WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ETHIOPIA: THE DYNAMICS OF SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006800010002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 6, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Ethiopia: The Dynamics of Succession
Secret
6 December 1968
No. 0050/68A
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Aging Emperor Haile Selassie I has
ruled his empire for more than half a
century by skillfully balancing Ethiopia's
powerful political forces, preventing any
of them from completely dominating the
country or overthrowing the monarchy.
When the Emperor dies, however, his
successor will face formidable obstacles
in attempting to establish himself firmly
on the throne and in creating a stable
and progressive government.
The powers of the church and the
provincial nobility, long the strongest in-
fluences in Ethiopia, have been reduced by Haile Selassie, but he has also
modernized the military establishment and expanded the civil service. These,
like the traditional forces, are now striving to preserve their own interests.
All four groups are continually trying to maintain a favorable position and
are already maneuvering to enhance their status in any future administration.
Haile Selassie's son, Asfa Wossen although not as strong a personality as
his father appears to be the most likely successor. His right to the throne
may be challenged by elements of the nobility or by the military, but his
opponents would probably be fragmented. Both of these groups- as well as
the church and leading civil servants - will certainly try to influence or
control him after he becomes emperor. The new ruler will also be confronted
with the danger of fragmentation of the empire because of dissidence among
some of its ethnically and culturally diverse peoples.
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The Monarchy
The Conquering Lion of the
Tribe of Judah, His Imperial
Majesty Haile Selassie I, Elect
of God, King of Kings, Emperor
of Ethiopia, is represented to
his people as the 225th succes-
sive Ethiopian monarch descended
from Menelik I, the legendary son
of King Solomon and the Queen of
Sheba. He is both chief of state
and head of government, and his
powers, though overlaid with a
constitutional veneer, are very
nearly absolute. He effectively
controls legislative, executive,
and judicial power in the coun-
try and, even at the lower levels
of administration, little is ac-
complished without his approval.
The Emperor appoints or ap-
proves the selection of most high
officials in the government, and
he has an absolute veto over any
actions of the parliament. He
is also the titular head of the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church and
approves the appointment of all
high church officials. As com-
mander in chief of the armed
forces, he controls the appoint-
ment and promotion of all high-
ranking military officers.
In addition to his legal
powers, Haile Selassie also exer-
cises an overwhelming influence
on both government officials and
the general populace. This in-
fluence results partly from his
unusual personal vigor and long
tenure as the nation's ruler and
partly from the tradition of cen-
turies which has ingrained an at-
titude of fear, reverence, and
obedience to the Emperor in the
minds of most Ethiopians.
When Haile Selassie gained
control of the 2,000-year-old
Ethiopian Empire in 1916, he be-
came the feudal ruler of a medi-
eval state. A large portion of
his efforts during his 14 years
as regent, and as Emperor since
1930, has been directed toward
subduing two powerful and largely
independent forces in the coun-
try--the provincial nobility and
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
Under his predecessors, the nobles
had usually been autonomous, ow-
ing allegiance to the Emperor
only as feudal vassals paying
some tribute and serving if
needed in the army. They were
opposed to any attempt by the
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Emperor to reduce their power or
to bring them under the direct
control of the central govern-
ment. The church aided Haile
Selassie in coming to the throne,
but remained fiercely jealous of
its own exclusive position as
the predominant religious in-
luence on the government and a
large number of its subjects.
Haile Selassie has spent a
lifetime subduing and balancing
the power of these two forces.
To counter their influence, he
has created a modern military
establishment and a large civil
service formally under the con-
trol of the central government.
These organizations, however,
have also achieved considerable
power themselves, and must now
be reckoned among the political
forces that will shape the coun-
try's future when the present
Emperor dies.
Despite his 76 years and more
than half a century in power,
Haile Selassie remains in gen-
erally excellent health although
he has begun to show some signs
of advancing age. Most observ-
ers agree that he has become
more forgetful and easily fa-
tigued in recent years, but he
still regularly averages a 14-
hour workday and continues per-
sonally to oversee all the major
functions of the government. He
apparently believes that he will
survive another 10 to 15 years,
a view which--though allegedly
based on the prediction of a
trusted astrologer--is supported
by medical evidence to date.
he Emperor also has an
'binary capacity to pit
rival factions of the establish-
ment against one another, aided
by his absolute powers as ruler.
Shum-shir, the practice of fre-
quently transferring government
officials from one position to
another, is a common feature of
Ethiopian political life. As
with the de facto prohibition on
political activity, government
censorship of the press and radio,
and other control measures, Shum-
shir is designed to keep any
group or individual from achiev-
ing a position of strength suf-
ficient to challenge the Emperor's
regime.
The constitution carefully
establishes succession on the
basis of male primogeniture in
the line of Haile Selassie I,
and Crown Prince Asfa Wossen
Haile Selassie, the Emperor's
oldest and sole surviving son,
is therefore heir to the throne.
Although all foreseeable con-
tingencies have been provided
for in the 25 articles dealing
with the succession, there has
rarely been a peaceful succession
in Ethiopia, and the prescribed
system has not yet been tested.
Historically, the death of
an emperor has usually resulted
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ETHIOPIA
Amhara-Tigrai Heartland
(predominantly Christian)
Massaua !
Asmara
AREA OFIMAP
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in an intensive struggle for the
crown, with few qualifications re-
quired of any pretender except
that he command sufficient force
to make good his claim. Ruling
emperors have also been compelled
to defend their crowns against
challengers who felt qualified to
seize the throne. Haile Selas-
sie has put down half a dozen
major uprisings and innumerable
smaller revolts against his rule.
The Crown Prince
Crown Prince Asfa Wossen,
52, is almost universally acknowl-
edged as a less powerful person-
ality than his father, but will
probably succeed him. He is not
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The Emperor frequently snubs
the crown prince in public and
showed obvious favoritism toward 25X1
his younger brother until the
latter's accidental death in 1957.
Only in the last two years
has the crown prince begun to
play a more active part in poll- 25X1
tics, but he still does not
rank as a ke member of the gov-
ernment.
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KEY ETHIOPIAN PERSONALITIES
Crown Prince Asfa
Wossen Haile Selassie
N 0 B I L I T Y Ras Bitwoded Andargat-
chew Massai
Leul Ras Imru Haile
Selassie
Patriarch Basleyos
(Basilios)
CHURCH Abuna Tewoflos
(Theophilus)
Like Siltanat Habte
Mariam Workneh
Aklilu Habte Wold
Lij Yilma Deressa
Lt. Gen. Kebede Gabre
Lt. Gen. Abye Abebe
Lt. Gen. I yassu Mengesha
Brig. Gen. Abera
Woldemariam
Maj. Gen. Debebe Haile
Mariam
Maj. Gen. Teshome Irgetu
Maj. Gen. Abebe Gemeda
Maj. Gen. Jagema Kello
Governor of Wollo;
member, Crown Council
None-former governor of
Sidamo; injured 1964
Deputy governor of Shoa
(Emperor is governor)
None
Member, Crown Council
Head of Ethiopian church;
Bishop of Shoa
Acting Patriarch; Bishop
of Harar
Chief of ecclesiastical
affairs, Private Cabinet
Prime Minister
Finance Minister
Defense Minister;
dislikes chief of staff Iyassu
President of Senate
Chief of staff, Imperial
Ethiopian Armed Forces
2nd Division commander
3rd Division commander
4th Division commander
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The Nobility
The power of the nobility
has been substantially reduced
during the last 30 years. When
Haile Selassie became Emperor
in 1930, provincial nobles still
raised their own armies, ran their
own police forces, selected their
own civilian administrators, and
paid for all these with tribute
exacted from their provinces.
The Emperor gained supremacy
over the nobility principally by
taking away their right to levy
provincial armies, a reform not
completed until 1947. Haile
Selassie further subdued the
nobility by assigning many of
them to remote provinces or
abroad, by dynastic marriages
between members of prominent fam-
ilies and the royal house, by his
sole power to grant titles--not
hereditary without the Emperor's
approval--and by his right to
give land and other rewards to
loyal officials while confiscat-
ing the property of those who
oppose him.
Despite their reduced status,
however, the nobles still rank
as one of the most influential
political forces in the country.
Through their large landholdings,
they control a sizable portion
of the wealth in Ethiopia's
agriculturally dominated economy.
They also govern the lives of
the many Ethiopians who work as
sharecroppers on land owned by
the nobility.
Eleven of Ethiopia's four-
teen provinces have governors
who are members of the nobility
or the royal family, and other
titled officials serve as deputy
or subprovince governors. Al-
though all provincial officials
are under the nominal control of
the central government, they
retain considerable autonomy and
a few of them have managed to
build a personal base of support
in the areas they govern.
The highest title of nobil-
ity given by the Emperor today
is ras, of which there are now
six. All are important political
figures, but only two--because
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of their relative youth, politi-
cal ambition, support, and royal
lineage--are possible contenders
for the throne. They are Ras
Mengasha Seyoum, governor of Tegre
Province, and Ras Asrate Kassa,
governor of Eritrea.
Has Menqasha, a great-grand-
son of the Emperor Yohannes (1868-
1889), has been governor of Tegre
since 1961. He is popular among
the Tegreans, who have always
competed with the southern Am-
haras from Shoa Province for dom-
inance of the empire--of which
Tegre was once the center. Has
Mengasha's personality and ambi-
tions are the subject of much
speculation, but as the leading
member of the Tegrean royal house
he might be capable of present-
ing a strong challenge to the
crown prince. He does not ap-
pear to have any significant sup-
port in the capital, which he
rarely visits, but he is married
to a granddaughter of the Emperor
and may be playing a quiet wait-
ing game until Haile Selassie
dies.
Has Asrate Kassa is a member
of the same large family as the
Emperor. His father was a firm
supporter of Haile Selassie and
renounced his own claim to the
throne in favor of the present
Emperor. Ras Asrate may desire
to become prime minister, however,
and has been thought b some to
harbor royal ambitions
He probably lacks the
regional popular support of Has
'Mengasha, but does have power-
ful connections among the Shoan
nobility, notably as the leading
member of the influential and
wealthy Moja clan, and enjoys some
connections with the army and
police.
At present, most of the other
important nobles appear to sup-
port the crown prince's succes-
sion. Loyalty, however, has not
been a historically stable item
among the Ethiopian nobility and
there may be a considerable re-
alignment in order to ensure a
position on the winning side if
any serious opposition to the
crown prince develops.
The Ethiopian Orthodox
Church claims 10 million members,
but estimates place its strength
nearer 8.5 million, about 35 per-
cent of the population. Muslims
are believed to constitute an
approximately equal number. The
remainder of the population is
divided among various animist
religions, Falasha Jews, and
several Christian sects.
Although the church's mem-
bers are not in the majority, they
are concentrated among the Amhara-
Tigrai ethnic group that completely
dominates the country, and the
church enjoys a correspondingly
favored status. The Emperor is
required by the constitution to
be orthodox, and most government
officials are also orthodox
Church members. In 1966, all
but five out of 19 government
ministers were orthodox (the
others were Christians; there
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were no Muslims), as were most
members of both houses of the
parliament. Nearly all of the
nobility belongs to the Orthodox
Church, and many of them hold
prominent lay positions.
In addition to its influ-
ence within the government, the
church has considerable economic
power. It collects taxes on some
of its large landholdings, as
well as renting acreage to tenant
farmers in the time-honored
Ethiopian system of sharecrop-
ping.
The clergy are among the
most reactionary influences in
Ethiopia. They are nearly unan-
imous in opposing any change
in the country's traditional so-
ciety that would reduce their
influence.
Although Haile Selassie
has somewhat reduced the power
of the church by gaining control
over the appointment of high
officials and by making the
church more financially depend-
ent on the government, he has
also relied on it as a pillar
of support for his regime. The
Emperor regards the church as
one of the chief stabilizing
elements in Ethiopia because of
its tremendous influence over
the uneducated masses of the
country and because of its en-
trenched position within the
nobility and the government. He
recognizes the need for reform
to modernize the church, but has
been slow to compel any changes
in recent years, largely from
fear of losing the church's sup-
port for his rule and for the
succession of the crown prince.
In a succession crisis, the
church would probably support the
crown prince. His relatively
progressive views on the role of
the monarchy and the need for
reform within the church, how-
ever, might lead some clergymen
to favor a more conservative mem-
ber of the nobility. The con-
tinuance of the traditional im-
perial system is crucial to the
church's power and prestige, and
it would not hesitate to oppose
any basic change that threatened
its place in Ethiopian society.
The Military
The modern Ethiopian military
is a post - World War II creation
of Haile Selassie and is the
first truly national armed force
in the country's history. The
40,000-man army and the 2,500-
man air force are the strongest
physical forces in the country,
far outstripping the 31,000-man
Imperial Ethiopian Police both in
size and in the quality of their
training and equipment. There
is also an infant navy, commanded
by the Emperor's 34-year-old
grandson, but it is of no mili-
tary or political significance.
The Emperor, who relies on
the military to protect the coun-
try against external threats from
Ethiopia's Muslim neighbors as
well as against internal dissi-
dence among minority tribes, also
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clearly realizes the danger of
a military take-over and has been
careful to maintain strict con-
trol over the appointment and
promotion of leading military of-
ficers. The Emperor also fosters
a certain amount of competition
and intrigue among high-level of-
ficers in order to keep them off
balance and to prevent any coa-
litionof forces that might chal-
lenge his rule.
Such a challenge did develop
in December 1960 while the Emperor
was in Brazil. A group of of-
ficers in the Imperial Bodyguard,
the best-trained and equipped of
the army's four divisions, at-
tempted to seize the government.
Although the rebels gained some
support within military and stu-
dent groups in the capital, they
were opposed by the church and
by large segments of the army.
After two days of bloody fight-
ing, the revolt was crushed and
some of its leaders killed them-
selves--the others were later ex-
ecuted. A large number of govern-
ment ministers and high officials
held as hostages during the fight-
ing were killed. The crown prince
was also a hostage but was re-
leased unharmed.
The army remains a definite
contender for power in Ethiopia.
The higher officers, for
the most part, are old, generally
uneducated men who owe their posi-
tions to the fact that they have
the Emperor's trust rather than
to their ability. The junior of-
ficers resent this favoritism and
would prefer a promotion system
based on merit, which would allow
them to advance on the basis of
their more extensive educations.
The compe-
ong mili-
tary officers, which the Emperor
has used effectively to control
the army, could have extremely
divisive effects after his death
unless the crown prince acts
quickly to win the support of
the military.
The Civil Service
Like the military, the civil
service is largely a creation of
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the Emperor, and it has expanded
greatly since his return to power
in 1941. Its more than 30,000
members are vitally necessary to
run the government and have de-
veloped some influence over its
operations, although they lack
the power of the military or the
prestige of the nobility and
the church.
The civil service is com-
posed mainly of young, educated
officials who occupy the lower
and middle echelons, and a
smaller group of older adminis-
trators at the top who obtained
their training before or during
the Italian occupation. Some
of this older group are far from
competent, but they have demon-
strated their loyalty to the Em-
peror and he continues to main-
tain them in their high positions.
There is a basic antagonism
between those trusted officials
who exercise a monopoly of de-
cision-making power and the
younger employees who are of-
ten better trained but are frus-
trated because they lack any
real voice in government poli-
cies. The two groups are not
united as factions, however, and
many members of each have pri-
vate ambitions and engage in
various intrigues to improve
their own positions. Their po-
litical influence is very lim-
ited, and the cliques that de-
velop tend to be temporary al-
liances of like-minded friends
with no ideological base. Even
these are likely to be regarded
as dangerous by the Emperor,
who keeps a close watch on all
high government officials.
Because they depend on the
present government for their pres-
tigious jobs, government workers
at all levels are likely to re-
main neutral in any succession
crisis, although some individuals
high in the administration might
throw their influence to a par-
ticular candidate. Most would
probably support the crown prince,
but regional and ethnic leaders
might attract some support.
Other Factors
Although most of Ethiopia's
educated elite are associated
with the military, the civil
service, or the nobility, there
are also a number of university
students and secondary school
graduates who are not connected
with any of these groups. Hav-
ing no vested interest in the
present administration, they are
consequently the most radical in
their desire to change it, al-
though their ideas are still mild
compared with the political out-
look of some African student
groups.. The students have not,
however, succeeded to date in
gaining any appreciable influence
on the government, nor any large
degree of popular support, and
are not likely to play a major
role in deciding the succession
question.
Of far more immediate sic -
nificance than student activists
are the insurgents of the Eri-
trean Liberation Front (BLF), who
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have been active since 1961.
The ELF is fighting for the in-
dependence of Eritrea, a prov-
ince that was an Italian colony
for 60 years and has been under
Ethiopian administration only
since 1952. The ELF is largely
Muslim and opposes the domina-
tion of Eritrea by the Christian
Amharas. Its guerrilla opera-
tions have been supported by
the radical Arab states. Ethio-
pian Government forces have not
yet been able to eliminate the
ELF and--although the insur-
gents suffered some serious
defeats in 1968--the movement
remains an active threat.
The ELF, which lacks sup-
port outside Eritrea, is com-
pletely outside the ruling
structure of Ethiopia, and its
members have little hope of in-
fluencing the government on any
question, let alone the matter
of the succession. If a serious
struggle develops during a change
of rulers, however, the ELF
might be able to break Eritrea
away from Ethiopia and estab-
lish its independence with the
aid of Arab states before the
central government could be
sufficiently organized to inter-
vene.
The same possibility of
breaking away from the empire
also exists for other outlying
provinces that have become part
of Ethiopia within the last
century, such as parts of Harar,
Bale, and Sidamo, which have
each had sporadic insurgent
movements in the last five years.
The danger of fragmentation of
the empire, however, is clearly
realized by most Ethiopians within
the ruling establishment and con-
stitutes one of the strongest
reasons for avoiding any prolonged
struggle for the crown.
Emperor Haile Selassie re-
tains firm control of the govern-
ment at present and should be
able to retain his position as
long as his health remains sub-
stantially unimpaired. His 52
years of practice have made the
Emperor a master at his Byzantine
system of ruling, and his methods
will probably not change apprecia-
bly during the remainder of his
lifetime. His government will
continue to provide Ethiopia with
a stable, somewhat repressive,
and only haltingly progressive
administration, characterized by
the corruption and inefficiency
at all levels that Haile Selassie
regards as an acceptable price to
pay for the loyalty of those who
serve him. When the succession
problem does arise, the crown
prince will probably succeed to
the throne.
The degree of support that
the crown prince enjoys within
the ruling establishment is dif-
ficult to evaluate, however, be-
cause he has been in the back-
ground in national affairs. He
can probably count on the support
of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church,
and on most of the royal family,
although many of its members are
pessimistic about the dynasty's
chances of survival in any form
in the post - Haile Selassie
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Many members of the nobility
would probably support or at least
not actively oppose the crown
prince's succession. Few if any
of them would favor abolishing
the monarchy or the establishment
of any form of republican govern-
ment, but many would like to see
the Emperor's power reduced to
their own advantage.
The deciding factor in the
succession will probably be the
military, which the crown prince
would need to hold the throne.
If he can retain his present pop-
ularity within the army, his pros-
pects are excellent to become a
limited monarch with a close cir-
cle of military and perhaps some
civilian advisers.
Ras Mengasha Seyoum, Ras
Asrate Kassa, or some less well
known member of the nobility
could make an attempt to seize
the crown but to be successful
they would need to win wider sup-
port than their present regional
bases as well as the acquiescence
of the military. Members of the
military might also attempt to
take over the government, but
they would probably need to pre-
serve some of the trappings of
the monarchy in order to gain
the support of the church and
avoid serious challenges from
the people who revere the tra-
ditional emperor.
Whoever takes over the reins
of the government is unlikely to
wield the authority or to have
the prestige of the present Em-
peror. The impact of modern so-
ciety, though still not great in
most of Ethiopia, is being in-
creasingly felt, and the tradi-
tional attitude of obedience to
the church and to the Emperor
is being called into question
by the country's growing edu-
cated elite. Even the peasants
are becoming interested in mod-
ernization and are beginning to
view the government as an insti-
tution that should help them to
achieve a higher standard of
living. A coalition government
of the crown prince and civilian
and military leaders may be able
to do this, but with Ethiopia
already lagging behind the de-
velopment pace of much of Africa,
they will face a formidable task.
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