WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007000050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 18, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Navy review completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
42
18 April 1969
No. 0366/69
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(Information as of noon EST, 17 April 1969)
VIETNAM
Although many Communist units are now refitting in
sanctuaries and border areas, the enemy has launched
a few heavy attacks. The Vietnamese Communists in
Paris are sending out mixed signals, but politicians
in South Vietnam have been busy reacting to President
Thieu's recent initiatives regarding the coming polit-
ical struggle.
LAOTIAN COMMUNISTS MAINTAIN OFFENSIVE PUSH
The Communists have captured a government outpost
astride the Mekong River in northwest Laos, while a
government operation in the Plaine des Jarres contin-
ues to make only limited headway.
CAMBODIA SEEKS TO LIMIT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY
The Cambodian Government appears to be carefully ap-
plying new pressure against Vietnamese Communist
forces in Cambodia.
Page
1
COMMUNIST CHINESE PARTY CONGRESS CONTINUES DEBATE
After two weeks of silence, Peking has broadcast its
first "interim" communique, a bland and uninformative
statement noting that both Lin Piao's political re-
port and the new party constitution had been adopted
"unanimously."
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NATIONALIST CHINESE HOLD TENTH PARTY CONGRESS
At the Kuomintang's recent tenth party congress,
President Chiang Kai-shek moved to revitalize his
party's leadership, a step apparently designed both
to strengthen the policy-making machinery and to
prepare the way for his chosen successor.
Europe
CZECHOSLOVAK PLENUM ELECTS HUSAK AS PARTY CHIEF
The newly elected first secretary--replacing Alex-
ander Dubcek--has been head of the Slovak party and
is a "realist" who advocates closer cooperation with
Moscow.
SLOWDOWN IN COMMUNIST OIL EXPORTS TO FREE WORLD
Soviet petroleum exports to the Free World are likely
to decline this year after failing to increase last
year for the first time since 1955.
GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE FOCUSES ON SEABEDS
The seabeds issue appears the most likely to gain US-
USSR cooperation, which the other countries at Geneva
recognize as the sine qua non of disarmament progress.
MOSCOW PUTS LITTLE STEAM BEHIND "EUROPEAN SECURITY"
In their propaganda, the Soviets even seem to be
adding further conditions to those set forth in the
Budapest declaration of 17 March.
NATO MARKS 20th ANNIVERSARY
At last week's 20th anniversary meeting in Washing-
ton, the NATO ministers expressed a cautious attitude
toward detente, emphasized intra-Alliance consulta-
tions, and reiterated the need for substantial con-
ventional forces.
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Middle East - Africa
NIGERIAN FORCES THREATEN BIAFRAN CAPITAL
Federal forces are threatening the Biafran capital,
and the organization of African Unity committee on
Nigeria meets this weekend, but no dramatic peace
moves appear likely.
STUDENT UNREST PERSISTS IN TURKEY
Student strikes, which began in Ankara over two weeks
ago and rapidly spread to other schools and univer-
sities throughout Turkey, involved an estimated 75
percent of the total higher education student body.
LARGE SOVIET NAVAL FORCE STILL IN MEDITERRANEAN
The ships and submarines that sailed into the Medi-
terranean from the Atlantic a week ago rendezvoused
with units of the Mediterranean squadron off the
Tunisian coast and then split into several groups.
PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT ACTS TO WIN POPULAR SUPPORT
President Yahya Khan's government is taking steps
to improve its popular image and to solve pressing
economic problems through a series of meetings with
leaders of industrial, labor, and student groups.
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Western Hemisphere
PERU'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT FACES ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
An exodus of competent personnel from the Central
Bank and an inflationary economic program could com-
bine to cause Peru further serious economic problems.
VENEZUELA'S PRESIDENT SPEEDS PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN
There is a possibility that President Caldera, in
his eagerness to claim credit for pacifying the coun-
try for the first time since 1962, may jeopardize his
relations with the military.
CUBA REACTS TO RISE IN CRIME
Shortages, austerity, and personal frustrations have
caused such an increase in crime that the government
has been forced to take a critical look at its law
enforcement apparatus.
JAMAICAN OPPOSITION SHOWS NEW VIGOR
The opposition People's National Party is attempting
to organize popular support as public dissatisfaction
with the government's performance continues to grow.
SEC.RE'I'
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The North Korean shootdown of a US reconnaissance aircraft over
international waters appears to have been a deliberate action designed to
revive a high level of tension with the US. In light of its experience in the
Pueblo affair, the Kim 11-song regime apparently saw a relatively low-risk
opportunity to score another propaganda triumph that would offset the
failure of its pressure campaign against South Korea. North Korea's imme-
diate call for a Military Armistice Commission meeting probably was in-
tended to forestall US retaliation and to provide a propaganda forum for
further charges of US aggression.
South Korean reaction to the incident has indicated an immediate
concern over US resolve to deal firmly with North Korean attacks. In Japan,
on the other hand, concern has been expressed that Japan might become
embroiled in a Korean conflict.
In South Vietnam, main force Communist units continue to refit in
sanctuary and border base areas. The enemy has, however, sought to cover
his general disengagement by launching a few heavy attacks against outlying
targets. In Paris, meanwhile, the Vietnamese Communists are sending out
mixed signals, probably in an effort to suggest some flexibility on their part
without actually abandoning any of their maximum positions.
After two weeks, the Chinese Communists have announced only that
their ninth party congress has "unanimously" approved the new party
constitution and the political report given by Mao's heir apparent, Lin Piao.
Peking has announced that discussions leading up to the election of a new
central committee did not begin until 15 April, suggesting that differences
between the various, party factions still have not been settled.
An increasing willingness on the part of local Cambodian officials to act
on long-standing instructions to limit Communist activities along the border
with Vietnam reflects Phnom Penh's growing preoccupation with the prob-
lem of the Communist presence. The change in the Cambodian attitude is
largely a result of heavier fighting along the border and increasing Commu-
nist encroachments in the southern half of Cambodia over the past several
years.
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VIETNAM
Many main force Communist
units throughout the country are
now refitting in familiar sanc-
tuaries and border bases. Even
so, the enemy has sought to cover
his general disengagement by
launching a few heavy attacks
against outlying targets, partic-
uarly in III and IV corps.
MILES
On the night of 10-11 April,
enemy troops launched rocket and
mortar attacks that caused heavy
allied casualties and damage to
military installations near Tay
Ninh city and to delta civilians
living in the capital city of Vinh
Long Province. More recently, the
enemy again attempted to demon-
strate his presence in the field
by launching a human-wave attack
on a US fire-support base south
of Tay Ninh city; more than 200
Communists were killed during the
ensuing battle.
Over the near term, it seems
like
ly the Communists will con-
tinu
e sporadic she,llings against
sele
cted allied targets and per-
haps
occasional ground assaults
such
as the one on the fire-sup-
port
base. The Communists are
not
now in a position, however,
to launch heavy, coordinated ground
attacks against major US installa-
tions throughout the country.
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
South Vietnamese politicians
have been engaged in an intensive
round of parleys since President
Thieu announced on 7 April that
he would head a new political
organization in the coming politi-
cal struggle with the Communists.
Thieu, however, has yet to make
clear precisely what he has in
mind.
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In addition to the likely
support of groups that have fa-
vored the government in the past,
such as Tran Quoc Buu's Vietnam-
ese Confederation of Labor, the
Catholic Greater Solidarity Force,
and the Nhan Xa Party, Thieu seems
to have acquired the support of
the Revolutionary Dai Viets, who
have generally been a key element
in opposition to the government.
Other possible supporters include
factions of the Vietnamese National-
ist Party (VNQDD) as well as ele-
ments of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai
sects. Another group that has
supported the government, Senator
Tran Van Don's National Salvation
Front, remains uncommitted, how-
ever, and has withdrawn from the
progovernment Lien Minh Front.
A number of politicians, in-
cluding some close to President
Page 3
Thiet., are concerned that the new
organization may develop into an
authoritarian party similar to the
Can Lao under President Diem. F_
A group of members of the Lower
House: who support the militant Bud-
dhists, meanwhile, has accused the
government of damaging national
unity by its handling of the Thich
Thier.L Minh case. Some of these
legislators have criticized alleged
differences between Thieu's words
and actions, pointedly accusing him
of a lack of tolerance of dissent
despite his pledge on 7 April to
allow a real opposition to operate.
The recent arrests of several al-
legec' members of a Viet Cong cell,
including the publisher of the Sai-
gon Daily News and a militant Bud-
dhist:, are bringing more of this
type of criticism.
President Thieu's initiative
has apparently encouraged several
opposition elements, particularly
liberal, southern-oriented groups
led by the Tan Dai Viets, to be-
gin closing ranks. One Tan Dai
Viet leader reportedly wants to
broaden his party--through mergers
with such groups as an element of
the I!oa Hao sect and the followers
of former chief of state Phan Khac
Suu--into a coalition to act as a
"loyal opposition."
Such mergers could produce an
opposition group of some substance,
and the largely southern character
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Apr 6 9
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SJ. :RL' `
of this organization might intensify (suggested that the Communists see
regional antagonisms because Thieu's a "peace cabinet" in Saigon as a
support so far comes mainly from transitional device in which the
northern and central Vietnamese Front need not be represented. In
elements. Thieu, however, has put several other forums, including the
a number of southerners in office, North Vietnamese presentation at
and he may be able to draw on his last week's plenary session of the
credit with them to offset this tend- talks, the Communists seemed to hint
ency to line up on a regional basis. that they might deal with the Thieu
Communist Negotiating Tactics
The Vietnamese Communists are
sending out mixed signals in Paris,
probably in an effort to suggest
some flexibility on their part with-
out actually abandoning any of their
maximum positions. They continue
to make the usual hard-line demands
such as the replacement of the Thieu
government, but on several recent
occasions they have dropped hints
of willingness to bargain.
Tran Buu Kiem, the Liberation
Front's chief delegate in Paris, told
a Communist interviewer last week
that the Front's demands are to be
"proposed" not "imposed." He also
government if it makes some basic
changes in policy. Sometimes they
suggest this could happen after some
minor reshuffling of the South Viet-
namese leadership, or even simply
after the Communists are satisfied
that Saigon accepts such broad gen-
eralities as "peace" and "independ-
ence."
These suggestions of modera-
tion may only be attempts to regain
propaganda ground lost as a result
of recent South Vietnamese peace
initiatives, but they may also be
intended to encourage new initiatives
on the allied side by holding out
the possibility of a favorable Com-
munist response,
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LAOTIAN COMMUNISTS MAINTAIN OFFENSIVE PUSH
The Communists have captured
a government outpost astride the
Mekong River in northwest Laos.
A series of enemy ground
assaults against government forces
at Pak Beng on 14 April brought
about the fall of the garrison
and two outlying defense positions.
This caps a seven-month enemy
effort to clear government forces
from the Nam Beng Valley. The
protracted siege may have been
designed to draw off government
guerrillas who have stepped up
operations against Lao and Thai
Communist elements along the
Thai-Lao border.
Communist forces have long
been able to move in the area
surrounding Pak Beng and to block
traffic on the Mekong, but the
opening up of the valley could
facilitate the passage of troops
and supplies into western Saya-
boury Province. The erosion of
the government's presence in this
area may also have an impact in
Thailand, where a Communist tribal
insurgency has made significant
inroads in the border area.
In the Plaine des Jarres to
the south, there has been no new
major fighting but a government
counteroffensive continues to make
limited headway. The Communists,
probably thrown off balance by
heavy air strikes, have so far
limited their response to a se-
ries of probing attacks against
the neutralist headquarters
at Muong Soui.
Pak 9eng
Nam Senp
A Ci S
Muong
Soui. Maim des
Jarres
VIENTIANE
( .j Comm- t controlled
tortory
Contested territory
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CAMBODIA SEEKS TO LIMIT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY
The Cambodian Government ap-
pears to be carefully applying new
pressure against Vietnamese Com-
munist forces in Cambodia.
Cambodian border elements
have fought several skirmishes
with Viet Cong and North Vietnam-
ese troops in recent months. Such
incidents are not without prece-
dent, but they are a clear sign
of growing tension in the border
areas. Local officials, includ-
ing at least one provincial chief,
have gone so far as to contact
their South Vietnamese counterparts
to discuss cooperation against
the Viet Cong.
The change in the Cambodian
attitude is largely a result of
heavier fighting along the bor-
der and the extent to which Com-
munist bases have proliferated
in the southern half of Cambodia
over the past several years.
i Problems
have arisen because the Communists
apparently have expanded bases
into new areas and built new
fortifications, thus upsetting
understandings reached long ago
with local Cambodian officials.
The Cambodians also believe the
Communists are supporting local
rebels.
The increasing willingness
of local Cambodian forces to act
on long-standing instructions to
limit Communist activities re-
flects Phnom Penh's growing pre-
occupation with the problem of
the Communist presence. Cambodian
news media have described Viet
Cong violations of the border in
greater detail than heretofore,
and Liberation Front representa-
tives have been maneuvered into
admitting publicly that such in-
cidents occur. By applying new
pressures against the Communists
now, while at the same time moving
toward a resumption of relations
with the US, Cambodia's Prince
Sihanouk is again trying to achieve
by political means what he has
been unable to gain by military
measures alone.
Cambodia also appears to be
setting the stage for its eventual
participation in a regional peace
settlement. Sihanouk has publicly
demanded representation when the
Paris talks discuss his country,
and he will certainly consider
evacuation of foreign troops his
primary goal.
For their part, the Com-
munists are trying to maintain as
cordial relations with the Cambo-
dians as possible. The recent
Cambodian actions do not seriously
threaten Communist bases in Cam-
bodia, and the Communists will
probably not react strongly
unless the Cambodians become more
aggressive .
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COMMUNIST CHINESE PARTY CONGRESS CONTINUES DEBATE
After two weeks of silence,
Peking broadcast on 14 April its
first "interim" communique on
developments at the party's ninth
congress. This communique, like
the one announcing the opening
of the congress, was bland and
uninformative, in general more
remarkable for its omissions than
for its positive content. No
speeches delivered at the congress
have yet been made public.
In an obvious effort to
counter speculation regarding
the silence that has enveloped
the meeting, the announcement
on 14 April pointed out that the
congress was meeting in plenary
session only for the second time
on that date; delegates were re-
ported to have been meeting in
small groups in the intervening
two weeks to discuss the new
party constitution and Lin Piao's
political report delivered on the
opening day of the congress.
Both the report and the consti-
tution were reported to have been
adopted "unanimously" at the sec-
ond plenary session.
Neither of these documents
seem likely to have been the sub-
ject of extended debate. The
new party constitution, which in
its final form almost certainly
closely resembles a "draft" that
has been circulating in China
since last autumn, is a vague and
loosely worded document setting
forth a number of general proposi-
tions regarding the role of the
party--in effect a political pro-
gram rather than a codification
of the party's by-laws. Some
discussion of the actual practi-
cal functioning of the various
party organs was undoubtedly re-
quired, given the highly general-
ized nature of the new constitu-
tion, but it is unlikely that the
wording of the document itself led
to sharp debate.
Nor does it seem likely that
the content of Lin Piao's politi-
cal report was closely questioned.
The speech was undoubtedly care-
fully reviewed by Mao and other
members of the leadership prior
to delivery, and in this sense
the speech itself was probably
sacrosanct. Debate was almost
certainly limited to the question
of how the "tasks" set forth in
the report were to be implemented.
In this area, however, considerable
differences of opinion may have
arisen. A muffled discussion on
how far and how rapidly to press
in implementing radical new pro-
grams surfaced in the press and
radio in the weeks prior to the
opening of the congress.
The item on the agenda al-
most certainly causing the most
trouble is the election of a new
party central committee. The jn-
terim communique reported that
discussions on this last major
issue were not to begin until 15
April. This, however, was almost
certainly a self-serving declara-
tion designed to conceal deep
cleavages on this important ques-
tion. Indeed, it seems likely
that the congress was due to con-
clude its work last weekend, and
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that adjournment of the meeting
has been postponed because the
conclave has become bogged down
on this still unresolved issue.
Provincial leaders have re-
peatedly complained that party
"core groups" cannot be properly
established at lower levels un-
til similar groups have been set
up at "higher"\ levels. The most
important of these higher level
party groups is, of course, the
central committee itself, and a
great deal is apparently riding
on the precise composition of
this body. Competing interest
groups unquestionably wish to
pack the committee with like-
minded allies; moreover, prob-
lems are probably also being
thrashed out involving the bal-
ance of the committee among mil-
itary figures, "rehabilitated"
officials who had been criticized
in the course of the Cultural
Revolution and younger party
members who had unreservedly
supported it from the outset.
A further area of contention
may involve the balance of pro-
vincial leaders to officials
whose duties are focused on Pe-
king.
The interim communique re-
ported that Mao Tse-tung, in
his opening speech on 1 April,
expressed the "hope" that the
congress would be one of "unity."
Thus far, it does not appear that
he is getting his wish.
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NATIONALIST CHINESE HOLD TENTH PARTY CONGRESS
President Chiang Kai-shek's
moves at the Kuomintang's recent
tenth party congress to revitalize
his party's leadership appear de-
signed both to strengthen the
policy-making machinery and to
prepare the way for his chosen
successor. Chiang's intent to in-
ject fresh enthusiasm and motiva-
tion into the party as a whole,
however, met with little apparent
success.
At the congress, the first
since 1963, Chiang named six new
members to the central standing
committee--the party's senior
policy-making body. Most of the
new appointees are young, econo-
mist-oriented technocrats. The
virtual exclusion of such experts
in the past contributed to a
gradual decline in the standing
committee's importance and rein-
forced the government's emphasis
on military priorities at the
expense of economic investment
and growth.
Chiang's action may reflect
a recognition that his son and
chosen successor, Defense Minister
Chiang Ching-kuo, will not be able
to command the unchallenged au-
thority that the Generalissimo en-
joys. President Chiang apparently
believes that the presence of a
group of energetic, competent of-
ficials will help balance the
conservatism of old-line Kuomin-
tang hierarchs and give the re-
gime's economic development pro-
grams the guidance and drive they
must have to succeed. Chiang
also created a new "advisory"
presidium that reportedly will
provide a graceful exit from ac-
tive party life for aged party
stalwarts.
Despite these moves to re-
vitalize the top level of party
leadership, the congress made no
move to lessen the domination of
the traditional mainland elements
in the party. Little was done to
increase the limited role of the
native Taiwanese, who constitute
84 percent of the island's popu-
lation but only 10 percent of the
congress' delegates.
The Nationalist congress was
legally scheduled for late 1961
and may have been delayed at least
initially because of President
Chiang's indecision over what to
do with the vacant post of party
deputy director general. Many
party officials had assumed that
the post would go to Chiang Ching-
kuo, but the Generalissimo instead
announced that he was abolishing
the position. Chiang probably
wanted to avoid not only the
"dynastic" implications of ap-
pointing his son to the post,
but also the potential risk of
creating a challenger to an or-
derly succession if someone
else were named. President
Chiang, in any event, appears
confident that his son already
has sufficient control of the
party apparatus to assure a
-smooth transition.
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Eastern European attention was centered on Czechoslovakia this week
as the party central committee grappled with the problem of responding to
Soviet pressures for restoration of orthodoxy. The Dubcek leadership has
not only been under attack for vacillation frorn greatly emboldened conserv-
atives but also from youth and workers for bowing to Soviet desires. As the
plenum opened, it looked as if most of the liberals would be ousted from the
leadership.
Top Polish and East German leaders conferred with Soviet Defense
Minister Grechko in East Berlin, probably about the situation in Czechoslo-
vakia and what the Soviets were doing about it. Grechko returned to Prague
before going home; Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov is still there
overseeing developments. The Warsaw Pact exercise involving Czechoslovakia
ended on schedule, 16 April, according to a TASS announcement.
Hungarian party chief Kadar in effect withdrew his conditional support
of the Dubcek leadership in a sharply critical public speech; later, he tried to
soften the blow by ratifying a friendship pact he signed with the Czech-
oslovak leader last June.
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CZECHOSLOVAK PLENUM ELECTS HUSAK AS PARTY CHIEF
The Czechoslovak party cen-
tral committee on 17 April elected
Gustav Husak as first secretary
of the Czechoslovak Communist
Party--replacing Alexander Dub-
cek. Husak has been head of the
Slovak party and is a "realist"
who advocates closer cooperation
with Moscow as the only possible
course.
the Czechoslovaks also succumbed
to pressures to streamline the
leadership to Soviet specifica-
tions by reducing the size of the
presidium from 23 to 11 members--
in the process removing from
power 11 of Dubcek's moderate
and liberal supporters.
Ithe
central committee has abolished
the executive committee of the
presidium--the "inner politburo"--
created last November.
The new presidium is domi-
nated by moderates who, like
Husak, believe that the Czecho-
slovaks must comply with Soviet
directives in order to prevent
the Soviets from cracking down
more harshly and narrowing the
already limited maneuverability
that the Czechoslovaks have in
pursuing their own domestic
goals. Dubcek was named to the
new presidium, but the outspoken
Josef Smrkovsky--the last remain-
ing progressive in the leadership--
was dropped.
Key members of the central
committee apparently gathered in
informal caucus on the morning
of 17 April to discuss the ques-
tion of leadership prior to con-
vening the crucial plenum in the
Page 12
afternoon.
On the eve of the plenum,
the Dubcek regime granted a clean
bill of health to ten prominent
pro-Soviet conservatives. Most
of these "rehabilitated" hard-
liners had been branded as
"traitors" and "collaborators"
by the public in the aftermath
of the invasion. Before the
plenum, the Dubcek leadership
came under strong attack for
its "vacillation" from Husak
Soviet Deputy For-
eign Minister Semenov apparently
is staying in Prague to observe
the proceedings and to maintain
pressure on the leadership.
Security forces prepared for
demonstrations. Interior Minis-
try officials on 16 April rounded
up and questioned thousands of
would-be dissidents. They de-
tained 138 people whom they prob-
ably consider potentially dangerous
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in the present s;t^.a-irn. The
police are hoping to intimidate
the people and head off trouble
by removing the "antisocialist
elements" they consider most
likely to generate it.
Earlier this week, students
in Prague staged peaceful strikes
in an attempt to persuade Dubcek
and his associates that they must
not cave in to the Russians. Un-
happily for the leadership, the
student declarations were uncom-
promisingly anti-Soviet in tone.
The students' reaction to the cen-
tral committee meeting is un-
predictable.
The trade unions had also
reiterated their support for
progressive policies and had
criticized the restrictive meas-
ures introduced earlier this
month, but the union leaders
have pledged cooperation with
the party and will try to avoid
stirring up anti-Soviet senti-
ments. Militant workers, how-
ever, might join the students
should the latter decide to
demonstrate.
SLOWDOWN IN COMMUNIST OIL EXPORTS TO FREE WORLD
Soviet exports of petroleum
to the free world are likely to
decline about ten percent this
year after failing to increase
in 1968 for the first time since
1955. Domestic demand and the
USSR's commitments to Eastern
Europe are rising rapidly at the
same time that the growth of So-
viet oil production has slowed.
Little expansion is likely in
Soviet exports at least through
the mid-1970s.
Total Communist petroleum
exports to the free world during
1969-70 probably will not signifi-
cantly exceed last year's level
of 51 million tons even though
exports from the Eastern European
countries, especially Rumania,
may increase. The share of free
world demand--excluding the US--
that Communist countries will
satisfy in these two years will
drop below its recent level of
five to six percent.
Soviet deliveries, which ac-
count for most Communist petroleum
exports to the free world, amounted
to 4:3 million tons in 1968, worth
about $540 million. Sales for
hard currency, principally in
Western Europe, increased slightly
to $375 million, while exports to
the less-developed countries de-
clined for the third straight
year.
Rumania accounted for about
one half of the eight million tons
of petroleum products exported
from Eastern Europe last year.
Although Rumania's sales in 1968
were derived largely from domestic
crude oil, probable increases over
the next few years will be sus-
tained primarily by crude oil im-
ported from the free world. The
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Communist Countries: Exports of Petroleum to the Free World, 1955-70
viet markets east of Suez.
In exchange, the USSR pro-
vided oil to the Western
oil companies at Black Sea
ports for delivery to their
markets in Europe. Ship-
ments to Western Europe
rose by 1.8 million tons,
and Communist countries
provided about the same
share of total oil sup-
ply to Western Europe--
nine percent--as in 1967.
The USSR may try to
preserve its free world
market position by ac-
quiring small quantities
of petroleum from na-
tional oil companies in
the Middle East and Af-
frica through the bar-
ter of industrial goods.
58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 1970
(est.) (prof.) (pro].)
other Eastern European countries
export petroleum products derived
mainly from Soviet crude; it is
unlikely that the USSR will permit
these countries to expand their
exports significantly, as this
would deprive the USSR of addi-
tional hard currency.
The increased cost of trans-
port resulting from closure of
the Suez Canal brought about a
total decline of about 1.1 mil-
lion tons in exports to Japan,
India, and Ceylon. The drop in
exports to Japan was about 800,000
tons, reducing the Communist share
of Japan's oil supply to about two
percent from more than three per-
cent in 1967. This decline was
lessened to some extent by the
arrangement of swap deals with
Western oil companies that pro-
vided oil to the USSR at Persian
Gulf sources for delivery to So-
Such an arrangement was reached
with Algeria last year. The USSR
may decide to deliver such petro-
leum to other less-developed coun-
tries to conserve its own oil for
sales to hard-currency countries.
The decline in Communist pe-
troleum exports to the less-de-
veloped countries is expected to
continue during the next few years.
A substantial decrease is antici-
pated in exports to Greece, which
recently concluded a long-term con-
tract with Western oil companies
for most of its oil requirements
through 1980. Although total So-
viet petroleum exports to Egypt
are expected to decline this year,
shipments of products rather than
crude may increase following ex-
tensive damage to the Egyptian
oil refinery complex at Suez.
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GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: FOCUSES ON SEABEDS.
The Eighteen Nation, Dis-
armament Committee (ENDC), after
four weeks of negotiations in
Geneva, seems ready to settle on
the drafting of a treaty restrict-
ing arms on seabeds as its most
feasible project. The conferees
want to retain the ENDC's effec-
tiveness as a disarmament forum
and to present a meaningful dis-
armament proposal to the UN's 24th
General Assembly when it convenes
next fall. The seabed issue ap-
pears the most likely to gain US-
USSR cooperation, which the other
countries at Geneva recognize as
the sine qua non of disarmament
progress.
At the outset of the ses-
sion, the matter deemed most im-
portant by the nonaligned nations
was a comprehensive test ban
treaty, but various US and Soviet
objections made it apparent that
this would not be readily obtain-
able. A new US proposal for a
cutoff of production of fission-
able material for weapons purposes
was rebuffed by the USSR as un-
workable. Other issues that ap-
pear to be nonstarters include a
package deal of various disarm-
ament measures, desired by the
Italians; nuclear-free zones,
brought up by Mexico and the East
Europeans; and a Soviet-proposed
agreement banning the use of nu-
clear weapons "for attack."
The Soviet draft treaty on
seabeds, introduced on 18 March,
proposes a ban--beyond the twelve-
mile limit--on the use of the sea-
beds for military purposes. All
installations on the seabed would
be open to inspection by repre-
sentatives of all signatory states
on a reciprocal basis. The draft's
broad sweep has raised a number of
reservations, but the Soviet rep-
resentative has argued that com-
plete demilitarization would fa-
cilitate settlement of such thorny
issues as verification. He con-
tended that if only nuclear weap-
ons were prohibited, any country
could reject verification requests
on the grounds that only conven-
tional facilities were involved.
The US has suggested prohibiting
only "nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction," and
also that verification be handled
by International Atomic Energy
Agency inspectors.
There have been indications
that. the Soviets are not inflex-
ible: on across-the-board demil-
itarization, and in any case are
willing to negotiate the issue.
The proposed treaty's geo-
graphic coverage--whether it
is defined by the twelve-mile
limit or by some other formula-
tiort--will probably provoke con-
troversy. In exchange for their
obligations under the NPT, how-
ever, the nonnuclear countries
are impatient to exact further
disarmament concessions from the
super-powers, and this will serve
as an incentive to agreement.
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MOSCOW PUTS LITTLE STEAM BEHIND "EUROPEAN SECURITY"
Moscow is keeping alive its
appeal for a European security
conference but is taking no steps
to bring the idea closer to re-
ality. In their propaganda, the
Soviets even seem to be adding
further conditions to those set
forth in the Budapest declara-
tion of 17 March.
A Soviet government state-
ment on the eve of NATO's minis-
terial meeting last week took a
more polemical tone and inflex-
ible approach than did the decla-
ration that the Warsaw Pact states
coordinated and signed. Unlike
the Budapest document, which
called for a preparatory meet-
ing "as soon as possible," the
USSR stressed that "serious and
effective work" on European se-
curity "is possible only on the
basis of recognizing the true
situation on the continent."
Moscow made clear that it
has not scaled down its standard
demands for recognition of post-
war borders, "two Germanies,"
the "separate entity" of West
Berlin, and the prevention of
West German access to nuclear
weapons--familiar prerequisites
that were in the Budapest appeal.
The Soviets added, however, that
Bonn must declare the Munich
agreement of 1938 to have been
invalid at its inception, and
they also implied that Bonn must
sign the Nonproliferation Treaty.
Soviet diplomats waited to
deliver the Budapest document to
Western capitals until the week
before the NATO meeting, but they
apparently had no instructions
to follow it up. They were at
pains to avoid specifics about
the conference called for in
the document and to leave vague
the key question of the US role.
Some Soviet officials, including
Ambassador Dobrynin in Washing-
ton, said that Moscow would not
veto US participation, but they
kept to the line that this was
a matter for the "Europeans" to
decide.
Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies
have also been active in push-
ing the proposal in the West.
They are just as vague as the
Soviets, however, and are often
contradictory in explaining key
points. Moreover, they are
adding conditions to the Buda-
pest appeal consonant with their
national interests.
Moscow sees merit in the
security conference idea, which
strikes a responsive chord among
the detente-minded in Europe
and fosters friction within the
Alliance. The Soviet press has
blamed the "Bonn-Washington axis"
for blocking progress on detente.
Over all, however, none of the
ambiguity has been removed and
nothing new has been added in
this most recent of Moscow's re-
current European security cam-
paigns. Moscow intends to keep
the subject nebulous, as was the
case with the Bucharest declara-
tion of 1966 and the Karlovy Vary
appeal of 1967.
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St; (JKii,' 1
NATO MARKS 20TH ANN]:VERSARY
The discussion at last week's
NATO ministerial sessions focused
mainly on the recent Budapest
"appeal" of the Warsaw Pact na-
tions for a European security
conference. Enthusiasm for de-
tente, which had seemed strong
earlier, waned following Moscow's
description of NATO on 9 April
as the "main obstacle to the safe-
guarding of international secu-
rity." As a result, the minis-
ters decided not to refer to the
Budapest appeal in their communi-
que. They advocated exploring
with the East "concrete issues
which best lend themselves to
fruitful negotiation and an early
resolution." US participation
in any European political set-
tlement was stressed.
Looking forward to an era
of negotiation--the communique
explicitly endorsed US-USSR dis-
cussions of strategic arms limi-
tations--the ministers called
for "strict adherence to the prin-
ciple of full consultation...be-
fore and during any negotiations
that might affect the interests
of the Alliance or any of its
members." The French refused to
agree to policy guidelines on
future East-West relations but
accepted a statement that the
members "would take into account"
these guidelines in forming their
national policies.
Among the other topics con-
sidered at the meeting was the
proposal for discussion of com-
mon social and environmental prob-
lems. The ministers instructed
the permanent NATO representatives
to examine means of improving
exchanges of views on these sub-
jects. They also remanded to the
permanent representatives the
proposal that deputy foreign min-
isters meet periodically to re-
view major, long-range Alliance
problems. The ministers of the
nations in the integrated command
deferred substantive questions on
Alliance defense posture to the
May meeting of the Defense Plan-
ning Committee, but they reiter-
ated the need for "sufficient,
substantial, and effective" con-
ventional forces.
The quadripartite dinner on
Berlin and German affairs--held
on the eve of each NATO minis-
terial meeting--produced some
debate when West German Foreign
Minister Brandt asked that the
communique include a sentence
rejecting the Soviet "thesis"
on intervention rights under the
enemy states articles of the UN
Charter. This Soviet contention
is a factor in West Germany's
reluctance to sign the Nonprolif-
eration Treaty. French Foreign
Minister Debre", citing Soviet
reticence on the subject in re-
cent months, doubted that the
climate was "seasonable" for re-
introduction of Western views
on the Soviet claim, a stand gen-
erally endorsed by the US and
UK. Lacking support, Brandt
dropped his request.
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SF C,RE"I'
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Artillery duels along the Suez Canal between Egyptian and Israeli forces
are now occurring nearly every day. Nasir's forces initiate most of these in an
apparent attempt to demonstrate to the other Arabs that Egypt is still in the
forefront of opposition to Israel and to bolster Nasir's position at home.
King Husayn's speech at the Press Club in Washington has been de-
nounced by all fedayeen organizations and has received a very cool reception
by the Arab press and radio.
The build-up of military forces along the disputed river boundary
between Iran and Iraq continues, although both sides probably want to avoid
open hostilities.
The Iranian Government is playing the
matter in low key publicly, but a minor incident on the river could provoke
a dangerous flare-up.
In India, a new constitutional amendment allowing the formation of
autonomous regions within states almost assures the early creation of the
Garo and Khasi-Jaintia substates in the hill areas of the eastern state of
Assam. Home Minister Chavan has refused to regard the measure as a
precedent for formation of additional autonomous regions-even for trou-
bled Andhra Pradesh where intrastate regionalism has led to violent demands
for separatism. He warned that such a trend would lead to the "disintegra-
tion of this country."
The Soviets are again searching for space recovery facilities in the
Indian Ocean. The government of Mauritius is considering a Soviet request
for aircraft parking rights, the temporary installation of communications
equipment, and permission to sail through Mauritian territorial waters.
The Central African Republic has announced the execution of Lt. Col.
Alexandre Banza, minister of state for public health, for attempting a coup
and the assassination of President Bokassa. Banza, principal architect of the
military take-over that brought Bokassa to power in 1966, had been un-
happy over a recent demotion in cabinet rank. Whether Banza actually
attempted a coup or Bokassa deliberately rid himself of a potential chal-
lenger is still unclear. Although a few presumably related arrests have been
re orted there have been no major repercussions in Ban i.
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OrIltSild - ~?
y
* .'
2nd Federal
Division - 0kig i
~."B/AFRA- [....
1 r __Calabar
CAMEROON
1iN KW RA
rbadan Makurdi
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Lagos \ ? city
nugo
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Orlu; ? Fe ral forces threathr-
iafran capital
o 50
MILES
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EQUATORIAL GU EA
FERNANDO PO
SECRET
Kano Maidugurie
c1R 1H KANO
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~NORTH_`~. ~-^._.?`l `~
CENTRAL(
\, Kaduna l0S NORTH EASTERN
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NIGERIAN FORCES THREATEN BIAFRAN CAPITAL
Federal forces are threat-
ening the Biafran capital of Umu-
ahia, whose fall would represent
a major psychological victory for
Lagos. Meanwhile, Nigerian and
Biafran delegations are attend-
ing a meeting in Liberia of the
Organization of African Unity
(OAU) Consultative Committee on
Nigeria, but prospects for a
negotiated settlement remain dim.
Elements of the federal 1st
Division have advanced to within,
seven miles of Umuahia, and early
this week Biafran civilians be-
gan to evacuate the town. It
appears increasingly likely that
the lst Division will capture the
town before long. As federal
pressure on Umuahia increases,
Ojukwu can be expected to move
his headquarters to a more secure
area.
Secessionist forces have held
their own on the other fronts, in-
cluding the south where the fed-
eral 3rd Division has been try-
ing unsuccessfully to relieve a
brigade trapped in Owerri since
February. Should the Biafrans
decide to wage a prolonged defense
of Umuahia, however, federal units
may well be able to make some
progress on the southern front.
There are no indications that the
static 2nd Division is about to
move from Onitsha.
The Nigerian military success
in the Umuahia area has probably
relieved some of the pressure on
the federal leaders, who had failed
to show any military progress since
September. New strains are devel-
oping in Lagos, however, as the
prolongation of the war has led
to a considerable amount of fi-
nancial corruption--high even by
Nigerian standards--among senior
members of the military.
Thus far, federal leader
Gowon appears untainted, and it
seems unlikely that there will
be a move against him at pres-
ent. A more serious threat
probably comes from the guilty
officers, including all three
division commanders, who may
well fear that Gowon will take
action against them.
On the diplomatic front,
neither Gowon nor Ojukwu opted
to go to the OAU meeting this
weekend, although both sent
delegations. African leaders,
including Emperor Haile Selassie
and President Tubman, have shown
increasing concern over the Ni-
gerian situation, but it seems
unlikely that any dramatic peace
moves will result. Lagos, bol-
stered by its recent military suc-
cess, will almost certainly main-
tain its insistence that Biafra re-
nounce secession before serious
peace negotiations begin. Biafra,
on the other hand, seems unlikely
to retreat from its demand for an
unconditional cease-fire as a pre-
requisite to substantive talks.
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STUDENT UNREST PERSISTS IN TURKEY
Student strikes, which be-
gan in Ankara over two weeks ago,
have rapidly spread to other
schools and universities through-
out Turkey. At their peak, it
is estimated that about 75 per-
cent of the total higher educa-
tion student body was involved.
Unlike the student boycotts last
spring, which concentrated pri-
marily on justifiable student
grievances, the current disturb-
ances have focused largely on
political issues, especially in
Ankara.
The primary target of the
leftist student leaders who have
organized and coordinated the
strikes appears to be the Demirel
government, although there has
also been some anti-American
propaganda. The student "Occupa-
tion Committee" at Ankara Univer-
sity openly admitted that it was
doing everything possible to
"erode the government's position."
From all appearances, the polit-
ical left is clearly exploiting
student discontent in an attempt
to strengthen its own position
in the forthcoming campaign lead-
ing to national parliamentary
elections in October.
Although the student boycotts
are widespread, the action has
primarily centered in Ankara.
Student agitation in Istanbul
has been generally muted except
for two clashes between student
extremists on 14 April. The stu-
dent body at Istanbul University
appeared to be reluctant to fol-
low Ankara's lead, although it
may be planning further political
action.
The important political par-
ties condemned the new student
strikes, but tried to get politi-
cal mileage from them. The major
opposition Republican Peoples'
Party (RPP) accused the ruling
Justice Party of capitalizing
on the student unrest to help
destroy democracy. In response,
Prime Minister Demirel charged
the RPP with provoking past dis-
orders and pledged that freedofi
of education would never be en-
dangered by the brute force of
a few.
There are increasing signs
that the current wave of stude*t
strikes may soon end, at least
until further action can be
planned. The six-day occupation
of buildings of Middle East Tech-
nical University--sponsored in
part by the US--was brought
to a speedy climax last Sunday
when gendarmes and riot police
ousted the students; several were
injured and about 100 arrested,
The six-day boycott in Adana in
southern Turkey ended quietly on
15 April after a promise to corp-
sider legitimate student demands.
The current halt may be
merely the lull before the storm
as student extremists are reported
to be increasingly emboldened in
their denunciation of the govern-
ment and their espousal of the
socialist cause. There are rumors
that student demonstrations are
being planned for 28 April on the
anniversary of the student riots
that preceded the military ouster
of the Menderes regime in 1960.
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LARGE SOVIET NAVAL FORCE STILL IN MEDITERRANEAN
The ships and submarines
that sailed into the Mediter-
ranean from the Atlantic a week
ago rendezvoused with units of
the Mediterranean squadron off
the Tunisian coast and then
split into several groups.
The flagship of the Northern
Fleet contingent--a Sverdlov-
class cruiser--and several other
Soviet ships are making a five-
day official visit to Annaba
(formerly Bone), Algeria. This
naval visit closely follows So-
viet President Podgorny's visit
to Algiers and may portend an ex-
panded use of Algerian port fa-
cilities by Soviet naval units.
Most of the Soviet ships
now in the Mediterranean--19 sub-
marines, 18 surface warships, and
16 support ships--are in the usual
Soviet anchorages and Egyptian
ports. There has been no major
naval activity thus far; some
four of the submarines and sev-
eral surface units probably will
leave the Mediterranean in the
next few days. Most of the ships
scheduled to leave the Black Sea
during the past week failed to
pass through the Bosporus.
25X1
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PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT ACTS TO WIN POPULAR SUPPORT
The new government of Presi-
dent Yahya Khan is continuing
its efforts to win the support
of those elements of Pakistani
society that participated in the
agitation against former presi-
dent Ayub Khan. Meetings have
been held with industrial, labor,
and student leaders, with em-
phasis being placed on the need
to revive the economy.
Deputy Martial Law Admin-
istrator Nur Khan, whose respon-
sibilities apparently include
labor, conducted a series of
meetings with labor leaders in
both East and West Pakistan in
an attempt to formulate plans
for settling grievances. On 5
April at Rawalpindi, he met with
members of the Joint Labor Coun-
cil--a group representing sev-
eral labor unions from West
Pakistan--and a labor repre-
sentative from East Pakistan.
In Dacca on 9 April, Nur
Khan assured labor leaders in
the east wing of the country that
workers would receive the wage
increases agreed to by employ-
ers prior to the imposition of
martial law, even if the in-
creases had been won by force.
He warned, however, that if the
wage rates eventually established
for various industries by gov-
ernment committees were lower
than the rates achieved through
Page 26
compulsion, the workers would be
obliged to return overpayment's.
Nur Khan also met with student
leaders on 9 and 10 April in
Dacca, where he received a copy
of their long-standing proposals
for reform. The present govern-
ment, however, is unlikely to
be sympathetic to some of these
proposals, such as autonomy for
East Pakistan.
On 12 April, another deputy
martial law administrator, Ad-
miral Ahsan, announced that the
support price for wheat would be
lowered and that the issue price
of government wheat in both prov-
inces would also be reduced. He
claimed the lower prices would
not reduce farmers' income be-
cause of higher production and
would significantly benefit the
population, which spends a high
proportion of its income on food.
He also reaffirmed President
Yahya's earlier statement that
foodgrain requirements for East
Pakistan would be met by ship-
ments from the West.
In an apparent move to create
a more favorable popular image
for his new government, Yahya Khan
on 13 April dismissed Altaf Gauhar
as secretary of the Ministry of
Information. Gauhar had been one
of former president Ayub Khan's
closest advisers and had become a
symbol of the former government.
In East Pakistan, meanwhile,
authorities disciplined two in-
dividuals for alleged excesses in
enforcing law and order, perhaps
in an effort to demonstrate that--
despite stringent martial law regu-
lations--the government's primary
concern was the protection of the
common man.
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With the Easter holidays over, activity began to pick up in Latin
America this week.
Separate terrorist incidents in the Dominican Republic in the last ten
days have claimed the lives of at least four members of the security forces
and left others seriously wounded. Communist terrorism is becoming such a
problem that it will provoke military reprisals and further complicate politi-
cal conditions.
The secretary general of the Chilean Communist Party told a party
meeting last week that the Communists cannot hope to win the 1970
presidential election alone. His speech was directed primarily at the Social-
ists, whose candidates the Communists have supported in recent elections
and who in general espouse a more extremist line than do the Communists.
He added that his party would support an alliance of "popular forces"
including the Radical Party, now under the control of leftist leaders, and
parts of President Frei's Christian Democratic Party.
The 13th meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America began in Lima, Peru, on 14 April. Trade and development
problems will be the general topics of discussion, but developed nations'
policies toward Latin America will come under considerable fire. For the
first time since Peru severed relations in 1959, an official Cuban delegation,
led by central committee member and key economic adviser Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez, is visiting the country. In a bitterly anti-US speech, he blamed
the US for all the economic ills of Latin America. Also present are observers
from the Soviet Union and some East European nations.
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PERU'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT FACES ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
An exodus of competent per-
sonnel from the Central Bank and
an inflationary economic program
could combine to cause Peru fur-
ther serious economic problems.
Most of the professionals on
higher level staffs of the Cen-
tral Bank have been dismissed or
have resigned to protest charges
related to the controversy over
the International Petroleum Com-
pany (IPC); some have taken asylum
in Latin American embassies in
Lima. This not only lowers the
competence of the bank, but also
has shaken the confidence of in-
ternational lenders.
On 10 April, Finance Minis-
ter Morales Bermudez outlined
his financial program, which will
do nothing to stem inflationary
pressures in Peru. The US Embassy
comments that the program demon-
strates that Peru's financial af-
fairs now are in the hands of of-
ficials who not only do not under-
stand the magnitude of the prob-
lems facing them but also are
blithely confident that the un-
realistic schemes they are devel-
oping are adequate to meet the
situation.
Morales Bermudez' program
includes a sizable deficit in
the 1969 budget, which he stated
would be financed without direct
recourse to the Central Bank and
without a resultant increase in
inflationary pressure. He also
stated that the budget must be
used to achieve development ob-
jectives, regardless of whether
it is balanced. He promised a
loosening of credit without un-
duly increasing liquidity, and
stated that financial austerity
would not be necessary. These
plans are not likely to be in
accord with standby loan require-
ments set by the International.
Monetary Fund.
In addition, foreign credits,
which dried up in anticipation of
imposition by the US of economic
sanctions under the Hickenlooper
Amendment, have not been forth-
coming as the government had
hoped. There is no evidence that
foreign lenders are eager to deal
with Peru as long as the threat
of sanctions remains.
Negotiations between Peru
and the US over compensation for
expropriation of some facilities
of IPC are expected to resume
in about ten days when a Peruvian
delegation arrives in Washington.
The delegation will be led by,Gen-
eral Fernandez Baca, who is had
of the state-owned petroleum com-
pany. One of President Velasco's
extreme leftist advisers reportedly
is to be a member of the delega-
tion. Velasco continues to rep-
resent the deferral of economic
sanctions as a great victory for
Peru.
Poland's ambassador to Ven-
ezuela, in commenting to the press
on the establishment of diplo-
matic relations between Peru and
Poland, said he saw "great possi-
bilities" for profitable economic
contacts between the two countries.
Despite such pro forma statements,
it is unlikely that any great in-
crease in trade will occur soon.
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VENEZUELA'S PRESIDENT SPEEDS PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN
The Caldera government is
continuing its efforts to bring
an end to insurgent activities
in Venezuela.
On 10 April, President Cal-
dera announced that the govern-
ment has accepted the offer of
a distinguished group of Vene-
zuelan citizens led by the Roman
Catholic cardinal of Caracas to
act as a mediator between the
government and the rebels. The
committee will seek guarantees
for the guerrillas in return for
pledges that all guerrillas in
the country will lay down their
arms. The decision to accept
this offer was undoubtedly aimed
at bringing about complete paci-
fication of the country, a goal
that the new government has given
highest priority.
The government for its part
probably hopes that talks with
guerrilla leaders will further
widen the split among their
followers between those favor-
ing a cease-fire and those who
want to continue armed action.
The MIR is seriously di-
vided over what course to fol-
low. A special plenum of the
party has been called this week
in eastern Venezuela to discuss
the debilitating effects that the
government's pacification program
is having on the guerrillas. MIR
leaders fear that the government
may try to split the party by sud-
denly legalizing it while nego-
tiations are going on. Although
some government officials are
said to favor such a tactical
move, the action would probably
cause considerable unease among
military and political figures
who take a dim view of the gov-
ernment's negotiations with the
rebels.
Although they were willing
to go along with the government's
decision to legalize the Commu-
nist Party last month, they see
a vast difference between re-
storing constitutional guarantees
to a party that has abandoned
armed struggle, and one that con-
tinues insurgent activities and
has the gall to present impos-
sible demands to the government
before agreeing to a cease-fire.
There is a possibility that Cal-
dera, in his eagerness to claim
credit for pacifying the country
for the first time since 1962,
may take actions that could
jeopardize his relations with
the military.
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CUBA REACTS TO RISE IN CRIME
The growing incidence of
crime throughout the island has
forced Cuban leaders to review
the effectiveness of the nation's
law enforcement apparatus.
Crime--ranging from vandalism
and draft-dodging to arson and
murder--has been increasing be-
cause of shortages of food and
consumer goods, increased aus-
terity, and frustration brought
about by the heavy demands made
on the population. Recent state-
ments by regime spokesmen indi-
cate a deep concern that may lead
to stringent countermeasures.
The serious nature of the
problem was first made public
last September when Fidel Castro
complained of mounting juvenile
delinquency and acknowledged that
more than 70 major "counterrev-
olutionary acts" had taken place
in the preceding six months. His
promise "that heads would roll"
was followed shortly by the execu-
tion of two men accused of set-
ting a warehouse fire that re-
sulted in alleged losses of 1.5
million pesos. This harsh ob-
ject lesson apparently had only
a temporary deterrent effect.
To address the problem on
a broad scale, the Vice Ministry
of Internal Order of the Interior
Ministry organized meetings in
its units to discuss all types
of crime including such minor
offenses as traffic violations,
worker absenteeism, and various
kinds of "antisocial acts" in-
volving "hippies." The meetings,
which began at the local level
in January and had progressed up
through the regional and provin-
cial levels by mid-March, were
attended by representatives of
the mass organizations who con-
tributed "constructive criticism."
In late March, a National Forum
on Internal Order was held in
Havana with key regime officials
presiding.
Speeches delivered by Presi-
dent Osvaldo Dorticos and In-
terior Minister Sergio del Valle
gave clues as to what measures
were being considered. New laws
will broaden the application of
capital punishment; technical re-
sources for crime prevention and
detection will be improved; or-
ganizational changes will be made
within the Vice Ministry of In-
ternal Order; and pressure will
be exerted on religious groups
whose teachings interfere with
the Cuban revolutionary process.
Also, stress will be placed on
social work performed primarily
by the mass organizations; com-
missions will be set up to study
the unification of the various
law enforcement agencies; codifi-
cation of laws will be studied
in an effort to create uniformity
of sanctions; and the Interior
ministry will involve itself more
in educating the public on the
ministry's role in Cuban society.
Despite the Castro regime's
use of the term "counterrevolu-
tionary" to describe any activity--
political or criminal--that is
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SE.CRET
at variance with its aims, there
is no evidence to suggest that
crime in Cuba today represents
an organized effort to undermine
stability and present a political
challenge to the government. No
matter what measures the regime
may adopt, crime will probably
remain a problem as long as the
current depressed economic condi-
tions persist and as long as the
government provokes frustration 25X1
and discontent by demanding total
conformity of the individual with
the goals of the revolution ~~
JAMAICAN OPPOSITION SHOWS NEW VIGOR
The opposition People's Na-
tional Party (PNP) is demonstrat-
ing increased vigor under its
new leader, Michael Manley.
Early this month, the 44-year-
old Manley, who succeeded his
father as party chief in Febru-
ary, announced the formation of
a shadow cabinet "designed to
reflect the aims and goals of a
PNP government." There are 16
ministries in all, the three
most important of which--Exter-
nal Affairs, Defense, and Labor--
are held by Manley himself.
Manley has also allocated
to his top party lieutenants new
responsibilities for organizing
popular support. This move is
in line with Manley's expressed
interest in encouraging collec-
tive leadership in contrast to
the traditional one-man rule of
Caribbean political leaders.
There is evidence that pub-
lic support may be shifting to
the PNP. In recent elections
for local officials throughout
the country, the PNP led the in-
cumbent Jamaica Labor Party in
popular votes for the first time
since 1959. In the last gen-
eral elections, held in 1967,
the vote was fairly evenly di-
vided between the two parties.
Although Prime Minister
Shearer is not scheduled to
face the voters again until
1972, elections might be called
earlier if divisions within his
own party should result in de-
fections from the government
ranks. The PNP is already capi-
talizing on the government's in-
ability to cope with serious
crime. Shearer, whose own home
was fired at recently, has
charged that subversive elements
are responsible for the current
wave of violence, but there is
no evidence to substantiate this
allegation. According to the US
Embassy, general reactions in
the Kingston area range from jit-
ters to fear.
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