WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007200010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
4
27 June 1969
No, 0376/69
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(Information as of noon EDT, 26 June 1969)
Page
1
2
VIETNAM
The Communists'
summer campaign remains confined
to
sporadic surges of offensive military activity.
The
Vietnamese Communists are taking a tougher line
on
the negotiations, especially regarding a role for
the Saigon government.
COMMUNISTS RENEW FIGHTING IN LAOS
Communist forces have launched a series of ground
attacks against government positions near the Plaine
des Jarres in north Laos.
COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS ACTIVE IN THAILAND
Communist insurgents continue to make headway in the
north while they try to improve their assets in the
northeast.
Europe
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NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IN FRANCE
President Pompidou has put together a carefully
balanced government that reflects both the continuity
and the change he stressed during his electoral cam-
paign.
POLES INTERESTED IN WEST GERMAN TRADE
During the recent visits to Poland of West Berlin
Mayor Schuetz and West German economic officials,
the Poles exhibited a more relaxed political attitude
toward Bonn, and demonstrated their interest in a
significant expansion of commercial relations with
West-Germany, West Berlin, and the West in general.
CZECHOSLOVAKS DRAFT NEW DOMESTIC POLICIES
Husak and his colleagues are drafting new measures
that they hope will minimize the country's political
and social ills.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
BRITAIN SEVERS FINAL TIES WITH RHODESIA
As a result of the decisive mandate that the Smith
government won in referenda held on 20 June, Britain
this week announced the severance of all remaining
formal ties with Rhodesia.
MIDDLE EAST INCIDENTS INCREASE
The tempo of terrorist incidents and Israeli reprisals
has risen over the past few weeks.
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POWER STRUGGLE ERUPTS IN SOUTHERN YEMEN
President al-Shaabi's ouster on 22 June appears to
represent a further shift to the left in Southern
Yemen, but the position of the new government may
not yet be secure.
Western Hemisphere
SWEEPING LAND REFORMS ANNOUNCED IN PERU
President Velasco has announced the promulgation of
an agrarian reform law that provides for the expro-
priation and redistribution of all major land hold-
ings in the country, including those owned by US
companies.
COLOMBIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN GETTING UNDER WAY
The reunification of the Conservative Party will
strongly influence the choice of the National Front
Coalition's presidential candidate for next year's
election and reduces the chance of a split in the
coalition that might enable ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla
to win the presidency.
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,r,t. JICt',1
Hanoi, by rejecting any compromise arrangements short of of a provi-
sional coalition government, is trying to intensify pressures on the Thieu
government. Le Due Tho, Hanoi's top man in Paris publicly dismissed a
suggestion that the Communists might join South Vietnamese Government
representatives on an electoral commission. He also flatly ruled out interna-
tional supervision of elections.
On the military side, the major Communist thrust during their sporadic
summer campaign has been aimed at western Kontum Province, where South
Vietnamese troops have recently assumed the major ground combat role. In
particular, the Communists apparently are trying to impose a local defeat on
South Vietnamese irregular forces at the isolated outpost of Ben Het in
hopes of demoralizing the Saigon government and the armed forces. The
enemy, despite substantial losses, has been repeatedly attacking the camp
since early May.
Communist forces in Laos have launched a series of ground attacks
against government positions near the Plaine des Jarres. The ability of North
Vietnamese troops to move rapidly into position around Muong Soui demon-
strates the vulnerability of the neutralist headquarters there to enemy forces
situated directly east on the Plaine. It is also fresh evidence that the North
Vietnamese can deploy troops into Xieng Khouang Province with little or no
warning. The attack may have been intended as a response commensurate
with the government's occupation for six weeks this spring of the once
inviolate Communist base at Xieng Khouangville.
Communist insurgents are consolidating their control over tribal ele-
ments in north and north-central Thailand, while in the northeast they are
trying to improve their assets. The guerrillas have continued to avoid armed
encounters with superior government security forces, although periodic Thai
operations have resulted in some small-unit clashes.
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The Communist summer campaign
remains confined to sporadic
surges of offensive military ac-
tivity. The second June "high-
point" materialized, for the most
part, only to the northwest of
Saigon. The enemy's two-day of-
fensive thrust in Tay Ninh Prov-
ince, which included a penetra-
tion into the provincial capital,
cost the Communists more than 320
killed late last week.
VIETNAM
artillery and mortar bombardments--
totaling some 5,000 rounds--since
early May. South Vietnamese pa-
trols and reconnaissance forces
have fought numerous engagements
against enemy troops in the vi-
cinity of the remote allied out-
post.
s ippage in the en-
emy's timetable was caused by al-
lied pre-emptive operations.
Nevertheless, current enemy ac-
tivities strongly suggest that
preparations for future offen-
sives are and
Meanwhile, Communist forces
are maintaining pressure against
the Ben Het Civilian Irregular
Defense Group Camp in western
Kontum Province. Elements of
three North Vietnamese regiments
pose a substantial threat to the
Ben Het - Dak To area. These
units have been active throughout
western Kontum Province for nearly
two months. The camp and sur-
rounding defensive positions have
been the target of almost daily
The Communists may believe
a decisive victory over South
Vietnamese troops who recently
assumed the major ground combat
role in Kontum Province would have
considerable impact on the South
Vietnamese Government and its army. 25X1
Furthermore, if Ben Het should
fall, it could be a major stepping
,stone for an enemy thrust against
the South Vietnamese strongpoint
at Dak To.
Despite the heavy losses suf-
fered by the UNCODEDst 9th Divi-
sion in its attacxs on Tay Ninh
on 18-19 June,
elements or e ivision con-
tinue to plan for coordinated at-
tacks against allied targets in
,the province.
The extent of the continuing
Communist effort in Tay Ninh sug-
Igests that this province plays an
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important role in longer term en-
emy plans. Tay Ninh has been an
important factor in the Commu-
nists' strategy for years. The
headquarters of the Vietnam Work-
er's Party in South Vietnam,
called COSVN, is located in the
vast and rugged jungle area of
War Zone "C," which runs from the
northern part of the province
across the Cambodian border. Geo-
graphically, the province offers
the Communists a strategically
advantageous position. More than
half of it borders on Cambodia and
the area to the east of its bor-
ders is relatively sparsely popu-
lated. Moreover, the writ of the
Saigon government has never run
strong there as local control is
in the hands of the Cao Dai reli-
gious sect.
The Communists may well be
looking toward a period when a
cease-fire and arrangements for
a settlement lead to a head-on
political confrontation with South
Vietnamese authorities for control
of the province. Tay Ninh is one
of the areas where the Communists
recently set up a provincial-level
"revolutionary committee." There-
fore, it is likely that the Commu-
nists will maintain their military
and political emphasis on Tay
Ninh for some time.
Communist Diplomatic Tactics
The Vietnamese Communists are
taking a tougher line on the ne-
gotiations, especially regarding
a role for the Saigon government.
Hanoi's top man in Paris, polit-
buro member Le Duc Tho, reflected
these tactics in an interview with
the Washington Post this week.
Page 3
Tho dismissed a suggestion that
the Communists might join South
Vietnamese Government representa-
tives on an electoral commission
and he flatly ruled out interna-
tional supervision of elections.
Tho probably was trying to
blunt the impact of any allied
statements incorporating such
proposals and to head off any
i CORPS
06al tone
SOUTH CHNA SEA
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impression that there is room for
compromise in the Communist ten-
point program. Hanoi clearly is
not going to agree to such ar-
rangements soon, but Tho's remarks
are by no means Hanoi's final
words.
The Communists seem convinced
that by not giving an inch on sub-
stance now and by concentrating
their fire on the Saigon govern-
ment, they will help fan American
antiwar sentiment and eventually
force the US to move to break the
deadlock in Paris.
Political Infighting Continues
in Saigon
Despite the widely acknowl-
edged need to prepare for politi-
cal competition with the Commu-
nists, both the South Vietnamese
Government and the opposition are
having difficulty organizing sup-
port among the country's fractious
politicians. Many political lead-
ers appear to be most concerned
with promoting their own personal
interests, and it is clear that
Thieu's goal of a unified pro-
government organization and a
single "loyal opposition" will
not be achieved soon.
Meanwhile, opposition groups
that have been discussing the
formation of an organization to
counter Thieu's front are also
facing differences among their
leaders. Although some of the
groups apparently want to proceed
with the early establishment of
a publicly proclaimed opposition
front, the influential National
Progressive Movement reportedly
opposes this. The leader of the
movement, Nguyen Ngoc Huy, has
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ai,vlt_E, 1
indicated that the function of
his group in the opposition will
be to moderate the extreme views
held by some of the other groups
and that his group may yet join
Thieu's front. Opposition lead-
ers have agreed to invite promi-
nent Senator Dang Van Sung to
join their discussions, but Sung
also has indicated that he in-
tends to keep open his lines to
the government.
are also divided. Militant Bud-
dhist leader Thich Tri Quang has
indicated that he has rejected
overtures from Tran Ngoc Lieng
for the Buddhists to join Lieng'
new opposition group.
More militant opponents of
the Thieu government, meanwhile,
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UL'Vl\l~l
Communists Launch Ground Attacks Near the Plaine des Jarres
aQV~rnTh I11t held lao lion
Comm rnsI hall location
THAILAND
Enq?my
Attacks
Muong
Soul
P1iou
Soung
PLAINE
h 1
DESa
JAR`RES-`
Enemy
Attacks Thong
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COMMUNISTS RENEW FIGHTING IN LAOS
Communist forces have launched
a series of ground attacks against
government positions near the
Plaine des Jarres in north Laos.
The action was highlighted
by a sharp attack on 24 June
against the neutralist headquar-
ters at Muong Soui. At least two
battalions of North Vietnamese
troops supported by tanks overran
a number of the base's outlying
defense positions and inflicted
light casualties on government
defenders. The airstrip, however,
remained in government hands.
The a i. -
ity of the North Vietnamese to
move their forces rapidly into
position around Muong Soui demon-
strates the vulnerability of the
neutralist headquarters to enemy
forces situated directly east on
the Plaine. It also is fresh
evidence that the North Vietnam-
ese can deploy troops into Xieng
Khouang Province with little warn-
ing or chance of detection.
In apparently related moves,
the Communists drove government
troops from Phou Soung, a recently
won position north of the Plaine,
and hit government guerrilla out-
posts on the southern rim. These
actions are almost certainly in
response to General Vang Pao's
recent effort to re-establish a
government presence on the Plaine.
The attack against Muong Soui
is the first major action against
that position in five years. It
may have been intended as a com-
mensurate response to the govern-
ment's occupation for six weeks
this spring of the once inviolate
Communist base of Xieng Khouang-
ville. The attack may also have
been launched for political rea-
sons. In recent weeks the Com-
munists have made a concerted ef-
fort to portray Communist "patri-
otic neutralist" elements as the,
"true representatives" of the
neutralist faction. Such preten-
sions presumably would be fur-
thered by the capture of the
neutralist headquarters at Muong
Soui.
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COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS ACTIVE IN THAILAND
Communist insurgents continue
to make headway in the north while
they try to improve their assets
in the northeast.
In the north and north-cen-
tral provinces, the Communists
are consolidating their control
over tribal ar
The guerrillas continue to
harass government security forces,
but incidents have become less
frequent because several army
units have been pulled out of the
area for security duty in adja-
cent lowlands. Bangkok has as-
signed a new military commander
to the north who has a reputation
for being aggressive. Neverthe-
less, the leadership still ap-
pears to be divided on the best
course to follow in combatting
the tribal insurgency.
In the northeast, the guer-
rillas are apparently carrying
out plans drawn up last December
to pare down and improve their . ti
or a
The guerrillas also continue
to avoid armed encounters with
superior security forces, al-
though periodic Thai Army opera-
tions have resulted in some small
unit clashes.
There are some indications
that the Communists intend to in-
crease their military assets in
the northeast.
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The Sino-Soviet commissions dealing with border river navigation began
meetings as scheduled in Khabarovsk on 18 June. Neither side has issued any
progress report.
The Soviet Union continued its diplomatic efforts to isolate China.
A central committee
plenum opened in Moscow yesterday. So far the only announced business
was a report by General Secretary Brezhnev on the results of the recently
concluded international Communist conference.
Brezhnev may make his oft-rumored visit to Romania in July, although
the precise date has not yet been fixed. Most observers expect him to sign a
new treaty of friendship and mutual assistance; the old one expired in
February 1968.
Hungary is proceeding cautiously with its reforms. The party is encour-
aging trade unions to defend worker interests, but it has reacted harshly to a
suggestion in the official government newspaper that the time has come for a
"free exchange of ideas" in Hungary.
The wide publicity West Berlin Mayor Schuetz received during his visit
to Poland overshadowed the separate visits at the same time of West German
economic officials
The Husak regime is drafting new measures designed to energize the
flagging Czechoslovak economy, and to bring under control recalcitrant
students, intellectuals, and army officers. The restrictive aspects of. these
moves have set off new popular dissension.
French President Pompidou has named Gaullists, Independent Repub-
licans, and centrists to his government. The most striking appointment is
that of Maurice Schumann, known as a believer in European.cooperation, to
the Foreign Ministry.
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NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IN FRANCE
President Pompidou has put
together a carefully balanced gov-
ernment that reflects both the
continuity and the change he
stressed during his electoral
campaign. The new team, which
is less homogeneous and doctri-
naire than its predecessor, in-
cludes not only orthodox and left-
wing Gaullists but also Independ-
ent Republicans and centrists.
Of the nearly 40 ministers and
state secretaries in the govern-
ment, about 13 are personal as-
sociates of Pompidou.
The most striking appointment
was that of Maurice Schumann as
foreign minister. Schumann brings
to the Quai d'Orsay the reputation
of a believer in European coopera-
tion whose Gaullism is more senti-
mental than doctrinaire. He is
much more flexible than his prede-
cessors, and probably will prove
in practice to be the loyal exec-
utor of policy lines laid down
by Pompidou. The man he replaces,
Michel Debre, was installed as
minister of state for national
defense, a newly created position
that formally ranks directly be-
low Prime Minister Jacques Cha-
ban-Delmas. The post was "up-
graded" more in appearance than
in substance, primarily in an
effort to provide Debre with a
suitable portfolio after removing
him from the prestigious Foreign
Ministry job.
On the crucial social front,
Pompidou selected a group of min-
isters with an over-all reputation
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for moderation and open-minded-
ness. Olivier Guichard, presid-
ing over the confused and poten-
tially still explosive educational
scene, is known to be an able ad-
ministrator and is a very close
associate of Pompidou. For the
first time since World War II,
no information minister was named.
This omission probably reflects
Pompidou's sensitivity to charges
during the election campaign that
the communications media under De
Gaulle were merely tools of the
state.
The most urgent problems the
government faces are in the eco-
nomic and social sphere, and the
new ministerial team's "honeymoon"
promises to be brief. Chaban-
Delmas is meeting with the labor
union next week to discuss de-
mands for wage increases, and he
has already announced that the
parliament will be called into
special session in September to
examine urgent domestic legisla-
tion.
Although France can be ex-
pected in many ways to turn in-
ward now, Pompidou's ministerial
changes also indicate a concern
with foreign policy, especially
European issues. The appoint-
ment of Schumann and other min-
isters, such as Rene Pleven and
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, with
known pro-European sentiments
indicates the government will be
giving Common Market problems and
the question of British entry
careful attention.
No major changes are ex-
pected in the realm of defense.
Debre's appointment may slow
down improved de facto coopera-
tion with the US and NATO, but
progress in this area was ex-
pected to be slow in any case.
Over-all, both foreign and dom-
estic problems are likely to be
dealt with in a pragmatic fashion.
POLES INTERESTED IN WEST GERMAN TRADE
Warsaw used the recent sep-
arate visits to Poland of West
Berlin Mayor Schuetz and West Ger-
man economic officials not only to
exhibit a more relaxed political
attitude toward Bonn, but also
to show its interest in a signifi-
cant expansion of commercial re-
lations with West Germany, West
Berlin, and the West in general.
The Poles are determined to
upgrade the technological level
of their industry through in-
creased acquisition of Western
know-how, especially that of West
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Germany. The Polish leadership
also probably hopes that its eco-
nomic overtures will induce West
German economic interests to press
Bonn for progress on political
issues.
West Berlin Mayor Schuetz
was in Poland from 14 to 16 June
for a widely publicized visit that
had political implications. Dur-
ing the same period but with con-
siderably less publicity, the
West German Economics Ministry
state secretary, Klaus Dieter
Arndt, and the chairman of the
Bundestag Economic and Foreign
Trade Committee, W. A. Menne,
visited the Poznan international
trade fair. Both men held pri-
vate talks with ranking Polish
officials and subsequently made
statements favoring closer Pol-
ish - West German cooperation in
economy, technology, and research.
The head of the West German
trade mission in Warsaw, Heinrich
Boex, said later that, during
the talks, Arndt and Menne were
struck by the strong Polish in-
terest in increased trade, cred-
its, and further joint industrial
endeavors with West German firms.
The West Germans claim that
the Polish economic overtures re-
flect a basic decision by Warsaw
to bring its economy to the level
of East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
To advance this aim, the Poles are
clearly determined to seek West-
ern economic help, not to the
detriment of their commitment to
CEMA, but in order to enable them
to swing more weight within the
organization.
For the time being, both
sides continue their sparring on
the political front. Despite a
mutual desire to improve relations,
few new initiatives are likely
soon. The Poles are clearly
stalling pending the outcome of
the elections in West Germany
this fall. Warsaw may believe
that a Social Democratic victory
there, together with the mutual
interest in expanded trade, could
contribute to a break-through in
political relations. One Polish
economic official has already
hinted that establishment of dip-
lomatic relations would greatly
facilitate trade and, especially,
credits.
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CZECHOSLOVAKS DRAFT NEW DOMESTIC POLICIES
Husak and his colleagues
are drafting new measures that
they hope will minimize the coun-
try's political and social ills.
Several of the draft policies
that have been publicized are
restrictive, however, and have
generated popular dissension.
In an effort to revivify an
ailing economy, the regime in-
tends to announce a series of
short-term steps, including wage
controls and another round of re-
tail price hikes, to curb infla-
tion. These plans may cause se-
rious trouble with the rank-and-
file workers, who are incensed
by the growing conservatism of
the Husak leadership and who have
warned that they will not toler-
ate a rise in prices without con-
comitant increases in wages.
Workers in some plants al-
ready have slowed production to
a virtual standstill, and some
of their unions have been dis-
seminating appeals and printed
materials without prior clearance
from the proregime central trade
union council.
The leadership, as part of
an extensive personnel reshuffle
in the armed forces, has ordered
security investigations of all
military officers to determine
their loyalty to the Husak re-
gime. Czechoslovak officials re-
portedly believe that about 6,000,
many of whom have remained stead-
fastly anti-Soviet in political
outlook will be dropped from the
officer corps. Defense minister
Dzur, a moderate holdover from
the Dubcek leadership in 1968,
may get the axe in the process.
The Soviets will undoubtedly be
pleased with the personnel changes,
inasmuch as they are said to have
some reservations about the re-
liability of the Czechoslovak
Army.
The regime has also let it
be known that it will not toler-
ate student defiance. The In-
terior Ministry has banned the
union of Czech university stu-
dents because it refused to obey
the party dictum that all socio-
political groups must join the
Communist-controlled National
Front or cease to exist. Some
of the students, with more "real-
istic" or conservative political
Czech Students Vote Against Joining
Communist-Controlled National Front
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views, have set up a preparatory
committee to pave the way for
the formation of their own Czech
students' union, which will af-
filiate with the Front.
Disaffected intellectuals
probably will support the dissi-
dent students. The Czech writ-
ers' and journalists' unions--
despite their expressed willing-
ness to cooperate with the re-
gime--continue to be dominated
by liberals, who appear to have
strengthened their position in
Lhose bodies as a result of re-
cent elections.
On the other side of the
coin, however, hard liner Bohuslav
Chnoupek, who last August, was
alleged to be a "collaborator,"
has been installed as head of
Czechoslovak radio. This change
demonstrates the regime's desire
to clamp down on liberals and mod-
erates who continue to air their
views via radio.
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Meanwhile, the government,
over the objection of the con-
servatives, has decided to re-
instate the former liberal lead-
ership's policy of issuing tour-
ist visas at the border. This
is primarily an economic move
designed to replenish the coun-
try's dwindling hard-currency
reserves. Nevertheless, it may
be another source of friction be-
tween the Husak leadership and
the hard liners because the pol-
icy was originally introduced by
Dubcek in 1968. This policy led
to charges by both the Soviets
and the conservatives that Czech-
oslovakia was becoming a play-
ground for Western spies.
More of Husak's new meas-
ures--including personnel shifts
previously approved by the party
presidium but as yet unannounced--
may come to light at a nation-
wide conference of regional and
district party and government
officials, which opened on 26
June.
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The tempo of Arab terrorist incidents and Israeli reprisals has risen over
the past few weeks. Daily artillery duels across the Suez Canal have resumed
after a comparative lull last month, and Egyptian commando raids across the
canal have also been renewed. Along the Israeli-Jordanian cease-fire lines, the
number of incidents has increased greatly following a cooling-off period in
early June. Meanwhile, the USSR is maintaining the rate of military deliv-
eries to its arms clients in the Middle East-principally Egypt, Syria, and
Iraq-at close to last year's levels, despite Arab complaints about receiving
aging and insufficient equipment too late.
Southern Yemen's ruling National Liberation Front ousted President
al-Shaabi on 22 June and installed a five-man presidential council and a new
cabinet. The move appears to represent a victory for the extreme leftist
faction of the Front. The army-whose support is crucial-has been dis-
pleased in the past when Front leaders exhibited tendencies that were too far
to the left, and its position in the current power struggle is still uncertain.
Britain severed all formal ties with Rhodesia this week after the Rho-
desian electorate voted overwhelmingly on 20 June in favor of declaring
Rhodesia a republic and adopting a new constitution that will institution-
alize white minority rule. Prime Minister Ian Smith will probably not put the
new constitution into effect until early next year, although he may declare a
republic before that, perhaps on 11 November-the fourth anniversary of
Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence.
In the civil war in Nigeria, the Biafrans held their own in all sectors this
week, and federal troops have been unable to clear secessionist commandos
from an area west of the Niger River where they still threaten oil fields in the
Midwestern State. No significant amount of relief supplies was flown into
Biafra for the second consecutive week, but both sides continue to receive
more arms supplies.
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere has hinted very broadly that he
would like to call on President Nixon this fall when he visits the United
Nations. In seeking such an invitation, Nyerere apparently desires not only
to cultivate better relations with the US, but also to re-emphasize his
nonaligned position at a time when Communist China's presence in Tanzania
appears paramount.
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BRITAIN SEVERS FINAL TIES WITH RHODESIA
As a result of the decisive
mandate that the Smith government
won in referenda held on 20 June,
Britain this week announced the
severance of all remaining formal
ties with Rhodesia. At the UN,
an Afro-Asian resolution condemn-
ing the Rhodesian regime and call-
ing for stronger punitive measures
was narrowly defeated.
Pre-referenda indicators had
suggested that the ruling Rhode-
sian Front's controversial consti-
tutional proposals might win by
only a small plurality and that
many voters might abstain. In
fact, however, not only was there
a large voter turnout but the
proposals, aimed at institution-
alizing white minority rule, were
approved by a wide margin.
Nearly 83 percent of the
predominantly white electorate
voted, and final returns showed
81 percent in favor of declaring
Rhodesia a republic and only 19
percent opposed. Even the con-
stitutional proposals were en-
dorsed by 73 percent of those
voting.
Had the vote been closer,
London probably would have kept
its representatives in Salisbury--
partly as a sign to Rhodesians
that a settlement was still
possible, although not with the
Front. After the massive Smith
victory, however, London announced
the resignation of its governor
and the closing of its mission,
thus removing from Salisbury the
last visible symbols of Britain's
sovereignty over Rhodesia.
Prime Minister Smith, mean-
while, has not announced when he
will declare Rhodesia a republic
or implement his constitutional
proposals. Because the full text
has yet to be drafted and elec-
toral districts will have to be
redrawn, the new constitution may
not be put into effect until early
next year. Smith may declare a
republic before that, however,
perhaps on 11 November--the
fourth anniversary of Rhodesia's
unilateral declaration of
independence.
In the UN Security Council,
an Afro-Asian resolution calling
on the British to use force
against the regime and extending
economic sanctions to South Africa
and the Portuguese territory of
Mozambique fell one vote short
of passage. Spain, which found
itself in a key position, was
constrained from casting the
deciding affirmative vote because
of its unwillingness to approve
sanctions against a Portuguese
colony. The African countries,
however, can be expected to con-
tinue, both in the Security Coun-
cil and at the next General Assem-
bly, to push for stronger UN ac-
tion against the Smith regime.
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THE WEST BANK AREA
1 -7,
Haifa~
Reti ner_eI
Vii
ipelin
7..,k,
; leenas\
~~'ipeline hit by
fedayeen,
24 June
Natany,
Israelis blow up
,ater conduit,
f23 June
?lablus ? ' .
Tel vivSS~ BANK
nt afo f9RAPL7
csacuwr.D~
mman
Tempo of Incidents Quickens Along Cease-Fire Lines
W.
rican'tourist killed,
17 June
Gaze~~~s`) ._ ,
GAZA STRIP-,'
Al Arih Beersheba
Jer`I4 alem
Alexan(oa
Israeli donrmandos attack
radar,statio`n, 21 June
plat
Aqaba
Area of
ensef
o R D A N
SAUD I
A R A B I A
Hurghada
Sharm ash-
Shaykh
SECRET
Iaraeti;alr attai ks,
18?June .
S Y R I A
*Damascus
GOLAN HEIGHTS
IISRALLI-CCCUPIED&
I Qunaytirah
Haifa,
ISRAELI
f Al
Mafra (l?
tl
Tel Aviv W9,57,
-?AtK
Yafo &. c .Ai Zarqa
Daily artillery.duels
e:rtfs~?~~r~al . .
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MIDDLE EAST INCIDENTS INCREASE
The tempo of terrorist inci-
dents and Israeli reprisals has
risen over the past few weeks.
Daily artillery duels across the
Suez Canal have resumed after a
comparative lull last month.
Egyptian commando raids across
the canal have also been renewed.
Along the Israeli-Jordanian cease-
fire lines, the number of inci-
dents has increased greatly fol-
lowing a cooling-off period in
early June.
The fighting along the Suez
Canal may have been initiated by
the Egyptians, both to placate
the more militant elements in
Egypt and to impress the Big
Four with the need for an early
settlement. Heightened tension
along the Jordan River was sig-
naled by the death of an Ameri-
can tourist or, 17 June as the
result of shelling by an Iraqi
unit stationed in Jordan.
The Israelis have adopted
an even tougher retaliation pol-
icy. They have been particularly
irked by the increasing aggres-
siveness of regular Jordanian
forces. Last week, the Israelis
mounted heavy air attacks against
Jordanian positions and on 23
June they blew up a water conduit
in the East Ghor Canal, a major
irrigation facility.
Although the Israelis have
been somewhat more relaxed about
Egyptian shelling across the Suez
Canal, the resumption of cross-
canal attacks by the Egyptians has
already prompted one reprisal at-
tack by the Israelis and seems
sure to provoke others. The
fedayeen attack on 24 June on
the Israeli pipeline just outside
of Haifa is certain to further
irritate the Israelis and to
bring new reprisals against ter-
rorist bases in Jordan and Leb-
anon.
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POWER STRUGGLE ERUPTS IN SOUTHERN YEMEN
The ouster of President
Qahtan al-Shaabi and the forma-
tion of a five-man presidential
council and a new cabinet appear
to represent a further shift to
the left in Southern Yemen. The
new regime's ability to gain the
support of the army remains in
doubt, however.
President al-Shaabi was re-
moved from office on 22 June
by the 40-man General Command
of the ruling National Liberation
1?ront (NLF) party. His dismissal
apparently stemmed from the
General Command's unhappiness
with his increasingly personal
rule, and most immediately from
his removal of the interior min-
ister without prior consultation
with other members of the NLF
ruling body. Aden has remained
quiet since the change in com-
mand, and the new presidential
council appears to be in effec-
tive control for the moment.
The new cabinet announced
on 23 June, along with the new
Presidential Council, apparently
is a victory for the extremist
faction of the NLF. The local
professional class has greeted
the new government with dismay,
and has characterized some of the
new faces as "Communists." Al-
though this may be an exaggera-
tion, there is little doubt that
the number of extreme leftists in
prominent positions has increased.
The support of the army re-
mains critical to the position of
the NLF. The army previously has
shown displeasure when NLF lead-
ers exhibited tendencies that were
too far to the left, but the in-
clusion in the Rew cabinet of two
figures popular with the army
may help win the support of the
armed forces.
The army's position in the
current power struggle is still
uncertain, however, and there
have been reports that some army
units were on the move. The new
government appears to have at-
tempted to neutralize any threat
from the military by reorganizing
the police command to ensure its
loyalty to the new NLF ruling
group.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Governor Rockefeller begins the last of his four fact-finding trips to
Latin America on 29 June. The Governor and his party will probably
encounter demonstrations of some type in Argentina, the first stop; in the
Dominican Republic; and possibly in Jamaica and Guyana. Haiti and Barba-
dos are expected to be quiet.
Argentine authorities are bracing for a new round of student and labor
unrest. Members of the leftist-oriented Argentine University Federation are
planning demonstrations for the third anniversary, on 28 June, of the coup
that brought President Ongania to power, and for the arrival of Governor
Rockefeller on 29 June. Their plans reportedly include using Molotov
cocktails against some US-owned businesses. Several supermarkets of a chain
operated by a firm in which the Rockefeller family has an interest were hit
by firebombs on 25 June.
Haitian President Duvalier is preparing a large welcome for the Gov-
ernor. The President appeared in public last weekend for the first time since
his illness in early May, suggesting that he is still in firm control of the
country.
Peru's new agrarian reform law will probably meet strong opposition
and will disrupt agricultural production. President Velasco's announcement
of the new law came after a 20-hour cabinet meeting, indicating that there is
opposition to the measure even within the military government. The sweep-
ing reforms strike at the heart of the political and economic power of the
traditional oligarchy by calling for the seizure and redistribution of all major
land holdings, particularly those under absentee ownership.
Uruguayan President Pacheco imposed a limited state of siege on 24
June to combat a mounting labor and political crisis. Terrorist incidents have
been increasing for the last few weeks, and numerous strikes are in progress.
In addition, Pacheco faces a challenge from power forces within his own
party and among the opposition, who hope to discredit him and force
abandonment of his unpopular economic austerity programs.
El Salvador and Honduras are engaged in an imbroglio as a result of an
emotional outburst by Salvadoran soccer fans last week. Reports of harass-
ment of the Honduran team and mistreatment of Honduran tourists by
Salvadorans touched off anti-Salvadoran demonstrations in Honduras.
Thousands of itinerant Salvadoran workers have now fled Honduras, and
although both governments have attempted to quiet the situation, nation-
alistic passions have been aroused and positions appear to be hardening.
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SWEEPING LAND REFORMS ANNOUNCED IN PERU
President Velasco announced
on 24 June the promulgation of an
agrarian reform law that provides
for the expropriation and redis-
tribution of all major land hold-
ings in the country, including
those owned by US companies. The
reforms strike at the heart of
the political and economic power
of the traditional oligarchy in
Peru and could arouse strong op-
position to the Velasco government.
The principal provisions of
the new law establish limitations
on ownership of land, doing away
with both the large land holdings
of the wealthy and the extremely
small plots worked by the peas-
ants. Uneconomical farms of less
than eight acres are to be con-
solidated. The maximum size for
privately owned irrigated lands
ranges from about 75 acres in the
mountain and jungle regions to
approximately 370 acres in the
coastal areas, and up to 3,700
acres for natural pasture lands.
The size of all these holdings
can be increased providing the
land is improved and profits are
shared with the workers. Excess
lands will be sold to individuals
and to peasant communities, with
payments ranging over a 20-year
period.
The large "agro-industries,"
which include US-owned sugar plan-
tations, are to be expropriated
and operated as cooperatives. In
order to avoid serious disruptions
in production, they will continue
to operate as single units. In-
dustries that are directly tied
to agriculture will be expropri-
ated and ownership assumed by the
state.
The government has promised
compensation for all the expro-
priated property in a form that
is intended to promote industrial-
ization. Payments will be made
partially in cash, with the re-
mainder in nontransferable gov-
ernment bonds. These bonds may
be exchanged at face value for
shares in new industrial invest-
ments, provided that shares of
equal value are purchased for cash.
Velasco noted in announcing
the new law that the government
expects opposition from the
wealthy land owners, but stated
that the military government would
take all necessary steps to pre-
vent the disruption of an orderly
implementation of the reforms.
No definite time limit was given
for completing implementation.
Action apparently will begin im-
mediately, however, and some land
owners will be given as much as
one year to divest themselves of
excess lands.
The Velasco government's
first major step toward its an-
nounced goal of "economic and so-
cial transformation of the coun-
try" will indeed meet some oppo-
sition from the traditional oli-
garchy. Moreover, announced plans
to devise new regulations for the
fishing industry and the formation
of a committee to draft a new law
on worker participation in the
profits of private companies could
swing additional support to those
opposed to the agrarian reforms.
It is doubtful, however, that these
opponents will be able to find suf-
ficient backing, even from dis-
gruntled army officers, to confront
Velasco and his supporters.]
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COLOMBIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN GETTING UNDER WAY
The reunification last week
of the two factions of the Con-
servative Party is the first ma-
jor development in the campaign
for the national elections to be
held next year. The move will
strongly influence the choice
of the National Front coalition's
presidential candidate and reduces
the danger of a split in the coa-
lition that might enable ex-dic-
tator Rojas Pinilla to win the
presidency.
Under the National Front,
the long-dominant Liberal and Con-
servative parties--seeking to end
political violence after the
ouster of Rojas Pinilla--in 1957
agreed to govern together. The
plan included alternation of the
presidency from 1958 to 1974 and
the equal sharing of other top
government positions, including
membership in congress. It is
the Conservatives' turn to choose
the coalition candidate for the
1970-74 presidential term and, as
the minority partners, they plan
to use the period to strengthen
and broaden their political influ-
ence before the return to open
political competition in 1974.
The Liberal party must approve
the candidate, however, and Lib-
eral President Carlos Lleras is
determined that his successor
will carry out the much-needed
reform programs he has launched.
Disagreement several years
ago over the extent of cooperation
with the Liberals caused the de-
fection of a group of Conserva-
tives led by Alvaro Gomez. Auto-
cratic former president Mariano
Ospina heads the larger faction,
which has continued to work closely
with President Lleras even when
there were marked differences
of opinion. Gomez had indicated
that he supported the already
announced presidential candidacy
of maverick Conservative Belisario
Betancur, and Conservative leaders
feared that if the party fielded
two candidates, the Liberals might
support neither and Rojas Pinilla
could be elected.
Discussions were opened in
an intensive effort to solve the
long-standing differences. On 18
June a declaration of reunifica-
tion was signed by Ospina, Gomez,
and other Conservative leaders.
The agreement provides for a broad-
based party convention to be held
this fall to choose a single Con-
servative candidate.
The effect of the reunifica-
tion on the prospects of Presi-
dent Lleras' preferred candidate,
Ambassador to the US Misael Pas-
trana, is not yet clear. The re-
unification will weaken Betancur's
prospects, but he may persist
with the support of labor, student
and church groups who are seeking
a voice to combat the closed system
of old-line party pDlitics.
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