recent raids is similar to that
of the guerrillas who struck at
drilling sites in Alta Verapaz in
early October, appears to have
split into two groups, possibly
as an evasion tactic. Various
army units, including the rapid
reaction paratroop force from San
Jose, are tracking the guerrillas
and apparently have wounded some
who are fleeing eastward. Bad
weather has hindered the counter-
insurgent operation, which is one
of the largest the army has made
and to which the government has
committed paratroop forces for
the first time. Army Chief of
Staff General Cifuentes has macse
an urgent appeal to the US for the
immediate delivery of a helicopter,
which he considers crucial to the
operation's success.
In general, politicking for
the presidency has failed to fire
the public. Unless the Communists
begin to put their subversive
plans into operation this month,
the political lull is likely to
prevail until after the Christmas
holidays.
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GUATEMALA: Guerrillas Continue Rural Operations
Sites of guerrilla attacks
4-5 October _
GUATEMALA
CITY
Santa An e
'4
EL 5AO7ADO
SECRET
Village occupied ,f
26 November
)EI cave
Middlesex*
BRITISH
HONDURAS
Francisco
Yale
irf 113t XA:-
\ ( Puerto
7 ?(3 Trios
HONDURAS
0 10 20 40 Mil-
0 10 20 40 Kilometers
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sF.CR I -- I'
ATTENTION SHIFTS FROM MILITARY TO POLITICS IN CHILE
Further military defiance
of the Chilean government seems
less likely as political activity
intensifies ten months before the
presidential election.
Retired General Roberto
Viaux is awaiting trial for lead-
ing an army uprising on 21 Octo-
ber. Unless he is made a martyr
by a harsh sentence, Viaux' chances
of becoming the leader he thinks
Chile needs are waning. Pay raises
and the appointment of respected
new commandants have assuaged
much of the military's restless-
ness for the present.
Meanwhile, all seven de-
clared presidential candidates
are campaigning in widely varying
styles. Among them, former pres-
ident Jorge Alessandri on the
right, Radomiro Tomic of the gov-
erning Christian Democrats, and
Socialist Senator Salvador Allende
on the far left now are considered
the real contenders for the six-
year term. President Frei cannot
succeed himself.
The 73-year-old Alessandri
is an independent with a nation-
alistic and paternalistic image
that carries his appeal far be-
yond the conservative National
Party that nominated him.
The ambitious and combative
Tomic is suffering from wide-
spread public disenchantment with
the government, and he rated very
low in a recent opinion poll.
Rebuffed in his pitch for Com-
munist support, he now is court-
ing middle class voters and re-
organizing the lower class groups
that were a big factor in Frei's
unusually high margin of victory
in 1964.
Allende suffers from over-
exposure and the lukewarm support
of his own extremist Socialist
party. Nevertheless, the Com-
munist Party may drop its own
candidate, poet Pablo Neruda and
back Allende because of his proven
vote-getting powers.
Chileans have a near obses-
sion with politics. Their numer-
ous, opinionated, and articulate
newspapers foster interest and
accentuate divisions in this
85 percent literate population.
Acrimonious political jokes are
a national avocation, and political
judgments are harsh and change-
able. The Christian Democrats'
'?revolution in liberty" has
alienated so many that Chileans--
the majority of whom belong to
no political party--are seeking
a new solution. At the moment,
Alessandri appears to have the
most appeal, but this may be
undercut by a growing suspicion
that he might turn back the clock.
The consistent and growing
strength of Chilean leftist po-
litical forces is a major factor.
If they can overcome the serios
internal squabbles that divide
them and settle on one candidate,
their coalition under the dis-
ciplined leadership of the Com-
munist Party could win.
SECRFT
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SECRET
CUBA SEEKS TRADE TIES WITH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
Havana is showing greater in-
terest in establishing commercial
ties with its Caribbean neighbors.
According to a recent press re-
port, Fidel Castro sent a personal
message to Jamaican Prime Minister
Shearer calling for closer trade
ties among all Caribbean nations.
The report has been denied by the
official of the United Nation's
Economic and Social Council who
purportedly delivered the message,
but press coverage of the matter
is keeping it alive. Cuban offi-
cials have indicated that Cuba may
attempt to join the Caribbean Free
Trade Association.
Some governments may be recep-
tive to Cuba's initiatives. For
example, Prime Minister Williams
of Trinidad-Tobago has called for
cooperation with Cuba on several
occasions, and at a recent West
Indian Sugar Conference he again
openly discussed the merits of
closer trade ties between Cuban
GUATEMALA-:''H6NDURA$
and other Caribbean nations, es-
pecially in the area of sugar trade.
A few Caribbean leaders are
convinced that lasting regional
agreements must eventually include
Cuba. These governments may also
be trying to demonstrate their in-
dependence of United States policy
regarding Cuba.
Castro, for his part, would
welcome a "chink in the armor" of
the US-sponsored economic denial
program and an undermining of pres-
ent OAS policy. He would also
use expanded economic ties to ex-
tend his political influence.
SECRET
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Secret
Secret
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