WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007000020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 28, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00700 20001-4 -
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
D
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
N
'141 RE CORDS CEAT.KK
Lti14IEDIATELY AFTER USE
a0B2 2 '1: ff 2 7 Box L`.? C ITV!_T_, R, .CDII )
1'x_,1'..". ? ITT TO
AGENCY ARU U V E ,
Secret
44
28 March 1969
No, 0363/69
0-
,
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 Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO07000020001-4
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(Information as of noon EST, 27 March 1969)
Far East
Page
1
VIETNAM
3
The
five
the
aggressive Communist campaign has gone on
weeks, with indications it will continue
same pattern of shellings, ground probes
for
along
and
civilian terrorism. Allied sweep operations
have
for the moment slowed the Communist timetable
but
significant numbers of enemy troops remain in
posi-
tions threatening allied bases and. cities.
LAO GOVERNMENT BEGINS AIR OFFENSIVE
The government is taking steps to blunt anticipated
enemy moves in the northeast.
THAILAND RECONSIDERS ITS FOREIGN POSTURE
Foreign Minister Thanat is actively considering ways
to broaden Thailand's foreign policy options.
INDONESIAN PRESIDENT SEEKS BETTER ADMINISTRATION
President Suharto is looking for ways to consolidate
his control over the army, apparently in order to
make the-military-dominated government more respon-
sive to national needs.
SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFRONTATION EASES
No shooting has been reported in the area of the
disputed island in the Ussuri River since 19 March,
and the situation there appears to have stabilized.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 9
EUROPEAN TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION SHOWS SOME PROMISE
Recent developments in the British-Dutch-German gas
centrifuge project demonstrate the great potential
of European technological cooperation, but programs
such as the Concorde and the multi-role combat air-
craft are evidence of its problems.
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CZECHOSLOVAK FACTIONS MANEUVER TO GAIN SUPPORT
Progressives and conservatives within the regime
leadership are continuing their efforts to gain addi-
tional support before the next party plenum.
FRENCH NAVY UNDERTAKES MODERNIZATION
One aircraft carrier is presently being modernized
and two others are scheduled for modification. Mod-
ernization of the carriers and other ships seems to
signal renewed government interest in upgrading the
navy's capabilities.
EAST GERMANS REPORTEDLY WANT TALKS WITH BONN
East Germany reportedly has sounded out West German
officials privately concerning the possibility of
direct East-West German talks.
BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FACES CRUCIAL TEST
The future of the Social Christian - Socialist
coalition remains in doubt as opponents seek to
alter the government's program, the core of which
is constitutional revision. The coalition may not
be able to muster the necessary two thirds majority.
SPANISH GOVERNMENT RESCINDS EMERGENCY RULE
Madrid's lifting of the state of emergency is a con-
cession to moderate officials who argued that the
decree was an excessive reaction to the unrest.
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Middle East - Africa
25X1
AYUB SEEKS MILITARY SOLUTION TO PAKISTAN'S PROBLEMS
President Ayub Khan's resignation and the imposi-
tion of military rule have calmed civil strife for
the moment, but much will depend on the reaction of
the East Pakistani population, whose grievances
will not be easy to satisfy.
JORDAN'S NEW CABINET SIGNIFIES LITTLE SHIFT IN POLICY
King Husayn's new government will probably continue
his present foreign and domestic policies, and is
apparently designed to strengthen his own position.
TOURE MOVES AGAINST POTENTIAL RIVALS IN GUINEA
President Sekou Toure claims to have crushed a plot
against his radical regime, amid signs of increased
dissatisfaction both within the armed forces and the
civilian populace.
Western Hemisphere
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GOVERNMENTAL CONFUSION PERSISTS IN BRAZIL
The Costa e Silva government continues its uncoor-
dinated and somewhat haphazard efforts to accomplish
its announced goals.
Mounting urban violence highlights the deteriorating
security conditions in Jamaica despite increased ef-
forts by police and military authorities to restore
order.
BRITISH PROBLEMS IN ANGUILLA
The British have been unable to obtain any signifi-
cant cooperation from the Anguillans during the
second week of their occupation, and their action
has met with mixed reactions in the Caribbean.
URUGUAYAN PRESIDENT FACES CONTINUING FRUSTRATIONS
A rebellious Congress, an active Communist labor con-
federation, and depressed economic conditions will
test President Pacheco's governmental abilities dur-
ing the next few months.
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There are indications that the Communists intend to carry their spring
offensive, now in its fifth week, well into April. The enemy has continued to
concentrate on allied military installations, using rockets and mortars to
strike targets from he Demilitarized Zone to the delta. Allied sweep opera-
tions have disrupted enemy plans to stage attacks in the Saigon area but a
large body of enemy forces remains east and west of the city.
President Thieu's statement that South Vietnam is willing to hold
private talks with the Liberation Front appears to have been calculated
primarily to counter criticism in the US of Saigon's attitude in the negotia-
tions. Two weeks prior to this statement, Thieu told South Vietnamese
legislators that it is now unrealistic to try to negotiate with the Communists
and that time is on the government's side.
The stiff ten-year prison term given militant youth leader Thich Thien
Minh has apparently led to tentative steps far renewed contacts between
militant and moderate Buddhists. Many political leaders believe that the
harsh sentence will set back efforts to achieve; national unity by deepening
antagonisms between Buddhists and Catholics.
The situation in the area of the disputed island on the Sino-Soviet
border appears to have stabilized. Any serious dialogue on border problems
seems unlikely, however, inasmuch as China would probably insist on prior
Soviet admission that the 19th century treaties establishing the present
frontiers are "unequal treaties." The immediate issue that sparked the
clashes probably will be eased in a few weeks when spring floods on the
Ussuri River inundate the disputed island.
An intensive air campaign has been launched in Laos to disrupt Com-
munist offensive capabilities near the Plaine des Jarres. The air strikes may
upset the enemy's timing, or cause the Communists to concentrate on
defending their rear areas. The heavy strikes, directed against positions that
have been inviolate up to now for political reasons, could, however, trigger a
sharp enemy response.
Thai Foreign Minister Thanat believes Bangkok must minimize its
dependence on the US and develop a more "independent" foreign policy.
These moves are based on a Thai belief that it would be prudent to plan for
the possibili of a reduced US security commitment as a result of a Vietnam
settlement.
25X1
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 SECRET
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CAM BOD1JA
PHu0c
inh
LONG
KIE
IAN'
Saravane
LAOS
'Loc
H NH
BINH
UONG
CJ IN
N
TUOI' . -. GC,
,
X~Al,~ C}ho
I, OAbINH
AVERAGE STRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
VC NVA
Battalion 200-400 300-500
Regiment 1,000-1,500 1,200-2,000
Division 5,000-7,000 5,000-8,000
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LONG
}c HANH
?-Hu0c j
TUY ,
' Ban Me
\ Thuot,
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VIETNAM
The aggressive Communist
campaign has gone on for five
weeks and indications are that
the enemy intends to continue
it into April. A flurry of co-
ordinated country-wide enemy
shellings last weekend followed
much the same pattern of previous
high points in this offensive.
For the most part, the enemy
concentrated on allied military
installations, using rockets and
mortars to strike targets from
the Demilitarized Zone to the
delta. Damage and casualties suf-
fered by the allies in these at-
tacks were relatively light.
Some stiff ground fighting
also took place in connection
with the shellings, but more as
a result of allied spoiling op-
erations than of enemy initiatives.
The bulk of the ground action oc-
curred in the southern provinces
of I Corps and in the districts
surrounding Saigon. Several sig-
nificant clashes south of Da Nang
and around Quang Ngai city resulted
in heavy enemy losses.
Allied sweep operations, in
III Corps have, at least tempo-
rarily, short-circuited enemy plans
to attack targets in the provinces
nearer to Saigon. Fairly heavy
casualties occurred on both sides
in several encounters resulting
from allied pre-emptive attacks.
Nevertheless, a large body
of enemy forces remains east and
west: of Saigon. At least six reg-
iments, some 8,000 men, are holed
up near the Michelin rubber plan-
tation. The Michelin area is
situated on the Saigon River cor-
ridor and is important to Commu-
nist: strategy for staging future
attacks.
The cities of Saigon, Hue
and Da Nang remained relatively
free of Communist activity. The
Communists, however, have begun
to increase pressure on rural
populated areas in various parts
of the country. Refugee centers
in is Corps and in the western
highlands have been hit by in-
tensified enemy shellings and
ground probes. As a result,
civilian casualties have risen.
Dependents of the government's
territorial security forces, and
hamlet and village officials,
seem to be special targets for
assassination.
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
President Thieu's offer to
hold. private talks with the Lib-
eration Front is the most forth-
coming public statement he has
made on this subject. Thieu told
newsmen on 25 March that South
Vietnam is willing to talk pri-
vately with the Front in Paris
and that this willingness has al-
ready been made known to the Com-
munists. The President is prob-
ably concerned about the prospect
of growing criticism of the war
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in the US and he may also expect
that this announcement will help
bring his own countrymen further
along toward acceptance of the
idea of serious talks with the
Front.
The stiff ten-year prison
term given to militant Buddhist
youth leader Thich Thien Minh
has apparently led the rival mod-
erate Buddhist faction to take
tentative steps toward renewing
contacts with the militants. F__
Militant Buddhist leaders are
continuing to move cautiously and
have indicated that they do not
plan, at this time, to organize
protest demonstrations over the
Thien Minh case. They are planning
a country-wide propaganda campaign,
however, aimed at mobilizing the
faithful by stressing the theme
that the government's actions
represent Catholic oppression of
the Buddhists. They have also
lodged a protest with the National
Assembly and plan formally to ap-
peal Thien Minh's conviction to
the Supreme Court.
Public reaction to the Thien
Minh case by Saigon political lead-
ers, meanwhile, has been relatively
mild. President Thieu's announce-
ment softening the nature of Thien
Minh's confinement has apparently
tempered some criticism of the
government. Influential Senator
Tran Van Don, however, issued a
statement--which probably represents
widespread popular feelings--ex-
pressing "concern" and calling on
the government and the militants
to seek a "mutually acceptable
solution." In private, many poli-
ticians have expressed a belief
that the militants cannot generate 25X1
any effective mass support because
they are divided internally and
have suffered a significant decline
in prestige in recent years. Many
leaders seem to feel, however, that
the harsh sentence will cause a
setback in efforts to achieve na-
tional unity by deepening the
antagonism between Buddhists and
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LAO GOVERNMENT BEGINS AIR OFFENSIVE
The government is taking
steps to blunt anticipated enemy
moves in the northeast.
An intensive air campaign
has been launched to disrupt Com-
munist offensive capabilities
near the Plaine des Jarres and
present plans call for at least
three more weeks of heavy strikes.
US and Lao pilots have reported
a large number of secondary ex-
plosions resulting from their
attacks.
The Communists have moved
cautiously since capturing Na
Khang over three weeks ago, but
the loss of the base was a severe
psychological blow to Meo guer-
rillas operating in the northeast.
The fall of a number of govern-
ment outposts in recent weeks
has been more a result of sagging
morale than of enemy ground as-
saults. In addition, government
efforts to establish a defensive
line southwest of Na Khang have
been complicated by the movement
of large numbers of tribal ref-
ugees into the lightly defended
government positions.
The air strikes may upset
the enemy's timing, or cause the
Communists otherwise to forgo of-
fensive actions in order to de-
fend their rear areas. On the
other hand, the heavy strikes,
directed against positions that
have been inviolate up to now for
political reasons, could trigger
a sharp enemy response.
Communist-controlled
territory
Contested territory
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THAILAND RECONSIDERS ITS FOREIGN POSTURE
Foreign Minister Thanat is
actively considering ways to
broaden Thailand's foreign policy
options.
Thanat referred to the need
to win Thai public support for
his foreign policy. This sug-
I gests that one objective of his
current soundings is to find a
way to make Thailand's funda-
mental alignment with the US more
palatable to critical elements
in and out of the government.
Pressure from those who believe
that the leadership is too closely
associated with the US will al-
most certainly increase under the
new constitutional setup. Thanat
probably also calculates that a
demonstration of Thai restiveness
will strengthen Bangkok's hand
in its relations with Washington.
Aside from these limited
purposes, it is clear that Thanat,
as well as other Thai leaders,
believes that the time has come
for Bangkok to take a hard look
at its staunchly pro-US posture.
The Thai are far from sanguine
that they can find another course
more advantageous to their in-
terests, but they fear that the
US security commitment to Thai-
land may be reduced as a result
of a Vietnam settlement and that
it would be prudent to plan for
that ossibilit .
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INDONESIAN PRESIDENT SEEKS BETTER ADMINISTRATION
President Suharto is looking
for ways to consolidate his con-
trol over the army, apparently
in order to make Indonesia's mili-
tary-dominated government more
responsive to national needs.
With the anti-Communist se-
curity program well in hand, Su-
harto wants actively to begin
creating the bases for rebuild-
ing the nation. He is especially
anxious to strengthen the direc-
tion of the government's vital
five-year economic development
program, which is to get under
way next month. Because the in-
efficient and inadequately trained
civilian bureaucracy is unable
to administer many of the govern-
ment's programs effectively, he
may plan to rely on army chan-
nels more than previously.
Suharto made it clear to a
recent conference of army com-
manders that he wishes to con-
solidate the army structure by
restoring the general staff as
the primary military authority.
In recent years, partly because
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Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
of operational necessity, much
of this authority has passed to
regional commanders, particularly
those in Java, and to Suharto's
personal assistants. Suharto
apparently sees centralization
as a means of improving admin-
istration and of moving against
army corruption and malpractices,
thus reducing some of the ci-
vilian resentment caused by the
army's pervasive control.
Despite Suharto's concern,
army leaders appear more concerned
with perpetuating their predomi-
nant: power than with easing civil-
ian resentment. These men are
aware, however, that there are
civilian elements highly critical
of their absorption of power.
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SING-SOVIET BORDER CONFRONTATION EASES
No shooting has been re-
ported in the area of the dis-
puted island in the Ussuri River
on the Sino-Soviet border since
19 March, and the situation there
appears to have stabilized.
During the past week, Pe--
king has shown little interest in
continuing propaganda exploita-
tion of the border conflict, and
probably believes it has already
made a strong case regarding
ownership of the island. Chinese
commentary on the clashes has
all but ended and there have been
no anti-Soviet demonstrations in
China for almost two weeks.
Soviet propaganda output is
still voluminous with the accent
largely on patriotic themes.
There is also a hint of a shift
in focus from the disputed island
to the larger issue of border de-
marcation. On 20 March two So-
viet newsmen privately informed
US Embassy officials that a state-
ment on the border situation was
being preparedthat would express
a willingness to discuss broader
boundary demarcation problems as
well as a solution to the disa-
greement over the disputed island.
Although no statement has yet
come forth, Moscow might profess
a willingness to negotiate in or-
der to gain a propaganda advan-
tage. The Russians, however, un-
doubtedly realize that Peking
would demand a Soviet recognition
of the 19th century treaties es-
tablishing the present frontiers
as "unequal treaties" before en-
tering into any border negotia-
tions. A Chinese Foreign Ministry
statement on 10 March denounced
Moscow for refusing to concede
this point during the boundary
talks in 1964. As a result, any
serious dialogue on border prob-
lems seems unlikely. Spring floods
will inundate the island in a few
weeks and reduce the chance of
further clashes.
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Soviet media have begun to criticize the US decision on antiballistic
missiles more openly, but this treatment does not mark a loss of Soviet
interest in strategic arms talks. In private, Soviet officials have also favored
getting on with the talks.
Within the Communist world, Moscow had to deal with two major
problems of long standing. The Sin.o-Soviet border continued to be the
subject of intense Soviet military and propaganda attention, although no
new shooting incidents have been reported over the past week.
In Moscow, representatives of 67 Communist parties met to try to agree
on the agenda document for the world Communist conference. The Soviets
were able to fix a date-5 June-for the conference. The communique
showed, however, that differences remained over the main draft document,
and still another preparatory meeting had to be scheduled for 23 May.
The East Germans are up to their old tricks again. Claiming their
cessation of interference with German travel to Berlin is a "concession,"
they have been putting out feelers to Bonn concerning the possibility of
direct talks.
The Poles have indicated to the chief of the West German trade mission
in Warsaw that they want to continue last January's political discussions,
although at this point the talks are not likely to go beyond sounding out
Bonn. Whatever the purpose of this approach, it will be another aggravation
to the irritable Ulbricht who considers any contacts between his neighbors
and Bonn as countering his efforts to gain acceptance for East Germany.
Warsaw Pact commander Yakubovsky and his chief of staff have been
in Bulgaria since 24 March. He could. be on an inspection trip or discussing
plans for Soviet-Bulgarian military exercises-either a smaller command-post
type soon, or something for later in the year, after the spring thaw, involving
large ground force units.
Bonn's Defense Minister Gerhard Schroeder, restive over the Grand
Coalition, helped kick off the long political year when he hinted he was
ready to replace Chancellor Kiesinger, a fellow Christian Democrat, after the
September election.
The lines are drawn for a showdown between the liberal and Stalinist
wings of the Finnish Communist party at its 15th Congress on 3-6 April.
Battles loom over a new party program junking the dictatorship of the
proletariat, new by-laws, and a purge of recalcitrant old-timers.
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EUROPEAN TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION SHOWS SOME PROMISE
Developments in recent weeks
reveal the potentially great bene-
fits of European technological
cooperation, but at the same time
they show the difficulty in ad-
ministering joint enterprises
across national borders.
As a result of the progress
made at recent meetings of Brit-
ish, Dutch, and West German sci-
ence ministers, the three nations
now plan to draft a final. agree-
ment by summer which provides for
their mutual construction and
management of a gas centrifuge
facility to produce enriched
uranium. The centrifuge method
is expected to be cheaper than
any other process used in Europe,
and the three partners hope to
take the lead in filling Europe's
rapidly growing need for enriched
uranium.
Representatives of the three
nations met to discuss the proj-
ect for the first time only last
November. They have reached
agreement in a remarkably short
time, probably because of the
potential benefits, the mutual
desire to strengthen British ties
with the Continent, and the ease
of merging the national programs
already under way. The British,
Dutch, and Germans expect to in-
vite other countries to loin
them but only after the formal
agreements have been signed. Al-
though some oroblemshave vet to
be resolved, construction is ex-
pected to begin soon on centri-
fuge plants in Britain and the
Netherlands, and the administra-
tive offices of the consortium
will be in Germany.
In contrast, however, other
European cooperative ventures
are faced with continuing diffi-
culties. The successful maiden
flight of the Anglo-French Con-
corde on 2 March assures that the
two countries will continue, at
least on a limited basis, efforts
which began in 1962 to develop a
supersonic transport. Actual pro-
duction of the Concorde neverthe-
less will depend on the results
of tests in the next year or so.
Skepticism about the economic via-
bility of the aircraft abounds
in both Britain and France, and
London will be judging the proj-
ect in terms of its likely con-
tribution to national prestige
and the ailing economy.
Joint efforts to develop
a "European" combat aircraft like-
wise seem increasingly entangled
-.n the web of national self-inter-
est. West Germany, Britain, Italy,
and the Netherlands joined other
NATO countries last year in cal--
ing for a multirole combat air-
craft that could effectively meet
their needs beginning in the mid-
1970s, but Belgium and Canada
decided not to join the consor-
tium. The four members have
agreed to a cost-sharing scheme
but neither Britain nor West Ger-
many thus far has been willing
to forfeit the leading role in
engine production because of ex-
pected benefits to its own indus-
try. The British have hinted at
withdrawal from the consortium
unless their Rolls-Royce entry
is selected, and the Germans are
seeking to preserve a special con-
tract they have with America's
Pratt and Whitney by pressing
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for the use of its engine. A
similar problem arose over air-
frame design leadership, but it
was solved by an agreement to
produce two versions.
Other mutual technological
ventures--for example, the Eu-
ropean space programs ELDO and
ESRO, the Symphonie satellite
project, and the proposed airbus--
promise rewards for Europeans.
They also currently promise a
re etition of familiar problems.
25X1
CZECHOSLOVAK FACTIONS MANEUVER TO GAIN SUPPORT
Progressives and conserva-
tives within the regime leader-
ship are continuing their efforts
to gain additional support before
the next Czechoslovak party
plenum takes place.
Prominent liberals and their
moderate supporters are attempt-
ing to allay popular fears that
more reforms will be sacrificed
to satisfy Moscow's lust for
"normalization." They have in-
dicated publicly that a date for
national elections will be an-
nounced in June, and that the
controversial enterprise law,
under which the workers hope to
acquire greater participation
in management through workers'
councils, will be enacted before
July. In addition, Zpravy, the
illegal proconservative publica-
tion, will evidently be discon-
tinued in the future, and the
public prosecutor is preparing
a case against illegal pro-Soviet,
proconservative pamphleteers.
Premier Hamouz traveled to Mos-
cow to discuss CEMA questions
and bilateral issues. These
talks may have been connected
with the postponement of a cen-
tral committee plenum on economic
problems which had been tenta-
tively set for late March. In-
dra probably also briefed the So-
viets on whatever progress the
conservatives may have had in
extending their influence within
the security, police, and defense
establishments.
The Soviets are encouraging
these efforts by expanding where
possible their contacts within
the Czechoslovak military estab-
lishment. Deputy Defense Minis- 25X1
ter Stangl discussed the strength-
ening of Czechoslovakia's Air
Force and its antiaircraft defense
system during a visit last week
to the USSR. On 24 March, a So-
viet military delegation from the
Carpathian Military District ar-
rived in Bohemia "to spend a week
Meanwhile, conservative
party secretary Indra and Deputy
with troops" in the Western Mil-
itary District.
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FRENCH NAVY UNDERTAKES MODERNIZATION
The French Navy reportedly
d
id
d
be under a separate
command
ec
e
recently to modernize
structure--do not benefit th
its aircraft carriers extensively
and continue their operation into
navy.
e
the late 1970s. Such a major
The air
ft
modernizati
cra
carrier Arro-
on program, if not
manches
resentl
i
d
too limited by a shortage of
funds, would seem to be a signal
of renewed government interest in
'
p
y
s un
ergoing
major overhaul of all machinery
and catapults. The attack car-
rier Foch is scheduled for over-
upgrading the navy
s capabilities
Like th
th
haul and modernization in 1972.
This would provide special weap-
e o
er conventional
ons-handlin
e
ui
m
t
l
French
forced
i
forces, the navy has been
to accept limited budgets
g
q
catapults to ac
clear-capable J
p
e
commo
aguar
n
,
onger
date the nu-
aircraft
s
nce
de di
1960 when the nuclear force
i
b
now under development, and in-
ssuas
on
egan receiving
stallation of a
new command and
priority treatment. The major
control system similar to that
portion of the present French
fl
of the US Navy.
Similar modifica-
eet was completed in the 1950s.
Since then, except for Continu-
tions apparently also are sched-
uled for the attack carrier
ing construction of submarines
and frigates, the navy has been
forced to curtail its procure-
Clemenceau.
The navy's
best
capabil-
ment programs severely and to
concentrate primarily on main-
ities are in su
submarine warfa
bmari
re
ne and anti-
The Fre
h
tenance and limited moderniza-
recently comple
.
ted a
nc
second
tion. Expenditures on the nu-
guided-missile
frigate and re-
clear submarine force--which will
fitted a second
and
third destroyer.
SELECTED FRENCH NAVAL INVENTORY'
Combatant Ships
Aircraft Carrier 4 Submarine
19
Cruiser 2 Submarine Chaser
15
Destroyer & Destroyer Escort 47 Amphibious (major)
5
Guided Missile Destroyer 4 Minesweeper (major)
86
Guided Missile Frigate 2
Combat-Type Aircraft
Fighter Aircraft 90
Helicopters 43
Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft
ASW Carrier-Based 67 This is a partial naval inventor
y and
does not constitute the entire h
ASW Land-Based 62
oldings
of the french Navy.
Helicopters 51
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These ships will provide addi-
tional Malafon antisubmarine
missiles and low frequency sonar
capability to the French fleets.
The guided missile frigates also
are equipped with the French-built
Masurca surface-to-air missile.
Three other destroyers are sched-
uled for the Malafon conversion
and the navy has begun construc-
tion of the first two of four
5,000-ton antisubmarine corvettes,
which should begin to reach the
fleet in the mid-1970s.
France also has continued
its submarine construction pro-
grams. Nine submarines have
been completed since 1960. When
two more, which were launched
this year, are completed the in-
ventory of conventional subma-
rines will be 21.
The navy is weak in mine
warfare, amphibious operations,
and a:Lr defense. Continued
lack of personnel, modern ma-
terial, and training probably
will :Further reduce these ca-
pabilities. The modifications
of the aircraft carriers, the
acquisition of a new interceptor
aircraft, and Masurca SAMs, how-
ever, should improve the navy's
air defense capability.
One of the principal tasks
of the French fleet has been to
support the nuclear test center
in the Pacific. Cancellation
of the 1969 nuclear test series,
however, will reduce the scale
of support this year and lessen
the navy's expenditures. Whether
the navy will be allowed to re-
tain these savings and use them
for other programs is problemati-
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EAST GERMANS REPORTEDLY WANT TALKS WITH BONN
East Germany reportedly has
sounded out West German officials
privately concerning the possi-
bility of direct talks.
Details are lacking, but
Foreign Minister Brandt informed
the British on 11 March that he
had received information that
Pankow wants to hold discussions
at the state secretary level.
Another official in Bonn has
stated that the feelers are sim-
ilar to those of last August. At
that time, preparations were made
for meetings between the economic
ministers, but the plans were can-
celed after the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia.
In a probably related move,
the East Germans now are trying
to present themselves as being
conciliatory on Berlin issues.
Pankow has ceased harassment of
Berlin transport and its propa-
ganda alleging production of
military goods in the city, and
has reopened East German water-
ways to Berlin traffic. In re-
turn for these "concessions" in
stopping its aggressive diplo-
macy, Pankow requested that Bonn
grant it economic concessions.
The real motives for Pankow's
willingness to adopt a "concilia-
tory" approach on Berlin issues
remain in doubt, especially in
view of reports that Moscow pres-
sured the East Germans to cease
their interference and propaganda.
The East Germans may be merely
seeking to make the best of what
they considered a bad deal handed
them by the USSR.
There is also some doubt
that Pankow is actually seek-
ing genuinely productive dis-
cussions with Bonn. The East
Germans still insist that Bonn
must meet certain preconditions
before relations can improve.
Party chief Walter Ulbricht
stated on 22 March, for example,
that a modus vivendi between
Bonn and Pankow would be pos-
sible only when both are recog-
nized to have "fully equal rights."
He also added the usual caveats
that relations can be normalized
only when Bonn renounces its
claim to represent all Germans
and recognizes existing borders.
Whatever other motives may
be behind East Germany's tenta-
tive approaches to Bonn, fear
of a West German - Soviet deal
at its own expense is ever pres-
ent. The East Germans presumably
know that Bonn is seeking at
least to reopen a "dialogue"
with the Soviets. Pankow may
hope to persuade Moscow that
such an exchange is futile by
having its own direct negotia-
tions with the West Germans and
then posing such obstacles that
talks will be fruitless. U1-
bricht's remarks suggest at the
least that any negotiations be-
tween East and West Germany will
be difficult ones.
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BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FACES CRUCIAL TEST
The future of the Social
Christian - Socialist coalition
under Prime Minister Eyskens re-
mains in doubt as political and
public interest groups seek to
adapt or amend his government's
program.
The core of the program is
a long-pending revision of the
constitution intended to promote
cultural autonomy of Belgium's
two major ethnic communities,
the Dutch-speaking Flemings and
the French-speaking Walloons.
No date is in prospect for a
parliamentary vote on this and
on the equally controversial
economic decentralization bills,
but most observers doubt that
the coalition can muster the
necessary two thirds support for
the constitutional revision.
cess in the lackluster elections
of March, 1968 and, within the
last month, he has moved more def-
initely toward the Francophones
on several important current issues.
Although he has called for
"political renewal" and labeled
the present party structures as
outmoded, he probably will be con-
tent to create an ad hoc coalition
from among existing party wings
behind a more or less pro-Walloon
but moderate program. He has al-
ready won plaudits from the Walloon
wing of his Social Christian Party,
as well as a pledge of support from
the divided Liberals. The Brussels
branch of the Socialist Party also
seems to be moving toward him. At
the same time, however, the power-
ful Flemish Social Christians and
the non-Brussels Socialists have
become increasingly critical-of him.
The major stumbling block
for the government is the op-
position Liberal Party, which
the Socialists prevented from
participating in the drafting
of the reform program. Conse-
quently, the Liberals intend to
boycott parliamentary considera-
tion of the bills. The coalition
may be able to pick up votes from
Liberal mavericks, and thus get
a quorum in parliament, but these
gains will no doubt be offset
by defections from within its
own ranks.
Meanwhile, Eysken's prede-
cessor, Pierre Vanden Boeynants,
is quietly gathering support in
the largely Francophone Brussels
area for a possible comeback bid
if and when Eyskens falls. Vanden
Boeynants scored an impressive suc-
Another area of concern for
the government is student unrest
which has appeared on several cam-
puses this spring, but for the
moment at least, it does not
threaten the government's stability.
In a wave of incidents on 18 March,
however, demonstrators for the
first time this year protested
alleged police brutality and called
for "greater democracy" in higher
education. This suggests that stu-
dent radicals may be attempting to
play up local grievances in order
to carry out their long-delayed
plan to create trouble on all cam-
puses. Although a wave of student
dissidence might divert public at-
tention from Eyskens' troubles in
parliament, it could also conceivably
lead to the government's collapse,
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SPANISH GOVERNMENT RESCINDS EMERGENCY RULE
The lifting this week of the
state of emergency, declared in
January, is a victory for moder-
ate officials who believed that
the decree was an excessive re-
action to the student and labor
unrest and that it harmed Spain
internationally.
The decree had given the gov-
ernment special powers of arrest
and censorship. In announcing
the decision to lift it, the min-
ister of information said it was
no longer required because the
subversive outbreaks had stopped.
He warned, however, that the gov-
ernment would immediately reim-
pose the restrictions in the event
of further disturbances.
The government undoubtedly
was influenced in its timing by
the celebration on 1 Aoril of the
thirtieth anniversary of the end
of the civil war. Madrid report-
edly was also apprehensive that
continuing the state of emergency
would adversely affect the bases
agreement negotiations that re-
sumed this week in Washington.
In addition, the government prob-
ably wanted to avoid criticism of
the decree from the large group
of foreign journalists attending
the Eurovision festival in Madrid
on 29 March, fearing that such
criticism could hurt tourism.
The state of emergency did
serve to warn discontented ele-
ments that the government was pre-
pared to take strong measures to
maintain order. During the emer-
gency the government moved to in-
crease its legal powers to deal
with unrest. It sent to the tortes
a bill providing for wide discre-
tionary powers for full or partial
mobilization of enterprises, prop-
erty, and persons as required for
war or "exceptional situations."
The government also arrested
a number of dissident students;,
professors, labor leaders, law-
yers, priests, and other political
oppositionists. Most were re-
leased and the few who were exiled
to remote provinces presumably now
will be free to return home. Au-
thorities broke up several Commu-
nist groups in the Barcelona area.
The universities of Madrid and,
Barcelona were closed for a time
but have reopened.
The two months of strict
censorship may make the press
more cautious, especially the
newspapers that had publicized
criticism of the government's
inflexibility. The information
minister announced that the gov-
ernment was dropping the require-
ment to submit material for cen-
sorship prior to publication, but
it still has other ways--developed
since the press law went into af-
fect in 1966--to discourage cr t-
icism.
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Israeli leaders continue to express apprehension over the Four-Power
talks now under way. Arab leaders, however, are more optimistic. Jordan's
King Husayn probably hopes, during his state visit to Washington from 8-10
April, to receive a sympathetic hearing for Jorrdan's requests for military and
political assistance.
The pattern of Israeli air attacks on Jordan over the past two weeks
indicates that the Israelis have adopted a new policy of "preventive" attacks
on Arab commando bases and concentrations. Minister of Defense Dayan
recently stated that Israeli forces must hit tt..e guerrillas "before they cross
the border and before they reach a supermarket."
Pakistanis are accepting the imposition of martial law calmly and, in
some circles, with relief. Thus far, the military has maintained a low profile,
with few troops in evidence in the cities. Yahya Khan and his administration
appear to be moving with dispatch, having already rushed food shipments to
East Pakistan where critical shortages were developing.
Indo-Nepalese relations continue to be strained by growing nationalistic
sentiment in Nepal, but Kathmandu has indicated a genuine desire to restore
the usually cordial relationship, and appears to have signaled New Delhi for a
conciliatory Indian response.
In Nigeria, there has been no significant change in the military situa-
tion, although fighting has intensified on all fronts. One federal division has
started an attack in the north, and the Biafrans continue to hold a federal
brigade under siege in Owerri in the south. Meanwhile, Biafran leader
Ojukwu is apparently willing to meet with British Prime Minister Wilson
when the latter visits Nigeria.
Early reports from Equatorial Guinea indicate that the withdrawal of
Spanish forces and citizens is proceeding without incident and will be
completed by next week. President Macias last week rejected a moratorium
on the withdrawal of the 260-man Guardia Civil proposed by a representa-
tive of UN Secretary General Thant. Economic deterioration caused by the
Spanish evacuation is likely to contribute to further instability.
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AYUB SEEKS MILITARY SOLUTION TO PAKISTAN'S PROBLEMS
National affairs in Pakistan
are in a state of suspension fol-
lowing President Ayub's resigna-
tion, the transfer of authority
to army chief Yahya Khan, and the
imposition of martial law early
this week. The transition seems
to be smooth and has thus far been
accepted calmly throughout Paki-
stan.
Ayub announced his decision
in an emotional nationwide broad-
cast Tuesday evening. In proclaim-
ing martial law, Yahya stated that
the constitution had been abrogated,
the national and provincial assem-
blies dissolved, and important gov-
ernment officials deposed. Yahya
addressed the nation on 26 March,
urging cooperation with his re-
gime and warning that agitational
and destructive activities would
not be tolerated. He emphasized
that it was his sole intention to
bring the country "back to sanity"
and restore conditions conducive
to the establishment of constitu-
tional government. He gave no hint
of when he expected this to be ac-
complished.
Yahya was accorded the top
position because he heads the
largest of the armed services .r
Ayub's military commanders,
who allegedly met with him for
eight hours on Monday, probably
influenced his decision to step
down. The consensus may have been
that Ayub, as the focus of na-
tional discontent, would have to
withdraw from the scene before any
effort could be made to grapple di-
rectly with the insurrectionary sit-
uation in East Pakistan. At any
rate, it seems likely that the move
was dictated by the supposition that
able political solution could
a work
not be accomplished at this stage.
The imposition of martial law
was greeted with calm and acquies-
cence throughout the country and
with considerable relief in many
parts of West Pakistan. Urban areas
in both East and West Pakistan are
quiet, and daily life near normal;
few troops are in evidence. Reac-
tions from rural areas have not yet
filtered into the cities. Few news-
papers have thus far carried edi-
torial comment and opposition lead-
ers have eschewed public statements.
Whether Yahya and the military
establishment can succeed where
Ayub failed remains to be seen, par-
ticularly since they too are mostly
West Pakistanis. They should have
little trouble handling the resid-
ual unrest in West Pakistan but
their task in the East--where the
military symbolizes West Pakistan's
long-time domination--will be more
difficult. The military leaders--
who had been reluctant to intervene
in the civil disorder--will prob-
ably have to respond as necessary
to the actions of the aroused East
Pakistani population.
At the moment, military rule
appears to be intended as a stopgap
measure to restore order and, if
possible, to permit the holding of
national elections. Continuation
of the chaos, however, might con-
vince the military leaders that rep-
resentative government is a luxury
Pakistan cannot yet afford and that
they must rule the country them-
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.JORDAN'S NE
CABINET SIGNIFIES LITTLE SHIFT IN POLICY
King Husayn's new cabinet
represents no major shifts in
Jordan's domestic or foreign pol-
icies, but seems to indicate an
effort by the King to strengthen
his own position in both areas.
The new premier, Abd al-
Munim Rifai, is an experienced
diplomat who could be extremely
helpful to the King in any Arab-
Israeli peace negotiations that
might develop. Rifai, who served
as Jordan's UN representative
and was foreign minister in the
cabinet dissolved last week, is
considerably more astute and
sophisticated than his predeces-
sor. He has already been active
in talks with UN emissary Jarring
as well as in dealings with Cairo
regarding a possible settlement.
The remainder of the cabinet
is basically a new line-up of old
faces. The political coloration
of its members seems to indicate
the King's desire to commit var-
ious elements of the population
to his own policies. The new
interior minister and deputy
premier represents a prominent
Bedouin family, while other cabi-
net members are West Bankers.
Two ministers are suspected mem-
bers of the Arab socialist Baath
Party, but most major figures
are considered to be generally
pro-Western. The new minister
of national economy is said to
be one of his country's most able
technicians.
The cabinet reshuffle is
not apparently related to King
Husayn's forthcoming visit to
Washington, but rather seems an
effort to strengthen his hand
regarding a peace settlement.
Rifai is probably the most compe-
tent aide Husayn could pick to
represent Jordan. He will also
certainly follow the King's
wishes in any future discussions.
As always, the locus of
power in Jordan remains with
the King. His tenuous accom-
modation with the terrorist
groups is still holding and will
probably continue unless some
settlement excluding the Palestin-
ian question is achieved. Husayn
has long walked the tightrope
of authority within his own
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TOURE MOVES AGAINST POTENTIAL RIVALS IN GUINEA
President Sekou Toure has an-
nounced the crushing of an "impe-
rialist-fomented subversive plot,"
amid signs of increased unrest
within the military and of growing
popular dissatisfaction. In a de-
termined effort to forestall any
move by dissident elements against
his radical regime, Toure has
launched a massive, carefully or-
chestrated antisubversion campaign.
A number of army personnel and
civilians have been arrested, in-
cluding at least one cabinet of-
ficer.
Haranguing a crowd of over
50,000 militants in Conakry on 21
March, Toure claimed the leader of
the plot was Colonel Kaman Diaby,
the deputy chief of staff of the
armed forces. Diaby had long been
considered to be the person most
capable of leading a revolt. His
arrest, however, may have been a
precautionary move by Toure rather
than the result of any evidence of
plotting. The commanders of the
minuscule air force and navy are
also in custody. Rigid security
measures have been imposed, includ-
ing police roadblocks throughout
Conakry.
Close associates of the key
individuals involved have also been
arrested, especially those close to
Diaby. The government claims that
Toure and other government leaders
were to have been assassinated
while visiting a military camp in
middle Guinea, traditionally an
area of Fulani tribal opposition.
Several officers of the camp are
under arrest. Two former political
rivals of Toure, both Fulanis, have
also been detained presumably be-
cause they are considered to be po-
tential rallying points for a
Fulani opposition. A revolutionary
tribunal has been set up, and'the
scenario probably now calls for a
show trial.
Tensions have been building in
Guinea ever since the military; coup
in neighboring Mali last November.
Believing the Mali coup to be rrench-
inspired, Toure now believes that a
similar fate is being planned for
him, and he has already linked' those
arrested with Paris. The discon-
tent in the military may stem, how-
ever, primarily from tightening
party control over the army rather
than from outside influences. Re-
duction of military profession4lism
by party interference and the lack
of promotions for both officer$
and NCOs has produced a potentially
volatile combination.
The latest charges are being
met with unusual skepticism by
Guineans at all levels, and coisid-
erable open discontent is evid nt.
Ten years of party indoctrinat4on
and unkept promises have produced
widespread apathy and disillusion-
ment, and the regime is finding it
difficult to marshal popular enthu-
siasm.
Although the elements of Vio-
lent change seem present, Tour 's
feverish activities, the intensified
security measures, and the party's
pervasive informant system will make
it difficult for antiregime el~ments
to coalesce. Any would-be plotters
would also have to overcome the
1,200-man Republican Guard, an~autono-
mous military unit directly res1ponsi-
ble and apparently loyal to To re.
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The British have been unable to obtain any significant cooperation
from the Anguillans during the second week of their occupation of the
Caribbean island. Lord Caradon, Britain's minister of state for foreign affairs
and now acting ambassador to the UN, and a senior official from London are
being sent to the island to review the situation. One of their main problems
will be handling Ronald Webster, the self-proclaimed president of the island,
with whom the British have not yet come to terms.
Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera fulfilled one of his campaign
promises this week by legalizing the Communist Party, which was outlawed
in 1963 during the wave of terrorism preceding the elections of that year.
The government reportedly is also trying to get the other extremist parties-
the Castroite Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the dissident
Communist Armed Forces of National Liberation-to give up their guerrilla
effort. Some members of the MIR apparently are favorably disposed toward
the government's idea, but certain preconditions set down by them will
probably be unacceptable to the government. The military will undoubtedly
have the final say in any discussions that may develop.
Ecuadorean students and professors, led by extreme leftists, demonstra-
ted in downtown Quito on 25 March in commemoration of the third
anniversary of the military occupation of Central University-Ecuador's
largest. The military intervention in the university in 1966 led to the junta's
downfall four days later. It is possible that the students may hold another
demonstration on 29 March to mark the anniversary of the junta's ouster.
The Central American Common Market has emerged from its present
crisis probably stronger than before. Action has been taken on pending
protocols and agreement was reached on a plan to improve the functioning
of the market. However, details of this plan have not been worked out, and a
number of basic problems remain. F7 I
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GOVERNMENTAL CONFUSION PERSISTS IN BRAZIL
Brazil's Costa e Silva gov-
ernment continues its uncoordi-
nated and somewhat haphazard ef-
forts to accomplish its announced
goals.
Political punishments are
still being meted out--the latest
list issued on 13 March stripped
96 more persons, mostly state dep-
uties, of their political rights--
and there is no sign that the
process is nearing its conclu-
sion. Justice Minister Gama e
Silva told the press that more
purges will occur "whenever per-
sons who may oppose the ideals
of the revolution are found." He
also said his ministry is review-
ing needed alterations in the 1967
Constitution, the electoral laws,
and the political party statutes.
Government decree laws and
complementary acts, often contra-
dictory and vague, appear fre-
quently. On 21 March, the Presi-
dent issued a new law extensively
altering the 1967 national secu-
rity law by broadening still fur-
ther the definition of "crimes"
against national security and by
increasing penalties for offend-
ers. The new law gives the gov-
ernment a better legal basis for
acting against terrorists. it
is also aimed, however, at the
press and other communications
media, and it prohibits not only
false and tendentious news but
also any "truncated or distorted
true fact."
Considerable confusion has
followed in the wake of the an-
nouncement on 27 February of In-
stitutional Act 8, which set down
procedures for streamlining ag~ar-
ian reform processes. Although
the act should have been published
within four days, it is still be-
ing "revised," presumably under
pressure from conservative land-
owners, to remove "radical" ex-
propriation measures. The govern-
ment is once again clearly cauc--t
between the desire of some to use
its extensive powers to push ahead
with social reform and the feeling
of others that the strong forces
opposed to change must be placated.
Also contributing to the gov-
ernment's indecisive performance
is the still-unresolved struggle
for power at the top. Maneuvering
within the upper echelons of gov-
ernment has continued as various
military leaders and cabinet mem-
bers jockey for position. There
has been some speculation that the
President wishes to stay in office
beyond his legal term--which ends
in March 1971--and any such move
on his part would almost certainly
set off a major internal political
crisis.
Although Costa e Silva appears
more firmly in control than he has
been in several months, he has re-
mained wary of doing anything that
could precipitate another confron-
tation with hard-line military
leaders. For example, in a bland
speech on 15 March, he outlined
the economic accomplishments of
his government but avoided setting
forth any timetable for a return
to a democratic facade. He also
moved cautiously with the touchy
problem of military promotions
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and reassignments, trying to de-
fuse potential troublemakers with-
out offending them.
It is possible that this er-
ratic style of governing will con-
tinue for some time. There is no
apparent threat to the administra-
tion :From the beleaguered and dis-
organized opposition forces, and
Costa e Silva will probably manage
to maneuver within the bounds set
by the military. Such a situation
does not hold much promise, how-
ever, for the development of strong
and progressive government Poli-
cies.
POLITICAL OPPOSITION CAPITALIZES ON JAMAICAN SOCIAL UNREST
In spite of recurrent tur-
moil and long-term social griev-
ances in Jamaica, until recently
neither of the major political
parties had appeared much con-
cerned about problems of civil
unrest. Since the riots last Oc-
tober, however, public attention
has focused on internal security
conditions.
Mounting urban violence high-
lights the deteriorating security
conditions in Jamaica despite in-
creased efforts by police and mil-
itary authorities to restore
order. During the past month
Kingston and Montego Bay have
been plagued by a series of fires
of suspicious origin and a dra-
matic increase in the crime rate.
In a departure from his customary
relaxed stance, Prime Minister
Shearer recently established a
new anticrime police squad and has
called publicly for an end to
violence. Meanwhile, Michael Man-
ley, the leader of the political
opposition, has urged the crea-
tion of a crime commission on
grounds that "violent crime has
risen to the point where there now
is understandable public hysteria."
Although several US and for-
eign personnel have been assaulted
by black Jamaicans, white foreign-
ers are not the only targets; at
least two prominent Jamaicans were
recently attacked. The possibility
nevertheless exists that some per-
sons are being stirred up by black
power advocates or other radicals.
Racist: groups have become increas-
ingly active in Jamaica during the
past. year and appear to have con-
tributed to a rise in antiwhite
sentiment.
The government's inability to
cope with crime and other social
ills has resulted in a shift of
public: support to the opposition
People's National Party (PNP). In
elections for local officials on
18 March the PNP led the incumbent
Jamaica Labor Party in popular
votes for the first time since
1959. The PNP leadership has pro-
jected a more energetic image since
Michael Manley succeeded his father
as party chief last month, and it
appears that the opposition's ef-
forts to exploit the government's
shortcomings are meetin with
greater success.
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BRITISH PROBLEMS IN ANGUILLA
The British have been unable
to obtain any significant cooper-
ation from the Anguillans since
occupying the island on 19 March
and their action has met with
mixed reactions in the Caribbean.
Senior British officials,
including Lord Caradon, minister
of state for foreign and common-
wealth affairs, now also acting
as ambassador to the UN, were sent
this week to Anguilla to review
the political situation. Although
Foreign Secretary Stewart has
stated that Anthony Lee will re-
main as commissioner, Lee has been
unable to secure cooperation. If
the situation persists, the British
may try to find someone more ac-
ceptable to the Anguillans. During
the past week Ronald Webster, the
self-proclaimed "President" of
Anguilla, has apparently gained
considerable popular support for
his opposition to Lee, and London
now thinks it unlikely that any
Page 2 7
of the island moderates will be
able to displace Webster.
Reaction among Caribbean mem-
bers of the Commonwealth has dif-
fered; some have approved the
British intervention and others
have called for an immediate with-
drawal of troops. Although Prime
Minister Shearer of Jamaica told
the British prior to the invasion
that Jamaica would do nothing
regarding Anguilla, he has joined
Eric Williams of Trinidad-Tobago
in publicly denouncing the use
of force. Government leaders
in Guyana, on the other hand,
have strongly endorsed the move;
Prime Minister Barrow of Barbados
has expressed cautious approval.
The French and Dutch govern-
ments have also reacted to the
British intervention by maintain-
ing warships off the coast of
St. Martin/Maarten, the island
closest to Anguilla which is held
jointly by the two governments.
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URUGUAYAN PRESIDENT FACES CONTINUING FRUSTRATIONS
Uruguayan President Pacheco's
austerity programs achieved a
measure of success last year in
halting the economy's downward
spiral but his policies have cost
him the allegiance of powerful
politicians in his Colorado Party.
As a result he has become a mi-
nority president, depending upon
the quixotic support of dissident
opposition politicians to get his
programs through Congress.
Pacheco attempted to reach
an accommodation with Congress
earlier this month by unexpect-
edly granting the legislature's
oft-expressed wish that he lift
the limited state of siege that
had been in effect since June
1968. Congress, however, was
in no mood for rapprochement.
As soon as it reconvened on 18
March, it voted to question seven
cabinet ministers.
Neither side wants to force
a showdown, but Pacheco has vowed
not to let his ministers be cen-
sured on policy questions. If
the congressmen push too far,
Pacheco could be forced into a
position where he will have to
make good on his threat to dis-
solve Congress and call for new
elections.
The Communist-dominated;na-
tional labor confederation his
emerged from its summer torpor
to add to Pacheco's problems.
Its first reaction to the lift-
ing of the-state of siege was to
stage a 3,000-worker demonst*a-
tion demanding wages higher than
the president was rumored to!!:have
suggested. Pacheco is opposed to
anything more than limited ii--
creases, but he does not have the
full support of his economic
team. Following the worker demon-
stration, two of the government
members on the wage board rejigned
and on 24 March the labor minis-
ter, who had advocated giving
greater increases to lower paid
industries and geographic areas,
also quit. A tough policy or1
wages is one of the major planks
in Pacheco's stability program
and this display of governmental
disunity strengthens Pacheco's
opponents and increases his iso-
lation from the mainstream of
political opinion.
The government's inability
to pull off a spectacular eco-
nomic upswing in 1969, combined
with Pacheco's determination to
pursue austerity policies, pe-
sents a situation ready made.for
Communist exploitation.I
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