WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006900050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Re ase 2007/03/07 : CIA.RDP79-00927AQ 9000 e001 33 t
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Department review completed
ARCHIVAL RECORD
Approved For Release 2007/63iOfi' ` I FZI
i\!fC1i1VL'S,
Secret
43
28 February 1969
No. 0359/69
00050001-3
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
 Approved For Aefease 2007/0 * RDP79-00927AW6900050001-3
(Information as of noon EST, 27 February 1969)
VIETNAM
The Communists launched their first major offensive
in six months with scores of coordinated hit-and-
:run attacks throughout South Vietnam. Saigon's
official reaction has been, for the most part, calm
and reasoned.
INDONESIA SETS STAGE FOR WEST IRIAN SELF-DETERMINATION 5
Djakarta is pushing ahead with preparations for this
year's act of self-determination in West Irian and
is trying to head off criticism of its methods.
COMMUNIST CHINA TO HOLD PARTY CONGRESS SOON
The long-delayed ninth congress of the Chinese Com-
munist Party now appears likely to convene in March.
COMMUNISTS MAINTAIN MILITARY PRESSURE IN LAOS
The Communists are still threatening government posi-
tions in widely separated areas of the country and
may be making cautious moves to prepare the ground
for political talks with the Vientiane government.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 11
LAST-MINUTE EFFORT TO EASE BERLIN TENSION
Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity set off by
a surprise Communist bid to bargain with Bonn for a
change of venue, the stage remains set for the West
Germans' presidential election in the city on 5
March.
SECRET
Approved For Rp( sle 200 Q 4/~~-~ PI -009 ~AQ909950001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/0,7 ? J79-0092 06900050001-3
:IE ,,.1
DE GAULLE - SOAMES AFFAIR RAISES STIR IN EUROPE
The controversy over an early February conversation
between De Gaulle and the British ambassador in
Paris has highlighted the deep differences between
the two governments over the future organization of
Europe.
CZECHOSLOVAKS CONTINUE ON ROCKY ROAD TO NORMALIZATION 16
Czechoslovak: authorities are acting more confidently
and firmly with the Soviet occupiers, with Czecho-
slovaks who sympathize with the Russians, and with
other extremists.
WARSAW PACT AND CEMA "SUMMITS" DELAYED
The complex substantive issues involved partly ac-
count for the delay in calling Warsaw Pact and CEMA
summit meetings, but Moscow's allies, notably the
Rumanians, also seem to be engaged in stalling tac-
tics.
YUGOSLAVIA STRENGTHENS ITS TIES WITH THE WEST
Belgrade has intensified its efforts to expand re-
lations with the West in order to avoid increased
reliance on the USSR and Eastern Europe.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
ESHKOL'S DEATH FURTHER COMPLICATES ISRAELI PLANNING
Prime Minister Eshkol~s death is not likely to re-
sult in any basic changes in Israeli policies,
although it may call a temporary halt to any large-
scale Israeli retaliation plans against the Arab
terrorists.
USSR INCREASES AID TO SOUTHERN YEMEN AND YEMEN
Despite the Dsolit.ical dispute between the two under-
developed countries, the USSR has been able to aid
each side without alienating the other, thus winning
a foothold in the Red Sea area and posing as a sup-
porter of "progressive" Arab nationalism.
SECRET
Approved For please 2007/03/07 Y CIA-MDP79-009277AO0b906050001-3
Iff
 Approved For Ruse 2007/03WIDP79-00927AQj$900050001-3
AYUB WITHDRAWS FROM PAKISTANI PRESIDENTIAL RACE
A scramble for national leadership has begun in the
wake of President Ayub's announcement that he will
not seek re-election next year. It is increasingly
clear that any presidential aspirant must have sub-
stantial support in both East and West Pakistan.
INTERNAL TENSIONS MOUNT IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA
In recent weeks, the country has experienced a seri-
ous decline in law and order, and further deteriora-
tion, if not a general political upheaval, is likely.
Western Hemisphere
PALACE COUP MOUNTED IN PANAMA
In a quickly executed move on the morning of 24 Feb-
ruary, National Guard commander Colonel Torrijos
ousted his chief rival, Colonel Martinez, who was
viewed as a growing threat to the old order.
ECUADOR SEEKS NEW INTERNATIONAL POSTURE
Increasingly uncertain over US policies in Latin
America, Ecuador is seeking substitutes for some of
its traditionally strong ties with the US.
PERU FACING UP TO PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM EXPROPRIATION
Some moderate officials are still seeking to avoid
the loss of US economic assistance early in April,
while others are looking for ways to soften the ex-
pected impact and bring international pressure on
the US.
SECRET
Approved For %1 sd-2007 /HYY 61A4R PT9-009 7A0069O50001-3
 Approved Foelease 2007/03~~:JADP79-009206900050001-3
GUATEMALAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY INTENSIFIES
Political events--such as last week's withdrawal of
the ruling party's presidential candidate--continue
to overshadow terrorist activity, but pro-Castro in-
surgents are again planning violence.
SECRET
Approved Foir eIease 20I1ZM07sx1 t-RI'P79-OtDg27AQ0$0050001-3
 Approved For Rease 2007/03/gki,5 1 P79-00927AqW00050001-3
The country-wide Communist attacks in South Vietnam launched on
23 February appear to be the opening phase of an offensive designed to
continue for several weeks. Main force units for the most part have been held
in reserve so far, suggesting that the Communists intend either to mount
major ground assaults in the near future or to spin the offensive out by
committing such forces to battle piecemeal. These attacks are aimed at
demonstrating the Communists' continuing military capability and their
readiness to stretch out the war indefinitely. Hanoi again publicly disavowed
any "understanding" with the US prior to the total cessation of bombing last
November that would oblige the Communists to exercise military restraint.
It now appears likely that the long-delayed ninth congress of the
Chinese Communist Party will take place in March. The party should have
elected a new congress in 1961 but this requirement was disregarded in the
aftermath of the Great Leap Forward. Unresolved problems within the
Chinese leadership could cause further slippage in opening the congress.
The Communists in Laos continue their efforts to regain territory they
held at the time of the 1962 settlement. They apparently are trying to
strengthen their position while they make cautious moves to prepare for
political talks with the Vientiane government. The Communists may calcu-
late that such talks would undercut the US position that the Lao and
Vietnamese questions are inextricably connected.
Djakarta is pushing ahead with preparations for this year's act of
self-determination in West Irian. UN and Netherlands officials are generally
sympathetic to Indonesia's handling of the matter and the West Irianese
themselves appear to accept that they have no alternative to formal union
with Indonesia.
The Australian and New Zealand prime ministers have confirmed that
their countries will retain ground forces, as well as an air and naval presence.
in MnlavRin and Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971 1
SECRET
Approved For F1Wasle 200ff /W d I 'Y9-00927M0169b0 001-3
 Approved Fc Iease 20079/'YA-RDP79-0092TD06900050001-3
INH
L)INH
is
MILES
Da Nang
Approved For Release 20077 9k 9fA-RDP79-00927A006900050001-3
 Approved For IZWease 2007/Or.LOZ~ RDP79-00927Pi 6900050001-3
VIETNAM
The Communists launched
their first major offensive in
six months on 23 February with
scores of coordinated hit-and-
run attacks throughout South
Vietnam. During the first four
days of their drive, enemy forces
concentrated largely on allied
field positions, outposts, and
government administrative centers
in the countryside and large mili-
tary encampments, airfields, and
logistics installations in and
near most of the major cities.
The Communists struck mainly
with harassing rocket, mortar,
and sniper fire, sometimes accom-
panied by light ground probes
and commando raids. In a few
instances, Communist infantry
ranging up to battalion size in
strength assaulted targets af-
ter the initial shellings, trig-
gering sharp, close-quarters
fighting.
The pace of the enemy's
drive slackened after the first
night, but the intensity of the
strikes, particularly ground as-
saults, seemed to increase. Many
targets were struck a second or
third time while a handful of
new cities and field positions
were hit during subsequent days.
The Communist emphasis on
indirect, heavy-weapons attacks
and their conservative employ-
ment of ground assaults kept
their casualties relatively low
during the first 72 hours of the
offensive. Some 3,500 enemy
troops were killed while allied
losses totaled some 650, includ-
ing about 200 US killed. Damage
to allied installations ranged
from light to moderate for the
most part although a handful of
ammunition depots and airfields
was extensively damaged.
Saigon was shelled on 23 Feb-
ruary for the first time since
the complete US bombing halt last
November. The enemy also hit Da
Nang and Bien Hoa with rockets
and follow-on sapper raids.
Pleiku city, Can Tho, Cam Ranh
Bay and more than half of South
Vietnam's provincial capitals
were shelled. In an effort to
offset charges of indiscriminate
shelling of population centers,
Communist propaganda carefully
phrased their accounts of the
city attacks, especially in a
detailed report on the Saigon
strikes, as being specifically
directed against military or
government positions.
The Communist offensive
clearly has not yet run its
course. There are solid indica-
tions that additional attacks
are planned, probably including
some by main force units that
remained largely uncommitted dur-
ing the offensive's first three
days. Sizable enemy formations
have maneuvered into positions
just outside major cities and al-
lied redoubts in eastern and
southern I Corps, the western
highlands, much of northern and
western III Corps, and the upper
SECRET
Approved For &Mia3se 200'VffiM7 : bX)i 79-009 OF06~060050001-3
 Approved ForIease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-009206900050001-3
SECRET
delta. Most of the enemy's ini-
tial efforts were concentrated
in these regions and allied sweeps
there on 24 and 25 February
touched off some stiff skirmishes
with concentrations of Communist
regulars.
If the next phase involves
strong thrusts into populated
areas, the Communists probably
will bring their political agita-
tion and proselyting efforts into
play. There is strong evidence
that they made preparations prior
to the offensive to agitate, in-
cite "uprisings," and drum up
support among the populace through
an intensive propaganda campaign
and the infiltration of political
cadre into cities and towns. One
of the Communists' major aims
in the first round of action is
to demonstrate that they are as
strong as ever and that allied
claims of recent gains are il-
lusory. The Communists also hope
to bolster the morale of their
troo-os, cadre, and supporters,
whic:71 has declined in recent
months, and, additionally, to
erase the gains allied military
and pacification operations have
scored since Tet 19613.
Political Develop Lents in
South Vietnam
Official reaction to the Com-
munist attacks has been, for the
most part, calm and reasoned. Sai--
gon's top leaders have made simi-
lar statements describing the of-
fensive as a desperate act by a
defeated enemy and praising the
population for its steadiness.
In characteristic fashion, how-
ever, Vice President Ky also told
the press that he favored swift
retaliatory action against North
Vietnam if the attacks continued.
Most newspapers reacted
strongly to the shellings of
Saigon and focused on the gov-
ernment's earlier pledge to
abandon the Paris talks if the
Communists renewed their attacks
on South Vietnamese cities. The
majority of opinion favored that
course of action, while the more
militant journals called for
more dramatic reprisals. Most
Upper House members condemned
the attacks, although one sena-
tor criticized the government
for allowing the shellings of
the capital city.
The government did take the
precaution of raiding and closing
the An Quang Buddhist Youth Center
to forestall any possible Buddhist-
inspired demonstrations in concert
with attacks on Saigon. Police
arrested militant Buddhist Thich
Thien Minh at the center. They
are investigating his connection
with a number of students who
were also arrested, and with
Viet Cong propaganda, weapons,
and ammunition found there.
SECRET
Approved For ea` a 20O'lJfl 0"! S0WMD1P79-0Q 7 06?p0050001-3
 Approved For R ase 2007/03 t I 4fDP79-00927A 900050001-3
INDONESIA SETS STAGE FOR WEST IRIAN SELF-DETERMINATION
Djakarta is pushing ahead
with preparations for this year's
act of self-determination in West
Irian and is trying to head off
criticism of its methods.
UN and Netherlands officials on
this approach. The Australian
minister for external affairs has
also adopted an understanding po-
sition.
The 1962 Indonesia-Nether-
lands agreement requires only that
the West Irianese be allowed to
decide whether to remain with
Indonesia, without specifying
~_ _ ;Ai~UI'H
93994 2-49
procedures. Djakarta has been
making careful moves to avoid con-
troversy while ensuring a favor-
able outcome.
The Indonesians have been
concerned that a one-man, one-
vote approach would give anti-
Indonesian elements opportunities
for agitation and have, there-
fore, argued in favor of reaching
a decision through Indonesia's
established method of consulta-
tion and consensus. Indonesian
representatives have received a
generally sympathetic hearing from
Apparently, Djakarta's latest
plan is to conduct a series of con-
sultations within each of nine spe-
cially selected regional councils.
Council membership would vary from
75 to 175 and would consist of geo-
graphic and organizational repre-
sentatives and traditional lead-
ers, most of whom probably would
be Djakarta-appointed. The nine
councils apparently are expected
separately to reach a consensus in
favor of formally uniting with In-
donesia. The process would take
several months and presumably would
get under way this summer.
Among the West Irianese them-
selves, there is a growing aware-
ness that they have no alterna-
tive to formal union with Indo-
nesia and organized anti-Indonesian
activities appear to be declining.
Two of the area's three major
rebel leaders surrendered early
this year and have given public
support to the Suharto govern-
ment. Djakarta, for its part,
has sent more consumer goods and
better qualified military and ad-
ministrative personnel int-n st
Irian. 25X1
SECRET
Approved Forig1eaee 20O /,Q S1R1 79-009ZJA0@950001-3
 26X1
2X1
i
Approved Fd elease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-009 ' 06900050001-3
SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA TO
]OLD PARTY CONGRESS SOON
The long-delayed ninth con-
gress of the Chinese Communist
Party now appears likely to con-
vene in March. Premier Chou En-
lai is said
that the congress wou p
be held next month, though no fi-
nal decision had been made. This
remark is the most authoritative
statement so far on the timing
of the congress, but most other
signs now available also point
to March as the probable date.
According to its constitu-
tion of 1956, the Chinese party
should have elected a new national
concress during 1961, but this
legal requirement was quietly
ignored in the aftermath of the
Great Leap Forward. The congress
was scheduled to take place a
year ago, but was postponed be-
cause of factional fighting.
After the 12th plenum last
October of the central committee
elected in 1956, Peking announced
that the ninth party congress
would be held "at an appropriate
time." In November and December,,
provincial-level congresses of
par-:y members to ratify the pro-
posed new party constitution and
too prepare for the ninth party
congress took place in at least
a third of China's provinces.
This stage, which now has prob-
ably been completed throughout
the country, was the first task
assigned publicly to the party
organization since it was torn
to pieces in 1966.
Diplomatic sources in Peking
reported last month that high-
level meetings to lay the ground--
work for the congress were held
in the capital from the end of
December to mid-January. Some
delegations to the congress were
already in Peking by early Feb-
ruary, and security patrols in
the capital have been increased.
Signs welcoming the congress be-
gan going up on the city's build-
ings in mid-February.
A number of reports indicate
that the regime--and Mao person-
ally--had favored holding the
congress in February. Thus, un-
resolved problems within the
leadership have probably already
forced a one-month delay, and
further slippage is possible.
The congress is intended to bring
the Cultural Revolution to a for-
mal conclusion and to set the
stamp of legitimacy on the po-
litical structure that has begun
to emerge after three years of
turbulence. There are many signs,
however, that the badly divided
leadership has been unable so
far to agree on basic policy for
the future on such matters as
staffing the reconstituted party
and general economic policies.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/Q?ln7 : s9o-MRP179-0092~f-0p69b0( 50001-3
Page 6 WE Y e
 Approved Foielease 2007/PLVM]RIiC-RDP79-009254M06900050001-3
Differences within the leader-
ship probably played an important
role in Peking's cancellation on
18 February of talks with the US
at Warsaw, talks which China it-
self had advocated last November.
The Maoists seized on the defec-
tion of the former Chinese charge
in The Hague as a pretext for
not meeting with the US. This
cancellation constitutes a set-
back for moderate elements in the
leadership, as does the resump-
tion in late January of poster
attacks on the sidelined ad-
vanced weapons administrator,
Nieh Jung-chen.
Domestic propaganda, on the
other hand, although often am-
biguous, suggests a hardening of
SECRET
opposition to the excesses of
Mao's social "reforms." The Peo-
ple's Daily editorial of 21 Feb-
ruary--billed as a major pro-
nouncement, and heavily encrusted
in standard Maoist slogans--
called essentially for a more
reasoned, systematic management
of industrial and agricultural
production. This may be only
part of a continuing debate, how-
ever, because no moderation of
Maoist measures has been noted.
Factories are still being ordered
to effect wholesale reductions
in managerial and technical staffs
with the object of "reforming"
personnel who do not work with
their hands. More egalitarian
methods of remunerating peasants
are bein instituted in rural com-
munes. 25X1
Approved Forftle4se 20 $i I -'b)b)579-009ifAg6&0bb50001-3
 SECRET
Approved Fo lease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00921W06900050001-3
"'Z C H I N A
Government-held location
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
~sar an$
~j IETNAM
Souvanna~l1.. hate
. ..a }
Qaks
Rt. 13
Botovens
Plateau
Approved For Release 200MEgI'A-RDP79-00927A006900050001-3
,N D
 Approved For.$elease 2007IOfg.%}RDP79-009274606900050001-3
COMMUNISTS MAINTAIN MILITARY PRESSURE IN LAOS
The Communists are still
threatening government positions
in widely separated areas of the
country and may be making cau-
tious moves to prepare the ground
for political talks with the Vien-
tiane government.
North Vietnamese troops re-
main dug in around the government
base at Thateng in southern Laos,
although government efforts to
relieve the garrison have eased
the enemy pressure somewhat. The
tactical situation is basically
unchanged, however. The govern-
ment defenders, whose numbers have
been substantially reduced through
casualties and withdrawals, are
increasingly restive over their
plight..
The Communists are also main-
taining pressure against other
government positions in the Bolo-
vens Plateau area. On 23 Febru-
ary, a multibattalion Pathet Lao
force hit the government position
at Souvannakhili, some 15 miles
north of Pakse on Route 13, and
inflicted moderate casualties be-
fore being driven off. The enemy
may hope that such attacks will
force regional military commander
General Phasouk to consider pull-
ing back government troops along
the eastern edge of the Bolovens
Plateau, including those in Tha-
teng, in order to bolster the se-
curity of Route 13 and the pro-
vincial capital of Pakse.
The Pathet Lao, meanwhile,
continue to step up activity in
Vientiane Province. Reports of
small numbers of Pathet Lao guer-
rillas filtering into isolated
villages and increased terror-
ism suggest the Communists hope
to re-establish their presence
in areas north of the capital
from which they were driven sev-
eral years ago.
The Communists undoubtedly
see political advantages in re-
gaining territory held at the
time of the 1962 settlement. In
recent months, they have been ar-
guing more forcefully that the
amount of territory under Commu-
nist control entitles the Pathet
Lao to a larger representation
in any reconstituted coalition
government. Although the have
n in erl
the
communists ope to get pre imi-
nary talks going between the con-
tending factions before too long.
The Communists may calculate that
such talks would undercut the US
position in Paris that the Lao
and Vietnamese quest' are in-
extricabl co
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Re eg se 20071 7tiYCfKl* O]$~-00927 O0 038001-3
 Aft
Approved For Release 2007/03/g7-~Ik-79-009276900050001-3
SECRET
Approved For Rq$eaSe 20WQ, tpl :5(~k- 79-009?7#g
6 050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/9.EiFjDP79-00927AQ900050001-3
Official and public reaction to President Nixon's European visit has
been generally enthusiastic and the Europeans appreciated that the President
concentrated on exchanging views rather than solving problems. The Soviet
press has played the trip in a low key, taking the President to task only
moderately for his remarks in support of NATO and Bonn.
As it has so often over the last twenty years, West Berlin again became a
matter of immediate concern, with the focus this time on the West German
presidential election scheduled there on 5 March. The Communists have used
a combination of protests, threats, and barely concealed troop movements in
an attempt to get Bonn to shift the election away from Berlin. Last week,
they added some hints that progress on the Berlin pass issue and an
improvement in Soviet-German relations would be possible if the election
site were moved. Time to arrange a compromise was growing short, however,
and harassment of the city and West German access to it seems likely next
week.
The West Europeans regretted that the disagreement between Britain
and France over political consultation in the Western European Union had
developed, just before President Nixon's arrival, into an even sharper dispute
over De Gaulle's conversation with British Ambassador Soames on 4 Febru-
ary. It tardily became known that De Gaulle, in suggesting bilateral talks,
had spoken of European independence making NATO in time unnecessary,
and had expressed an interest in reorganizing the Common Market as a large
free trade area-both ideas he has long espoused. In the ensuing public
discussion, France charged Britain with a breach of confidence and with
distorting De Gaulle's ideas.
Among the top members of the leadership in Czechoslovakia, a subtle
change in attitude toward the Soviet occupiers is becoming evident, with the
Czechoslovaks acting more confident) and firmly toward the Russians and
those who sympathize with Moscow.
SECRET
Pn fie btease 20 J&' 5 A8~79-009ifAU 6b50001-3
Approved For R
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
SECRET
Travel Restrictions Around Berlin
FEDERAL
REPUBLIC
annpygr
GERMANY
??? Autobahn
-- Road
------ Railroad
^--r- Canal
Letzldnge Hein 16' 1 Ar
Btendal _
Probst Ila
,~ Ludwigss lauen
? Gutenfurst
f 01er ~a~.Xienn
Aemporarily Restricted Area.
',.Travel denied to Allied
ni ttary liaison personnel.
Approved For Release 1 i 7 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/Cf$ ;1 fAWDP79-00927A1p6900050001-3
LAST-MINUTE EFFORT TO EASE BERLIN TENSION
Despite a flurry of diplo-
matic activity set off by a sur-
prise Communist bid to bargain
with the West Germans for a change
of venue, the stage is still set
for Bonn's presidential election
to take place in West Berlin on
5 March. If the election is held
as scheduled, Communist harass-
ment of the city and of West Ger-
man access is likely to take place.
A meeting on 26
e ruary o representatives of
the West Berlin Senat and the
East Germans failed to bring the
two sides closer, but the West
Berliners hoped to arrange further
negotiating sessions.
pursuing a "soft" policy toward
Bonn and the West.
Misgivings on the part of
key Bonn officials regarding the
Berlin site for the election have
been evident for some time. Many
believed that the decision, while
wholly within Bonn's rights, tended
to complicate relations with the
East and undermine efforts to re-
duce tension.
The Soviets would, of course,
like to see Bonn reverse itself
and take its election elsewhere,
but there is no evidence that
they are leaning on Ulbricht to
improve his original offer. Moscow
18 December 1968
20 December
23 December
10 February
12 February
10 13 February
The East Germans probably
wish that their last-minute ma-
neuvering will foment friction
between the two coalition parties
in Bonn and create difficulties
between Bonn and West Berlin. The
East Germans may also hope that
the West Germans will turn down
the "concession" so that Pankow
may then play up the futility of
18-21 February
20 February
21 February
SECRET
Bonn announces intention to hold election in West Berlin on 5 March
1969
Soviet and East German media printfirst reaction "a serious dabber 25X1
ate prosecution_endangers the peace and security of Europe.-."
East Germans announce now travel restrictions, inter alia prescribing
access to Berlin of anyone having to do with election
Moscow publicly endorses East German travel restrictions
Bonn formally schedules election for Berlin
Warsaw Pact commander Yakubovsky confers with East German
leaders
Soviets protest to Bonn, implying East Germans would be allowed to
hinder West German access to Berlin, Soviet ambassador in Washing-
ton says that the USSR does not wish to jeopardize relations with US
over Berlin, that no action will be taken against visit of Presidcnr
Nixon, and that East Germans will not disrupt Allied presnece in
Bob i n
West German ground traffic to and from Berlin delayed for varying
periods every day by East Germans
Joint Soviet - East German maneuvers announced for East Germany
in early March
East German party boss lJlbricht sends letter proposing a deal
Chancellor Kissinger talks with Tsarapkin, who gave implicit ap- 25X1
prnval to talks between the West Berlin Scram and the East Germans
Approved For l 1eaaaaas 20(~ /~7~! ' A-W F 79-009 A( 0~~50001-3
 Approved Foriease 2007/03fTCRIDP79-00926900050001-3
itself has promised Bonn no more
than a favorable attitude toward
pending Soviet - West German bi-
lateral matters.
Meanwhile, Moscow has gone
ahead with preparations for a
joint Soviet and East German
exercise announced for early March
in East Germany. The Soviets
have banned the travel of Allied
Military Liaison Mission observer;:;
from 25 February to 10 March in
an area of central East Germany
that includes the Letzlinger Heide
training area, the largest in East
Germany. The movement of addi-
tional forces could interfere
with traffic on the ground ac-
cess routes to Berlin. There
is no firm evidence that additional
Soviet forces have been moved
into East Germany to
in the exercise./
DE GAULLE - SOAMES AFFAIR RAISES STIR IN EUROPE
Despite differences of em-
phasis, there is widespread agree-
ment about much of what De Gaulle
told British Ambassador Soames in
their controversial conversation
of 4 February. All versions make
clear that De Gaulle reiterated
that Britain could become a mem-
ber of the European Communities
only if these in fact: became a
larger and looser association of
states or a free trade area. He
also repeated his well-known crit--
icisra of NATO and his; support for
a "reform" of the defense ties
between Europe and the US.
There still is disagreement,
however, over whether De Gaulle
proposed a "directorate" of
France, Britain, West Germany,
and ]Italy to guide Western Euro-
pean affairs. French Foreign Min-
ister Debre admitted to France's
Common Market partners only that
De Gaulle had mentioned the four
countries as having the most im-
portant military forces in Western
Europe.
It is clear that De Gaulle
proposed bilateral talks between
Paris and London, but speculation
varies as to why he did so. Some
attribute the move to his alleged
concern about growing French iso-
lation from the rest of Europe;
others believe it resulted from
anxiety about increasing German
assertiveness. There are also
varied opinions on the timing of
the discussion with Soames--mere
happenstance, a desire to make the
pitch prior to President Nixon's
visit, or a response to hints
given by Soames himself that the
UK might be considering a new
European initiative other than
the Common Market route.
The British Government, in
any case, suspected a possible
trap. London evidently feared
that the French could use British
acceptance of "discreet" talks to
prove that the UK is not really
interested in the close unity of
Europe represented by the Communi-
ties. Britain's disclosure to
SECRET
Approved For PdIea?i 20 MM1 sUMVPP79-0G7h106900050001-3
 Approved For Retease 2007/1R t4 RDP79-00927A966900050001-3
France's five Common Market part-
ners of De Gaulle's "proposals"
was intended to reveal Paris as
the enemy of true European unity
and to bolster the British cam-
paign to engage the Five in po-
litical consultations.
In Parliament, Foreign Sec-
retary Stewart said that the UK's
policy is to "seek membership in
the Communities. If the French
Government believes there is an-
other and better way to achieve
European unity," he said, "they
will have to convince not only
us but the other countries con-
cerned."
In Britain, however, there
has been press and political criti-
cism of the government's handling
of the affair. Some of this re-
veals considerable misunderstand-
ing of the government's apparent
commitment to Community member-
ship and its rejection of French
concepts of European organization;
some other criticism emphasizes
disagreement with London's policy.
Such criticism could be a serious
obstacle for London's future
strategy. British "Europeanists"
suggest that the government may
have to go even further--toward
proposing a supranational politi-
SECRET
cal community--in order to retain
the initiative.
Italian Foreign Minister
Nenni alluded publicly this week
to seeking "other paths" with
like-minded countries should the
Western European Union (WEU) forum
for political consultations be
blocked. Although the Five have
avoided public statements about
the De Gaulle - Soames affair,
they continue to oppose the French
position on the "illegality" of
these WEU meetings. The Germans,
who have shown the most reserve,
will nevertheless continue to
participate in the WEU meetings
taking place without France. The
Benelux states believe they have
now at least been "warned" about
possible collusion over their
heads by the larger European states.
France may hope to capitalize
on sentiment in Britain for free
trade area - type solutions to UK
"membership" in Europe. Paris
therefore may now attempt to put
new life into the flagging notion
of "commercial arrangements" be-
tween the Community and any other
interested European states. Debre
told the Austrian foreign minister
this week that France would soon 25X1
introduce some new elements into
earlier proposals al n these
lines.
Approved Fo 1 Ie'e 26 7 ( 67s-L'6iN-` ffP79-00 1A 968050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007 e -RDP79-00927A006900050001-3
CZECHOSLOVAKS CONTINUE ON ROCKY ROAD TO NORMALIZATION
Czechoslovak authorities are
acting more confidently and firmly
with the Soviet occupiers, with
Czechoslovaks who sympathize with
the Russians, and with other ex-
tremists.
The federal government last
week empowered local officials
to arrest individuals responsible
for clandestine publications,
which are illegal under Czecho-
slovak law. These publications
include Zpravy--the official
paper of the Soviet occupation
forces--and irregular, anonymous
publications that have slandered
Czechoslovak leaders.
A burst of activity by
Dubcek's progressive and moderate
supporters has put three promi-
nent conservatives on the run.
Youth organizations in Prague
filed a libel suit against party
secretary Alois Indra for sug-
gesting that the death by fire
of student martyr Jan Palach,
as well as youth and journalist
meetings in Prague, were pro-
gressive plots perpetrated by
one "stage director." Another
outspoken hard liner, Vilem Novy,
claimed that he has been "mis-
understood" and announced his
retirement from the party cen-
tral committee and the federal
assembly. In addition, former
deputy interior minister Viliam
Salgovic, charged with collabora-
tion last August, denied that he
had a role in the invasion and
declared his support for Dubcek.
Czechoslovak officials ap-
pear to have fared much better
than expected during recent nego-
tiations with the Soviets over
housekeeping details of the oc-
cupation. The Russians agreed
to pay for all goods and ser-
vices, including rent for "mili-
tary areas, training grounds,
water," and other utilities.
Prague reportedly managed to post-
pone the construction of new
housing for Soviet officers by
arguing that such work would
contradict the agreement on the
"temporary" nature of the occupa-
tion. Moreover, the Czechoslovaks
announced that various Soviet com-
mand headquarters in Prague would
be reduced to a single office.
The Prague leadership has publicly
requested, too, that Soviet soldiers
refrain from carrying live ammuni.-
t:ion when off duty.
A potential source of trouble
for Dubcek developed on 25 February
when another student committed
suicide by fire in Prague. The
act allegedly was in protest against
the political retrogression that
followed the occupation. Because
the public mood now is not as re-
sponsive, the act probably will not
precipitate a political crisis--
as did the self-immolation of Jan
Palach in January--but it might
hurt Dubcek's efforts to curb the
conservative extremists.
In addition, the government
has become embroiled in a growing
dispute with trade union leaders,
workers, and industrial managers
over legislation on the management
of enterprises. This could cripple
the economic reform program and, in
turn, could mushroom into a serious
political problem if the government
should lose worker su ort. 25X1
SECRET
Approved For:aeldase 200 fA /U75U t P79-009WAIM900050001-3
 Approved For R1fease 2007/Q20~f;RDP79-009276900050001-3
WARSAW PACT AND CEMA "SUMMITS" DELAYED
Despite sporadic efforts in
recent months, Moscow has been un-
able to schedule "summit" meetings
of the Warsaw Pact and the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA). The complex substantive
issues involved, particularly on
the economic side, partly account
for the delay, but Moscow's allies,
notably the Rumanians, seem to be
engaging in stalling tactics.
The Soviets probably had hoped
originally to have both meetings
take place in late 1968 or early
1969, a plan obviously gone awry.
Various other dates have been men-
tioned subsequently, with the lat-
est reports predicting a Warsaw
Pact meeting sometime in March and
a CEMA meeting possibly in April.
Any dates early this spring
would be difficult to meet. A Po-
lish official has commented that
responsible Polish officials have
not even been asked to prepare the
necessary working papers for a War-
saw Pact "summit." The reluctant
Rumanians can point to their na-
tional elections in early March and
a projected visit to Turkey by
party leader Ceausescu in late
March as grounds for postponement.
The Soviets themselves are likely
to be preoccupied with the Berlin
problem in early March. Soviet De-
fense Minister Grechko is scheduled
to visit Pakistan in the first part
of March, making a Warwaw Pact
gathering at that time doubtful.
Apart from scheduling difficul-
ties, Moscow's inability to set a
date and make it stick results bas-
ically from the lack of consensus
among member states on the proposals
to be considered. There have been
reports that Moscow would like to
subordinate the national armies to
the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact
command. Bucharest would certainly
oppose such proposals, and many of
the other East Europeans probably
share these doubts. The scheduling
of pact exercises--particularly on
Rumanian soil--also remains unre-
solved. The Rumanians reportedly
discussed some of these issues with
ranking Soviet visitors last week,
but a meeting of the minds seems
unlikely.
There is evident uncertainty
about what can or should be done to
make CEMA a more effective instru-
ment. Although the Russians in gen-
eral favor a tightening of economic
ties for political reasons, their
thinking about forms and methods is
anything but firm. The East Euro-
peans clearly are acting as though
they have leeway to chart their own
particular courses, suggesting that
Moscow has yet to take a firm stand.
Moscow at this stage seems will-
ing to let matters drift rather than
risk a dispute that would prejudice
chances for its long-cherished world
Communist conference. Under these
conditions, a decision to convene
"summit" meetings before May, how-
ever unlikely, would probably repre-
sent more a formal demonstration of
"unity" than a real reconciliation
of differences. 25X1
SECRET
Approved Fort el a 20 3II uQ E)P79-00~W 9p9050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/ RDP79-00927A006900050001-3
SEC i T'-
YUGOSLAVIA STRENGTHENS ITS TIES WITH THE WEST
Yugoslavia, uncer-:ain about
its relations with the Soviet
bloc, continues to diversify its
political and economic ties with
the non-Communist world. Yugo-
slav Federal Executive Council
member Toma Granfil's highly suc-
cessful trip to West Germany
from 10-14 February caps six
months of accelerated contacts
between Belgrade and Bonn. Bel-
grade is seeking just this sort
of result in its other contacts
with the West.
.As a result of Granfil's
trip.--the first official visit
by a Yugoslav cabinet member
since World War II--an agreement
was signed covering economic,
industrial, and technical coopera-
tion, and Bonn reaff:_r:ned its
support for Yugoslav efforts to
gain improved access to the Com-
mon Market. In addition, experts
are now working out the final
details of a $75 million German
credit, part of which will be
used to refinance outstanding
Yugoslav debts to West Germany.
Other Western countries
also have provided financial as-
sistance to Yugoslavia or are
considering such aid. The US
has agreed to a partial debt re-
scheduling, Rome is reported to
be favorably considering a Yu-
goslav request to refinance its
outstanding debts, and last No-
vember London granted Belgrade
a $24 million trade credit. These:
measures are necessary if Yugo-
slavia is to continue efforts
to restructure and modernize its
economy while increasing its
economic ties with the West.
In January, Bonn and Belgrade
initialed two agreements provid-
ing for increased cultural co-
operation and the mutual estab-
lishment of information centers.
These agreements may be formalized
next June. At that time, accord-
ing to tentative plans, the new
Yugoslav foreign minister, not
yet appointed, will visit Bonn
in return for Foreign Minister
Brandt's visit to Belgrade last
June.
Despite differences over ac-
cess to the Common Market, Yugo-
slav Premier Mika Spiljak ended
his visit to France in January in
an atmosphere of growing bilateral
cooperation which stressed a
similarity of views on interna-
tional affairs. High-level US-
Yugoslav contacts have also in-
creased over the past six months,
and Tito has indicated a desire
to meet with President Nixon.
Belgrade has coupled this
flurry of diplomatic activity
with a more objective approach
by the information media on
sensitive East-West issues such
as the Middle East, Vietnam, and
the current Berlin confrontation.
SECRET
Approved Foq3 le se 2f 4Q75k
_ P79-009 9eG050001-3
 Approved For Lease 2007/03,YCRIRLFDP79-009276900050001-3
In the wake of Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol's death, a political struggle
for power has begun within the ruling Labor Party between the "Old Guard"
and two younger military leaders, Yigal Allon, who was named acting prime
minister, and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan. The "Old Guard" is bent on
blocking Dayan and may put forward either Allon or former foreign minister
Mrs. Golda Meir as leader of a caretaker government until the fall elections.
The Nigerian civil war, now in its 20th month, remains a military
stalemate, as federal forces have been unable to launch their planned "final
offensive."
The situation in Ethiopia has been unusually tense this week because of
possible student demonstrations and the rising level of open criticism against
the government among the educated elite.
In radical-dominated Congo (Brazzaville), President Ngouabi's ex-
panded attack on local moderates during the past week could trigger a new
round of political turbulence and leftist violence. Several moderates have
been arrested, and party militants have been urged to increase their open
surveillance and denunciation of all "reactionary elements."
In Pakistan, President Ayub's announcement on 21 February that he
will not seek re-election has touched off a scramble for power among
opposition leaders. Ayub met briefly with the opposition on 26 February in
an effort to begin negotiations on constitutional changes and to set the stage
for an orderly transition of power. The next meeting is scheduled for 10
March.
India's Left Communists dominate the new coalition government
formed this week in strategic West Bengal and are in a good position to
penetrate further important sectors of Bengali society. The new government
is already tr in to bring the state civil service and police in line with its
objectives.
SECRET
Approved For I e91e e 20('l9IH:SiEI 79-0092+A0b@Y00001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/0gpt;.*ffDP79-00927A006900050001-3
ESHKOL'S DEATH FURTHER COMPLICATES ISRAELI PLANNING
Prime Minister Eshkol's
death is not likely to result in
any basic changes in Israeli poi--
icies, although it may call a
temporary halt to any large-scale
Israeli retaliation plans against
the Arab terrorists,. Eshkol, who
was a "near-hawk" in the Israeli
political spectrum, played a very
important role in the cabinet as
a compromiser. His death prob-
ably will cause some unevenness
and difficulties within the cab-
inet, and is certain to set off
a three-way political struggle
for succession with:-n the ruling
Labor Party among the party
"Old Guard" led by Pinhas Sapir
and Mrs. Golda Meir,,Acting Prime
Minister Yigal Allon, and Min-
ister of Defense Moshe Dayan.
The 50-year-old Allon--a
leader in the 1948 war and the
author of the Allon plan for the
disposition of the occupied Arab
territories--was named deputy
prime minister by Eshkol in June
1968, primarily as a political
bloc to the ambitious and popular
minister of defense, Moshe Dayan.
Allon has lately been somewhat
out of favor with the ruling La-
bor Party "Old Guard," and Eshkol
was grooming the party's secre-
tary general,Pinhas Sapir, as his
heir apparent. Although the "Old
Guard" apparently would like to
use Allon again against Dayan, he
can be expected as caretaker to
make the most of the prime min-
istership to further his own per-
sonal ambitions.
Deputy Prime Minister Allon's
appointment as acting prime min-
ister is clearly a atop-gap mea-
sure. The formation of a care-
taker government to hold office
until the fall elections is
thought most likely? This will
be established when the Knesset
reconvenes on 6 March-
Sapir apparently intends to
maneuver in the background for
the moment, putting Golda Meir
forward to represent the estab-
lishment. Mrs. Meir, however,
will be 71 in May, her health
is not good, and she is not a
serious contender. Sapir is a
25X1
/tough, extremely
hard-working member of the "Old
Guard." As a "dove" regarding
a peace settlement, however, Sapir
is probably unacceptable to the
Israeli public in the present dif-
ficult situation in which Israel
finds itself vis-a-vis the Arab
terrorists.
The "Old Guard," clearly
reluctant to give up power, has
fought off the younger "Sabras"
such as Allon and Dayan. The
SECRET
Approved For eW 200f @.7f:5M 79-00927AO.06S0GM0001-3
 Approved For Rlease 2007/N4i~rfRDP79-009276900050001-3
minister of defense, however, is
without doubt the most popular
man in Israel and the hero of
the six-day war, although some-
what unpredictable and volatile.
He is a "hawk," but he is prob-
ably the only leader in Israel
who can effectively fend off an
"imposed" Middle East settlement,
or lead Israel into a settlement
without a major political up-
heaval.
Israeli leaders, in the
wake of the Arab commando at-
tack on the El Al airliner in
Zurich and the series of terror-
ist bombings in Jerusalem, ap-
pear to be trying to develop
some new methods or techniques
to quash the terrorists. What
this would involve is not yet
clear. It seems certain, how-
ever, that the Israeli air raids
on the two fedayeen bases in
Syria on 24 February are only
the beginning. Israeli spokes-
men have characterized the raids
as "only the appetizer," and the
Israeli press has talked of a
"new method war" against the
terrorists. That something more
is coming is also suggested by
the fact that the Israelis spe-
cifically identified the Syrian
bases as belonging to Fatah, not
to the Popular Front for the Lib-
eration of Palestine, which
claimed credit for the El Al at-
tack and the Jerusalem bombings.
Whatever techniques the Is-
raelis devise, continuing ter-
rorist attacks are a critical is- 25X1
sue in Israel that result in
mounting pressures on the govern-
Minister an, in a statement
in the Knesset on 25 February,
said that Israel would demand
that terrorism be banned as part
of any peace settlement. "Is-
rael," he said, "cannot agree
to make peace with Arab govern-
ments while murder and terror-
ism continue to be carried out
by another militar arm which
belongs to h
USSR INCREASES AID TO SOUTHERN YEMEN AND YEMEN
Moscow is increasing military
and economic assistance to both
Southern Yemen and Yemen, unde-
terred by the political dispute
between the two underdeveloped
countries. So far, the USSR has
been able to aid each side without
alienating the other, and has
thus been able to win a foothold
in the Red Sea area and pose as a
supporter of "progressive" Arab
nationalism.
SECRET
Approved For fe3sle 20U/6,%l 5 bP79-0092P4('M06650001-3
 ON Ak
Approved For Release 2007/7RVI4.RDP79-00927A006900050001-3
During Southern Yemen Presi-
dent Al-Shaabi's visit to the USSR
early this month, the Soviets
agreed to meet his country's long-
standing requests for economic as-
sistance. They extended a credit
of about $12 million, matching a
Chinese offer of last September.
Both of these credits probably
will be used for land reclamation
and for construction of roads and
airfields. The South Yemenis
still have not found a source,
however, for the cash loans needed
to overcome serious budget defi-
cits.
The USSR agreed to provide
technical aid, particularly to the
burgeoning fish industry.. In re-
turn for assistance in building a
cannery and cold-storage facili-
ties, the Soviets have allegedly
received a four-year fishing con-
cession, thus affording their
fishing trawlers further access
to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.
Moscow has already concluded sim-
ilar agreements with Egypt, Iran,
Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen.
In its technical assistance,
Moscow will also put heavy stress
on transportation facilities. The
Soviets agreed to deepen Aden's
harbor and to provide six pilots;
in return, they reportedly will
be exempt from some port fees.
In addition, the Sov=_ets will mod--
erni:ze equipment and ground con-
trol operations at Aden's inter-
national airport, and Soviet air-
liners will stop there on the way
to East Africa. All of these
agreements will provide greater
official and public acceptance
of the Soviet presence.
Southern Yemen reportedly
will receive 20 MIG fighter air-
craft from the USSR over the next
two years, presumably MIG-15s and
17s, some of which may already
have been delivered. No Southern
Yemenis are qualified to fly MIGs,
so the Soviets now have
agreed to establish a local air
training mission, similar to the
army group currently in operation.
Along with small arms, the Soviets
also agreed to provide Aden with
25 tanks.
In addition, the Soviets are
renewing their efforts in Yemen.
As with Southern Yemen, Moscow
has refused Yemen's requests for
a cash loan, but intermittent de--
liveries of military equipment
have been made throughout 1968,
and the economic aid agreement
signed in 1964 is being reacti-
vated. Soviet technicians, with-
drawn during the worst fighting
of the civil war in 1967, have
started to return. One group is
currently rebuilding Yemen's ma-
jor roads, and a team of physi-
cians was scheduled to arrive in
Sana last month. Moscow has also
promised to replace the techni-
cians who were assisting land-
reclamation projects. President
Al-Amri had long been miffed by
the Soviets' failure
these advisers, I
SECRET
Approved ForlPlelane 2009t -07SLXM RDP79-0092FADO69O 050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/0~ 7jj - DP79-00927A006900050001-3
AYUB WITHDRAWS FROM PAKISTANI PRESIDENTIAL RACE
A. scramble for national
leadership has begun in the wake
of President Ayub's announcement
that he will not seek re-election
early next year.
longer run the country. He re-
portedly discussed plans to
step down with his top military
men before making the announce-
ment.
A.yub's capitulation came
on 21 February after more than
three months of violent nation-
wide agitation and a steady de-
terioration of his authority,
culminating in near anarchy in
East Pakistan. The President's
inability to get government-oppo-
sition talks under way last week--
even after major concessions--
was probably the final blow, con-
vincing him that he could no
Ayub's withdrawal has brought
a temporary lull in antigovernment
violence, but it is unlikely
to restore political stability.
Inasmuch as he has groomed no
successor, the way is now open
to the disparate and fragmented
opposition forces, but formation
of viable alliances will be more
difficult than ever now that op-
position to Ayub no longer pro-
vides a rallyinq point.
Bhutto Speaks
To Supporters
In Karachi
From Prison.
SECRET
q)ARPR79-00927#0P?%0 50001-3
Approved For 1~ 4ga?q 200,4 3 Z:S
 Approved Fo?elease 2007/WR$ 1 RDP79-009206900050001-3
While most West Pakistanis
greeted Ayub's decision with
relief and optimism, East Paki-
stani contended that it was of
minima]. importance because basic
grievances remain--grievances
against: the entire system, not
just against Ayub. It is increas-
ingly clear that East Pakistan
will no longer settle for a
secondary role in government and
that a successful contender for
leadership must have substan-
tial support in both provinces.
Maneuvering for power among
opposition leaders has already
begun. Outspoken former foreign
minister Bhutto has acted most
quickly to strengthen his posi-
tion, flying to East Pakistan to
seek a united front with leaders
there and even suggesting that
he would step aside for an East
Pakistani candidate. Popular
Bengali. leader and regional
autonomy advocate Mujibur
Rahman-?-released from jail last
week after the withdrawal of
conspiracy charges against him--
has moved with the most assurance,
realizing that he holds all the
aces in his overwhelming East
Pakistani support. Ex - air force
chief Asghar Khan, an independent,
has behaved more cautiously, indi-
cating that he may form a new
coalition party and also making
a bid for East Pakistan's support.
Pro-Peking leftist Maulana
Bhashani has continued to advo-
cate violence and to wield some
influence because of his East
Pakistani following and ability
to muster support in the streets.
Ayub apparently intends to
work for an orderly transition,
but he now has very little power
to control events. On 26 Febru-
ary, he and opposition leaders met
briefly to begin talks on constitu-
tional changes, including direct
adult franchise, and then adjourned
until 10 March. Bhutto and
Bhashani chose not to attend this
first session and their presence
at subsequent meetings remains un-
certain. Ayub has warned that if
negotiations do not produce work-
able reforms, he will submit
his own solutions to the National
Assembly for approval.
If a resolution of the polit-
ical crisis is not forthcoming
and disorders continue indefinitely,
the possibility of army interven-
tion cannot be ruled out. The
military remains one of the few
stable elements in Pakistan and
has stepped in before when there
appeared to be no other way to
restore order. 25X1
INTERNAL TENSIONS MOUNT IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Four months after independ-
ence, internal tensions created
by social and economic problems
are mounting in Equatorial Guinea.
In recent weeks, the country has
experienced a serious decline
in law and order, and further
deterioration, if not a general
political upheaval, is likely.
From the start, Equatorial
Guinea's prospects for stability
have not been bright. Ethnic
rivalries, exacerbated by the
SECRET
Approved For Wea~% 2WjNf%7 5&&RW79-009227gk O@950001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006900050001-3
SECRET
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
N I G E R I A
FERNANDO PO I.
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PROVINCE OF FERNANDO PO
G u I f o f G u i n e a
SAO TOME I.
(Portugal) Sao Tome
0
ANNOBON I.
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PROVINCE OF FERNANDO PO
ADouala
Yaounae6
GABON
Approved For Release A3 CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
 Approved For7elease 2007/JjRCH-RDP79-009206900050001-3
geographical separation and eco-
nomic disparity of the country's
two provinces, had dominated pre-
independence politics. Spanish
rule had not fostered a feeling
of nationhood and, despite a
short period of limited autonomy,
had provided little preparation
for self-government.
As independence approached,
many of the indigenous inhabitants
of Fernando Po Province were un-
happy with the prospect of join-
ing fortunes in a single state
with their poorer, less sophis-
ticated, and far more numerous
mainland neighbors of Rio Muni.
To complicate the ethnic situa-
tion, the island has a disenfran-
chised population of skilled Ni-
gerian laborers, at least equal
to and probably larger than its
native population. The political
future in Equatorial Guinea of
these Nigerians, most of whom are
from secessionist Biafra, is still
uncertain.
Despite promises to create
a "national conciliation" govern-
ment, President Francisco Macias
Nguema, winner of a four-man
election contest, has done little
to ease tensions. Macias, often
emotional and erratic in behavior,
has been extremely sensitive to
the possibility of opposition to
his government. His decision in
December to create a single-party
political system apparently re-
sulted from his desire to elimi-
nate opposition activity rather
than to create a vehicle for
reconciliation. He has detained
many former opposition figures
and has closely monitored the
activities of those few who are
in the government. Normal gov-
ernment activities thus are nearly
paralyzed by the fear of most
ministers to make even routine
decisions without presidential
approval. Macias has also insti-
tuted measures to control resi-
dent Portuguese and Nigerian
nationals, whom he suspects of
opposition activity.
Another cause of uncertainty
is Macias' failure thus far to
negotiate permanent accords
with Spain, on whose continued
assistance Guinea's economic
well-being is in large part
dependent. Macias, who gained
his electoral support on a na-
tionalistic platform with strong
anti-Spanish overtones, apparently
has abandoned the moderate ap-
proach to relations with the Span-
ish that he initially took on
assuming office. The uncertainty
of future Guinean-Spanish rela-
tions has caused uneasiness among
the several thousand Spanish
residents whose skills are vital
to the Guinean economy.
Macias' preoccupation with
internal problems, including the
status of the Ibo Nigerian popu-
lation, has probably been a
factor in his reluctance to allow
continuation of the originally
Spanish-authorized relief flights
from Fernando Po to Biafra. The
international attention that
has resulted from the sporadic
suspension of the relief opera-
tion, however, has undoubtedly
complicated his efforts to deal
with pressing domestic problems.
SECRET
Approved For (lease 2007/b3/~SUGIA-RD 79-009i9A6uo50001-3
 Approved For ( ease 2007/Q R(RPFRDP79-009276900050001-3
Government activity increased noticeably in Latin America this week
with the end of the traditional pre-Lenten holidays.
The week's most dramatic event took place in Panama where National
Guard Commander Ton-ijos pulled off a palace coup against a clique of
dissident guard officers headed by military chief of staff Martinez. Martinez
triggered the ouster of President Arias last October and had shared power
with Torrijos for the past five months.
Chile is in the final week of campaigning for the congressional elections
on 2 March. Political pundits in Santiago will be watching the results closely
for evidence of political trends and the relative strengths of the various
political parties. The final outcome will also have a bearing on the future
direction of President Frei's Christian Democratic Party and on who will be
the presidential candidates in the important election in September 1970.
In Venezuela, the new congress elected last December takes office next
week, with the opposition Democratic Action Party commanding the largest
bloc of votes. The election of the president of the Senate and the filling of
other congressional offices will provide the first test of strength between the
Caldera government and the former ruling Democratic Action Party.
The Catholic Church in Brazil has finally taken an open stand against
the government's recent authoritarian acts. The central committee of the
powerful National Conference of Brazilian Bishops sent a message to Presi-
dent Costa e Silva warning that the government's new powers could lead to
"violations of fundamental rights." Although moderately worded, the mes-
sage may be resented by many in the military who believe that most liberal
priests concerned with social problems are subversives.
In the Dominican Republic, student demonstrations for increased gov-
ernment financial support to the University of Santo Domingo and rumors
of an imminent coup against the government by the Communist Left have
created an unsettled political situation. Extensive security precautions, how-
ever, are likely to thwart any such plans.
SECRET
W
Approved For W~~ 20(1
5 79-00927A00900050001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/q?/FfZpFi1-RDP79-00927A006900050001-3
PALACE COUP MOUNTED I N PANAMA
In a quickly executed move
on the morning of 24 February,
National Guard commander Colonel
Torrijos ousted his chief rival,
Colonel Martinez, who was viewed
by traditionalist political ele-
ments as a growing threat to the
old order in Panama.
Torrijos' action, which had
the backing of the majority of
his staff officers, climaxed a
prolonged power struggle between
the two men who had shared gov-
erning power since the short-
lived Arias government was toppled
last October. The country re-
mained calm following the removal
Colonel Martinez and Colonel '1 orrijos
of Martinez and several of his
key supporters, and Torrijos
emerged as strong man of Panama.
Martinez, who started the
military ouster of Arias, had be-
come a freewheeling policy maker
in the government and an advocate
of stronger reform measures. De-
spite Martinez' zeal for "revolu-
tion," however, the junta's "na-
tional reconstruction" program
had moved little beyond a politi-
cal housecleaninct and an anti-
corruption campaign.
Martinez' impulsive and high-
handed methods led to resentment
among military as well as civil-
ian circles and in large part
caused his downfall. His precipi-
tous closing of the Costa Rican
border--presumably to exert pres-
sure on that government to extend
diplomatic ties--reportedly was
made without informing Torrijos
and perhaps played some part in
his expulsion. Furthermore, the
announcement last week abolish-
ing political parties and promis-
ing major land rc-form, probably
instigated by .Martinez, could
have added pressure by the coun-
try's elite to have Torrijos
eliminate him.
Tory: jos, ir? contrast, is
believed +:o be willing to accom-
modate some of tfhee old-line po-
liticians and oligarchs. They
have been under heavy fire since
the coup, but now may regain some
of their former influence. I
sl1,CREV
Approved FoVfthi se 2b'(' % ?$fib-'~ldf4`VI P79-00g T s9O6050001-3
 Approved For lease 20070RP[A-RDP79-00927A6900050001-3
orrijos a so sai tnat u ure
reforms would not be "impetuous,"
and in a conversation with the
US ambassador added that some of
the exiled oligarchs would be
allowed to return and a number
of political prisoners would be
:released.
Meanwhile, Martinez and
three loyal officers were flown
to Miami, where they flatly re-
jected Torrijos' offer of assign-
ment to the Inter-American De-
fense Board in Washington, which
they regarded as a thinly dis-
guised form of political exile.
The four disgruntled officers
hope to return to Panama and
lead a military movement against
the junta, but their chances
of rallying support are prob-
ably slim atthis juncture.
ECUADOR SEEKS. NEW INTERNATIONAL POSTURE
While attention focuses on
Peru's deteriorating relations
with the US, Ecuador is.increas-
ingly uncertain over US policies
in Latin America and is seeking
substitutes for some of its tra-
ditionally strong ties with this
country.
The most urgent problem is
Ecuador's claim to 200 miles of
territorial waters in an area of
major interest to US tuna fishing
fleets. US reaction to recurring
Ecuadorean seizures of tuna boats
has aroused strong nationalistic
emotions that are fanned by Ecua-
dorean politicians and press.
Extremist ex-president Carlos
Julio Arosemena has called for
expropriation of the boats rather
than the current practice of levy-
ing heavy fines.
The recent application for
the first time of the Pelly Amend-
ment, excluding Ecuador from the
US military sales program in re-
taliation for the seizures, has
particularly angered the military.
On 19 February, the Ecuadorean
Foreign Ministry issued a strongly,
worded rejection of a US suggestion
for a conference on fishing that
was to include Chile and Peru,
which also claim exclusive fishing
rights for 200 miles off their
coasts. The statement added that
"violations" of Ecuadorean waters
and the "coercive legislation" in-
voked by the US have created an
adverse climate.
Although the Ecuadorean mili-
tary prefers to consider that it
is not directly involved in the
200-mile controversy, there is
a growing dissatisfaction among
officers over US policies. The
navy has already canceled partic-
ipation in Operation Unitas and
a midshipmen's cruise to the US
scheduled for this year. A
step-up in seizures of US tuna
boats, hitherto kept at a politi-
cally feasible minimum, now seems
SECRET
Approved F8i'?ReQe%se' &fdB'/0` I&L4A'KYDP79-0( 2 D6J?0050001-3
 AW
Approved For Release 2007 Q _z :CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
ET -
poss:_ble. President Velasco has
thus far contained the traditional.
military suspicion of him by re-
tiring many senior officers and
shifting top commands when polit-
ical pressure appeared to be rising
among the officers. Impressed
by the military's det:e.-mination
to obtain replacement equipment,
he may also have acquiesced in
reported overtures toward buying
such equipment in Western Europe.
Velasco has beer., searching
for international ties to strengthen
his image as an independent na-
tionalist and, even more impor-
tant, to find new markets for
Ecuador's prime export, bananas.
Recent sharp drops in. banana ex-
ports to the US and other tradi-
tional markets have worsened the
fiscal crisis that has hamstrung
many of Velasco's programs and
could help bring down his govern-
ment. Following the lead of his
predecessor, Velasco has success-
fully sought expanded trade and
new markets for bananas in East-
ern Europe. Also active in this
effort is ambitious Vice Presi-
dent Jose Zavala, presently re-
ported to be heading an East Ger-
man-subsidized delegation to the
Leipzig trade fair.
A Soviet delegation that
arrived in Quito on 20 February
to negotiate trade and diplomatic
arrangements like those it had
just concluded with Peru report-
edly found the Ecuadoreans unpre-
pared for the talks.
SECRET
Approved Fwr F eteE se M3VQRzM4RDP79-0027A,086$00050001-3
 Approved For Fease 2007/0R/VDP79-00927A606900050001-3
PERU FACING UP TO PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM EXPROPRIATION
The Peruvian Government is
intensifying its efforts to deal
with all aspects of the problem
surrounding the expropriation of
the International Petroleum Com-
pany (IPC). Some of the more mod-
erate government officials are
still searching for ways to avoid
the loss of US economic assistance
early in April for failure to pro-
vide compensation for the expro-
priated properties, while others
are looking for ways to soften
the blow of the expected economic
sanctions and to bring interna-
tional pressure on the US.
In a seven-hour session on
22 February, representatives of
the Central Bank and the Foreign
Ministry briefed President Velasco
and his cabinet on the serious
economic impact the invocation of
the Hickenlooper Amendment would
have on Peru and the diplomatic
options still open to the govern-
ment. A Central Bank official
told the US Embassy later that
he thought Velasco had become
aware of the economic losses the
country would suffer if the cur-
rent hard-line position on the IPC
issue was maintained and that some
members of the cabinet were
"frightened" of the serious pros-
pects.
At. a press conference on Peruvian press reports and the
22 February, President Velasco diplomatic offensive, Peru is not
indicated that he may be beginning likely to gain significant offi-
to believe that the US will, after cial support, but articulate po-
all, impose the sanctions by stat- litical groups throughout the
ing that Peru is taking steps to hemisphere will undoubtedly rally
assure that the loss of its US to the Peruvian cause inst
sugar c[uota would "have the least "US im erialism."
possible effect upon the country's
economy." The President also told
a group of visiting US business-
men that his government "has
opened the doors to foreign cap-
ital."
Another possible outcome of
the briefing is the reported
agreement by the cabinet on 25 25X1
February to accept an Argentine
offer to mediate the dispute.
Meanwhile, the press has been
playing up Latin American support
for the Peruvian position on the
IPC and 200-mile territorial seas
issues. After several days of
meetings in Lima, Peruvian ambas-
sadors are prepared to launch an
all-out campaign to obtain hemi-
spheric support. Despite the
SECRET'
Approved For Mleejje 2097 9 /p? s 4 79-0092z7~op O 50001-3
 Approved For Release 2OO7 Q / /CIA-RDP79-OO927AOO69OOO5OOO1-3
GUATEMALAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY INTENSIFIED
Political events in Guatemala
continue to overshadow terrorist
activity, but pro--Castro insur-
gents are again planning to carry
out acts of violence.
Last week, Defense Minister
General Chinchilla resigned his
post soon after withdrawing as
the ruling Revolutionary Party's
presidential precandidate for
1970. Relations between him and
President Mendez cooled apprecia-
bly after a hassle among party
leaders--already annoyed because
Mendez had gone outside the party
to pick a military candidate--con.-
cerning the nominations for con-
gressional and execu-:ive posts.
Although Mendez failed to
support Chinchilla against the
party leaders, the party suffered
deep divisions over the nomina-
tion. The party's national execu-
tive council reportedly took na-
tionwide soundings among members
this week before finally select-
ing Mario Fuentes Pieruccini as
the new precandidate. Fuentes
is minister of finance and has
been active in party affairs for
many years.
The new defense minister,
General Reyes, is the former
army chief of staff. Although
he is a colorless and cautious
individual, Reyes is relatively
apolitical and completely loyal
to the President. Brigadier Gen-
eral Cifuentes, commander of a
key army brigade in the capital,
moved to the post of army chief
of staff. These command shifts
are not expected to cause opposi-
tion within the military or ad-
versely affect counterinsurgency
operations.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
Page 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Feb 69
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
 AAW
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900050001-3