WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007000070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
-1
DIA
Review
Completed.
0
Secret
45
2 May 1969
No. 0368/69
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(Information as of noon EDT, 1 May 1969)
VIETNAM
The majority of the enemy's combat forces in the
South continue to refit and resupply. On the polit-
ical front, President Thieu's proposed non-Communist
confederation has made some progress although it has
still not been able to attract several of the more
significant groups.
COMMUNISTS INCREASE PRESSURE MODERATELY IN LAOS
The Communists are applying some pressure against
government positions in northeast Laos, but otherwise
the military situation continues relatively quiet.
CHINESE COMMUNIST CONGRESS REFLECTS CONTINUING IMPASSE
The party's ninth congress adjourned last week with
no single interest group having managed to win a
decisive victory. The new central committee and
politburo reflect the existing balance of forces
within the leadership.
CAMBODIA PLANS RENEWED RELATIONS WITH THAILAND
Moving ahead with plans to re-establish diplomatic
relations with Bangkok
NORTH KOREA SEEKING FOREIGN SUPPORT ON PLANE INCIDENT
Pyongyang has shown increased frustration over its
failure to obtain foreign support for its version of
the shootdown of the US reconnaissance aircraft.
ECONOMIC STAGNATION FRUSTRATES NORTH KOREANS
Premier Kim Il-song has staked his personal prestige
on reviving the economy by administrative gimmicks.
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Europe
FRANCE CALM AS LEADERS PREPARE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Georges Pompidou, the former Gaullist prime minister,
is the leading candidate to replace De Gaulle.
EUROPEANS RELIEVED BY DE GAULLE'S DEPARTURE
They have reacted with some apprehension but more
noticeably with renewed hope for European unity.
CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS MEND FENCES ABROAD, CLAMP DOWN AT
HOME
Ilusak's firm initial moves have brought about a pe-
riod of uneasy calm, characterized to a large extent
Ly hopelessness and frustration, but also by a grow-
ing public curiosity inspired by the new party lead-
er's reputation as an ardent nationalist and a victim
of Stalinism.
EAST GERMANS TO MAINTAIN HARD-LINE POLICIES
A continuation of East Germany's hard-line policies
in foreign and domestic affairs was made clear in a
speech that the regime's number-two man made this
week at a plenum of the central committee.
CEMA SUMMIT MEETING ACCOMPLISHES LITTLE
Disagreement on economic integration was evident
throughout the meeting, which probably was held at
this time to avoid a continuing display of political
disunity.
WINTER GRAIN OUTLOOK BETTER IN EASTERN EUROPE THAN USSR 18
Prospects for the winter grain harvest are mediocre
in the Soviet Union but relatively good in Eastern
Europe, where such crops constitute roughly 90 per-
cent of total bread grain production.
ALBANIA PLEDGES SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLAVIA AND RUMANIA
This new Albanian stance contrasts sharply with the
vituperation that Tirana has heaped on the Yugoslavs
for most of the last 20 years.
SEC RS 'j.
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Middle East - Africa
COMMANDO ACTIVITY SHARPENS MIDDLE EAST STRIFE
While Lebanon suffers civil strife as a result of
the government's attempts to curb Arab terrorists,
chances of an all-out confrontation between the feda-
yeen and the Jordan Government are increasing. Mean-
while, Israeli forces struck into Egypt on 30 April
following a number of incidents along the border.
POLITICAL ACTIVITY PICKING UP IN PAKISTAN
A series of meetings between President Yahya Khan and
opposition political leaders highlights a gradual re-
vival of political activity. Recently proposed labor
and educational reforms could generate basic support
for the new government.
PERSIAN GULF FEDERATION EFFORT UNDER STRAIN
Recent statements by Britain's Conservative Party
leader Edward Heath have complicated the situation
at a time when local rulers are still moving slowly
to make their federation something more than a paper
entity.
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Western Hemisphere
INSTABILITY IN BOLIVIA AFTER BARRIENTOS' DEATH
The death of President Barrientos in a helicopter
crash on 27 April has removed an important element
of stability from the Bolivian political scene.
CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER VENEZUELAN PACIFICATION EFFORTS
Opposition to the manner in which President Caldera
is trying to bring an end to almost seven years of
insurgency is crystalizing in some political and
military circles.
PERU'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS GROW
Minister of Interior Artola and the witch hunt he is
leading against former officials of the Belaunde gov-
ernment have become the primary targets of those
opposed to the Velasco administration.
NEW PURGES MOUNTED IN BRAZIL
President Costa e Silva appears to be having trouble
restraining military hard liners, and the prolonged
purging process also is beginning to cause uneasiness
among the government's civilian supporters.
COSTA RICAN COMMUNISTS MAKE STRONG BID FOR LEGALITY
The Communists are well on their way toward making
their party the only legal Communist political organ-
ization in Central America.
JAMAICA FACES POSSIBLE CRISIS OVER SUGAR INDUSTRY
Prime Minister Shearer appears headed for a confronta-
tion with the sugar industry that could compound po-
litical problems already heightened by violence and
public dissatisfaction.
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Enemy combat forces in South Vietnam continue to refit and resupply,
apparently for a "May Action Phase." The Communists suffered heavy losses
in the relatively few attacks they staged this week. There was an increase in
terrorist and sapper attacks in Saigon and more such violence is expecte
President Thieu's proposed political confederation has made some pro-
gress, but some of South Vietnam's more significant political groups and
personalities are withholding their support.
The ninth congress of the Chinese Communist Party adjourned last
week with no single interest group in Peking having managed to win a
decisive victory. The composition of the party's new central committee and
politburo reflects the existing balance of forces between newly important
military men and radicals who have been closely associated with the Cultural
Revolution. The absence in the new politburo of most central government
ministers who served in the previous politburo may indicate some diminu-
tion of Chou En-lai's influence, but it is too early to be certain of this. The
worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution are clearly over, but there is no
real sign that the congress marks a return to pragmatic normality.
North Korea has shown increased frustration over its failure to obtain
support for its version of the shootdown of the US reconnaissance aircraft.
Moscow's first editorial comment on the incident did not appear until 27
April, after the US naval task force had left the Sea of Japan. It was limited
to a routine condemnation of US actions in the Korean area, with only
indirect support for Pyongyang's claims.
In Laos, the Communists continue to apply some pressure against
government positions in the northeast, but otherwise the military situation
has been relatively quiet.
Violence by Japanese leftist students on "Okinawa Reversion Day"
drew strong condemnations from the press and political parties. Major
newspapers called on the authorities to take whatever action is necessary to
eliminate this threat to public order. Although these excesses have further
isolated and discredited the extremists, they are unlikely to abandon violent
tactics in prosecuting their campaign against the extension of the US-Japan
security treaty in 1970.
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VI ETNAM
The majority of the enemy's
combat forces in South Vietnam con-
tinue to refit and resupply, appar-
ently for a "May Action Phase" that
has been forecast by a number of
sources. Despite a lack of wide-
spread large-unit actions, the
enemy has mounted several sizable
attacks in I and III Corps as well
as sporadic shellings of allied po-
sitions, occasional small-unit
probes, interdiction of important
roads, and small-scale harassing ac-
tivities.
The Communists were hit hard
early this week in fighting west
and north of Saigon. At least 230
enemy troops were killed, compared
with one American wounded, during
an enemy assault on a US fire-sup-
port base near the Cambodian border.
Several other skirmishes in III
Corps accounted for more than 160
enemy killed, again with only light
allied casualties.
Enemy-initiated ground fight-
ing picked up in northern I Corps
this week. One significant battle
took place just south of Khe Sanh
when an estimated 150 enemy troops
attacked a US mechanized unit.
Thirty-four Communists were killed
and 200 antitank rocket rounds and
500 satchel charges were captured.
American losses included five killed
and 34 wounded.
There was also an increase in
terrorist and sapper attacks in
Saigon, many apparently aimed at
the city's electrical power system
Page 2
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
President Thieu's proposed,po-
litical confederation has made some
progress in working out organiza-
tional questions but the new group
has still not been able to attract
several of South Vietnam's more sig-
nificant political groups.
t e poli-
ticians have gone a ong with Thieu's
ideas of forming a loose political
confederation that could later be
made into a more tightly knit or-
ganization. This confederation will
have a presidium composed of rep:-
resentatives from all the member
organizations that will serve as an
advisory body, but President Thieu
{ will make the final decisions.
The politicians have agreed to
join Thieu despite their disappoint-
ment over the President's unwilling-
ness to reward their support with
appointments to high government
positions. Thieu is apparently
promoting his confederation on the
ground that it will become the only
progovernment political party, and
that it will take the lead in com-
bating the Communist political chal-
lenge.
Several major political forces
in South Vietnam, however, are still
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 May 69
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apparently hoping to receive special
benefits as the price of their sup-
port. Such political luminaries as
Senator Tran Van Don, Duong Van
"Big" Minh, and Tran Van Tuyen have
indicated that they will wait to
see how the confederation develops
before deciding whether to join.
Even Prime Minister Huong is known
to believe that the chances are
poor for achieving any political
unity among Vietnamese nationalist.
parties.
Traditional political faction-
alism, meanwhile, continues to pre-
vent better cooperation in the prov-
inces. In I Corps, competition for
provincial leadership has prevented
the formation of an anti-Communist
alliance among the Revolutionary
Dai Viet, the VNQDD, and the Nhan
Xa parties. The Dai Viets, with
the assistance of a cousin of the
I Corps commander, "purged" members
of rival political groups from key
provincial and district positions
in the two northernmost provinces
of the corps area.
The expected return to Paris
of F[anoi's chief negotiator, Le Duc
The, after unusually long consulta-
tions at home, could bring some new
developments in the peace talks. Tho
left. Paris before the latest Viet
Cong offensive in early February and
in his absence the Communist nego-
tiator showed little interest in
any allied efforts to move the talks
off dead center. Tho's return prob-
ably means tht Hanoi has concluded
its initial assessment of the Nixon
administration's attitude toward
Vietnam and has reviewed its own
negotiating strategy.
Tho is returning via Peking and
Moscow, and is holding the usual con-
versations with Hanoi's two major al-
lies.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 May 69
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? Government-held location
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
? Communist-held location
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COMMUNISTS INCREASE PRESSURE MODERATELY IN LAOS
The Communists are applying
some pressure against government
positions in northeast Laos, but
otherwise the military situation
continues relatively quiet.
North Vietnamese and Pathet
Lao troops hit the government
guerrilla base at Bouam Long three
successive nights last week but
were unable to drive the defenders
from the area.
this may be the beginning
o push that has been antici-
pated since the Communists cap-
tured Na Khang almost two months
ago.
The enemy is still reacting
cautiously to the government's
counteroffensive south of the
Plaine des Jarres, but there are
signs that as many as three Pathet
Lao battalions may have recently
moved into the area. The counter-
offensive has caught the enemy off
guard and has helped raise the
morale of government forces; it
has not, however, achieved its
principal objective of forcing
the enemy to divert troops from
operations in northern Xieng
Khouang.
In the northwest, government
troops have reoccupied the Mekong
River town of Pak Beng, which the
enemy had captured in early April.
Government forces hold a number
of outlying defense positions but
elements of two Pathet Lao bat-
tal:Lons dug in on the surrounding
ridgelines continue to threaten
the town.
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2 May 69
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CHINESE COMMUNIST CONGRESS REFLECTS CONTINUING IMPASSE
The Chinese Communist Party's
ninth congress adjourned last
week after naming a new central
committee. The composition of
this body, and of the politburo
"elected" at its first plenary
session, shows that no single
interest group in Peking has yet
managed to win a decisive vic-
tory, and reflects the existing
balance of forces within the Chi-
nese communist leadership. Al-
though the congress legitimized
the political situation that has
prevailed in China since late
last summer, its unexpected length
suggests that the delegates en-
gaged in wide-ranging debate on
a variety of disputed personnel
and policy issues.
One sign of the continuing
impasse is the failure, for the
first time in party history, to
reveal the relative standing of
members of the politburo. In-
stead, the 25 members are listed
in the Chinese equivalent of
alphabetical order, except for
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Vice
Chairman Lin Piao, who head the
list. The five-man standing com-
mittee, composed of Mao, Lin,
and three others, leaves it un-
clear whether Chou En-lai retains
his traditional number three spot.
The remainder of the new
politburo reflects the balance
between newly important military
men and Maoist radicals who have
been closely associated with the
Cultural Revolution. Some of the
military members were severely
Page 6
criticized early in the Cultural
Revolution. The presence of mili-
tary leaders--from both the Peo-
ple's Liberation Army central
headquarters and the provincial
military regions--signals an at-
tempt to legitimize the army's
role in the party and attests to
the army's importance in running
the state. A major surprise in
the new politburo is the absence
of most of the central government
ministers who served in the pie-
vious politburo. This may indi-
cate some diminution of Chou Hn-
lai's influence, but it is too
early to be sure of this.
In short, this politburo,
like the congress, seems to be
a reflection of the stalemate
that has persisted in China for
some time. It indicates a gen-
eral withering of the normal ad-
ministrative machinery of the
state and party, an increase in
strength of army personalities,
and a continuing important role
for Mao's closest "radical" as-
sociates. But even here, there
are ambiguities. Some of the
military men included on the new
politburo have benefited by the
upheavals of the Cultural Revo-
lution and have been identified
with its excesses. Moreover,
factions cannot be clearly de-
fined, balances -shift, and a gen-
eral unwillingness or inability
to resolve fundamental questions
of authority appears to be the
order of the day.
The new central committee,
comprising 170 full members and
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 May 69
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109 alternates, is much larger
than its predecessor and will be
too unwieldy to play a major po-
litical role. The number of
"model heroes" and minor officials
on the new committee--about one
fourth of its membership--will
further reduce its political sig-
nificance. Presumably, they were
included primarily to symbolize
an infusion of new blood into the
leadership after the turmoil of
the Cultural Revolution.
Aside from the make-up of
the new ruling bodies, little is
known about the proceedings of
Chairman, Central Committee, CCP
Vice Chairman, Central Committee. CCP
THE NEW POLITBURO OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
(elected 28 April 1969, at first plenum of 9th central committee)
MEMBERS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE POLITBURO
Mao Tse-tung
Lin Piao
Other Members:
Chen Po-ta
Chou En-lai
Kang Shang
Yeh Chun
Yeh Chien-ying
Chairman, Cultural Revolution Group, (CRG)
Premier; heretofore listed third
"Adviser" to CRG
the congress. Peking has re-
leased virtually no information
on the debates that undoubtedly
characterized the working ses-
sions, and the three communiques
issued by the congress secretariat
as the sessions proceeded all
seem designed to conceal rather
than reveal. Even Lin Piao's
"political report"--the most im-
portant speech delivered at the
concress--is reticent on many
subjects. Its vague and general-
ized rhetoric appears to leave
many doors open--either by de-
sign, to prepare for further
shifts in policy, or by necessity,
Lin Piao's wife
Old marshal; member Military
Affairs Commission (MAC)
Li Tso-peng Member, MAC; Navy Commissar
Wu Fa-hsien Air Force chief
Chang Chun-chiao Deputy head, CRG; Chairman,
.hanghai Municipal RC
Chlu Hui-tso Member, MAC; director, General
Rear Services Department
?3 Wen-yuan CRG member; Vice Chairman, Shanghai
MRC; reputed son-in-law of Mao
Huang Yung-sheng Chief of Staff; former Commander,
Canton Military Region
Tung Pi-wu Deputy chief of state; no longer politically
important
Hsieh Fu-chih Chairman of Peking MRC; Police minister
Liu Po-cheng Old marshal; probably unimportant
Chiang Ching Mao's wife; 1st Vice Chairman, CRG
Chu Te Former head of army; probably
unimportant
Hsu Shih-yu Commander, Nanking Military
Region; Chairman of Kiangsu
Provincial Revolutionary Com-
mittee (PRC)
Chen Hsi-lien Commander, Shen-yang Military
Region; Chairman Liaoning PRC
ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF POLITBURO
Chi Teng-kuei Vice Chairman, Honan PRC; former party secretary; aligned with radical
supporters of Cultural Revoluticn
Li Hsueh-feng Chairman, Hopeh PRC; former head, North China Party Bureau; brought down
by Red Guards in late 1966; restored to present lesser post in February 1968
Li Te-sheng Chairman, Anhwei PRC; commander, 12th Army
Wang Tung-hsing Vice Minister. Public Security; longtime bodyguard to Mao
Names listed in the Chinese equivalent of "alphabetical order"
New members in blue
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bhuKL l
because no consensus could be
reached on important questions.
The prime policy issues dis-
cussed in detail were the vexing
question of how to deal with of-
ficials criticized during the Cul-
tural Revolution and the need
for renewed attention to increas-
ing production. On both these
matters, Lin took a moderate
stance. Regarding personnel, he
prescribed the "rehabilitation"
of large numbers of cadres; this
may mean that a considerable num-
ber of middle- and lower-level gov-
ernment and party officials will
be restored to their posts. Lin
was exceptionally strong in his
praise for the army, calling it
the "pillar of the state."
Although the worst excesses
of the Cultural Revolution are
clearly over, there is no real
sign that the congress marks a
return to pragmatic normality.
The immediate post-congress pe-
riod, at least, is likely to be
characterized by intense politi-
cal maneuvering as the contending
elements in the ruling structure
search for advantages and attempt
to enhance their positions.F
CAMBODIA PLANS RENEWED RELATIONS WITH THAILAND
Phnom Penh is moving ahead
with plans to re-establish diplo-
matic relations with Bangkok.
Cambodia's initiative appears
to be part of Prince Sihanouk's
current effort to widen his diplo-
matic options by adopting a more
balanced neutrality. Moreover,
Sihanouk is increasingly concerned
over the military threat along his
eastern border with South Vietnam,
and no doubt would like to ease
tensions along the Thai border,
where a substantial part of Cam-
bodia's security force is now
stationed.
Although substantive dif-
ferences between the two countries
are minimal, a number of minor
issues, including personal ani-
mosities between Sihanouk and Thai
Deputy Prime Minister Praphat,
will have to be kept in check if
a rapprochement is to be achieved
Page 8
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NORTH KOREA SEEKING FOREIGN SUPPORT ON PLANE INCIDENT
Pyongyang has shown increased
frustration over its failure to
obtain foreign support for its
version of the shootdown of the
US reconnaissance aircraft.
North Korea's limited foreign
propaganda probably is related to
the lack of international support
its version of the incident has
received. During the week, the
regime began prodding its allies
and friends to back publicly its
claim that the US aircraft was
shot down after it had violated
North Korean airspace.
Moscow's first editorial
comment on the incident finally
Page 9
appeared on 27 April, after the
US naval task force had left the
Sea of Japan. The editorial
claimed that the "Soviet people"
condemned the "dangerous actions"
of the US in the Korean area.
This comment, which is the closest
the Soviets have come to a clear
endor=sement of North Korean ac-
tions, probably was stimulated by
Pyongyang's urgings.
Only one broadcast from
Pyongyang during the past week
attempted to exploit the shoot-
down. Pyongyang radio on 24 April
focused directly on Japanese fears
of being dragged into a new Korean
conflict because of the Japan-US
security treaty. The statement
criticized the Japanese Govern-
ment's support of the US reaction
to the incident as "openly taking
a hand in moves for the provoca-
tion of a new war in Korea."
Pyongyang has as yet made no com-
ment on the removal of the US
naval task force from the Sea of
Japan.
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ECONOMIC STAGNATION FRUSTRATES NORTH KOREANS
Premier Kim Il-song has
taken the extreme step of com-
mitting his personal prestige on
reviving the sluggish North Ko-
rean economy. Kim apparently be-
lieves the economy must support
increased military power as well
as overcome the unfavorable con-
trast with the rapid economic de-
velopment taking place in South
Korea. Civilian economic needs
appear to be a secondary consid-
eration and are being met only
on the atsterity level.
As the economy probably has
been supporting a near-maximum
military burden for many years,
it is doubtful that military ex-
penditures can climb rapidly in
the future unless the size of the
economy increases. -Pyongyang has
said that military spending has
been consuming about 30 percent
of the national budget during the
past two years.
Although these figures can-
not be taken at face value, there
is no doubt that military spend-
ing has been very heavy. The
Pueblo and EC-121 incidents,
furt e-rmore, may have induced
more spending than was planned.
On 24 April, North Korea announced
that defense expenditures will
increase 11 percent this year,
an action that may be connected
with the EC-121 shootdown.
In seeking to foster faster
economic growth, Kim has publicly
argued with his economic advis-
ers, who claim that "diminishing
resources" make an annual rate
of growth of six or seven per-
cent the best that can be ex-
pected. Kim believes that a
socialist country can achieve
continuous growth rates of 15
to 20 percent annually. Under-
scoring this assertion, the press
has dubbed it one of the "per-
fect Marxist-Leninist answers"
that Kim's "genius" has provided
to "break entirely new ground in
socialist economic theory."
In actuality, North Korea's
rate of growth is estimated to
have averaged less than 5 percent
annually in the 1960s. South
Korea's growth rate overtook
North Korea's in 1962 and reached
13 percent in 1968, or about
three times the North Korean
rate last year. North Korea's
sensitivity to comparisons with,
the South is reflected in Pyon-
yang's economic reports, which
regularly devote up to half their
space to disparaging the South
Korean economy.
North Korea would have per-
formed better in this decade if
Soviet aid--the bedrock of the
1961-67 plan--had not been cut
off in the early 1960s because
Pyongyang sided with China in
accusing the USSR of using aid
to control other countries. In
lieu of Soviet aid, the North
Koreans have sought to promote
growth by a series of administra-
tive improvements, such as reorgan-
izing ministries, revamping the
planning process, and recasting
control organizations in the
countryside. Although these
measures have not been particu-
larly successful, Kim continues
to prescribe the same treatment.
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Frenchmen accepted president De Gaulle's departure with composure;
the chaos that he had predicted did not appear. Elsewhere in Western
Europe, there were some misgivings, but the dominant reaction was one of
relief and new hope for European unity.
Moscow broke sharply with its May I)ay tradition in an effort to
advance a "peaceful image." The military section of the parade was canceled,
and party chief Brezhnev, rather than the defense minister, gave the principal
address. The speech was conciliatory, placing primary emphasis on disarma-
ment, easing of international tension, and peaceful cooperation. It specifi-
callyendorsed "peaceful coexistence." Brezhnev did not mention either the
US or China, but it is probably a sign of Moscow's thinking that the anti-Mao
placards carried in the parade out-numbered the anti-American ones.
In Czechoslovakia, Husak's firm initial moves toward orthodoxy appear
to have brought about a period of uneasy calm characterized for the most
part by a popular mood of hopelessness, frustration, and watchful waiting.
Last week, Husak met with his Eastern European counterparts during the
four-day CEMA summit meeting in Moscow, and-except for the East
Germans-seems to have won their support.
Continued student unrest in Yugoslavia and the possibility of demon-
strations are causing concern in official circles. Belgrade was alarmed enough
to have precipitously postponed the long-scheduled visit in early June of
Indonesia's President. Regime leaders fear that the presence of the anti-Com-
munist leader could lead to an outburst of disorders on the first anniversary
of last year's riots. Student dissatisfaction centers on the government's
failure to deliver on its promises to reorganize university education and to
improve employment opportunities for graduates.
Politburo rapporteur Honecker--Ulbricr.t's right-hand man-speaking to
the tenth plenary session of the East German party's central committee this
week revealed that there will be no change in East Germany's hard-line
policy toward Bonn. Official alarm was evident over continuing domestic
economic and ideological problems. 25X1
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FRANCE CALM AS LEADERS PREPARE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Contrary to De Gaulle's
prediction on the eve of the
abortive referendum that "shocks"
and "upheavals" would follow his
departure, France has remained
calm in the week following his
resignation. Political leaders
have spent the week jockeying
for position in the presidential
race, which most observers expect
to take place on 1 June. Several
candidates have their hat in the
ring already, including the former
Gaullist prime minister, Georges
Pompidou, and the moderate Social-
ist mayor of Marseilles, Gaston
Defferre.
Pompidou, the front runner,
is making significant headway in
his effort to win over essential
support from the center and from
those in the Gaullist camp who
defected in the referendum. The
decision of Independent Republican
leader Valery Giscard d'Estaing--
who broke ranks with the Gaullists
over the referendum and later im-
plied he could not support the
candidacy of his former cabinet
boss--to rally to the Pompidou
banner may well prove to be the
critical factor in Pompidou's
drive for election. According
to centrist leader Pierre Sudreau,
Pompidou offered Giscard a top
post in a future government.
together hold almost 100 seats in
the 487-seat National Assembly,
one persuasive argument probably
was that Pompidou's election would
make the election of a new parlia-
ment unnecessary. Any presidential
successor other than a Gaullist
might find it necessary to dis-
solve the present assembly, in
which almost three fourths of the
seats are held by Gaullists and,
their allies.
Pompidou is further aided
the fact that both the left and
the center are badly divided.
Gaston Defferre, who hopes to ap-
peal to that broad spectrum from
the left to the center which lifs
between the Communists and the
Gaullists, has complicated the
task of those who want to come up
with a generally acceptable cen-
trist candidate or a single can4i-
date of the left. One result of
Defferre's announcement has been
to lessen the likelihood that in-
terim President Alain Poher, who
also hoped for center-left support,
would put forth his candidacy.
Defferre's candidacy has
dealt a sharp blow to the Commu-
nist Party, which is now railing
against a center-left coalition
and calling instead for a joint
Communist-leftist candidate
The
.
Pompidou's efforts to culti- party would prefer not to run its
vate the center also appear to be own candidate because standing
bearing fruit. Sudreau said that
the leader of the centrist parlia-
mentary group, Jacques Duhamel,
is virtually "on board the Pompi-
dou train." For both centrists
and Independent Republicans, who
alone would not only symbolize a
"redescent into the ghetto" but
might also reveal that the party,
in fact, commands less votes than
it traditionally claims.
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EUROPEANS RELIEVED BY DE GAIJLLE'S DEPARTURE
The West Europeans have re-
ceived the news of De Gaulle's
resignation with some apprehen-
sion, but more noticeably with re-
lief and renewed hope for European
unity; there has been almost no
expression of regret. Officials
for the most part have commented
discreetly, leaving the more force-
ful national reactions to the press.
Some concern has been regis-
tered about the prospects for a
smooth transition to a new French
leadership and for future French
political stability. There is
more worry about the stability of
the franc over the long term and
the impact on other currencies of
a devaluation.
The predominant reaction, how-
ever, has been relief at the depar-
ture of a man whose ideas and style
of governing were uncongenial to
his European partners. It is
widely conceded that Gaullism did
not go out with the general, how-
ever, and it is not believed that
his successor will abruptly alter
France's course. Nevertheless,
possibilities are seen for a more
positive French policy toward Eu-
rope and NATO.
Italian Foreign Minister Nenni
expressed the opinion that a new
dialogue on Europe was about to
open with France. The Italian
press, exultant over the change,
pointed to the timeliness of the
Anglo-Italian declaration on Eu-
ropean unity issued on 28 April.
Page 13
In the West German press,ex-
pectations for the future of Europe
were generally reserved but hopeful.
Foreign Minister Willy Brandt said
that he hoped "the coming period
will make it possible to strive for
new progress in European policies."
Moscow has betrayed some dis-
comfiture over De Gaulle's resigna-
tion. Izvestia praised him for
having provided an alternative to
"Atlanticism" and expressed hope
that the "realism" of French foreign
policy will not depart with him.
The Soviets have been at pains to
stress that the defeat for De Gaulle
should not be construed as rejec-
tion of his rapport with Moscow and
his show of independence from the
US and NATO.
The current pre-election period
in France may be a trying time for
Moscow. The USSR has put consider-
able diplomatic effort into build-
ing a special relationship with
France and will not gamble these
gains on the long shot of a Commu-
nist share of power in a new French
government. Although the Soviets
will support the electoral bid of
the French Communist Party, they
will use caution in attacking those
whose chances of governing are bet-
ter.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 May 69
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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS MEND FENCES ABROAD, CLAMP DOWN AT HOME
Party first secretary Husak
last week garnered support for
his new regime from most of his
conservative Soviet bloc counter-
parts, an important step that
will help him establish greater
control in Czechoslovakia.
During his visit to Moscow
last week to attend the CEMA
summit, Husak met separately with
the party bosses of each of the
invading powers, as well as with
Rumania's Ceausescu. The import
of these meetings was to make
clear that he will base his rule
on Soviet power and the Warsaw
Pact, but also that he expects
to have some leeway in his for-
eign relationships. As if to
underscore these points, while
Husak was in Moscow, other Czech-
oslovak delegations were sent to
resume contacts with both hard-
line and more liberal Eastern
European regimes.
Husak's trip to Moscow--his
first since becoming party chief--
precipitated rumors that he and
Brezhnev had worked on a schedule
for the withdrawal of Soviet oc-
cupation troops from Czechoslo-
vakia. There is, however, no
reliable information to this ef-
fect. There may be token with-
drawals, but Moscow is unlikely
to consider a major reduction of
its occupation forces or to com-
mit itself to a firm timetable.
A Czechoslovak expert on Soviet
bloc affairs, commenting on a pos-
sible Soviet withdrawal, said that
it would be a smart move from the
Soviet point of view, but he doubts
they are that smart.
Czechoslovakia's new party chief Gustav Ilusak (hatless) and Premier Cernik are met at Moscow Airport by Soviet leaders
Brezhnev and Kosygin.
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The Czechoslovak leadership
also took steps last week to re-
duce the corps of Western cor-
respondents in Prague, to impose
new restrictions on the press,
and to discourage further united
action by the students by declar-
ing their parliament "illegal."
To avoid potential trouble, the
annual May Day parade in Prague
was called off and celebrations
were restricted to easily con-
trolled district and factory
meetings. As a result, May
Day--a trigger for youthful dis-
sidence in the past--passed with
only scattered anti-Husak or
anti-Soviet incidents.
Husak's firm initial moves
have brought about a period of
uneasy calm, characterized to a
large extent by hopelessness and
frustration, but also by a grow-
ing public curiosity inspired
by the new party leader's repu-
tation as an ardent nationalist
and a victim of Stalinism. Husak
received, for example, an un-
expected boost from the still
outspokenly liberal youth daily,
Mlada Fronta, when its editor-
in chief' lauded his capabilities.
There are many people, how-
ever, as yet unreconciled to
Husak's ascendancy, as is evi-
dent in acts of vandalism, the
refusal of the national students'
organization to join the Commu-
nist-dominated National Front,
and in a notable number of resig-
nations from the Communist Party.
Some party organizations, espe-
cially in northern Bohemia, have
withheld their endorsement of
Husak until they judge how far
he intends to go.
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EAST GERMANS TO MAINTAIN HARD-LINE POLICIES
Politburo rapporteur Erich
Honecker's speech before the
tenth plenum of East Germany's
party central committee on 28
April made clear not only that
Pankow is unprepared to change
its hard line toward Bonn but
also that the leadership is
alarmed about continuing domestic
economic and ideological problems.
Honecker lashed out at West
Germany, and its Social Democratic
Party in particular, charging
Bonn with increasing tension and
preventing progress on European
security, and the Social Demo-
crats with betraying West German
workers. He repeatedly asserted
that diplomatic recognition of
East Germany was an absolute con-
dition for European security and
also reiterated other long-stand-
ing--and unacceptable--demands
on Bonn that were contained in
the Budapest appeal of the War-
saw Pact.
Honecker confirmed that
East Germany favors closer polit-
ical and military integration of
the Warsaw Pact countries, and
that it continues to have reserva-
tion about the new Czechoslovak
leadership. His remarks suggested
that Pankow also does not fully
concur with the draft document
that is to be discussed at the
forthcoming international Commu-
nist conference.
Honecker devoted half of his
speech to criticism of the party's
economic apparatus, stating that
party members were "persistently
impatient" over continued produc-
tion difficulties and other short-
comings. His disparagement of
"convergence theories," "reform-
ers," and "revisionists" was di-
rected to his domestic audience,
rather than to the Czechoslovaks,
and indicated the party's con-
tinuing concern over cultural and
ideological deviations. Honecker's
speech and remarks by other party
officials suggest that the party
intends to take further steps
to ensure ideological conformity
and to maintain tight control of
the economy.
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CEMA SUMMIT MEETING ACCOMPLISHES LITTLE
The eight CEMA countries
failed to agree on any immediate
reforms of the organization at
their long-heralded summit meet-
ing that ended on 26 April. Al-
though the session probably was
held at this time to avoid a con-
tinuing display of political dis-
unity, disagreement on economic
integration was evident through-
out the meeting.
The focus of the conference
was on the narrow issue of the
development of intra-CEMA trade
and financial relations. The
member states plan to intensify
these relations at a time when
their share of trade with the
free world apparently has passed
its peak. The participants de-
cided to establish an investment
bank to finance specific projects
and to work out improvements in
CEMA's existing International
Bank for Economic Cooperation.
Unless substantial progress is
made in solving problems of prices
and currency convertibility, how-
ever, the proposed investment
bank will not be able to play an
effective role.
If new methods were devised
to lead to meaningful economic
cooperation, they were not an-
nounced at the meeting. Pravda
reported only that CEMA's execu-
tive committee will draft meas-
ures to implement the session's
decisions, which will be reviewed
at the next meeting of the execu-
tive committee later this month.
The vaguely worded communi-
que stated that proposals are to
be worked out for enhancing CEMA's
role in promoting economic coopera-
tion. In the past, CEMA has been
most successful in technical
areas--such as a railway freight-
car pool--because these efforts
avoid. the political controversy
caused by conflicts of national
economic interests.
The communique admitted that
"the session raised many problems
concerning deepening relations be-
In certain member countries...there is talk of
need for integration, for creation of supra-
national organs.... [Rumania] is not an advocate
of integration and does not wish to participate in
joint supranational organs.
Rumanian party Secretary General
Ceausescu on CEMA in a speech
to students on 18 April
tween the national economies," a
phrase that indicates continued
disacreement on the desirability
of economic integration. Ruma-
nia's Ceausescu again stated that
his country "resolutely opposes"
any integration within CEMA that
would restrict the sovereignty
and economic autonomy of member
states.
Support for integration dif-
fers markedly among the other CEMA
members. Moreover, measures to
make CEMA a more effective organi-
zation apparently must still be
drafted and then approved by the
members, a prospect that is long
range at best.
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WINTER GRAIN OUTLOOK BETTER IN EASTERN EUROPE THAN USSR
Prospects for the winter
grain harvest are mediocre in
the Soviet Union but relatively
good in Eastern Europe. Although
winter grains usually account
for about half of the USSR's
bread grain production, in East-
ern Europe they constitute
roughly 90 percent of the total.
Winter grain crops in the
USSR were seeded on about 39 mil-
lion hectares last fall, slightly
less than in the previous year.
Fall sowing weather was good,
precipitation was well above
normal in most regions, and good
fall growth was reported. In-
tense cold and inadequate snow
cover during the winter, however,
heavily damaged fall-sown grains
in parts of the Ukraine, the cen-
tral black soil zone, and the
northern Caucasus.
Although the damage appar-
ently was not as widespread as
initially reported, it will re-
quire significant reseeding with
spring grains, which generally
have a lower yield. A vigorous
press campaign is currently under
way urging farmers to reseed with
corn because of its alleged higher
yield, particularly in the south-
ern areas.
under a three-year agreement with
Canada.
Current prospects for the
important winter grain crops of
Eastern Europe--wheat, rye, and
barley--are relatively good,al-
though not as favorable as a year
ago when bread grain production
in this area set a new record.
Throughout Eastern Europe, winter
grains were sown later than usual
because of delayed harvesting of
fall crops and rainy weather.
Soil moisture was sufficient for
germination but freezing temper-
atures began before good root de-
velopment and snow cover could
afford protection from winter-
kill. The weather last winter
was more severe than in 1967;68.
Soil moisture levels as of
1 April were near normal through-
out Eastern Europe and were bet-
ter than a year ago in the Bal-
kans, but a cold, snowy March
prevented the timely seeding of
spring grains and retarded growth
of winter grains. Normal precip-
itation and warm temperatures
during the late spring months
could significantly improve yield
prospects because both the area
sown to higher yielding wheat and
allocations of fertilizer in-
creased except in Czechoslovakia.
Barring further setbacks in
growing and harvesting both win-
ter and spring grains, the USSR
should be able to meet its ex-
port commitments to Eastern Eu-
rope, Cuba, and certain free
world countries. Nevertheless,
the Soviets may elect to purchase
at least a portion of the four
million tons of wheat remaining
Eastern Europe's demand for
imported grain in fiscal 1969 is
expected to approximate the 6
million tons of a year ago. Im-
ports of grain from the free
world may reach the lowest level
in a decade, however, as the'USSR
will be supplying over 75 percent
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ALBANIA PLEDGES SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLAVIA AND RUMANIA
In an article in the party
daily Zeri I Popullit of 11 April,
Albania pledged support to Yugo-
slavia and Rumania in the event
of Soviet aggression. This con-
trasts sharply with the vitupera-
tion Tirana has heaped on the
Yugoslavs for most of the last
20 years and seems designed to
take advantage of the community
of anti-Soviet feelings in Yugo-
slavia and Rumania to score propa-
ganda points against the USSR.
Tirana stammered in the
wake of the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia last summer, apparently
undecided how to treat its old
antagonist, Yugoslavia, which
was vociferously condemning the
USSR. The indecision was ap-
parent even last month when the
Yugoslav party congress--normally
a prime target for Tirana's ti-
rades--met without drawing any
Albanian commentary. Probably
with Peking's acquiescence if
not approval, Albania clearly
has not decided to shunt aside,
if only temporarily, its dif-
ferences with Yugoslavia in view
of the common fear of the Soviet
Union.
Pact. Rumania is the only East-
ern European country to which
Albania has sent a delegation
for May Day celebrations.
While softening its approach
toward Belgrade, Albania has in-
creased its polemics against
Sofia. It continues to criticize
Bulgaria's role in the Czecho-
slovak intervention and to accuse
Sofia of being the "Kremlin's
mouthpiece." Albanian-Bulgarian
relations have been bitter since
last July when Bulgaria threw
out Albania's ambassador and most
of his staff for "illegally" dis-
tributing Marxist-Leninist prop-
aganc:a.
The Rumanians have tried to
remain on good terms with Albania
since it broke with the Soviet
Union in 1961 and, since August,
Tirana has set Bucharest apart
from its criticism of the Warsaw
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Peking's part in Albania's
policy shift is unclear, but the
possibility that China encouraged
Tirana to identify with Belgrade
and Bucharest cannot be ruled
out. Peking would, in any case,
not look askance at the three
independent-minded Balkan Com-
munist regimes loosely coalescing
in opposition to Moscow.
Albanian-Yugoslav antagonism
is deep-seated, however, and Ti-
rana's old polemics could easily
return. In the meantime, the
Albanians--without sacrificing
their doctrinaire interpretation
of the Marxist-Leninist ideology
or their alliance with Peking--
are displaying unusual flexibility
in spelling out common interests
and concerns with the unorthodox
Yugoslavs and independent-minded
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Lebanon's political crisis, touched off by violent popular reaction to
President Hilu's efforts to curb Arab commando activity, remains unre-
solved. In Jordan, the Palestinian terrorist groups appear to be preparing for
a showdown with King Husayn. Commando-inspired clashes occurred with
increasing frequency along all the Arab-Israeli borders, particularly in the
Suez Canal area, and Israel retaliated with a punitive raid deep into Egyptian
territory.
Iran has temporarily faced down the Iraqis in the dispute over naviga-
tion rights in the Shatt al-Arab, and is now awaiting an Iraqi response to its
offer to renegotiate the treaty governing the boundary river. Another test
could come if Iran decides to force third-country ships to fly the Iranian flag
on the river. The Baghdad government has lodged a strong protest against
Iranian policy with the UN Security Council, and many Iranians resident in
the country allegedly have been arrested.
India's Congress Party had a discouraging week as it continued to try to
recover from setbacks in the February mid-term elections. Disagreements
dominated the party's annual convention, and no important resolutions were
adopted. In Tamil Nadu, Congress lost its dominant position in the state's
municipal councils to the south Indian regionalist Dravidian Progressive
Federation, the party that won control of the Tamil Nadu. state government
in 1967.
In the Nigerian civil war, federal forces now hold Umuahia, the former
secessionist administrative center, but federal supply lines to the town are
very vulnerable, and there are many organized I3iafran army units in the area.
The Biafrans
~ecapture the important road junction town of Owerri last week. De
Gaulle's resignation has made continued French assistance to the secession-
ists uncertain.
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COMMANDO ACTIVITY SHARPENS MIDDLE EAST STRIFE
The political situation in
Lebanon remains unresolved, a
government-fedayeen clash may be
shaping up in Jordan, and Israeli
commandos raided upper Egypt.
In Lebanon, President Hilu
has failed in his attempts to
find a successor to Prime Minis-
ter Rashid Karami, who resigned
on 24 April. Karami's resigna-
tion came in the wake of two
days of clashes between Lebanese
security forces and demonstra-
tors from Palestinian refugee
camps who were protesting the
government's recent moves to re-
strict fedayeen activities in
southern Lebanon. Seventeen
people were killed and over 100
injured in incidents in Beirut,
Site of serious
civil disturbance
Tyre, Tripoli, Sidon, Baalbek,
and Nabatiyyah. A four-day state
of emergency and the imposition
of curfews in the six cities did
much to quiet the situation.
Hilu decided to move against
the f' 'edayeen after their rate of
infiltration into Lebanon from
Syria increased sharply during
the last of March and early April.
He apparently saw this as his
last chance to stand up to the
terrorist groups before they be-
came too powerful to control.
As the number of fedayeen grew
larger, the general staff had
become increasingly pessimistic
about the army's ability to keep
them in check.
In his resignation speech
on 24 April, Karami noted that
the issue of what action the gov-
ernment should take regarding
the fedayeen was dividing the
country. He and other Muslim
political leaders have told Hilu
that there must be a national
consensus on future fedayeen pol-
icy before they would be willing
to participate in the government.
Meanwhile, leaders of Fatah
and the Palestine Liberation Or-
gani;,ation (PLO), meeting in Bei-
rut early this week, apparently
decided not to exacerbate the
situation any further for the
time being.
This may be no more than a tac-
tical move, however, to gain them
a little breathing time before
their next move.
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several targets in
upper Egypt, 30 April
i ,i
CONFIDENTIAL
In Jordan, the Palestinian
organizations have put more pres-
sure on King Husayn, increasing
the chances of a major clash be-
tween the commandos and the re-
ime.
The fedayeen, already appre-
hensive of government reaction
to their criticism of Husayn's
six-point peace plan, have been
preparing for a showdown. There
are some indications that feda-
yeen supporters are approaching
Jordanian security and army per-
sonnel, asking them to remain
neutral in any future clash. The
growing tension is illustrated by
an incident between fedayeen and
the military police on 29 April
in Amman in which five persons
died in an abrupt exchange of
fire.
Incidents along the Arab-
Israeli borders continued at a
high level all week, the most
serious being on the Egyptian
front. Daily shooting across the
Suez Canal and Egyptian commando
raids in the area provoked an
Israeli raid into upper Egypt on
30 April. According to press
reports from Tel Aviv, Israeli
commandos struck at sites along
the Nile River, hitting a low
dam, some power lines, and a
bridge. Egypt denies that any
damage was done. Although Nasir
may be under pressure to mount
some kind of retaliatory strike,
Cairo is playing down the impor-
tance of the Israeli raid and
has to reckon with the likeli-
hood of still harsher Israeli
reprisals if further military
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*Damascus
SYRIA
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POLITICAL ACTIVITY PICKING UP IN PAKISTAN
Political activity in Pakistan
is on an upturn, highlighted by
President Yahya Khan's recent meet-
ings with opposition political
leaders. Meanwhile, the new gov-
ernment has announced proposed re-
forms in its continuing efforts to
win the support of labor and stu-
dents.
On 22 April, President Yahya
Khan, kicking off a political fact-
finding tour, told reporters in
Lahore that he hoped to appoint a
new chief election commissioner
soon and predicted "early" elec-
tions.
As of Apri , he had avoided
meeting with leftists and extrem-
ists in West Pakistan, or with
Maulana Bhashani, one of the most
important political figures in the
eastern wing.
Meanwhile, West Pakistani op-
position leaders Nasrullah Khan and
Asghar Than visited Dacca and, with
the apparent approval of the gov-
ernment, investigated prospects for
forming a new nationwide political
party. This proposed organization
reportedly would include conserva-
tive East Pakistani elements opposed
to a loosening of ties between the
two provinces and would exclude the
only two significant parties in
the East wing, Mujibur Rahman's
Awami League and Bhashani's Na-
tional Awami Party/Left. This ef-
fort appears doomed as it is un-
likely to find much support among
the Be
ngalis.
Mujibur Rahman, emerging from
almost
a month of relative seclu-
sion,
April
gave a press interview
in which he dismissed
on
talk
22
of any union between East Pakistan
and the Indian state of West Ben-
gal. He affirmed that he was pre-
pared to discuss with the new gov-
ernment those aspects of his six-
point political program which
seemed unsatisfactory to the mili-
tary, including the degree of au-
tonomy for East Pakistan, but not
his demand for division of West
Pakistan into four provinces, which
is opposed by powerful Punjabi ele-
ments in the military.
Deputy Chief Martial Law Ad-
ministrator Nur Khan has been meet-
ing with labor heads, school ad-
ministrators, and student leaders
in anticipation of recommending
reforms. On 25 April, he presented
outlines for a new labor policy
that would include guarantees of
the right to strike as well as min-
imum wages. Following a number of
sessions with teachers and student
leaders, Nur Khan proposed the ba-
sis for a new educational policy
providing greater participation
by students in university affairs,
more emphasis on scientific and
technical training, and maximum
autonomy for universities. Such
reforms could answer many of the
grievances that contributed sig-
nificantly to the unrest prior to
the imposition of martial law.
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PERSIAN GULF FEDERATION EFFORT UNDER STRAIN
Recent statements by Brit-
ain's Conservative Party leader
Edward Heath have complicated the
situation in the Persian Gulf area
at a time when local rulers are
still moving slowly to make their
federation something more than a
paper entity.
In a trip to the gulf area
in early April, Heath announced
his party's intention to reverse
the present Labor government's
decision to terminate Britain's
military presence there.
The announce-
ment has already drawn fire from
the Iranians and several radical
Arab states, however. It could
have even more harmful conse-
quences; should the Saudis place
too much reliance on the prospect
that Britain will remain, they
will be less motivated to perse-
vere in the delicate business of
cooperating with the Iranians.
In addition, Britain's origi-
nal decision to leave had taken
some of the wind out of the sails
of the gulf's proliferating sub-
versive groups. With the over-
riding issue of Israel effectively
distracting the Egyptians, Syri-
ans, and Iraqis, the absence of a
flammable anti-imperialist cause
has helped keep the area rela-
tively tranquil. A reversal of
the decision now, or even the
widespread conviction that such
a reversal was in the works, could
provide new fuel for incendiary
radicals.
Meanwhile, the rulers of the
Federation of Arab Amirates and
its subordinate councils continue
their periodic and inconclusive
meetings, bedeviled by the key
problem of the Iranian claim to
Bahrain. Time and again, the
skeikhdoms have backed away from
a scheduled meeting in Bahrain
out of fear of Iran's reaction--
most recently in the case of the
next rulers' meeting slated for
25 May. The Bahrainis are disil-
lusioned at the lack of support
for them, and now seem to be try-
ing to force the others into a
public and definitive acceptance
of Bahrain as a full and equal
member of the federation. They
have seized on the recent tour of
gulf states by a high-powered
Iraq_ delegation to press their
case.
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As leaders of many Latin American nations gather in Bolivia for the
funeral of President Rene Barrientos, killed in a helicopter accident, an early
unconstitutional change of government in that country seems increasingly
likely. Vice President Siles was allowed to assume the presidency immedi-
ately following Barrientos' death, but armed forces Commander in Chief
Ovando has been pressing demands to gain de facto dominance of the
government. He may be satisfied only with Siles' resignation or ouster.
The Velasco government in Ecuador is also under growing pressure
from many sources. The latest in a series of cabinet resignations is that of
Defense Minister Andrade, who had been under attack from young officers;
Government Minister Larrea probably will be the next to go. Velasco is hard
put to find competent replacements, and if congress fails to adopt measures
to finance the unbalanced national budget before adjournment on 4 May, a
fiscal crisis could further weaken his position.
In the Caribbean, Trinidad's Prime Minister Williams is facing a rare
challenge in the form of a nationwide strike by the Transport and Industrial
Workers Union. The union hopes to secure abolition of legal restrictions on
labor's right to strike in addition to wage increases. The government is
considering declaring a state of emergency.
The Castro regime, on the other hand, has received an unusual display
of support from the leadership of the Cuban Catholic Church. All top
members of the hierarchy joined in a pastoral letter denouncing the US
economic denial policy toward Cuba. In all likelihood, the statement re-
sulted from pressure from Castro, who continues to be frustrated by eco-
nomic failures.
Tension between Costa Rica and the military regime in Panama is
building up to the point where Costa Rica may again break relations or
appeal to the Organization of American States. A break precipitated by the
military coup in Panama last October ended only two months ago. The Costa
Ricans are incensed at repeated. border incursions by the Panamanian Na-
tional Guard in search of antijunta insurgents, and over the shabby treatment
accorded the chief of the Costa Rican Civil Guard when in Panama City to
discuss outstanding problems.
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SI.C;RE`F
INSTABILITY IN BOLIVIA AFTER BARRIENTOS' DEATH
The death of President Bar-
rientos in a helicopter crash on
27 April has removed an important
element of stability from the Bo-
livian political scene. Luis
Adolfo Siles Salinas, who as vice
president constitutionally suc-
ceeded Barrientos, lacks any broad
political support. Armed forces
Commander in Chief Alfredo Ovando
probably would have won the pres-
idential election scheduled for
May 1970. It now appears, how-
ever, that Ovando is unwilling to
wait that long, and he may move
to oust Siles very soon.
Ovando met with Siles on 29
April and presented him with a
list of demands including selec-
tion of certain cabinet officers
by Ovando, a nationalistic policy,
and guaranteeing Ovando's elec-
tion in 1970. Siles refused to
agree to all these demands because
to do so would have made him a
puppet president. The two men
agreed to postpone a final deci-
sion until 2 May after Barrientos'
burial. Mutual dislike between
Siles and Ovando exacerbates thg
situation. Ovando has a low opin-
ion of Siles, and Siles believes
that Ovando would usher in a "bla-
tant military dictatorship" even
if he were elected constitution-
ally.
Pressure is building on Gen-
eral Ovando to move quickly. The
powerful Bolivian National Peasjnts
Confederation on 30 April called
for Siles' immediate resignation,
and as many as 25,000 to 30,000
anti-Siles peasants were expected
to be in Cochabamba for Barrientos'
burial.
Armed Forces Commander in Chief
Alfredo Ovando
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CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER VENEZUELAN PACIFICATION EFFORTS
pposition to the manner in
which President Caldera is try-
ing to bring an end to almost
seven years of insurgency in Ven-
ezuela is crystalizing in some
political and military circles.
High-ranking military offi-
cers are quite concerned over the
government's recent actions that
legalized the Communist Party
(PCV) and freed a number of im-
portant extremist leaders. More-
over, the government's ready ac-
ceptance of an offer by the car-
dinal archbishop of Caracas and
other prominent individuals to
mediate between the rebels and
the government is looked upon as
giving the insurgents a respecta-
bility and publicity they had not
previously enjoyed. Army offi-
cers complain that the government
does not bother about the inter-
ests of the junior officers still
on the alert in the field who
have battled the insurgents for
years with no such publicity.
They resent the fact that their
success in reducing insurgency
to its present low ebb may be can-
celed by political compromises
DIA the government may have to make
in order to achieve its goal of
25X1 a cease-fire.
President Ca era has been quiet ly
sounding out officers of all the
services regarding their attitudes
on recent government moves toward
accommodation with the PCV and the
guerrillas. These opinions have
reportedly revealed enough con-
cern to warrant a second look by
the government at what it is
doing and at the vigor with which
some of its pacification programs
are being advanced.
Although government of-
ficials insist that the insur-
gent" will be ruthlessly sup-
pressed if they reject their
proposals, there i8 a general feel-
ing in the military that the Cal-
dera administration will not carry
its warnings through. Officials
of the opposition Democratic Ac-
tion Party are also taking a hard
look at the government's actions
and are exploiting the military's
concern.
An additional irritant to the
military is the possibility that
thei share of the budget--an
austere 8.5 percent--may have to
be reduced even further if the
government is going to meet cur-
rent operating expenses. There
is considerable grumbling among
air force and naval officials,
who may bear the brunt of the
cuts. The air force chief of
staff has complained that pro-
jected cuts will prevent the ac-
quisition of new aircraft this
year and will force a halt in
construction of the new air force
headquarters. The navy is also
faced with the necessity of find-
ing money to meet expenses al-
ready obligated.
Although military concern
has not reached the point where
it is a threat to the government,
military leaders can be expected
to keep a close watch on further
moves by the new administration.
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SECRET
PERU'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS GROW
Minister of Interior Artola
and the witch hunt he is leading
against former officials of the
Belaunde government have become
the primary targets of those op-
posed to Peru's Velasco adminis-
tration. Many respected former
officials have been forced to seek
asylum in various embassies or
exile in other Latin American
countries.
Until recently, the opposition
press had been forced to support
the Velasco government in its con-
frontation with the US or run the
risk of being charged with treason
but now it seems to have found an
issue on which it can criticize
the government. General Artola has
so far borne the brunt of this for
his seemingly exaggerated charges
of corruption against well-liked
people. The criticism, however,
is indirectly aimed at the entire
military government, suggesting in
effect that the Velasco regime is
just another repressive military
dictatorship.
It is unlikely that this grow-
ing dissent will seriously affect
the functioning of the government,
but there are indications that
President Velasco is sensitive to
such charges. In recent public
statements, he has made a point of
appealing for national unity in the
face of an allegedly serious threat
from the US. General Artola is
one of Velasco's most ardent sup-
porters, and the President will
probably keep him on unless he be-
comes a serious political liability
In any event, Artola represents a
convenient scapegoat.
Meanwhile, the government is
keeping the public stirred up over
the International Petroleum Com-
pany (IPC) issue, using the con-
tinuing nationalistic reaction
to consolidate the military's
hold. There are indications
that some government leaders would
like to avoid the economic conse-
quences of an imposition of sa: nc-
tions by the US, but it is prob-
ably politically impossible for
them to make the necessary com-
promises. A ruling on IPC's ap-
peal to reduce or eliminate the
company's alleged $690 million
debt is expected before 6 August,
but it seems doubtful that the
ruling will satisfy either the
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NEW PURGES MOUNTED IN BRAZIL
President Costa e Silva appears
to be having trouble restraining
Brazil's military hard liners, and
the prolonged purging process also
is beginning to cause uneasiness
among the government's civilian
supporters.
On 29 April, the National
Security Council issued the long-
est purge list to date, bringing
to nearly 300 the number of per-
sons cassated by the government
since it assumed broader powers
under an institutional act in De-
cember 1968. Over one fifth of
the federal legislators have lost
their political rights, including
many members of the government
party. Nearly 42 other persons,
including 12 diplomats, were
forcibly retired from the Foreign
Ministry.
None of those on the latest
list were men of significant na-
tional stature, but their punish-
ment and the prolonged nature of the
purging process is beginning to
cause uneasiness, even among those
civilians who have supported the
government's efforts to root out
corruption. Moreover, the govern-
ment's recent summary retirement of
44 leading educators, many of na-
tional and some of international rep-
utation, has aroused widespread crit-
icism and reportedly has badly shaken
the scientific community as well.
It is almost certain to prove a set-
back to educational reform efforts
and may well contribute to the "brain
drain" about which the government
claims to be worried.
It seems clear that Costa e
Silva is not able to resolve the
differences between hard-line acti-
vists who want even more widespread
purges of politicians and more
moderate leaders who want a return
to at least some form of constitu-
tional normality. The president is
apparently not strong enough to
deny the hard-liners' demands, and
it seems likely that additional
purges of political and educational
leaders will occur.
COSTA RICAN COMMUNISTS MAKE STRONG BID FOR LEGALITY
Costa Rica's Communists are
well on their way toward making
their party the only legal Commu-
nist political organization in Cen-
tral America.
In December 1968, the Commu-
nist front--the Bloc of Workers,
Peasants, and Intellectuals (BOCI)--
petitioned the National Electoral
Tribunal for inscription as a na-
tional political party. The tri-
bunal has the authority to ban any
Communist party, but side-stepped
the issue and referred it to the
legislature, which reconvened on 1
May. The parties represented have
freed their deputies to vote accord-
ing to their own conscience, and
the two thirds vote necessary to
proscribe the BOCI will be diffi-
cult to muster.
The Communists have skillfully
played on Costa Rican distaste for
denying rights to minority groups.
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In addition, last year's sale of ex-
cess coffee to the USSR, negotiated
by Communist chief Manuel Mora, has
added to the Communists' respectabil-
ity. Mora, who heads both the
regular Communist Party and the new
front, has threatened to resign if
the BOCI is turned down. He has
fostered the idea that his depar-
ture would give control to revolu-
tionary extremists in the party.
An indicator of the Communists'
effectiveness is that the 600-mem-
ber party had 21,000 signatures on
their petition for registration and
may have up to 15,000 in reserve.
With even a small representation
in the next legislature, the Commu-
nists' bargaining position would
be enhanced because no party is
likely to have a majority. It is
also possible, however, that Costa
Rica's several vigorous Anti-Cdmmu-
nist organizations, which have so
far limited their activity to propa-
ganda in the public media, might in-
cline toward violence to oppose Com-
munist intrusion on the political
scene.
JAMAICA FACES POSSIBLE CRISIS OVER SUGAR INDUSTRY
Prime Minister Shearer appears
headed for a confrontation with
the Jamaican sugar industry that
could compound political problems
already heightened by violence and
public dissatisfaction.
The island's largest sugar
estate, Monymusk has threatened to
close down at the end of this crop
season unless the government, which
controls the price of sugar for
domestic consumption, grants ma-
jor concessions to the industry,
including a guaranteed price in-
crease.
Since 1965, the sugar industry,
which accounts for approximately 30
percent of total agricultural pro-
duction, has stagnated; even the
large producers have been unable
to show profits. A two-year drought
is partially responsible for the
decline in production, but the in-
dustry also suffers from high pro-
duction costs and lack of mechaniza-
tion. Several estates have closed
down, and approximately 4,000 inde-
Page 3 2
pendent farmers have been forced
out of production.
The Jamaican Government has
ignored the recommendations of the
Sugar Inquiry Commission, published
in October 1967, to encourage mech-
anization and greater managerial ef-
ficiency. Prime Minister Shearer
opposes mechanization because he
fears that unemployment--already 18
percent--will increase and that the
skilled labor necessary to handle
the machines would be organized by
a union affiliated with his major
political rival, the Peoples Nab-
tional Party (PNP).
A confrontation now between
the government and the sugar indus-
try would add to Shearer's increas-
ing political problems occasioned
by the growing strength of the po-
litical opposition and by an in-
crease in the already high crime
rate that has generated some pub-
lic hysteria. Michael Manley, the
PNP leader, has already called for
significant policy changes to stimu-
late agricultural development.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 May 69
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