WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ELECTION PROSPECTS IN TURKEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007300070003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 3, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Election Prospects in Turkey
Secret
N2 44
3 October 1969
No. 0390/69B
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As the campaign for the National Assembly election enters its final week, the
Justice Party headed by Prime Minister Demirel appears virtually certain of victory. The
party's prospects are enhanced by its traditional support among the peasants, the
relative impotence of the seriously divided opposition, and the absence of any major
controversial issues. The possibility of a coalition government cannot be ruled out
entirely, however, because the proportional representation system now being used favors
such arrangements, and because the generally quiet and often dull campaign could result
in a relatively small turnout at the polls.
Whatever the outcome of the election, however, the face of government and
politics in Turkey is changing. There is great ferment within and among the several
political parties, and among the electorate as well. The primaries clearly indicate that
there will be a substantial turnover in the National Assembly-the lower house of
parliament-as a result of the current elections.
Whether the Justice Party wins a majority or merely a large plurality, Prime
Minister Demirel may believe he controls enough of the sources of power to lead with a
firmer hand. After four years of relative domestic tranquility and a generally successful
foreign policy, he must now seek answers to some of Turkey's unresolved social and
economic problems. Not the least of these are the rising tide of extremism on both left
and right, seriously depleted foreign exchange reserves, and rising inflationary pressures.
Turkey is one of the world's youngest repub-
lics, dating back only to 1923, when Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk closed the book on the Ottoman
Empire and oriented Turkey toward the West.
After a military revolution in May 1960 swept
from power the regime headed by President Bayar
and Prime Minister Menderes and ushered in the
Second Turkish Republic, the constitution was
revised to restrain future governments from as-
suming excessive personal and partisan power.
The new constitution also replaced the one-house
Grand National Assembly with a bicameral parlia-
ment, thus offering yet another check on execu-
tive and legislative authority.
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The prerevolutionary majority system of
elections was replaced by a proportional system.
During the first four years under this system,
Turkey had three coalition governments and
experienced two abortive military coups. Inter-
party cooperation proved extremely difficult, and
the government became increasingly fragile. Fol-
lowing the collapse of the third successive coali-
tion in February 1965, an interim government
was formed by the Justice Party (JP) and some of
the minor parties, with a neutral figure as prime
minister, to clear the way for national elections.
In October 1965, when the JP was swept
into power with an impressive 53 percent of the
popular vote, party leader Demirel became the
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first prime minister of the Second Republic with
a majority government. Since then, the JP has
continued to increase its parliamentary strength.
Representation in the 450-seat National Assembly
has gone up from 240 to 256, and the party has
increased its elective seats in the Senate from 79
to 100. Recently, the party's popular strength
appears to have stabilized at about 50 percent of
the electorate. The JP draws its strongest support
from the Turkish peasantry, about 65 percent of
the total population, who have played an increas-
ingly active role in the country's political life.
The JP, however, was the acknowledged suc-
cessor of the Bayar-Menderes regime's Democrat
Party, which had been banned following the re-
volution in 1960. As such, it aroused strong sus-
picions within the military, suspicions that were
not substantially eased for many months and
which still linger in some military circles. Indeed,
the military shadow behind the political scenes
surfaced again in May 1969, when threats of
intervention forced the withdrawal of a bill aimed
at restoring full political rights to former presi-
dent Bayar and his colleagues, despite the bill's
apparently overwhelming acceptance in parlia-
ment.
In 1965 as now, there was not a great deal of
difference between the programs of the JP and
the major opposition party, the Republican Peo-
ples Party (RPP). In domestic economic policy,
however, the JP placed greater emphasis on the
private sector and free enterprise in contrast with
the state ownership and control favored by its
opposition. In foreign affairs, the JP maintained
much the same lines as the RPP, including a firm
Cyprus policy and a willingness to accept rap-
prochement with the USSR and the Communist
countries of eastern Europe. Although in recent
years the Turks have become more independent
in their relations with the US, they continue to
regard the Western alliance as a cornerstone of
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their foreign policy, and this is not an issue in the
current campaign.
The RPP, since its formation in 1923 as the
government party, has been closely associated
with the social and economic reforms on which
the Second Republic is based. In 1950, -however,
a "silent revolution" among peasant voters took
control of the government out of the hands of the
RPP and passed it to the Democrat Party. Since
then, the RPP has consistently held the support
of only 30 to 40 percent of the electorate, pri-
marily among bureaucrats, intellectuals, and busi-
nessmen. Even in the first election following the
military revolution in 1960, the party polled less
than 37 percent of the vote. In the spring of
1967, the party's popular strength was further
reduced when its more conservative element with-
drew and formed the Reliance Party (RP).
Under the present proportional representa-
tion system, the JP can gain majority control of
the National Assembly-the only house being con-
tested-by winning only 55 percent of the seats in
those provinces where it previously won either a
popular majority or a plurality. Although the JP
needs only 226 seats for a bare majority, it prob-
ably would need at least 245 seats to hold work-
ing control of the lower house. Its stated goal is
to gain two-thirds (300) of the seats, to permit it
to amend the constitution.
PARTIES, PROGRAMS, AND PERSONALITIES
The eight political parties participating in
the election on 12 October cover the entire
spread of the political spectrum from left to right.
The parties range from the rightist Nationalist
Movement Party to the Marxist Turkish Labor
Party, but only the incumbent moderate JP and
the left-of-center RPP have any potential to con-
trol the government. Because of recent changes in
the electoral law, some of the minor parties may
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even lose their representation in the National As-
sembly and be faced with extinction unless they
merge with other parties.
In the coming elections, over 3,400 candi-
dates-including 160 independents with little
chance of winning-will be vying for the 450
seats. Votes in the national election are cast for
the party, however, rather than for the candidate,
and only those high on the list are elected. Favor-
able positions at the top of the lists have been
pre-empted by the leaders of most parties, an
action that has generated considerable heat in
local party circles.
The campaign thus far has passed quietly,
almost to the point of dullness. None of the
candidates has demonstrated much charisma or
oratorical ability. Prime Minister Demirel has
been by far the most active of the major candi-
dates, especially during the early part of the cam-
paign. He traveled to all parts of the country
carrying the JP story of accomplishment, espe-
cially in industrialization and internal develop-
ment, and the promise of things to come such as
the large Keban dam being built in southern Tur-
key and the projected bridge across the Bos-
porus. Demirel was born a peasant, grew up in
the countryside, understands the peasants' prob-
lems, and talks their language.
Bulent Ecevit, the energetic secretary general
of the RPP and the main architect of the party
platform, has also traveled widely, talking of am-
bitious plans and lofty ideals. Nevertheless, he
lacks the popular appeal of the party's old war
horse, 85-year-old Ismet Inonu, whose health has
not permitted a barnstorming campaign. None of
the RPP spokesmen has been able to present the
party program in terms that attract the peasant
voter.
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PROMINENT POLITICAL LEADERS
Prime Minister and
President of the
Justice Party
Bulent Ecevit
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Mehmet Ali Aybar
President General of the
Turkish Labor Party
Alpaslan Turkes
President General of the
National Movement Party
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Other opposition spokesmen, when not en-
grossed in intraparty squabbles- especially preva-
lent in the Turkish Labor Party-have focused
their attention on the country's economic ills and
have offered mostly promises. Probably the most
colorful of the candidates is Professor Necmettin
Erbakan, an independent and an ardent believer
in the religious far right. Erbakan made his initial
public splash earlier this year by fraudulently
maneuvering himself into the presidency of the
influential Union of Chambers of Commerce and
Industry and then resisting efforts to oust him by
his opposition, by the government, and by the
police for several weeks before finally capitulating
in the face of a court order.
The only other independent candidate of
interest is Turban Dilligil, the owner of a right-
wing newspaper and former JP deputy, who has
become a close associate of former president
Bayar and may be fronting for Bayar's group.
Although the independents have little chance of
being elected, they probably will draw some votes
away from the JP.
The published party platforms are generally
colorless and unimaginative, with the exception
of the lengthy manifesto of the RPP, which is
trying to raise a groundswell of popular support.
Only the two major parties and the relatively
small Reliance Party have issued statements that
have attracted much attention.
The JP delayed releasing its platform until
the campaign opened officially on 21 September.
In addition to offering glowing accounts of past
accomplishments and future hopes, the JP made a
strong plea for massive popular support that
would give it the control of the lower house
necessary to amend the constitution. Specific ref-
erence was made to amendments needed to per-
mit stronger government action against "Com-
munists and others opposed to the state," to
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increase government influence over the normally
autonomous universities, to assert more govern-
ment control over the generally independent com-
munications system, to permit more action
through executive order, and to return full politi-
cal rights to former Democrat Party leaders.
These proposed amendments, widely con-
demned by both moderate and leftist elements,
are almost certainly a political ploy designed to
reduce friction within the JP and attract marginal
votes. Nevertheless, they have raised serious ques-
tions about the JP's intentions and its future
relations with the military leadership, which has
generally opposed constitutional change. If the JP
wins a substantial majority, these questions could
become matters of embarrassment to the govern-
ment and raise serious concern among the opposi-
tion and within the military.
The RPP manifesto played heavily on the
theme of "time for a change" and "let's drive the
rascals out." The lengthy document focused pri-
marily on the economy, promising major land
reform, tax reform, and increased industrial
growth. The party platform is an obvious attempt
to break the JP's monopoly of the peasant vote.
The RPP also issued a "secret election strategy"
aimed at improving the image of the party and
keeping it clear of highly controversial issues.
Members of the party were urged to refrain from
discussing past political differences and quarrels,
to defend the democratic regime, and to avoid
talk that could be interpreted as a threat to the
national opinion expressed at the polls. This air of
restraint is in marked contrast with the party's
past efforts to promote gains by creating a crisis
atmosphere.
Secretary General Ecevit has described the
RPP's "change of order" program as aimed at
creating an industrial revolution in Turkey. This
would be led by the state, but would be based on
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itIkfaren
%0 10 20 30 40
TLP RPP JP
(Turkish Labor Party) !Republican (Justice Party)
pie. io es Peoples Party)
Turkish Election Results - 1965
I
NODES
50 60 70 80
immonewsom
Independents NTP UP RPNP I NMP
and others (New Turkey Party) (Unity Party) (Republican
Peasant Nation Party/
Nationalist Movement Party
1
J -
oTakat
Adgaman
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TURKISH POLITICAL SPECTRUM - Percent of Popular Vote
E] Even (within 7%)
Republican Peoples Party Plurality
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ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
- Province (III) boundary 0 Province (Ili) capltal
P-ince names are the same as the adminisarative
centers enless otherwise ,?ndicoted.
0 50 100 150 Miles
I I 1.
0 so 100 150 Kilometer.
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NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
SENATE
GNA
NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
SENATE
GNA
JP
240
92
332
256
100
356
RPP
134
50
184
86
34
120
NP
31
2
33
14
15
NTP
19
20
13
14
RPNP/NMP
1 1
12
6
7
TLP
15
16
14
15
UP
4
4
RP
31
11
42
INDEP.
17
18
VACANCIES
9
9
450
150
600
PRESIDENTIAL
APPOINTEES
LIFETIME
(FORMER CNU)
20
18
GRAND TOTAL
635
633
the investments of large masses of people rather
than a few individuals or foreign concerns. Re-
gardless of the outcome of the present election,
the party's platform and the new strategy indicate
what to expect from it in the years ahead.
The smaller parties have not played a very
important role in the campaign thus far. They
face not only the possibility of losing parliamen-
have transformed the party into a "den
of dervishes." The party may not be
destined for oblivion, but it could ret
group along more extremist lines.
The youth of Turkey have become
a more important political factor than
in previous elections. Not only are there
more of them-almost three million new
voters since the last national election-
but they are more literate and
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tary representation, but also the divisive effects of
internal dissension. The leftist Turkish Labor
Party is in particularly difficult straits because of
internal factionalism. Although a deep schism
may be papered over for the remainder of the
campaign, a major contest for power is shaping up
between evolutionary socialists and more extreme
leftists. The current struggle is reported to extend
down to the provincial and local levels, and to
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politically conscious than before. Perhaps of
greater significance is the estimate of some ob-
servers that this new group of young voters repre-
sents almost one third of the total electorate in
each province.
The youth of Turkey are certainly the most
volatile of all the country's political forces, espe-
cially at the two extremes. There are rumors that
leftist extremist students may take to the streets
and escalate clashes with police in the hope of
frustrating an election from which the left seems
unlikely to gain.
At one point, leftist student leaders report-
edly warned that the situation in Turkey this
month would resemble the turmoil in France in
1968. Heavy pressure by the major parties as well
as the leftist Turkish Labor Party may have pre-
vented student demonstrations.
Nevertheless, Istanbul authorities are becom-
ing increasingly concerned over student violence
in the city, where three students have been killed
in recent days. Extremist students may try to
exploit the situation to promote unrest, but secu-
rity forces should be able to keep any demonstra-
tions within bounds.
THE MILITARY AS A POLITICAL FACTOR
The military formed the backbone of the
elite during the early years of the First Republic.
After the election upset in 1950, and especially
after 1955 when the Bayar-Menderes regime be-
gan to rule more arbitrarily, the prestige of the
military began to suffer. Military leaders particu-
larly resented the smear on Turkey's national
honor of the anti-Greek riots in 1955, for which
they held the politicians responsible, and the in-
creasingly dictatorial policies of the regime. Fi-
nally, in May 1960, the army-with navy and air
force backing-ousted the civilian government for
the stated purpose of saving the constitution and
the republic.
Although the military withdrew from the
forefront of the political scene within 18 months,
its representatives-General Gursel as president
and the remaining 22 members of the revolution-
ary Committee of National Union as lifetime sen-
ators-served notice that the armed forces re-
tained a watchful eye on developments.
The military establishment still constitutes a
potent force in Turkish politics. Few major deci-
sions concerning foreign or domestic affairs are
made without military sanction. Prime Minister
Demire.[, during his four-year term, has estab-
lished close rapport with the military leadership.
He is enough of a realist to know that the civil
regime cannot act in the face of strong military
opposition, especially in areas pertaining to the
constitution and the ideals of the revolution. On
questions primarily military in nature, such as the
NATO command structure or bilateral defense
treaties, the high command will be hard nosed,
and its opinions often will prevail.
Nevertheless, the military is not expected to
play any significant role in the approaching elec-
tions except to maintain security, if necessary.
Clash Between Rightists and Leftists, February 1969
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TURKISH ELECTION RESULTS, 1950-1968
PERCENT
60
Pre-revolution
majority not held
by Democrat Party
Minority Republican
Peoples Party
1950 1954 1957
(Grand National Assembly)
_. which was
banned after
the revolution
.... gained a
plurality
following the
revolution
.... but lost it
in subsequent
elections.
Some recently retired military leaders may soon
become influential figures on the political scene,
however. There have been scattered rumors of
dissension among some junior and middle-level
officers, but their influence remains one of the
imponderables of the political equation.
The odds at the moment favor a clear major-
ity victory for the JP. None of the opposition
parties has been able to uncover an issue with
which to damage the Demirel regime, or to field
candidates who could attract the necessary votes
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to unseat the government. Some press and politi-
cal observers estimate the JP will win better than
50 percent of the votes, the RPP about 3S per-
cent, and that the remainder will be divided
among the minor parties and independent candi-
dates. The RPP estimate seems high, however, in
view of the split in 1967 over the "left-of-cQnter"
issue that resulted in the formation of the Reli-
ance Party. No realistic estimate can be made of
this party's popular strength.
Despite the widespread voter apathy evident
in the campaign thus far, the JP continues. to be
confident of victory. The RPP, on the other hand,
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while not exuding much vigor or enthusiasm, is
still going through the motions. In the absence of
any upsurge in emotional domestic issues or a
sudden foreign crisis, increased incomes and im-
proved standards of living plus the obvious indica-
tions of industrial growth throughout the country
should benefit the JP in the final vote tally.
A coalition government remains a possibil-
ity, although not a strong one. If no party re-
ceives a majority, the JP-with an almost certain
plurality-would be asked to form the new gov-
ernment. This would leave Demirel as prime min-
ister, but with a seriously weakened position
within both his party and the government. His
first choice for a coalition partner almost cer-
tainly would be the Reliance Party. There have
been rumors that these two parties might merge
after the elections in any case. A coalition govern-
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ment would encourage opposition obstruction-
ism, however, and would increase the tendency to
govern through executive decision rather than by
legislative direction.
Trouble from extremist elements during the
few remaining days before the elections continues
to be a possibilit
there al-
most certainly will bete usual number of scat-
tered incidents involving shootings, knifings, and
local brawls, especially in the provincial areas
where local issues and personalities often take
precedence over national ones.
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