WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT USSR STEPS UP ACTIVITY IN AFRICAN LABOR MOVEMENT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
USSR Steps Up Activity in African Labor Movement
Secret
N2 738
9 May 1969
No. 0369/69B
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m ~P A I Y IN A LA
ctiv ty in Africa by the ommunist dominate or e eration
e pionsis anct the Sl `s Ail Union Central Council of
for nearl three years, is aimed at
ions w as been increasing y
in a clot oin local labor unions recent=Burr of Soviet
ty m t e r can labor Tmovem'en ' does not appear to portenda new
in t is area but rather seems to stem chiefly from the convening of
arined African labor conferences of consr era e interest to
nt vlet ettorts appear to TOCUS on etu outclyiiiy uieIvi iIICLIU V va
r~can aior^feceration susceple toWFTU
etween indiv cduaT fncan unions and the WFTU, and garnering
n su` ort for major oanizationa l c anges in t e united rations
i na a or 3r an zation. a or schools in the USSR and Eastern
e are- con inuing to train Africans, some of whom will presumabl
e positions in their `own countries and may possibly prove
etrc to t e Soviet .Union. soviet influence evil{ be severely limited
V r stron Afn an nationalism in nearly 611 unions and by anti-Com
ti it in many o t em, tric supervision by local governments
be a actor. evert e ess, Moscow s activity among African trade
i s encouragement o tie socialist economic practices that they
any?other foreign
v r, e v to give t e' more influence t an
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9 May 1969
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Algiers
AFRICA
Special Report
SOUTH-WEST
AFRICA
Unh-reafiona L.
wnrws e n :r~.^.~ i
9 May 1969
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 ECR
WFTU Delegation Visits Leaders of Dahomey's
General Union of Workers
SOVIET OBJECTIVES
The considerable aid and attention given Af-
rican trade unions by the USSR seems at first
glance a useless investment in view of the minus-
cule size of the continent's organized labor force.
The African unions claim a total membership of
about five million, however, and are a strong
locus of power in many countries. They are
highly political compared with economically ori-
ented Western unions and, as such, are often
closely tied to or dominated by political parties.
Furthermore, many labor leaders have been re-
cruited for government service because of their
hard-to-find executive, organizational, and admin-
istrative experience. Among those who have risen
to high government office through the trade un-
ion movement are Sekou Toure, President of
Guinea; Cyrille Adoula, former prime minister of
the Congo; Maurice Yameogo, former president
of Upper Volta; and Tom Mboya, minister for
cooperatives and economic developments in
Kenya.
The long-term objectives of Soviet efforts in
the African labor movement are to inculcate a
preference for socialist economic practices, to
weaken or eliminate political and economic ties
between the West and African countries, and to
promote government policies favorable to the
USSR. Among Moscow's more immediate objec-
tives is the securing of African support for far-
reaching structural changes in the UN's Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO). The trade un-
ions are a valuable means to these ends in that
they can influence governments to adopt policies
consonant with Soviet goals and promote state-
to-state relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet
opportunities are also advanced by many African
labor leaders' eagerness for a strongly centralized
government and economy. Over all, the Soviets
appear to understand, support, and exploit the
basically political nature of the labor movement
in Africa.
Special Report
SOVIET ACTIVITY 1957-1966
Moscow's early appreciation of the impor-
tant role of labor organizations in Africa and their
political potential stands out against its otherwise
poor record of political acuity between
1957-1966. During this period, the USSR gave
considerable effort to cultivating African trade
union organizations and extending bloc influence
among them, but the field was crowded with
international organizations bidding for the loyalty
of the African unions. Competition from non-
Communist metropole unions-gradually super-
seded in many states during the 1950s by the
Western-oriented International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)-was particularly
stiff. These organizations, the hostility of some
governments, and the instability of others all
stood in the way of Soviet inroads into the Afri-
can labor movement.
The WFTU has served since World War II as
the chief vehicle for Moscow's efforts to expand
Soviet influence in the world labor movement.
Since the mid-1950s, however, many African
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Veteran Soviet Labor Officials Piotr Pimenov (right) and
Dimitri Turtchaninov (left) Meet With African Colleagues.
states and trade unions have preferred neutrality
between East and West, choosing not to bind
themselves to one bloc or the other. The Soviets,
stealing a march on the West, accepted this neu-
tralism and stopped pressing African unions to
affiliate with WFTU. Instead, Moscow encouraged
regional organizations, hoping that these would
undercut the ICFTU and encourage the severance
of ties with the West. As an example, the Soviets
and WFTU actively collaborated with Sekou
Toure's regional labor federation, the Union Gen-
erale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire, formed in
1957. Toure's break with France in 1958 and his
anti-Western policies, however, created wide-
spread suspicion that his organization served as a
channel for Guinean-inspired, pro-Communist
subversion. Its credibility as a potential pan-Afri-
can union rapidly waned.
A new organization was needed and, in Oc-
tober 1959, initial steps were taken to organize a
broader pan-African federation. With WFTU sup-
port and financial aid, the All Africa Trade Union
Federation (AATUF) was formed in May 1961 by
the Casablanca powers (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mo-
rocco, the UAR, and the Algerian rebel regime).
Special Report
From the Soviet viewpoint, AATUF was a means
of dislodging the pro-Western ICFTU in Africa
and also a more effective means of influencing
African unions. As a precondition for member-
ship, for example, AATUF required disaffiliation.
from all other international federations; this has
generally been viewed as a device for weakening
the influence of the ICFTU and other Western
labor organizations. AATUF has gained few new
members since its founding, however, and has
proven a rather weak exponent of the radical
labor movement. One of its greatest setbacks was
Ghana's assumption of virtual control of the or-
ganization between 1964 and 1966.
In an effort to counteract the potential
threat of AATUF to Western trade unionism, the
African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) was
established in 1962 by Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Ethiopia, and. the French-speaking black
African states-with the active support of the
ICFTU. Although rivalry between AATUF and
ATUC was inevitable, their failure to destroy one
another has led to several attempts at unification.
The AATUF rule on affiliation with other inter-
national organizations, however, has continued to
be a major stumbling block to a merger.
Nevertheless, in the early 1960s Moscow,
not putting all its eggs in AATUF's basket, made
direct but low-level approaches to African unions.
In many cases, these were through the Soviet
Union's own labor organization, the All Union
Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), and
its East European allies, rather than WFTU. A
major area of activity was-and remains-the
training of African labor cadres, who account for
almost 75 percent of all labor trainees schooled in
the Soviet bloc since 1958. In addition, by 1965
the USSR had channeled over 1,000 academic
and vocational training scholarships through the
African labor unions. Soviet labor advisers have
also been sent to African countries on educational
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assignments, mostly having to do with the estab-
lishment of labor leadership training centers. Such
centers have been organized in Guinea, Mali, Al-
geria, and Nigeria.
THE DIRECT SOVIET APPROACH
By 1966, AATUF had become chiefly a ve-
hicle for the pursuit of Ghanaian ambitions in
Africa, and the overthrow of President Nkrumah
dealt the organization a serious blow from which
it has not yet recovered. One consequence of
AATUF's dramatic decline apparently was a deci-
sion by the Soviets in mid-1966 that WFTU
should assume a more open and active role in
African labor affairs in its own name. Greater
emphasis was also given to the expansion of So-
viet AUCCTU activity.
Both organizations sought to enhance their
position in Africa between 1966 and 1968 by
sending numerous delegations to Africa and by
routing funds to unions more directly. WFTU was
successful in acquiring new affiliates in Dahomey,
Gambia, Reunion, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, and
Somalia. Several of these new affiliates, however,
as well as many other unions leaning toward
WFTU, are weak and in disfavor with their home
governments. WFTU also increased its training
programs during this period and offered assistance
to any union seeking advice, materials, or lec-
turers. In May 1968, WFTU announced plans to
collaborate openly with AATUF. Delegations
from both groups met in Prague to plan a joint
meeting for early 1969.
CURRENT SOVIET ROLE
The Soviets have been particularly busy on
the African labor scene during the last four
months. The African labor ministers' conference
in Al iers (12-17 March
adopted several
resolutions is were un ou e y gratifying to
Special Report
the Soviets, the most important of which was in
support of a joint AATUF-ATUC decision to seek
a merger into a new pan-African organization.
Moscow probably favors such a new organization
because of AATUF's general ineffectiveness and
the fact that both the ICFTU and ATUC are now
very weak. The Soviets presumably hope that a
unified organization would be susceptible to their
influence.
To encourage formation of a new organiza-
tion, Soviet trade union officials on a recent Afri-
can tour urged AATUF members to drop their
rule forbidding dual affiliation. Such a move
would also clear the way for WFTU to recruit
new African affiliates for itself. The Soviets ap-
parently hope that in return for their assistance, a
united African labor organization would be will-
ing to work hand-in-glove for structural changes
in the ILO that would increase both Communist
and African representation on the governing
board.
AATUF Vice President W. 0. Goodluck Presents Token of
Close Ties to WFTU Leadership.
9 May 1969
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 SE(.RF'I,
MAHJOUB BEN SEDDIK
President of AATUF
Nevertheless, there are numerous obstacles
both to the formation of a pan African labor
federation and to Communist influence over it.
As with past efforts to form such an organization,
regional jealousies and other purely African prob-
lems are major hindrances. Even if a new federa-
tion could be created, Soviet efforts to influence
it would face formidable hurdles. Soviet influence
would presumably have to be exercised through
one-union, one-party states such as Algeria and
Guinea, and even these would be unlikely to
accept Soviet control. Furthermore, some trade
union organizations in Africa are extremely suspi-
cious, if not openly hostile, to anything that
smacks of Communist influence and would be
sure to oppose a Soviet-oriented federation. Two
such groups are Tanzania's National Union of
Tanganyikan Workers and the Kenyan Central
M~1MADI KABA Organization of Trade Unions. In addition, there
Guinean Labor Leader is some residual French and British trade union
, A. C. A. TANDAU
Tanzantan Labor Leader
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SEKOU TOURE
interest in Africa, and Moscow would probably
have to compete against both to establish a posi-
tion in a new organization--an unseemly competi-
tion that would risk an antiforeign reaction
against all three countries.
Apparently aware of the unfavorable pros-
pects for either AATUF or a pan-African federa-
tion, WFTU and the AUCCTU have continued to
increase their own activity in Africa. WFTU's
joint sponsorship of the Conakry Conference of
African and European Unionists (18-21 March) is
an example of that activity. Prior to the confer-
ence, a trio of veteran Soviet labor leaders made
an extensive trip through west and central Africa,
pressing for closer local ties with WFTU and seek-
ing aid in reorganizing the ILO governing board.
They also encouraged attendance at the Conakry
conference, billing it as a major African trade
union event. The conference itself was probably
intended to revitalize the AATUF, increase
WFTU contacts among the unions, and neutralize
remaining ICFTU influence in Africa. Though
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D
concrete results were few, Moscow was surely
gratified-as witnessed by extensive coverage in
the Soviet press-by conference resolutions on
Vietnam, the Middle East, and West Germany.
OUTLOOK
The high visibility of recent Soviet labor
activity in Africa has aroused some concern about
a "new" Soviet labor offensive on the continent.
It seems more plausible, however, that these activ-
ities are an outgrowth of Moscow's presumed
decision after the fall of Nkrumah to emphasize
WFTU-AUCCTU initiatives in Africa. Although
not yet prepared to abandon AATUF, the Soviets
have more and more tended to bypass it, appar-
ently considering that direct contact with the
African unions will be more fruitful and easier to
manage. Support for a pan-African organization is
probably based not only on the hope of eradicat-
ing what is left of ICFTU and AFL-CIO influence,
but also in the expectation of possible use in
restructuring the ILO. Moscow can probably ex-
pect some limited successes in the trade union
movement in north, central, and west Africa, but
east Africa-judging from past experience-will
continue to be inhospitable to Soviet efforts.
Special Report
The young and growing African labor move-
ment offers a fertile field for Soviet cultivation,
but Moscow's progress is likely to be slow and
dependent in no small way on the intensity of
African xenophobia. Many union officials trained
in the USSR will presumably rise to positions of
power in their home countries, a process likely to
favor the Soviet Union in the long run. Moreover,
the growing preference in Africa for centralized
economies, governmental planning, and the
growth of strong public sectors will also enhance
the popularity of those advancing a socialist ap-
proach. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily
portend a corresponding rise in Soviet influence.
The forces of nationalism in Africa are growing
and both trade unionism and socialism appear
likely-to assume a distinctively African cast. Al-
lowing for this limitation, however, it seems likely
that the extent of Moscow's involvement in the
labor field, as well as its encouragement of social-
ist economic policies, will make the USSR the
most influential foreign power in the African la-
hor movement in the future.
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