FIDEL CASTRO AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: THE FIRST DECADE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 7, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900020002-5
Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution: The First Decade
Secret
r,TT,'. rfe`O D Na 36
~`w ray _' 1 ~i-;'a 7 February 1969 25X1
Approved For Release 24q,5/01/27 : CI DP79-00927A00690( 0 69A
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900020002-5
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900020002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/0cg-RDP79-00927A006900020002-5
FIDEL CASTRO AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: THE FIRST DECADE
Castro has in the last ten years
achieved most of his primary objec-
tives at home and abroad. He has
consolidated his personal rule, re-
moved Cuba from the influence and
orbit of the United States, uprooted
Cuba's traditional ruling groups, ele-
vated the peasantry and the poor,
and redistributed and equalized
wealth and privilege. He has also suc-
ceeded in creating a dynamic cha-
risma about the Cuban Revolution
and its leaders even though it is
largely contrived and inconsistent
with what he has actually done.
Castro's other principal objectives-to help Latin American revolutionaries emulate the
Cuban Revolution and to achieve economic prosperity in Cuba-have been more elusive.
Although he has been mainly preoccupied with domestic problems, Castro probably considers
his inability to "export" the revolution as the greatest failure of his foreign policy. Despite
continuing Soviet aid, the Cuban economy has failed to make progress. Acute shortages of
almost every kind of consumer goods have prevailed since 1961.
Fidel Castro is the first Latin American caudillo to have personally created a total social
and political revolution. His success is attributable to his ability to portray himself to the
majority of Cubans as the life force of the revolution, to his creation of a ruling apparatus of
total power and an effective propaganda machine, and to his cautious and systematic
approach in radicalizing his government while encouraging the mass emigration of his
opponents. Although many of his programs have been extremely unpopular, he has been able
to uphold his patriarchal image-disassociated from specific failures of the revolution. Most
important, however, is Castro's success in educating and indoctrinating the new generation.
An overwhelming majority of the youth are fervidly loyal to Castro. Thus, although he has
radically reordered life in Cuba in just one decade, Castro is now as firmly in control as at any
time since coming to power.
Special Report - 1
7 February 1969
Approved For Release 200511 * DP79-00927A006900020002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/GAt21'.CtA DP79-00927A006900020002-5
CONSOLIDATION AND ORGANIZATION
OF POWER
Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement and
the orthodox Communist party--the Popular So-
cialist Party (PSP)- were the only organized polit-
ical groups in Cuba in January 1959. The PSP did
not fully support Castro's movement until the eve
of its victory, but by late 1959 attempted to join
forces with it in a united front. Castro was re-
luctant to establish new national institutions until
he had destroyed or replaced the ones he had
inherited and for the first two and a half years he
ruled without a formalized national political or-
ganization.
Economic deterioration and chaos increased
as the skills of the disenfranchised middle and
upper class groups were lost. As a result of radical
nationalization measures and economic disrup-
tions, there was more discontent and overt politi-
cal opposition in 1961 and 1962 than there has
been at any other time during Castro's administra-
tion. His position, however, was secured by his
26th of July followers who had taken control of
the military and security forces and by the popu-
larity he enjoyed with the masses. As a result, he
was able to withstand economic disorders, or-
ganized opposition, mounting discontent, and the
Bay of Pigs invasion.
By mid-1961 Castro found it necessary to
institutionalize his regime to deal with internal
pressures and win favor with Moscow. He merged
the 26th of July group and the "old guard" PSP
Communists into a new "united socialist party"
which was intended ultimately to become the
ruling political party in Cuba. With the backstage
support of the Soviet ambassador, the "old
guard" soon dominated the party. In March 1962,
however, Castro purged most "old guard"
Fidel Castro dates his Revolution to
26 July 1953 when, with his younger
brother Raul and a group of followers,
he led an attack in a provincial army
post. He was captured by Batista's
forces, imprisoned, and in 1956 exiled
to Mexico where he was joined by
Ernesto Che Guevara. With a small
group they sailed to Cuba in Dec-
ember 1956 and for the next two
years built up a guerrilla force of
several thousand which ultimately suc-
ceeded in toppling the Batista dic-
tatorship. The 26th of July Movement
succeeded mainly because Batista was
extremely unpopular even within his
own armed forces, and because Castro
because immensely popular with the
masses and middle class groups
Specials Report
7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/01/M;(qt -iRgP79-00927A006900020002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/Ol?tIc A-4DP79-00927A006900020002-5
members and requested the recall of the Soviet
ambassador. The party was completely recon-
structed and the vast majority of new members
;- were chosen from the military and the working
classes.
In October 1965, the party was formally
constituted as the Cuban Communist Party with a
central committee of 100 and has grown to an
estimated 65,000 members with a strong provin-
cial and local organization. The party was origi-
nally intended to become the ruling political ap-
paratus and Castro promised that a "socialist con-
stitution" would be promulgated at a party con-
gress in 1966. Still wary of strong civilian bureau-
crats, however, he has procrastinated about for-
mally instituting party or constitutional rule, and
further delay is likely.
Since his 1962 experience with the "old
guard" bureaucrats, Castro has never fully trusted
the civilian institutions and bureaucracy created
by the regime. As a result, he has conducted
frequent ministerial reorganizations, "adminis-
trative purges," and purges of "dilettantes and
loafers"-including one party central committee
member. In 1965 and again in 1967 harsh
antibureaucracy purges were undertaken and
ministries and agencies were compelled to reduce
their staffs by as much as 75 percent. Although in
most of these cases Castro was interested in reas-
signing surplus white collar workers to agricul-
tural work, the frequency and intensity of the
drives emphasize his basic distrust of formal
civilian organizations. The "microfaction" purge
of January 1968 included two central committee
members and several dozen other minor regime
officials. It was followed in March by the radical
"revolutionary offensive" which resulted in the
emergence of the military establishment as the
supreme institutional force.
Special Report
THE MILITARY AS MAIN BUTTRESS
During the entire decade that Castro has
been in power his position has been firmly
anchored by the military and security forces
through a number of senior officers who are
veterans of the 26th of July Movement. Senior
officers comprise about two thirds of the central
committee of the Communist Party. In addition
to Fidel and Raul Castro, four other army majors
are on the eight-man politburo. Military men
make up at least one fifth of the party member-
ship. In January 1968, the first of the political
bureau delegates was appointed as a permanent
inspector and supervisor of the Matanzas Province
party bureau. By early November, at least six
other majors were appointed to similar posts to
represent Castro and the politburo in other prov-
inces, regions, and in industry. Thus, originally
constituted with a wide representation of military
and civilian leaders, the Cuban Communist Party
is under the exclusive control of Castro and a
personal entourage of army majors.
These same men dominate almost all other
public institutions and mass organizations
through the party. In 1968, the military were
responsible for mobilizing tens of thousands of
civilians for the sugar harvest and other agricul-
tural work. This year the Ministry of the Armed
Forces is directing the harvest. During the past
two years the military also assumed complete
control of civil aviation, and began the reorgani-
zation of pre-university education. The increas-
ingly martial environment is dramatized inces-
santly by Cuban public information media, and
Castro and his colleagues from the 26th of July
Movement have become a cult of "guerrilla
heroes."
The military has become the supreme in-
stitutional force probably because the officer
7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/01W~P79-00927A006900020002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/O1 7c&k. DP79-00927A006900020002-5
corps is the only organized element that Castro
completely trusts. The officer corps consists of
about 200 majors (the highest military rank) and
an unknown number of captains and junior of-
ficers. Most of the latter were commissioned after
Castro came to power, and although they are not
members of the 26th of July group they have
been subjected to extensive political indoctrina-
tion and military discipline and are loyal to the
regime. No Cuban military officer on active duty
has defected to the US in several years, although a
few noncommissioned officers and some con-
scripts have defected via the Guantanamo Naval
Base.
Because most of the senior majors are
simple, unsophisticated men who are uncom-
fortable with the power they have acquired, and
because they are devoted to Castro, few of them
are considered politically ambitious. Field com-
manders are regularly rotated, and Raul Castro
and his deputies conduct frequent field tours.
Thus, although little is known about them, the
loyalties of Castro's colleagues clearly transcend
the ideological and the political. Very few were
exposed to Marxist-Leninist thought before 1959
and even now their ideological commitments are
Special Report -4-
4 -
probably
probably shallow. So deep is their personal com-
mitment to Castro, however, that the cult of his
personality has become for them an ideology.
CASTRO'S POPULARITY
Fidel Castro has consistently been able to
maintain the support of a majority of the popula-
tion. He has achieved this because of his charisma
and because of the effectiveness of the propa-
ganda machine he controls. Castro's popularity
has remained relatively high because he has en-
couraged the mass exodus of his opponents and
critics. Since 1959 between 500,000 and 700,000
Cubans have left the island, and about 1,000
more leave weekly on the Varadero-Miami airlift.
Many others have left in small boats or via "fence
jumping" at the US Navy base at Guantanamo.
Most of the legal refugees are middle aged or
elderly and former members of the middle and
upper classes.
As a result of this steady migration of the
disenfranchised and the high rate of population
growth, the groups most favored and benefited by
Castro have become larger in proportion to the
rest of the population. The median age has
steadily declined since P)59; in January 1969, an
estimated 55 percent of the population was under
25. The vast majority of them who are in school
are probably fervent supporters of Castro. The
oldest were only 14 when Castro came to power,
and they have been subjected ever since to an
intense and effective propaganda assault.
The radical and "puritanical" reforms
imposed last year, however, caused a deteriora-
tion of Castro's popularity even among the groups
he has most favored. Last March he announced a
harsh "revolutionary offensive." He closed all
bars and nightclubs in Cuba, reduced beer produc-
tion, outlawed gambling and cock-fighting,
mobilized tens of thousands of civilians into agri-
cultural work brigades, upgraded the military over
7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/O'17, tDP79-00927A006900020002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01$~(#)P79-00927A006900020002-5
the civilian bureaucracy, and nationalized more
than 57,000 small private businesses. Castro railed
against "cafe pundits" and barroom philosophers,
and insisted that city dwellers and youths per-
form "volunteer" agricultural work. In addition,
mainly because of the severe drought of 1967,
food shortages increased last year, and the list of
rationed goods was expanded. In January 1969
even sugar was rationed.
As a result of the shortages and austerity,
there was increased dissatisfaction and a number
of isolated acts of sabotage and vandalism against
the regime. More than 1,000 Cubans defected by
way of the Guantanamo Naval Base in 1968
(about twice as many as in 1967), and there have
been about 120 defections this year. The level of
isolated dissidence appears to be mainly a result
of the increased hardships, and there is no evi-
dence of organized resistance to the regime. In-
creased food production this year should amelio-
rate some of these problems. Despite such fluctu-
ations, however, Castro probably retains the hard
core support of large majorities of the youth,
peasants, and various working class groups.
THE YOUTH
Under Castro the youth have been granted
special privileges and endowments, and their
loyalty to the regime is a result of these benefits
as much as an outgrowth of the propaganda ef-
fort. All education is free. Tuition charges have
been eliminated and textbooks-when available-
are provided by the government. About 300,000
scholarship students are provided free room and
board, clothing, medical care, and a monthly al-
lowance. Many of them live in Havana mansions
once occupied by the affluent. In ten years the
government has doubled both the number of
schools and students. A substantial portion of
these increases occurred in rural areas where the
population had been isolated and largely illiterate.
Students are spared many of the hardships of
Special Report
rationing and food shortages. As wards of the
state they do not have to wait in queues for food
or supplement their rations by covertly patroniz-
ing the black market. Thus favored, they remain
overwhelmingly in accord with Castro.
During the past two years as the military has
expanded its role and as Castro has become more
radical and dogmatic, the morale of some of the
older youths has diminished. Most of them are
school dropouts and former students who are
disaffected because of the drop in their standard
of living after leaving school. In addition, because
of the oversupply of labor for nonagricultural
work, many have become idle. Their expectations
rose during their school years, and they are disap-
pointed to find few job opportunities outside of
agriculture.
Last September Castro criticized such
youths for being "hippies and loafers" and sent
several hundred of them off to the fields. Even
though Castro and many of his military colleagues
wear beards, young men were told last year that
beards, mustaches, and long hair were prohibited.
Mod fashions and music have been repressed, and
more than 50,000 youths between the ages of 17
and 27 were inducted last year for three-year
hitches in agricultural work under military disci-
pline.
Although a growing number of youths out
of school seem disenchanted with the regime and
the new "puritanical radicalism," a majority prob-
ably still supports the regime. They have been
subjected to propaganda for a decade, and have
little objective knowledge of the rest of the
world. Most of them are probably convinced that
they are better off under Castro than they would
have been under previous administrations; in any
case they can see no alternative. The older
youths, however, seem more cynical in judging
Castro and the accomplishments of the revolution
7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/01M~QP79-00927A006900020002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/C9,`.J~C"DP79-00927A006900020002-5
than the youths in school. Their continuing
loyalty is crucial for Castro. One of the major
problems for his government during the next few
years therefore will be to create satisfactory em-
ployment for them and to maintain their motiva-
tion and loyalty at the level of their school years.
THE PEASANTS AND URBAN WORKERS
In addition to the military caste and the
youth, the peasants and some urban working
groups have been the most favored groups in
Cuba. They were the first beneficiaries of Castro's
reforms. As expenditures for p7ablic consumption
increased, they experienced an advance in their
standards of living. Although a large segment of
public expenditures has been spent on enlarging
the military establishment and the government
bureaucracy, extensive programs in public health,
education, and welfare have helped those who
could not afford these services before the revolu-
tion. All medical services are free and they have
been expanded beyond what was previously avail-
able. The regime's expenditures for education,
moreover, have not been intended for the youth
alone. Extensive adult education programs and
literacy drives reached more than a half million
adults by 1967. Residents of rural areas probably
profited the most from these benefits, since few
public services were available to them before
1959.
Personal income has also increased, accord-
ing to Cuban figures, and its distribution has
shifted to the advantage of the poorer classes. The
supply of goods and services available for con-
sumption remained relatively stable during the
first few years of the revolution, and personal
income- especially among peasants and urban
workers--grew. Unskilled and semiskilled workers
received pay raises and other benefits which aug-
mented their purchasing power. In addition, un-
employment and underemployment were re-
duced, according to Castro, as large numbers of
Special Report
agricultural workers migrated to better paying
jobs in industry and construction.
Despite Castro's promise before he tool;
power to "give the land to those who till it,"
virtually all large farms and ranches were nation-
alized and converted to state farms and cooper-
atives. In October 1963, the Second Agrarian
Reform increased public ownership to about 70
percent of the land, when privately owned lands
of more than 65 hectares were nationalized. To-
day, the owners of small farms who still till about
30 percent of the land are the only remaining
private property owners in Cuba. They are kept
under close state control, however, and since last
year they have been required to sell all of their
produce to the government. In the past they were
allowed to keep some for themselves and to sell a
small amount for profit. Castro has indicated that
these farmers will be allowed to keep their
properties, but since land may not be sold or
inherited, the state will ultimately own it all.
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
After an initial period of growth and expan-
sion, the Cuban economy has stagnated, despite
the annual infusion of some $350 million in
Soviet subsidies and credits. In 1967, the year of
highest output since Castro came to power,
Cuba's estimated GNP was only 15 percent higher
than in 1957 (the highest prerevolution year), and
in 1968 the drought of the previous year and
economic disruptions caused a decline. During the
last ten years, however, there has been a
20.percent increase in the Cuban population re-
suiting in a 15- to 20-percent decline in per capita
consumption.
Economic stagnation is the result of a
variety of factors, many of which are direct out-
growths of the rapid and disruptive nationaliza-
tion undertaken during the first few years of the
revolution. Fundamental to all of these factors,
7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020002-5
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2005/01 C. iI3P79-00927A006900020002-5
however, is the inefficiency and disorganization
of the new managerial class. Most white-collar
workers are inexperienced and poorly educated,
and political reliability has long been the main
criterion for their employment.
The antibureaucracy drives and administra-
tive purges of the last few years seriously dis-
rupted government ministries and agencies, and
their efficiency is further reduced as they are
forced to provide personnel for "voluntary" agri-
cultural work. Even more disruptive, however,
have been the mass mobilizations of office work-
ers to help in the sugar harvest. Every able-bodied
adult is expected to participate, and as a result,
most government offices are operated with skele-
ton crews from February to May.
Management is also poor because the strictly
centralized system of administration stifles initia-
tive and reduces the effectiveness of lower level
managers. Centralization became even more
stringent in 1968 as the military expanded its
influence over the civilian bureaucracy.
Another important reason for economic
failure and managerial confusion is the frequency
with which economic plans and national priorities
have changed during the last decade. Under the
influence of Che Guevara, Castro insisted during
the first few years that Cuba industrialize to re-
move itself from dependence on sugar. By late
1963 it was obvious that agriculture must be the
mainstay of the economy, causing the postpone-
ment of the industrialization program at least
until the mid-1970s. Since then, plans have con-
centrated on diversifying agricultural production
and increasing sugar output. Many short-range
programs have been expensive fiascos, however,
because they were undertaken impulsively. One
such scheme enacted without sufficient study last
year ended in failure. Ganduls (pigeon peas) were
planted between established rows of coffee plants
Special Report - 7 -
with the hope of increasing the output of both
crops. After several months, however, the ganduls
were choking out the coffee plants, and city
dwellers, organized into agricultural brigades,
were drafted to remove them.
A labor shortage for agricultural work and a
surplus of white-collar workers add to the prob-
lems causing the economy to stagnate. The
problem worsens yearly, moreover, as the schools
graduate technically skilled students who shun
manual labor. Severe drought during four of the
last eight years has also caused serious difficulties.
Finally, the US trade embargo has forced Cuba to
import large amounts of capital goods to replace
US-built machinery and equipment for which
spare parts are no longer available. This has re-
stricted further Cuba's ability to import other
needed goods.
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Despite these problems Castro is optimistic.
In his speech on 2 January 1969 he was ebullient
and confident, predicting that many of the eco-
nomic goals for 1970 will be fulfilled. Castro was
probably correct in appraising the various factors
that point to an economic recovery this year.
Rainfall has been normal, large quantities of ferti-
lizer have been used, and the military can prob-
ably organize and manage the economy more
authoritatively and rationally than the civilian
bureaucrats. These factors may continue and re-
sult in further improvements in 1970.
During the first half of 1969, increased agri-
cultural output should restore the economy at
least to the level of 1967 when it was about 15
percent above the best prerevolution year. Fruit
and vegetable crops will probably increase, and
meat and dairy products and other foodstuffs
should be in greater supply. Furthermore, al-
though it is not likely that 10 million tons of
sugar will be milled in 1970, Cuba can probably
produce a record crop.
7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/ffRW- DP79-00927A006900020002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/0 '_RIALFDP79-00927A006900020002-5
CUBAN SUGAR PRODUCTION
(Millions of metric tons)
1961
6.8
1965
6.1
1962
4.8
1966
4.5
1963
3.8
1967
6.1
1964
4.4
1968
5.2
(In 1952 under Batista, the largest crop on
record was produced, 7.2)
Gains in sugar output, however, may be off-
set by disruptions elsewhere in the economy be-
cause large numbers of workers will be diverted
from their regular work and mobilized to cut
cane. It is still too early to determine to what
extent gains made in the economy this year will
benefit the consumer. In the past Castro has ex-
ported food commodities to earn foreign ex-
change while rationing them at home. He recently
put sugar on the ration list in an effort to gain
foreign exchange and because his last harvest was
a low one. In addition, per capita gains will be
inhibited by the high rate of population growth.
Long range economic growth is uncertain.
Plans have centered on agricultural diversification
and increased sugar production, but a number of
problems must be resolved before production
goals can be fulfilled. Castro has attempted to
remedy the acute shortage of regular agricultural
workers by investing heavily in mechanization
and by attempting to glorify the arcadian way of
life where manual work in the fields would be the
most dignified and most highly rewarded profes-
sion. In 1968 he mobilized hundreds of thousands
of civilians and military personnel for agricultural
work, and this year even greater sacrifice will be
expected. Most Cubans will be required to work
six and a half days a week, and to "volunteer"
their vacations and leave time for additional work
Special Report
in the fields. Castro predicted continuing auster-
ity when he said that the revolution will be
"harsh, implacable, and inflexible."
These efforts may help increase agricultural
output over the next few years. A Western diplo-
mat in Havana stated last summer that the city
workers he observed in the fields "enthusiasti-
cally" participated in pastoral work. He predicted
some significant gains as a result. Moreover,
Soviet aid to Cuba continues to support Castro's
vigorous effort to expand and renovate Cuba's
sugar mills. Large Soviet credits have been ex-
tended for this purpose, and the 1969 Soviet-
Cuban trade protocol now being negotiated in
Moscow may expand it further. In order to main-
tain economic growth at rates above the popula-
tion growth rate, however, Castro will have to
endorse basic and wide ranging institutional re-
forms. Without more rational and professional
management and planning the Cuban economy
may continue to fluctuate without achieving a
lasting and significant rate of growth.
CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
Cuban-Soviet relations are characterized by a
broad mutuality of interests which far outweigh
the contentiousness engendered by Castro's
limited assertions of independence. Soviet eco-
nomic and military support is crucial. Castro real-
izes that no other patron or group of beneficiary
states can be expected to provide aid and credits
in quantities approaching the $350 million in-
jected yearly by the USSR. For their part, the
Soviets will probably consider a "Marxist-
Leninist" Cuba as a net asset so long as Castro
does not side with Peking and does not seriously
disrupt Soviet efforts to establish better relations
with Latin American governments.
Although Cuba is not a showcase of social-
in the Western Hemisphere, it is the only
ism
underdeveloped country of the "third world" to
8- 7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006900020002-5
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2005/01/2' :q[&P79-00927A006900020002-5
have joined the "socialist camp." Cuba is still an
important asset to the Soviets as a propaganda
centerpiece and as their only ally in Latin
America. Moreover, even though Moscow and
Havana pursue conflicting policies there at times,
it appears that Moscow gains from both. The
USSR continues to support "old guard" orthodox
Communist parties in Latin America rather than
the Cuban-supported groups that espouse violence
now. By allowing the Cubans a sphere of in-
fluence among extremist revolutionary factions in
Latin America, however, the Soviets have pre-
vented the Chinese from gaining more than a few
adherents in the area. Most Cuban-supported
groups look. ultimately to Moscow as the center
of world Communism, and may even believe that
the USSR covertly supports them through the
Cubans.
't'hus, Castro's obsession with pursuing a
policy of violence in Latin America and his pre-
tensions of independence from Moscow are toler-
able nuisances to the Soviets. They have not re-
taliated by reducing or seriously limiting the ship-
ment of vitally needed goods, and in 1968 Soviet
aid and credits actually increased. Moscow, how-
ever, does use selective restraints to influence
I ilavana and put pressure on Castro. During the
annual negotiations of bilateral trade agreements,
for instance, Moscow probably exerts psycholog-
ical pressures by protracting the talks over a two-
to-three-month period while urging the Cubans to
improve the management of their economy. In
January 1968, Castro announced that consump-
tion of petroleum products had increased by eight
percent and that Soviet deliveries would increase
by only two percent. He declared that rationing
would be necessary to make up the difference. By
refusing to supply unlimited amounts of petro-
leum, Moscow was probably attempting to force
Havana to utilize its resources rationally.
On the other hand, when Cuban-Soviet inter-
ests are in direct conflict and when Moscow for
its own reasons requires Cuban su
25X1
can be expected to give it.
25
Soviet efforts to influence Cuban domestic
programs have been less successful. The major
irritant in their relations is probably the inef-
ficiency with which the economy is managed and
the waste and misallocation of Soviet aid. Soviet
technicians are often frustrated by the slovenly
and lazy performance of Cuban workers and by
the uninhibited flair of the Cuban temperament,
which to them amounts to "Marxism-cha, cha,
cha."
Moscow has used pressures, technology, and
aid to encourage more coherent planning and
management and to order and rationalize the
Cuban economy. Soviet designed cane-cutting
machines were introduced in 1964, but after
several years of testing they proved unusable. The
Brezhnev and Castro in Moscow
Special Report - 9 7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/( -,RCfA 9-00927A006900020002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/097-.-RDP79-00927A006900020002-5
Soviets have also experimented with hybrid plants
and livestock, and have assigned an estimated
several thousand technicians and advisers to assist
the Cubans.
Probably with some encouragement from
the Soviets, Castro introduced a system of
"material incentives" for workers in January
1965. This move was an important retrenchment
from the "dogmatist" views of Che Guevara who
favored only the concept of moral rewards for
work. Even this innovation, however, was aban-
doned about two years later when Castro reaf-
firmed his support of Guevara's view. The "ortho-
dox" programs to motivate and mobilize workers,
however, were not instituted pervasively until
1968 during the "revolutionary offensive." Al-
though the Soviets have taken no public notice of
these sweeping radical reforms they may see them
as similar to the disruptive Cultural Revolution in
China.
"EXPORT" OF THE REVOLUTION
Since :1959 Castro has dreamed of seeing his
revolution emulated elsewhere in Latin America.
Like his aggressive hostility toward the US, the
policy was originally based on a paranoid fear and
suspicion of his powerful neighbors and on a
desire to defend Cuba by distracting potential
enemies. Even before the Bay of Pigs invasion in
April 1961, Castro believed correctly that his
regime would be the target of conspiracy and
violence from conservative forces in Latin Amer-
ica. Young and unsure of the course his revolu-
tion was taking at home and abroad, Castro tried
to enlist the support of other young leftist ex-
tremists in Latin America to ratify and emulate
the Cuban experience. During this period, Castro
was strongly influenced by Che Guevara, the
"roving revolutionary" who had joined the 26th
of July Movement in 1956. Guevara was the
Trotskyist in the Cuban leadership; he believed
that Cuban resources and energies should be
Special Report
directed abroad to instigate and support other
radical revolutions.
Under Guevara's influence Cuban foreign
policy became more extreme and more carefully
organized. In 1959 and 1960 Castro supported at
least four small expeditionary forces against his
Caribbean neighbors. Between 1961 and 1964 at
least 1,500 to 2,000 young Latin Americans re-
ceived guerrilla training in Cuba. Castro sounded
the keynote of this policy on 26 July 1960 when
he said, "we promise to continue making Cuba
the example that can convert the cordillera of the
Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American
continent."
From late 1961 through 1964, Cuban sub-
versive activities reached their apogee. The most
spectacular event was the discovery of a three-ton
cache of weapons on a Venezuelan beach in
November 1963. Cuban supported guerrillas and
agents were active in at least six other Latin
American countries.
_10- 7 February 1969
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/01/Z7V
I6y~-PgP79-00927A006900020002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/fBICR DP79-00927A006900020002-5
25X1
25X1
Guevara, who had been the principal archi-
tect of Cuban subversive efforts, resigned his of-
ficial posts in October and traveled abroad for
about four months-mainly in Africa where he'
appraised the potential for Cuban assistance to
revolutionary groups. In 1965 he commanded a
Cuban contingent which fought with the rebels in
the Congo (Kinshasa). He became disillusioned
with his efforts there, however, and returned to
Cuba late in 1965 or early 1966 where he began
making plans for the movement he later led in
Bolivia.
delivered an explicit call or. vio en revolution in
the hemisphere, and thereafter he began to build
up propaganda support for the effort Guevara was
organizing. From mid-1966 until October 1967
when Guevara's insurgency collapsed in Bolivia,
Cuban support for Latin American guerrillas ap-
proached the levels of the 1961-1963 period. In
May 1967, Venezuelan guerrillas, escorted by
Cuban military advisers, landed in Venezuela to
join insurgent groups. Other landings probably
occurred the same year. Cuban military advisers
may also have infiltrated Guatemala during 1967.
Havana's consummate effort to export the revolu-
tion, however, was Guevara's movement in
Bolivia. His failure and death in October 1967
and the failures of Cuban-supported insurgents in
Venezuela apparently influenced Castro to begin
a serious reappraisal of tactics for "exporting" the
revolution.
During the 15 months since then, Castro has
discussed foreign policy in only a few of more
than 25 major speeches, and he has almost en-
tirely ignored the subject of "revolution" in Latin
Special Report
America. During this period he has been in-
ordinately preoccupied with Cuban domestic
problems. Without the collaboration of Guevara
who had always been one of the main designers of
Havana's foreign policy, Cuban subversive efforts
have apparently lost some of their importance.
Cuba continues to support insurgents in
Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia, but at rates
substantially below the levels of 1966 and 1967.
Although Castro is not likely to renounce the use
of violence as an instrument of Cuban foreign
policy in the near future, he has not emphasized
it in more than a year. Since Guevara's death he
has not attempted to initiate new areas of in-
surgency and has confined his aid to and-focused
his propaganda effort on viable guerrilla move-
ments.
It is unlikely that Castro will admit that his
dream to "create other Cubas" has failed. Even
without Guevara, and even though he can be
expected to concentrate on domestic matters for
the next few years, Cuba will probably continue
to support subversion in the hemisphere on a
selective basis. It is not likely to reach the scope
or intensity of earlier years unless a local revolu-
tionary group seems to be making definite head-
way.
PROSPECTS FOR CASTRO'S TENURE
After a decade in power, Fidel Castro rules
absolutely through a totalitarian personal appara-
tus. The military and security forces under the
control of Fidel's younger brother Raul are well-
trained, well-equipped, and effective in identify-
ing and eliminating opponents of the regime. In
addition, most youths, students, peasants, and
urban workers, support the regime and provide
Castro with a reliable constituency.
There is no evidence of organized opposition
to Castro and his regime. Whatever course Castro
- 11 - 7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/01~ CIA-- P79-00927A006900020002-5
C'REIT
 Approved For Release 2005/01f'' .(dkWP79-00927A006900020002-5
25X1
follows, he seems likely to retain the hard-core
support of the groups he has favored. They realize
that they are better off than they were before,
and they see no alternative to him.
25X1
Special Report -12- 7 February 1969
Approved For Release 2005/%RWDP79-00927A006900020002-5
 Buffet For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900020002-5
Secret
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06900020002-5