WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007300060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 26, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
DIA review
completed.
State Dept. review Secret
completed 6
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ICMIao
26 September 1969
No. 0389/69
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(Information of as noon EDT, :25 September 1969)
Far East
VIETNAM
North Vietnam has formally designated a presi-
dent and vice president, but the new leader-
ship has generally remained out of view since
Ho's funeral. There are also strong indica-
tions that Communist military policies of the
past year will continue. Meanwhile, some
South Vietnamese leaders seem worried that the
US is pulling troops out of some areas too fast.
BURMESE EX-LEADER TRIES TO FORM OPPOSITION
Former prime minister U Nu is trying to develop
a resistance movement to overthrow General Ne
Win, but Nu's chances of success are slim.
LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE FACING HEAVIER RESISTANCE 7
Government forces last week continued to make
some slight progress in trying to advance farther
north of the Plaine des Jarres. Enemy resistance
has stiffened, however, and there are signs that
North Vietnam is dispatching reinforcements into
north Laos.
PREPARATIONS FOR CHINA'S NATIONAL DAY PROCEEDING
IN LOW KEY
The regime's preoccupation with pressing in-
ternal problems has resulted in a subdued
approach to the National Day celebrations on
1 October.
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Europe
GROMYKO'S SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
While the Soviet foreign minister's message
in general was a standard one, there was a
suggestion that the USSR wants to enlarge its
opportunities for negotiation and detente.
LABOR POSING CHALLENGE TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
With the reconvening of the Chamber of Depu-
ties, the government must face inflammatory
interrogation over how it intends to deal
with a series of one-day, nationwide strikes.
SOVIET GRAIN CROP MEDIOCRE
The grain harvest now appears to be consider-
ably smaller than that of last year, but
weather during the next few weeks will con-
tinue to influence the outcome.
SOVIETS CONTINUE BUYING WESTERN CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY 15
Orders for equipment and technology are ex-
pected to remain at a high level at least
through 1972, with annual purchases probably
averaging at least $100 million.
EAST AND WEST GERMANS DISCUSS MUTUAL PROBLEMS
Recent talks between East and West Germany on
transportation and postal matters mark the
first official contacts between the two in
several years.
SE ;RF:.I.
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Middle East - Africa
MIDDLE EAST CONTINUES TO SIMMER
Israel will continue to keep military pressure
on Egypt, where there has been another round
of military dismissals and civilian arrests.
Both Lebanon and Jordan are experiencing grow-
ing difficulties with the fedayeen.
MUSLIM DISSIDENCE CONTINUES IN CHAD
Chad's persistent insurgency enters its fifth
year next month with no end in sight, prompting
the French--Chad's main source of financial and
military support--to undertake a top-level re-
view of their commitment to their beleagured
former colony.
NEW LIBYAN REGIME UNLIKELY TO MOVE AGAINST OIL
COMPANIES
The new regime probably will seek fuller par-
ticipation in the oil industry, but its depend-
ence on oil revenues makes any immediate major
adjustments unlikely.
GUINEA GAMBLES ON CONTRADICTORY POLICIES
President Sekou Toure's contradictory policies
of radical socialism and economic cooperation
with Western capitalists will add to that coun-
try's instability in the long run.
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Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
BRAZILIAN TRIUMVIRATE WORKING ON SUCCESSION AND
TERRORISM
The government is continuing to seek a replace-
ment for President Costa e Silva and is trying
to curb urban terrorism. The succession prob-
lem is likely to be resolved in early October.
CUBA PUBLICIZES NEW ANTIHIJACKING LAW
The law contains no important concessions and
seems designed primarily to placate world opinion
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FACES CONTINUED LABOR UNREST
The principal economic issue involved is the
government's determination to maintain its eco-
nomic stabilization program in the face of labor's
demands for a larger share in the nation's wealth.
REFUGEE AND TRADE PROBLEMS TROUBLE EL SALVADOR 31
Despite agreement on a number of important is-
sues, relations between El Salvador and Honduras
have not improved substantially.
BELIZE INDEPENDENCE MOVES WORRY GUATEMALA 32
Premier Price of British Honduras (Belize) is
increasingly insistent on moving toward early
independence despite British and Guatemalan
warnings that this is not a good time.
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Hanoi has picked a convenient figurehead as president and a relative
unknown as vice president. Neither the appointment of 81-year-old Ton Due
Thang nor that of Nguyen Luong Bang, a long-time party stalwart, provides
any firm clues to the real power structure in Hanoi. Although there is little
evidence as to the relative standing of the top leaders in North Vietnam,
there are strong indications that Communist military policies of the past year
will continue. The armed forces' newspaper, for example, has called for a
protracted war strategy and has urged economy of manpower and the
maintenance of a well-trained reserve force in the North. In keeping with
this, military activity in South Vietnam has been generally light, but an
upsurge in Communist actions may come around 27-28 September, accord-
ing to a number of reports.
In Laos, on the other hand, government forces have run into stiff
enemy resistance, especially along the northern edge of the Plaine des Jarres.
Although General Vang Pao's weary troops have still managed to make some
slight gains, they now are facing substantial numbers of dug-in North
Vietnamese, and sharp Communist counterattacks can be expected after the
rains stop late next month.
The major upcoming event in the Communist world is the 20th anniver-
sary of the founding of the Peoples Republic of China on 1 October. Peking
is moving forward with preparations for the celebration, but unexpectedly is
discouraging the kind of hoopla that accompanied the 10th anniversary. This
restrained attitude may be a result of internal disorders in the provinces, as
well as of a number of economic problems, both of which have required
considerable attention by the Chinese leadership. National Day on 1 October
has traditionally been the occasion for a major leadership turnout, and
evidence is beginning to accumulate that Mao Tse-tung, who has been widely
rumored as incapacitated, will indeed appear as he has for all the previous
anniversaries.
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VIETNAM
North Vietnamese Policies
North Vietnam announced on
24 September that the two top
government positions have been
filled. The 81-year-old former
vice president Ton Duc Thang was
moved up to the presidency, where
he will serve as a convenient
figurehead. Thang was replaced
as -vice president by an important
and long-time party stalwart, Nguyen
Luong Bang.
Bang's appointment may have
implications for the eventual shape
of Hanoi's leadership, but what
these may be is not readily ap-
parent. He was one of the found-
ers of the Vietnam Communist Party,
a member of its first central com-
mittee, and since 1964 has been
head of the party control depart-
ment, which handles party disci-
pline. In this capacity, he pre-
sumably has worked closely with
many of North Vietnam's top lead-
ers, but he cannot be firmly as-
sociated with any one group or
individual.
Communist reactions to the
latest US troop withdrawal plans
and President Nixon's United Na-
tions speech were predictably
negative. North Vietnam and the
Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment issued formal statements
ridiculing Washington's moves.
They charged that the troop re-
ductions were but "a drop in the
bucket," designed only to dampen
domestic opposition to the war
while, in fact, the US was "in-
Page 2
tensifying" the fighting. They
reiterated that their "ten points"
provide an honorable solution to
the war and demanded a serious
US response to them. The Commu-
nists may well have judged that
a strong propaganda counterattack
was called for to head off any
impression that the next move is
up to Hanoi.
Meanwhile, there are further
indications that the regime in-
tends to carry on with military
policies of the past year, at
least for the short term. An edi-
torial in Hanoi's armed forces
newspaper on 17 September called
for the continuation of a pro-
tracted war strategy designed to
frustrate allied efforts in South
Vietnam and to maintain a credi-
ble Communist military threat in
the field. The editorial men-
tioned several measures aimed at
enhancing North Vietnam's ability
to sustain a prolonged effort,
including economy of manpower
and equipment, and maintenance of
a well-trained reserve force in
the North.
the Communists have do-
livered the same protracted war-
fare message to their forces in
the South. A party resolution
appears
to call for a strategy of low-
key but persistent enemy mili-
tary operations in tandem with
political and propaganda opera-
tions at least through early 1970.
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IVEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Sep 69
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With its emphasis on political
organization, the resolution ap-
pears to represent the most sys-
tematic effort to date to prepare
Communist forces in the South for
the possibility of a negotiated
settlement.
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
South Vietnamese reaction
to the announcement of the second
US troop reduction was mixed but
generally cautious. Several sena-
tors as well as the army news-
paper endorsed the decision,
stating that it strengthened Sai-
gon's hand at the Paris talks
while it reflected honor on the
Vietnamese armed forces. A
strongly southern-oriented paper
said the troop reduction and the
short halt in B-52 strikes appeared
to be "an invitation offered to
an adversary" for serious nego-
tiations.
Some vernacular papers sug-
gested that the troop cuts re-
sulted from pressure on President
Nixon by Americans who believed
that doves in Hanoi would be
strengthened by such a gesture.
The prestigious Chinh Luan ex-
pressed concern that tie US might
purposely be withdrawing troops
faster than the Vietnamese could
take up the slack in order to
press Saigon either to broaden
the government with leftists or
to be more forthcoming at the
Paris talks, even if this resulted
in "dishonor to the people and
army of South Vietnam."
25X1
SOUTH VIETNAM 25X1
O 50 JO
MILES
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Military Developments in
South Vietnam
The level of Communist mili-
tary activity remained generally
light throughout most of South
Vietnam this week, in part be-
cause of heavy seasonal rains in
the northern provinces. Small-
scale engagements in the vicinity
of the Rockpile in northernmost
Quang Tri Province, an enemy at-
tack on elements of a US combat
operation south of Da Nang, and
localized, small-unit attacks on
remote friendly positions in III
and IV corps accounted for gener-
ally light allied casualties.
Many of the Communist com-
bat units apparently have not
abandoned plans to climax this
year's fall offensive with further
attacks. Major Communist forces
continue to prepare for combat in
the northern provinces of I Corps.
The equivalent of three enemy reg-
iments together with supporting
units is concentrated in the
southern highlands near the Bu
Prang Special Forces Camp in west-
ern Quang Duc Province. Further-
more, most of the enemy's forces
in northern III Corps are still
in position to strike at key tar-
gets north of Saigon.
Since the Communist's fall
campaign commenced on 11-12 Au-
gust, it has become clear that it
has fallen short of many of its
intended goals as forecast in
captured documents, prisoner in-
terrogations, and intelligence re-
ports. Although specific goals
varied from region to region, the
drive generally has aimed at dis-
rupting the pacification programs
and the gradual "Vietnamization"
of the war, while continuing to
inflict a high rate of casualties
on the allies. The Communists,
however, have not been able to
seize the initiative in any area
and, perhaps because they have
not committed many of their ma-
jor main force units in the cam-
paign, have not scored a single
military victory.
Meanwhile, numerous intel-
ligence reports allude to impend-
ing enemy activities to take place
within the next few weeks, possibly
in the form of another highpoint.
Agent reports indicate that di-
versionary activity is being
planned against Special Forces
camps and other allied positions
in the remote reaches of Kontum
and Pleiku provinces, while the
major enemy action in the region
would be against allied targets
in the Bu Prang area of southern
II Corps. Several agents, ralliers,
and prisoners cite the date of
27-28 September as the target date
for the next upsurge in enemy mili-
tary action.
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BURMESE EX-LEADER TRIES TO FORM OPPOSITION
Former prime minister U Nu,
hoping to capitalize on the gen-
eral unpopularity of Burma's mili-
tary government, is trying to
develop a resistance movement to
overthrow General Ne Win. U Nu's
chances of success are slim, how-
ever, largely because he has no
capacity for effective organiza-
tion, but also because of the
strong control exercised by the
military regime.
Deteriorating economic con-
ditions under seven years of mili-
tary rule have resulted in a gen-
eral malaise, but there is no po-
litical vehicle for mobilizing
discontent into a united opposi-
tion. Burma has only a single
party, and no others are legally
permitted. Ne Win, moreover, has
been encountering increasing bick-
ering within the ruling military
Revolutionary Council over the
question of permitting some ci-
vilians to participate in the
government. The Council, however,
appears to remain united in its
commitment to Burma's home-grown
socialism.
U Nu left Burma for India
last April, ostensibly on a re-
ligious pilgrimage, and in August
he moved to Bangkok, from which
vantage point he announced he
would work toward the ouster of
Ne Win and the return of the coun-
try to civilian rule.
The former prime minister
remains a popular national figure
and might be widely welcomed if
he were to return to Burma. Many
civilian leaders, however, have
unhappy memories of his lack of
political organization as prime
minister, and his recent allusions
to using force against Ne Win have
dismayed followers within Burma,
who fear the military might ar-
rest them.
Some of Nu's followers have
gone to Ne Win to assure him of
their loyalty, and even ex-Briga-
dier Aung Gyi, U Nu's principal
lieutenant in Burma, appears to
be less than fully committed to
the announced plan of action.
The Burmese Government has
been trying to play down U Nu's
public statements of opposition.
At home, the publication of Nu's
pronouncements in the government
controlled press may have been
intended as a show of contempt
for his efforts.
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LAOS: Current Situation
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T It A I I. A N D
Communist-controlled lerritorv
SJ~.C RET
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LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE FACING HEAVIER RESISTANCE
Government forces last week
continued to make some slight
progress in trying to advance
farther north of the Plaine des
Jarres. Enemy resistance has
stiffened, however, and there
are signs that North Vietnam is
dispatching reinforcements into
north Laos.
General Vang Pao's weary
troops have had only limited s c-
cess in repeated efforts to se-
cure the high ground north of the
Plaine, where substantial numbers
of North Vietnamese forces are
dug in. In the northwest sector
of the Plaine and in the key area
near the Route 7/71 junction, gov-
ernment units have been checked
by several small but sharp enemy
counterattacks. The government
wants to hold this area as long
as possible to impede enemy re-
inforcements from North Vietnam.
On the more positive side,
a small government element has
advanced to within five miles of
Muong Soui, meeting light enemy
resistance. Northeast of Khang
Khav, government guerrillas oc-
cupied a large, abandoned cave
complex believed to be the former
Laos.
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PREPARATIONS FOR CHINA'S NATIONAL DAY PROCEEDING IN LOW KEY
The regime's preoccupation
with pressing internal problems
has resulted in a subdued ap-
proach to the National Day cele-
brations on 1 October. Peking
has set the mood for the rest
of the country by discouraging
the hoopla that might be expected
to accompany the 20th anniversary
of the founding of the republic.
In part, the restrained mood
stems from the fact that only a
frELgile tranquility has been im-
posed inside China.
Peking probably does not want
to jeopardize the newly imposed
order by staging major rallies in
Peking and provincial capitals,
events which by their very nature
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bring crowds into the streets
and tend to raise emotions.
Diplomatic sources report
that Peking intends to keep this
year's celebrations a "family
affair," with few invited for-
eign guests.
Day celebration, and a failure to
show up this time would give sub-
stance to reports that he is seri-
ously ill. The Chinese, in trying
to counter such rumors, have been
publicizing recent decisions they
say were made by Mao.
Despite the low-key approach
Provincial radiobroadcasts to the celebrations, Peking will
have taken Peking's cue and are undoubtedly exploit the occasion
urging restraint in celebration for its maximum propaganda value
planning. A recent Anhwei broad- to help promote the commonly
cast, for example, stated that heard themes of national unity
National Day should be observed
in a "down-to-earth" manner and
that unnecessary expenditures
should be avoided.
National Day traditionally
has been the occasion for a major
leadership turnout. Rumors that
Mao is incapacitated have become
widespread lately, and he has not
appeared in public since 19 May.
Mao has been absent for long pe-
riods before, however, and has re-
appeared each time to confound
speculation about his health.
He has never missed a National
and preparedness against war.
The regime has taken the unusual
step of releasing separately 29
National Day slogans, giving par-
ticular emphasis to those slogans
concerned with war preparations.
This probably reflects Peking's
growing concern over the possi-
bility of expanded conflicts with
the Soviet Union and also serves
to dramatize for the population
the seriousness of the current
war preparations drive and the
need to economize and increase
production.
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Moscow has taken a small step toward re-entering the propaganda war
with Peking. Over the past weekend TASS and some Soviet radiobroadcasts
began issuing critical but still relatively mild. commentaries on China. This
suggests that Moscow is becoming impatient with the lack of a positive
Chinese response to the Kosygin overture and the Soviet propaganda black-
out.
Foreign Minister Gromyko's address to the UN General Assembly last
week was in most respects unexceptional. His anti-Western remarks showed
some restraint, however, and lie presented a more positive view than usual of
the UN's peacekeeping potential. He gave the impression that the USSR
intended to be forthcoming on strategic arms limitation talks but did little to
dispel the uncertainty about Moscow's long delay in responding to US
overtures on this subject.
The Soviets also offered a draft convention banning the production,
development, and stockpiling of chemical and biological weaponry. This
ensures a hot debate at the General Assembly, as a number of other
proposals for UN resolutions on the subject have been presented at the
Geneva disarmament talks. The Soviet initiative will gain considerable sup-
port, but its lack of inspection arrangements will be criticized.
East Germany has ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty, bringing the
number who have done so to 21. To bring the treaty into force, 22 more
ratifications are required, including those of the US and the USSR.
The Czechoslovak party central committee convened on 25 September
to resolve the status of Dubcek and perhaps of as many as 60 of its 183
members. Indications are that party first secretary Husak has imposed his
will and there will be no major political trials, although the way will be
cleared for a widespread purge of liberals.
A selective purge has been threatened in Yugoslavia by President Tito,
who has sharply condemned indiscipline at all levels of the party. The
Yugoslav leadership is seriously concerned about widespread disregard of
central policy directives at local levels.
In Italy, the Chamber of Deputies has reconvened, and the government
is preparing to face some serious questioning on how it intends to deal with a
series of one-day, nationwide strikes.
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GROMYKO'S SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Soviet Foreign Minister Gro-
myko's speech at the UN General As-
sembly session on 19 September was
one of even tone, devoid of propa-
ganda bombast. He spent much ef-
fort trying to identify the poli-
cies of the USSR with the peaceful
mission of the UN. In the process
he seemed to emphasize more than
usual the need for expanded UN
peacekeeping efforts, and he pre-
sented the Assembly with proposals
apparently designed to give some
force and substance to his remarks.
After paying homage to the UN
for averting the outbreak of a new
world war, Gromyko noted that peace
remains precarious and unstable.
He implied that the troubles in
Vietnam, the Middle East, and else-
where were the result of a flout-
ing of UN principles. With respect
to the German problem and European
security, Gromyko laid down the ab-
solute condition that there can be
no advancement toward solution un-
til the existence of East Germany
is recognized.
Gromyko set out the main tasks for
examination and action by this ses-
sion of the Assembly. He said he
was submitting a draft paper to the
Assembly covering these matters,
which he declared must be addressed
to all states, whether UN members
or not.
Gromyko saved his punch on arms
limitation and disarmament for last.
Alluding to previous milestones in
limiting the arms race, he said
that further measures were needed
to match Soviet advocacy of univer-
sal and complete disarmament and
a halt to the arms race. He point-
edly chastised "the enemy" for not
decreasing steps toward a strate9ie
weapons build-up. He also said,
however, that several important
measures of nuclear control "are
knocking on the door." He ended
by submitting for discussion a con-
vention banning the development,
production, and stockpiling of chem-
ical and biological weapons and call-
ing-for the destruction of existing
stocks.
Any mention of Soviet diplo-
matic activity toward a settlement
of the Vietnam situation was avoided.
It is noteworthy, too, that the
Soviet Union refrained from express-
ing its usual support for seating
Communist China in the UN.
Under the rubric of "consoli-
dating international security,"
Gromyko's message was in most
respects a standard one. There was,
however, the suggestion--in his re-
peated urgings of a greater effort
by the UN to meet the world's prob-
lems and in his presentation of spe-
cific recommendations--that the USSR
wants to enlarge its opportunities
for negotiation and detente
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LABOR POSING CHALLENGE TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
A series of one-day strikes
are posing a first test for the two-
month-old, minority Christian Demo-
cratic government of Mariano Rumor.
The nationwide strikes began
on 10 September with the 1.05 mil-
lion metal workers employed by pri-
vate industry. The metal workers'
contract was scheduled to run to
31 December but the unions de-
nounced it last month in order to
advance the date for negotiation of
a new one. Discussions for the
metal workers' contract, which will
probably set the pattern for other
labor contracts, began on 8 Septem-
ber but were quickly broken off.
Other important sectors involved in
24- and 48-hour strikes because of
contract renewal negotiations this
fall include chemical, construction,
and textile industries. In all,
the contracts cover at least 3.5
million industrial workers, about
one half Italy's industrial labor
force.
With the reconvening of the
Chamber of Deputies this week, the
government faces inflammatory inter-
rogations on the strike situation.
Thus far, the authorities have con-
tained extremist provocations and
only marginal violence has occurred.
The government's major imme-
diate concern is to help obtain a
labor settlement conducive to con-
tinuing Italy's economic growth,
which since World War II has been
exceeded among industrial nations
only by West Germany and Japan. Man-
agement, in both private and na-
tional industry, is prepared to
grant wage increases of some 25 per-
cent over the next two years. It
is more reluctant to grant demands
for such union prerogatives as the
right to assemble on plant premises
during working hours and the right
to negotiate piece-work rates.
The unions' power in Italian
plants will increase if present de-
mands are granted. Union leaders
as well as many politicians are
stiffened in backing labor demands
by the fear of being outflanked on
the left by anarchist "worker power"
elements, which reportedly inspired
recent serious wildcat strikes
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SOVIET GRAIN
Although weather conditions
will continue to affect the mag-
nitude of the grain harvest during
the next few weeks, it now seems
likely that this year's harvest
will be considerably smaller than
that of last year. A spokesman
for the Soviet Ministry of Agri-
culture, apparently alarmed by a
recent slowing of already late
harvesting work, has found it
necessary to assert defensively,
"We can firmly declare that there
will be no repetition of 1963 and
1965." Both of these were dis-
astrous years for Soviet grain
production.
By 15 September grain had
been threshed on only 68 percent
of the sown area, significantly
less than the 90 percent normally
harvested by this date. The prob-
ability is increasing that har-
vesting work in Kazakhstan and
Siberia will be overtaken by snow
and winter storms.
Unfavorable weather dealt
its first blows to this year's
grain harvest last winter when
a combination of intense cold,
hurricane-force winds, and in-
adequate snow cover destroyed an
unusually high proportion of the
winter grain crop and reduced
the potential yield of much of
the rest of it. Efforts to com-
pensate for the loss of winter
crops by increasing spring sow-
ings also ran afoul of the weather.!
Spring came late and sowing was
completed 10 or more days later
than usual. Cool weather also
retarded plant growth in most ma-
jor grain producing areas through 1
CROP MEDIOCRE
late spring and, in the European
USSR, well into July.
As early as mid-June the cen-
tral committee of the Communist
Party and the Council of Ministers
evinced concern over harvest pros-
pects by issuing a joint decree,
aimed at facilitating an unusually
large temporary mobilization of
trucks and people from nonagri-
cultural sectors to aid in bring-
ing in the harvest. Despite urn-
usual efforts, harvesting began
late and has progressed slowly be-
cause of unfavorable weather con-
ditions.
During the week ending 15 Sep-
tember, when an acceleration of.
harvesting work was desperately,
needed, 12 percent less grain area
was threshed than during the pre-
ceding week, apparently because
the weather took yet another ad!
verse turn. On the 15th, grain
remained unthreshed on about one-
third of the area.
The USSR has not sought to
buy grain from the West this year,
possibly because world grain prices
are expected to decline further.or
because of large domestic stocks
accumulated in recent years and
the anticipated availability of
surpluses in some East European
countries. There is some specu-
lation that the USSR has requested
Bulgaria and Hungary, which havq
not yet offered the West wheat From
their good harvests, to hold their
surpluses for other Communist coun-
tries that rel on the USSR for
grain.
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SOVIETS CONTINUE BUYING WESTERN CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY
The Soviet Union is continuing
to buy large quantities of chemical
equipment and technology from the
free world, especially from West-
ern Europe and Japan. Largely be-
cause of Soviet ineptness, however,
the USSR is realizing less benefit
from these purchases than Soviet
planners had anticipated.
The total value of contracts
signed since 1957 for the import
of chemical equipment is $1.4 bil-
lion. Orders in 1967-68 were val-
ued at about $250 million. These
purchases represented one fourth
of the total value of Soviet orders
for free world machinery and equip-
ment of all types, except ships
and marine equipment.
Soviet failure promptly to
erect plants purchased from the
free world along with other short-
comings in construction and opera-
tion has contributed to a decline
in capital productivity in the So-
viet chemical industry over much of
the past decade. Nonetheless, such
plants are making a fairly signifi-
cant contribution to Soviet chemi-
cal output. Many of the plants are
for the production of synthetic ma-
terials and fertilizers, areas in
which Soviet technology has lagged
far behind that of free world
countries.
The slow progress of the So-
viet machine building industry in
providing up-to-date equipment for
the chemical industry is forcing
the USSR to continue seeking free
world chemical equipment and tech-
nology. Orders for such equipment
are expected to continue at a high
level at least through 1972, and
annual purchases probably will
average at least $100 million.
Although Western Europe and
Japan probably will continue to be
the major suppliers, the US share
of Soviet orders almost certainly
will grow. US know-how and/or
equipment is being considered for
15 of 20 chemical plants currently
under negotiation by the USSR. If
contracts result, the US in most 25X1
cases will supply technical data
and other Western countries will
provide the e ui ment.
Value and Origin of Free World Chemical Plants and
Equipment Purchased by the USSR,1967-68
ORIGIN OF PLANTS
1967-68
Chernical fibers and intermediates 27.9
Basic petrochemicals 15.7
products Plastics, plastics processing,
and intermediates
62.2
Agricultural chemicals 10.7
Rubber and rubber Other chemical equipment 59.9
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LAST AND WEST GERMANS DISCUSS MUTUAL PROBLEMS
Recent talks between East
and West Germany on transporta-
tion and postal matters mark the
first official contacts between
the two in several years.
The circumstances and timing
of the meetings make it appear
that the East Germans agreed to
the talks at Moscow's behest.
Pankow's action was almost simul-
taneous with the Soviets' response
to an Allied demarche calling for
four-power discussions on Berlin
and Soviet promotion of East-West
German talks on questions of mu-
tual interest. The East Germans
appear to be mainly interested in
collecting money rather than in
solving inter-German problems.
Nevertheless, Pankow has left the
door open for future discussions
that could resolve some issues
having political, as well as eco-
nomic, significance.
After two years of stalling,
the East Germans agreed to a meet-
ing with West German Transport
Ministry officials in East Berlin
on 16 September. The meeting was
cordial and businesslike and the
East Germans agreed to reopen a
short West German railroad spur
that cuts through East Germany.
The East Germans closed the line
in 1967 when Bonn refused to pay
an exorbitant charge for past
use. The West Germans agreed to
pay approximately a third of the
original sum demanded plus a
stipulated amount for future use.
Both sides agreed in prin-
ciple to permit inland waterway
traffic to transit each other's,
territory and continue into third
countries. At present, East Ger-
man barges are prevented from
exiting West Germany and continM-
ing into Western Europe, and West
German barges may not cross over
into Poland or Czechoslovakia
from East Germany. Details of
the new agreement are to be worked
out next month.
West German Postal Ministry
negotiators who met with their
East German counterparts on 19
September in East Berlin failed
to achieve any agreement on Bonn's
compensation for Pankow's serv-
ices. At issue is the question
of future annual payments of 30
million West marks. The West
Germans for their part hoped to
establish an agreed system for
balancing inter-German postal and
telecommunications payments and
to improve services. The discus-
sion was stalemated when Bonn in-
sisted on improvements before
making payment and the East Get-
mans demanded payment first.
The West Germans proposed
that the next meeting be held in
the latter part of October, pre-
sumably to prevent the negotia-
tions from becoming an issue in
the West German elections. Such
timing would also dissociate ne-
gotiations from the East German
request for admission to the Uxi-
versal Postal Union during its
meeting in Tokyo in early October.
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Israeli jets continued to strike at Egyptian targets across the Suez Canal
during the past week, but the Egyptians still mounted military forays. Israeli
jets also hit guerrilla bases around the Dead Sea on 25 September, but
fighting along the Jordanian front has consisted primarily of fedayeen
mortar attacks and artillery duels between the Jordanian and Israeli armies.
The UN announced this week that five of the eighteen truce observa-
tion posts along the Suez Canal have been temporarily closed. Danger to
observers from firing incidents and encroachment by military forces were
cited as reasons for the closures.
Turkish national elections are less than three weeks away, and official
circles are increasingly concerned over renewed student violence. The govern-
ment is determined to keep the lid on student activists to avoid increased
tension during the election period. Student extremists, however, may try to
exploit recent student deaths to encourage the government to overreact, thus
inviting the army to intervene.
Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis, who has returned to Athens after
three months in Switzerland recuperating from a heart attack, is renewing his
efforts to move the regime toward a constitutional government.
Ahmadabad in western India remains under army control after a week
of unusually severe Hindu-Muslim riots. There are no signs yet that violence
will spread to other regions of the country, but the high tension necessitated
a 24-hour curfew in Ahmadabad on 26 September. Prime Minister Gandhi
flew there on the 25th, cutting short the eastern part of her tour of India.
In East Pakistan, a violent student-government confrontation again
appears possible. The compromise on the eve of Education Day last week is
being widely regarded as a defeat for the government. In an effort to regain
some credibility, the regime has summoned six student leaders to answer
charges regarding offenses allegedly committed during the day's activities.
The Nigerian civil war remains stalemated. In the predominantly
Yoruba Western State, a series of clashes over the past ten days between
farmers, who were protesting high taxes, and security forces has resulted in
more than 50 deaths. The situation in the west is embarrassing to the federal
government, but does not represent a threat to Nigeria's ability to continue
the war.
Haile Selassie University opens on 29 September, and the students
apparently are ready to resume their disruptive activities. They have pre-
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MIDDLE EAST CONTINUES TO SIMMER
Israel's chief of military
intelligence, General Yariv, re-
cently explained to the US defense
attache Israel's rationale for its
military action against Egypt.
Yariv made two points: first,
Israel intended to keep up the
military pressure on Egypt; and,
second, the fall of Nasir would
be a happy byproduct of such pres-
sure. Yariv stressed the point
that, although Israeli military
operations since 9 September had
been a shock to Egypt, both in
materiel losses and casualties,
they were "not enough" to accom-
plish Israel's objectives. He
said that further "selective" ac-
tions were in the offing, partic-
ularly helicopter assaults. Yariv
said Nasir still was the major and
most powerful figure among the rad-
ical Arab states, and that he con-
tinues to call the shots and prod
other Arab states into taking ac-
tion against Israel. Yariv claimed
that as long as Nasir remains, no
solution to the Middle East prob-
lem is possible.
In Cairo, Nasir is having
his troubles, but they do not
appear serious enough to threaten
his position. A new wave of
military dismissals and civilian
arrests has been carried out, re-
sulting in the replacement of the
Egyptian chief of staff and other
high-level military transfers.
This action may have been trig-
gered by the lack of an immediate
Egyptian military response to the
Israeli raid across the Gulf of
Page 20
Suez on 9 September. The dismis-
sals, therefore, may have been a
gesture to appease the "hawks" in
the military who are eager to strike
at Israel and could be expected to
resent the inactivity during the
raid.
Over 100 Egyptian civilians,
primarily judges and lawyers,
have been jailed in the past few
weeks. These arrests, which fol-
lowed the dismissal of the jus-
tice minister earlier this sum-
mer, could be part of a campaign
against judicial corruption. It
could also be Nasir's answer to.
criticism of his regime, which
has been widespread in recent
months. Another element of the
muddled political scene in Cairo
is the recent political eclipse,
at least temporarily, of Ali Sabri,
a long-time Nasir associate.
In Lebanon the government
and the fedayeen are heading
toward new clashes. Fedayeen
groups have infiltrated signif-
icant numbers of men and weap-
ons into Palestinian refugee
camps during the past month.
The major fedayeen organizations
have also opened "public service
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offices" in the camps, which act
as covers for recruitment activ-
ities. The army chief of staff
thinks the situation has rapidly
deteriorated and has set up army
observation posts in the vicinity
of the camps to preserve security
and order.
Jordan is also experiencing
difficulties with the fedayeen.
The US Embassy in Amman reports
that fedayeen cockiness and dis-
respect for authority are in-
creasing. The police, most of
whom are Palestinian, are un-
willing to confront the fedayeen.
Over the past few weeks, the
police have refused to take ac-
tion in at least two cases where
prominent members of the Chris-
tian and Circassian communities
were killed by'the fedayeen.
Nor did they intervene in the
kidnaping of a newspaper editor
or in a youth riot at a downtown
theater and hotel. Furthermore,
storekeepers have begun to com-
plain that the fedayeen are tak-
ing advantage of the situation
to extort greater contributions.
To meet the growing demand
for police protection, the gov-
ernment is relying more and more
on bedouin security forces.
Many ordinary citizens, however,
worried over the lack of normal
security protection, are arming
themselves and some are even
setting up their own vigilante
units. A number of army offi-
cers also are becoming critical
of the government's ineffective-
ness. The embassy believes that
the government must soon take
firm action to re-establish its
authority or lose the backing
of its traditional elements of
support.
Jordan repaired the East
Ghor Canal on 22 September, and
water is again flowing in the
irrigation system. An Israeli
Foreign Ministry spokesman said
that Israel had decided to al-
low the repair to take place
"in consideration of the danger
to the crops and soil" of the
East Bank area. The spokesman
also expressed hope that the Jor-
danian Government would observe
a cease-fire in effect in the
are a.
MUSLIM DISSIDENCE CONTINUES IN CHAD
Chad's persistent insurgency
enters its fifth year next month
with no end in sight. Paris'
growing concern over developments
in its beleagured former colony
recently prompted the French--
Chad's main source of financial
and military aid--to undertake a
top-level review of their future
course.
The insurgency problem is
rooted in the ethnic and religious
antagonism between the Muslim
tribes of the eastern and north-
ern provinces and the animist or
partially Christianized black
tribes of the southern provinces.
Since independence in 1960, the
central government at Ft. Lamy
has been dominated by black
tribesmen whom the Muslims regard
as :inferiors. Maladministration
by officials of President Tombal-
baye's frail regime and the in-
ability of his weak security forces
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to cope with even simple brig-
andage have further complicated
the situation.
In the north the dissidents
are mainly Toubou tribesmen who
have traditionally opposed all
authority. A year ago, the Tou-
bous' defiance finally forced
Tombalbaye to call for help from
the French. A sizable military
operation eventually restored Ft.
Lamy's tenuous hold over the vast
Tibesti area, but this month the
government's control was chal-
lenged anew when Toubous attacked
a joint Chadian-French force.
In the eastern provinces, the
government's security forces have
since 1965 been engaged continu-
ously with armed bands of dissi-
dents drawn from both the seden-
tary and nomadic Muslim tribes of
the area. Many of these bands owe
allegiance to a shadowy organiza-
tion called the National Liberation
Front of Chad. As in the north,
administrative abuses have fed,this
dissidence and have driven many vil-
lagers into the arms of the inpur-
gents. These insurgents reportedly
now may be getting better organized
and seeking to extend their influ-
ence into new areas.
So far there is no evidence
that the insurgents in either area
have enlisted any significant ex-
ternal support. The establishment
of a leftist military regime in
Sudan last spring and the overthrow
of King Idris in Libya early this
month have increased Tombalbaye's
concern that one or both of these
Muslim states might seek to exploit
the current situation in Chad by
assisting the insurgents.
In response to new appeals from
Tombalbaye, Paris began last spring
to increase its military presence.
Two companies of Foreign Legion-
naires were sent in April, two more
this month, and another reportedly
will arrive soon. This will bring
French forces in Chad--France's main
military base in Africa--to well
over 2,000 men.
plemented.
posed reforms will actually be im-
At the same time, France put
Tombalbaye on notice that he must
make broad changes in the civil ap-
paratus or face cuts in French aid.
In response to these pressures, he
recently announced sweeping moves
aimed at decentralizing authority
and permitting greater initiative
at the local level. It remains to 25X1
be seen, however, whether these pro-
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NEw LIBYAN REGIME UNLIKELY TO MOVE AGAINST OIL COMPANIES
Libyan dependence on oil ex-
ports in the face of keen compe-
tition from other oil-producing
nations makes immediate strong
actions against foreign oil com-
panies in Libya unlikely. The
new regime will probably acceler-
ate the policy of the former gov-
ernment to increase the country's
share of oil profits, however,
which could affect the financial
flow to the US.
The Libyan petroleum opera-
tion makes a large contribution
to the US balance of payments po-
sition. Ninety percent of the
oil industry there is American
owned and operated, with a total
investment of about $1.2 billion.
In 1968 the US surplus with Libya,
almost exclusively from the oper-
ation of US oil companies, ap-
proached $700 million.
The quantity of Libyan oil
imported by the US, however, con-
stitutes only an insignificant
share of total US oil consumption.
At present about 93 percent of
Libyan crude goes to Western Eu-
rope. West Germany is the largest
single importer. Libyan oil ac-
counts for about one third of im-
ported supplies in West Germany,
Italy, and the Netherlands, and
25 percent of the British demand
for crude oil.
Foreign oil concessionaries
were assured at the outset of the
military take-over that oil oper-
ations would not be hampered and,
to date, Libyan oil production
and exports have not been cur-
tailed or seriously interrupted.
Nationalization and operation of
the oil industry by Libya at this
time are unlikely both because of
a lack of skilled technicians to
maintain and operate the industry
and because of oil marketing prob-
lems? it is likely, however,
that the new regime will increase
the involvement of the Libyan
state oil company, LIPETCO, in
oil production through joint part-
nership agreements.
Although petroleum produc-
tion began late in Libya as com-
pared with other Middle Eastern
countries, Libya skyrocketed to
fourth among world oil producers
and could rank third to the US
and the USSR by next year. Oil
revenues are Libya's primary
source of income, amounting in"
1968 to $770 million of the total
$966 million gross domestic prod-
uct. Libya is dependent upon oil
revenues to finance 60 percent of
its food supply and for all non-
oil development activity. Oil
revenues have also been the source
of annual Libyan aid of about $84
million under the Khartoum agree-
ment, which called for oil-rich
Arab states to aid Egypt and
Jordan following the Arab-Israeli
hostilities in June 1967.
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GUINEA GAMBLES ON CONTRADICTORY POLICIES
On 2 October President Sekou
Toure's radical regime will cele-
brate its 11th independence an-
niversary along with the inaugu-
ration of a $183-million, West-
ern-financed mining project.
Celebration of this larqe capi-
talist investment in the economy
of socialist Guinea illustrates
the conflicting pressures that
are forcing Toure to adopt pol-
icies which, in the long run,
will only add to Guinea's politi-
cal instability.
Since independence, Toure
has pursued a policy of strong
central control of the country's
political and economic life
through a single political party,
the Marxist-influenced Democratic
Party of Guinea. Rational eco-
nomic planning has been sacrificed
to political expediency, however,
and has resulted in the failure
of Toure's economic policies. The
living standard of the average
Guinean is little better today
than it was in 1958.
To help solve its economic
problems, the government in 1964
signed a partnership agreement
with a consortium of Western com-
panies to develop large bauxite
deposits in western Guinea. Pro-
duction is to begin in 1972.
Guinea, as owner of 49 percent
of the joint development company,
expects initial profits to in-
crease its yearly net foreign ex-
change earnings by about one
fourth. Toure apparently believes
that such partnership agreements
will largely solve Guinea's eco-
nomic problems and that he thus
will not be required to reform
the economy, where unprofitable
state enterprises and a noncon-
vertible currency are retained
for political reasons.
To gain time until production
begins, the government this year
negotiated with Western -and Com-
munist creditors the rescheduling
of its major foreign debts and
also sought help from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). In
return, Guinea promised to follow
an IMF austerity program, advice
previously considered interference
in its internal affairs.
While economic necessity has
pushed Guinea toward cooperation
with the West, political expe-
diency has produced increasingly
radical domestic policies. Toure's
reaction to popular unrest over
economic failures has been more
authoritarianism disguised as re-
dedication to revolutionary prin-
ciples. To distract popular at-
tention and to keep opponents off
balance, a succession of alleged
imperialist plots have been ex-
posed--five this year alone. Fol-
lowing exposure of one such plot
in March,Toure moved against mod-
erates in the government and army
in an attempt to neutralize them.
The question is how long
Toure can reconcile the conflict-
ing pressures generated by his
dual program. The bauxite proj-
ect is of such importance that
Toure is unlikely to let radical
excesses jeopardize it. Once
set in motion, however, the "radi-
calization" process acquires a
momentum which Toure may find
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In Brazil, the military is still trying to reach a decision on a replacement
for President Costae Silva.
Unrest has continued in Uruguay as students commemorating the first
anniversary of demonstrations against the policies of President Pacheco
clashed violently with police in Montevideo on 19 and 20 September. Unrest
also continued to be a problem for the Argentine Government. The fourth
general labor strike this year is now scheduled for 1 and 2 October, and new
violence may occur.
A solution to the political impasse in the Netherlands Antilles, caused
when no party gained a legislative majority in the elections of 5 September,
may be at hand. The Democratic Party, which has controlled the government
for 15 years, is apparently maneuvering to form a coalition government prior
to the deadline of 29 September for the installation of a new govern-
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BRAZILIAN TRIUMVIRATE WORKING ON SUCCESSION AND TERRORISM
The government is concen-
trating on finding a successor to
ailing President Costa e Silva
and on curbing terrorism.
The military's deliberations
on selecting a replacement for
the President continued during
the week, the leading candidates
reportedly being Generals Sar-
mento, First Army commander;
Medici, Third Army commander; and
Albuquerque Lima, director gen-
eral of army supply. Medici is
the choice of the Costa e Silva
followers and probably of the
majority of generals.
The 63-year-old Medici might be
reluctant to accept the presi-
dency, particularly for a long
term, because of his health and
because of a hesitancy to replace
his close friend, Costa e Silva.
He would probably do so, however,
if he believed this to be the only
way to preserve military unity
and the country's internal secu-
rity.
In any case, the army's de-
cision must be ratified by the
armed forces joint high command,
and consideration may still be
given to another candidate, such
as General Albuquerque Lima, who
has heavy support from younger
officers and who is waging a
strong campaign for the top post.
fical pronouncement by the Presi-
dent's doctors on his condition,
or on his own decision to resign.
The triumvirate's delay probably
springs from a desire to select
the candidate with the highest
possible degree of military sup-
port, as well as from the minis-
ters' wish to have the President
recover sufficiently to give his
blessing to the solution. Al-
though Costa e Silva's close sup-
porters are trying to hold off
his replacement, the decision is
likely to come in early October.
The triumvirate fears that further
delay might increase the insta-
bility in both political and mil-
itary 25X1
spheres. The type of pres-
sure the triumvirate is under is
illustrated by an editorial in
Rio de Janeiro's progovernment
newspaper "0 Globo" calling for
a rapid replacement for the Pres-
ident, who it said would never
be able to return to office.
Urban terrorism remains the
government's other most serious
problem. On 19 September six
young men attacked the Brazilian
police unit guarding the US Con-
sulate General in Sao Paulo,
wounding two policemen and burn-
ing their car. One suspect in
the case has been apprehended.
Security forces have also made
some progress in finding the per-
sons responsible for Ambassador
Elbrick's kidnaping. At least
three men have been arrested
The timing of the succession
apparently will depend on an of-
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SECRET
CUBA PUBLICIZES NEW ANTIHIJACKING LAW
Cuba's new antihijacking
law, published with much fanfare
on 19 September, provides for
the punishment, by prosecution
or extradition, of any person
who hijacks aircraft or ships
or otherwise violates immigra-
tion regulations. Various stip-
ulations in the law, however,
preclude an easy solution to
the hijacking problem.
The decision to issue the
law probably resulted primarily
from a desire to placate world
opinion. The recent spate of
airplane hijackings in the Mid-
dle East and Latin America--par-
ticularly those involving Mex-
ican and Ecuadorean aircraft
on 26 July and 6 September,
respectively--has created an
international atmosphere of
hostility to which Havana appar-
ently felt obliged to react. Al-
though the latter two incidents
caused Cuba much embarrassment,
in neither case did Havana con-
sent to demands to return the air
pirates.
The new law, however, indi-
cates that Cuba is willing to
arrange for the extradition of
hijackers on a basis of recip-
rocal, bilateral treaties. Ha-
vana hopes to undercut the OAS
policy of diplomatic isolation of
Cuba and would welcome treaty
negotiations with selected indi-
vidual Latin American countries
as a negation of that policy.
The law is heavily larded
with anti-US propaganda. It
claims that the "US and Latin
American lackey governments
have promoted and encouraged the
forces diverting and hijacking Cu-
ban air or maritime ships." The
measure is written from the point
of view that Cuba is a victim, not
a proponent, of hijackings. Co-
lombia's foreign minister has al-
ready rejected the possibility
that his government would sign an
agreement with Cuba on air piracy.
Ecuadorean Foreign Ministry spokes-
men have reserved comment until
after the measure is studied in
detail.
A major loophole in the law
is Cuba's reservation of the right
to grant asylum in -selected cases.
The decision to grant or refuse
asylum would be made by Cuban im-
migration authorities. Thus, Ha-
vana will not be legally bound to
return any hijacker despite any
extradition arrangements that are
negotiated.
Another key facet of the liw
is Cuba's insistence on addressing
the problem of all illegal move-
ment in or out of the country
rather than just air piracy. Spe-
cifically mentioned was the refuge
that the US Navy base at Guantanamo
provides to Cuban "fencejumpers,"
of which there were over 1,000
last year.
Despite the law's shortcomings,
the mere fact that Havana chose. to
publish it may discourage some po-
tential hijackers. Those persons
running from personal problems may
be less inclined to force a plane
to Havana now that the Castro gov-
ernment has gone on public record
as being generally unfavorably dis-
posed toward air piracy.
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SECRET
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FACES CONTINUED LABOR UNREST
Labor unrest continues to be
a problem for the Ongania govern-
ment. Its roots are primarily
economic, but political factors
are involved. The fourth general
strike this year, now scheduled
for 1 and 2 October, is likely to
increase the hostility between
the government and workers, and
new violence may occur.
The principal economic issue
involved is the government's in-
sistence on maintaining its eco-
nomic stabilization program in
the face of labor's demands for
a greater share in the country's
wealth. Officials maintain that
despite contrary claims by union
leaders, there has not been a
major decline in most workers'
real wages during the past three
years, and that in some cases
there has actually been an in-
crease.
The distance between the two
positions became manifest early
this month, when talks on wage
increases for 1970 began. Union
leaders called for hikes of 40
percent and up, while employers
generally limited their offers to
5-10 percent. Management negoti-
ators claimed that they could not
offer more because the government
had prohibited large price ad-
vances from matching wage in-
creases.
Earlier this month, the wage
is-sue and other factors led to
labor violence. Workers struck
the railroad that links Buenos
Aires with Rosario, the nation's
second largest city, and other
northern areas to protest the
dismissal of employees who had
taken part in general strikes
earlier this year. Extreme left-
ists in the union urged that the
strike be continued indefinitely,
and called for support from other
unions.
A sympathy strike by the CST
unions in Rosario on 16 and 17
September paralyzed the city, and
clashes between demonstrators and
police resulted in three deaths'
and some $8 million in property
damage. Army troops were called
in to protect public services and
railroad property, which suffered
the greatest damage.
A government decree placing
the striking railroad workers,
and any others who joined them,
under military jurisdiction lim-
ited the success of a nationwide
railroad strike called in sym-
pathy with the Rosario line em-
ployees on 16 September.
Although the government ap-
parently is willing to meet some
of the Rosario workers' demands,
the strike is not over, and if
the authorities take disciplinary
actions against the union members
it could flare up again.
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SECRET
REFUGEE AND TRADE PROBLEMS TROUBLE EL SALVADOR
Despite agreement on a num-
ber of important issues, relations
between El Salvador and Honduras
have not improved substantially.
Political pressures for a tougher
anti-Honduran line appear to be
building in El Salvador. At the
same time, political considera-
tions are limiting the ability of
the Honduran Government to make
concessions.
The Salvadoran Government is
coming under increasing public
pressure to find some way to force
Honduras to open its portion of
the Pan-American Highway to Salva-
doran transit trade. Salvadoran
industrialists have demanded that
the government close its borders
to Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa
Rica to force them to put pressure
on Honduras. President Sanchez
resisted strong cabinet pressure
to take this action, but indicated
that such a step might be taken in
two to three weeks if the problem
could not be solved through nego-
tiation. Sanchez is also deeply
concerned about the growing mood
of frustration and anger stemming
from the continued exodus of Sal-
vadorans from Honduras.
The Hondurans have tended to
follow a fairly conciliatory pol-
Page 31
icy. They readily agreed to re-
deploy their troops away from the
border, to release Salvadoran in-
ternees, and to open telecommuni-
cation links with El Salvador.
The refugee issue and reopening
of the highway, however, are po-
litically hot potatoes. President
Lopez,, worried about his popular
image, has been reluctant to op-
pose public opinion and has not
used his prestige to end discrim-
ination against Salvadoran resi-
dents or to end the boycott of
Salvadoran products.
`Uhe Honduran Government has
said that it will not reopen the
highway until the OAS agrees to
set up machinery to process Hon-
duran war damage claims and calls
upon E1 Salvador to begin border
negotiations. The government has
also indicated that it would en-
able all documented Salvadoran
residents to become naturalized
and would facilitate the docu-
menta-:ion of Salvadorans illegally
in Honduras if they have Honduran
families or have "roots" in the
country, but that all other Sal-
vadorans would be expelled. In
addition, the government intends
to control future immigration
carefully.
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SECRET
BELIZE INDEPENDENCE MOVES WORRY GUATEMALA
Premier Price of British Hon-
duras (Belize) is increasingly in-
sistent on moving toward early
independence despite British and
Guatemalan warnings that this is
not a good time. The major im-
pediments to a workable independ-
ence for the tiny colony--Guate-
mala's unresolved claim to the
area and Britain's unwillingness
to grant a security guarantee--
loom as particularly difficult
obstacles during the Guatemalan
campaign already under way for
the presidential election next
March.
The nationalistic rhetoric
of the campaign could easily push
Guatemala toward a hawkish and
totally irrational position.
President Mendez and the govern-
ment's presidential candidate are
aware of the implications of fo-
cusing on the Belize issue, but
cannot afford to exhibit less
"patriotism" than the other poli-
ticians who have already taken
strong stands. The Mendez admin-
istration
is clearly
determined not to be the govern-
ment that "sells out" the long-
standing national claim to the
poor and sparsely inhabited ter-
ritory.
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Premier Price is unwilling
to back down on his promise to
gain independence in 1970, and he
is holding the British to their
commitment to grant an independ-
ence conference at British Hon-
duras' request. Price may use
the Commonwealth Parliamentary
Associations Conference scheduled
to be held in Trinidad in October
to present a formal request for
independence. In his latest pub-
lic speech, Price pointedly de-
scribed his policy as in no way
dependent on or affected by the
wishes of Guatemala, whose terri-
torial dispute he regards as
strictly with the British. He
also regards Britain'as morally
bound ..to see us through a
territorial dispute that is not
of our making and to insure us
against any form of violence that
might beset us."
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