WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT NORTH KOREA TACTICS AGAINST SOUTH KOREA: 1968

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006800080002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 24, 1969
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2005/01/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A0068sfP0
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
North Korean Tactics Against South Korea: 1968
Secret
t-t?_ 39
ARCHIVAL
25X1
24 January 1969
Approved For Release 200516J22 P79-00927A006800080002-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06800080002-0
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06800080002-0
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06800080002-0
Ir 198 South' Korea faced the most formidable North Korean pressures and harassment
since the 1953 armistice. Paramilitary operations from the North-the unsuccessful raid o
the South Korean presidential residence in January and a large-scale armed propaganda and
terror campaign in the mountainous east coast region in November and December-went far;
beyond the scope of any act of recent years. In addition to these operations, which involved-
large commando teams in rear areas, Pyongyang continued its armed reconnaissance and-
agent penetrations along the Demilitarized Zone, resulting in arecord number of"incidents
and casualties.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 IMos o e
North Korean activity involved short-term prob-
ing and reconnaissance missions against United
Nations Command defenses along the Demili-
tarized Zone. The intruders generally tried to
avoid contact with United Nations Command
forces, but from September through early Novem-
ber they became more aggressive and conducted
ambushes and planted mines within and just be-
low the zone.
A large-scale guerrilla operation departed sig-
nificantly from the over-all pattern of paramili-
tary activity during the year. A large number of
guerrillas staged an armed propaganda and terror-
ist campaign in a remote area of the South Ko-
25X1 rean interior during severe winter weather
Special Report
or Koreans crossed inTO_7fY_e_
Demilitarized Zone or entered South Korea by
boat in 19681
tralize the guerrillas
The short-term aim of these large-scale
armed incursions probably is to probe South Ko-
rea's defenses for vulnerabilities which might be
exploited in the future to shake public confidence
in the government and thus weaken the nation's
political and economic stability. The North Ko-
reans almost certainly believe that these probing
actions will also cause friction between Seoul and
Washington over measures to counteract them.
Pyongyang's tactics have been aimed at
achieving what it probably regards as the
24 January 1969
25X1
5X1
Approved For Release 2005/01,7CRI*IIDP79-00927A006800080002-0
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/2 : CIA- DP79-00927A006800080002-0
indispensable conditions for advancing toward its
goal of unification-establishing a strong subver-
sive apparatus in the South and creating a guer-
rilla movement against the South Korean Govern-
North Korean theoretical journals and party
spokesmen have long emphasized that a covert
Marxist-Leninist party in the South is an essential
precondition for a successful unification effort.
The generally strong anti-Communist atti-
tudes of the South Korean population, however,
have made political action work very difficult. In
August, Pyongyang's effort apparently suffered a
major setback when the South Korean Central
Intelligence Agency arrested 158 persons, includ-
ing a former national assemblyman, who were
accused of belonging to a North Korean - spon-
sored United Revolutionary Party.
North Korean media have given heavy coverage to
the court trials of the party leaders, calling them
Special Report
the true patriots of Korea and outstanding
examples for other South Koreans to follow.
North Korean Premier Kim 11-song has stated
that a political infrastructure can grow and
develop assets only when agents operate in a
favorable environment. Infiltration of armed
agents for harassment, terrorism, and sabotage is
probably seen as the necessary catalyst for creat-
ing a more revolutionary environment in the
25X1
25
The increased militancy of the subversion
program was evident in North Korean propaganda
broadcasts in 1968, when broadcasts rarely
carried the theme of peaceful unification. The
Pyongyang-based "Liberation Radio" appealed to
South Korean citizens to join the anti-US front
and work to establish a Marxist-Leninist party for
leadership in a violent struggle against the Seoul
government. Since the u c ul the
presidential residence by North 25X1
Korean agents in January, ongyang me is have
been emphasizing "armed guerrilla struggle" in
the South. Propaganda reports picturing the in-
ception of a broadly. based, violent uprising in the
South grew in intensity and specificity after
South Korea's east coast was infiltrated late last
year. For the first time threats of "execution"
were made against people who aided the South
Korean security effort. The propaganda appears
24 January 1969
Approved For Release 2005/ORCRDP79-00927A006800080002-0
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06800080002-0
designed to create doubts about the validity of
contrary claims by the South Korean Government
and the United Nations Command that all this
activity is carried out by the North.
North Korea seems, however, to want to
keep its subversion program from leading to ma-
jor hostilities. After the raid on the presidential
residence and the capture of the Pueblo in Janu-
ary, there were relatively few North Korean oper-
ations until mid-year.
North Korean casualties significantly in-
creased this year. This probably will not deter the
North Korean leadership from working toward
creating a "revolutionary" situation in the South
during 1969. Kim 11-song knows that a "revolu-
tionary movement" demands sacrifices during its
initial stages, and he sees his campaign against
South Korea as not only an essential program fc r
uniting the peninsula under Communist contrci
but also as a major contribution to the interna-
tional Communist offensive against "US imperial-
ism."
Special Report -3- 24 January 1969
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/RDP79-00927A006800080002-0
 SW r d For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06800080002-0
Secret
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06800080002-0