SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006900070001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 14, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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ecret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
46
State Dept. review completed 14 March 1969
No. 0361/69
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EST, 13 March 1969)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
Enemy forces are maintaining a fairly steady pace of
harassing rocket and mortar attacks, with occasional
heavier ground probes. In Paris, Hanoi has been jus-
tifying the new offensive as "self-defense" against
intensified US military pressure. The Saigon govern-
ment, meanwhile, continues to focus on future polit-
ical competition with the Communists.
COMMUNIST TROOPS MAINTAIN OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Communists are moving against other government
positions in the northeast following the capture of
devel-
Khang on 1 March, but a major push
oped.
MALAYSIA EXPANDS ECONOMIC TIES WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Malaysia is widening its economic relations with Com-
munist countries in a search for markets for its in-
creasing production of rubber.
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MOVES TO CURB STUDENTS
The Sato government is considering pushing emergency
legislation to control student disorders.
PEKING AND MOSCOW CONTINUE PROPAGANDA OVER BORDER CLASH
The propaganda exchange between Peking and Moscow
over the border clash on 2 March is continuing, with
both sides apparently unwilling to abandon the field
to the other.
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Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
FRENCH LABOR SCENE REMAINS TROUBLED
Both the labor unions and the government have ex-
pressed willingness to re-open talks that collapsed
last week, but the wide gap between their positions
raises the prospect of continued unrest.
FRANCE'S NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE BEING MODIFIED
France is converting the Mirage IV bombers of its
strategic air force to achieve a low-level penetra-
tion capability.
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS UNCERTAIN AT NEW ENDC SESSION
When the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee meets
in Geneva on 18 March, many smaller countries will be
watching for any signs that the nuclear powers intend
to negotiate further disarmament measures.
HUNGARY REINVIGORATES REFORM POLICIES
Hungary has drawn up a charter for domestic political
reform and has applied public pressure on its bloc
partners to modernize and improve certain operations
of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
YUGOSLAV CONGRESS ADDS TO COMMUNIST DISSENSION
Tito set the tone in his opening address to the ninth
party congress when he reviewed the history of Soviet
interference in Yugoslav affairs and reaffirmed all
of Belgrade's unorthodox policies?
BULGARIAN-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE OVER MACEDONIA FLARES ANEW
Recent Bulgarian assertions that Macedonians in Yugo-
slavia are really Bulgarians have touched off a new
outburst of this long-standing dispute, further aggra-
vating bad relations between Sofia and Belgrade.
middle East - Africa
THE 167EEK IN PERSPECTIVE
PAKISTANI OPPOSITION REACHES PARTIAL AGREEMENT
With a new wave of unrest in the background, the gov-
ernment-opposition round table conference in Rawal-
pindi this week concluded with agreement on adult
franchise and a federal parliamentary system.
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA'S TROUBLES PERSIST
Tensions in Equatorial Guinea have eased somewhat
since the attempted coup last week, but further in-
cidents are possible.
SOVIET NAVY CRUISES ALONG WEST AFRICAN COAST
Recent Soviet ship visits to Guinea and Nigeria have
highlighted continuing efforts by the USSR to promote
its interests abroad through the use of naval forces.
OBJECTIVES OF SUEZ CANAL DUELS APPEAR LIMITED
The latest outbreak of fighting along the Suez Canal
highlights the uneasy nature of the Arab-Israeli
cease-fire lines, but the fighting is not expected
to expand dramatically.
Western Hemisphere
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USSR EXPANDS TRADE TIES WITH LATIN AMERICA
The USSR is applying realistic criteria in negotia-
tions to expand its economic contacts with Latin
America.
CHILEAN LEFT ASSESSES IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
The Communists are disappointed by their failure to
increase their vote significantly, but they and the
Socialists are gratified by the drop in the vote of
President Frei's Christian. Democratic Party.
CUBA RESTRUCTURES TOP LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES MINISTRY
Recent changes underline the ministry's increasing
involvement in activities such as education and ideo-
logical guidance that are normally considered outside
the military area of responsibility.
AGITATION INCREASING IN DOMINICAN :REPUBLIC
A recent rise in Communist. and student agitation in
the Dominican Republic, combined with President Bala-
guer's hints that he will run for re-election in
1970, may signal the beginning of an extended period
of unrest.
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Hanoi gives no sign of modifying its official position in order to break
the impasse in the Paris talks at least until it assesses the impact of the spring
offensive in South Vietnam. North Vietnamese propaganda has reacted in
defiant tones to statements by American leaders about a possible US re-
sponse to Communist attacks. The Communists claim their offensive is a
response to intensified US military pressures.
In the fighting, major actions were concentrated in the western high-
lands and in northwestern III Corps. Communist forces, however, maintained
a fairly steady pace of harassing rocket and mortar attacks, and occasional
commando raids and ground probes, throughout the country. Hue was hit by
rockets on 10 March for the first time during the offensive.
Cabinet changes designed to strengthen government operations in rural
areas in order to compete more effectively with the Communists were
announced in Saigon this week. Most of the new men are close to Prime
Minister Huong or Interior Minister Khiem, but President Thieu selected
them primarily for their administrative abilities. Village and hamlet elections
were conducted successfully on 9 March, the second of four Sunday election
days, despite some light Communist harassing fire.
In China, chauvinistic propaganda engendered by the Sino-Soviet
border clash on 2 March has concentrated on the "unequal treaties" the
Chinese claim imperial Russia forced on China, thus reviving Peking's claim
to extensive areas in Siberia. The Soviets, for their part, have focused on the
recent incident itself and have tried to fix the blame on the Chinese. In the
meantime, preparations for the Chinese Communist Party's ninth congress
have apparently continued against the militant backdrop of massive propa-
ganda demonstrations condemning the Soviets. There is every indication that
the congress will convene soon even though the Chinese leaders have not
resolved some of their basic disagreements.
The Communists in Laos are moving against other government positions
in the northeast following the capture of Na Khang on 1 March, but a major
push into areas controlled by the government has not developed. On 12
March, the Communists launched the third attack in as many years against
the Luang Prabang Airfield in the northwest, and have also been active in the
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VIETNAM
Hanoi's position in Paris
during the new military offensive
in South Vietnam has been to just-
ify it as an act of "self-defense."
The Communists maintain that they
have had to send their forces back
into the field in response to re-
cently intensified US military
pressure.
As the outlines of the new
offensive become clearer, it is
increasingly apparent that the
Communists hope to use the new
fighting to nudge the US into bar-
gaining over the issue of de-es-
calation. The Communists are now
openly flouting any understand-
ing on military restraint in con-
nection with the bombing halt,
both in their shellings of the
cities and in their use of the
Demilitarized Zone for large troop
movements.
Their propaganda still shrilly
insists that the negotiations can
make progress only when the US
starts talking seriously to the
Liberation Front. They probably
do not believe that the US will
engage in such talks without Sai-
gon and. their own language, which
justifies the leading role of the
Front in such talks, also leaves
room for the presence of Saigon--
they argue that talks about the
fighting in the south must in-
clude those who are doing the
fighting.
Military Developments in
South Vietnam
The major fighting this
week was concentrated in the
western highlands and in north-
western III Corps. Elsewhere,
Communist forces maintained a
fairly steady pace of harassing
rocket and mortar attacks with
occasional commando raids and
ground probes. Several major
cities and military installa-
tions again were struck, in-
cluding Saigon, Da Nang, and
Hue.
Battalion-sized infantry
elements from three main force
divisions attacked in the north-
ern and western provinces of
III Corps, particularly Tay
Ninh, triggering stiff, sus-
tained battles. This fighting
is concentrated along the in-
filtration corridors leading
to the capital city and could
be designed to pave the way for
a thrust into the Saigon area.
Saigon itself was struck by
rocket fire on 6 March for the
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fourth time since the offensive
began. Twenty 122-mm. rockets
have hit the capital during these
attacks, killing 45 civilians
and wounding 82 more. There were
also sporadic incidents of terror-
ism in the city and a few small
skirmishes on its outskirts.
Political Developments in
South Vietnam
Despite the distractions of
the current Communist offensive,
the Saigon government continues
to focus on the problems of fu-
ture political competition with
the Communists.
In II Corps, enemy main force
units have maintained pressure for
more than a week against a string
of Special Forces camps along the
international frontier in western.
Kont:um and Pleiku. provinces.
Other enemy forces have overrun
several hamlets in the nearby
highlands, often routing the mi.l
itia defenders and then holding
their ground during allied coun-
terattacks. In many cases, civ-
ilian casualties and property
damage have been heavy. Commu-
nist: losses in their highlands
offensive have been around 1,500.
The Communist threat in IV
Corps continues to be centered
in Dinh Tuong Province, where en-
emy forces have maintained a
steady rate of harassment against
My Tho, the US base at Dong Tam,
and several nearby district and
crossroad towns.
No major ground activity was
reported during the week in I
Corps, where the Communists con-
tinued sporadic, harassing rocket
and mortar attacks. Hue was hit
by rocket fire on 10 March, the
first time during the offensive.
Cabinet changes that were
announced this week are designed
to strengthen government opera-
tions in rural areas. Most of
the new men are close to Prime
Minister Huong and Interior Min-
ister Khiem, but President Thieu
has selected them primarily for
their administrative abilities.
Cao Van Than, for example, was
appointed agriculture minister
in line with President Thieu's
expressed determination to
implement a meaningful land re-
form program and his complaints
that the former minister had ac-
complished little in this field.
To ease the workload of
Prime Minister Huong, who had
previously been responsible for
Revolutionary Development, Nguyen
Van Vong was appointed to a cabi-
net post overseeing these activ-
ities. Vong will work closely
with Interior Minister Khiem,
who earlier this month had been
named deputy prime minister for
pacification. The government's
concern about preparing for a
peacetime environment was also
demonstrated by Minister of
State Vu Quoc Thuc's assumption
of the additional title of
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minister of postwar planning, as
well as by the creation of a
special subcabinet post to handle
veterans affairs.
President Thieu's instruc-
tions to the cabinet to develop
a program of "political mobiliza-
tion" to bring some semblance
of unity into competing anti-Com-
munist political groups also re-
flects his intention to be ready
for competition with the Commu-
nists. The President is now re-
portedly ready to place himself
at the head of the slow-starting
progove:rnment front, the Lien
Minh, to help give it some momen-
tum. In addition, the government
has helped to organize a new labor
confederation to reduce the pos-
sibility of formerly independent
unions becoming susceptible to
Communist penetration and con-
trol.
Other efforts to strengthen
Saigon's positron in the country-
side include a program aimed at
assigning additional policemen
and information and propaganda
cadres to villages to function
as the eyes and ears of the gov-
ernment. This goal may prove
hard to reach, however, even
though President Thieu has given
high priority to the struggle
against the Communists at the
village level, because recruit-
ing personnel suitable for train-
ing as policemen and propagand-
ists for the villages will be ex-
tremely difficult in view of
South Vietnam's already over-
taxed manpower pool. Meanwhile,
despite some light Communist
military harassment, village and
hamlet elections were conducted
successfully on the second of
four Sunday election days.
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COMMUNIST TROOPS MAINTAIN OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Communists are moving
against other government posi-
tions in the northeast following
the capture of Na Kh.ang on 1
March, but a major push has not
developed.
In the area north of Na
Khang, North Vietnamese troops
have moved back into Houei Hinsa,
a guerrilla stronghold captured
during the government's summer
offensive last year. There are
also reports of an increased
NORTH
Hanoi.
VIETNAM
enemy threat against Muong Hiem
and a number of bases immediately
north of the Plaine des Jarres.
Government military leaders hope
to use these positions to anchor
a new defensive line.
Efforts to blunt the North
Vietnamese thrust are being se-
riously hampered by large numbers
of tribal refugees who are flock-
ing into the bases still under
government control. In addition,
government personnel and equip-
ment losses in the recent fight-
ing appear to be high.
Farther west, a small enemy
force attacked the Luang Prabang
Airfield on 12 March, destroying
one observation plane, damaging
several T-28 fighters, and in-
flicting light casualties on the
base's defenders. This is the
third such attack in as many years.
In south Laos, meanwhile,
Communist forces continue to
apply pressure against govern-
ment positions west of the Bolo-
vens Plateau. The movement of
fresh enemy troops and supplies
into the Thateng area suggests
that a new round in the three-
month-old offensive against that
government outpost may be in th
offing.
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Plainedes
Jarres
rig
ang
?
Communist-controlled
territory
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MALAYSIA EXPANDS ECONOMIC TIES WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Malaysia is widening its
economic relations with Commu-
nist countries in a search for
markets; for its increasing pro-
duction of rubber. Kuala Lumpur
recently agreed to a Soviet dele-
gation's proposals to expand
trade, and is presently negotia-
ting with several East European
countries. In addition, trade
with Communist China continues
to grow.
The USSR suggested that
Malaysia establish private agen-
cies to promote the sale of So-
viet goods in Malaysia. The So-
viets :Look toward eventually set-
ting up a network of outlets to
handle their machinery and equip-
ment. The Soviet delegation also
indicated that Moscow is prepared
to extend long-term commercial
credits to finance these sales.
Moscow's trade promotion ef-
forts reflect in part its adverse
trade balance with Malaysia. The
USSR has been the leading buyer
of Malaysian rubber since 1965--
about $70 million worth annually--
while Malaysian purchases of So-
viet goods have been less than $2
million a year. Moscow used its
position as the largest single
purchaser of Malaysian rubber to
establish a diplomatic presence
in November 1967, and the current
trade promotional effort should
probably be viewed as an attempt
to extend Soviet influence further.
The USSR also has urged Kuala
Lumpur to accept economic aid for
several projects proposed under
Malaysia's current five-year plan
(1966-70). An agreement now un-
der negotiation calls for the
delivery of $10 million worth
of Soviet agricultural machinery
with repayment over 15 years at
four percent interest. Kuala
Lumpur also is considering a So-
viet proposal to assist in the
construction of a major highway.
The USSR offered to supply mili-
tary aircraft, but was turned
down.
Malaysia's economic rela-
tions with Eastern Europe center
on the Balkan countries. Last
October, a Bulgarian delegation
discussed joint ventures involv-
ing timber and food processing
and pharmaceutical manufactur-
ing. Sofia's purchases of Malay-
sian rubber are to reach $7 mil-
lion this year, half again as
large as in 1968. In addition,
a Rumanian delegation is now in
Kuala Lumpur to sign a trade
agreement.
Malaysia's trade with Com-
munist China, its leading Com-
munist trading partner, increased
again last year. China was the
third leading buyer of Malaysian
rubber in 1967, when direct con-
tracts and purchases through
Singapore totaled $20 million.
Malaysian imports from China,
some of which are purchased in
Singapore, consist largely of
foodstuffs and inexpensive con-
sumer goods. These purchases
amounted to $87 million in 1967,
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giving China a trade surplus of
about $60 million as Malaysia
remained a substantial source of
foreign exchange for Peking. The
opening of two new Chinese empo-
riums at Malacca and Penang, in
addition to the present one at
Kuala Lumpur, will increase the
sale of Chinese goods in Malaysia.
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MOVES TO CURB STUDENTS
The Sato government is se-
riously considering pushing emer-
gency legislation to control stu-
dent disorders. If such legis-
lation encounters stiff opposi-
tion in the Diet, as is expected,
Prime Minister Sato may revise
his political timetable and call
for general elections this spring.
Many government leaders ap-
parently are now convinced that
it is politically imperative to
act soon to resolve the crisis
in higher education. Recent po-
litical soundings by ruling Lib-
eral Democratic Party Diet mem-
bers indicate that popular sup-
port for curbing student excesses
J_s strong and widespread, tran-
scending even the Ok:inawan rever-
sion issue. A recent upsurge of
violence at Kyoto University has
added to the public concern.
The government, moreover, is
concerned that de facto coopera-
tion between weak university ad-
ministrators and Communist stu-
dent organizations for joint de-
fense against the rampaging ultra-
leftists can only enhance the
Japan Communist Party's influ-
ence at the university level.
Sato has probably concluded that
if he does not soon respond to
the school challenge, intra-
party rivals may exploit the
crisis to undermine his leader-
ship.
Sato's timetable up to this
point has envisaged national
elections late this year, fol-
lowing his projected visit to
Washington to arrange the de-
tails of Okinawan reversion.
Sato expected the successful out-
come of his visit to enhance the
prospects of his Liberal Demo-
cratic Party in the elections.
There are indications now, how-
ever, that Sato may not be ad-
verse to early elections pre-
cipitated by the school crisis.
In addition to exploiting the
general disarray of the main op-
position Japan Socialist Party,
Sato may also estimate that gov-
ernment efforts to restore order
in the schools in the face of
legislative obstructionism by
the Socialists and Communists
would have wide electoral ap-
peal.
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PEKING AND MOSCOW CONTINUE
The propaganda exchange be-
tween Peking and Moscow over the
border clash on 2 March is con-
tinuing, with both sides appar-
ently unwilling to abandon the
field to the other. There has
been no indication that either
side intends to go beyond the
level of polemics, but further
incidents along the border can-
not be ruled out.
Although Moscow was quick
to publicize the clash, Soviet
leaders may have been undecided
over their next step. They ap-
parently became convinced, how-
ever, of the need to respond to
Peking's extensive exploitation
of the issue, and on 7 March be-
gan a major campaign to emphasize
Russian innocence. Moscow has
presented considerable detail on
its version of the incident,
claiming that 31 Soviet border
guards were killed and 14 were
wounded in a Chinese ambush and
that reserves had to be brought up
to drive the Chinese off Soviet
territory. The Soviets have also
fitted the incident into their
efforts to discredit the Chinese
leadership prior to the conven-
ing of both China's ninth party
congress and the coming world
conference of Communist parties.
PROPAGANDA OVER BORDER CLASH
The Soviets coordinated the
opening of their propaganda of-
fensive with large demonstrations
in front of the Chinese Embassy
in Moscow on 7 and 8 March, ob-
viously in retaliation for ear-'
lier anti-Soviet demonstrations in
Peking. This led to the resump-
tion of tightly controlled counter-
demonstrations in the Chinese
capital on 11 March.
In contrast to Moscow's propa-
ganda focus on Chinese responsi-
bility for this incident, Peking
has used it to revive its claim
to extensive territories in Si-
beria. On 10 March, a lengthy
and carefully constructed Chinese
Foreign Ministry statement re-
hearsed the series of "unequal
treaties" imposed by imperial
Russia and charged Moscow with
having "sabotaged" the Sino-So-
viet border discussions held in
1964.
Peking is also exploiting
the border clash for domestic
purposes by staging a series of
massive anti-Soviet rallies that
are still under way throughout
China. This chauvinistic cam-
paign is probably intended in
part to provide a properly mili-
tant backdrop for the ninth party
congress, which will probably be
convened soon.
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The propaganda battle over the clash on the Sino-Soviet border rages
on, with Moscow supplying most of the gory details but giving no indication
that it desires to go beyond polemics.
Meanwhile, there is considerable activity and uncertainty concerning
two potentially significant negotiating sessions set to begin next week on
opposite sides of the continent. In Moscow, at least sixty Communist parties
are expected to make final plans for the long-scheduled "world Communist
conference" that the Soviets hope to stage in May. Early reports of disagree-
ment among the planners suggest that decisions about the agenda and even
the date of the world conference will not come easily.
In Geneva, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee resumes its
negotiations. The agenda is open and the prospects for major initiatives
unclear, but interest is high in seeing the superpowers follow the Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty with progress on other outstanding disarmament issues.
Moscow also still seems to be trying to lay the groundwork for a
high-level Communist economic meeting. Top-level economic delegations
from five Eastern European countries have been in Moscow within the last
two weeks. Numerous rumored dates continue to be bandied about in
Eastern Europe concerning an economic summit and an attendant Warsaw
Pact summit. None is firm, and important differences still must be resolved
before the meeting can take place.
Otherwise, attention in Eastern Europe this week focused on the
Sino-Soviet border thriller, on the Yugoslav party congress, and on political
reforms in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
In France, with workers back on the job after the 24-hour general
strike, De Gaulle appears to have at least temporarily averted another
economic crisis.
permit the transport of goods-claimed by them to be military materials-
between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. Pankow probably will con-
tinue this type of harassment, perhaps hoping to influence Bonn to negoti-
ate. F_ I
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FRENCH LABOR SCENE REMAINS TROUBLED
France's labor unions and
the government remain locked in
a dispute over wages, thus rais-
ing the prospect of continued so-
cial unrest. Both sides have ex-
pressed a willingness to reopen
the talks that collapsed last
week, but there is a wide gap be-
tween what the government is
willing to grant and what labor
leaders are demanding. The key
question is to what extent the
rank and file are willing to
back the demands of their lead-
ers.
A general strike, called
on 11 March by all three labor
federations to reinforce their
position, won massive support
and succeeded in slowing French
economic life to a walk. There
were no major disorders during
the strike, primarily because
both union and student leaders
were on hand to keep their own
in line. The continued hostil-
ity between workers and students
was underlined by of:icials of
the Communist-led General Con-
federation of Labor (CGT), who
were particularly active in try-
ing to ensure that left-wing stu-
dents did not spoil the orderly
and disciplined show. Their ef-
fort was aided by firm police
action against students who tried
to disrupt the demonstrations.
The CGT, making energetic efforts
to refurbish its militant image,
dominated the protes,: march in
Paris of over 100,000 people.
De Gaulle's speech on the
same day returned to the themes
that he used in combatting the
tumult of last May. He castigated
labor for allegedly attempting
to wreck the nation, the economy,
and the franc--and thus further
enraged labor leaders. All of
the unions responded harshly to
the President's charges, partic-
ularly the implication that strik-
ing workers were part of a "to-
talitarian" plot. Last June,
De Gaulle raised the specter of
a Communist take-over in his suc-
cessful effort to convince voters
to support the government in par-
liamentary elections. Union of-
ficials were highly critical of
his failure now to offer any
solutions other than those that
have already drawn either indif-
ference or outright hostility
from the workers.
De Gaulle's harsh words were
taken as further evidence that
the government would not deviate
greatly from its position that
wage increases of over four per-
cent would be inflationary and
would threaten the stability of
the franc. Government leaders
appear to be betting that the
unions' demand for wage increases
of about 12 percent reflects
more the fear of union leaders
that they will be overtaken by
the rank and file than deep-rooted
worker dissatisfaction.
Pressure on the government
eased when selling prices for
gold, which had risen to new
highs as labor unrest mounted,
dropped by mid-week. De Gaulle's
clear intention to defend the
troubled franc and resist any
inflationary wage settlement prob-
ably helped stabilize the gold
market.
25X1
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FRANCE'S NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE BEING MODIFIED
France is modifying the
Mirage IV bombers of its stra-
tegic air force to achieve a low-
?.evel penetration capability,
The Force consists of c 's
X13:age IV medium jet bombers, of
..:i.cYz 36 are deployed at all
Lies, and t2 Boeing KC-135
-.:a ,ker aircraft. The other 22
bombers are spares, electronic
countermeasure carriers, or.
The modification of the
Mirage IVs will improve their ca-
pability to penetrate fighter and
missile defenses in the USSR and
Eastern Europe. The force, how-
ever, still will pose only a lim-
ited threat to the Soviet Union.
At high altitudes, the bombers
have an unrefueled radius that
would enable them to penetrate
just inside the western Soviet
border. At low altitudes, where
they would be less vulnerable,
the bombers could not reach the
Soviet Union without refueling.
The modifications, never-
theless, will serve to prolong
the useful life of the Mirage
IVs to about 1975. During the
interim, French strategic attack
capabilities will be gradually
augmented by up to 27 land-based
missiles equipped with nuclear
warheads and the nuclear-powered
ballistic-missile submarines.
The French Government does not
plan to re-equip the bomber force
with improved nuclear delivery
aircraft prior to 1975.1
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SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS UNCERTAIN AT NEW ENDC SESSION
Or. 18 March, the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee
(ENDC) will meet in Geneva. Many
smaller countries, now consider-
ing whether or not to accede to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
will be watching the session for
any signs that the nuclear powers
intend to fulfill their NPT com-
mitment to negotiate toward fur-
ther disarmament measures. Al-
though the climate for disarma-
ment may have improved since the
Czechoslovak crisis, the stage
does not appear set for substan-
tial immediate progress on any
of the issues expected to receive
attention.
High on the agenda is a com-
prehensive nuclear test ban. The
sticking point in the past--ac-
ceptable verification procedures--
promises to stymie the negotia-
tors again. Several ENDC mem-
bers, notably Sweden and Italy,
are expected to suggest verifica-
tion procedures based on voluntary
bilateral exchange of seismographic
data or on the creation of a new
international organization to
monitor and inspect compliance.
Having publicized their
readiness to make progress on
disarmament issues, the Soviets
probably consider themselves
obliged to put forth some kind
of proposal at Geneva. In doing
so, Moscow would hope at a mini-
mum to provide a public, multi-
lateral forum as a balance to the
private arms talks it seeks with
the US, and to show forward move-
ment to those states that have yet
to ratify the NPT.
There is also considerable,
interest among ENDC members in
the possibility of a cutoff of
production of fissionable materials
for weapons purposes, and in an
arms control measure applying to
the seabed. As yet, however, no
concrete proposals with broad
support have materialized. Of
the two, the seabed proposal ap-
pears to have the better chance
for agreement between the ENDC's
cochairman, the US and the Soviet
Union, who tend to dominate the
committee.
With the growing interest in
disarmament among smaller countries,
the issue of enlarging the ENDC
may well arise at the plenary ses-
sion. The Soviets have not yet
responded officially to a US "pack-
age" proposal last month to admit
Japan and at the same time preserve
a balance of East, West, and non-
aligned members by also adding
Mongolia, West Germany, Hungary,
Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Argentina,
and Tunisia. Because Moscow can
be expected to oppose membership
for Bonn, however, the Geneva con-
ference seems certain to open with
this question still no nearer solu-
tion.
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HUNGARY REINVIGORATES REFORM POLICIES
Hungary has drawn up a charter
for domestic political reform and,
to help assure the success of its
economic reform, has applied public
pressure on its bloc partners to
modernize and improve certain oper-
ations of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CEMA).
After an unusual joint meeting
on 5-6 March, top-level party and
government leaders issued a communi-
que calling for concentrated efforts
toward long-awaited political re-
forms, which have been in limbo
since the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia. The carefully
worded statement on "socialist de-
mocracy" called for expanded rule
of law, constitutional revision,
further election reforms, regional
autonomy, and an increased role for
mass and state organizations. Some
of these are the logical extensions
of the economic reform inaugurated
in 1968. It is still too early,
however, to judge how great an ef-
fect any political changes will have
on the largely apolitical Hungari-
ans.
The communique makes clear the
party's resolve to maintain control.
Although party organizations will
have to cede some authority to youth
groups, local government, and in-
dustrial enterprises, these groups
will not be granted independence.
To avoid repetition of Czechoslovak
developments last year, the program
makes no changes in censorship, po-
lice controls, or the single-party
system. Judging by past reform ac-
tivities, the Hungarians will move
carefully but resolutely to enact
the new program.
The party has taken several
steps to emphasize its primacy and
its resolve to see the political
reform through. The ailing head
of its agitprop committee, which
will be primarily responsible for
pushing the new reforms, has been
replaced by Gyorgy Aczel, a hard-
nosed Kadar man who won his politi-
cal spurs in the field of cultural
affairs. The day after the commun-
ique was issued, the party ostenta-
tiously demonstrated its commitment
to reform and its rejection of
Stalinism by honoring Laszlo Rajk,
a chief victim of the Stalinist
terror and a symbol of liberaliza-
tion in 1956.
Kadar probably discussed these
moves with the Soviets during his
visit to Moscow in early February,
but Soviet reaction to the communi-
que has been noncommittal. Moscow
barely mentioned it in domestic re-
porting, and the more detailed TASS
international account contained dis-
tortions and deletions. Although
Budapest may have Moscow's general
approval, this type of slanted
press coverage--not uncommon for
the Soviet press--will probably cre-
ate uneasiness.
The communique also called for
an "all-round view" of CEMA economic
relations, backed a scheme for eco-
nomic integration, hinted at the
need for standardization of prices,
and pushed for currency converti-
bility. Hungarian planners fear
that, with Hungary's great depend-
ence on foreign trade, economic re-
form cannot succeed without some ac-
commodation by its bloc partners.
The Hungarians therefore want to
press their views publicly before
the issues are settled.
F__ I
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YUGOSLAV CONGRESS ADDS TO COMMUNIST DISSENSION
Proceedings at the Yugoslav
party congress, which opened on
11 March, reflect the growing
attraction of Yugoslavia's in-
dependent brand of Communism and
underscore the basic nature of
the rift in the international
movement. Tito set the tone in
his opening address to the con-
gress; when he reviewed the his-
tory of Soviet interference in
Yugoslav affairs and reaffirmed
all of Belgrade's unorthodox pol-
icies.
Even though the Soviet Un-
ion and all its Warsaw Pact al-
lies except Rumania are boycot-
YUGOSLAV-SOVIET TENSIONS
DURING PREVIOUS PARTY CONGRESSES
FIFTH CONGRESS July 1948: Three weeks after Yug-
oslavia had been expelled from the
Cominform
SIXTH CONGRESS November 1952: At the height of
Stalin's arti-Yugoslav campaign
April 1953: Under the impact of a
renewed freak between Moscow and
Belgrade
EIGHTH CONGRESS
December 1964: In the midst of
tense uncertainty that followed Khru-
shchev's ouster two months earlier
NINTH CONGRESS March 1969: In a new era of distrust
following the invasion of Czechoslo-
vak is
SECRET
ting the congress, a record num-
ber of foreign delegations are
present. Except for the eighth
congress in December 1964, the
Soviet and Eastern European par-
ties have not officially attended
any Yugoslav congress since World
War II. This time, however, in
addition to Rumania, the more
important Western Communist and
Socialist parties are taking
part despite pressure on the
Communist parties to do nothing
but send messages. Prague's
decision not to attend report-
edly has met with popular dis-
favor. Tito's speech treated
the absence of the Warsaw Pact
parties more in sorrow than in
anger.
Soviet pressure also failed
to persuade the Yugoslavs to
soften their criticism of the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, or
to lay off other issues disa-
greeable to Moscow. Tito's re-
fusal to subjugate Yugoslav in-
terests to those of the USSR has
been at the core of the Belgrade-
Moscow dispute for over twenty
years. The program adopted by
the congress is certain to ag-
gravate this feud because it
will further challenge Moscow's
claim to be the sole authorized
interpreter of Marxism-Leninism.
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BULGARIAN-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE OVER MACEDONIA FLARES ANEW
Recent Bulgarian assertions
that Macedonians in Yugoslavia
are really Bulgarians have touched
off a new outburst in this long-
standing dispute, further ag-
gravating bad relations between
Sofia and Belgrade. Published
in an inflammatory pamphlet--ap-
parently circulated clandestinely
in Yugoslavia over the past few
months--the claims provoked ac-
rimonious rebuttals from Belgrade
and finally, on 12 February, an
official protest.
The Yugoslavs blame the
Bulgarians for the steady dete-
rioration of relations since late
1967 when the Bulgarians vocifer-
ously celebrated the 90th anniver-
sary of the San Stefano Treaty.
This short-lived treaty created
a greater Bulgarian state that
included present-day Yugoslav
Macedonia, and is the basis for
Bulgarian irredentist claims to-
day. More disturbing for the
Yugoslavs, however, are the
charges in the pamphlet that the
main problem is not Macedonia
but the "question of cooperation
in the building of socialism."
Belgrade resents this as an at-
tempt to apply the recently ex-
pounded theory of "limited sov-
ereignty" of socialist countries.
Since publishing the pamphlet,
Sofia has maintained a low-key ap-
proach. The press has refrained
from answering Yugoslav polemics
directly, and officially Sofia
still proclaims its interest in
neighborly relations with all
Balkan states. The Bulgarians
finally answered the Yugoslav
protest note on 4 March, but the
text was not made public.
The Bulgarian regime is
nevertheless subtly keeping the
pressure on Belgrade--possibly
at the instigation of the Soviets,
as the Yugoslavs charge. More
likely, however, the Bulgarian
campaign is also aimed at sup-
pressing nationalist sentiments
among its own Macedonian minor-
ity. Sofia is also probably try-
ing to distract public attention
from other internal problems,
such as economic dissatisfaction
and disillusionment over Bulgaria's
participation in the invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
The Bulgarians, aware that
the hypersensitive Yugoslavs can
easily be prodded into overreact-
ing, will probably continue to
press their academic claims to
Macedonia and ignore Belgrade's
outraged charges of "territorial
aspirations."
MACEDONIA
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SECRET
Tension in the Middle East has been highest along the Suez Canal, with
exchanges of artillery fire over the weekend. Incidents have also occurred on
the Jordanian-Israeli border, but the Lebanese-Israeli border remains rela-
tively quiet.
Moscow continues to supply military equipment to Southern Yemen. A
Soviet freighter unloaded two
helicopters, artillery, small arms, and ammunition. The I J, has already
delivered at least eight MIG-17s, trucks, and small arms.
In Nigeria, the Soviet naval visit to Lagos from 5 to 11 March, the first
such visit of its kind, ended on a sour note when Soviet officials offended
the Nigerians by their clumsy tactics in getting the release of a Soviet seaman
who jumped ship. Nigeria returned the deserter, but the incident probably
antagonized federal leaders, some of whom opposed the visit in the first
place. Meanwhile, the civil. war remains stalemated.
Guinea is in ferment over reports of a plot against President Toure's
radical regime. Several persons-including army officers-reportedly will be
tried before a revolutionary tribunal in connection with the plot, and
committees are being set up throughout the country for the "defense of the
revolution." These actions could presage a purge of the army, a move that
would serve to divert public attention from the harsh realities of Guinean
life.
In India, the Congress Party appears to be stumbling as it tries to adjust
to its disappointing showing in the recent mid-term elections in four north-
ern states. Open squabbling among senior party leaders is occurring again,
and former food minister Subramanjam has resigned from the Congress
working committee in protest against party opportunism in aligning with a 25X1
corrupt group of former congressmen in an attempt to establish a Congress-
led coalition government in Bihar State.
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PAKISTANI OPPOSITION REACHES PARTIAL AGREEMENT
The government--opposition
round -table conference concluded
in Rawalpindi this week with
agreement on adult franchise and
a federal parliamentary system.
EL new wave of unrest provided the
backdrop for the talks.
The agreement focuses on
only two of many basic issues to
6e settled. Although opposition
leaders held a series of meet-
ings in preparation for the talks,
the two proposals seemed to be
,.he only areas where they could
.agree. They remained badly di-
vided on other important issues
such as the future relationship
between East and West Pakistan
,and the basis of representation
in parliament--population or pro-
vincial parity. In announcing
the conference agreement, Ayub
indicated that he would now ask
the National Assembly to put into
effect the the agreed-upon con-
stitutional changes and leave the
unresolved questions to the new
representatives to be elected.
It seems unlikely that the
agreement will end the unrest in
the country, because it falls far
abort of the agitators' demands.
The period between now and the
elections--which have not been
set--will be one of intense po-
litical activity and jockeying
for position among the disparate
opposition groups. Tensions be-
tween conservative and leftist
forces have already produced se-
rious violence.
Various developments, un-
leashed by Ayub's decision to
step down, have further compli-
cated the political picture in
recent weeks. Latent agitation
for the break-up of West Pakistan
into its former autonomous prov-
inces has surfaced in the Karachi
district as well as the northwest
frontier area. Daily violence con-
tinues in East Pakistan, where the
provincial government has abdicated
authority to the students. Labor
agitation is growing in the face of
the inability of government and in-
dustry to resist union pressures. A
serious port strike in Karachi and
a number of other labor disputes have
now been settled, but the clear un-
ion victories have emboldened other
groups to press for redress of griev-
ances.
The protracted unrest has re-
sulted in serious economic disloca-
tions throughout the country. Tele-
communications, postal services,
and commercial activity have been
widely disrupted. Critical food
shortages are reportedly develop-
ing in East Pakistan and could
play into the hands of political
extremists who continue to dispar-
age compromise and advocate vio-
lence.
As always, the army remains
in the background--the one stable
element that might be able to re-
store order. Rumors of impending
martial law continue to circulate.
It seems likely, however, that the
army would only intervene if it felt
that the popular outcry against in-
ternal chaos and anarchy demanded
such action. 25X1
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA'S TROUBLES PERSIST
Tensions in Equatorial Guinea
have eased somewhat since the at-
tempted coup last week against
the Macias government, but fur-
ther incidents are possible. Al-
though prospects for resolving
differences with Spain appear to
have improved slightly, the ef-
fects on the economy of the con-
tinuing exodus of Spanish resi-
dents are already evident.
The unsuccessful coup at-
tempt on 5 March was led by For-
eign Minister Atanasio Ndongo
and UN representative Saturnino
Ibongo. Both men were moderates
and former political opponents
who had joined President Macias'
coalition government at indepen-
dence last October. Although de-
tails of the coup attempt and the
fate of the participants are un-
clear, their advocacy of negotia-
tions with Spain may have led the
two officials to attempt to wrest
power from the more militant and
anti-Spanish President.
Although new anti-Spanish
incidents and factional infight-
ing that erupted in the wake of
the coup report have apparently
subsided, emergency controls were
still in effect as of 13 March.
Spain's special envoys and the
personal representative sent by
UN Secretary General Thant re-
portedly have made some progress
in calming the emotional and er-
ratic President, and both Macias
and Madrid now appear prepared to
conclude quickly basic bilateral
cooperation agreements. Spain,
whose decolonization of Equatorial
Guinea was motivated largely by
the desire to secure African sup-
port on the Gibraltar issue, has
a continuing stake in preserving
Guinean stability, and therefore
may offer further aid.
The Spanish, however, have
announced that they will withdraw
their forces when evacuation of
all Spanish nationals wishing to.
leave is completed, and have re-
buffed Guinean proposals for a
new defense agreement providing
for the stationing in Guinea of
Spanish troops "without a coloni-
alist mentality." Spanish mili-
tary withdrawal, if accomplished,
will leave Macias with an 800- to
1,000-man security force whose
loyalty to him is uncertain.
In any event, prospects for
stability remain poor. Macias'
recent constructive approach to
his problems could dissolve at any
time. Meanwhile, the mass Spanish
exodus will jeopardize the normal
functioning of the government and
many public institutions as well
as virtually all commercial and
industrial facilities. The im-
portant lumber industry is already
on the verge of collapse and a
significant decline in the key
cocoa crop is anticipated.
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SOVIET NAVY CRUISES
ALONG WEST AFRICAN COAST
Recent Soviet ship visits
to Guinea and Nigeria have high-
lighted continuing efforts by the
USSR to promote its interests
abroad through the use of naval
forces.
Two guided-missile destroy-
ers, a diesel submarine, and an
oiler have been traveling slowly
along the west coast of Africa
since leaving the Mediterranean
Soviet Naval Ships in West African Waters
Departed Mediterranean M A U
4 February
2 Guided Missile }NOtr.,kchott
Destroyers
1 Submarine
1 Oiler
Dakar}
}GAM~tIf' J -
s .*NI!:~til
PORT. GUINEA
In Port "jr-
15-20 February SIERRAAEONE I
}
urrtrvuLIA
i tlak:3rlougou}
on 4 February. The ships may
return home soon following calls
at Conakry in mid-February and
at Lagos early this month.
Although this unprecedented
visit by Soviet ships to West
African waters probably was
planned as a good will gesture
it also was related to Ghana's
prolonged detention of two So-
viet trawlers seized last October
GHANA (
t~N-o
*akor adi
Two Soviet Trawlers
in Ghanaian Custody
Since October
Lome ,// Lao
In Port
5-11 March
N I G E R I A
Departed Lagos
10.11 March
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}
EQUATORIAL GUINEA /
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for violating Ghanaian terri-
torial waters. It coincided
with intensive Soviet pressures
on Ghana, including a stiff note
from Soviet President Podgorny,
to secure release of the trawlers.
The.presence of the warships off
Takoradi during the closing stages
of the trial of the trawler cap-
tains probably contributed to the
decision of the Ghanaian leaders
to release the trawlers on 4
March.
Federal leader Gowon, who only
reluctantly agreed to the visit,
reportedly was angered by the
Soviets' aggressive methods in
obtaining the return of a dis-
gruntled seaman who had deserted.
That incident, which delayed for
a day the departure from Lagos
of two of the ships, probably
detracted from the public rela-
tions impact of the visit as
well.
The cruise appears to have
yielded mixed results for the
Soviets. Guinean President Toure,
whose regime has been under con-
siderable strain since the over-
throw last fall of fellow social-
ist Modibo Keita in neighboring
Mali, almost certainly welcomed
this gesture of Moscow's support
for his government. The Nigerian
stop, on the other hand, may have
been a net loss for the Soviets.
The current cruise is part
of expanding maritime operations
by the Soviet Navy. Soviet war-
ships began operating in the
Mediterranean on a regular basis
four years ago, and there has
been a Soviet naval presence in
the Indian Ocean for over a year.
Cruises to the South Atlantic
may become more frequent, but
the establishment of a permanent
naval force there is unlikely.
F_ I 25X1
OBJECTIVES OF SUEZ CANAL DUELS APPEAR LIMITED
The serious outbreaks of
fighting along the Suez Canal
this week highlight the uneasy
nature of the Arab-Israeli cease-
fire lines, but the fighting is
not expected to expand dramati-
cally in scope.
The extended exchanges of
artillery and small-arms fire on
8 and 9 March resulted in nu-
merous casualties on both sides
and aerial engagements accounted
for one Egyptian fighter. The
Egyptian oil refinery complex at
the southern end of the canal was
hit for the third time since the
war in June 1967. The extent of 25X1
Egypt's rationale for initi-
ating the weekend shooting is not
yet entirely clear. Cairo may
have believed that it must demon-
strate to the other Arab states,
as well as to the more militant
elements at home, that Egypt is
doing its share in the confronta-
tion with Israel. Some of the
earlier sniping may have been
initiated by restless elements
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of thy: various military contin-
gents stationed alone the water-
way. The renewed shelling on
11 March probably stemmed from
the _Lncreased tensions created
in the area by the earlier ex-
changes of fire and the death of
Egyp-cian Chief of Staff Abdul
Munim Riad.
Nasir will probably have
some difficulty finding a suit-
able replacement for Riad, who
was considered a highly competent
soldier and a political moderate,
even though he may have differed
with Nasir on some policies.
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Rafael Caldera was inaugurated president of Venezuela on 11 March,
with a great deal of fanfare but none of the attendant violence promised by
leftist extremists. His inauguration marks the first time in Venezuelan
history that power has passed peacefully from one political party to another,
and only the second time that one democratically elected president has
followed another into office.
In his inauguration address, Caldera pledged to abandon the Betancourt
doctrine of nonrecognition of military governments and to establish relations
with "all countries"-except Cuba-irrespective of ideology. Regarding neigh-
boring Guyana, Caldera expressed a desire to cooperate with the Burnham
government, but reiterated Venezuela's determination to press its claim to
the Essequibo region.
Clashes between Chilean police and illegal squatters outside the south-
ern city of Puerto Montt early this week resulted in the death of eight
persons and numerous injuries. The incident has developed into a major
political issue, with the conservatives supporting the government and the
Communists and Socialists condemning government "repression." President
Frei's Christian Democratic Party is badly divided over the issue, and some
leftists within the party may use it as an excuse to bring long-simmering
differences to a head.
Ecuador signed its first trade agreement with the USSR on 10 March.
The Soviets reportedly tried to make the agreement contingent on permis-
sion to set up a trade mission with diplomatic status as well as a commitment
by Ecuador to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR within six
months, but it is not yet clear whether these conditions were agreed to by
Ecuador.
There has been an upsurge of violence against US and other foreigners
in Jamaica in the past few weeks. Two Americans have been shot by
unknown assailants and the wife of an important British official has been
severely beaten. The life of the US ambassador has also been threatened. It is
not clear whether white foreigners are deliberate targets, as at least two
recent attacks involved prominent Jamaicans. "Black power" and racist
groups have become increasingly active in the past year, however, and they 25X1
have probably contributed to the rise in antiwhite sentiment on the is-
land.
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USSR EXPANDS TRADE TIES WITH LATIN AMERICA
The USSR is applying realis-
tic criteria in negotiations to
expand its economic contacts with
Latin America. In negotiating
recent agreements with Peru, Ecua-
dor, and Uruguay, Moscow acknowl-
edged the difficulties of expand-
ing mutual trade while indicating
a willingness to explore possibil-
ities for eventual growth.
Although seeking to dilute
US influence in Latin America,
Moscow increasingly measures the
short-term political impact of
its foreign economic dealings in
this area against the long-term
costs and prospects. This was
clearly evident in the USSR's re-
cent negotiations with Peru and
Ecuador.
Soviet proposals to Peru
covered only the reasonable pros-
pect of limited trade.
Lima's suspicions of Soviet
motives were evident during the
talks. The Peruvians reacted un-
favorably to Soviet insistence
that imports of its machinery be
accompanied by installation and
maintenance technicians. This So-
viet action was an effort to rec-
tify the bad reputation much of
its manufactures have in Latin
America because of improper main-
tenance by poorly trained native
personnel.
In Ecuador, a Soviet mission
was responsive to Quito's desire
to formalize trade relations, but
the Soviet negotiators quickly
quashed press reports that they
would absorb Ecuador's large ba-
nana surplus. As in the Soviet-
Peruvian agreement, the USSR's
pact with Ecuador provides for
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USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA
MILLIONS US DOLLARS
EXPORTS
IMPORTS
USSR - LATIN AMERICA
198
92
1964 1965 1966 1967
159
EASTERN EUROPE - LATIN AMERICA
242
264
277 280
1964 1965
1966 1967
most-favored-nation treatment ex-
cept for trade privileges extended
by Quito to neighboring countries
or special treatment received by
any regional economic organiza-
tion that Ecuador might join.
The agreement also calls for pay-
ment in convertible currencies,
but specifies no quantities or
values of commodities.
Following several years ne-
gotiations, the USSR has just con-
cluded a, modest credit arrangement
with Uruguay. As trade has been
limited primarily to Soviet pur-
chases, Moscow presumably hopes
that its $20 million credit will
help widen the Uruguayan market
for Soviet goods.
Latin American countries
probably will continue to turn to
the USSR in an effort to expand
their trade with Communist coun-
tries. The USSR can absorb sig-
nificant quantities of the con-
tinent's leading export items, and
the Soviet Union is especially at-
tractive when political factors
motivate a shift to new markets.
The past trade experience of La-
tin America with Communist coun-
tries, however, indicates that
the East European states are a
more probable market for sus-
tained sales. Eastern Europe
normally carries on about three
times as much trade with Latin
America as the USSR, and is out-
ranked by Moscow only during pe-
riods of emergency Soviet grain
purchases. r- I 25X1
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CHILEAN LEFT ASSESSES IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Chilean political parties are
beginning to analyze in some depth
the results of the congressional
elections held on 2 March. The
Communists are somewhat less
pleased with the results than are
the Socialists, but both parties
are gratified by the drop in the
vote of President Frei's Christian
Democratic Party.
The Communist Party ran a
hard, well-organized campaign,
but is very disappointed that its
vote did not increase as much as
it had hoped. Its s:iare of the
vote did increase, however, from
12 percent in the congressional
elections in 1965 to nearly 16
percent this year. The party
gained six seats in the Chamber
of Deputies for a total of 24 out
of 150, and one in the Senate for
6 out of 50. The Communists are
particularly perturbed by the
strength shown by the conserva-
tive: National Party in the urban
districts of Santiago. They be-
lieve that much of this strength
is clue to support for former pres-
ident Jorge Alessandri, who may
run for president in 1970. The
Communists fear that Alessandri's
candidacy might cut into tradi-
tional leftist support in the
presidential elections.
The Socialist Party is
pleased with the fact that it was
able to overcome the defection
of a faction that split off and
ran as the Popular Socialist Un-
ion (USP). The Socialists' vote
total was slightly lower than in
1965 and 1967, but the USP did not:
elect a deputy or a senator and
will probably disappear from the
political scene. Pro-Castro So-
cialist Salvador Allende ran very
strongly, earning the highest vote
total in his senatorial district.
This performance has strengthened
the likelihood that he will re-
ceive Communist support for the
presidential nomination.
The Communists are emphasiz-
ing unity with the Socialists, but
they also are trying to maintain
the option of including part of
the Christian Democratic or the
Radical Party in a leftist front.
The Radical Party is presently led
by a group that wants to cooperate
with the Communists and Socialists
and had hoped for their support
for a Radical presidential candi-
date. The Radicals dropped from
second place to fourth, however,
and probably will not be able to
pull Communist support away from
Allende. The Radical Party may
even execute one of its many flip-
flops and move to support Ales-
sandri, who has always been popular
with many moderate Radicals.
Several political parties
will hold national conventions
during the next few months. As
the relative influence of the fac-
tions within the parties becomes 25X1
evident, a clearer picture of the
prospects for the presidential
campaign may emerge.
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CUBA RESTRUCTURES TOP LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES MINISTRY
Recent changes at the vice
ministerial level of Cuba's Armed
Forces Ministry (MINFAR) reflect
the expanding role of the mili-
tary establishment in all aspects
of Cuban life. The reorganization
underlines MINFAR's increasing
involvement in activities such as
education and ideological guidance
that are normally considered out-
side the military area of respon-
sibility.
The number of vice ministers
has been raised from four to six
with the creation of slots for
political. work and for military
technological training. In ad-
dition, the chief of the General
Staff now clearly ranks a step
above his fellow vice ministers
and is third behind Majors Raul
Castro and Pedro Miret in the
chain of command in the ministry.
The former chief of MINFAR's
political. directorate, Antonio
"Tony" Perez Herrera, has been
upgraded to vice minister for
political work and promoted to
the rank of major. His star has
been rising since early 1968 when
the ministry began to assume the
role of guardian of revolutionary
ideology. Under his guidance, it
has advanced deeply into a field
usually considered the private
domain of the Cuban Communist
Party.
The appointment of former
chief of the General Staff Major
Belarmino Castilla Mas as the new
vice minister for military tech-
nological training appears at
first glance to be a demotion but
a closer inspection reveals the
post to be one of major importance.
The incumbent will presumably have
responsibility for converting the
armed forces from the present system
of obligatory military service to
a new system based on Cuba's senior
high schools and technological
institutes.
All such institutions are
gradually being transformed into
"military training centers" where
the students, both male and female,
will receive extensive training
in the handling of weapons and
other military subjects in addi-
tion to their academic studies.
When a new law establishing com-
pulsory education up to the univer-
sity level is enacted--probably
late this year or in early 1970--
all Cuban youth will be subject
to military training. The draft
system currently in effect will
then be discarded and students in
the military training centers will
form the rank and file of the armed
forces under the command of a per-
manent cadre of officers and non-
coms. Although the plan sounds
simple, the new vice minister will
need all his skill and experience
to put it smoothly into operation.
Although the vice ministers
for instruction and for services
have not yet been announced, it
is safe to assume that they have
been selected from Fidel Castro's
coterie of old "comrades-in-arms."
The veterans of the Sierra Maestra
campaign of 1957-58 continue to
hold all key positions in MINFAR
as well as in other branches of
the government.
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AGITATION INCREASING IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
A recent rise in. Communist
25X1
and student agitation. in the Do-
25X1
minican Republic, combined with
President Balaguer's hints that
he will run for re-election in
1970, may signal the beginning
of an extended period. of unrest.
Student demands for increased)
funds; for the government-controlled
budget of the Autonomous University
of Santo Domingo have prompted five
weeks; of demonstrations both in
the capital and the interior; one
student has been killed. In an
attempt to enlist wider support
for the recurrent budget struggle,
leaders of some Communist parties
and other leftist groups report-
edly met with labor and university
officials last week. In addition,
some factions of the badly splin-
tered Communist movement, prob-
ably planning to exploit the uni-
versity issue, reportedly hope to
establish an antigovernment front.
The Balaguer administration, how-
ever, has shown no inclination to
compromise, and open Communist or
labor support would increase the
chances of disorder.
Elements of the extreme left
appear increasingly willing to en-?
gage in violent agitation, in-
cluding assassinations , and to
risk military reprisals in order
to create an unstable: atmosphere.
The Dominican Popular Movement,
one of the more important Commu-
nist factions, publicly claimed
credit for the murder of a former
Trujillo henchman last December
and barely missed killing a police
The President's announcement
on 27 February that he might stand.
for re-election if "the people
will it" has heightened tensions.
Re-election is not prohibited by
the constitution, but "continuismo"
(extended one-man rule) is a heated
public issue, stirring memories of
Trujillo's hated 31-year dictator-
ship. If the President does run,
the major opposition Dominican
Revolutionary Party, which has dis-
played an increasingly radical bent,
may well boycott the elections, as,
it did the municipal voting last
May. The leftist Revolutionary
Social Christian Party, the only
party of any size to compete against
the government in 1968, has also
condemned the principle of re-elec-
tion and has hinted it might sup-
port a coup.
Balaguer, still personally
popular, would nevertheless prob-
ably win an election under present:
conditions. His renomination, how-
ever, not only would raise the pos-
sibility that few, if any, legiti-'
mate political parties would con-
test the 1970 elections, but could
prompt elements of the opposition
to make common cause in an effort
to topple the government. In turn,
the prospect of militant action by
the left could induce Balaguer to
rely increasingly upon the military
to bolster his position.
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