WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007200020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 3, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
~' 43
3 July 1969
No. 0377/69
77,2Z"-37/Z--
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(Information as of noon EDT, 2 July 1969)
Far East
VIETNAM
The Communists have begun to disengage some of their
forces. Leaders of President Thieu's National Social
Democratic Front, meanwhile, remain bogged down with
organizational details, and the new front has a long
way to go before it can become an effective rallying
point for the non-Communists in the South.
VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS PRESS CAMBODIA FOR CONCESSIONS
There are indications that several important problems
between Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists have
yet to be resolved.
LAO GOVERNMENT MOVES TO COUNTER COMMUNIST GAINS
Vientiane is taking steps to blunt recent Communist
military gains west of the Plaine des Jarres.
Europe
Page
1
NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT GETS OFF TO GOOD START
A change in both style and mood is apparent in France
in the early weeks of Pompidou's term as president.
One veteran parliamentarian has been quoted as saying
that the atmosphere in the legislature is better than
at any time since the end of the first world war.
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USSR PREPARES FOR AUTOMOBILE AGE
Although the Soviets are beginning a rapid expansion
of their passenger car industry, private ownership by
the average Soviet citizen is decades away.
ROMANIA APPARENTLY EXPECTS NEW PRESSURES
Fear of such pressures may account for an intensifica-
tion of Bucharest's contacts with some of its neigh-
bors and the increased activity on the part of its
armed forces.
SHIFTS IN POLISH GOVERNMENT ARE ECONOMICALLY ORIENTED 15
Three new deputy premiers and three economic ministers
were approved by the Polish parliament on 28 June in
a session called to reconstitute the government fol-
lowing the national elections on 1 June. Both Premier
Cyrankiewicz and Chief of State Spychalski were re-
elected.
PROSPECTS REMAIN BLEAK FOR MOSCOW IN SUB-SAHARA
Recent setbacks suffered by Moscow in a number of Black
African countries point up the continuing suspicion of
the USSR in much of this area as well as the problems
Moscow faces in trying to expand its position there.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
17
MOZAMBIQUE INSURGENTS OVERCOME ORGANIZATIONAL STRESSES
19
The Mozambique Liberation Front has remained organ-
izationally intact despite serious setbacks earlier
this year, but its guerrilla campaign is still show-
ing the disruptive effects of these reversals.
VIOLENCE AGAIN ERUPTS IN INDIA'S TELENGANA REGION
21
Violence is flaring again in the Telengana region of
Andhra Pradesh as the police appear to be taking more
repressive action against the fierce local separatist
movement.
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MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY INCREASES IN MIDDLE EAST 21
The pace of incidents along the cease-fire lines is
stepping up, and hard-line statements coming out of
Tel Aviv and Cairo suggest that progress on a peace
settlement will be slow, at best.
ETHIOPIA: PROBLEMS OF A FADING DYNASTY
Emperor Haile Selassie will arrive in the US on 7 July
for his fourth official visit. The Emperor's highly
personalized style of rule has enabled him to remain
firmly in power since he became emperor in 1930, but
the 76-year-old monarch has failed to prepare anyone
to succeed him. The reforms he has introduced have
set in motion forces he is no longer able to control.
Student unrest is intensifying, discontent is strong
among the educated elite, and the government is be-
ing hurt financially by the rising costs of economic
development and of combating insurgency. (Published
separately as Special Report No. 0377/69B)
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 23
SETTLEMENT OF EL SALVADOR - HONDURAS DISPUTE CLOUDED
Efforts by Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica to
heal the breach in diplomatic and commercial rela-
tions between the two countries have thus far had
only limited success.
PERU BEGINS TO IMPLEMENT NEW AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
No significant opposition has as yet developed to
President Velasco's sweeping agrarian reform law.
ARGENTINA IMPOSES STATE OF SIEGE
The Ongania government has demonstrated its determi-
nation to end student and labor unrest by imposing a
state of siege for the first time since it took of-
fice three years ago.
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Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's chief negotiator, is returning to Paris after
a month-long stay in Hanoi. Presumably the North Vietnamese leadership
has sorted out the implications of President Nixon's recent pronouncements
on Vietnam and the first steps toward "Vietnamizing" the war. There have
been no indications that Xuan Thuy's return presages any shift in the
Communist stance at the peace talks.
In South Vietnam, the Communists have begun to disengage some of
their forces. At the same time, however, certain enemy units are continuing
to prepare for battle, and the focal point of heavy fighting may shift from
the central highlands to northwestern III Corps. This would allow the enemy
to maintain tactical momentum as well as to present an appearance of
strength by sustaining military action.
Leaders of President Thieu's National Social Democratic Front con-
tinue to struggle with organizational details and have yet even to work out
the relationship among component parties at the provincial and local levels.
One factor accounting for the slow progress is Thieu's own inability to push
the development of the front while performing more urgent tasks of national
leadership.
Lao regional commander Vang Pao has taken steps to retake the
politically important neutralist base at Muong Soui, west of the Plaine des
Jarres, which was evacuated last week, but the Communists may be difficult
to dislodge. They may be preparing to make a case that the pro-Communist
"patriotic neutralist" forces, not the troops identified with Souvanna
Phouma, represent the genuine neutralist faction in the tripartite government
called for in the Geneva Accords.
Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk has been reluctantly meeting with the
head of the South Vietnamese Communists' Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment. Sihanouk's main gambit in the talks appears to be to try to gain
some solid assurances from the Communists that they will limit their
activities on Cambodian territory before he agrees to permit supply ship-
ments to the Viet Cong to resume.
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VIETNAM
A general regroupment of
Communist main force units is ap-
parently under way in certain key
sectors of South Vietnam. Pris-
oner and rallier interrogations,
as well as the general lack of
contact with the enemy's major
combat units, suggest that a
limited disengagement of Commu-
nist forces has begun. This ma-
neuver is typical of past enemy
operations. In previous periods,
such respites have been used to
develop new tactical plans and
to brief cadres before the next
offensive thrusts, which are ex-
pected later this month.
Some of the enemy units in-
volved have probably withdrawn to
traditional in-country base areas,
while others may have sought ref-
uge in Cambodian safehavens. In-
cluded in the latter groups may
be elements of the three regiments
that have been involved on the Ben
Het battlefield since early May
and which are apparently retreat-
ing back to Cambodian sanctuary.
For the most part, the cur-
rent widespread withdrawals from
primary combat zones probably
represent seasonal refitting and
retraining. Last summer, there
was a prolonged lull in large-
scale offensive activity between
the pushes in May and August.
There are some indications
that certain other enemy units
are continuing to prepare for
battle.
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Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Jul 69
The Communists could be planning
to shift the focal point of heavy
fighting from the central high-
lands to northwestern III Corps,
in order to maintain their tac-
tical momentum as well as to pre-
sent an appearance of strength
by sustaining military action in
at least one key sector of the
country.
In addition to a possible
step-up in fighting to the north
and northwest of Saigon, sapper
units and local force units will
probably continue small-scale
actions throughout the country.
These could include forays against
remote allied positions as well
as an increased level of terrorism
in Saigon and other major cities.
These efforts would tend to take
up the slack in enemy offensive
activity as preparations for the
July phase of the Communist "sum-
mer" campaign are completed.
Available evidence
suggests that enemy mili- 25X1
tary ac ion during July will closely
parallel that of May and June during
which several so-called "highpoints"
were sta ed
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indicators point to some increase
in enemy action in early July,
but efforts of greater magnitude
will probably not begin until
later in the month.
Meanwhile, a recent speech
by North Vietnamese Defense Min-
ister Vo Nguyen Giap provides
additional clues on current North
Vietnamese military strategy.
Giap reaffirmed his long-stand-
ing view that, using the right
military tactics, the Communists
can fight on as long as necessary
to demonstrate that the war is
stalemated and can be resolved
only through negotiations and al-
lied concessions. He counsels a
strategy of small-scale but per-
sistent military operations de-
signed to maintain steady pres-
sure on the allies and preserve
a strong Communist army.
Political Developments
North Vietnam's chief nego-
tiator, Xuan Thuy, is en route
back to the Paris talks and should
arrive within the next few days
after brief stopovers in Peking
and Moscow.
During Thuy's month-long
stay in Hanoi, the leadership
presumably has sorted out the
implications of President's Nixon's
Vietnam speech, his latest press
conference, and the first steps
toward "Vietnamizing" the war.
The South Vietnamese politi-
cal scene was relatively quiet
this week. Leaders of the pro-
government National Social Demo-
cratic Front remain bogged down
with organizational details, and
opposition leaders have also
been making only marginal prog-
ress toward establishing a common
front.
The political leaders brought
together by President Thieu to
work out the specifics of his front
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organization are having diffi-
culty agreeing on the organiza-
tional structure at the national
level, and they have yet to work
out the relationship among the
component political parties out-
side Saigon, at the provincial and
local levels. These leaders seem
to be operating on a business-as-
usual basis, maneuvering for posi-
tion rather than readying them-
selves and their followers for
future political struggles with
the Communists.
One important reason for
this lack of a sense of urgency
and purpose seems to be Thieu's
inability to remain fully engaged
for extended periods in the for-
mation of his front while at the
same time trying as president to
keep on top of developments in
all other fields of vital concern
to the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment. Because the power and
prestige of the presidency are
not being brought to bear directly
from day to day, little psycholog-
ical momentum seems to have been
built up among those people who
are expected to run the progov-
ernment front. Accordingly, the
new organization has a long way
to go before it can become an
effective rallying point for the
non-Communists of South Vietnam.
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bP U.K.L I
VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS PRESS CAMBODIA FOR CONCESSIONS
Circumstances surrounding
the visit of the head of the South
Vietnamese Communist Provisional
Revolutionary Government to Cam-
bodia suggest that several impor-
tant problems between Sihanouk
and the Vietnamese Communists
have yet to be resolved.
The recent admission by the
provisional government's ambassador
in Phnom Penh that Communist
troops are located on Cambodian
soil, and the "promise" that they
would leave "as soon as possible,"
may have been part of the price
Sihanouk exacted for agreeing to
Phat's visit.
The Communists presumably
now will push Sihanouk for a firm
commitment on the supply issue.
Phat may have other ques-
tions relating to the Vietnam war
that he wants to discuss with Si-
hanouk at this juncture, includ-
ing a reduction of Cambodian mil-
itary pressures against Communist
forces in Cambodia.
Press reports from Phnom
Penh indicate that Sihanouk is
likely to drive a hard bargain with
Phat. The reluctance with which
he agreed to the visit, however,
and reports that the Vietnamese
themselves are taking a tough line
suggest that the Communists are
attempting to pressure Sihanouk
into concessions on matters of
vital importance to them. A
joint communique that reportedly 25X1
will be issued on 4 July could
provide some indication of the
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5r;UKtl
LAOS: Current Situation
.sung Prabang
Government moving against
Communist positions
1PLAINE "
DES' hafig Khay
hou Khoun
JARR?S
-RVern~ @n{ held IARstian?
Cam nu isY-held' iucahon
Recently captured by
Government forces
NORTH
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LAO GOVERNMENT MOVES TO COUNTER COMMUNIST GAINS
The government is taking steps
to blunt recent Communist gains
west of the Plaine des Jarres.
Regional military commander
Vang Pao has drawn up plans to re-
take the politically important
neutralist base at Muong Soui,
which was abandoned by the govern-
ment on 27 June in the face of
the wholesale desertion of the
neutralist defenders.
Some 2,000 neutralist, regu-
lar army, and Meo guerrilla troops
are scheduled to launch a counter-
attack within the next week. Ef-
forts to regroup scattered neu-
tralist forces have gone slowly,
however, and this may disrupt the
government's timing. In addition,
Communist forces, possibly antici-
pating a government countermove,
have probed a number of the gov-
ernment's forward staging bases
southwest of Muong Soui.
To the west of Muong Soui
the government is moving to clear
Communist forces dug in near Phou
Khoun, a strategic highpoint
overlooking the Route 7/13 road
junction. In addition, govern-
ment units fresh from the capture
of the Communist position at Tha
Thom are reinforcing government
defenders at Muong Kassy.
The Lao Communist radio has
termed the recent fighting a de-
fensive operation designed to re-
gain one of the "important stra-
tegic positions" the Communists
held at the time the 1962 Geneva
Accords were signed. The Com-
munists will probably trumpet the
capture of Muong Soui as "proof"
that the pro-Communist "patriotic
neutralist" forces, not Souvanna
Phouma and his neutralist troops,
represent the genuine neutralist
faction in the tripartite Laotian
government called for by the
Geneva Accords. The Lao Commu-
nists no doubt believe their re-
cent gains will strengthen their
bargaining position with
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Surprised East Europeans reacted hesitantly to the announcement of
President Nixon's visit to Romania. All except the Romanians and Yugo-
slavs, who are pleased at the prospect, are obviously awaiting an authorita-
tive lead from Moscow. Unofficially, Moscow has made its displeasure clear.
The usual "well-informed Soviet sources" have been 'busy passing the word
to Western correspondents that Moscow was not informed and that the trip
jeopardizes both Soviet-Romanian and Soviet-American relations.
There is some apprehension in Bucharest that Brezhnev and Kosygin
may postpone their scheduled visit to Romania in July in pique over
President Nixon's visit, but on balance, it appears that the Romanians still
expect the Soviet leaders to come and sign a new treaty of friendship and
mutual assistance.
Brezhnev has been quick to capitalize on the international Communist
conference on the home front. He gave a report to a central committee
plenum last week and won the "unanimous" approval of its members for the
results of the conference. The plenum resolution conveniently glossed over
the fact that the conference documents contained no criticism of Commu-
nist China. All members of the politburo have now fanned out across the
country to address local party meetings on the conference.
East. Germany was recognized by Southern Yemen on 30 June. It is the
fifth non-Communist state to take this step.
The North Atlantic Council began discussions this week on the proposal
that the US enter into strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.
Some NATO members will seek US assurance that there will be full consulta-
tion on any issues arising at the talks that touch on European military or
political interests, but Allied endorsement is expected.
Talks on disarmament will begin again in Geneva on 3 July, with Japan
and Mongolia participating for the first time. As a first order of business, the
negotiators will probably try to reach a compromise between the Soviet and
US drafts of a seabed arms control treaty.
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NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT GETS OFF TO GOOD START
A change in both style and
mood is apparent in France in the
early weeks of Pompidou's term as
president.
After 14 months of hectic
political activity that included
a major social upheaval, a finan-
cial crisis, a referendum result-
ing in De Gaulle's resignation
and both parliamentary and presi-
dential elections, Frenchmen are
viewing the current political
scene with satisfaction. One vet-
eran parliamentarian has been
quoted as saying that the atmos-
phere in the legislature is bet-
ter than at any time since the
end of the first world war.
Both Pompidou and Prime Min-
ister Chaban-Delmas, in maiden
messages to parliament, stressed
that the new government would be
one of reconciliation. Pompidou
said once again in effect that he
wanted to be president of all the
French--an invitation for those
who had worked against him to join
in a common program of action.
Signaling a desire to cooperate
more fully with the parliament,
he charged it with seeing that
the state neither overwhelmed the
country nor became dangerously
weak.
The applause accorded the
speech by deputies of both the
Communist and the non-Communist
left seems to indicate that the
new president's message of recon-
ciliation thus far has been taken
at face value.
Chaban-Delmas, reflecting
the change in style, has paid
courtesy calls on the presidents
of the Senate and of the Economic
and Social Council, bodies which
De Gaulle pointedly ignored and
tried to legislate out of exist-
ence in the April referendum.
Pompidou has greeted photographers
in the Elysee gardens and drasti-
cally reduced the security forces
in the vicinity of the presiden-
tial palace. Such gestures are
welcome departures from De Gaulle's
austere style. The General him-
self plans to remain at Colombey
through the summer.
There have, however, been
some-sour notes, such as the re-
appointment of Jacques Foccart--
associated in the public's mind
with unsavory and illegal activi-
ties--as Secretary General for
African Affairs. In addition,
it will take some time for cer-
tain members of the new govern-
ment to settle down to functions
that in many cases have not been
clearly defined.
All key members of the gov-
ernment will be devoting their
summer to preparing the detailed
"program for action" that Chaban-
Delmas announced. The government
clearly is aware that an impres-
sive number of problems must be
dealt with, and that reconcilia-
tion must be followed by action
to avoid a recurrence of the prob-
lems of the past year or so.
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USSR PREPARES FOR AUTOMOBILE AGE
The Soviets are in the midst
of an expansion program to quadruple
the output of their passenger car
industry by 1975. Even if this
goal is achieved, however, the USSR
will still have only about one tenth
as many cars per 1,000 persons as
Sweden or Canada had in 1967. The
prospects of individual car owner-
ship for the average Soviet citizen
is clearly decades away.
In 1968 the USSR produced
about 280,000 cars and the total
inventory of automobiles at the
end of the year was about 1.4 mil-
lion--or about 5 per 1,000 persons.
The Soviets plan to expand output
to about 1.2 million units in 1975,
which will raise the total stock
to about 4.8 million cars, or 19
per 1,000 persons.
The key to the Soviet program
to enter the automobile age is the
construction of a new plant at
Tol'yatti under a contract with
Fiat of Italy. Work on this plant
is about six months behind schedule,
however, largely because of the un-
usually severe winters of the past
two years, supply difficulties,
and bureaucratic tie-ups.
The first Soviet Fiat is
scheduled to roll off the assembly
line in April 1970, the centennial
of Lenin's birth, instead of late
in 1969 as originally planned.
Barring further setbacks, the plant
probably will reach its capacity
output of 600,000 cars in 1974
rather than in 1972 as scheduled
originally.
Work is also under way on ex-
panding the capacities of three of
the USSR's existing automobile
plants--the Moskvich plants in Mos-
cow and Izhevsk, and the Zaporozhets
plant in Zaporozhye. A small in-
crease in production of the Volga
car is also planned at the Gorkiy
plant.
Although moderately ambitious
plans were announced last year to
build more roads, garages, gas sta-
tions, motels, and other service
facilities, little progress has
been realized thus far. At present
there are only about 200 repair
garages and 2,000 filling stations
along the roughly 300,000 miles of
hard-surfaced and graveled roads
in the entire country. A chronic
shortage of spare parts, moreover,
typically keeps nearly one fifth
of the USSR's automobile inventory
out of service at any given time.
The USSR allocates about half
the cars its produces each year to
the government; exports about one
quarter (mainly to Eastern Europe);
and sells the remainder to the pub-
lic. Government inventory and ex-
port requirements probably will
continue to have first claim on an-
nual production, but by 1975 as
many as 600,000 cars may be avail-
able for public sale.
The price of the cheapest So-
viet car is currently equivalent to
more than twice the annual earnings
of an average Soviet worker. In-
creased incomes and a rise in sav-
ings deposits are anticipated during
the next few years, but cars will
still remain beyond the reach of the
vast majority of Soviet citizens if
high prices are maintained and in-
stallment purchase is not allowed.
By 1975, however, Soviet families
that have managed to accumulate the
necessary cash probably will not
have to wait to buy a car, as is
the current practice.
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ROMANIA APPARENTLY EXPECTS NEW PRESSURES
Romania's determination to
maintain its maneuverability in
the face of anticipated pressures
for conformity from its Warsaw
Pact allies probably underlies its
recent intensification of con-
tacts with some of its neighbors.
These contacts have included an
exchange of high-level border
guard delegations with Yugoslavia,
and a visit by a Hungarian mili-
tary delegation.
There has also been increased
activity on the part of the Ro-
manian armed forces, which may re-
flect some apprehension in Bucha-
rest.
While the international Com-
munist conference was in progress
in Moscow, Romanian Deputy Foreign
Minister Sandru, who deals with
Warsaw Pact and European security
matters, spent several days in
Tirana, the first Romanian high-
level visit there in some time.
He later moved on to Belgrade
for talks with Yugoslav Foreign
Ministry officials. On 20 June,
the Romanian ambassador in Bel-
grade talked with a Yugoslav ex-
pert on interparty relations. The
same day a Yugoslav Border Guard
delegation began a six-day visit
to Bucharest, ostensibly in re-
turn for an earlier visit to
Yugoslavia by a similar Romanian
group.
Capping these intensive
Romanian-Yugoslav contacts was
the trip to Belgrade and Brioni,
from 26 to 28 June, of Paul
Niculescu-Mizil, the Romanian
party's leading ideologue, who
talked with President Tito.
The Romanians next hosted
a high-level Hungarian delega-
tion led by Minister of Defense
Czinege. Arriving in Bucharest
on 27 June, the delegation re-
ceived red-carpet treatment and
even met with Ceausescu for
talks which, according to the
Romanian news agency, were held
in a "warm, comradely atmosphere."
There is as yet no clear
indication of the purpose of the
Hungarian visit, or indeed of
this spate of activity that thus
far conspicuously omits contacts
with Bulgaria, with whom Bucha-
rest's relations are cool.
The impression emerges, how-
ever, that the Romanians, rightly
or wrongly, sense a buildup of
pressure against them in the wake
of the international Communist
conference. Under such circum-
stances, it may be that Hungary's
Czinege, the most liberal of the
Pact's defense ministers, is act-
ing more as a Pact emissary than
in a national capacity. In put-
ting out these apparent anchors
to windward, however, the Romanians
still exhibit no inclination to
veer away from their national Com-
munist course.
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SHIFTS IN POLISH GOVERNMENT ARE ECONOMICALLY ORIENTED
The appointments of three new
deputy premiers and three economic
ministers were approved by the
Polish parliament on 28 June in a
session called to reconstitute the
government following the national
elections on 1 June. Both Premier
Cyrankiewicz and Chief of State
Spychalski were re-elected.
With the new appointments,
four of the five deputy premiers
are specialists in economics, in-
dustry, trade, and finance. Most
of those promoted are younger and
professionally more qualified than
their predecessors. This is in
:Line with the pattern set at last
year's party congress, which stressed
the need for improving the flexibil-
ity and efficiency of the economy.
In his speech to parliament
Cyrankiewicz called for a "new look"
in the next five-year plan--for
1971-75--and implied that further
changes in economic administration
would follow. The first of these
apparently was the establishment on
30 June of the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers, an inner exec-
utive body entrusted with the coord-
ination of economic policy. The
long-dormant Economic Committee at-
tached to the Council was simul-
taneously abolished.
For the first time, Poland's
deputy premierships are officially
ranked by number. The first in the
pecking order of five is veteran
Deputy Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz,
and the second is Deputy Premier
Eugeniusz Szyr, who is also the
only Jew in the party leadership.
Szry's designation as second dep-
uty premier may be another indica-
tion that Gomulka wants to erase
the regime's unsavory anti-Semitic
image that emerged as a result of
last year's factional warfare.
None of the shifts appears to
have deep political implications,
with the possible exception of party
secretary Moczar's election to the
Council of State. This body,
Poland's collective presidency,
is headed by Spychalski. Some
Poles view this promotion for Moc-
zar, Gomulka's long-time political
rival who mounted a significant
challenge last year, as the first
step in Moczar's semiretirement,
but this judgment appears premature.
The Defense and Foreign minis-
tries were not affected, although
the death on 27 June of Deputy For-
eign Minister Kruczkowski, appointed
only last year and responsible for
bloc affairs, may give new impetus
to shifts already D nder way in the
Foreign Ministry's middle and lower
echelons.
PROSPECTS REMAIN BLEAK
Recent setbacks suffered by
Moscow in a number of Black African
countries point up the continuing
suspicion of the USSR in much of
this area. These setbacks have oc-
curred in capitals where the So-
FOR MOSCOW IN SUB-SAHARA
viet position was admittedly already
weak rather than in established So-
viet footholds such as Guinea and
Congo (Brazzaville) or in potential
ones like Nigeria and Somalia. Never-
theless, they indicate the problems
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the USSR faces in trying to expand
its position in the area.
The USSR's most serious
trouble has been with the Ivory
Coast. President Houphouet-
Boigny had long been unhappy about
Soviet contacts with Ivorian stu-
dents and about highly critical
articles in the Soviet press. He
broke relations in late May fol-
lowing student unrest amid reports
that some Ivorian officials sus-
pected Soviet involvement. The
US Embassy in Abidjan reports,
however, that the student dissi-
dence was an internal phenomenon
in which the Soviets were prob-
ably blameless.
Elsewhere in Africa, Presi-
dent Ahidjo of Cameroon was re-
cently on the verge of expelling
the Soviet ambassador in connec-
tion with the dissemination of
Soviet propaganda to members of
the Cameroonian armed forces.
Dissuaded from this step by his
advisers, Ahidjo insisted that
the ambassador be given a stiff
warning.
In Chad, President Tombalbaye
appears convinced that the So-
viets are behind the rebels in
his country and that they are
also active among youth. Tom-
balbaye has said that if he could
get solid evidence of Soviet in-
terference, he would give the em-
bassy 24 hours to get out. US
observers, believe however, that
reports of Soviet involvement
should be taken with reserve.
President Lamizana of Upper
Volta is uneasy over the large
Soviet presence there and con-
cerned about Communist propaganda
aimed at Voltan youth. Lamizana
reportedly has decided to reduce
the Soviet delegation, but he
has not yet acted.
Moscow is also under suspicion
for fomenting student disorders in
Congo (Kinshasa). Lacking evidence
that might justify more dramatic
action, the government has so far
been content to warn the Soviets
about disseminating propaganda and
interfering with students.
In East Africa, Kenya expelled
two Soviets last March for alleged
intelli ence activities.
even the Kenyan police admitted
that the government's case was not
strong. On the other hand, Ethiopia
apparently had good evidence when
it declared three Russians persona
non grata in mid-March for fomenting
student unrest.
Moscow's current troubles, de-
riving from its long record of sub-
versive and otherwise undiplomatic
behavior, make it a prime foreign
suspect wherever there is a chal-
lenge to the more conservative Af-
rican regimes. In many cases, the
suspicion is justified. Neverthe-
less, the Soviet Union is not com-
pletely culpable--and in a few in-
stances may be altogether innocent--
in the current spate of labor and
student unrest.
Events of the past four months,
however, provide further evidence
of the fragility of mutual trust
between Moscow and most sub-Saharan
countries--and how quickly it can 25X1
be shattered.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The pace of incidents has stepped up almost everywhere along the
cease-fire lines between Israel and the bordering Arab states this week, and
matters were no better on the diplomatic front. Cairo's Al-Ahram published
a slashing attack on recent US proposals for a peace settlement, and Israeli
Foreign Minister Eban responded with oblique but equally biting charges
against the USSR and Egypt. The UN Security Council discussion of the
emotional Jerusalem issue seems likely only to exacerbate Arab-Israeli ten-
sions further.
Morocco's King Hassan and a large delegation of high officials are
visiting Madrid. The apparently hastily arranged trip, together` with the
King's long meeting with General Franco, aroused speculation that the
future status of the remaining Spanish-controlled areas in Africa was under
discussion. The Spanish enclave of Ifni was transferred quietly to Morocco
on 30 June, under the terms of an earlier agreement.
The Nigerian civil war enters its third year next week with the situation
essentially stalemated. Although federal forces have counterattacked in sev-
eral areas in response to recent Biafran gains, it is unlikely that this latest
"major offensive" will quickly reduce the size of Biafran-held territory. Both
sides continue to acquire more arms, while relief shipments to Biafra remain
at a trickle.
The South African Government has enacted another repressive law that
further strengthens the secret police. The new measure not only makes the
Bureau of State Security legally unanswerable to the courts, but can also be
used to prevent an accused person from testifying even in his own defense.
Passage of the law, which has evoked strong public criticism even from
Afrikaner sources, reflects the determination of the Vorster regime to
maintain rigid internal controls despite its slightly more flexible approach in
foreign policy.
The effort to reduce Pakistan's plethora of political parties-one of
President Yahya Khan's prerequisites for holding elections-received a set-
back last week when a recent merger of four small parties came apart at the
seams. The President, meanwhile, was off on his second tour of the country,
during which he noted that he would discuss the Kashmir dispute and the
Farakka Barrage-a controversial dam being built by India on the Ganges-
when President Nixon visits Pakistan on 1 August.
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O
SECRET
M ~.;.ME3IQ
?Nampula Jumbo
MOZAMBIQUE
District boundary
? District capital
loo zoo
STATUTE MILES
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SEU Kii l'
MOZAMBIQUE INSURGENTS OVERCOME ORGANIZATIONAL STRESSES
The insurgent Mozambique
Liberation Front (FRELIMO) has
remained organizationally intact
despite the assassination of its
former president and the defection
of a key tribal leader. The
Front's guerrilla campaign, how-
ever, is still feeling the effects
of these setbacks.
FRELIMO, the African nation-
alist group directing insurgency
against the Portuguese in Mozam-
bique, installed a three-man
Council of the Presidency in
April, two months after the death
of Eduardo Mondlane. This coun-
cil has apparently taken over
the administration of FRELIMO
smoothly. Military chief Samora
Machel, perhaps supported by the
intellectual, Marcellino dos San-
tos, may be emerging as the prin-
cipal figure. In any event, there
are no signs of serious dissension
between these two and Uriah Si-
mango, the third member of the
triumvirate and an alleged leader
of a second group of Front fig-
ures; there have been reports of
some factional maneuvering, how-
ever.
The Front also has weathered
the defection to the Portuguese
in March of Lazaro Nkavandame,
the highest ranking FRELIMO
leader belonging to the principal
tribal element in the organiza-
tion. Nkavandame has subsequently
cooperated with a determined
Portuguese effort to win over his
fellow tribesmen in northeastern
Mozambique--the one region where
FRELIMO has remained relatively
strong. Despite an airdrop of
up to 80,000 pamphlets, prepared
tapes broadcast by plane, and
some 250 tribal "emissaries"
Page 19
sent into the bush, however, there
are no signs of significant defec-
tions by armed guerrillas.
The campaign, nevertheless,
has had minor success in alienat-
ing certain fears among the popu-
lation, and several hundred bush
villagers have decided to settle
in government fortified villages.
Also, some guerrillas are now
willing to surrender when sur-
rounded by Portuguese forces
rather than fight to the death.
FRELIMO's uneven guerrilla
record since February indicates
that its insurgent effort is
still feeling the disruptive
effects of Mondlane's death,
Nkavandame's defection, and
earlier military setbacks. The
movement has had to reduce in-
surgent action in the northeast
to concentrate on countering
the Portuguese defection cam-
paign. FRELIMO's principal
military actions in the region
through mid-June consisted of
three spectacular--but ineffec-
tual--assaults against Portuguese
installations and fortified vil-
lages. Portugal's casualties
were light, however, and its
confidence has not been shaken.
Elsewhere, FRELIMO is making
a concerted effort to retake areas
lost to the Portuguese in the
Niassa district and to expand
activity in western Tete. There
has been little insurgent prog-
ress, however, particularly in
Niassa, and the effort is divert-
ing resources from established
insurgent areas, particularly
in the northeast, where they
could be put to better use.
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- State boundary
MILES 400
SECRET
`" ORISSA
Bhubaneswar*
Andhra Pradesh
upset by agitation
for Telengana
statehood
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VIOLENCE AGAIN ERUPTS IN INDIA'S TELENGANA REGION
Violence is flaring again
in the Telengana region of Andhra
Pradesh as the police appear to
be taking more repressive action
against the fierce local separa-
tist movement.
After severe rioting in early
June abated, the mounting agita-
tion for a separate Telengana
state within the Indian Union
had been characterized by large,
Gandhian-type, peaceful protest
demonstrations. Recently, how-
ever, the level of violence has
again increased, following the
arrest of prominent separatist
leaders and a police crackdown
on disruptive mass demonstrations.
The government is trying to
avoid concessions in Telengana
that might precipitate similar
separatist agitation in other
states. If serious disorders
persist, however, New Delhi could
be forced to impose direct rule
on Andhra Pradesh even though
this would displace a Congress
Party state government. Or the
state's chief minister, Brah-
mananda Reddi, who has become
the symbolic focus for Telengana
hostility, could be dumped as a
temporary expedient. Reddi and
his cabinet have already sub-
mitted their resignations and
reportedly are awaiting the de-
cision of the Congress Party
high command.
Even if the Telengana agita-
tion is contained by police and
military action, the accumulated
bitterness may make the effective
functioning of the state govern-
ment very difficult. The almost
six-month-old Telengana separat-
ist movement has gained a broad
base of support in the local pop-
ulation, particularly among uni-
versity students, middle-class
professionals, businessmen
lims, and urban workers.
MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY INCREASES IN MIDDLE EAST
The pace of incidents along
the cease-fire lines is stepping
up, and hard-line statements com-
ing out of Tel Aviv and Cairo sug-
gest that progress on a peace set-
tlement will be slow, at best.
Discussion of the emotional Jeru-
salem issue in the UN Security
Council seems likely only to ex-
acerbate Arab-Israeli animosi-
ties further.
All cease-fire lines except
the one on the Lebanese-Israeli
border continue to be the scene
of several clashes a day with no
sign of any intention by either
the Israelis or Arabs to back
off. The Jordanian and Egyptian
"fronts" remain the hottest, al-
though clashes between the Syrians
and the Israelis are also occur-
ring more frequently now.
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Notable this past week was
Israel's harassment of Jorda-
nians trying to repair the East
Ghor irrigation canal, which the
Israelis blew up last week. The
full extent of the damage is not
yet known, but the canal supplies
water to important citrus and ba-
nana orchards in the Jordan valley.
The implication is that the Is-
raelis were again aiming to in-
lict economic as well as mili-
tary damage.
The situation along the Suez
Canal also continues active with
daily artillery barrages, snip-
ings, and cross-canal commando
attacks. Israel has followed up
last week's attack on an Egyptian
radar station with a helicopter-
commando raid deep into Egypt to
cut power lines again. Although
an Israeli general described
these attacks as "beautiful pro-
fessional performances," they
seem to be having little effect
on Egyptian activities along the
canal.
The fedayeen, smarting from
Arab criticism of their attack
on the Tapline oil pipeline, re-
trieved their position by a
follow-up attack on the Haifa
refinery products pipeline and
a new bombing incident in Tel
Aviv proper. Four of the sus-
pects in the refinery pipeline
attack were reported to be Israeli
Arabs--a new and possibly dan-
gerous factor for Israel, indi-
cating that the fedayeen have
been recruiting some of the 400,-
000 reputedly "tame" Arabs in Is-
rael. Prime Minister Golda Meir,
in the wake of the Tel Aviv bomb-
ing, threatened "seven-fold"
retaliation,. and Minister of
Defense Dayan was talking of
having to call up more reserves.
Things are no better on
the diplomatic front. Nasir's
confidant-publisher Heykal has
made a slashing attack in Al-
Ahram on recent US proposals for
a peace settlement, charging
that the US is seeking to divide
the Arabs and is trying to im-
pose a US-Israeli - designed set-
tlement. Israeli Foreign Minis-
ter Eban, in a press conference
in Tel Aviv after Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko's visit to
Cairo, made an oblique but equally
biting attack on the Soviet Union
and Egypt, maintaining they have
no intention of moving toward a
viable peace settlement. With
hopeful irony, he alleged that
the Soviet-Egyptian talks indi-
cate that the USSR and the US
are still as far apart as ever
on a Middle East settlement.
Meanwhile, Jordan's call for
a UN Security Council discussion
of the Israeli take-over and admin-
istration of Jerusalem seems de-
signed to put pressure on the US
to prove its more "even-handed"
policy in the middle East, and
to try diplomatically at least to
get Israel out of the Holy City.
Although the debate serves to let
off steam, it can only push a
settlement further and r
off.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Governor Rockefeller began his fourth and final fact-finding trip to
Latin America this week. While he visited Argentina, a countrywide state of
siege and a crackdown on student and labor leaders took some steam out of
the disorders aimed at the Ongania government for the past two months. The
Governor received a rousing welcome in Haiti on 1 July, and the following
afternoon arrived in Santo Domingo under heavy security precautions. On 3
July, Rockefeller's party flies to Jamaica and will wind up his trips with
visits to Guyana on 4 July and Barbados on 5 July.
In Chile, the progressive nationalization agreement with the Anaconda
Company has already come under strong attack by leftist political groups,
especially the Communists. Both the Socialist and Radical parties have
announced their intention to press hard for bills now in Congress to na-
tionalize Anaconda immediately with little compensation. These proposals
would fare poorly-even if passed-because of the difficulty of overriding
Frei's inevitable veto.
Several developments in Ecuador, including the signing of a new con-
tract with a major US oil consortium, the release of a US tuna boat detained
for over a week, and a lull in student agitation, have brought an upturn in
relations with the US and should also allay some immediate pressures on the
Velasco government.
A semblance of normality returned to Uruguay this week when the
state of siege imposed by President Pacheco in late June gradually brought
an end to a series of strikes and terrorist incidents. The Communist-
dominated labor confederation is still threatening a general strike, but heavy
security patrols have somewhat dampened the party's enthusiasm.
In neighboring Paraguay, President Stroessner has backed off from his
long-standing move toward political liberalization by issuing a decree
banning publication of news or pictures that might "directly or indirectly
contribute to prolonging or aggravating" student disturbances. The students
are protesting the brutality of security forces during Governor Rockefeller's
mid-June visit and opposition parties are becoming increasingly vociferous in
attacking the government's tactics.
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SETTLEMENT OF EL SALVADOR - HONDURAS DISPUTE CLOUDED
Efforts by Nicaragua, Guate-
mala, and Costa Rica to heal the
breach in diplomatic and commer-
cial relations between El Salvador
and Honduras have thus far had
only limited success. Both coun-
tries have agreed in principle to
mediation, but an understanding
on procedures has not yet been
reached.
The Salvadoran Government,
which initiated the break on 26
June, has set five conditions for
accepting mediation. These in-
clude the immediate cessation of
the persecution and expulsion of
Salvadorans in Honduras; the in-
vestigation of crimes against
Salvadorans and the prosecution
of those responsible; and the pay-
ment of reparations. Salvador has
refused to drop its charge of gen-
ocide and has demanded that all
Page 2 4
Salvadorans who fled Honduras and
wish to return be reinstated in
their homes, businesses, and jobs.
The Honduran Government has
particularly resented the geno-
cide charge that El Salvador
brought before the OAS Human
Rights Commission. The govern-
ment has denied responsibility
for the departure--which appears
to have been voluntary--of approx-
imately 10,000 of the more than
250,000 Salvadorans who live in
Honduras. It also maintains that
it acted promptly to prevent re-
prisals after the abusive treat-
ment of Hondurans in Salvador
during a soccer match between the
two countries there on 15 June
had aroused popular feeling in
Honduras.
SECRET
of the Salvadorans who
fled apparently had been
in the neighboring coun-
try illegally and it is
unlikely that Honduras
can be persuaded to re-
admit them all. Indeed,
Honduras is suspicious
that many of the remain-
ing Salvadorans entered
illegally, and has or-
dered that all resident
Salvadorans must regis-
ter within one month or
be expelled.
The break in diplo-
matic relations and Sal-
vador's victory in last
Sunday's play-off soccer
match in Mexico City
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appear to have relieved some of
the pressure on Salvadoran Presi-
dent Sanchez to take decisive ac-
tion against Honduras.
The President was forced to
adopt a hard line for fear of be-
ing overthrown, and has only lim-
ited room for maneuver. He is un-
PERU BEGINS TO IMPLEMENT
Only two days after President
Velasco announced his sweeping
land reform program on 24 June,
Peru's military government began
to take over the eight largest
sugar plantations in the country.
As yet, no significant opposition
to the reform law has developed.
The expropriation of the
large sugar plantations with the
intention of forming them into
cooperatives was probably moti-
vated primarily by domestic polit-
ical considerations. US-owned
properties that will be affected
by the agrarian reforms are almost
entirely in the sugar industry.
By moving against them first, the
military government probably
sought to generate additional sup-
port for its program, which is
primarily aimed at Peruvian land-
holders.
Government officials have
emphasized that the land reform
program is directed at the entire
agricultural sector, and not at
US interests alone. Officials of
the US-owned W. R. Grace & Company
have been assured that they will
be compensated fairly for their
expropriated property and that
their other industrial operations
likely to compromise at this time
on the issue of reparation or the
return of the refugees. Rapid
settlement of the dispute, there-
fore, will be difficult, and a
prolongation of the situation can
be expected to cause serious eco-
nomic dislocations within the
Central American Common Market.
NEW AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
will not be affected. In return,
Grace has announced its support
for the government's planned re-
forms.
Peruvian landowners have
not been as quick to back the
government's plan, but opposition
to the reform has been subdued.
As yet, no organized group has
come out totally against the re-
forms, but various newspapers
and agrarian associations have
criticized the government for
moving against the efficiently
run coastal agricultural indus-
tries rather than against uncul-
tivated lands.
Part of the oligarchy's hes-
itancy to oppose the government
actively on this issue is due
to their lack of support within
the military and to their desire
to retain their holdings that are
not affected by the new measures.
Government statements that there
soon will be reforms in other
sectors of the economy, including
more control of the fishing in-
dustry and plans for profit shar-
ing in private enterprises, could,
however, still arouse some open
opposition.
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ARGENTINA IMPOSES STATE OF SIEGE
President Ongania's govern-
ment on 30 June demonstrated its
determination to end student and
labor unrest by imposing a state
of siege for the first time in
its three years in office. The
administration announced that the
measure was necessary to end the
threat to law and order posed by
a "perfectly organized subversive
plan."
Renewed violence had resulted
from the efforts of leftist stu-
dent and labor groups to demon-
strate their opposition to Ongania
and to Governor Rockefeller's
visit. The main participants in
the unrest were militants of the
Argentine University Federation
and members of unions belonging
to the leftist bloc within the
General Labor Confederation headed
by Raimundo Ongaro.
On 25 June, 14 supermarkets
operated by a firm partly owned
by the Rockefeller family were
hit by incendiary time bombs,
causing nearly $3-million damage.
The Federation had included at-
tacks on these stores and other
US-owned firms in its anti-Rocke-
feller plans. On 27 June, a po-
liceman was wounded and a pro-
Chinese labor figure was killed
in clashes in Buenos Aires between
police, students, and workers.
Other demonstrations and attacks
on some US-owned establishments
occurred in Rosario, Tucuman, and
La Plata from 27 to 29 June.
The Ongaro bloc's planning
for antigovernment activity in-
volved a call for a "march of
silence" on 30 June and a 24-hour
general strike on 1 July. These
proposals were opposed, however,
by the large union bloc headed
by Augusto Vandor, Argentina's
most powerful labor leader. Van-
dor, claiming he was acting un-
der orders from Juan Peron to re-
unify and reorganize the labor
movement, attempted to persuade
union leaders to avoid an open
challenge to the government. He
also tried to get several unions
to leave the Ongaro bloc. These
efforts earned him the enmity of
leftist labor leaders, who accused
him of selling out to the govern-
ment and to foreign business in-
terests. On 30 June, Vandor was
killed by several men armed with
machine guns who invaded his office.
The state of siege provides
the government with the authority
to prohibit public assemblies,
censor communications media, make
arrests without warrants, and hold
persons for an indefinite period
of time. Police rapidly rounded
up Ongaro and many of the leaders
of his bloc, probably in order to
prevent an internecine battle
within the labor movement and to
stop the increasingly hostile po-
litical activities of the leftist
unions. The government also took
over four of the Ongaro-associated
unions and closed the blocs head-
quarters. The police now have
widened their net to include mem-
bers of some of the political par-
ties dissolved in 1966.
The Ongaro bloc nevertheless
did go ahead with the strike on
1 July which was fairly success-
ful in Tucuman and Cordoba prov-
inces and in the industrial belt
around Buenos Aires. Scattered
terrorist bombings occurred de-
spite rigid security measures.
Vandor's bloc did not take part in
this strike, but his metalworkers'
union has called for a 24-hour
strike of mourning on 2 July
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Secret
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Approved For Release 2008/07/22 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07200020001-2