WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007100070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 20, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A007100070001-8
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
IVEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
4 3
20 June 1969
No. 0375/69
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A007100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 19 June 1969)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
The Communists stepped up their attacks against
allied military targets this week while continuing
to prepare for another upsurge of offensive action.
The Communists' announcement of a provisional revolu-
tionary government has encouraged ambitious South
Vietnamese politicians to begin promoting themselves
as an alternative "third force."
CAMBODIA AGREES TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH THE US
One of Sihanouk's main purposes in agreeing to re-
establish diplomatic relations probably is to place
Cambodia in a better position to put further pressure
on the Vietnamese Communists.
COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LAOS LESSENS
Heavy rains have brought a lull to the ground war but
government forces are planning new initiatives.
PEKING SHOWS FURTHER SIGNS OF NORMALITY
Government ministries are beginning to function more
normally in the wake of the ninth party congress held
last April. Basic policy and staffing problems have
not, however, been resolved.
COMMUNIST CHINA PREPARED FOR BIRTH CONTROL
A nationwide contraception program appears feasible
for the first time since the Chinese began experiment-
ing with birth control more than a decade ago.
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
Page
1
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
OPPOSITION TO ANOTHER TERM FOR PRESIDENT PAK GROWS 9
Opponents of a third term for South Korean President
Pak are becoming more confident.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
USSR CONSIDERS NEW POLICY INITIATIVES IN ASIA
The deterioration in relations with China and the
scaling down of the Vietnam war evidently have led
Moscow to consider new policy directions in Asia.
THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE ENDS
The conference ended with adoption of the main docu-
ment on the "imperialist" threat and the "unity" of
the Communist world.
GOVERNMENT CRISIS THREATENS IN ITALY
Factionalism within the two major coalition parties
is once again threatening the stability of the center-
left government.
SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
INSTABILITY INCREASES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Party first secretary Husak returned to Prague on 18
June to face an intensifying feud between party fac-
tions and a population increasingly alienated from
his leadership.
NEW FRENCH PRESIDENT FACES SERIOUS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
Pompidou will be acutely aware that his most pressing
problems during his first few months will be in the
domestic rather than the foreign policy sphere.
Middle East - Africa
SUEZ CLOSURE SPEEDS DEVELOPMENT OF OVERLAND TRADE ROUTES
Railroads, highways and oil pipelines are assuming
increasing importance for shipments between Europe
and Asia as the closure of the Suez Canal enters its
third year.
GREEK GOVERNMENT CRACKS DOWN ON DISSIDENTS
In the past two months the Greek Government has begun
a wave of trials and arrests of many of its opponents
within the country.
RHODESIAN FRONT'S PROPOSALS WILL WIN APPROVAL
Prime Minister Ian Smith's constitutional proposals
and his plan to declare white-ruled Rhodesia a re-
public are certain to pass on 20 June, although it
is unclear by how wide a margin.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
OPPOSITION TO PERU'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT GROWS
The unpopularity of the government's policies and
actions is creating a situation in which important
changes in the government may occur.
ARGENTINE CABINET REORGANIZED
President Ongania has completed his new cabinet,
which now must deal immediately with several major
problems, with student and labor unrest heading the
list.
COPPER AND POLITICS MIX IN CHILE
As negotiations continue between the Chilean Govern-
ment and a US copper company, politicians are drawing
up legislation that would nationalize the copper in-
dustry in whole or in part.
RULING DOMINICAN PARTY FACES SPLIT
Vice President Lora's public refusal to support Pres-
ident Balaguer if he seeks re-election next May in-
creases chances for an open break in party ranks.
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
Battle lines for future political confrontation between the Saigon gov-
ernment and the Communists have hardened in the wake of the Communist
announcement of a provisional revolutionary government and President
Thieu's recent efforts to line up his political support. At the same time,
ambitious politicians in Saigon have been encouraged by the Communist
move to disassociate themselves from either side and promote themselves as
an alternative "third force."
Communist forces increased their attacks against allied military targets
this week while continuing to prepare for another upsurge of offensive
action. Enemy shellings of allied bases and field positions were accompanied
by some follow-up ground attacks.
Government ministries in Communist China are beginning to function
more normally in the aftermath of the ninth party congress, but basic policy
and staffing problems have not been resolved. Peking has been insisting that
many cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution must now be restored to
active roles, suggesting that those with the greatest interest in order and
national development are now influential enough to put the radicals on
notice that obstruction of cadre rehabilitation will not be tolerated. Political
disunity and sporadic violence continue to erupt in several provinces, and
meaningful progress toward normal governmental operations is likely to be
slow at best.
Heavy rains have brought a lull to the ground war in Laos, but
government forces are planning new initiatives. Except for inroads in the
northeast, the Communists brought neither substantial new territory nor
great numbers of additional people under their control during the recently
ended dry season.
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
I Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
VIETNAM
Communist military forces
stepped up their attacks against
allied military targets throughout
South Vietnam this week while con-
tinuing to prepare for another
upsurge of offensive action.
Enemy shellings of allied
bases and field positions were
accompanied by some follow-up
ground attacks. South Vietnam-
ese infantrymen and US Marines
were targets of several heavy
ground attacks in the northern
provinces and allied forces
throughout III Corps were struck.
The largest attack was an
abortive assault against the Thai
base camp in Bien Hoa Province
where 212 of the enemy forces
were killed. More than 1,800
of the enemy have been killed in
western Kontum and Pleiku prov-
inces, where intense fighting
has continued since early May.
The three Communist infantry reg-
iments in this area, however,
have been brought up to strength
with newly infiltrated North
Vietnamese troops and are in a
position to maintain the recent
high level of combat.
areas. Evidence now, indicates that
the Communists' "suarrner" campaign
is to be limited an moderate in
intensity, and will emphasize
harassment of scatt red allied
installations in or e:r to limit
Many Communist military
units are in the final stages of
combat preparation and have been
actively engaged in reconnaissance
operations. Some appear to be
deploying toward intended target
U 50 10
O _.... .~
45758 6-69 CIA__ _.~..~..._ _ MI L.F5 ......
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 0 Jun. :6 9
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8 W
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
losses of Communist forces and
materiel. Shellings and limited
ground probes will probably be
concentrated in I and III Corps
and at present there does not
appear to be any appreciable
threat to Saigon.
Political Developments
With their military units
poised for attack, the Communists
are examining the impact of their
new provisional government in the
political arena. The Communist
announcement last week, coupled
with President Thieu's recent
efforts to line up his political
support, has hardened the battle-
lines for a future political con-
frontation. It has also encour-
aged ambitious politicians in Sai-
gon to disassociate themselves
from either side and promote them-
selves as an alternative "third
force."
Several of the most important
opposition groups in South Vietnam
met on 15 June to discuss the
establishment of some sort of
opposition group to Thieu and his
National Social Democratic Front.
The major figures involved were
Senator Tran Van Don, former chief
of state Phan Khac Suu, Hoa Hao
leader Phan Ba Cam, Nguyen Ngoc
Huy of the National Progressive
Movement (NPM), plus emissaries
from Father Hoang Quynh and the
An Quang Buddhists. The cement
holding these disparate forces
together appears to be their
belief--shared more or less by
Thieu--that South Vietnam needs
to organize a nationalist opposi-
tion party to provide an alterna-
tive for those who might otherwise
turn to the Communists. Such
political luminaries as Don, Suu
and even Cam demonstrated consid-
erable vote-getting ability in
the 1967 elections, while the NPM
is partly made up of the politi-
cal organizations which supported
Truong Dinh Dzu's strong run for
the presidency.
At the other end of the op-
position spectrum is leftist
lawyer Tran Ngoc Lieng, who has
publicly called for the immediate
investiture of a "government of
conciliation." He reportedly
envisions an alliance of neutra-
lists, antigovernment nationalists
and militant Buddhists collabo-
rating to force out the present
government by forming a temporary
one which he fancies would in-
clude such influential personali-
ties as Senator Don and General
"Big" Minh. Lieng allegedly ad-
vocates cooperation with the
Communists' provisional govern-
ment in an interim coalition
that would hold elections in South
Vietnam.
Lieng's grandiose scheme
fits the standard Communist
scenario demanding the ouster of
the present government and the
establishment of a peace cabinet.
As a result, the government has
SECRET
Page 3
I Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
already taken steps to put the
lid on Lieng's nascent organiza-
tion by calling in various
members for questioning. Thieu
had warned on his return from
Midway that he would not tolerate
the open advocacy of a coalition
government.
Meanwhile, there appears to
be increasing displeasure with
Prime Minister Huong's conduct of
office, although there is no indi-
cation that President Thieu has
soured on him.
Page 4
Oppostion to Iuong within
the military establishment may
also be increasing. The prime
minister has never'received much
support from military leaders but
many officers reportedly are now
concerned by the government's
inability to do anything about
the rising cost of living and
believe that conditions will not
improve until the.IHuon cabinet
is replaced.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A007100070001-8
SECRET
CAMBODIA AGREES TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH THE US
One of Prince Sihanouk's
main purposes in declaring that
he is ready to re-establish diplo-
matic relations with the US prob-
ably is to place Cambodia in a
better position to put further
pressure on the Vietnamese Com-
munists.
In his statement on 10 June
to the Council of Ministers, Si-
hanouk argued that establishing
relations with the US would en-
able Cambodia to avoid becoming
"too isolated." He implied that
an official American presence
would improve Cambodia's ability
to resist pressures from both
local and Vietnamese Communists,
and would strengthen his hand in
present military and diplomatic
efforts to limit Vietnamese ac-
tivity in Cambodia.
Sihanouk cited the predomi-
nant US influence in such inter-
national programs as the Mekong
River basin development and the
International Monetary Fund, and
claimed that improved relations
with Washington would make avail-
able more resources for Cambodian
development. Attracting foreign
investment has been a major theme
in Phnom Penh's current plan to
revitalize the country's lethargic
economy. Sihanouk rejected, how-
ever, the idea of asking for di-
rect US aid unless free of "con-
ditions."
The quickness
with which Sihanouk recognized
the Vietnamese Communists' re-
cently declared Provisional Re-
ingness to meet them half way
indicates
his continuing will-
volutionary Government
Page 5
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A007100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LAOS LESSENS
Heavy rains have brought a lull
to the ground war but government
forces are planning new initiatives.
Communist forces appear to be
moving into a defensive posture
after one of their more restrained
dry seasons in recent years. For
several weeks enemy forces have
been consolidating their hold over
portions of southern Xieng Khouang
Province they had lost to government
guerrillas in late April.
There have been tenuous signs
that some North Vietnamese forces
are being withdrawn from Laos as
part. of the routine wet season op-
erational standdown, but so far most
of the troops that entered the coun-
try last fall are still there. The
burdens of mounting overland mili-
tary operations in the wet season
probably will cause the Communists
to refrain, as they have in past
years, from any substantial mili-
tary initiative over the next sev-
eral months.
Meanwhile, Elements of three
government battalions have recently
taken Sala Den Din in preparation
for an assault against Tha Thom,
a supply center that the Communists
captured last year. Farther north,
Meo leader Vang Pao intends to ex-
tend government holdings near the
Plaine des Jarres and increase
harassment against Route 7. Vang
Pao's preoccupation with this area
apparently rules out any early ef-
fort to re-establish the govern-
ment's presence in tribal areas
farther north.
Except for inroads in the
northeast, the Communists brought
neither substantial new territory
nor great numbers of additional
people under their control during
the dry season. The exodus of large
numbers of a progovernment tribal
population from the northeast, com-
bined with the lobs of Na Khang, an
important government staging base,
will, however, add significantly to
the government's ',increasing diffi-
culties in operating behind the
enemy's lines in''Samneua Province.
In the south, Thateng, on the north-
eastern edge of the Bolovens Pla-
teau, was the only important govern-
ment position to fall into enemy
hands this year.
The alarmist reaction of the
government leaders to these limited
losses was the most noteworthy fea-
ture of the past., dry season. It
suggests that the will of the lead-
ership to withstand future Communist
threats may be s li. in .
territory
Contested territory
SECRET
CAMBODIA
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 0 Jun 6 9
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
PEKING SHOWS FURTHER SIGNS OF NORMALITY
Government ministries are be-
ginning to function more normally
in the wake of the ninth party
congress held last April. Basic
policy and staffing problems have
not, however, been resolved as
Peking has concentrated on quell-
ing resistance to its drive to
restore political unity and re-
habilitate some cadres.
Without publicity, Peking
has taken some steps toward deal-
ing more responsibly with press-
ing domestic problems. New atten-
tion, for example, is being de-
voted to the urgent problem of
birth control--largely ignored
during the Cultural Revolution.
The clearest move toward more con-
ventional operations is in the
post-congress conduct of foreign
affairs; 12 of China's 45 ambas-
sadors have returned to duty.
Despite these indications
of a more businesslike approach,
the party congress evidently
failed to act on basic economic
and social policies. Instead its
Page 7
energies were taken up by divi-
sive political issues, especially
cadre "rehabilitation," which
have broad implications for every
group in the power structure.
Peking on 8 June broadcast
its most authoritative pronounce-
ment to date on restoring politi-
cal unity at all levels. This
statement insisted that many
cadres who had been purged during
the Cultural Revolution must now
be restored to positions of au-
thority and excoriated "leftists"
who are blocking progress in this
field. This suggests that ele-
ments in China's leadership with
the greatest interest in order
and national development--pri-
marily the central and regional
military leaders--are now influ-
ential enough to put the radicals
on notice that obstruction of the 25X1
rehabilitation process will not 25X1
be tolerated.
Peking has a long way to go
in solving this problem, however,
as political disunity and sporadic
factional violence continue to
erupt in several provinces.
Hence, meaningful progress toward
normal governmental operations is
likely to be slow at best.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA PREPARED FOR BIRTH CONTROL
A nationwide contraception
program now appears feasible for
the first time since the Chinese
began experimenting with birth
control more than a decade ago.
The loop seems to have been se-
lected over other contraceptive
methods, and medical personnel
needed to administer such a pro-
gram have been sent to the coun-
tryside, the locus of the problem.
After three years of offi-
cial silence on the subject,
pragmatic voices in the govern-
ment appear to have overcome ide-
ological opposition by arguing
the obvious need for population
control. Earlier this year Pre-
mier Chou En-lai devoted most of
an interview
25X1 to a discussion
of China's population problem.
The influence of the opposition,
however, can be discerned in the
almost total absence of press
propaganda on the subject.
Intra-uterine devices appar-
ently have been adopted as the
-type of contraceptive because
they are effective, yet cheap and
simple to manufacture and require
a minimum of medical skills to
administer.
The necessary medical per-
sonnel to administer a loop pro-
gram are probably now in the
countryside, where 85 per cent
of China's population lives.
during the past year personnel
from urban medical centers have
been transferred en masse to the
communes, partly for political
reform. The presence of most of
China's doctors, nurses, and med-
ical technicians in the country-
side means that. for the first
time the competence for adminis-
tering a contraceptive program
is now available in rural areas.
The greatest remaining bar-
rier to effective birth control
in China is the resistance and
lack of sophistication of the
peasantry. Rural medical treat-
ment centers being set up to serv-
ice a new medical insurance pro-
gram may help :Lh gaining the
peasant's acceptance of birth
control. People lured to the
centers by prospects of inexpen-
sive medical cafe could become
promising subjects for conversion
if the program is administered
adroitly.
No action that can be envis-
aged at this t:LIne, however, is
likely to reduce China's popula-
tion growth by more than a mar-
ginal amount during the next few
years. Peking has always avoided
coercive methods to enforce birth
control. Although the leadership
acknowledges that the population
is now as much hs 750 million,
it is probably Moser to the 825
million estimated by Western de-
mographers. No matter which
figure is closet,, it is probable
that the population will grow
by at least 15 million annuall
in the near future.
SECRET
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
OPPOSITION TO ANOTHER TERM FOR PRESIDENT PAK GROWS
Opponents of a third term
for South Korean President Pak
are becoming more confident.
Leaders of the major opposi-
tion party, which has 46 assembly
seats, are also showing more con-
fidence that the amendment can
be defeated. In an unusual dis-
play of unanimity, the party at
its annual convention last month
re-elected its president by ac-
clamation on a platform pledged
to defeat the proposed amendment.
Supporters of Pak have been
predicting victory. The govern-
ment party's secretary general
assured the press on 3 June that
the amendment would pass when it
goes befcre the assembly--report-
edly late this year or early next.
Although the party's annual con-
vention has reportedly been set
for August, President Pak never-
theless has not publicly committed
himself to the amendment and the
activities of the regime's se-
curity apparatus belie the confi-
dence expressed by the amendment's
proponents.
Public attention probably
has been temporarily diverted from
the third-term issue by the re-
cent successes of the much im-
proved internal security forces
in frustrating seaborne infiltra-
tion attempts by North Korean
agents. On 8 June three North
Korean agents were ambushed as
they attempted to land on the
east coast in the same general
area where some 120 agents landed
successfully last November. Four
days later, a 75-ton agent boat
was destroyed in a trap off the
southwestern coast. Again on
14 June, three Communist agents
were killed after they came ashore
near the US air base at Kunsan on
the central west coast.
Anti - third-term activity
by students threatens to claim
the spotlight, however. Possibly
encouraged by the success of a
student sit-in early in the week,
about 500 students at each of two
leading Seoul universities held
meetings on 19 June against abol-
ishing the no third--term rule.
The sit-in was the first since
the student demonstrations during
the South Korean - Japanese treaty
negotiations in 1964-65. The
apparent flurry of student activ-
ity may be intended to probe the
limits of official tolerance in
preparation for off-campus demon-
strations, reportedly planned to
follow the students' return to
school this fall.
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
The international Communist conference ended with approval of the
main conference document by most of the 75 attending parties. Moscow
could be pleased that the conference was held at all, that wording was found
to win at least the grudging support of most of the parties, and that many
speakers backed party chief Brezhnev's attack on China. The final document
is vague and propagandistic on doctrinal points, however, and falls far short
of providing an action program for the Communist world. The divergent
views, so apparent before and during the conference, have hardly been
reconciled, and each party can find support for its position in the rhetoric of
the conference documents and proceedings.
A consultative meeting of 39 nonaligned countries will open in Belgrade
on 8 July, the first such gathering of the so-called uncommitted countries
since 1964. Yugoslav leader Tito hopes the gathering will lead to a third
nonaligned summit, an enthusiastic view not shared by many of the others
who will be attending.
Czechoslovak party leader Husak continues to balance on a tightrope
between the demands for change by the Soviet leaders and the needs of the
Czechoslovak populace, which fears a return to heavy repressive policies. In
Moscow at the international conference, Husak tried to assure his confreres
that he had the situation under control at home. He returned to Prague to
find the internal party struggle for power intensifying and the population
more alienated from his leadership than ever.
The most urgent problems of newly elected French President Pompidou
are domestic rather than foreign. Chiefly, the government must find a way to
cope with deep-seated labor unrest without causing an inflation that will
threaten the franc.
The stability of the Italian Government is threatened by factionalism
within the coalition's Christian Democratic and Socialist parties. The leader-
ship of these parties is being contested in meetings later this month against a
background of debate as to whether the Communist Party is a worthy
coalition partner.
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
USSR CONSIDERS NEW POLICY INITIATIVES IN ASIA
The continued deterioration
in relations with China and the
belief that the Vietnam conflict
is scaling down evidently have
led Moscow to consider new policy
initiatives in Asia. The Soviets
seem to be thinking in terms of
proposing some kind of regional
cooperation or loosely defined
"collective security" arrange-
ments for various Asian countries.
Moscow's recall this month of
most of its ambassadors to Asian
countries, is probably connected
with a general policy review.
The Soviet effort appears
to have gotten under way in May
when Premier Kosygin made separate
trips to India, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan, only one of which
had been long-planned. In each
country, Kosygin placed consid-
erable emphasis on the China
"menace" and the need for those
countries to solve their differ-
ences peacefully and to work to-
ward regional cooperation. He
evidently followed up these talks
with at least one concrete pro-
posal. On 16 June Indian Prime
Minister Gandhi said her govern-
ment had responded favorably to
Kosygin's suggestion to discuss
freer trade and transit with
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.
On 28 May, an Izvestia ar-
ticle suggested for the first
time that Moscow would favor an
all-Asian security arrangement.
In his speech before the world
Communist conference on 7 June
Brezhnev noted that "the course
of events" was creating the need
for 1a system of collective se-
curity in Asia," but he did not
amplify on these remarks.
The recall of Moscow's am-
bassadors to Asia probably means
that Moscow's ideas are still
being formulat:od. The meeting,
which was apparently called in
some haste, was probably also
prompted by the return to some
semblance of normalcy in Chinese
diplomacy follbwing the Chinese
Communists' n:Ljth Congress and
by a desire to :review the pros-
pects for settling the Vietnam
conflict.
if a "col'l'ective security"
system for Asia is under consid-
eration, it might contain at
least some of the same features
as Moscow's European security
proposals. This might mean pro-
posing an allHAsian security con-
ference at which all nations would
agree to stay out of military
blocs, solve their differences
peacefully, a.r4d. work toward better
political, economic, and cultural
relations.
Even by proposing a "collec-
tive securitarrangement for
Asia, Moscow would be able to
portray itself as interested in
Asian peace a#id harmony in con-
trast to the Chinese who could
be expected to denounce it. Mos-
cow could also present it as a
constructive alternative to exist-
ing regional organizations which
Moscow claims'; are dominated by
the US.
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
2 0 Jun 6 9
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE ENDS
The world Communist confer-
ence of 75 parties ended on 17
June with adoption of the main
document on the "imperialist"
threat and the "unity" of the
Communist world. Sixty-one par-
ties signed the document without
reservation, but five did not
sign and nine others gave quali-
fied or partial approval.
The document that emerged
from the conference was the re-
sult of revisions up to the last
moment. It retains its bellig-
erency toward imperialism but is
rather bland on the controversial
subject of relations among Com-
munist parties. It balances a
defense of "proletarian interna-
tionalism," with statements de-
voted to the autonomy of indi-
vidual parties.
The nonsigners were the Do-
minican Republic and the Cuban
and Swedish parties, which were
present only as observers. The
British and Norwegian delegates
withheld their signatures, pend-
ing a decision by their central
committees. The parties of Aus-
tralia, Italy, and San Marino
agreed to sign only one of the
four sections of the document,
that on anti-imperialism. The
parties of Switzerland, Sudan,
Romania, Spain, Reunion and Mo-
rocco are reported to have signed
with reservations.
By contrast, other documents
which issued from the conference
ran into little opposition. The
conference endorsed appeals on
the centenary of Lenin's birth,
Vietnam and peace. It issued
statements in support of the
Arabs against Israeli aggression,
and solidarity with Communists
under repression in several coun-
tries. The conference unanimously
adopted a proposal to convene a
world anti-imperialist congress
open to non-Communists, and it
set up a commission of 13 parties
to prepare it.
The conference as a whole
was dominated by the tide of de-
nunciations of China--stimulated
by the Soviets--that arose from
the floor. In a rough box score
of speeches by the 75 delegations,
51, including the Italians, con-
demned the Chinese leadership by
name. Two parties, including
Romania, adopted a neutral stance.
Nineteen avoided the issue, though
several alluded to it by condemn-
ing "left opportunism."
Soviet party chief Brezhnev,
in a speech to delegates at a re-
ception following the conference,
stated that the conference had
successfully completed its work.
Moscow, with fairly limited goals,
got a good deal of what it set
out for, but only at the cost of
demonstrating the divergent opin-
ions that exist in world Commu-
nism. Each party, whether faith-
fully supporting the Soviet line
or not, will find words and phrases
in the conference documents and
proceedings to support its views.
The end result, therefore, may be
less, not more, discipline in in-
ternational Communism.
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
GOVERNMENT CRISIS THREATENS IN ITALY
Factionalism within the two
major coalition parties, the
Christian Democratic and the So-
cialist, is once again threaten-
ing the stability of the center-
:Left government in Italy.
Both parties will face
struggles over leadership posts
at meetings later this month,
and an important faction of the
Socialists threatens to form a
separate political party. The
issue--divisive for both par-
ties--of whether the Italian Com-
munists are worthy of eventual
consideration as a coalition
partner may become sharper fol-
lowing the Italian party's rela-
tively independent stand at the
Moscow conference.
Last month an effort to ex-
clude right-wing leaders from
the controlling group of the So-
cialist party led the right wing-
ers to threaten to walk out of
the party. This action still
threatens and may occur at the
Socialist Central Committee meet-
ing beginning on 23 June. The
conservatives are considering
re-forming the old Social Demo-
cratic party, which united with
the Italian Socialist party in
1966. They believe that their
opponents in the Socialist party
are too willing to open a dialogue
with the Italian Communists, look-
ing toward eventual political co-
operation.
The Christian Democrats will
also meet shortly, in a national
congress during the last week in
June. Left-wing leaders are press-
ing for a role in the party lead-
ership which is now in the hands
of a coalition of center and con-
servative factions. Resolution
of this problem could well result
in major shifts in the party lead-
ership which could in turn lead to
a government shake-up.
In recent months the govern-
ment has made important progress
in its domestic program. It has
put into effect the new Social
Security Pension Law, which calcu-
lates pensions at a relatively
high percentage of working income.
It has also gorse forward with a
variety of other legislation,
ranging from university reform
to a divorce bill. The govern-
ment of Mariano Rumor hopes to
keep up legislative momentum de-
spite the prevalent political in-
fighting and thus improve pros-
pects for long-term government
stability. The leaders fear,
however, that legislative prog-
ress may be cut short by an early
government crisis and that the
problem of the democratic parties'
relations with the Communists may
then become acute.
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jura E19
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
INSTABILITY INCREASES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Party first secretary Husak
last week tried to assure the in-
ternational Communist conference
in Moscow that his regime had the
domestic situation under control.
He returned to Prague, however, to
face an intensifying feud between
party factions and a population in-
creasingly alienated from his lead-
ership.
Husak's remarks to a press
conference in Moscow dispelled pop-
ular hopes of a Soviet troop with-
drawal and a substantial loan from
the USSR in the immediate future.
He further implied that these is-
sues would require protracted ne-
gotiations at various levels. He
emphasized that Prague and Moscow
would continue to work out the
problems of "normalization," sug-
gesting that the two respective in-
terpretations must still be recon-
ciled.
While Husak was in the USSR,
pro-Soviet conservatives stepped
up their campaign to return the
country to a more orthodox politi-
cal system. The Czech party bureau,
dominated by hard liners, is plan-
ning sweeping personnel changes in
the middle and lower levels of the
party in Bohemia and Moravia. The
conservatives also have weakened
Husak's program to rehabilitate
political prisoners unjustly con-
demned during the Stalinist era.
The party's official rehabilita-
tion report--which would incriminate
many hard liners--has been shelved,
and the party rehabilitation com-
mission, now chaired by a conserva-
tive, is rejecting one half of all
applications for reviews.
The hard liners are also urging
more repressive measures--hinting
that arrests might be necessary--
against still defiant groups of in-
tellectuals and workers, many of
whom are openly opposing Husak's
cooperation with the conservatives.
Open protest is still possible be-
cause police terror has not been
reinstated as an instrument of pol-
icy and because Husak and his hard-
line protagonists have been preoc-
cupied with gaining control of the
party.
Earlier this month, progressive
workers held unsanctioned meetings
in the industrial towns of Ostrava
and Kladno. In these and other
places, a production slowdown is
spreading among factory workers who
are politically disenchanted and ap-
prehensive about economic belt-tight-
ening measures.
The mass media have been si-
lenced, but the liberal intellec-
tuals are now getting support from
some Czech party politicians who are
demanding that the dissident Czech
writers' and journalists' unions be
permitted new journals to replace
those that have been banned. Per-
haps as a sop to the disaffected
writers, Husak declared in Moscow
that censorhip will be abolished af-
ter an undefined, but probably
lengthy "transition period." Husak
probably will relax press restric-
tions once he is assured that the
editors will voluntarily eschew
anti-Soviet and antiregime arti-
cles.
SECRET
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
NEW FRENCH PRESIDENT FACES SERIous DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
Georges Pompidou officially
took power yesterday as the second
President of France's Fifth Re-
public. In choosing a prime min-
ister and putting together a new
cabinet, Pompidou will be acutely
aware that his most pressing prob-
lems during his first few months
in office will be in the domestic
rather than the foreign policy
sphere.
The labor front has been un-
usually quiet since March. Union
leaders were anxious to deny--
first to De Gaulle during the
referendum campaign, and then to
Pompidou during the presidential
campaign--any opportunity to ex-
ploit fears of instability. Such
fears had greatly aided the Gaul-
list party in the parliamentary
elections of June 1968. Deep-
seated unrest persists, however,
and labor, after allowing Pompidou
a brief honeymoon until the August
vacations are over, probably will
renew agitation for increased
wages to meet the rising cost of
living. In fact, given the ex-
tremely weak position of the par-
ties of the left in the National
Assembly as well as the remote-
ness of new parliamentary elec-
tions, strikes and demonstrations
will be the only effective way
that the left can influence the
Pompidou regime.
In dealing with labor unrest,
government decisions will be
shaped in large measure by fear
of another financial crisis on
the scale of last November's.
Evidence of an, overheating of the
economy has ben accumulating
since early sp~:ing. This will
put heavy preslsure on prices, and
thus have a negative impact on
France's trade;: balance. In these
circumstances,; any large infla-
tionary labor; settlement would
almost certainly trigger another
round of speci4lation against the
franc, a deve]rcpment the govern-
ment will definitely try to avoid.
Many observers in Paris be-
lieve the only man with suffi-
cient stature; to deal effectively
with France's; complex economic
dilemma is Antoine Pinay, former
Fourth Republ~c prime minister
during the fist years of De
Gaulle's rule'. Pinay's appoint-
ment to a cab,,inet position would,
in the short term, bolster the
confidence o~, the French in their
currency andeconomic future, but
a far-reaching program for coping
with France'4' economic ills will
be necessary' This program could
include deva cation, new austerity
measures, an tighter exchange
controls.
Fortunately for Pompidou,
prospects ace brighter on the
student front. He is likely to
continue thef controlled experi-
ment in university reform, be-
gun after last May's crisis, with
the reasonable expectation that
these changes will keep student
dissidence t. a low level when
classes res ie late in the fall.
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
Efforts by Jordan's King Husayn to persuade Iran and Iraq to open
negotiations in Amman on the Shatt al-Arab dispute have fallen through, at
least temporarily. The Iraqis apparently attached conditions to beginning
discussions which the Iranians found unacceptable. The Jordanians had
hoped the talks would start this week.
In Pakistan, merger talks involving four minor parties have begun. A
successful union of these parties probably will not simplify the political
spectrum, now cluttered by a dozen or more parties and factions, because
two more new parties reportedly are being formed. President Yahya Khan
has warned that elections are unlikely until the plethora of parties has been
significantly reduced.
Student demonstrations in Kabul have abated, and the first significant
dialogue between alienated university officials and the government has taken
place. Rumors persist, however, that a cabinet shuffle may be in the offing,
with the government adopting firmer measures to maintain law and order.
In Africa, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) continues to publicize
its cause by acts of sabotage outside Ethiopia. For the second time, the ELF
has inflicted damage on an Ethiopian Airlines jet, this time in Karachi on 19
June.
Relief flights into secessionist Biafra have now virtually ceased, at least
temporarily
remains essentially stalemated, but a Biafran air attack on 18 June on an oil
installation in federal territory underscores the increasing threat to the
continued flow of Nigerian oil.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
SUEZ CLOSURE SPEEDS DEVELOPMENT OF OVERLAND TRADE ROUTES
The closure of the Suez
Canal, now two years old, has
accelerated the development of
overland trade routes between Eu-
rope and countries of the Middle
East and South Asia, although
most of the trade continues to
move by way of the longer sea
routes.
Routes between Iran and
western Europe are being improved,
Turkey is promoting its transit
role in trade between Europe and
points east of Suez, and several
oil pipelines are under construc-
tion or have been proposed.
Shipments between Iran and
Europe via the USSR--primarily
through the port of Leningrad--
have increased to the point of
overtaxing Iranian customs, rail,
and port facilities. Soviet
technicians are working with the
Iranians, however, to improve the
congested railroad facilities at
Jolfa, to modernize the Joifa-
Tabriz railroad, and to expand
Iranian ports on the Caspian as
well as build a large new harbor.
These programs also will facili-
tate the USSR's use of Iranian
railroads and ports in its trade
with the Middle East and South
Asia.
The scheduled opening next
year of the Central Treaty Organ-
ization railroad, which will link
Iranian railroads, including lines
to the Persian Gulf ports, with
Turkey will provide an alternative
to the trade routes through the
USSR. Together with its neighbor-
ing countries, Turkey is trying
to increase the use of an existing
rail link across its territory
from Europe to Iraq. The spur
joining Baghdad with Basra, re-
cently completed with Soviet as-
sistance, has extended this line
to the Persian Gulf. In addi-
tion, truck transport to Europe
via Turkey and Lebanon is in-
creasing as highways are improved.
Closure of the canal has
also lent impetus to the growing
role of crude oil pipelines in
the Middle East. Israel is work-
ing on a 42-inch pipeline from
Eilat to the Mediterranean; the
line's annual capacity will be
20 million tons when the first
stage is completed later this
year. Faced with the competitive
threat of this pipeline, Egypt
probably will proceed with its
plans to construct a pipeline
with an initial annual capacity
of 50 million tons from Suez to
Alexandria to move Egyptian and
Middle East oil to the Mediter-
ranean.
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
Odessa
.
lzmai
of Overland Trade Routes Between Europe and Asia
PROPOOEO'"
Suez
HA
Baghdad
New'
Delhi
SECRET
Continued Closure of Suez Canal Accelerates Development
Railroad
Highway
Oil pipeline
Trade route
95352 6-69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
GREEK GOVERNMENT CRACKS DOWN ON DISSIDENTS
In the past two months the
Greek Government has begun a wave
of trials and arrests of many of
its opponents within the country.
The regime appears securely en-
trenched, and its leaders appar-
ently feel able to cope with any
foreign criticism certain to be
aroused by such actions.
The opposition elements pri-
marily center around a small
group of retired officers, ex-
politicians, imprisoned Commu-
nists or Communist supporters,
intellectuals, and a few students.
Those opposing the regime, how-
ever, are not against the govern-
ment for the same reasons, nor
do they work together. There is
no determined pattern of opposi-
tion, and the many resistance
groups remain fragmented and
largely ineffective.
Beginning early last spring,
the government brought to trial
many Communists and Communist
supporters who had been in prison
for several months. The trials
were interrupted, from time to
-time, by the defendants who
charged that they had been tor-
tured. The government has coun-
tered these accusations by point-
Lng to the recent escape and re-
arrest of the would-be assassin,
Alexander Panagoulis, citing his
escape as proof of the leniency
with which the government has
treated such a criminal. Even
though the trials were open to
the public, they were almost to-
tally ignored by the local press.
Although these incidents have so
far caused no loss of life or
extensive damage, they have be-
come increasingly dramatic and
could cause a drop in tourist
travel to Greec '
SECRET
Page 2 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 65
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
RHODESIAN FRONT'S PROPOSALS WILL WIN APPROVAL
The referendums on 20 June
on Prime Minister Ian Smith's con-
stitutional proposals and his
plan to declare Rhodesia a repub-
lic are certain to be approved by
the country's overwhelmingly white
electorate. Because many voters
are apparently still undecided,
however, and opposition to the
proposals has increased slightly,
it is unclear how large a major-
ity they will get.
A recent poll, although
based on an extremely limited
sampling, indicated that perhaps
as many as 30 percent of the
voters were still undecided. This
number may in part represent
voters who were puzzled at the
outset by the need for a new con-
stitution and whose doubts appar-
ently have not been dispelled by
campaign rhetoric.
The passage of Smith's pro-
posals, moreover, will lead in-
evitably to a final break with
Britain, and some Rhodesians still
seem reluctant to take such a
step.
Nevertheless, the Rhodesian
Front will win, because it has
based its appeal squarely on
white self-interest and continued
white-minority rule. Smith's
constitutional proposals are a
clear example. Theoretically
Africans could, under Smith's
terms, obtain representational
parity in the legislature as
their income tax contributions
increased and finally matched
those of the whites. Even if
they could do so, however, only
half their number would be popu-
larly elected, the other half
would be tribal chiefs, the only
African group that has consist-
ently supported the Smith gov-
ernment.
Parity itself, however, is
virtually impossible to obtain.
In order for Africans to increase
their legislative representation
by even two, from 16 to 18 in
a house initially to be composed
of 66 members, their income tax
contributions would first need
to exceed 24 percent of the to-
tal. In 1967-68 Africans con-
tributed less than one percent.
Thus, as Smith has claimed, his
proposals will ensure that gov-
ernment remains in "responsible
hands."
At best, the Centre Party,
Smith's main opponent and an ad-
vocate of settlement with Brit-
ain, has made a few inroads into
the Front's strength, including
drawing to its side the former
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
commander of the Rhodesian Army lead earlier this week in cai
and some low ranking Front offi- ing on the UN Security Council
cials. to condemn the'Front's proposals.
Meanwhile, to pre-empt the
the African states and keep the
initiative, Britain took the
SECRET
Page 2 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
This week Governor Rockefeller began the third of his four fact-finding
trips to Latin America. In sharp contrast to the last trip, this one has been
very quiet-at least so far. During his three-day stay in Brazil, the Governor
encountered practically no hostility, mostly because of the heavy security
precautions imposed by the Costa e Silva administration. Paraguay, where
the Governor arrived on 19 June, is also expected to be quiet, but there
probably will be demonstrations in Uruguay, the Governor's last stop. The
final trip will begin about the first of next month and will include Argentina
and the Caribbean countries.
Argentina's President Ongania has completed the reorganization of the
top echelon of his administration with the appointment of a new defense
minister. The new minister is a brother of a key general on active service, and
his appointment may be in response to a desire by high military officers to
have a greater voice in the government's decisions. The Ongania regime will
probably make some move to alleviate the student and labor unrest that has
been prevalent since May, but the level of tension is likely to remain high for
some time.
Chilean Foreign Minister Valdes is continuing to promote the idea that
Cuba should be reintegrated into the inter-American system. In conversa-
tions with US officials last week, Valdes took the line that ending Cuba's
isolation would reduce its threat as a source of revolution. He has often said
in the past that Latin American nations, acting as a group, should resume
trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba, but he has usually qualified his
statements by asserting that Cuba must first stop "exporting" revolution.
Valdes' attitude seems to have aroused little enthusiasm elsewhere in the
hemisphere.
In Panama, Bolivar Urrutia was installed as acting president following
the heart attack of President Pinilla on 10 June. Urrutia, the former deputy
commandant of the National Guard, will preside over the government in
form only. Current guard commandant, General Torrijos, remains the coun-
try's strong man.
The Peruvian Government's heavy-handed methods of dealing with its
opposition are giving rise to increasing public resentment. At the same time,
the resignation of the minister of agriculture and growing opposition in
business circles to the government's economic policies may be creating a
group that has both the means and the desire to oust President Velasco.1
SECRET
Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
OPPOSITION TO PERU'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT GRQW'S
The Peruvian Government's
heavy-handed methods of dealing
with its opposition are giving
rise to increasing public resent-
ment. At the same time, the res-
ignation of the minister of agri-
culture, General Jose Benavides,
and the growing opposition to cur-
rent economic policies in business
circles may be creating a group
that has both the means and the
desire to oust President Velasco.
The Lima press has been
highly critical of the government
for deporting the editor of a
weekly news magazine and then
closing down the publication.
The action has been attacked by
the leftist-leaning Lima Bar As-
sociation, of which many of the
President's closest advisers are
leading members, as well as by
the National Federation of Jour-
nalists. The federation report-
edly has decided to file a pro-
test against this latest viola-
tion of the freedom of the press
before the United Nations human
rights commission and interna-
tional journalist organizations.
Most of the political parties,
too, have gone on record publicly
denouncing the government's ac-
tion, marking the first time since
the October coup that so many in-
fluential groups have publicly
opposed the military government.
The government's harsh reac-
tion to student protest demonstra-
tions has also created an issue
on which its opponents believe
they can take a stand without be-
ing labeled as traitors. The
brutal police action at Catholic
University in Lima following a
minor student demonstration has
drawn loud protests. The batter-
ing down of the university's front
gate, which is considered a na-
tional monument, throwing of tear
gas into orderly classrooms, and
the use of night sticks and cat-
tle prods on students and faculty
alike, prompted the primate of
the Peruvian Catholic Church to
issue a communique expressing his
"most energetic condemnation and
protest" against these "intoler-
able outrages." I-se was joined
in his protest by a good many of
the political and ',journalistic
groups that have supported the
Velasco government.
Businessmen's disenchantment
with the administration is also
growing. The food price controls
announced this week and the agrar-
ian reform law thot is expected
are beginning to scare wealthy
Peruvians. The food price con-
trols, however, should be popular
with the man in 1-be street who is
beginning to fee:L'the pinch of
higher prices and increasing un-
employment. Even some of the
President's closest advisers are
unhappy with some,, of the govern-
ment's policies, such as the pro-
posed reorganization of the judi-
ciary.
SECRET
Page 2 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 0 Jun 6 9
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
The President
apparently still has at least the
tacit support of most of the army,
and could probably head off any
move against him at this time.
This could change overnight, how-
ever, if civilian opposition con-
tinues to mount and if an effec-
tive and capable leader presents
himself to those in and out of
the army who would like to see
Velasco removed.
ARGENTINE CABINET REORGANIZED
Argentine President Ongania
has completed the reorganization
of the top echelon of his admin-
istration. The new cabinet must
deal immediately with several ma-
jor problems, with student and
labor unrest heading the list.
On 18 June, Ongania filled
the last post in his five-man
cabinet. The key post of economy
minister went to Jose Maria Dag-
nino Pastore, a young Harvard-
trained economist who had been
serving as chief of the govern-
ment's national development coun-
cil. Outgoing minister Krieger
Vasena reportedly recommended
Dagnino Pastore, and there will
probably be no great variation
from the current economic program
in the near future. The new min-
ister is likely to grant some
benefits to labor in order to al-
leviate the unrest among workers,
but these measures probably will
not come close to meeting the de-
mands of the militant unions.
The new interior minister is
retired General Francisco Imaz.
He moved to the cabinet from the
governorship of Buenos Aires Prov-
ince, where Dagnino Pastore had
served as his economy minister.
There was some military opposition
to the appointment of Imaz because
of his alleged strong nationalist
SECRET
Page 2 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
and pro-Peronist orientation, but
the exact degree and extent of
this dissatisfaction is not clear.
Ongania appointed Juan Mar-
tin, a prominent livestock grower
and proponent of increased trade,
to head the Foreign Ministry.
Martin held a number of public
posts under the Frondizi adminis-
tration, and has just been the
ambassador to Japan.
Another key position--that
of secretary of education--was
given to Dardo Perez Guilhou,
rector of the National University
of Cuyo in western Argentina.
Perez, who will become education
minister when that post is for-
mally established, will have the
difficult task of responding to
the demands--some of them legiti-
mate--of militant students, while
at the same time preventing future
disturbances like those that
erupted in May.
The appointment of Jose Ra-
fael Caceres Monie as defense min-
ister may be in response to a de-
sire by high military officers
to have a greater voice in the
government's decisions. He is a
brother of thedirector of the
national param4]Litary police or-
ganization, ani served briefly
as secretary g;neral of the pres-
idency in the Iilitary-backed
Guido administration in 1962,
following the overthrow of Fron-
dizi.
The fact that there were
discussions in:high military cir-
cles about Ongania's cabinet
choices--and some opposition to
them--suggests that the armed
forces chiefs have begun sitting
in judgment on'the government's
decisions. This process of "de-
liberation" is, one Ongania has
worked hard to:eliminate during
his three years in office, and
its reactivation appears to indi-
cate some decline in the Presi-
dent's personal power and pres-
tige.
SECRET
Page 2 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 0 Jun 6 9
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
COPPER AND POLITICS #IIX IN CHILE
As negotiations continue
between the Chilean Government
and the Anaconda Company over a
basic revision of the tax and
ownership arrangement agreed upon
two years ago, politicians are
rushing to introduce legislation
in Congress that would national-
ize the company outright.
The government is attempting
to work out an agreement whereby
Chile would obtain majority con-
trol in operations now wholly
owned by Anaconda. In addition,
a new tax procedure would be
arranged with Anaconda, Cerro,
and Kennecott to give the govern-
ment a higher share in the reve-
nues from the current high world
price of copper.
President Frei believes that
unless he can come to an accept-
able agreement with Anaconda and
the other US companies, Congress
will pass nationalization legis-
lation. He does not wish to face
the economic and political conse-
quences of such action and is
trying to gain popular support
for his approach to full control
over copper. Politicians, even
those within his own party, are
increasing the pressure on him,
however. Nationalization is a
very popular, emotional issue in
Chile, and, with a presidential
election only 14 months away, the
political parties are trying to
capitalize on it.
The first official entrant
in the nationalization sweepstakes
was the Radical Party, which is
trying to establish its leftist
credentials so that the Social-
ists and Communists will support
a Radical presidential candidate.
The Radical bill permits the gov-
ernment to nationalize not only
the Anaconda operations but also
the private shares in the gov-
ernment's joint ventures with
Anaconda, Kennecott, and Cerro
Corporation. The US Embassy cal-
culates that the bill, as drafted,
would leave Anaconda with nothing
and the holders of shares in
mixed companies with very little.
A bill drafted by the Communists,
Socialists, and break-away Chris-
tian Democrats provides somewhat
more but hardly adequate compen-
sation, as does one submitted by
moderate Christian Democrats for
consideration by the party lead-
ership.
There is some disagreement
within the copper workers' unions
as to the benefits of nationali-
zation. Copper workers always
have received higher pay and
more liberal fringe benefits
than other groups. Many rank-
and-file workers believe that
nationalization would make them
government workers and thus sub-
ject them to lower rates of pay
and increased bureaucratic in-
terference. In spite of this
sentiment, the leftist-controlled
Copper Confederation probably
will continue to support its
recent resolution favoring na-
tionalization becauseits leaders
are solidly behind the position
of the Marxist parties.
SECRET
Page 29 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
SECRET
RULING DOMINICAN PARTY FACES SPLIT
Vice President Lora's public
refusal to support President Bala-
guer if he seeks re-election next
May increases chances for an open
break in party ranks.
Last week the vice president
shattered any semblance of party
unity by categorically refusing
to accept second place on the
Reformista ticket again. He fur-
ther stated that he would not sup-
port Balaguer's re-election "under
any circumstances," a major depar-
ture from his previous public
position that he would respect the
party's decision.
Lora's declarations are an
outgrowth of the intensive inter-
nal party struggle under way
around the country. Since the be-
ginning of the year, Lora has
been actively lobbying for his
party's presidential nomination;
supporters of Balaguer have taken
countermeasures. In Santiago,
the nation's second largest city,
a municipal council meeting last
month degenerated into a brawl
between supporters of the two
men that was broken up by police.
Other city councils, including
that in the capital, have suf-
fered similar divisions.
The President's own equivocal
public stance has been partly re-
sponsible for t:he: divisive infight-
ing. Balaguer has hinted he will
be "available" for renomination,
but Lora is apparently convinced
that substantial opposition will
dissuade the President from seeking
a second term.
Although Balaguer has pub-
licly characterized Lora as a
"capable" candidate and qualified
for the presidency, his actions
belie that stat4ament.
Lora's decision to shift
the battle to the public forum
probably reflects, in part, the
success of Balaguer's backstage
maneuvering.
Opposition' parties on both
the left and right, which have
already focused; on "no re-election"
as the overriding campaign issue,
would be emboldened by a public
split in Reformista ranks. Anti-
Balaguer forces, both in the
government and outside it, are
apparently confident that they can
demonstrate widespread public
opposition to $alaguer's seeking
a second term. The political
unrest generated by their
efforts will probably be accen-
tuated as the elections approach.
SECRET
Page 30 WEEKLY SUMMARY 20 Jun 69
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/09/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100070001-8