AFGHANISTAN: KING ZAHIR'S EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007400040002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 31, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
A fghanistan.? King Zahir's Experiment in Democracy
Secret
N2 43
31 October 1969
No. 0394/69A
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AFGHANISTAN: KING ZAHIR'S EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY
King Zahir's bold "experiment in democracy" has just passed another political milestone
with the completion of Afghanistan's second parliamentary election under the 1964 constitu-
tion. The first few years of the experiment, were designed to give an authoritarian tribal
society a degree of Western-style parliamentary government. They were turbulent years for
the country, which, nevertheless, has managed to maintain a remarkable degree of stability.
The cautious modernization effort is
generating obvious strains, particularly
in urban areas, but it has not seriously
damaged the social fabric of this tra-
dition-bound country.
Although the underpinnings of a
new political system have been estab.
lished, a workable balance between
executive leadership, parliamentary
action, royal guidance, and popular
participation has not yet been struck.
Achieving this balance and resolving-
within a democratic framework-the
conflict between Afghanistan's con-
servative and progressive forces are the
primary challenges facing the nation's
new leadership. Despite the discouragingly slow pace of social change and barely perceptible
economic and political progress thus far, the King apparently remains sincerely committed to
the eventual realization of the liberal reform program which he set in motion six years ago.
THE "EXPERIMENT" IN CRISIS
In the last two years, public confidence in
the experiment has begun to wane. The extra-
ordinary tasks of effectively running a new politi-
cal system and dealing with massive socio-
economic problems have tended to overwhelm
the country's new and essentially untried leaders.
Faced with bewildering new challenges of civil
unrest created by the slow erosion of traditional
ties and disciplines, the government of Prime
Minister Etemadi has been afflicted with a dis-
turbing immobilism. The resulting leadership
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void, combined with the sluggishness and un-
manageability of parliament, has contributed to
economic and social stagnation. Some educated
citizens, particularly conservatives who favor
return to a more autocratic form of government,
are said to be seriously questioning Afghanistan's
readiness for even a limited form of democracy.
Among the skeptics are many of the most in-
fluential people in the country, including
important members of the royal family, educated
technocrats whose prerogatives are challenged by
the experiment, and other established interests.
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Discontent with the experiment, however,
although it affects an important segment of
Afghans, is still centered in a tiny portion of the
population. The vast majority of Afghans care
little who occupies the seat of power in Kabul.
The country remains overwhelmingly illiterate-
over 90 percent-and rural; 90 percent of the
people are tied to the land or to their flocks.
Unconcerned about the political machinations
and intrigues of Kabul, the provincial tribes and
peasantry are content with their time-honored
customs and want only to be left alone. Having
been spared the problems of overpopulation,
hunger, and abject poverty prevalent in some
other South Asian countries, most Afghans feel
no sense of urgency about industrialization or
reform. Political awareness is limited almost
entirely to a very few urban residents who have
received some modern education. The tendency
of the current national leaders to proceed
cautiously and simply let things work themselves
out naturally-no matter how long and dis-
organized a procedure this might be-somehow
seems appropriate for this remote, tradition-
oriented kingdom.
King Zahir's role in Afghanistan has changed
dramatically since he assumed the throne at the
age of 19 in 1933, following the assassination of
his father. For years, Zahir and the Afghan
Government were dominated by the King's three
uncles. In 1953, the King's cousin and brother-in-
law, the authoritarian Mohammad Daud, became
prime minister and governed for the next decade,
using strong-arm tactics that won him both the
respect and the fear of the population. In the
early 1960s, King Zahir became increasingly
aware of the liberal political movements that had
been sweeping the Middle East since World War
11. In an effort to prevent such a development
from engulfing his own country and to halt the
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Prune Minister Etemadi
increasingly anti-Pakistan and pro-Soviet trend of
Afghanistan's foreign policy, Zahir forced the
resignation of Daud and launched his "ex-
periment in democracy." He appointed for the
first time a commoner Mohammad Yusuf, as
prime minister, and promoted the drafting of a
new constitution that established a parliamentary
government and prohibited members of the royal
family from holding high government offices. The
country's first elections under the new con-
stitution were held in September 1965, and
Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal was appointed
to replace Yusuf. After two controversial years in
office, Maiwandwal resigned, ostensibly for health
reasons, and was replaced by Nur Ahmad
Etemadi, who has since held the office.
Although the King seems to be staunchly
behind the reform program, he has not yet suc-
ceeded in defining a proper role for himself in the
new system. He has kept himself well informed
on internal developments, but has rarely asserted
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his will openly or even behind the scenes. On the
other hand, his ambivalence about sharing politi-
cal power has perpetuated the palace as the locus
of political strength and favor. He has kept a tight
rein on the defense establishment. He has failed
to sign enabling legislation for political parties
and municipal elections, thereby thwarting the
development of institutions designed to prepare
men for political leadership. The King's decisions
on these matters have been regarded by some
observers as a royal reluctance to permit the
establishment of alternative bases of power. It
seems more likely, however, that King Zahir is
under severe pressure from powerful reactionary
elements to abrogate the experiment altogether
and has been searching for some way to make the
new system acceptable to all Afghans and to bring
it safely through this trial period.
THE ETEMADI GOVERNMENT
King Zahir's appointment of Etemadi as
prime minister was generally regarded as a royal
decision to slow the pace of the experiment in
democracy and cool political tempers aroused by
Etemadi's predecessor, the controversial
Maiwandwal. Maiwandwal had given parliament
short shrift, making little effort to develop a
workable and equitable relationship between the
two branches of government. Furthermore, his
attempt to establish an independent political base
had threatened established interests
In Etemadi, the King found a man of
acknowledged integrity and intelligence but
questionable drive and decision-making ability.
Not unexpectedly, Etemadi's term of office has
been characterized by vacillating and ineffective
leadership. Viewed in perspective, this low-keyed
approach certainly had a large measure of royal
approval. Democratization and decentralization
of power under the experiment have not altered
the fact that in Afghanistan the King remains the
final and pre-eminent source of power. If King
Zahir had disapproved of Etemadi's performance,
he could have replaced him. In typical fashion,
King Zahir preferred to let the government
muddle along rather than step into the political
fray and provide a strong guiding hand.
It should be noted, however, that the
Etemadi government has made some positive
contributions to the new political system. The
prime minister did not rock the boat or challenge
established interests as Maiwandwal had. Further-
more, he succeeded in improving relations be-
tween the government and parliament. His
genuine effort to consult rather than bypass the
legislature, however, frequently was carried to
extremes. His deference to the inexperienced
deputies all too often resulted in a paralysis of the
political process and a shelving of important eco-
nomic development plans. These problems
worried Kabul's foreign advisers far more than
they disturbed the Afghans themselves.
Outgoing Parliament in Joint Session
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Despite its extremely poor legislative record,
the Afghan Parliament undeniably has established
its place in the political order as an institution
with considerable influence. Increasingly con-
scious of their representative function, the
deputies began to espouse the causes of students
and other constituents and make the Lower
AFGHANISTAN
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House a true forum for the expression of public
opinion. Parliament also served quite effectively
as an investigative body, rooting out corruption
and exposing wrong-doing among high
government officials; one investigation forced the
resignation of a cabinet member. In addition, the
deputies summoned cabinet ministers before the
Lower House to undergo strenuous questioning.
Aso ng deman
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Nevertheless, the Afghan Parliament has
been ineffective as a legislative body. Although
the deputies have gained some experience and
understanding of complex governing problems
during the past four years, there has been almost
no forward movement on urgent economic and
social programs. Parochialism and tribal ties have
continued to dominate parliament, with most
deputies concerned only about those issues which
directly affect their own interests. 25X1
Nor have the confused and disorderly in-
ternal proceedings of parliament shown any signs
of improving. Most of the parliamentary debates
are meaningless, with every deputy having his say
on each issue, according to age-old tribal custom.
The absence of legal political parties contributes
to this chaos. Parties could provide the basis for
internal parliamentary organization and rationali-
zation of procedures. Party spokesmen could
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Seats Contested
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Seats 28 Contested
for various reasons
speak for their supporters on the issues, thus
reducing debate and stepping up the current
snail's pace of activity. Thus far, the King has
been unwilling to sign into law the political
parties bill passed by parliament in May 1968.!
With these elections
over an the next one four years away, King
Zahir may now be ready to sign such legislation,
in the belief that political groups of all colora-
tions will have enough time to establish and
organize themselves before the next electoral
campaign.
King Zahir must take considerable re-
sponsibility for inaction on legislative as well as
executive matters. Parliament, which has
considered it a matter of pride not to take orders
Senate
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from the prime minister and his cabinet, has con-
sistently shown itself ready to move with alacrity
when royal interest was indicated. In the absence
of such interest, very few pieces of significant
legislation have been passed, and both houses
have recessed each year, leaving a full agenda of
unfinished business.
INCREASING CIVIL UNREST
Civil unrest also has come into its own
during Etemadi's term of office as the wave of
global student dissent reached the remote foot-
hills of the Hindu Kush. Student protests are not
a new phenomenon in Afghanistan, having been a
major factor in the toppling of the Yusuf govern-
ment in 1965. The permissiveness of the Etemadi
government, however, enabled student dissidents
to gain experience in demonstrating and to estab-
lish themselves as an important political factor.
They not only took their academic and political
grievances to the streets, but also succeeded in
establishing an alliance with parliamentary
deputies and eventually even a coalition with dis-
contented faculty members.
During the widespread demonstrations in the
spring of 1968, there were, for the first time,
definite indications of central guidance and
coordination-probably leftist-behind student
and labor protests. The demands and behavior of
the demonstrators were strikingly similar through-
out the country. The protests, which erupted in a
substantial number of Afghanistan's provinces,
succeeded largely because of the government's
delayed and indecisive response. In September
1968, after nearly five months of periodic student
demonstrations, the King issued new universities
and education decrees, which strengthened gov-
ernment control over educational institutions and
severely restricted student political activities.
Royal decrees have the force of law during parlia-
mentary adjournments but must be submitted for
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legislative approval within 30 days after parlia-
ment reconvenes. Students scored a resounding
success when parliament rejected the two laws in
November.
Laborers were less successful, because the
police moved in more forcefully to put down
their strikes and protests. The few concessions
that the government promised the industrial
workers-a small and quite inarticulate element of
Afghan society-have not been made good.
The Etemadi government's inept handling of
the 1968 civil unrest caused serious concern
among educated Afghans, and King Zahir re-
portedly came under considerable pressure from
members of the establishment in Kabul to adopt a
harder line against demonstrations. Finally, in
June 1969 after another series of student
protests, Etemadi made a hard-hitting speech,
emphasizing the government's intention to take a
firm stand in dealing with protests and dissidents.
The regime seems to have followed up Etemadi's
speech with action. All students registering at
Kabul University for this year's sessions are re-
portedly being required to sign pledges of good
behavior. Similar promises were allegedly also ex-
tracted from secondary school students. The
government hopes, in this way, to eliminate
troublemakers and separate protest instigators
from potential supporters and recruits.
The government's new policy, however,
simply puts in suspension the real grievances of
students and workers at a time when dissatisfac-
tion within these elements of society is growing.
Students are increasingly demanding the right not
only to an education at government expense but
also to a job following graduation. The govern-
ment will not be able to absorb this burgeoning
labor supply indefinitely, and the sluggish private
sector is not growing fast enough to take up the
slack. Many graduates may eventually swell the
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discontented ranks of the educated unemployed.
In addition, the government appears to be in no
hurry to pass legislation to improve the sorry lot
of the laborers, whose numbers will grow as the
nation slowly industrializes.
GREATER FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The permissiveness of the Etemadi regime
also encouraged the growth of a so-called in-
dependent press. Independent newspapers in
Afghanistan are really less than the term implies
because the government owns all of the country's
printing facilities. Nevertheless, the number of
independently managed journals-most are politi-
cal tracts-increased from two when Etemadi
assumed office to more than ten in the fall of
1969. When Etemadi first took over only those
articles regarded by the government as "calls to
revolution" were considered grounds for suspen-
sion of a newspaper's publishing rights. The prime
minister's get-tough speech of June 1969 and the
approach of the fall elections, however, signaled a
government crack-down on the press and other
critics. Several papers were suspended indefinitely
and legal action was taken against others. Never-
theless, on balance, the newspaper field has
grown, and the government will probably con-
tinue to allow limited freedom of the press,
possibly on the assumption that newspapers
provide a useful outlet for the expression of
grievances that might otherwise take a more
violent turn.
POLITICAL PARTIES
Although Afghan political parties have not
yet received legal sanction, a number of political
groupings have developed. These cover the entire
range of the political spectrum, but the most
easily identifiable and by far the best organized
are the extreme left and the far right. The
numerous amorphous groups which fall in
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between typically are made up of small numbers
of supporters of particular personalities-such as
ex-Prime Minister Maiwandwal or socialist
Mohammad Siddiq Farhang-whose ideas and pre-
stige give the groups their character. Although
these so-called parties are gaining in importance,
party membership still encompasses only a very
small minority of politically aware and active
Afghans. Parliament has provided an opportunity
for increased party activity. Usually, however,
factors other than party affiliation have
determined final votes on bills before the as-
sembly.
Analysis of the elections of August and
September of this year indicates that party and
ideology played a very small role in most races.
The crucial elements were family and tribal con-
nections as well as financial resources. Although
voting in the cities was generally light, the rural
turnout was heavier than in 1965 because pro-
vincial leaders made great efforts to get out the
vote for their candidates, most of whom had no
party ties. The political party line-up for the new
parliament gives the avowed pro-Communists
only two seats, leaving the far left, if anything,
weaker than in the previous legislature. The
strongest party will probably be a conservative-
royalist group, which, however, is not expected
to be subject to party discipline.
The prospects for impressive legislative
action from the new parliament are not encourag-
ing. The attitudes and backgrounds of the newly
elected deputies are similar to those which pre-
dominated in the last parliament. Most of the
deputies-who are primarily village, tribal, and
religious elders-have little education and hold
parochial views. In fact, provincialism and con-
servatism may be even more pronounced in this
parliament than in the last.
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Kabul, Capital of Afghanistan, in the Shadow of the Hindu Kush
Local leaders, who ignored the 1965 elec-
tions, were deeply involved in this year's cam-
paign. Having realized the potential power of par-
liament, they campaigned activeiy for conserva-
tive-even reactionary-candidate',. Many of the
more educated and enlightened candidates had to
suppress moderate or progressive views during the
campaign. Some were forced to drop out ol the
race entirely, and many who completed the cam-
paign were defeated. For what: ver reason, the
government apparently did not intervene on be-
half of liberal, educated candidates as it had in
1965. A surprisingly large number of incum-
bents-who would have been able to guide fresh-
men members of the new parliament-were also
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defeated. These developments appear to be pri-
marily the result of the light voter turnout in the
cities and apathy among educated Afghans who
have openly expressed disillusionment with the
experiment, dissatisfaction with the outgoing par-
liament, and disinterest in the elections. There
appears to be some indication, also, that registra-
tion regulations were misunderstood; many
people discovered on election day that they were
ineligible to vote.
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The new parliament, therefore, may be even
less inclined to pass reform legislation than was
the last. Its members are likely to become bogged
down with economic and social programs far
beyond their comprehension. The Lower House
seems headed for organizational problems as well,
since its able and highly respected president,
Abdul Zahir, chose not to stand for re-election.
There appears to be no one of his stature in the
new body. Zahir was the force which, for four
years, lent some semblance of order and sanity to
the chaotic procedures of the Lower House.
The Afghan Parliament will continue to be a
malleable entity, however, and its accomplish-
ments will depend not only on its own initiative
and enlightenment, but also on the nature and
degree of executive leadership and royal direc-
tion. Most deputies remain fiercely loyal to the
King, and they will be strongly influenced by his
opinions and desires, if he sees fit to make these
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King Zahir has again asked Etemadi to form
a government, possibly because there is simply no
one else willing or able to take over. An influx of
new ideas and leadership from the executive
branch, therefore, is unlikely. Etemadi does not
seem to be any more enthusiastic about con-
tinuing his prime ministerial duties than he was
ohnnt assuming them in the first nlacP I
Forming a government and obtaining a vote
of confidence from parliament will probably take
several weeks. Some ministers of the last govern-
ment are likely to be retained, but the over-all
make-up of the cabinet is, at present, still a
matter of speculation.
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In any case, no great political, social, or
economic changes are likely in Afghanistan for
the next several years. The experiment will prob-
ably continue to plod along much as it has in
recent years. Although students-and perhaps
workers-may protest periodically, they do not
present any real threat to the ruling powers. The
incipient leftist movement has little numerical
strength, and the government is prepared to
muzzle extremists, as indicated by the arrest of
several outspoken leftists during the recent elec-
tions and the indefinite suspension of certain
extremist journals.
The threat from the political right is more
real, particularly in view of the basic conservative
bias of the Afghan population. Certain influential
members of the royal family and other powerful
established interests will continue to press the
King to abrogate the experiment and resume
complete power, especially if dissidents again take
to the streets.
The King is apparently still convinced that
the experiment is a worthwhile and necessary
effort. Although he is not willing to push the
reform movement any faster than his people find
acceptable, he is indeed opposed to any reversion
to autocracy. He would probably terminate the
reform movement only if he considered it a threat
to the national interest or to his own position.
The King retains the vital support of the army,
which has established unquestioned supremacy
over occasionally recalcitrant tribes.
Should 55-year-old King Zahir be removed
from the scene, however, the prospects for
continuation of the experiment appear far less
bright. None of his potential successors possesses
both his governing capabilities and his commit-
ment to reform. Although provincial leaders now
have increased their stake in the continuance of
parliament, the legislature and the other inchoate
democratic institutions are almost certainly not
yet capable of surviving without the royal bless-
ing.
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