WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007300050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 September 1969
No. 0388/69
State Dept. review completed
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SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 18 September 1969)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Page
1
2
VIETNAM
Hanoi's leadership has withdrawn from the spotlight,
probably to try to forge the party unity it has re-
peatedly called for. The most significant military
actions in the South have been in the northern prov-
inces and in Chau Doc Province in the Mekong Delta.
CAMBODIA RENEWS NEGOTIATIONS WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS 5
from
tu
rn
Chief of State Sihanouk indicated on his re
Hanoi last week that he had opened a new round of
substantive talks with North Vietnamese leaders.
LAO GOVERNMENT OFFENSIVE SLOWS
Communist forces have begun to put up a more spirited
defense during the past week and government troops
d
.
have been checked in their efforts to gain new groun
SOUTH KOREAN REGIME CLEARS WAY FOR THIRD TERM
The Pak regime will use its full
powers to ensure a favorable outcome in next month's
national referendum to amend the constitutional ban
on a third term for President Pak.
APATHY GREETS PEKING'S "WAR PREPARATIONS" DRIVE
Peking's stepped-up "war preparations" drive is en-
countering public apathy and some resistance.
SECRET
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SECRET
Europe
NO RESULT APPARENT FROM KOSYGIN - CHOU EN-LAI MEETING
There is no indication that the meeting in Peking on
11 September resulted in any significant improvement
in Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese behavior suggests
A long-awaited meeting of the Czechoslovak party
central committee apparently was postponed again
this week. Meanwhile, party chief Husak met with
Poland's Gomulka, and Premier Cernik met with Soviet
leaders.
CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMY MUDDLES ALONG
One year after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,
the country faces the prospect of an apparently ex-
tended period of tight economic control.
NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT RETURNED TO OFFICE
The center-right coalition won only a narrow victory
in the recent parliamentary elections and can be ex-
pected to try to avoid controversy during its new
term.
SE;RET
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Middle East - Africa
ISRAEL INCREASES MILITARY PRESSURE ON EGYPT
Israeli aircraft have struck repeatedly--seven times
since 9 September--at the same area hit in their re-
cent ten-hour armored force raid, :but the Israelis'
military motives in continuing to pound this largely
empty area remain uncertain.
STUDENT-GOVERNMENT CLASH AVERTED IN PAKISTAN
A last-minute agreement forestalled a showdown be-
tween the government and discontented East Pakistani
students on "Education Day," but the authorities' re-
treat from their initial uncompromising stance may
encourage malcontents to instigate further confronta-
tions.
ERITREAN LIBERATION FRONT SCORES PUBLICITY GAINS
The hijacking of an Ethiopian Airlines' plane to
Aden on 13 September by ELF terrorists is the latest
effort of the front to dramatize its eight-year
fight for Eritrean independence.
SOUTH AFRICA'S COLOREDS GO TO THE POLLS
Two million people of black-white parentage--South
Africa's Cape Coloreds--will go through the motions
of electing a legislative council on 24 September,
but the move will do little to solve the dilemma of
their status within the apartheid system.
SECRET
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MINISTATE MAURITIUS ATTRACTS SOVIET ATTENTION
Strategically located Mauritius, although one of the
world's smallest states, continues to interest the
Soviets, and Prime Minister Ramgoolam has so far been
receptive to their overtures.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
BRAZILIAN LEADERSHIP CRISIS STILL UNRESOLVED
Military leaders apparently agree that a single chief
executive must take over, but they have been unable
to settle on an individual or on a method of transi-
tion.
TERRORIST ACTS CAUSE MILITARY UNREST IN ECUADOR
An upsurge in terrorist acts and military reaction
to them are weakening President Velasco's position.
DOMESTIC PRESSURES IMPEDE SALVADOR-HONDURAS SETTLEMENT
Both countries apparently recognize the dangers in-
herent in the present situation, but domestic polit-
ical considerations continue to impede the normaliza-
tion of relations.
SECRET
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Communist military operations in South Vietnam continue to follow
patterns established before the death of Ho Chi Minh. These include shell-
ings, small unit actions, and occasional highpoints involving larger forces. It
is unlikely that there will be any sudden shift in the Communists' approach
to the war or to the talks in Paris while Ho's heirs work out their relation-
ships with one another. This appears to have priority in Hanoi.
Cambodia's Sihanouk and the North Vietnamese leaders appear to have
made some progress on at least a few outstanding issues during renewed talks
in Hanoi last week. The importance of Cambodia to the Communists' war
effort and the fact that Sihanouk has not agreed to permit a resumption of
the flow through Cambodia of arms and ammunition to Communist forces in
South Vietnam may make Hanoi somewhat more responsive to Sihanouk's
desires than in the past. Materiel shipments will probably be a major topic
when the head of the Provisional Revolutionary Government visits Phnom
Penh in the near future.
Increasing enemy resistance has checked Lao government efforts to gain
new ground in the Plaine des Jarres. The Communists may now have
sufficiently consolidated their badly disorganized forces to take the offen-
sive. If so, government troops may be hard pressed to retain control over
recently occupied territory. Neutralist General Vang Pao's strategy will be to
try to establish strongpoints in the mountains surrounding the Plaine in
order to deny it to the enemy.
SECRET
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SECRET
VIETNAM
Hanoi's leadership has with-
drawn from the public spotlight
since the conclusion of the cere-
monies honoring Ho Chi Minh. Ho's
heirs are probably trying to forge
the party unity they have repeat-
edly called for, and central com-
mittee meetings may well be under
way. What has been done or said
publicly so far, however, has pro-
vided few clues to the shape of
future policy or the real distri-
bution of power.
The party daily is using
Ho's testament to set out policy
guidelines on specific issues
but, taken together, these edi-
torials provide something for
everyone. On 12 September, the
lead editorial was a hard-hitting
commentary for the war hawks
that called for continued sac-
rifice until final victory is
achieved. The next day the main
theme was the importance of "build-
ing socialism" in the North, and
support for the war took a defi-
nite back seat. On 14 September,
the issue was intraparty unity
and the next day it was unity in
the Communist world.
Apprehension over Sino-So-
viet strains and commitment to
Vietnamese neutrality vis-a-vis
the two Communist powers may well
be the only issues on which there
is genuine unity in Hanoi. Ho's
will and Party First Secretary
Le Duan's funeral oration gave
these issues high priority. It
is quite doubtful that the party
can muster much unanimity on
other issues that have been vig-
orously debated in the past and
contain the seeds of future di-
visiveness.
Indications of Le Duan's
personal commitment to continu-
ing Vietnamese neutrality in the
Sino-Soviet dispute came through
clearly in the party daily edi-
torial of 15 September, which was
liberally sprinkled with quotes
from Le Duan's earlier writings
along with those of Ho Chi Minh.
This coupling of Le Duan's views
with those of Ho also tends to
buttress the party first secre-
tary's leading position in the
politburo.
Except for the editorial
commentary immediately following
Ho's death, not much attention
has been given to the idea of
collective leadership. The one
reference to the idea this week
was a backhanded one in which
President Ho was credited with
developing a group of "close
comrades in arms who were both
loyal and outstanding." Every
public appearance or sign of
party ranking to date has Le Duan
exercising the prerogatives of
the post he held as Ho's second
in command. This pattern will
probably persist for some time.
SECRET
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ARY 19 Sep 69
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Military Developments
Communist forces loosed a
brief flurry of shellings and
ground attacks on 11-12 Septem-
ber immediately following the
cease-fire honoring Ho Chi Minh,
but enemy initiatives since then
have been at a generally low level.
The most significant actions have
been in the northern provinces,
where the enemy conducted damag-
ing raids against several vil-
lages and refugee centers, and
in Chau Doc Province in the Me-
kong Delta.
It is becoming increasingly
clear that the Communists are
stepping up their military com-
mitment in the populous delta,
which is now defended almost ex-
clusively by South Vietnamese
soldiers. Prisoners and ralliers
report that some 1,000 North
Vietnamese replacement troops
have been sent to Viet Cong bat-
talions in the northern delta
provinces since July. Earlier
this summer the enemy reinforced
the delta with North Vietnamese
regulars for the first time in
the war by shifting two regiments
from III Corps to the western
and southern delta provinces.
the Communists intend
L
to pursue the war during the re-
mainder of the fall and this
winter with much the same "high-
point" tactics that have charac-
terized their operations since
last spring.
Page 3
Ithe fall-winter
campaign will consist of several
phases, each marked by a brief
but intense surge of attacks.
enemy forces, in
their ground assaults, will try
to inflict maximum damages and
casualties, but in order to con-
serve manpower they will not at-
tempt actually to seize and hold
objectives.
future Communist military
'activity will not differ markedly
from that of recent months and
will feature stand-off shellings,
sapper raids, and guerrilla ac-
tivities in rural areas.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Sep 69
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Political Developments in
South Vietnam
The new cabinet is still feel-
ing its way, with only broad policy
guidelines so far laid down by
Prime Minister Khiem. Meanwhile,
progovernment legislators in the
National Assembly are still en-
countering some obstacles in try-
ing to create majority blocs in
each house under a common, unified
assembly leadership.
Several opposition groups
are considering the formation of
a joint political committee, but
it appears unlikely that they
will come up with an effective
coalition. Militant Buddhist
leader Thich Tri Quang, although
not actively associating with
such efforts, has added his
voice to those expressing concern
over the increased influence in
the government of members of the
old Diemist Can Lao Party. He
claims this influence will be
used to promote anti-Buddhist
policies and has indicated that
the Buddhists may create a secret
political group to counter the
Can Lao.
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUM MARY
19 Sep 69
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CAMBODIA RENEWS NEGOTIATIONS WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
Chief of State Sihanouk indi-
cated on his return from Hanoi
last week that he had opened a new
round of substantive talks with
North Vietnamese leaders.
The talks touched on major
issues that have been an increas-
ing source of tension between the
two sides over the past year, in-
cluding the presence of Communist
troops in Cambodia. Some prog-
ress appears to have been made
on at least a few of the outstand-
ing issues. Sihanouk claimed
that North Vietnamese Premier
Pham Van Dong had made many prom-
ises, but warned that he consid-
ered such promises as having only
limited value.
Sihanouk has been trying to
get North Vietnam to sign a border
agreement for almost five years.
Cong's Provisional Revolutionary
Government, signed an agreement
during his trip to Phnom Penh
last July that recognized Cambo-
dia's version of its borders and
pledged that Communist troops
would vacate Cambodian territory
once the war was over. Sihanouk
presumably wants a similar but,
from his point of view, more bind-
ing accord from Hanoi.
Sihanouk clearly believes
that the Communists will ulti-
mately prevail in South Vietnam
and that, as the war there tapers
off, they will increase their
military and political pressures
on Cambodia. Despite Communist
assurances, the presence of North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops
in Cambodia--Phnom Penh has esti-
mated that there are as many as
60,000--remains a major problem.
Although Phnom Penh knows full
well it cannot drive the Commu-
nists out, in the past year it
has ordered its security forces
to increase military pressures on
intruding Communist units and has
often looked the other way when
allied forces have engaged the
Communists along the border.
An announcement from Phnom
Penh that Sihanouk had concluded
a "commercial treaty" with the
Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment suggests that Sihanouk made
some progress with the Communists;
the Communists have pressed for
a formal trade agreement to cover
the purchase of nonmilitary sup-
plies ever since Sihanouk placed
an embargo on all supply ship-
ments, last May. Sihanouk may also
have viewed the trade agreement
as a conciliatory gesture to com-
pensate for his not honoring his
earlier promises to permit the
resumption of the arms and ammu-
nition flow to the Communists in
South Vietnam.
The importance of Cambodia
to the Communists' war effort and
the fact that Sihanouk apparently
has not agreed to permit the re-
sumed flow of arms and ammunition
may make Hanoi somewhat more re-
sponsive to Sihanouk's desires.
This presumably will be the major
topic Pham Van Dong will discuss
in his forthcomin tri to Phnom
Penh.
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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LAOS: Current Situation
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LAO GOVERNMENT OFFENSIVE SLOWS
Communist forces have begun
to put up a more spirited defense
during the past week and the gov-
ernment offensive in north Laos
appears to be running out of
steam. Aside from the unopposed
capture of Xieng Khouangville,
government troops have been checked
in their efforts to gain new
ground. Despite this turn of
events, the government still hopes
to secure the high ground north
of the Plaine des Jarres and re-
take Muong Soui before the rainy
season ends late next month.
Increasing enemy resistance
to repeated government attempts
to advance north of the Plaine
and a strong attack against a
government guerrilla unit south
of Khang Khay on 15 September
suggest that the Communists may
have consolidated their badly
disorganized forces. They may
be preparing to take more offen-
sive actions in and around the
Plaine. If so, government forces
are likely to be hard pressed to
advance farther and their ability
to retain control over recently
occupied territory will be se-
verely tested.
Meo leader Vang Pao has re-
inforced the northern Plaine with
additional guerrilla elements to
try to push forward in that sec-
tor. This move is in line with
his recently declared strategy
of denying the Communists access
to the Plaine in the future by
establishing government strong-
points in the mountains surround-
ing it. Moreover, he has opened
a new phase of the offensive by
dispatching irregular units to
try to retake Muong Soui, which
he believes has been isolated and
weakened by his operations in the
Plaine area.
Pathet Lao and Hanoi radios
have both come down hard on Vang
Pao's offensive and have threat-
ened to "mete out unprecedented
heavy blows" to the government.
The Pathet Lao broadcast may also
have signaled the Communists' in-
tent to retaliate when it empha-
sized that the offensive was
launched from Vang Pao's bases
at Sam. Thong and Long Tieng, and
from Vang Vieng, a headquarters
base for government neutralist
troops.
]:n south Laos, government
forces have been consolidating
their control in the immediate
area around the recently captured
town of Muong Phine and have de-
stroyed large quantities of enemy
supplies.
SECRET
Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SOUTH KOREAN REGIME CLEARS WAY FOR THIRD TERM
The Pak regime will use its
full powers to
ensure a favorable outcome in
next month's national referendum
to amend the constitutional ban
on a third term for President
Pak. The National Assembly for-
mally approved the amendment last
weekend and the government party
plans to open a nationwide cam-
paign on 20 September to promote
support for the final step in
the amendment process.
The regime's program has
probably been complicated, how-
ever, by its high-handed tactics
in ramming the amendment through
the National Assembly. Govern-
ment legislators, justifying th
actions as necessary to overcom
opposition party obstructionist
tactics, passed the measure on
September in a secret assembly
session held at 3:00 a.m. in an
Opposition elements have been
encouraged by the public outcry to
strengthen their antiamendment
drive. A leading minor party pol-
itician and a number of independ-
ent legislators have indicated
they will support the opposition
party's antiamendment campaign.
The press also appears more will-
ing to brave government retalia-
tion and speak out against the
amendment. Such efforts at this
point at least, are no match for
the regime's overwhelming financial
and political resources. Opposi-
tion leaders probably realize this
and may be playing for the outside
chance that the regime will over-
reach itself in suppressing its
detractors, and thereby provoke
eir
e
a wave of
public revulsion.
14
ment
The area
appears
where such a
most likely is
develop-
in
police handling of student
demon-
annex of the main assembly build-
ing. The government party's flout-
ing of parliamentary procedure has
provoked a torrent of public criti-
cism. This was heightened by a
singular display of insensitivity
on the part of police when they
broke up an antiamendment demon-
stration in downtown Seoul by a
small group of wounded Vietnam
veterans.
strators. The police anticipate
an increase in student violence;
all but two small universities in
the capital have been shut down
and some high-school classes have
been suspended. Riot-control
forces, which have been strength-
ened, are probably capable of 25X1
holding the students in check.
Excessive police force could still
be applied, however.
APATHY GREETS PEKING'S "WAR PREPARATIONS" DRIVE
Peking has stepped up its
"war preparations" propaganda in
recent weeks. In part this has
been done to push faltering do-
mestic programs, but it also re-
flects concern in the wake of
this year's border clashes with
Page 9
the Soviet Union. The regime's
past exploitation of the war prep-
arations theme to promote unpopu-
lar internal programs, as well as
to foster national unity, has re-
sulted, however, in widespread pub-
lic apathy and some resistance to
the new drive.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Sep 69
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Peking has been using the
theme to justify the highly unpop-
ular program of sending large num-
bers of city residents to the coun-
tryside. Many urban youths, how-
ever, are unwilling to o to des-
olate border regions
The regime has also used the
theme to put increased demands on
the peasants. A Kirin radiobroad-
cast of 29 August warned peasants
not to become lulled by feelings
of peace and to store more grain
in case the war with the Soviet
Union lasts for several years.
Broadcasts from several pro-
vincial radio stations indicate
that some local army elements also
are not responding to the call for
increased vigilance. These broad-
casts criticized erroneous atti-
tudes and a lack of understanding
of the Soviet threat. According
to Kiangsi radio on 30 August, one
local army unit expressed its skep-
ticism of the drive by questioning
why, amidst all the talk about
strengthening preparations for war,
Page 10
it was still tied down with domes-
tic political tasks assumed during
the Cultural Revolution and was not
allowed instead to carry out more
military training.
The domestic aims of the war
preparations drive probably remajn
paramount, but Peking's recent use
of the theme does suggest a grow"
ing concern among the Chinese lead-
ership over the possibility of
further hostilities with the So-
viet Union.
The evidence now available is
still too thin, however, to suggest
that Peking is doing more than tak-
ing some preliminary steps to firm
up its contingency plans in case
.of some new conflict. It is also
clear that Peking, for the time be-
ing at least, has no intention of
(freeing local army units from their
political role for purely military
duties,
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The 24th UN General Assembly convened on 16 September. Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko is expected to speak on the strategic arms
limitation talks and may announce a Soviet initiative concernin controls on
the production of chemical and biological warfare weaponry.
Neither Moscow nor Peking has given out any details of Kosygin's trip
to China on 11 September, which ended with only the briefest of state-
ments. The Soviets, who seem to have initiated the visit, probably intend it
to be read as an earnest of their peaceful intentions and have concurrently
halted their anti-Chinese propaganda. China's cold reaction
anthat no d its con-
tinuing press and radio attacks on the USSR, however, suggest improvement in relations has resulted.
On another front, Moscow responded positively on 12 September to
last month's Allied note on Berlin. The Soviet reply avoided specific commit-
ments, however, and was only a token of the USSR's willingness to continue
talking. On the same day, Moscow also replied in much the same manner to a
longstanding West German proposal for an exchange of declarations that
would renounce the use of force.
The Czechoslovak regime is virtually paralyzed at the top by political
infighting. East Germany suddenly arrived at a minor but advantageous
transportation accord with West Germany and. is discussing other potentially
lucrative agreements. Hungary's economic czar returned from a week in
Moscow where he had been coping with trade problems caused by his
economic reform.
The EC Council of Ministers agreed that the Six will hold a summit
conference in the Hague on 17-18 November. Although the conference will
apparently have no set agenda, topics such as the completion and the
enlargement of the Communities will no doubt be discussed.
Extensive strikes marked the opening of the fall political season in both
France and Italy. The French Government, fearful of jeopardizing its aus-
terity program, hopes to persuade workers to settle for relatively small
increases when wage negotiations begin. In Italy, management is prepared to
concede sizable wage increases but may be unwilling to meet demands for
greater union prerogatives. Organized labor in both countries is particularly
militant this year for fear of being outflanked on the left by spontaneous
"worker power" groupings.
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No RESULT APPARENT FROM KOSYGIN - CHOU EN-LAI MEETING
There is no indication that rest of the world to
the meeting in Peking between So- blame equally in the
viet Premier Kos
i
d
yg
n an
Chinese
Premier Chou En-lai on 11 Septem-
ber resulted in any significant
improvement in Sino-Soviet rela-
tions. Chinese behavior suggests
the contrary. It seems almost
certain that the hastily arranged
meeting occurred at Soviet initi-
ative, perhaps with the North Viet-
namese acting as intermediary.
Kosygin probably used the
occasion to emphasize the serious-
ness with which Moscow views the
present border confrontation and
to underscore Soviet determination
to react forcefully to any Chinese
provocations. At the same time
he probably reiterated Soviet
willingness to hold talks on the
border problem and may have at-
tempted to keep China under pres-
sure on this issue by indicating
that the situation was getting
out of control.
Such a presentation would
have served several Soviet pur-
poses. It would have dramatized
to the Chinese at an authoritative
and personal level the grave view
Moscow takes of what it regards
as provocations against the USSR.
The Soviets probably believe that
Peking is willing to accept a con-
tinuation of the present level of
border conflict unless it can be
convinced that Moscow is prepared
to take harsh measures. At the
same time, the Soviets are clearly
unhappy about the tendency of much
of the Communist movement and the
L'age 12
apportion
dispute.
The Soviets see themselves at
a disadvantage because many of
their enemies and allies believe
they can take advantage of Mos-
cow's preoccupation with the Chi-
nese. Moscow probably hopes that
Kosygin's dramatic visit will serve
to show that it is seeking to set-
tle differences peacefully. The
Soviets have refrained from polem-
ics against Peking since the meet-
ing, probably to underscore their
stance as the party willing to
moderate the dispute, and perhaps
also to emphasize to China their
willingness to take some of the
heat out of the situation.
Kosygin's cold reception in
Peking and the terse Chinese com-
munique on the meeting were clearly
designed to avoid the impression
of formal Sino-Soviet discussions.
The Chinese were probably reluc-
tant to talk directly with Kosygin,
but may have been unwilling to bear
the onus for refusing to meet, par-
ticularly in light of Ho Chi Minh's
last testament appealing for unity
between the two parties. In addi-
tion, the Chinese are undoubtedly
concerned over the possibility of
a serious escalation of the con-
flict and may have seen some ad-
vantage in sounding out Soviet in-
tentions.
It is too early to tell
whether Peking will respond in a
positive fashion to the Soviet
initiative. On the propaganda
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SECRET
front, however, Peking is maintain-
ing an air of implacable hostility.
On 16 September China made a force-
ful attempt to portray the USSR
as the aggressive party in the
dispute by calling attention to
the possibility of an atomic at-
tack by "social imperialism"--a
clear allusion to recent public
speculation concerning a possible
Soviet pre-emptive strike against
China. The statement is part of
a slogan for this year's National
Day celebrations on 1 October and
NEGOTIATIONS RESUME
Negotiations on the treaty
limiting the use of the seabeds
for military purposes have re-
sumed at the 25-nation Geneva
Conference of
the
Committee on
Disarmament.
The
US has submitted
a counterdraft
to
the recent So-
viet proposal,
and
has received
a qualified "green light" from
its NATO allies to try to reach
an agreement with Moscow on a
single text.
Various aspects of both drafts
have come under fire. Some states,
desirous of guaranteeing the in-
violability of their continental
shelves, want the proposed 12-mile
zone to which the treaty prohibi-
tions would not apply extended to
include a buffer zone in which
they would enjoy complete freedom
of action. Other states fear a
negotiating impasse over a US for-
is likely to aggravate tensions
between Moscow and Peking further.
The Soviet stand-down in po-
lemics, is unlikely to last much
longer in the face of the continu-
ing stream of invective from Pe-
king. China's behavior could al-
low the Soviets to re-enter the
propaganda battle with the renewed
claim that Moscow had sought to
temper the dispute but is com-
pelled to defend itself against
Peking's "aggressive" intentions.
ON SEABEDS TREATY
mulat:Lon that would not permit the
Soviets to claim certain marginal
seas as internal waters.
Most of the participants in
the Geneva talks appear willing to
give the US and the Soviet Union a
few more weeks to negotiate an
agreed text on a bilateral basis.
They are anxious, however, to show
some :measure of progress at Geneva
and do not wish to leave undecided
those aspects of the treaty most
likely to arouse controversy at
the General Assembly session, which
could tackle the subject as early
as mid-October. At the same time,
these nations would resist any at-
tempt to portray the treaty as a
Geneva recommendation if they did
not have the opportunity to con-
sider the final draft before it is
submitted to the Assembl.
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Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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CZECHS REMAIN DIVIDED OVER REFORMERS
25X1 A long-awaited meeting of the
Czechoslovak party central commit-
tee apparently was again postponed
this week
party leaders are di-
vided over the issue of how to deal
with former party leader Dubcek and
other reformers.
Party chief Husak, a victim
himself of a purge and political
trial in the 1950s, and President
Svoboda apparently are opposing de-
mands by ultraconservatives that
Dubcek and others be removed now
from all their official positions.
They almost certainly oppose the
demands that some reformers be tried
for their political activities. At
issue, however, is not the fate of
Dubcek and the others--eventually
they will become political "nonper-
sons"--but rather whether Husak will
be able to retain freedom of action
as head of the party and preserve
whatever popular prestige he still
enjoys.
Husak may be attempting to
stall the untraconservatives while
he seeks support for his views from
his allies. On 12 September the
party presidium decided that the
Czechoslovaks would inform other
parties of their political inten-
tions. Husak's position vis-a-vis
the extremists probably was strength-
ened three days later when Polish
leader Gomulka traveled to Ostrava
for a private meeting with Husak.
Premier Cernik met for a short
time with Brezhnev and Kosygin on
16 September, and two party secre-
taries met on the 15th with Soviet
party secretaries Demichev and Katu-
shev. On both occasions the two
sides presumably discussed the
forthcoming changes in the Czech-
oslovak party and government. Cer-
nik's traveling to Moscow suggests
that he will survive the ultracon-
servatives' recent attacks on him.
CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMY MUDDLES ALONG
One year after the Soviet in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia, the coun-
try faces the prospect of an appar-
ently extended period of tight eco-
nomic control. The Husak leader-
ship, like the Dubcek government
preceding it, has thus far been re-
luctant to take the unpopular steps
necessary to solve the nation's
long-standing economic problems.
The central committee plenum on eco-
nomic problems, which probably will
not be held until late in the fall,
may provide the forum for announc-
ing new economic guidelines.
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After Czechoslovakia recovered
from the slight physical damage and
short disruption in industrial pro-
duction that accompanied the Soviet
invasion in August 1968, additional
strains were imposed on an economy
already suffering from a lack of
direction, inefficient production,
and spiraling inflation. The inva-
sion stimulated a consumer buying
panic and the regime was forced to
import additional consumer goods at
the same time that production and
delivery of exports were declining.
The losses caused by transportation
tie-ups were not made up and contri-
bute to the current shortages of
coal and other goods. Earnings
from foreign tourism, which had
been up substantially in the first
half of 1968, have dropped sharply.
The few economic accomplish-
ments of the Dubcek regime proved
short lived, principally because
of the insufficient groundwork be-
hind their implementation rather
than the turn in political develop-
ments. The workweek, reduced to
five days last year, may be length-
ened to boost sagging production
rates; the gradual transformation
toward a system of market-deter-
mined wholesale prices has been
aborted; and the brief resurgence
in light industry--largely consumer
oriented production--which last year
grew faster than heavy industry for
the first time since the mid-1950s,
has subsided.
The Husak regime has tried to
restore discipline and stabilize the
economy by instituting only a mini-
mum of controls. Substantial retail
price increases were announced al-
most immediately after it came to
power last April and emergency steps
were taken to increase domestic sup-
plies of food and coal, and to deal
with rail tie-ups. Husak also im-
posed a ban on new construction
starts, except in housing, in order
to reduce the backlog of unfinished
projects.
Husak's efforts to reinstitute
party and government control of the
economy have failed to halt a dete-
rioration in growth rates that has
been under way since the early days
of the Dubcek regime. Retail sales
have risen, domestic shortages have
been : _ntensified, and prices and
money wages have increased. Czech-
oslovakia's worsening balance of
payments with other Communist coun-
tries, which was evident in 1968,
continues.
The deterioration of the econ-
omy Lends support to the conserva-
tives' position that government con-
trol must be increased. Now that
the invasion anniversary has passed,
the government may take stronger
measures against the once-powerful
trade unions and further restrict
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: ECONOMIC INDICATORS
1967-69*
Percent increase over the
corresponding period of
the previous year
1967 1968 1st Half 1969
Industrial production 7.1 5.2
Investment 2.6 8.6
Housing construction 5.0 7.2
Gross agricultural
production 5.5 3.6
Retail trade turnover 6.5 13.3
Foreign trade turnover 1.2 9.7
Money wages 5.5 8.4
3.7
3.2
3.9
15.9
1.5
9.0
National income 6.9 6.8 n.a.
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Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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the responsibilities of the workers'
councils. Trade union spokesman
Polacek has been forced by the gov-
ernment to speak out against strikes,
factory slowdowns, and early dis-
missals.
Eventually, pressure from the
country's conservatives may even
force a formal reorganization of
economic activity along East German
lines, with a strong chain of com-
mand down to the enterprise level.
Czechoslovakia's prospects for a
Hungarian-style reform, with thor-
oughly and carefully prepared pro-
posals, have a arentl been dis-
sipated.
NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT RETURNED TO OFFICE
The center-right government
coalition was returned to office
in the recent parliamentary elec-
tions by only a narrow margin.
Its previous ten-vote majority
was reduced to two.
Within the coalition Prime
Minister Per Borten scored a per-
sonal victory when his Center
Party picked up two additional
seats in Parliament, and his hold
on the leadership of the coalition
is thereby strengthened. Both
the Center and Christian Peoples
parties benefited from the prac-
tice of running joint lists in
marginal districts and from the
eleventh-hour support of older
Liberal voters disaffected by
their party's pandering to the
radical youth.
Chafing at the constraints
imposed by participation in the
Page 16
government, some of the more rad-
ical Liberals have called for
their party's withdrawal from
the coalition. To this, both Bor-
ten and the Liberal leadership
have replied that the present
arrangement will continue, and
with even stricter party disci-
pline.
The opposition Labor Party,
bitter at its defeat, has announced
that it will exploit to the full-
est any differences within the
coalition. The only satisfaction
Labor obtained from the election
was the elimination of the left
radical Socialist Peoples Party,
from-Parliament. This exclusion
resulted not only from a deter-
mined effort by Labor to rally
the left under its banner, but
also from the failure of the far
left to overcome divisions created
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in the wake of the invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
No major changes are ex-
pected in the distribution of
cabinet portfolios, which is to
be completed by the opening of
Parliament in early October.
The government, furthermore, be-
cause of its thin majority, can
be expected to try to avoid con-
troversy.
STRENGTH OF NORWEGIAN PARTIES
* Conservatives
*Christian Peoples
*Center
* Liberals
Labor
Socialist Peoples
Communist
1965 1969
Seats % Seats
21.0 31 19.0 29
8.2 13 9.4 14
9.9 18 10.8 20
10.4 18 9.4 13
43.1 68 46.9 74
6.0 2 3.5
1.4 - 1.0 --
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SICR E`I'
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SECRET
As the Israelis continue to use their aerial superiority to strike at the
Arabs across the cease-fire lines, King Hassan of Morocco is forging ahead
with preparations for an Islamic summit to consider means of protecting the
Muslims' holy sites in Jerusalem. Hassan, not averse to enhancing his own
prestige, has invited 35 Arab, African, and Asian heads of state to meet in
Rabat for three days beginning 22 September. Egypt's Nasir has been
pressing hard for a postponement, however, and his attendance seems doubt-
ful-in view of recent reports that he is ill.
Although the Biafrans mounted another air attack this week against an
oil installation in Nigeria's Midwest State, the over-all military situation
remains stalemated. Meanwhile, with no end to the war in sight, the possi-
bility of a coup against federal leader Gowon cannot be discounted.
South African Prime Minister Vorster announced this week that na-
tional elections will be held early in 1970, a year ahead of schedule.
Vorster's move is aimed at a small but vocal group of traditionalists within
the ruling National Party who have persistently decried his policy of cultiva-
ting relations with Black Africa. If unable to rally support within the party,
the dissident Afrikaners are likely to try to form a party of their own.
In Burundi, a coup attempt planned for 18 September was neutralized
by arrests the day before. Although tensions between the two major tribes
have heated up considerably in recent weeks, President Micombero remains
in firm control.
The Government of Ceylon responded to a sudden strike on 13 Septem-
ber by imposing a state of emergency and declaring the involved industries
"essential." Faced with possible suspension, many of the strikers promptly
reported back to work while the army filled in for those who remained out,
bringing the situation almost back to normal. Unlike many strikes in Ceylon,
this one was not politically motivated, but the leftist opposition coalition
may attempt to profit from labor agitation as the 1970 general elections
draw closer.
Early returns from Afghanistan's month-long national parliamentary
elections indicate that extremists from both ends of the political spectrum
are running well in urban areas. Many of the educated class have boycotted
the elections, apparently because of dissatisfaction with the candidates or
disdain for a process involving the obvious manipulation of large blocs of
unsophisticated voters. Reactionaries may attempt to portray the low turn-
out as a negative public response to King Zahir's continuing "experiment in
democracy."
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Israel Continues Military Pressure on Egypt
UNITED ARAB
Cairo *
Pon Said
REPUBLIC
uez,f
S I N A I
jlsraeli-occupied)
Abu Daraj
military post ant
radar `acrlity
Ras Zafaranal"
Banff Suwayf V radar lacdit
(EGYPT)
Area attacked seven
times since 9 September
Ras Ghari
radar facili
1?:cRI I
SHARM
AeH-eHAYKH
\*
eHurghada
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ISRAEL INCREASES MILITARY PRESSURE ON EGYPT
Following up their recent
ten-hour armored force raid into
Egypt, Israeli aircraft have
struck repeatedly--seven times
since 9 September--at the same
area of Abu Daraj, Has Zafarana,
and Has Gharib. The Israelis'
military motives in continuing
to pound this largely empty area
are not entirely clear. Perhaps
they are hoping to force an Egyp-
tian military reaction, in par-
ticular to get Nasir's aircraft
into the air; or they may be
"softening up" the area for fu-
ture--possibly larger scale--
ground and air thrusts northward
toward the Egyptian side of the
Suez Canal.
Aside from an initial air
reaction, in which 11 Egyptian
aircraft were reportedly lost,
Nasir has refrained from commit-
ting his fighters to the fray.
He will almost certainly keep up
the pressure on the Israelis,
however, by continuing to shell
their positions along the canal.
He is determined that Tel Aviv
pay for its occupation of Arab
territory and wants to prevent
the Israelis from becoming too
firmly entrenched along the cease-
fire lines. Nasir is probably
also under pressure from "hawks"
in the military who are eager to
answer the Israeli raids.
Page 21
aticns, and no return to the pre-
June 1967 borders.
orously her country's insistence
on no peace without direct negoti-
It is against this background
of militancy that Prime Minister
Golda Meir comes to the US next
week. In her talks with US offi-
cials, the 71-year-old matriarch
can be expected to exhibit a simi-
lar toughness. A long-term Zion-
ist veteran who is almost certain
to remain prime minister after the
elections on 28 October, Mrs. Meir
can be expected to reaffirm vig- 25X1
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STUDENT-GOVERNMENT CLASH AVERTED IN PAKISTAN
Government authorities ap-
pear to have successfully averted
the first potential showdown with
students since martial law was
declared in March.
The threat of a clash came
in East Pakistan, where rising
discontent among both workers
and students had recently begun
to take on strident antiregime
overtones. The occasion was the
proclamation of 17 September as
"Education Day" by Dacca Univer-
sity students in remembrance of
students killed during antigovern-
ment protests in September 1962,
In a belligerent mood, student
leaders asked their supporters
to observe the anniversary with
a province-wide strike and urged
the government to declare an of-
ficial holiday.
As the day approached, ru-
mors circulated that students
were planning public speeches,
meetings, and possibly even demon-
strations--all in defiance of
martial law regulations. It even
appeared that a call might be made
for worker participation. Clearly
apprehensive about the potential
for violence, government authori-
ties issued a tough statement,
warning that violations of regu-
lations would not be tolerated.
On the afternoon of 16 Sep-
tember, however, four student
spokesmen met with East Pakistan's
Governor Ahsan and negotiated a
facesaving compromise that allowed
students to hold a meeting at Dacca
University on 17 September but for-
bade other meetings or processions.
On "Education Day," classes
were suspended at the university
and local colleges while students
held their authorized meeting,
but Dacca remained calm with a
"business as usual" atmosphere.
Although the government avoided
a crisis, it did so at the sac-
rifice of some credibility, in
view of its initial uncompromis-
ing stance. It remains to be
seen if this hint of vulnerability
will encourage malcontents to in-
stigate further confrontations.
ERITREAN LIBERATION FRONT SCORES PUBLICITY GAINS
The hijacking of an Ethio-
pian Airlines' plane to Aden on
13 September by Eritrean Libera-
tion Front (ELF) terrorists is
the latest effort of the front
to dramatize its eight-year fight
for Eritrean independence.
Following a lull that ex-
tended roughly from the Arab-
Israeli war in 1967 until early
this year, the ELF embarked on
a new campaign to call world at-
tention to its cause and to in-
flict financial losses on the
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SECRET
Ethiopian Government. The prin-
cipal target has been Ethiopia's
profitable national airline, the
victim of three attacks since
March. Earlier, an Ethiopian
jet was damaged on the ground
in Frankfurt and another in
Karachi. Last Saturday's hi-
jacking followed a threat in
late July to attack planes in
the air, a move that has forced
the Ethiopians to adopt costly
security procedures.
The attacks on the airline
have been accompanied by stepped-
up propaganda broadcasts from
Damascus, the front's principal
benefactor. These messages are
no longer directed primarily to-
ward the Arab states, but are now
clearly aimed at winning support
for the ELF among audiences out-
side the Middle East. Moreover,
articles concerning the insurgency
and interviews with ELF leaders
have begun appearing more fre-
quently in the US and European
press. In addition, written ap-
peals have reportedly been ad-
dressed to the UN and the OAU.
Within Eritrea, the ELF has
also achieved some modest suc-
cesses, although in less spectac-
ular fashion. The front, shift-
ing from its previous ineffectual
hit-and-run tactics against mili-
tary and police units, has initi-
ated a number of well-planned
raids against economic targets.
Fuel trucks, buses, and railroad
equipment have been destroyed.
Damage has been inflicted on water
and power facilities in Asmara
and even on Ethiopian-owned rail
Kampala
,N ,t
SUdan
TANZANIA
96107 9-69
Chisini aio
installations across the border
in Djibouti.
Despite this, the security
situation in Eritrea has not
changed markedly. Ethiopian mili-
tary operations have kept the ELF
guerrilla bands scattered and off
balance. Nevertheless, the ELF's
new effort--bolstered by a con-
tinuing return of trainees from
Syri-a--has gained it much wider
international publicity, and has
added significantly to the govern-
ment's already heavy financial
and ;security burdens. Moreover,
the front has provided ample
evidence that it now has the ca-
pability to strike at economic
targets at home and abroad, and
more attempts at headline-making
incidents are likely.
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Sep 69
/ y
I _.~Belel Uen `
J, o
*Mogadiscio
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SOUTH AFRICA'S COLOREDS GO To THE POLLS
South Africa's Colored popu- parliamentary representation
lation--mulattos of mixed black- since 1967.
white parentage--goes to the polls I
on 24 September to elect the mem- The lack of any territorial
bers of a new Colored Persons Rep-
resentative Council. The council,
when eventually established, is
intended to handle the political
and administrative affairs of the
Coloreds. Although the move is
looked upon as the first step to-
ward establishing a Colored "na-
tion," the imposition of full
territorial apartheid appears to
be impossible because the Col-
oreds--unlike the blacks--have
no separate geographic homeland.
The vast majority of South
Africa's two million Colored
people, who constitute about ten
percent of the total population,
live in Cape Province, and they
form the largest ethnic group in
Cape Town. The Coloreds once had
close ties with the Afrikaners;
most still speak Afrikaans, and
nearly all are Christian with a
strong preference for the Dutch
Reformed Church. Nevertheless,
they now exist in a world some-
where-between the black and white
societies, where, for example,
they earn more than black workers
but less than whites. Since 1948,
when the Afrikaner National Party
came to power with its ideology
of strict racial separation, the
Coloreds' place in national poli-
tics has been gradually eroded.
Their voting rights have been
curtailed, and they have had no
homeland for the Coloreds, such
as the areas already set aside
for the blacks, poses a major
obstacle to the government's
policy of racial separation. It
would not consider giving them
the choice lands of Cape Prov-
ince, which they now occupy
jointly with the whites. The be-
ginnings of a Colored "nation"
within South Africa will there-
fore be on paper only--a "border-
less bantustan." Recently, even
Prime Minister Vorster admitted,
"[this) is South Africa's di-
lemma. Our children will have
to solve it."
An eventual solution ad-
vanced by some leaders in the
white power structure is that
one day the whites and Coloreds
will join together--presumably
against their supposed common
enemy, the blacks. Even they,
however, assert vaguely that the
Coloreds will have to reach par-
ity with the whites by "proving
themselves."
Like the black bantustan
legislative councils, the new
60-member council will be headed
by a "prime minister" and a
"Cabinet." The council, however,
will have only such power as the
whites choose to give it, and
they will be cautious about giv-
ing too much.
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SECRET
MINISTATE MAURITIUS ATTRACTS SOVIET ATTENTION
Mauritius, although one of
the world's smallest states, con-
tinues to receive a surprising
amount of Soviet attention. The
signing of a cultural accord be-
tween the two countries on 17 Sep-
tember closely follows Moscow's
recent agreement to help develop
the local fishing industry in ex-
change for the servicing of Soviet
ships at Port Louis.
Even before Mauritius gained
independence in March 1968, the
Soviets maintained some contact
with the island
Soviet merchant
vessels and space-associated na-
val auxiliaries frequently visited
Port Louis.
Since the USSR opened its
embassy in Mauritius in January
of this year, contacts and initia-
tives have increased notably. The
embassy now has a resident ambas-
sador and a staff second only to
the UK's in size. Soviet warships
paid their first visit in April.
The Mauritian Government subse-
quently made it known that it had
received requests for cosmonaut
rescue and recovery facilities.
These would include landing rights
for Soviet space-support aircraft
and permission for Soviet ships
to navigate in Mauritian waters.
Other Soviet assistance projects
are reportedly under considera-
tion.
{ r.~ KENYA'
4,a' Momhasa ,. -
TANZANIA ai
SEYCHELLES
Dar C$ Salaam l~ (U.K.)
FNDIA
"Eom6ay
CHAGOS
ARCHIPELAGO
(U K.)
MAEAGi A,4Y REUNION rcMAURITIUS
REP.i
(F 1.)
MOZAMBIQUE {
}~:1Lourenco Marques
Prince Edward I.
(Srclh Africa)
96111 9-d9
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Page 2 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Crozat Is.
(Fr.)
19 Sep 69
Kerguelen
Fr l
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The exact nature of Soviet
intentions remains unclear, but
Mauritius is strategically lo-
cated in the western Indian Ocean.
Moscow probably hopes that by
establishing a presence and
creating a favorable atmosphere
through economic assistance, it
will obtain the use of port fa-
cilities in support of its ex-
panding naval presence in the
area. Rescue and-recovery fa-
cilities, while not absolutely
essential, would be an added
convenience.
Prime Minister Ramgoolam
has been receptive to the Soviet
overtures despite the advice of
many of his advisers and local
businessmen, as well as of British
representatives worried about
the effect on their strategic
communications facility in Mau-
ritius. Nevertheless, Ramgoolam
quickly signed the fishing agree-
ment and agreed "in principle" to
the recovery facilities.
Ideologically, Ramgoolam
leans to socialism but he has not
moved strongly against the mono-
poly sugar interests that control
Mauritius' one-crop economy. He
frequently insists he is pro-West.
It is likely that Ramgoolam values
Soviet assistance for its domestic
political impact in showing that
he can attract international aid
for the shaky Mauritian economy.
He probably also hopes to stimulate
more economic assistance from the
West by raising the specter of a
Communist presence in the Indian
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In Brazil, a series of meetings of top military commanders failed to
produce a successor to ailing President Costa e Silva, and at mid-week a
decision was made to postpone the selection. The delay is probably in part a
reflection of their inability to agree on a single officer to succeed the
President.
Colombian Government officials have expressed concern that the kid-
naping of US Ambassador Elbrick in Rio de Janeiro on 4 September and the
release of prisoners to effect his return will inspire others to attempt to
abduct US officials-particularly in Latin America. A wave of kidnapings has
recently taken place in Colombia, and concerned officials have instituted
stern measures in an attempt to discourage such acts.
Martial law has been declared in Argentina's second largest city,
Rosario, following serious unrest growing out of a labor dispute. Two days
of rioting in the city have cost at least two lives, and several persons have
been wounded. Troops are patrolling the city to prevent further violence. A
similar strike was held in Cordoba, the third largest city, but this apparently
was free of serious violence.
An announcement last week by Colombia and Panama that they will
study the feasibility of a new interoceanic canal route through both coun-
tries may have been designed to show that they do not intend to be played
off against one another in any Washington efforts to negotiate a new
sea-level canal pact. Colombia may be pressing the binational canal concept
partly for domestic political and economic reasons inasmuch as President
Lleras has shown a particular interest in developing the northwestern Choco
region.
Latin American countries-notably Chile and Argentina-have recently be-
come interested in purchasing military equipment from European countries.
A Soviet economic mission led by the vice minister of economics will
visit Peru the second week of October to make a feasibility study of a major
irrigation project in the northern part of the country.
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BRAZILIAN LEADERSHIP CRISIS STILL UNRESOLVED
Top military officers have
not yet been able to resolve the
leadership crisis that arose from
the present inability of Presi-
dent Costa e Silva to carry out
his duties.
The triumvirate that has
been governing in his name since
his stroke on 30 August is widely
recognized as ineffective, and
the military leaders apparently
agree that a single chief execu-
tive must take over. They have
not been able to reach a consen-
sus on an individual, nor do they
appear to agree on the way in
which the transition should be
implemented. This lack of agree-
ment has temporarily prolonged
the tenuous life of the triumvi-
rate.
High officers of the three
services began meeting separately
on 15 September in an attempt to
choose a man for the nation's top
post.
There is considerable
maneuvering among several poten-
tial candidates, and this appar-
ently has led to a postponement
until the President can partici-
pate in the discussions himself.
There is no indication as yet
how long the decision will be de-
ferred.
In addition to the problem
of selecting the new chief exec-
utive, the commanders must reach
a decision on a method of putting
him in office and how long he
should remain there.
The
military men must also reach
agreement on whether to reopen
Congress for the purpose of rat-
ifying their choice for presi-
dent, and possibly for vice pres-
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TERRORIST ACTS CAUSE MILITARY UNREST IN ECUADOR
The Ecuadorean military and
the extreme left appear headed
for a showdown that could under-
cut the gains President Velasco
has made by adroit political ma-
neuvering during his first year
in office.
What appears to be a con-
certed terrorist campaign began
on 6 September with the skyjack-
ing to Cuba of two planes owned
by the airline run by the Ecua-
dorean Air Force, and the killing
of one of the co-pilots. The ter-
rorists threw down the gauntlet
to the outraged military by stating
that the skyjacking will continue
unless the embargo on trade and
travel to Cuba is lifted. The
threat was followed up by the
robbery of an armored car. On
11 September the homes of two
senior military officers were
stoned, and extremists have
threatened to kidnap US offi-
cials and children of high rank-
ing Ecuadorean military officers
unless a radical student await-
ing a court verdict as to his
guilt in the slaying of a police-
man in 1967 is released.
examinations. Student groups,
heavily influenced by President
Velasco's political foes including
radical Communist groups, will un-
doubtedly try to use the issues of
educational reform and the death
of six students last May in Guaya-
quil to create disturbances.
The terrorism during the last
two weeks has aroused a good deal
of :Latent resentment among senior
military officers who believe the
government has not enforced the
law sufficiently. The military
is demanding that strong measures
be taken against terrorists and
their apologists, and if nothing
is done, at least some high-rank-
ing officers are prepared to take
the initiative.
Velasco's reliance on the
army during his first year in of-
fice to enforce order has increased
his dependence on the military but
has decreased their hesitancy to
intervene in governmental affairs.
On 9 September the Minister of De-
fense placed an article in a lead-
ing newspaper stating that the min- 25X1
istry was preparing a bill providing
further punishments for acts of ter-
rorism.
A sharp upsurge in student
disturbances also appears likely
when the schools in the central
part of the country open in early
October. The main universities,
which are already overcrowded,
will open for the first time with-
out the requirement of entrance
Although the President appears
to be stronger now than he was a
year ago, leftists apparently are
determined to put his ability to 25X1
maintain law and order and his con-
stitutional prerogatives to the
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DOMESTIC PRESSURES IMPEDE
Both El Salvador and Hon-
duras apparently recognize the
dangers inherent in the present
situation, but domestic politi-
cal considerations continue to
impede the normalization of re-
lations.
Salvadoran policy has been
characterized by negotiation,
agreement, and then noncompli-
ance. This seems to be due to
the lack of strong presidential
leadership in the face of a dif-
ference within the administra-
tion over the relative merits
of a policy of firmness versus
a policy of conciliation. A
prime example was Salvador's
failure to honor an agreement
to withdraw troops a prudent
distance from the frontier. Pres-
ident Sanchez delayed the with-
drawal after becoming frightened
by the outcry of Salvadorans
living along the border that they
would be left defenseless against
Honduran attack and by public re-
action to sensationalist press
allegations that Salvadorans were
being expelled from Honduras.
Moreover, El Salvador has failed
to follow through on a commit-
ment to restore direct telecom-
munication links with Honduras.
Although the Honduran gov-
ernment has tended to follow a
more conciliatory line, it has
also refused to go against the
tide of public opinion. It has
failed to come to grips with the
fundamental issues of protecting
Salvadoran residents, restoring
commercial relations with El Sal-
SALVADOR-HONDURAS SETTLEMENT
vador, and limiting the arms race.
The government has already released
most of the Salvadorans detained
during the fighting, but it han
done little to combat the prevail-
ing anti-Salvadoran mood that has
led to economic discrimination
against Salvadorans and has prompted
their continued exodus from Hon-
duras.
Stung by public criticism that
it was and still is unprepared to
cope with a Salvadoran attack, the
Honduran Government is continuing
to purchase additional arms. Since
the beginning of September, Hon-
duras has received two arms ship-
ments from Belgium. The govern-
ment has already spent $2.5 million
The government
was embarrassed at being "tric}ed"
into unilaterally withdrawing its
troops from the border and is
likely to display extreme caution
and skepticism in negotiating and
implementing future agreements--
particularly those of a military
nature.
25X1
The other Central American
Common Market countries--Nicar-
agua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala--
are laying plans to press the two
feuding states to effect a recon-
ciliation during the current UN
General Assembly meeting. The
Colombian foreign minister plans
to call a formal meeting of the 25X1
Organ of Consultation at the Far- 25X1
eign Minister level in New York
to discuss the situation.
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