WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007300040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE C)F
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SU~I~
f1RY
R~~~~~ Tfl ~~~~"JzS F~ ~~~i~~~S C~i~'TEf
Secret ~~~
NAVY review
12 September X969
Noy 0387/69
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
~~~s~
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SECRE'T'
(Information as of noon EDT, 11 September 1969)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
The new distribution of power in Hanoi remains
obscured by the facade of collective leadership,
although Hanoi's politburo has appeared in public
in almost the same order as that estr~blished by the
last party congress in 1960. Authoritative Hanoi
pronouncements have stressed the need for continua-
tion of the struggle in the South anti the need for
national unity. In Saigon, some conc=ern is develop-
ing that the new cabinet will permit a resurgence of
influence by the widely hated Can Lao group of the
Diem era. On the military front, Communist forces
last weekend conducted the second hi~~hpoint of their
fall campaign, and indications persi;~t that the enemy
plans to extend its campaign through September and
beyond.
LAOTIAN FORCES MOVE DEEP INTO ENEMY TERRITORY
Government forces have pushed deep into Communist
territory in both the north and south, capturing
positions that have been in enemy hands for several
years.
MALAYSIAN LEADERS ARE RIDING AN UNEASY CALM
Over the next few months the government will probably
be able to keep the lid on the deep-seated political
and communal rivalries that erupted in riots last
May, although new outbreaks of violence could occur
with little warning.
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Europe
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONVENES NEXT WEEK
In addition to such perennial issues as Chinese
representation, the Korean goes o on, and colonialism
and racism, the assembly almost certainly will be
faced with a number of arms control proposals and
polemical speeches on current hot spots around the
world.
GROMYKO VISIT RESTORES BALANCE IN YUGOSLAVIA'S EAST-WEST 13
RELATIONS
Gromyko`s first visit to Belgrade in seven years has
tended to offset the flood of high-level Yugoslav
contacts with Western and neutral nations in recent
months.
50VIETS CONDUCT MAJOR EXERCISES IN MEDITERRANEAN
The recent maneuvers constituted the most extensive
Soviet naval exercise ever conducted in those waters.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA PUSHING ARMS EXPORTS
Prague has emerged as a major exporter of modern
weapons to the less developed countries of the free
world.
YUGOSLAV CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS MAY IMPROVE FURTHER 16
Increased cooperation between the Orthodox and Raman
Catholic churches in Yugoslavia has led to an im-
proved church-state relationship that may receive
further impetus from the resignation of Cardinal
Seper as archbishop of Zagreb.
POLES CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR BLOC ON EUROPE AND GERMANY 17
In-recent weeks Polish leaders have sought to stress
the multilateral, bloc -context of their bilateral
approaches to the West, especially those to West
Germany.
ALBANIA MOVING OUT OF ISOLATION
Albania has adopted a mare open and aggressive foreign
policy in the last 12 months,. Retaining Tirana's
strong ties to Peking, Hoxha and company -are never-
theless interested in developing Albania's contacts
in the Middle East, the "third world;' and with select
nations in the West. (Published separately as Spe-
cial Report No. 0387/69A~
Ijage i i WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 Sep 69
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s~cx~;~i~
Middle East - AfY?ica
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS TO BE DIFFIC;ULT
The accelerating tempo of militar~r and terrorist
raids reflects stiffening attitudF~s on both sides,
as the Arabs grow increasingly bitter over their
failure to regain the occupied te~'ritories, and
Israel--seeing no prospect for pe~ice on acceptable
terms--digs in for a long siege.
SOUTH AFRICA ACTIVE IN GOLD MARKETS
Balance-of-payments difficulties Have forced South
Africa to sell gold on the free m~~rket. Such sales
are likely to continue because PrE~toria's fears that
the price in that market would fa:Ll below the offi-
cial price have been dispelled.
SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL PARTY FACES D:CVISIONS
The ruling National Party is faci~zg growing criticism
from its ultraconservative wing i~z the round of pro-
vincial party congresses now in p~^ogress.
LIBYAN JUNTA NAMES CIVILIAN CABINET
The military regime has named a civilian cabinet in
its moves to restore Libya t.o normal. This action,
however, is not expected to affect the army's control
of power.
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
25
AMBASSADOR'S KIDNAPING WEAKENS BRAZILIAN TRIUMVIRATE
26
Military resentment of the triumvirate, particularly
its decision to ransom Ambassador Elbrick, combined
with the increasing certainty that Costa e Silva will
not return to office makes it unlikely that the pres-
ent government will be able to hold power for long.
PANAMA'S MILITARY REGIME FOCUSING ON CANAL TREATY ISSUE
27
A new team of canal treaty "advisers" was named last
week and a formal request for a resumption of talks
could come any time.
SECRET
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VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MOVES AGAINST MILITARY UNREST
President Caldera has apparently weathered a serious
disciplinary problem in the armed forces.
OAS EASING CENTRAL AMERICAN TENSIONS
The Organization of American States is making some
progress in its -effort to relieve tension anal pro-
mote a reconciliation between Honduras and E1 Salva-
dor, but much remains to be done,
UNEASINESS PERSISTS IN NETHERLANDS ANTILLES
The elections on 5 September have failed to resolve
a confused political situation and, until a stable
government is formed, the possibility of violence
will persist.
~I?C;R~;~I~
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The locus of power in North Vietnam remains obscured behind the
facade of a "stable and collective leadership," ;~s Hanoi termed it last week.
The new regime has emphasized the need to continue present policies and
maintain national unity, but there are no firm indications thus far about its
priorities. Party First Secretary Le Duan has taken the leading position at
important functions thus far, but other top leaders have also been promi-
nent.
On the military front in South Vietnam, the self-declared Communist
cease-fire ended with a number of Cornmunisl-initiated shellings and small-
scale ground actions. There were also continuing signs that the enemy is
planning another surge of attacks of the kind that have characterized
Communist activity much of this year.
Several progovernment and opposition figures in Saigon are concerned
over the appearance in Thieu's new cabinet of people formerly connected
with the once-powerful Can Lao clique of the Diem regime. Thieu presum-
ably decided that the need for experienced administrators outweighed the
danger of arousing lingering anti -Can Lao feeling.
In a major expansion of the ground war in Laos, government troops
spearheaded by Vang Pao's guerrillas have swept across the Plaine des Jarres.
Government forces captured an administrati~re and military headquarters,
which had heretofore been considered off limits to both air and ground
assault. In south Laos, guerrilla units seized along-held Communist town
near the infiltration corridor. Both actions are almost certain to generate
sharp enemy responses, especially after the wet: season ends in October.
The Malaysian Government has managed to keep the lid on the deep-
seated political and communal rivalries since the riots of last May. For the
next few months, the situation seems likely 'to remain relatively quiet, but
most government leaders are distrusted both try Malay extremists and by the
non-Malay community, and prospects for long~?term stability are poor.
In South Korea, proponents of a third term for President Pak will
almost certainly see their constitutional arne:ndment approved by the Na-
tional Assembly this Saturday. Opposition legislators and students have been
unable to generate widespread public opposition to passage of the amend-
ment.
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VIETNAM
Political Develo ments
in Nort Vietnam
The new distribution of power
in Hanoi remains obscured by the
facade of collective leadership.
Statements by high government anal
party leaders following the death
of Ho Chi Minh have stressed the
need for continuity of policy and
national unity,.
The new regime has described
itself as a "stable and collective
leadership." Its three top men
have all figured prominently in
the most important activities
since Ho'_s death, including meet-
ings with Soviet and Chinese dele-
gations and the funeral ceremonies.
Party First Secretary Le Duan pre-
sided at these functions, but
Truong Chinh and Premier Pham
Van Dong have also had active
roles. In general, North Viet-
nam's politburo has appeared in
public in the same order as the
official ranking conferred by the
last party congress in 1960 with
one exception. The leading mili-
tary figure, General Giap, seems
to have slipped one place behind
Paris negotiator Le Duc Tho.
Ho's will and the party cen-
tral committee's eulogy, which
were read by Le Duan, stressed the
need for victory in the South.
The eulogy gave top priority to
the continuation of the struggle
in the South, but Ho's will was
less clear on priorities, although
it did include an exhortation that
the fight must be carried on un-
Pale 2
til final victory. This and the
need for national unity, presum-
ably to smooth. North Vietnam's
transition into the post-Ho era,
have been repeatedly emphasized
in authoritative editorials and.,
messages since Hots death, His.
will termed the need for unity
a "must," while Le Duan's pledge
that the central committee would
do its best to preserve party
''' cohesion may reflect his concern
that policy differences or per-
sonal ambitions might hinder his
orderly succession to power.
Most of the regime's first
week in power was taken up with
the ceremonies and protocol sur-
rounding Ho's funeral. The North
Vietnamese leaders appear to have
handled the separate visits of
Chou En-lai and Kosygin in ac-
cordance with the dictates of Ho's
will, which termed the Sino-Soviet
dispute harmful to the Vietnamese
war effort and urged the continu-
ation of his policy of neutrality.
The differing Soviet and Ch~-
nese reactions to Ho's death, how-
ever, point up Hanoi's problems
in trying to maintain a balance
with its mutually antagonistic
supporters, The Chinese were
first off the mark as Chou En-
lai left for Hanoi only hours
after the announcement of Ho's
death in an effort to demonstrate
Peking's support and take a sound-
ing on .Hots successors before the:
Soviets arrived. The Chinese
probably registered their un-
happiness with Hanoi's prosecution
SEAR E`1'
^~'VEEiiLY Sl.~hihiARY 12 Sep 69
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of the war and the talks; in a
message of condolence they reit-
erated their contention that the
Communists should "vigorously
step up" the fighting. Chow s
abrupt departure 24 hours after
arrival probably served both to
avoid sharing top billing with
Kosygin and to remind Hanoi that
Peking remains unhappy over close
North Vietnamese ties with Mos-
cow.
Moscow, on the other hand,
did not try to put pressure on
Hanoi, but issued profuse praises
for Ho as an outstanding person-
ality of the international Com-
munist movement. Premier Kosygin
led the Soviet delegation and was
its only member of politburo rank.
Political Developments
in Sout~Vietnam
Concern is developing among
some prominent Saigon figures
that the new cabinet may provide
a vehicle for a resurgence of in-
fluence by former members of the
Can Lao, tYie semiclandestine,
elite group of the Diem regime.
The Can Lao served as a powerful
instrument of political control,
and widespread fear of it as re-
pressive, corrupt, and anti-Bud-
dhist caused Diem's successors
to conduct a broad purge of its
membership.
Some critics of President
Thieu's new cabinet selection have
pointed out that Prime Minister
Khiem and Foreign Minister Lam,
as well as the ministers of in-
formation, economy, finance, and
legislative liaison have been Can
Lao members or sympathizers.
renewed
Can ]~ao influence could lead to
a tr~~gic clash between Catholics
and l3uddhists.
u Can Lao leaders are trying
to rE~vive their old youth organi~
zatican, possibl with Thieu's
_blessina.
t e
new :in~ation minister has ap-
poin~ted some 20 cadre from the
Nhan Xa Party, a neo - Can Lao
grou~~, to key subordinate posi-
tion;~ .
President Thieu presumably
considered this risk when he made
his ~~abinet selections. He ap-
pare~ztly concluded that the need
for ]getter administrative per-
form,ance, particularly in the in-
form~ation and economic fields, and
thus for men of experience and
tale:zt, outweighed the dangers
of lingering anti - Can Lao feel-
ing and the desirability of bring-
ing in more popular faces.
Meanwhile, there are indica-
tion,~ that some of the leaders in
the ~~overnment-sponsored National
Social Democratic Front (NSDF) who
did :not receive positions in the
cabinet are considerin withdraw-
in .from the fro
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 Sep 69
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5~;~~tE"r
Military Developments
in South Vietnam
Communist forces conducted
the second highpoint of their
1969 fall campaign from 4 to ?
September, but generally observed
the subsequent three-day stand-
down that they unilaterally de-
clared in commemoration of the
passing of Ho Chi Minh.
The second highpoint, which
was in line with the economy--of-
force tactics characteristic of
enemy offensive activity over the
past year, included more than 25Q
rocket and mortar attacks against
allied bases and towns, largely
in the southern half of South
Vietnam. It also featured a se-
ries of heavy shellings and ground
attacks in the immediate Da Nang
area--actions which cost the al-
lies 18 dead and 229 wounded--as
well as intensified ground opera-
tions in the northern provinces
of III Corps. In Phuoc Long Prov-
ince, at least two battalions of
the Viet Cong 5th Division struck
a Special Forces camp and base
complex near the district town
of Duc Phang.
The enemy's latest upsurge,
which on the whole involved sig-
nificantly fewer shellings and
ground attacks than in earlier
highpoints this year, may have
been timed partly to celebrate
the 24th anniversary of North Viet-
namese independence. Enemy propa-
ganda, however, also called for
an increased effort on the south-
ern battlefields to honor Ho Chi
Minh.
During the 5-10 September
cease-fire? there were only a fe~,v
enemy-initiated incidents, but
indications persist that the Com-
munists plan to extend their fall
campaign through September or be-
yond. At least one more push this
month is likely, consisting of
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shellings and ground assaults
possibly coordinated with attacks
on targets such as Bu Prang Special
Forces camp in the southern high-
lands. Key bases and isolated
urban centers in northern III Corps
and allied strongpoints along the
DMZ in southern I Corps, are other
likely targets.
Additionally, in the southern
delta South Vietnamese forces may
soon face a crucial test. Some
of th~~ North Vietnamese units sent
into the delta for the first time
late this spring and summer are
being deployed to the southernmost
province of An Xuyen. These units
initially gathered in Chau Doc
Province near the Cambodian border
presumably in an attempt to secure
cross-border supply lines and base
areas, but some elements now ap-
pear to be moving southward toward
the Communist stronghold in the
U Minh Forest.
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;~ECI~.ET
?1aS: GOY@~tllllenf Fortes al'8 ~llfifltiQ It1t0 COI11R1tlttl5f Q~eaS
~ .~~~ti
Arne claimed under `~'~- `~
l
~'~ '
st
Communist ?nd 1Yeutra
i..~ . ~ control. June 1482 _ -- ti.,.~
'E! ~. r-ti
-Xia
ng
~~d1 , "~~-^^KhQU3n$vitle
rats;. s; tea. ~~.
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LAOTIAN FORCES PROVE DEEP INTO ENEMY TERRITORY
Government forces, in a ma-
jor expansion of their holdings,
have moved deeper into Communist
territory in north Laos, capturing
positions that have been in enemy
hands since 1962, when the Geneva
accords were signed. In the south,
an important town protecting the
enemy's infiltration corridor to
South Vietnam has fallen to gov-
ernment guerrillas.
Spearheaded by Vang Pao's
guerrilla forces, government
troops swept the Communists off
the Plaine des Jarres and cap-
tured Khang Khay, administrative
and military headquarters for
Pathet Lao and dissident neutral-
ist forces in Xieng Khouang Prov-
ince. Phong Savan Airfield has been
taken by a guerrilla company. Here-
tofore Khang Khay and Phong Savan
have been treated as off limits
to both air and ground assault
on the basis that they are con-
sidered politically sensitive.
Vang Pao has also dispatched three
battalions south of the Plaine to
retake Xieng Khouangville.
Although government farces
have been encountering some in-
creased enemy resistance in the
area, particularly on the north-
ern ec;ges of the Plaine, the
Communists have as yet given no
clear sign of their intentions.
]:n south Laos, meanwhile,
guerrilla elements have seized
Muong Phine, a long-held Com-
munist: town near the infiltration
corridor. They apparently hope
to pu~~h farther eastward into the
Tchepone area, a vital North Viet-
namesc~ logistic base and command
center. The capture of Muong
Phine constitutes the government's
deepe:~t penetration into the sup-
ply corridor in several years.
~~lthough bad weather may pre-
vent ,~n immediate move by the
Commu~zists , they are almost cer-
tain to react sharply to these
latest government offensives.
The e:zemy's response is not likely
to be confined to the Muong Phine
area, and diversionary attacks
may be tried against sensitive
and vulnerable positions in the
Mekong Valley.
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MALAYSIAN LEADERS ARE RIDING ~aN UNEASY CALM
Over the next few months the
government will probably be able
to keep the lid on the deep-seated
political and communal rivalries
that erupted in riots last May,
atrough new outbreaks of violence
could occur with little warning.
The moderate leadership is dis-
trusted by both non-Malays and .
Malay extremists, however, and
its ability to bridge the gap be-
tween the two communities and
restore the country to normality
appears to be circumscribed.
The ruling National Opera-
tions Council, which was formed
to establish order and ensure
Malay rule after the postelection
communal rioting last spring, now
seems likely to maintain the state
of emergency for at least a year.
The Malay-controlled council,
headed by Deputy Prime Minister
Ratak, has thus far managed to
put down opposition to its poli-
cies from Malay extremist groups,
but both the council and Prime
Minister Rahman are marking time
at the moment rather than taking
any steps to restore the country
to parliamentary democracy. Elec-
tions in East Malaysia, which
were canceled after the May riots
in Kuala Lumpur, have still not
been rescheduled and seem likely
to remain in abeyance indefinitely.
Prime Minister Rahman, who
was rumored several months ago
to be preparing for retirement,
Page 9
resumed active leadership in gov-
ernment affairs in the late sum-
mer. He has also been attempting
to regain popular support and
build .better communal relations
through a series of goodwill
tours. These have been gener-
ally unsuccessful, however, as
the prime minister's concilia-
tory efforts are looked on with
suspicion by both Malays and
Chinese. Rahman's re-emergence--
whether temporary or permanent--
has for the moment lessened the
government's strength by down-
grading Ratak, who has in effect
run the country since May. The
already limited prestige of the
council is thus further dimin-
ished.
Even if the council were in
a very strong position, the mod-
erate Malay leadership would still
face formidable obstacles in its
attem~~ts to ease communal differ-
ences and to weld the country into
a workable multiracial nation.
Withir.~ the Malay community itself
the e~:tremist politicians have
gained. in popularity and have
launcY:.ed a grassroots campaign to
build strength for an attempt to
take aver control of the leading
Malay political party. Although
they can not attempt this in the
immediate future--under present
regul~~tions the next party con-
gress cannot be held until the
emergency is formally ended--the
extremists remain a threat for
the lung term.
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Outside the Malay community
there exists almost complete dis-
trust of Malay politicians,
whether moderate or radical. l+Ion-
Malays, both Chinese a.nd Indian,
fear government steps to enhance
the status of Malays, particu-
larly in economic matters. Feel-
ing has remained high, and any
small incident could spark a
new series of riots. Although
the capable security forces are
alert to the dangers, heavy-handed
security measures would only tempo-
rarily damp down racial con-
flicts. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment's tendency to absolve
Malays charged with instigating
disturbances adds to intercom-
munal tensions.
S~:CH.E`I`
I'~iKc 10 VYEEKI.Y 5UIv[h1.aRY
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An atmosphere of terror is slowly taking hold in Czechoslovakia as the
party's conservatives make their strongest laid to date for control of the
apparatus. Two magazines on 10 September in effect charged Dubcek and
his liberal followers with treason. Hundreds of Slovaks have been arrested
under the emergency laws passed in anticipation of trouble during the
August anniversary. There is as yet no report of such arrests in Bohemia and
Moravia.
Calls for political trials are intensifyin?; in the conservative-controlled
press. At least one liberal member of the cer-tral committee plans to be out
of the country when that body convenes-roost likely next week-to mete
out final disgrace to the liberals. Party chief Husak can prevent this if he is
determined to control the conservatives. If he fails to do so, his future power
as first secretary will be limited.
The East Germans have indicated their indifference to West German
overtures for more neighborly relations, as ~~vell as their firm opposition to
any dialogue between Bonn and Moscow, or Bonn and another Eastern
European state. The brief, arbitrary detenl:ion in East Germany of West
Berlin Mayor Scheutz-one of West German~~'s most outspoken proponents
of better relations with the East-and renew~;d autobahn delays were clearly
designed by Pankow to dash Bonn's hopes.
President Tito is preparing to meet with Romania's Ceausescu on 18
September, presumably to emphasize solid,rrity and to give a report on
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Belgrade. The Yugoslavs are
pleased with the results of those talks but still harbor suspicion about Soviet
intentions in Eastern F,urope. In the wake of Gromyko's trip the Soviet press
has expressed the bland hope that bilater;il relations with Belgrade will
improve. Moscow has also recognized the new government in Libya, al-
though it remains uncertain of the regime's orientation.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko will arrive in New York early next
week to address the 24th United Nations General Assembly. Ambassador
Dobrynin -may also return at this time aftf:r an extended absence due to
illness. Gromyko will probably discuss the recent Allied note on Berlin with
Secretary Rogers. He may also choose to introduce a resolution on the
control of chemical and biological weapons.
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L!C! GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONVENES idEXt I~IEEK
The 24th UN General Assembly
(UNGA) convenes on 16 September.
In addition to considering such
perennial issues as Chinese
representation, the Korean ques-
tion, and colonialism and racism,
the UNGA almost certainly will be
faced with a number of arms con-
trol proposals and polemical
speeches on current hat spots
around the world.
Criticism of the lack of
progress in the Geneva disarma-
ment talks has been muted recently
by the disclosure of a new Soviet
bid to reach agreement with the
US on a treaty limiting the use
Gromyko may present a proposal in
this area to the General Assembly.
Some of the smaller nations
are unenthusiastic about the
nonproliferation treaty and wild.
probably criticize the failure of
the nuclear powers to make greater
progress toward meeting their
commitment under the treaty to
negotiate additional disarmament
measures. These nations are es-
pecially critical of the delay .n
initiating the strategic arms
limitations talks and are dis-
tressed over the continued lack,
of agreement in two vital arms ',
control areas--a comprehensive
of the seabeds for military pur- ( nuclear test ban. and a cutoff o~
poses. Moscow would like the US production of fissionable mater~.-
to agree on a complete text for ~ als for weapons gurposes.
submission to the UNGA prior to
its consideration of the subject,
probably in mid-October. Several
other Geneva conferees are also
hoping for a seabeds agreement
and fear that negotiations in the
free-far-all atmosphere of New
York could adversely affect the
entire arms limitation picture.
A number of proposals for
resolutions on the use of chemical
and biological warfare (CBw)
agents to be considered by the
24th UNGA have been tabled at the
Geneva talks. The Soviets have
attacked these initiatives and
have stated that the Geneva Proto-
col of 192 is comprehensive re-
garding the nonuse of CBW. They
are seeking greater concentration
on controlling CBW weapons produc-
tion. Soviet Foreign Minister
The Arab-Israeli conflict
i.s certain to come up during the
UNGA debates on the reports of
a number of UN agencies. Israel's
position among the assembly dele-
gations has probably deteriorated
in recent months, and emotions
aroused by the recent fire at
the Al-Agra Mosque in Jerusalem:
have contributed to an increase
in anti-.Israeli sentiment among
the Islamic nations outside the
Arab world..
On the perennial issues,
established voting patterns will
probably remain firm. Peking's
~r:~,x r,?1~
t~.~~~~ 1Z ~ti~~:~,~.~~ s~U~s~t~1t~~
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prospects f.or admission do not
appear to have substantially
improved, although Moscow seems
more concerned than usual that
the US may alter its position
regarding Chinese representation.
The USSR would prefer to soft-
pedal this issue again, Assembly
members almost certainly will
reaffirm the UN role in Korea
by the usual wide margin. The
political weight of a sizable
black African bloc will be felt
in a number of resolutions on
Rhodesia and the Portuguese
territories. The black Africans
will probably renew their fight
to oust South Africa from the UN
ConfE^rence on Trade and Develop-
ment?
The session will probably
give evidence of the UN's impor-
tance~ in the limited role it has
come to play. The UN's continu-
ing ~~roblem is to maximize its
infl~xence and avoid unenforceable
comm:~tments that have the effect,
in the long run, of reducin its
impa~~t on world affairs. 25X1
GROMYKO VISIT RESTORES BALANCE IN YUGOSLAVIANS EAST-~~EST RELATIONS
Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko's first visit to Yugo-
slavia in seven years has served
to restore the careful balance
Belgrade has sought to maintain
in its relations with East and
West, Bilateral differences were
not resolved but probably will be
less pronounced as a result of
Gromyko's visit of 2-6 September.
Gromyko reaffirmed the Bel-
grade declaration of 1955--issued
at the time Khrushchev and Bul-
ganin made amends with Tito--
which recognized Yugoslavia's
right to develop its own path to
socialism, The Yugoslavs appre-
ciate Gromyko's current gesture,
which appears to remove them
from the purview of Brezhnev's
"limited sovereignty" thesis.
Nevertheless, Belgrade probably
interprets the ideological truce
as a paper victory and will remain
skeptical of Soviet intentions in
Eastern Europe. Neither side re-
treated on fundamental issues
but simply noted and passed over
their differences while cl.ramatiz-
ing issues on which their views
are similar. The communique
stressed agreement on Vietnam,
the Middle East, and support for
a European security conference,
Gromyko's visit will com-
fort some of the older Yugoslav
leaders who favor closer ties
with the Communist world in con-
trast with younger elements who
believe Yugoslavia's interests
are best served by a pro-Western
posture, The spate of recent
and forthcoming high-level con-
tacts with the West, including
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Tepa-
vac's visit to Bonn in July and
Italian President Saragat's
scheduled visit to Belgrade in
October, have far outnumbered
similar associations with Commu-
nist Europe.
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Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMAHI'
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SOVIETS 1,~ONDU~CT ~1AJOR ExERCISES IN MEDITERRANEAN
Many of the nearly 6Q Soviet
ships in the Mediterranean during
the past few weeks participated in
the most extensive Soviet-naval ex-
ercises ever conducted in those
waters. Highlights of the recent ac-
tivity included two amphibious land-
ings on the Egyptian coast. Soviet
amphibious ships joined other So-
viet and Egyptian units in these
landings west of Alexandria, Joint
Soviet-Syrian amphibious operations
.may have been conducted south of
Latakia in August.
The commander of the Black lea
Fleet and the chief of the Main
Staff of the Navy probably observed
the exercises from ships of the
squadron.. The officers are review-
ing newly developed Soviet naval
tactics such as the movement of
surface ships in tactical forma-
tions similar to those used in the
West and the employment of coord-
nated ASW tactics.
The guided-missile helicopter
cruiser Moskva anal a half dozen
Soviet antisubmarine escorts con-
ducted ASW training in the waters
south of Crete and off the Egyp-
tian coast. Patrol bombers based
in Egypt and some eleven Soviet
submarines in the Mediterranean
participated in this training.
Soviet Naval Exercises ie tiae Medilerraneah
Warsnlps en. route
to Mediterranean -
9bai5 9-69 tiA
o aso
N~uric~~ r~i ~a
a force of two cruisers, three
destroyers, seven diesel submarines,
and two supgart ships from the
Northern Fleet is approaching Gi-
braltar. Most of this force prob,
ably will replace units leaving
the Mediterranean, 25X1
A9exendria
0
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AmpftibiousQ
tanditty area
LL A. R.
1EaT-T)
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Probable amphibious
training aria
Antiwbmarine
training operations
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA PUSHING ARMS EXPORTS
Czechoslovakia has emerged
as a major exporter of modern
weapons to the less developed
countries of the free world, and
is second only to the USSR as a
source of Communist military as-
sistance.
Czech exports consist mainly
of an assortment of ground forces
weapons ranging from armored ve-
hicles to small arms and aircraft.
Czech-designed amphibious armored
personnel carriers (APCs), twin
30-mm. antiaircraft guns, Soviet
designed but obsolescent T-54
medium tanks, and the SU-100 self-
propelled guns are the most sal-
able ground force equipment.
Prague has agreed to supply In-
dia with 100 APCs by early 1970
under a recently signed contract
that gives New Delhi the option
to purchase an additional 100.
Czechoslovakia also has built a
substantial export trade around
the domestically designed L-29
jet trainer, which was adopted
by the Warsaw Pact in 1962 as
its standard jet trainer.
Prague's military sales pro-
gram includes the exchange of
training personnel as well as
production technicians. In mid-
1969, approximately 300 Czech
military technicians were on as-
signment in a number of the less
developed countries, most of whom
were involved in the delivery,
assembly, and maintenance of mil-
itary equipment. The Czechs also
have helped a number of countries
establish or expand domestic arms
production :Facilities.
Czechoslovakia began selling
military equipment in the early
1950s when, acting as an inter-
mediary for the USSR, it sold re-
conditioned Soviet-manufactured
equipment and in some instances
equipment directly off its own
production lines. After a lapse
of seZ~eral years--during which
time t:he USSR began exporting
arms f`or its own account--Czech-
oslov