WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CHINA'S CURRENT INTENTIONS TOWARD BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007300020002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 29, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
China's Current Intentions Toward Burma
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
N! 44
29 August 1969
No. 0385/69A
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UL' v1\L 1
CHINA'S CURRENT INTENTIONS TOWARD BURMA
Peking's increased involvement with insurgency in Burma's northeastern border region
during the-past year has underscored China's continued hostility toward: Rangoon. Neither-
side has demonstrated a willingness to compromise on differences resulting from the- anti-
Ch-inese riots in Burma during 1967, China has continued its active propaganda sup ort of the
Burmese Communist Party (BCP)insurgents
and has resumed some political agitation in the Overseas Chinese community.
Although China has generally moderated its extreme foreign policy position held during
the Cultural Revolution, Peking cannot back away from its anti Ne Win posture unless
Rangoon first makes a significant compromise. Ne Win has shown no willingness to cooperate
while Chinese-supported insurgency continues, however, and Peking probably feels con'
strained to maintain active pressure in the hope of inducing Rangoon to adopt a -more
favorable- policy over the long term.
The Chinese probably will continue to employ indirect means, focusing primarily on
attempts to create a responsive revolutionary force centered on 130 cadre, while maintaining
limited materiel support for minority dissidents along the frontier. The recent increase in
Peking's activity in northeast Burma probably reflects a tactical Chinese maneuver and does
not appear to represent a major departure in China's continued limited efforts to influence
Rangoon
POLITICAL SCENE
Before the summer of 1967, Peking main-
tained outwardly friendly ties with Rangoon, re-
flecting a working relationship developed since
1960. During this period the Chinese had obvi-
ously been annoyed with some of Ne Win's inde-
pendent foreign and domestic policies, but were
generally tolerant. Chinese efforts over the years
to persuade Rangoon to support Peking's propa-
ganda were almost completely frustrated by
Burma's devotion to international noninvolve-
ment. The Ne Win regime's nationalization of
Overseas Chinese businesses and its attempts to
suppress local pro-Peking Communists also an-
gered China. Relations with Burma have been of
secondary importance to Peking, however, and
until 1967 the Chinese chose to overlook these
affronts and maintain normal ties with Rangoon.
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The breakdown in this relationship in 1967
should be viewed primarily as a by-product of the
Cultural Revolution. It did not appear to signal a
conscious, premeditated change in Chinese for-
eign policy, nor the beginning of a new step in
Peking's presumed timetable for "people's war"
in Southeast Asia. Rather, the disruption came
about as a result of the irrational diplomacy that
marred Peking's relations with most of the under-
developed world after mid-1966.
The friction in Sino-Burmese relations was a
direct result of political activity among the Over-
seas Chinese by the Chinese Embassy. Cultural
Revolution proselyting and Maoist demonstra-
tions led to nationwide anti-Chinese riots, to
which the Burmese Government apparently gave
tacit approval. The Chinese, clearly angered over
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ti UKF.I
Anti Ne Win Demonstrators at Burmese Embassy in Peking
Rangoon's unwillingness to satisfy their demands each capital has consisted of only a few minor
as a result of the riots, quickly launched a propa- officials.
ganda offensive against the "fascist Nc Win
clique" and, most importantly, for the first time In 1968 sporadic diplomatic efforts by the
publicly supported the Burmese Communist in- Chinese and cautious approaches by Rangoon sug-
surgents. Since 1967, diplomatic representation in gested that a working relationship might be
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29 August 1969
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re-established. Peking, through third-party diplo-
matic contacts, indicated its desire to improve
relations to the Burmese Government. The Chi-
nese followed this by virtually ending their public
support for the Burmese Communist insurgency
and their propaganda attacks against the Ne Win
regime. In mid-August, however, the Chinese once
again launched a series of rabid anti - Ne Win
propaganda statements and resumed political agi-
tation among the Overseas Chinese community in
Rangoon. Although the Chinese undoubtedly
were piqued at Rangoon's unwillingness to adopt
a friendlier attitude, policy disputes in Peking
may also have affected China's approach toward
Burma. In any case, relations further deteriorated,
and in late January 1969 a Burmese Foreign Min-
istry official told US Embassy officers that Burma
could not re-establish normal relations as long as
Peking continued its hostile activities against
Rangoon.
On 5 March, the Burmese, apparently con-
cluding that Peking's continued public support
for the Communist insurgents ruled out prospects
of improved relations, notifed Peking of their
intention to terminate the 1960 Treaty of Friend-
ship and Nonaggression with China. Rangoon
presumably had no incentive to continue a treaty,
which, in the absence of formal action at that
time, would have remained in effect indefinitely.
Two weeks later, Peking broadcast a BCP state-
ment denouncing the Ne Win government in the
most violent terms used since the summer of
1967. While recognizing the importance of an
understanding with China, the Burmese Govern-
ment seemed to believe that a firm stance was
needed to convince the Chinese that meddling in
its domestic affairs was unacceptable.
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AID TO INSURGENTS
Peking's growing hostility toward the Ne
Win government has been clearly reflected in
China's increased support for antigovernment in-
surgent forces inside Burma. Prior to 1967,
China's support was limited to discreet ideological
and tactical guidance to the BCP, which consists
of a group of ethnic Burman dissidents operating
in central Burma. Since the anti-Chinese riots,
however, when the Chinese issued their first pub-
lic statement of support for the BCP, they have
extended full propaganda backing as well as
limited financial aid and paramilitary training.
Over the past two years Peking has continued to
stress the need for developing the BCP, and Chi-
nese propaganda has consistently emphasized the
BCP's leadership position in the Burmese "peo-
ple's war." The Chinese apparently view these
rebels, operating in Burma's agricultural heartland
astride vital links of communication, as the most
reliable and ideologically responsive force in the
country..
Chinese support, however, has not alleviated
the BCD's recent setbacks caused by factional
infighting and effective Burmese military action.
During the past two years, continuing purges have
disrupted the party's central committee, while the
Burmese Army has successfully whittled away at
the BCI''s base of operations. Party membership
has fallen to 2,500 from an estimated 4,000 in
1968, and its headquarters has been overrun by
government forces twice in the past year. China is
well aware of the current disarray in the BCP and
has tried to reunify it. Last spring, Peking an-
nounced the "selection" of a new BCP chairman
and vice-chairman-an apparent effort to quash
the factional disputes and to support reliable pro-
Peking leaders within the party. Factionalism
persists, however, and the Burmese Army con-
tinues to press the Communist insurgents.
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Burma: Pro-Peking Insurgents
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Or,1)1C1', I
A Guerrilla Force Led By the Communist Party of Burma
Meanwhile, in late 1967 the Chinese began
actively supporting some ethnic minority bands in
the remote Sino-Burmese border area where gov-
ernmental control has always been weak. The
rugged terrain is inhabited primarily by Kachin
and Shan tribesmen who are traditionally anti-
Burmese, and much of the territory has been
under the de facto control of minority dissident
bands.
The only major group in the area that has
received substantial Chinese arms and training is
the "Northeast Command." This band is princi-
pally under the leadership of Naw Seng, an ethnic
Kachin whom Peking returned to Burma in late
1967 after 18 years in China. Naw Seng's group
of pro-Peking minority tribesmen and Burmans,
which reportedly now numbers 2,000 to 3,000,
has ties with the BCP. Although Naw Seng fre-
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quently crosses into China to regroup and re-
supply, he has apparently solidified his position in
a remote area along Burma's northeastern fron-
tier.
In addition, a few elements of other, basi-
cally non-Communist, minority groups have oc-
casionally accepted limited Chinese arms aid.
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Minority Insurgents
on the March
in Rugged Northeast Border Area
25X1 25X1
have caused a flurry of rumors in
Rangoon, leading to various assessments of
Peking's intentions. Some observers have assumed
the existence of a grandiose Chinese plan for the
immediate "take-over" of Southeast Asia, and
have depicted recent actions against the Ne Win
government as the latest manifestation of this
plan. They imply that Peking deliberately sabo-
taged relations with Rangoon in 1967 as part of
this scheme. Such an assessment, however, fails to
consider fully the conditions surrounding the
course of recent Sino-Burmese relations.
Peking's current hostile posture stems di-
rectly from the largely unforeseen Sino-Burmese
confrontation in 1967, which itself resulted from
China's irrational world-wide diplomacy during
the Cultural Revolution. The Maoist demonstra-
tions that provoked the anti-Chinese riots and the
subsequent impasse were the result of the unpre-
dictable but profound impact of the Cultural
Revolution within the Foreign Ministry in Peking
and on Chinese missions abroad. There were no
PEKING'S POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS signs the demonstrations were a premeditated ac-
The continued deterioration in Sino- tion directed specifically against the Rangoon
Burmese relations government.
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A variation of this assessment suggests that
Sino-Burmese relations have become so hostile
during the past year that Peking has decided to
foment insurgency along the border to topple the
current government and establish 'pro-Peking
regime. Although this would explain ,China's bla-
tant calls for the overthrow of the Ne Win regime,
the Chinese probably have a more realistic view of
the currently limited capabilities of the insurgents
in Burma.
Insurgency has been endemic in Burma for
20 years, and Rangoon has traditionally had little
control over the independent minority bands
along the border. Rangoon, reflecting the general
unimportance of the remote border area, has been
content during the past two years to contain the
minority rebels in that region while concentrating
effective military pressure against the potentially
more disruptive Communist insurgents in central
Burma, where 85 percent of the population lives
and where the government's control and its
chances of success are greater.
Peking appears well aware that increased aid
to these factional dissidents poses no overriding
threat to the Ne Win regime. Chinese public state-
ments and propaganda have underscored the "dif-
ficulties ahead" for the Burmese insurgents, as
well as the "twists and turns" in revolutionary
struggle, and have urged them to be "self-reliant."
It has also been suggested that the Chinese
are not primarily concerned with overthrowing
the Ne Win regime, but in fact want to use the
minority insurgents to establish a major "liber-
ated zone" in eastern Burma along the Chinese
border. Such a base of operations presumably
would facilitate the flow of men and, supplies to
Peking-directed minority rebels in northern Thai-
land-an area which has received increased Chi-
nese propaganda attention during the past year.
Peking's continued difficulties in controlling for-
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eign minority groups, however, appear to rule out
this assessment. Peking probably views the various
parochial and factional groups it now supports
along the frontier as something less than effective
or reliable revolutionary instruments. Moreover,
the Chinese already have adequate infiltration
routes into northern Thailand, and it is doubtful
that Peking believes that a "liberated zone" in
eastern Burma is necessary for the very limited
assistance it now provides to the rebels there.
CHINA'S PROBABLE OBJECTIVES
China's current objectives in Burma prob-
ably are more modest than those projected in
these assessments. Peking's overtures during mid-
1968 demonstrate that China probably would be
willing to establish more normal relations with
Rangoon and to end active support for antigov-
ernment insurgents provided the Burmese
adopted a less hostile attitude. During the past
year Chinese foreign policy has softened mark-
edly from its strident character during the Cul-
tural Revolution, but Peking cannot openly back
away from its anti - Ne Win posture without a
substantial public gesture from Rangoon. Because
Ne Win has exhibited no willingness to cooperate
while the "people's war" continues, the Chinese
probably believe that active pressure should be
maintained, hoping thereby to induce a more
favorable Burmese attitude over the long term
toward China.
In furthering this limited objective, the Chi-
nese have continued to resort to indirect means,
granting highly vocal propaganda support and
limited military assistance to the few, generally
ineffective pro-Peking revolutionary groups in
Burma. Peking has apparently focused its prime
attention on continued attempts to develop the
BCP into a well-organized, responsive revolution-
ary force. Thus far, however, the Chinese have
had little success, and the BCP's position has
continued to deteriorate in the face of strong
Burmese military pressure.
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It appears likely, therefore, that the recent
increase in Chinese assistance to the minority
insurgents along the border during the past year
probably has been an attempt to divert Burmese
military attention away from the BCP in central
Burma in the hope of giving the Communists a
much-needed respite for consolidation and re-
grouping. Moreover, it is possible that the Chinese
have become gravely concerned over the unfavor-
able turn of events for the BCP in the past year
and may be attempting to build up a small base of
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operations along the border to which the BCP
could retreat in order to continue its antigovern-
ment activities and receive closer support from
China. In any case, it appears clear that China's
support for the BCP and the minority insurgents
in Burma is tactical in nature, designed to under-
score China's current opposition to the Ne Win
regime, harass the Rangoon government and, over
the longer term, press the Burmese to adopt a
more pro-China policy.
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