WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006800010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 6, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
5 0
6 December 1968
No. 0050/68
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(Information as of noon EST, 5 December 1968)
Far East
VIETNAM
Ambassador Pham Dang Lam has been selected to head
South Vietnam's negotiating team in Paris, while
Vice President Ky is to lead and act as spokesman
for the entire delegation. Military activity this
week focused north and northwest of Saigon.
COMMUNISTS BEGIN NEW OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Communists appear to have begun their annual dry
season offensive in the Bolovens Plateau area, while
an uneasy quiet prevails elsewhere in Laos.
MAOIST PROGRAMS GENERATE NEW CONFUSION IN CHINA
Radical Maoist social programs that have been under
way this fall, particularly since the 12th party ple-
num in October, are impeding efforts to restore sta-
bility in major urban centers and the provinces.
Page
JAPAN'S PRIME MINISTER SATO RESHUFFLES CABINET
With his re-election as party chief safely behind
him, Prime Minister Sato is endeavoring to get the
government party to close ranks in anticipation of
an opposition onslaught on several controversial
issues.
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Europe
INCREASED WESTERN INTEREST IN MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY 10
At their recent ministerial meeting in Brussels, all
15 NATO allies affirmed the need for greater vigi-
lance in the area. NATO has already taken several
steps to that end, including the establishment of a
new maritime air force command.
USSR REAFFIRMS RIGHT TO MEDITERRANEAN PRESENCE
The USSR has denounced the new NATO command in the
Mediterranean, and has reasserted its own right to
operate there. At the same time, Moscow has pro-
posed calling a Mediterranean conference to discus-s
a detente in the area.
TITO RESTATES YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE
President Tito's policy statements last week clearly
set forth once again Yugoslavia's neutrality and
should serve to ease Soviet-Yugoslav tensions.
SLOWER GROWTH SEEN FOR SOVIET-FRENCH TRADE
Although new economic and scientific talks between
France and the USSR are about to begin, prospects
for expanded trade appear limited. The Soviets have
already abandoned one proposed joint venture and
others offer only limited trade opportunities.
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Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
ISRAEL INTENSIFIES RETALIATORY STRIKES AGAINST JORDAN
After four months of relative restraint, Israel
struck hard against Jordan this week. Tel Aviv has
said that its attacks were in retaliation against
continuous sabotage incidents by Arab terrorists
and the shelling of Israeli settlements by Jordan-
ian and Iraqi troops.
PAKISTANI DISSIDENTS WIN GOVERNMENT CONCESSIONS
In an attempt to end the intermittent antigovern-
ment disorders that have plagued West Pakistan for
nearly a month, President Ayub Khan has granted
major concessions to the dissidents.
POLITICAL POT BOILS IN GHANA
Long pent-up political discontent is beginning to
surface as the military government moves closer to-
ward restoring civilian rule, and factional politi-
cal maneuvering has renewed strains among key mem-
bers of the ruling National Liberation Council.
MAURITIUS LEFT WITH SERIOUS PROBLEMS
The departure of British troops leaves Mauritius
alone with its staggering problems of economic dete
rioration and ethnic hatreds. Unable to find eco-
nomic aid in the West, Prime Minister Ramgoolam
reportedly plans to go to Moscow.
MALI'S NEW LEADERS MOVE TO REDUCE COMMUNIST TIES
The moderate provisional government has indicated
that it hopes to reduce Mali's dependence on Com-
munist countries and to form closer ties with the
West.
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Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 23
PANAMA'S NATIONAL GUARD SKIRMISHES WITH INSURGENTS
National Guard units near the border with Costa Rica
were reinforced after two guardsmen and a number of
pro-Arias insurgents were killed or wounded in clashes
last week.
VENEZUELAN PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST NOT YET DECIDED
As of 5 December, with only 77 percent of the vote
counted, Christian Democrat Rafael Caldera was
slightly ahead of Gonzalo Barrios, the candidate of
the governing Democratic Action Party. Attempts by
dissident Communist groups to disrupt the election
were unsuccessful.
MEXICAN STUDENT STRIKE APPARENTLY WANING
The four-month-old student strike in Mexico appears
nearly over despite hard-line attempts to continue
the dispute with the government.
COLOMBIAN POLITICAL CRISIS LEAVES BITTER AFTERMATH
The latest Colombian political crisis has been re-
solved, but it has seriously strained the National
Front coalition formed in 1958 by the Liberal and
Conservative parties to end prolonged political vio-
lence.
REFORM TREND NOTED IN LATIN AMERICAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
28
Since the Pope's visit, Latin American clergymen
appear to be finally convinced that the church must
have an active role in the social reform movement.
GUYANA'S PRIME MINISTER WORKING FOR ELECTION MAJORITY
29
The prospects for Prime Minister Burnham to be re-
turned to office with a clear majority have improved
recently, in part by the disclosure of opposition
leader Cheddi Jagan's involvement with Castro-Com-
munist extremists in Venezuela.
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Saigon's arrangements for sending a delegation to Paris are virtually
complete, and the group should be pretty much in place by early next week.
Ambassador Pham Dang Lam will head the small negotiating team, but
over-all management of the delegation, which also includes a propaganda
staff and a "lobby group" of representatives of various religious and political
groups, will be in the hands of Vice President Ky.
The arrival of the South Vietnamese, however, may not prevent a
protracted procedural wrangle over the sticky question of the relative status
of the Saigon government and the National Liberation Front in the talks.
The ground war in South Vietnam sharpened somewhat during the
week, particularly in the areas north and northwest of Saigon. The increased
tempo was reflected in higher casualties on both sides.
In Laos, the Communists may have begun their annual dry season
offensive in the Bolovens Plateau area. North Vietnamese troops took heavy
losses in several sharp initial attacks against the government base at Ban
Thateng, but they may soon make another effort against the position.
Japan's Prime Minister Sato lost no time in holding out the olive branch
to his defeated factional opponents in the recent elections for the presidency
of the ruling party. In a bid for party unity before making a renewed attack
on such problems as the reversion of Okinawa, security ties with the US, and
student agitation, Sato reorganized his cabinet so as to achieve better
factional balance.
South Korean authorities are revising upward their estimate of the
number of North Korean infiltrators who landed on the east coast last
month. The number killed or captured already exceeds Seoul's initial esti-
mate of 60, while small groups of marauders remain at large, taking their toll
of South Korean civilian and military casualties.
In Burma, General Ne Win has finally opened a dialogue with civilian
politicians who have been out of power since his coup in 1962. It is clear,
however, that he intends to proceed at a deliberate pace in working out with
them a formula for their possible ultimate return to positions in the govern-
ment.
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VIETNAM
Ambassador Pham Dang Lam,
the head of South Vietnam's liai-
son delegation to the Paris talks,
has been selected to head the nego-
tiating team that will participate
in the forthcoming expanded talks.
He will operate under the direc-
tion of Vice President Ky, who
is to lead and act as spokesman
for the entire delegation, which
includes the negotiating team,
an information and propaganda
staff, and a "lobby group" com-
posed of representatives of vari-
ous religious and political or-
ganizations.
The government appears to be
placing heavy emphasis on organiz-
ing its propaganda effort at an
early stage; many delegation mem-
bers and several of Ky's advisers
are well qualified in the infor-
mation and psychological warfare
fields.
in preventing some militant as-
sembly members from voting against
approval.
Information Minister Thien
has been strongly criticized for
his heavy-handed treatment of the
press in recent weeks, and he may
have lost the confidence of Presi-
dent Thieu. He submitted his
resignation last week, but the
government has not yet accepted
it, partly to avoid any appearance
of governmental instability as
the delegation leaves for Paris.
Foreign Minister Thanh is also
the subject of mounting criticism.
The Upper House recently issued
a resolution of "dissatisfaction"
with Thanh's performance and it
is likely that there will be con-
tinuing agitation for his removal.
The Military Situation
in South Vietnam
President Thieu apparently
had the principle voice in select-
ing members of the delegation, al-
though he consulted closely with
Ky and has been working unusually
well with him on this problem.
The delegation is scheduled
to depart this weekend for Paris,
after securing National Assembly
approval as required by the con-
stitution. This requirement was
apparently overlooked until this
week when some of the legislators
reminded the government of their
prerogatives. Vice President Ky's
personal interest in the peace
mission probably will be a factor
Military activity this week
was focused north and northwest
of Saigon. In addition to reac-
tions to vigorous allied opera-
tions designed to seek out enemy
troop and supply concentrations,
the Communists staged several heavy
attacks in northwestern III Corps.
Scattered fighting also occurred
in other sectors of the country,
largely as a result of allied in-
itiatives.
Increased enemy aggressive-
ness in III Corps was reflected
by stepped-up shellings, small-
scale ground attacks, and a well-
planned ambush of a US field force
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in midweek which resulted in more
than 75 Americans casualties. Ad-
ditionally, the enemy is becoming
more sensitive to allied probes
and thrusts into base areas and
along infiltration routes and sup-
ply corridors. Consequently, both
allied and Communist casualties
have risen in the past several
weeks despite an apparent enemy
attempt to conserve his forces.
There are continuing signs
of increased enemy emphasis on
the Saigon region. In addition
to the four Communist divisions
deployed along the border of north-
western III Corps, other main and
local force units have been noted
preparing for offensive operations.
These preparations include the
build-up of supplies and the as-
similation of North Vietnamese
replacements into existing units.
Should the Communists elect to
renew large-scale offensive action
in III Corps, refurbished combat
forces are available on the pe-
riphery of III Corps and could be
committed to battle with relatively
little advance warning. Enemy
forces in other areas of the
country, including the coastal
flatlands south of Da Nang and
the western highlands and coast
of II Corps, have also been ob-
served preparing for combat.
In guerrilla actions, the
Communists continued their local
harassment throughout the four
corps areas, although at a some-
what reduced pace. Viet Cong ter-
rorists, for example, killed 226
persons in the past two weeks, a
drop from the 348 persons killed
in a similar two-week period in
early October. The III Corps
region, however, has witnessed a
recent rise in terrorist inci-
dents against members of the
People's Self-Defense Groups.
During the past week, at least
three provinces reported incidents
where members of these local self-
defense units were kidnaped or
assassinated.
Viet Cong guerrillas are gen-
erally focusing on interdicting
roads and shelling allied instal-
lations. Politically, however,
these local forces appear to be
continuing to work closely with
Communist political cadres in
their organization work in the
countryside.
North Vietnamese propagandists
are again emphasizing the successes
of Communist guerrilla forces in
the South. A recent propaganda
broadcast by the North Vietnamese
asserted that the fourth All-South
Guerrilla Warfare Conference was
recently concluded, and praised
the guerrillas of Kien Hoa, Vinh
Binh, and Thua Thien provinces,
where the Viet Cong have tradi-
tionally been strong. Communist
propagandists, as part of their
campaign to "prove" growing Viet
Cong influence, also claimed that
an urban guerrilla force has been
developing in Saigon and Hue.
It is becoming increasingly
clear that the Communists are in-
volved in both short- and long-
term preparations for strengthen-
ing their military position through-
out South Vietnam. To meet more
immediate contingencies, the Com-
munists are attempting to con-
serve their forces while rebuild-
ing, increasing training and morale,
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and improving logistical capabili-
ties.
The Communists also appear
to be maintaining their long-range
options. The renewed threat to
some areas of the northern prov-
inces, consolidation of forces in
the central section of the coun-
try, and the build-up of the im-
posing force of at least four
divisions within striking dis-
tance of Saigon allow the Commu-
nist strategists several options.
Logistics
The North Vietnamese have
substantially increased their
logistics base in the southern
provinces since 1 November but
thus far, traffic into the Lao-
tian panhandle and the Demili-
tarized Zone does not appear
to have increased.
Photography indicates that
virtually all the roads in south-
ern North Vietnam have been made
usable again since the bombing
halt. The photography also has
shown many more trucks on roads
and in parks during the daytime
than in the period before the
bombings stopped.
Although the level of logis-
tics activity in southern North
Vietnam has increased, the number
of trucks moving into the Laotian
panhandle has probably remained
at about the level of before the
bombing halt. This traffic may
step up in the near future in
accord with patterns of previous
years.
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COMMUNISTS BEGIN NEW OFFENSIVE IN LAOS
The Communists appear to
have begun their annual dry sea-
son offensive in the Bolovens
Plateau area, while an uneasy
quiet prevails elsewhere in Laos.
North Vietnamese troops
launched several sharp attacks
against the government base at
Ban Thateng last week and routed
a government supply column en
route to the beleaguered out-
post. Although the Communists
suffered heavy losses in their
unsuccessful assault against
Ban Thateng, they may soon make
another effort against the posi-
tion.
LAOS
? Government-held location
Communist-controlled territory
The attack against Ban Tha-
teng is the most significant
enemy action in the Bolovens
Plateau area since last February,
when the enemy moved into the
3edone Valley and surrounded the
provincial capitals of Saravane
and Attopeu. The North Vietnam-
ese may be picking up where they
left off then, with the Ban Tha-
teng thrust the initial step in
a new effort to push government
forces from the eastern rim of
the plateau. The attack could,
however, be no more than a
reaction to a recent sweep opera-
tion designed to clear enemy
forces east of Ban Thateng and
extend the government's pres-
ence into the infiltration cor-
ridor.
The North Vietnamese
have enough troops in the area
to take the Bolovens Plateau
and Saravane and Attopeu if
they choose to do so. One
recently captured North Viet-
namese prisoner claims that
plans have been laid for a
move against Attopeau. The
tactical situation was essen-
tially the same last year,
however, and these provincial
capitals have remained in
friendly hands.
Demarcation,','
Line
souru
Contested territory
Communist-held location
S EC, R ET
No major fighting has
been reported in north Laos,
but government guerrillas are
regaining some territory in
the Phou Pha Thi area in a
campaign designed to delay
the start of the enemy's dry
season offensive in Houa Phan
Province.
Page 6 WEEKLY SU Y 6
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MAOIST PROGRAMS GENERATE MEW CONFUSION IN CHINA
Radical Maoist social pro-
grams that have been under way
this fall, particularly since the
12th party plenum in October, are
impeding efforts to restore sta-
bility in major urban centers
and the provinces. These cam-
paigns are causing serious so-
cial disruption and are placing
a heavy burden on local offi-
cials all over China. The drives
appear to be ill-planned and
overzealously carried out.
A campaign to "simplify"
administration by sending large
numbers of cadres down to the
ranks or "back to the farm" is
creating widespread anxiety.
Ordinary people are also being
sent to the countryside on a
wholesale basis to work in agri-
culture on a semipermanent basis.
Much of the student body at col-
lege level--about 500,000 young
people--has also been dispersed
to the countryside under locally
administered programs.
These moves reflect radical
Maoist edicts calling for edu-
cational "reform" by giving
students extensive "work exper-
ience." Local authorities are
probably following through en-
thusiastically on these instruc-
tions in order to eliminate
factions that have been a source
of persistent trouble. There
is apparently no intention of
resuming meaningful higher edu-
cation in the near future. 25X1
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Urban youths, mainly of
high-school age, are also being
sent to the countryside under a
crash program that is producing
serious disruption in Kwangtung
and probably in other provinces
as well.
in Canton alone 300,000
students a -majority of the stu-
dent population above elementary-
school level--were being sent to
rural areas. The students are
going to distant army-run state
farms or to nearby communes.
farm-
ers are protesting t at the new
arrivals do not know farming
techniques, refuse to accept in-
struction from their involuntary
hosts, and are placing a heavy
burden on housing and food sup-
plies. Several incidents have
been reported in which farmers
have violently resisted the un-
wanted outsiders. At one of
these communes, students were
reported to have "disappeared"
on 24 November, presumably to
go home. Such unauthorized
flights to urban areas seem
likely to become a serious prob-
lem for local security forces.
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JAPAN'S PRIME MINISTER SATO RESHUFFLES CABINET
Following his election to
a third term as party president,
Prime Minister Sato is seeking
to strengthen his position for
dealing with three sensitive is-
sues over the next two years:
reversion of Okinawa, extension
of the US-Japan security treaty,
and student disorders.
On 30 November, he formed a
new and factionally well-balanced
cabinet in a clear attempt to
protect his flanks against intra-
party criticism of his handling
of these controversial issues.
Even competing factions received
ministerial posts, as well as a
party executive post, as Sato
strove to put himself on as good
a footing as possible to meet
the expected opposition onslaught
on the reversion and security is-
sues. Reflecting his intention
to retain personal management of
sensitive foreign policy issues,
Sato named Kiichi Aichi, a member
of the prime minister's inner
circle of associates, as foreign
minister. Aichi has had a long
and intimate involvement in re-
lationships with the US.
Sato looks upon Okinawa as
the crucial challenge to the suc-
cess of his third term. He con-
siders it essential to obtain
agreement next year on the form
and timing of reversion if he
is to preserve good relations
with the US and the viability of
his Liberal Democratic Party.
According to Aichi, Sato's
timetable calls for preliminary
soundings on Okinawa and the se-
curity treaty with the new US
administration early next year.
The main purpose of these talks
would be to devise a formula
that would permit Okinawa's re-
version to take place two or
three years after the security
treaty hurdle is passed in 1970.
Assuming the success of these
working-level negotiations, Sato
hopes to visit the US later in
the year to formalize the agree-
ments.
Sato may then call for na-
tional elections before 1970, when
forces opposed to the security
treaty plan to peak their cam-
paigns. He thus hopes to take
the wind out of the leftist op-
position parties' sails by gain-
ing a popular endorsement of his
management of these controversial
issues.
On the domestic scene, Sato
must wrestle with the immediate
problems of student disorders
and the ongoing debate on na-
tional security. The government
is coming under increasing pres-
sure from the general public to
take stronger police action
against extremist students who
not only spearhead the anti-US
movement but also the agitation
that has disrupted normal opera-
tions in about 60 universities
this academic year.
In the realm of national
security, Sato runs the danger
of arousing deep-seated Japanese
sentiments against rearmament
as he seeks public support for
a greater defense effort. The
prime minister believes an en-
largement of the Japanese defense
establishment would help persuade
the US to accelerate the rever-
sion of Okinawa.
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Events required Moscow to divert some of its attention from Eastern
Europe this week. Commenting on new Arab-Israeli tensions, Pravda warned
that the USSR would "administer a resolute rebuff" to any aggressors in the
region adjacent to its southern borders. Pravda's main message, however, was
a call for a political settlement, and it was timed to appear just as UN
representative Jarring was about to arrive in Cairo.
Moscow's pique at NATO efforts to improve surveillance of the Soviet
naval squadron in the Mediterranean came through clearly in renewed
assertions that the Soviet Union was a Mediterranean power and had a right
to be there. The UK was singled out in a particularly sharp note that Moscow
quickly published, perhaps in the hope that this would soften the British
position on the Czechoslovak issue.
Soviet press treatment of the incoming US administration, which has
been temperate to date, has revealed that Moscow is following developments
with interest.
In Moscow, preparations are under way for next Tuesday's opening of
the Supreme Soviet, the USSR's parliament. The economic plan and budget
for 1969 will be the main business of the session, but the return from abroad
of a number of ranking Soviet diplomats suggests that an end-of-the-year
foreign policy review may also be on the agenda. These officials are all
members of the party's central committee, which generally meets before
sessions of the Supreme Soviet.
Yugoslav National Day observances provided some of the Eastern
European countries with a safe target on which to focus their pent-up fears
and tensions.
There were wide differences in the commentary and official statements
taking note of the occasion. The Czechoslovaks and the Rumanians sent
warm congratulations; the Hungarians were enthusiastic; the Bulgarians gave
it the cold shoulder; the East Germans, surprisingly, gave prominent coverage
to the holiday; and the Poles sent a chilly, unsigned message.
Conditions remain uncertain in the major Western foreign exchange
markets, with no clear signs of a return to international monetary stability.
Exchange rates of the principal currencies have tended to move haltingly
back toward their parities, but the price of gold has responded to increasing
daily demand and moved up slowly. In general, the condition of the markets
suggest that investors and exchange traders are wary and skeptical, appar-
ently unsure whether recent corrective measures will prove sufficient to
restore either stability or confidence. Meanwhile, strikes plagued France and
Italy.
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INCREASED WESTERN INTEREST IN MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY
Western security require-
ments in the Mediterranean may
be the focus of increased atten-
tion in the months ahead. At
their recent ministerial meet-
ing in Brussels, all 15 NATO
allies affirmed the need for
greater vigilance in the area.
NATO has already taken several
steps to that end, including the
establishment of a new maritime
air force command.
The new command, COMARAIR-
MED, will concentrate on track-
ing the movements of Soviet ships
across the 2,000 miles of the
Mediterranean basin. Britain,
Italy, and the US will provide
hardware and aircraft for the
new unit while France and sev-
eral other NATO members are ex-
pected to contribute information
without formally taking part in
the command's operation. The
headquarters is in Naples.
Diplomatic initiatives from
several quarters, however, may
confuse the nature and scope of
the NATO commitment. An Israeli
demarche has sought to extend
the sphere of NATO's interests
to cover the Middle East situa-
tion in general and Israeli se-
curity interests in particular.
The Spanish, in contrast, have
called on both the US and the
USSR to consider withdrawing
their fleets completely from the
area.
The Israelis base their ini-
tiative on a statement in the
NATO ministerial communique that
warns the Soviets of "grave con-
sequences" in the event of threat-
ening actions in the Mediterran-
ean. In approaches to various
NATO capitals last week, Israeli
diplomats cited "the common inter-
est of both the NATO members and
Israel" in Soviet activities there.
Although the Israelis were
too circumspect to suggest a formal
security arrangement with NATO, they
did nevertheless urge an "ever-in-
creasing exchange of opinion." The
Israeli demarche is not likely to
be very successful in view of the
desire of the NATO ministers to
avoid the divisive issue of the Mid-
dle East. It could, however, force
the allies to clarify a commitment
they had hoped to keep loose and
flexible.
The Spaniards have explained
their proposal as intended to be
a constructive one for reduction
of tensions in the Mediterranean.
They argue that a roll-back of US
and Soviet forces would be consis-
tent with the NATO allies' endorse.
ment earlier this year of a bal-
anced withdrawal of US and Soviet
forces from central Europe.
Madrid is currently renego-
tiating Spanish base agreements
with the US and may have advanced
its proposal as a means of forc-
ing up the price. It may also be
seeking to curry support among
the Soviet and Arab blocks for
Spain's continuing efforts in the
UN to win Gibraltar from the
British
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USSR REAFFIRMS RIGHT TO MEDITERRANEAN PRESENCE
Moscow has reacted to the
recently established NATO mari-
time air force command for the
Mediterranean with a strident
propaganda attack, and has re-
asserted its own right to oper-
ate in the Mediterranean.
In addition, Moscow has
sent diplomatic notes to all
NATO countries protesting the
establishment of the new com-
mand. In its notes to the Med-
iterranean littoral countries--
Greece, Italy, and Turkey--Mos-
cow also suggested the need for
a Mediterranean conference to
promote detente in the area.
The note to the Turks was the
most explicit, calling for an
early meeting of the Mediter-
ranean powers. The suggestion
is intended to refurbish the
"peaceful" side of the Soviet
image in much the same way as
their occasional call for a
European security conference
does in central Europe.
Moscow's press campaign
is primarily designed to sug-
gest that the USSR, as a global
power, rates a presence in the
Mediterranean similar to that
of the US, and with the same
prerogatives. Moscow's aggres-
sive tone is also directed to-
ward buttressing the diplomatic
position of its Arab clients in
their discussions with UN emis-
sary Jarring. The Soviets are
also seeking to intimidate Is-
rael, and perhaps to raise the
level of anxiety in Yugoslavia
and Albania. Finally, Moscow's
claim to rights in the Mediter-
ranean is a measure of frustra-
tion over its lack of unimpeded
access to the area from the
Black Sea.
Moscow's tough statements,
however, could well be a fore-
runner to reopening its proposal
to make the Mediterranean a nu-
clear-free zone. This is a
standing item in Soviet disarm-
ament policy, designed to bring
an end to Mediterranean patrols
of the Polaris submarine. If
only for the nuisance value, the
Russians may profess to see
some merit in the Spanish sug-
gestion that both the US and
the USSR should withdraw their
Mediterranean forces. In the
meantime, the Soviets are devel-
oping a more sophisticated anti-
submarine capability in the area,
hoping to achieve a military
neutralization of the Polaris
threat that they have failed
to remove by diplomatic m ans.
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TITO RESTATES YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE
President Tito's policy state-
ments last week clearly set forth
once again Yugoslavia's neutrality
and should serve to ease Soviet-
Yugoslav tensions. In his remarks
during celebrations of the national
day anniversary, Tito also underlined
again his determination to defend
his country from all sides.
At the same time, he empha-
sized his desire to maintain ideo-
logical links with the interna-
tional Communist movement while
keeping Yugoslavia free from en-
tanglements with either Moscow's
"socialist commonwealth" or the
North Atlantic Alliance.
In a modest gesture to Moscow
Tito also repeated his line that
Yugoslavia does not expect a Soviet
TASS gave Tito's comments
the most favorable Soviet coverage
since the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia.
25X1
Despite this public stance
Yu oslav
appear eager to esta is
even closer ties with the West.
When the need arises, the Yugoslavs
will continue to denounce Soviet
pretensions to hegemony over all so-
cialist countries. Meanwhile, Bel-
grade will vigorously pursue non-
alignment as a device for avoiding
Soviet policies that infringe on its
soverei nty. 25X1
TITO'S COMMENTS ON
YUGOSLAVIA'S 25TH ANNIVERSARY
In regard to the Brussels statement by Mr. Rusk, our
position is in complete contrast to this statement. The spheres
of interest stop at our borders. What sort of zone they have
and whether it is gray, I do not know. Here in Yugoslavia, it is
a bright zone.
I believe that there is no reason for the Soviet Union to
undertake any [military] action against Yugoslavia, nor do we
believe in such a possibility.
Who does not respect his own country and his own
people in the first place cannot respect others either.
Our peoples made immense sacrifices and shed rivers of
blood in order to become masters of their own fate and to be
able to make independent decisions on the forms of their
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SLOWER GROWTH SEEN FOR SOVIET-FRENCH TRADE
Economic and scientific
talks scheduled for later this
month may set the course for
economic cooperation over the
next few years between France
and the USSR. Prospects for ex-
panding trade are limited by
Moscow's inability to provide
additional products of interest
to France. Such factors as the
invasion of Czechoslovakia and
recent pressures on the franc
have had little impact on the
prospects for future trade.
France ranked as the USSR's
sixth largest Western trading
partner last year, with trade
totaling about $340 million.
French exports of machinery and
transport equipment, which have
been increasing rapidly over the
past three years, have narrowed
France's substantial trade def-
icit with the USSR. These ex-
ports were envisaged under the
1965-69 trade agreement signed
in 1964. A recent contract to
build 12 refrigerator ships--
worth some $92 million--for the
Soviets will help maintain the
level.
French imports from the
USSR have been growing slower
than exports. Consisting chiefly
of raw materials, they are often
available elsewhere on better
terms than from the USSR.
Ways to increase trade and
economic cooperation probably
will be on the agenda of the high-
level "Grand Commission" talks
scheduled to begin later this
month. The discussions were
scheduled to be preceded by
meetings of the 13 technical
subgroups composing the "Petite
Commission." These talks may
result in some increased trade
opportunities, such as the pro-
posed sale of French machinery
and equipment for producing elec-
trical appliances, with the So-
viets selling a fixed percentage
of the eventual output in France.
Although economic coopera-
tion along these lines is envi-
sioned in other industries as well,
most contacts to date have been
limited to acquainting French
businessmen with their Soviet
counterparts. The concept of
joint ventures received a set-
back recently when the USSR turned
to the US for technology and
equipment to produce color tele-
vision components following the
failure of Franco-Soviet efforts
to make French color picture tubes
the basis for the mass production
of color receivers in the USSR.
Other joint scientific ventures,
such as testing of the Molniya
communications satellite and
atomic energy research, appear
to offer little in the way of
increased trade opportunities.
F77 I
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The Arab-Israeli confrontation reached another fever point this week
when Israel struck hard against Jordan and the Iraqi forces stationed there.
The present cycle of raids and counterraids is expected to continue.
Egypt's sole legal political organization, the Arab Socialist Union, met
several times during the week to discuss the causes of the recent student
riots. Nasir, faced with the problem of satisfying students and intellectual
malcontents without loosening his tight rein on the country, has alleged that
the riots were partially instigated by Israeli agents.
On Cyprus, the second round of talks between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot communities has so far resulted in little progress. The degree of local
self-government allowable to the Turkish Cypriot community is the major
snag. The governments of both Turkey and Greece are prodding the local
leaders on the need for compromise.
The military stalemate in Nigeria continues, although federal forces are
apparently preparing to launch another offensive sometime this month.
There are growing signs of war-weariness, especially among Yoruba tribes-
men in Western State, where army units last week killed some 11 persons
while suppressing demonstrators protesting a war tax. Some army deserters
were apparently involved in the demonstrations, which may have been
inspired in part by disaffected Yoruba politicians.
The second round of Algerian-French economic negotiations, concern-
ing principally wine and petroleum, opened in Paris on 3 December. The
semiofficial Algerian-French - language daily El Moudjahid, on 4 December
sharply criticized the conduct and motives of French oil companies in
Algeria. This press attack, implying that Algeria might resort to nationaliza-
tion, seems designed to exert pressure on the French negotiators to modify
the 1965 petroleum accords along lines more favorable to Algeria.
New irritants have arisen in Ethiopian-Somali relations that both ob-
struct Somali Prime Minister Egal's efforts at detente with Ethiopia and
provide fresh ammunition to his opponents in the election cam-
paign.
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Israelis Continue Strong Retaliatory Strikes
LEBANON
S Y R I A
Heavy artillery shelling
and airstrikes
1-2 December
Tel Aviv-YafQ *
As Salt
lierusalem
*Bethleh-em
Hebron
Beersheba
J O's, R D A N
Sedom
ISRAEL
c
UNITED \
ARAB
REPUBLIC
SINAI 1 /
PENINSULA
Elat
Aqaba
Two bridges destroyed
in commando raid
1 December
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SAUDI
ARABIA
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ISRAEL INTENSIFIES RETALIATORY STRIKES AGAINST JORDAN
Israel, after four months
of relative restraint in the
face of constant harassment on
the Israeli-Jordanian frontier,
struck hard against Jordan this
week.
Helicopter-borne Israeli
commandos, in a raid similar to
their raid into Egypt on 1 No-
vember, struck 40 miles deep
into southern Jordan and de-
stroyed a road and a railroad
bridge on 1 December. At the
same time, Israeli forces hit
hard with artillery and aircraft
at the Irbid area in northwest-
ern Jordan. Air attacks were
continued during the next few
days, culminating with a heavy
attack by Israeli aircraft on
4 December against Jordanian
towns in the northwest where
Iraqi troops are based. During
the 4 December fray, at least
one Israeli aircraft was downed
by antiaircraft fire.
Israel has said that its
attacks were in retaliation
against continuous sabotage in-
cidents by Arab terrorists and
the shelling of Israeli settle-
ments by Jordanian and Iraqi
troops. Border clashes and
incidents have been at a steady
rate of three or four per day
for many weeks now, and were re-
cently highlighted by the ter-
rorist bombing of a Jewish market-
place in west Jerusalem in which
12 persons died.
Arab terrorists and Jordan-
ian and Iraqi troops in the Irbid
area have repeatedly focused
their attacks on Israeli settle-
ments in the Bet Sheian Valley.
The Israelis are well aware that
the Iraqis--and probably the
Jordanians as well--are aiding
the terrorists, and have long
been anxious to get a crack at
the area. Whoever started this
week's fracas, the Israelis were
obviously happy to have the chance
to strike back. Public Israeli
statements emphasized that the
moves were directed particularly
against the Iraqis, who have
heretofore been comparatively
immune to retaliation.
King Husayn is still unable
to curtail terrorist activity.
Further Israeli raids will only
encourage the terrorists, and
the present vicious cycle of
raids and counterraids will con-
tinue.
The situation along the Suez
Canal, meanwhile, has been quiet
recently, although the potential
for exchanges of fire remains high.
Israel's timing of the at-
tacks against Jordan coincided
with the return of UN emissary
Jarring to his Nicosia headquart-
ers to attempt a resumption of
peace talks. While the Israelis
try to disassociate military ac-
tions from peace negotiations,
their moves strongly suggest
that they believe the chances of
the Arabs agreeing to a peace
settlement are almost nil, and
that in the meantime they must
revert to their old policy of
"teaching the Arabs a lesson" to
reinforce the image of Israel's
military supremacy.
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PAKISTANI DISSIDENTS WIN GOVERNMENT CONCESSIONS
In an attempt to end the in-
termittent antigovernment dis-
orders that have plagued West
Pakistan for nearly a month,
President Ayub Khan has granted
major concessions to the dissi-
dents.
On 1 December, in his regular
nationwide first-of-the-month
broadcast, Ayub outlined a plan
designed to placate student lead-
ers of the current unrest. The
most notable victory for the
students was Ayub's promise to
repeal a section of the university
ordinance that enables the govern-
ment to withdraw college degrees
from graduates accused of "sub-
versive" activities.
On the following day, the
government took steps to counter
economic discontent. It announced
that top members of the ruling
Pakistan Muslim League, meeting
with Ayub, asked the administra-
tion to ensure that workers re-
ceive essential goods at fair
prices.
The government's concession
followed several weeks of encour-
aging developments for the oppo-
sition. Although robbed of its
leaders by the roundup on 13
November of antigovernment spokes-
men--including ex - foreign
minister Bhutto--the disparate
opposition forces were neverthe-
less able to regroup and continue
their agitation. Their campaign
received a significant boost
on 17 November when former air
force chief Asghar Khan announced
his decision to enter politics
and to work for the unity of the
opposition. Far more attractive
as a potential presidential chal-
lenger than Bhutto, the popular
and respected Asghar may provide
a rallying point for the opposi-
tion if he can muster essential
support in East Pakistan.
Two other figures of national
stature subsequently joined the
opposition. On 26 November, S.
M. Murshed, retired chief justice
of the East Pakistan High Court,
threw his hat into the political
ring, endorsing the antigovern-
ment charges made by Asghar.
In a similar bid the next day,
Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, an old-
line Northwest Frontier politi-
cian with a substantial national
reputation, entered the fray,
backing Asghar's pronouncements
and vowing to pursue opposition
unity.
The government's concessions
will go part way toward satisfy-
ing demands made by the protes-
tors, but other issues are at
stake and basic grievances re-
main. The opposition's success
in forcing governmental liberali-
zation will probably encourage
it to continue the unrest, and
security authorities are antici-
pating sporadic disturbances
throughout the 1969-70 elections.
Ayub's willingness to authorize
certain reforms should not obscure
the fact that he also is more
than willing to use whatever
force is necessar to keep order.
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POLITICAL POT BOILS IN GHANA
Long pent-up political dis-
content is beginning to surface
in Ghana as the military govern-
ment moves closer toward restor-
ing civilian rule. Political
maneuvering by factions both
within and without the ruling
National Liberation Council has
renewed strains among key council
members and to some extent has
undercut their ability to govern
effectively.
Vocal discontent has erupted
over a new method of selecting a
constituent assembly, scheduled
to convene this month to review
a draft constitution. The major-
ity of the assembly's 150 members
will now be chosen by major in-
terest groups rather than be
elected. Although the change
will help the council meet its
deadline of September 1969 for
restoring civilian government,
critics have charged that the as-
sembly will be heavily weighted
toward government-controlled
groups. The controversy threat-
ens to jeopardize public accept-
ance of the constitution.
Concomitantly, the council
is attempting to cope with severe
dissension within its own ranks.
Brigadier Afrifa, popular and
mercurial hero of the 1966 coup,
has deliberately created discord
in the council because of his
disapproval of its formulas for
return to civilian rule. He has
also raised the ire of other
council members by unilaterally
and publicly advocating the scrap-
ping of a council decree disquali-
fying certain Nkrumah-tainted in-
dividuals from holding public of-
fice because he contends the de-
cree was too lenient.
Roundly condemned by council
members, Afrifa may now be in
even greater difficulty because
of his close association with
former armed forces commander
Otu, who was arrested on 20 No-
vember for allegedly plotting
with Nkrumah supporters in London.
Although the charges against Otu
have not been substantiated, he
is known to oppose some of the
council's plans and could have
encouraged Afrifa to be disrup-
tive.
Meanwhile, civilian politi-
cians, anticipating that the
ban on political parties will
be lifted in January, are be-
ginning to shift into higher
gear. With politics focused
primarily on personalities--pro-
grams and policies are seldom
raised--none of the identifiable
political groupings has yet de-
veloped a cohesive national struc-
ture. Dr. Kofi A. Busia, leader
of the former United Party, re-
mains a main contender for politi-
cal leadership. Faced with dis-
sidence among his own followers,
however, he has failed to spark a
dynamic political movement and ap-
pears to have lost ground in re-
cent months.
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SECRET
The fortunes of Komla A.
Gbedemah, one-time finance min-
ister under Nkrumah, appear to
be rising. Recently exempted
from the disqualification decree,
he can count on the support of
many former Nkrumah supporters
and is seeking to ally himself
with the labor movement. John
Harlley, deputy council chair-
man and a fellow Ewe tribesman,
is working behind the scenes to
abet Gbedemah's cause.
The ambitions of certain
council members further compli-
cate the political landscape.
Council Chairman Joseph Ankrah,
for example, is dickering with
various factions for support to
run for the presidency. Harlley,
who is contemptuous of Ankrah's
ability to govern, may also be
thinking of organizing a politi-
cal movement if Gbedemah falters
and Ankrah comes to the fore.
MAURITIUS LEFT WITH SERIOUS PROBLEMS
The withdrawal of British
troops leaves the fledgling Mau-
ritian Government to deal with
security problems arising from
the long-standing hatred between
the Muslim and Creole communities.
At the same time, a deteriorating
economy adds to Prime Minister
Ramgoolam's burdens.
Ramgoolam opposed the Brit-
ish exit even though incidents
between the two communities have
decreased since the open fighting
in January. To compensate for
the British withdrawal, the Mau-
ritian police have been increased
in number and have received addi-
tional training, but there is no
assurance that the security forces
could cope with any renewed dis-
turbances without outside help.
For the moment, the disor-
ders seem to have cemented Ram-
goolam's governing coalition of
Muslims and Hindus (together, 67
percent of the population) by
drawing some opportunistic and
wavering Muslims back into the
fold. Despite the government's
failure to deal with pressing
problems, the Creole-dominated
opposition Mauritian Party has
been unable to mount any effec-
tive challenge. With no program
other than opposition to domina-
tion by the Indo-Mauritian major-
ity, the Mauritian Party has been
gradually losing parliamentary
seats and support.
Neither the opposition party
nor the governing coalition has
shown much interest in attempting
to cope with the country's seri-
ous economic problems, which are
growing steadily worse. The
economy is almost totally depen-
dent on sugar, the booming birth-
rate exacerbates already over-
crowded conditions, and unemploy-
ment remains high. Ramgoolam,
apparently hoping that the eco-
nomic assistance he expected
would make sacrifices less neces-
sary, has so far been unwilling
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MM AGA 1\
~ja nan Y Yf
REPUBLIC
" AG SCAR
to make any difficult or unpopu-
lar decisions to stem the decline.
He has had little success from
his trips through the West seek-
ing economic aid, however, prob-
ably because of his unrealistic
development requests.
Ramgoolam reportedly plans
to visit Moscow later this month.
He may hope to find the Soviets
more willing than the West to
provide aid, and he may believe
that Mauritius' location in the
Indian Ocean space recovery area
is a useful bargaining point.
Although Mauritius recognized
both the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China at independence
last March, official Mauritian
contacts with Communist countries
so far have been limited. The
Soviets, however, are planning
to open an embassy on Mauritius
in January 1969.1
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MALI'S NEW LEADERS MOVE TO REDUCE COMMUNIST TIES
Mali's new moderate leader-
ship has indicated in both its
actions and policy statements
that it hopes to reduce Mali's
dependence on Communist coun-
tries and to form closer ties
with the West, which it hopes
will underwrite its liberalized
economic program.
The provisional government
has pledged to seek a nonalign-
ment that "would not be, as in
the past, a facade which under
cover of so-called ideological
affinities had almost enslaved
Mali to a bloc." Since the army
coup that unseated the radical
regime of Modibo Keita, Commu-
nist aid and diplomatic person-
nel have been under military
surveillance and, in some in-
stances, have been restricted.
Possibly as a result, a number
of Chinese Communists have al-
ready left the country. The
government has also ordered that
publications of foreign embas-
SECRET
sies in Bamako be submitted to
the Ministry of Information, a
measure apparently designed
primarily to permit government
control of the previously exten-
sive Communist propaganda ef-
forts in Mali.
The pace and degree of Mali's
reduction of its ties with Commu-
nist countries will probably depend
in part on the success of two aid
missions, one that left for France
this week and another that report-
edly will go to the International
Monetary Fund in the next few weeks.
A French aid official has stated
that France probably will agree to
grant all assistance originally pro-
grammed within the 1967 Franco-Ma-
lian accords and will discuss over-
all assistance for 1969 during the
visit. Although France undoubtedly
will attempt to increase its assist- 25X1
ance to the new government, it prob-
ably will be hampered b its own
economic difficulties.
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The uncertain outcome of Sunday's national elections in Venezuela, has
given rise to suspicion of voting irregularities and the possibility of demon-
strations. Security forces are on full alert to cope with any disturbances. As
of 5 December, Rafael Caldera of the Christian Democratic Party held a slim
lead over his nearest rival, Gonzalo Barrios of the government's Democratic
Action Party, in the race for the presidency.
Brazilian President Costa e Silva is having his troubles with Congress
and the Catholic Church. The government wants Congress to lift the im-
munity of an opposition deputy so that he may be prosecuted for a speech
criticizing the government and its military backers. The government's pres-
sure tactics have angered Congress and it may not grant permission. The
President would then be forced to take more drastic action to satisfy
military leaders. Costa e Silva's troubles with the church stem from the
recent arrest of several priests. The military regards the church's defense of
these priests as an open challenge, and many military officers would like to
see the government crack down on "subversion" in the church.
Government pressure, strikebreakers, and hunger broke the back of the
oil-workers' strike in Argentina last week. Workers began to drift back to the
oil fields, and the threat of an extended strike vanished, indicating that
organized labor still cannot threaten the Ongania government.
Ecuador's President, Jose Maria Velasco, is finding it as difficult to rule
Ecuador today as it was during his four previous administrations-only one
of which he completed. Early this week, Velasco reorganized his cabinet
under pressure from various interest groups dissatisfied with certain minis-
ters. Velasco dropped some of the more objectionable ones and added others
who appear more palatable.
Chilean students and police have clashed several times in the past two
weeks, most recently on 2 December when students in Santiago fought with
police after a march was dispersed. The students have been on strike since 19
November to protest the government's reduction of financial aid to the
university.
Former Dominican president Juan Bosch, in his usual highly personal
style, is apparently attempting to lead his Dominican Revolutionary Party in
a more radical direction. Bosch has reportedly urged that the party's leader-
ship be turned over to its Communist-influenced youth wing, and recently
threatened to resign as a means of persuading the party to accept his views.
One party leader is said to view the "resignation" as a publicity stunt.
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PANAMA'S NATIONAL GUARD SKIRMISHES L:ITH INSURGENTS
Sporadic violence flared
in the remote mountainous area
of Panama bordering Costa Rica
this week as small groups of pro-
Arias exile infiltrators clashed
with National Guard patrols.
Two guardsmen and a number
of insurgents were killed or
wounded, and guard units were
reinforced to crush the opposi-
tion to the junta. One exile
leader was murdered on 30 Novem-
ber in a small Costa Rican border
town and his body carried back
into Panama.
The incident set off a
clamor of public and official
attention in Costa Rica that
led Minister of Public Security
Trejos to take measures to close
the border--a move that is un-
likely to prove entirely effec-
ousted president Arias may leave
Washington for Costa Rica or some
other place closer to Panama, or
tive. Trejos said that exiles
who abused their asylee status
would be deported promptly, and
that use of Costa Rican terri-
tory as a base for "armed adven-
tures" would not be permitted.
Some Panamanians have already
been detained and an investiga-
tion of the "frontier incidents"
is under way.
Chief of Staff Martinez--
one of the leaders of the 11 Oc-
tober coup and a major power in
the provisional government--has 25X1
taken personal command of counter-
insurgency operations in the bor-
der area.
possibly make his way back into
his own country. His presence
in Panama probably would rally
his supporters but would not be
likely to improve significantly
his chances of overthrowing the
government.
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VENEZUELAN PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST NOT YET DECIDED
The outcome of Venezuela's
presidential election on 1 De-
cember is still in question. As
of 5 December, with only 77 per-
cent of the vote counted, Chris-
tian Democrat Rafael Caldera was
slightly ahead of Gonzalo Barrios,
the candidate of the governing
Democratic Action Party. Miguel
Angel Burelli Rivas, a coalition
candidate supported by three
minor parties, was running a
strong third. Luis Prieto,
whose leftist support was a
major campaign issue, was far
behind.
The closeness of the con-
test and the slowness of the
tally gave rise to impatience
among the voters and to some
nervousness in Caldera's party,
where it is feared that electoral
fraud is afoot and that Caldera
will be cheated of the presi-
dency. Although the counting
is actually no slower than in
1963, Caldera has demanded an
investigation of the delay and
has intimated that fraud could
lead to protest demonstrations.
The government has attempted
with some success to assure the
country that a slow count is nec-
essary to ensure accuracy and fair-
ness, and that the government will
be turned over peacefully to the
winner. It has also prohibited the
issuance of unofficial returns,
which had been misleading and con-
flicting, and asked Caldera not to
make inflammatory statements.
Attempts by dissident Com-
munist groups to disrupt the
elections were unsuccessful.
Only a few minor incidents took
place throughout the country.
At the same time, participation
by the orthodox Communist Party
in the elections was a disaster.
The party's electoral front won
only about three percent of the
votes.
On the other hand, the Na-
tional Civic Crusade, the party
of former dictator Marcos Perez
Jimenez, did well. Perez was
elected to the Senate and his
party may turn out to be the
fourth strongest in the country.
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MEXICAN STUDENT STRIKE APPARENTLY WANING
The four-month-old student
strike in Mexico appears nearly
over despite hard-line attempts
to continue the dispute with the
government.
The National Student Strike
Council (CNH) voted on 20 No-
vember to end the strike, and
formal decisions by the indivi-
dual school assemblies may soon
follow. Rising student attend-
ance, especially at the National
University, preceded the deci-
sion and reflected student con-
cern over the impending loss of
a year's credit. The knowledge
that the government was prepared
to take drastic action, includ-
ing closing all universities,
may also have played a part in
the decision. Recent presiden-
tial actions suggest the govern-
ment was lining up support for
a decisive stand.
Some of the more radical
student groups, especially at
the National Polytechnic Insti-
tute (IPN), the nation's second
largest school, disagree with
what appears to be the general
sentiment for a return. "Shock
groups," armed with machetes,
broke up an attempted meeting
at the National University law
school on 2 December. Other ex-
tremist efforts to continue the
strike included an attack on 27
November on students who had re-
turned to class. The attack
left one dead and two seriously
wounded. This week, students
clashed with Mexico City bus
drivers over a slight fare rise.
Such incidents have provoked
general criticism, however, in
contrast to earlier public
sympathy for the students' cause,
and any further violence is un-
likely to be coordinated or wide-
spread.
Radicals may desert the
CNH--some groups at IPN are
planning to form a National Fight
Council--but barring a major
incident that could rekindle
tempers on both sides, most
students will probabl report
back by next week.
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COLOMBIAN POLITICAL CRISIS LEAVES BITTER AFTERMATH
The latest Colombian politi-
cal crisis has been resolved, but
it has seriously strained the Na-
tional Front coalition formed in
1958 by the Liberal and Conserva-
tive parties to end prolonged
political violence. These strains
may hamstring the effectiveness
of the Front in its remaining six
years.
President Lleras has become
increasingly frustrated over the
combination of lethargy and self-
interest that has stalemated his
efforts to get legislation con-
firming the economic and political
reforms he has begun. Many of
the reforms were instituted by
decree under a state of siege,
which Lleras wants to end on 17
December as a major step in re-
storing political normalcy. To
force action on his constitu-
tional reform bill, Lleras had
proffered his resignation in June
and has reorganized his Conser-
vative-Liberal cabinet twice in
recent months. Each time he won
his point by some compromise and
with support from Conservatives,
but at the expense of increasing
irritation with his methods, par-
ticularly within his own Liberal
Party.
The latest dispute concerned
a new apportionment formula for
the postcoalition legislature to
be elected in l?74. The Conser-
vatives, led by ex-pre-,ident
Mariano Ospina, rejec.,d the
formula as favoring th_ Liberals.
President Lleras then demanded
the resignation of the cabinet,
with the implied threat that in
order to organize an effective
government he might seek beyond
the Ospinista Conservatives for
political allies.
It is not clear why Lleras
felt compelled to provoke a crisis
over an issue that could have been
resolved by closer contact with
Ospina. The aging former presi-
dent is judging events in the
light of the choice of a president
for 1970, when it is the Conser-
vatives' turn, and probably re-
sented the role of Interior Minis-
ter Noriega, an ambitious Conser-
vative, in working out the appor-
tionment formula with Lleras.
For the present, the issue
has been resolved. Passage of the
legislation by 16 December seems
assured, according to US officials
in Bogota, and a cabinet shake-up
has been averted. The four days
of tension and impasse, however,
have evoked old Conservative-Lib-
eral enmities that could seriously
affect the bipartisan system in
its critical remaining six years.
Lleras' programs for Colombia are
some of the best-conceived in Latin
America and his impatience over
obstructionism doubtless is justi-
fied. His political tactics, though,
are becoming counterproductive. The
followers of ex-dictator Rojas
Pinilla, now a declared presiden-
tial candidate for 1970, probably
profited by the latest clash, and
there are increasing signs that
extremists in labor and student
groups are playing on resentment
of Lleras' high-handed methods to
strengthen their influence. =1
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REFORM TREND NOTED IN LATIN AMERICAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
During the three months since
the Pope's visit to Latin America
and the bishops' conference at
Medellin, there has been a per-
ceptible change of attitude on
the part of many clergymen toward
reform and the formulation of
rudimentary guidelines to imple-
ment reform policies. Although
no spectacular change will take
place immediately, most Latin
American clergymen appear to be
finally convinced that the church
must take an active role in the
social reform movement in order
to be a viable force in the fu-
ture.
The conference's final docu-
ment pledged a firm commitment
to radical economic, social, and
political change in the hemisphere.
The church's role in this move-
ment, as stated by the bishops,
is to function as a catalyst, but
not as a direct agent. In the
future, therefore, it can be ex-
pected that the church will give
more support to student and labor
groups. Moreover, new impetus
will probably be given to Chris-
tian Democratic labor and politi-
cal ideals.
Another emerging tendency,
closely tied to the Latin Ameri-
can reform movement, is a pro-
nounced trend toward independence
from Rome. The conference dele-
gates endorsed the Pope's stand
against violence of any kind. On
the other hand, they stressed the
positive aspect of "active non-
violence"--"Peace has to be worked
for." Moreover, the conference's
final document admitted that vio-
lence was justified in cases of
"evident and prolonged tyranny
or the maintenance of obviously
unjust and tenaciously defended
structures." In the Latin Ameri-
can context, this statement eras
clearly aimed at reactionary gov-
ernments that maintain an unfair
distribution of wealth and con-
centrate political power in a
small nucleus.
The final conference docu-
ment on family planning was also
a marked departure from the papal
encyclical Humanae Vitae. In
hemispheric terms, mentioned
the existence of underpopulation
in certain countries, but it also
stressed the presence of a demo-
graphic problem and announced a
campaign for responsible parent-
hood. The conference's attitude
toward violence and birth control
makes it clear that while the
Latin American bishops will ac-
cept papal authority in principle,
they may seek to develop a cer-
tain independence.
At the present time, it is
difficult to see how the confer-
ence's principles and guidelines
will be translated into action.
Brazilian Archbishop Dom Helder
Camara's campaign for "active
nonviolence," called "Action,
Justice, and Peace," may be a
beginning. What is clear, how-
ever, is that the majority of
Latin American clergymen appear
to be finally convinced of the
necessity for change within both
the church's organization and the
hemisphere's social structure.
Moreover, most appear to be opti-
mistic about the ability of the
church to play an important role
in the future development of
Latin America.
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GUYANA'S PRIME MINISTER WORKING FOR ELECTION MAJORITY
The prospects for Guyana's
Prime Minister Burnham to be re-
turned to office with a clear
majority are improving. He is
making an all-out effort to gain
the necessary votes on 16 Decem-
ber and has become increasingly
reluctant to form another coali-
tion with conservative Peter
D'Aguiar's United Force.
Burnham is basing his elec-
toral strategy on obtaining the
lion's share of overseas votes,
most of which will be cast by
Negroes. He also plans to break
up the past voting pattern, which
has been almost entirely on ra-
cial lines--the Negroes supported
Burnham and the East Indians
backed pro-Communist opposition
leader Cheddi Jagan.
Major aid projects in sec-
tors of the economy dominated by
East Indians have been announced
recently. In addition, Burnham
disclosed last week that Jagan
has been clandestinely involved
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with Castro-Communist extremists
in Venezuela. Although it is
doubtful that the East Indians
will actually abandon Jagan,
Burnham strategists are convinced
that it would not be overly sur-
prising were the election results
to show that Burnham had cut into
Jagan's support. The Venezuelan
affair, in particular, will en-
able Burnham to counter any post-
election charges of vote-rigging
with the claim that East Indians,
revolted by such "treachery,"
deserted Jagan in substantial
numbers.
There is still a slight
possibility that Burnham's plans
will miscarry and that he will
fail to produce a majority. If
this occurs, and he still refuses
to enter another coalition with
the United Force, he may try to
form a minority government, de-
pending on support from border-
line opposition legislators on
each important issue.
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