WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007000060002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 25, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Cuban Subversion in Latin America: A New Look
Secret
ARCHIVAL CORD
PLEASE RETUI:NI TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
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N2 41
25 April 1969
No. 0367/69A
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CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA: A NEW LOOK
During the year and a half since the death of Che Guevara, Cuba has modified
its tactics and priorities for "exporting" the revolution in Latin America. Castro has
withdrawn from the extreme and violent approach he pursued in 1966-671
Since Guevara 's death, Castro has not attempted to initiate new areas of
insurgency, has toned down Cuban propaganda, and has allowed front groups like
the Latin American Solidarity Organization to lapse into quiet dormancy. During
this time, moreover, he has almost completely igncred themes of revolution in his
oratory.
Castro's caution is a result of a variety of pressures and realizations. He was
stunned by Guevara's rapid defeat in Bolivia, and in retrospect probably recognized
the quixotic hopelessness of the campaign as it was revealed in Guevara's field diary.
Castro has been repeatedly discouraged by the failures of guerrilla groups he has
supported, and may realize that Cuban interference and bullying have contributed to
their factionalism and impotence.
In any case, he seems to have grown more pessimistic about the prospects for
revolution in Latin America and about Cuba's ability to be a decisive influence. He
has probably been pressured by the USSR to pull back, and his willingness to do so
has been one of the major reasons for a considerable improvement in Cuba's
relations with Moscow. At the same time, without the significant influence of
Guevara or of powerful advocates of his Trotskyist views in the Cuban leadership,
Castro has adjusted Cuba's priorities inward. He has concentrated most of his
energies during the last year or so on the expansion of Cuban agriculture-especially
on the goal of producing 10 million tons of sugar in 1970. Although he has not given
up the dream of seeing the Cuban experience emulated in Latin America, he now
appears less inclined to impose it forcibly on his neighbors.
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CASTRO'S CHANGING TACTICS
Castro's conceit and his desire to see the
Cuban revolution ratified and emulated in Latin
America have been the only common ingredients
behind his varied attempts to "export" revolu-
tion. Between 1959 and 1961, these factors com-
bined with other nonideological compulsions.
Among them was his genuine fear of armed inter-
vention. Even before the Bay of Pigs invasion in
April 1961, Castro believed that his regime would
be the target of conspiracy from conservative
forces abroad. To a certain extent, therefore,
Cuban policy in the hemisphere was defensive as
well as provocative.
During his first three years in power, Castro
employed a variety of legal and clandestine means
to increase Cuba's influence in Latin America.
Large numbers of middle-class Latin Americans
and intellectuals continued to support him during
most of this period because of his simple and
undidactic appeals to nationalism and because of
his defiance of the US. Although he constantly
reiterated his call for violent revolution against
the ruling elites and conservative forces in the
hemisphere, 12 Latin American countries still
maintained relations with Cuba at the end of
1960.
Castro's approach was based essentially on
the same kind of tactics that had propelled him to
power in Cuba. He used both violent and non-
violent means, and pitched his appeal to the ur-
ban working classes and large segments of the
middle class, as well as to more radical elements.
Although he preached to the peasants, he prob-
ably believed that they were not vital to his cause.
Castro's commitment to a uniform strategy
of rural insurgency did not emerge until after he
publicly espoused Marxism-Leninism in December
1961. The change in strategy resulted from de-
velopments at home and in Latin America, and
Special Report
from the need to formulate a new theoretical
basis for Cuban action. During the second half of
1960, Castro had lost most of his appeal to mid-
dle-class groups in Latin America as he converted
his economy to radical socialism. In Cuba, mean-
while, Che Guevara became increasingly in-
fluential. The principal Trotskyist in the Cuban
leadership, he believed that Cuban resources and
energies should be directed abroad, that revolu-
tionary movements should take root among the
peasants in rural regions, and that support from
middle-class, urban elements-including most of
the Latin American Communist parties-was not
desirable. Guevara's handbook on guerrilla war-
fare was an adaptation of Chinese Communist
theory,
The infant Cuban intelligence service, cre-
ated in mid-1961 with Soviet aid, undertook to
coordinate Cuba's increasing commitment to
Guevara's views. Havana provided guerrilla train-
ing to almost any Latin American willing to travel
to Cuba, while supporting the guerrilla groups
that appeared in more than a half dozen coun-
tries.
These efforts met with one failure after an-
other. They were poorly organized and executed,
and were so far-flung that Cuba was unable to
provide decisive support. A spectacular setback
occurred in November 1963 when a three-ton
weapons cache of proven Cuban origin was found
on a Venezuelan beach. This discovery resulted in
the OAS resolution of July 1964 by which all
members except Mexico agreed to end relations
with Cuba.
By November 1964, Castro's indiscriminate
subversive endeavors also brought him into con-
flict with Moscow and with the leaders of most
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In addition, Castro was increasingly influ-
enced in late 1964 by "liberals" in his entourage
who opposed the dogmatic views of Guevara. At
home, a number of reforms were enacted in-
cluding the introduction of material incentives for
work, a concept Guevara strenuously opposed.
As a result of these pressures and realiza-
tions, Castro muted his revolutionary exhorta-
tions for about a year and narrowed his focus to
the three countries where viable guerrilla groups
were active. He concentrated on domestic matters
and seldom spoke about foreign affairs. Cuba
continued to train Latin Americans in guerrilla
tactics, but more selectively than before, and
Havana did not support violent tactics in coun-
tries when local Communist parties did not. The
undaunted Guevara, however, refused to be a part
of this arrangement. He resigned his positions in
Cuba and led a guerrilla contingent in the Congo
(Kinshasa) in 1965.
At the Tri-
on inen on erence in Havana, he made an
explicit appeal for violent revolution throughout
the hemisphere. At the same time, Havana an-
nounced the formation of the Latin American
Solidarity Organization as a continental front
group for violent revolution. Meanwhile, Castro
was assisting Guevara in laying the ground work
for the Bolivian guerrilla campaign.
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There were probably a number of reasons
for Castro's reversion to the tactics of guerrilla
insurgency. After his return from Africa, Guevara
apparently won Castro's confidence again. Cuban
domestic programs began to reflect his views, and
by 1967 the concept of moral incentives was
reinstated. Castro was probably impressed with
the gains made during 1965 by Venezuelan insur-
gents, and he may have believed that unless Cuba
stepped in with significant aid, Havana's appeal to
the left in Latin America would be compro-
mised-as he probably believed it had been in
1965 when he did not actively support the "con-
stitutionalist" rebellion in the Dominican Repub-
lic.
By early 1966, moreover, Castro probably
felt more confident in his dealings with the Soviet
leaders than in late 1964 when they had first
come to power. In any case, he probably believed
that Moscow would not retaliate against him for
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at odds with the Latin American Communist par-
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In August, the
Latin American Solidarity Organization held a
conference in Havana and repeated Guevara's call
for "Two, Three, Many Vietnams." Castro's vin-
dictive denunciations of the Latin American Com-
munist parties throughout this period were con-
stantly reiterated by the Cuban media.
Although he did not explain it in public,
Castro's rage was probably in large measure a
result of the refusal of the Bolivian Communists
to assist Che Guevara in his guerrilla campaign.
This was Havana's greatest single engagement in
guerrilla war, and was meant as the first step in a
continent-wide struggle. Guevara's failure and
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death in October 1967, however. signaled the
beginning of a serious reappraisal of his guerrilla
tactics, which has apparently now resulted in a
more moderate line.
C'ASTRO'S MOOD TODAY
Castro has delivered 34 speeches since
Guevara's failure in Bolivia. Two of them were
early eulogies to his fallen comrade, and in an-
other last July he announced the publication of
Guevara's dairy. In these three addresses, Castro
discussed revolution in Latin America in the spe-
cific context of Guevara's failure. Except for
these cases, however, he has not discussed themes
of revolution in the hemisphere in more than a
year and a half.
Although there is no direct correlation in the
short term between the things Castro talks about
in public and their relative importance, he is a
compulsive orator who is moved to speak about
the problems and issues confronting him.
Through the years, he has maintained his credibil-
ity with a majority of the Cuban population and
with his entourage by discussing in public the
decisions he makes. It would, therefore, seem
unlikely for him to pursue a major course of
action without ruminating about it in public. In
any case, there has been a parallel in the past
between Castro's frequent oratory on revolution
in the hemisphere and direct Cuban involvement
in it.
In addition, Castro has neglected the subject
on a number of occasions when the event being
celebrated directly concerned past guerrilla ac-
complishments. On the 15th anniversary of his
26th of July Movement last year, he did not
mention revolution, even though he had discussed
it at length in every previous speech on that date
since 1961. On 10 October 1968, Castro cele-
brated the 100th anniversary of the first Cuban
uprising against Spain, but did not relate it to
current events in the hemisphere. Likewise, on
the tenth anniversary of the Cuban revolution last
January, he did not preach revolution or boast of
his own victories as a guerrilla. He has neglected
numerous other occasions during the last 18
months that also would have been appropriate to
discussions of Cuba's role in support of revolution
in Latin America.
Although the subject of revolution has been
almost completely absent from Castro's public
utterances for 18 months, his desire to influence
events in Latin America continues to be evident.
In many of his speeches during the last year,or so,
he has contrasted Cuban achievements in public
health, education, social welfare, and agriculture
with those of other Latin American countries. He
has insisted that Cuba has done more in, these
fields than its neighbors, and has suggested that
Cuban methods and programs be imitated. This
effort to cast Cuba as mentor for the hemisphere
is not new, of course, but it is a quiet tactic that
was largely ignored during the two periods of
intensive Cuban guerrilla support activity. It prob-
ably reflects Castro's wish to stand back, until
Latin Americans take the initiative in bringing
about revolutionary change in their own coun-
tries.
OTHER SIGNS OF MODERATION
There are a number of other indicatipns of
disinterest in renewing the old policy of support-
ing continent-wide guerrilla war. The Cuban press
seldom mentions the issue, and Granma, he of-
ficial daily of the Cuban Communist Party, has
not carried a major front-page story about, Latin
America in many months. The Cuban firmed
forces' magazine and the theoretical jourfial of
the Cuban Communist Party have similarly neg-
lected the subject. The tone and quantity of
Cuban propaganda about revolution in the hemis-
phere have been modified during the last year or
more, and Havana has apparently cut off or
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significantly reduced its funding of certain Latin
American publications which, under its sponsor-
ship, advocated continental insurgency in
1966-67. The Mexican weekly Porgue, for in-
stance, has followed a line inconsistent with Ha-
vana's for about six months.
Little interest has been shown in the Latin
American Solidarity Organization (LASO) in
more than a year. There are no indications that a
second conference is planned, or that the organi-
zation is active. It is seldom mentioned in the
press or in radiobroadcasts, and Castro has pub-
licly ignored it for about a year. Havana probably
had mixed feelings about LASO from the outset.
During the conference in August 1967, many
delegates from various extremist and revolution-
ary groups in the hemisphere displayed a remark-
able degree of independence from Cuban tutelage.
Few of them or other Latin Americans who
figured prominently in Havana's plans in 1966
and 1967 have made publicized trips to Cuba
since early 1968. Only a handful of Latin Ameri-
cans attended the tenth anniversary celebrations
last January, and there were no indications that
Castro or other Cuban leaders met with any of
them.
CUBA AND THE LATIN AMERICAN
COMMUNIST PARTIES
Special Report
There are other signs, moreover, that the
Cubans are willing once more to work with the
old-guard Communists, at least under certain cir-
cumstances. The recent formation of a new Hai-
tian Communist Party is significant in what it
reveals about Soviet and Cuban tactics in Latin
America; even though Haitian Communist fac-
tions have long been illegal and among the least
important in the hemisphere. In January 1969,
the Moscow-controlled Haitian Party of Popular
Accord (PEP) announced that it had joined with
the pro-Castro United Haitian Democratic Party
(PUDA) in the United Party of Haitian Commu-
nists (PUCH). Since the PEP and the PUDA were
controlled from Moscow and Havana, respec-
tively, the merger is the first sign of Castro's
willingness to deal with old-guard parties again.
Moscow apparently was better satisfied with
the merger than Havana and-perhaps uncertain
how the Cubans would react in public-withheld
comment until Havana's position was clear. Ha-
vana first commented on 5 February in a brief
Creole radiobroadcast expressing approval of the
move and of the agreement by both Haitian Com-
munist factions that "armed force is the only
possible way to capture political power."
Subsequent radio discussions of the merger
seemed to spell out Havana's approval more
clearly. in one of them, the Cubans appeared to
condone criticism of one of the major tenets of
Che Guevara's guerrilla strategy. During a radio
discussion in early March, a former PEP member
stated that the creation of the PUCH eliminated
in Haiti the "dogmatic trend which contends that
unity is only attainable after breaking out of the
guerrilla struggle." This seemed to be a criticism
of Guevara's view-frequently reiterated by Cas-
tro during 1966-67-that the guerrilla cadre
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(rather than urban groups) must form the nucleus
of the new political organ after the guerrilla vic-
tory.
Pravda followed on I I March with the first
Soviet comment. In a lengthy editorial, Moscow
admitted that the PUCH "has made the develop-
ment of the partisan movement in Ilaiti the cen-
tral problem," but pointed out that other "organ-
izational work" must also be performed.
The Cubans have appeared to concede some
major points while Moscow has publicly stated
that in at least one Latin American country. vio-
lent tactics are preferred. This concession by the
Soviets will probably in no way affect their ef-
forts to expand their influence in more important
parts of Latin America, and will probably make it
easier for them to deal with Castro.
Haiti may not be the only country in Latin
America where Moscow and Havana could work
out joint objectives and tactics. It appears pos-
sible now for their policies to be compatible in
most countries as long as the use of violent tactics
is not excluded. Castro has apparently taken the
first step in this direction, and reconciliation may
be possible with most other Latin American par-
ties. He would probably refuse, however, to sit
down with the Bolivian Communist leaders be-
cause of their refusal to assist Guevara. and there
are also several other parties that he probably still
prefers to shun.
In Venezuela and Colombia, reconciliation
will depend on how firmly Moscow applies pres-
sure and on how Castro appraises the prospects of
guerrilla groups in the field. In both countries, the
guerrillas are factionalized and weak; in any case,
it is no longer clear that they still take orders
from Havana. In Guatemala. where revolution-
aries have drawn considerable attention to them-
selves through a few dramatic acts, Castro would
probably insist on a major role in determining the
tactics of any coordinated effort. In general,'
it seems possible that Castro is now willing
in many cases to make the same concession he
made in 1964-of allowing Latin American parties
to determine their own tactics.
Havana's more moderate approach since
t =uevara's death results from at least four factors.
Without Guevara's Trotskyist influence, Castro
has followed his primary inclination, that of do-
mestic administration. Soviet pressure for moder-
ation has probably been accompanied by threats
of economic strictures for defiance and promises
of economic rewards for compliance. This lactic
has probably been particularly appropriate during
the last year or so because of the unusually poor
slate of the Cuban economy. The third factor
grows out of Castro's realization by the end of
1967 that his full energies and concentration
would be necessary to achieve -a 10-million-ton
sugar harvest in 1970-his long-stated central do-
mestic objective. Finally, Cuban policy in Latin
America has been moderated by the lack of pro-
mising radical leaders or guerrilla causes tospon-
sor.
The moderate course followed since
rillagroup, responsive to Cuban direction, were to
make decisive progress or if Castro thought he
could successfully interfere in an uprising similar
to the one in the Dominican Republic in 1965. A
rapid deterioration of Cuban-Soviet relations or a
sharp renewal in hostility between Cuba and the
US could also result in new Cuban initiatives in
Latin America.
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Although Castro seldom follows a course of
action without careful deliberation, he could de-
part from his present line out of anger or frustra-
tion as a result of international developments that
adversely affected Cuba. His handling of a recent
dispute with Venezuela, however, is probably
more indicative of his present mood of caution
and restraint. Castro did nothing to inflame the
issue last November when a Cuban fishing trawler
was captured and detained by the Venezuelan
Navy in an unsuccessful attempt to prove that it
had been engaged in subversive activities.
Despite these possibilities, however, it seems
more likely that Castro will follow his present
moderate course for at least another year or so.
He will be preoccupied with Cuban agricultural
problems, especially sugar production. No one in
his entourage is known to share Guevara's Trot-
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skyist views, and the present warming trend in
Cuban-Soviet relations is likely to continue. In
any case, Castro is apparently disenchanted or at
odds with the revolutionary groups he has sup-
ported in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Colombia,
and he probably does not believe that conditions
in most other countries are right for armed strug-
gle. At least until the end of next year's sugar
harvest, therefore, Castro is not likely to take a
significant part in new guerrilla initiatives or to
introduce any sizable escalation in Cuban support
of existing roues.
as ro will probably adhere gen-
erally to e concept of guerrilla action, but he is
likely to step in only when Cuban support is
desired and when he believes it could be deci-
sive.
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