WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006700080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 22, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
- 50.
22 November 1968
No. 0048/68
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EST, 21 November 1968)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
Limited military initiatives in the Demilitarized
Zone area and against municipalities appear designed
to probe the limits of the US-Hanoi "understanding"
which led to the bombing halt, to exacerbate US-
Saigon differences, and to heighten Saigon's appre-
hensions about US intentions. During the lull in
the Paris talks, Hanoi is concentrating on enhancing
the status of the Liberation Front and on denigrat-
ing the Saigon government.
THAI GOVERNMENT'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN DISORGANIZED
The Thanom regime continues to have trouble getting
organized to campaign for next February's legisla-
tive elections.
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STRUGGLE ON POLICY ISSUES CONTINUES IN CHINA
The recent central committee plenum--the first in
over two years--has not resolved and may have exac-
erbated debate on a variety of key policy issues.
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Europe
THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
An air of unanimity dominated the closing sessions
of the ministerial conference but, despite the gen-
erally approved language of the communique, sizable
differences remain over the future role of the al-
liance.
ICELAND TAKES STEPS TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC CRISIS
Iceland's government has taken a number of drastic
measures, including a sharp devaluation of the
krona, the institution of strict price controls,
and a ceiling on wage increases.
CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS MOVE TO THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD
A newly created eight-member Executive Committee of
the Presidium has taken over the authority of the
traditional leaders, and its moderate majority will
keep liberals and conservatives in check.
POLISH PARTY CONCEDES MODEST GAINS TO NEW GENERATION
The party's fifth congress has endorsed a new fac-
tional balance under Gomulka's leadership, giving
significant, but not decisive power to a rising
generation of hardliners.
ITALIAN AND FRENCH COMMUNISTS FACE SOVIET PRESSURE
The Italian and French Communist parties continue
to be under considerable pressure from Moscow to
bring their views concerning Czechoslovakia and a
rescheduling of a world Communist conference into
line with those of the Soviets.
SOVIET AID ACTIVITY TO INCREASE IN ALGERIA
The tempo of Soviet activity in Algeria probably
will accelerate in the coming months. A Soviet
delegation now in Algiers is working out the final
details of an economic arrangement and negotiations
for a new arms pact between the countries may have
been held last month.
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Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
JUNIOR ARMY OFFICERS OVERTHROW KEITA REGIME IN MALI
The junior army officers who overthrew the radical
regime of President Modibo Keita on Tuesday appear
to be firmly in control, at least for the present.
They have formed a provisional military government
council and have lined up the support of most up-
country army garrisons.
RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS STALEMATED
The latest round of British-Rhodesian talks on terms
for Rhodesian independence ended without a solution
and it is unclear when discussion might resume, or
at what level.
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PARLIAMENTARY BY-ELECTIONS SPARK VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE 24
Heated politicking in parliamentary by-elections
has sparked violent clashes, forcing Prime. Minister
Siaka Stevens to declare a nationwide state of emer-
gency.
Western Hemisphere
VENEZUELA SEIZES A CUBAN FISHING TRAWLER
The seizure of the Alecrin appears to be a move to
prevent Cuba's fishing fleet from being involved in
infiltrating agents and guerrillas into Venezuela.
CUBA EXPANDS ITS FISHING INDUSTRY
Cuba has started an extensive expansion program to
enlarge its fishing fleet in order to develop a new
source of foreign exchange, but the expansion also
has implications for potential subversive activity.
VENEZUELAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL DAYS
The campaign in Venezuela for the elections on 1
December is drawing to a close amid tightened secu-
rity precautions and a spurt of activity by the
four presidential candidates.
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The current limited upsurge of Communist activity in South Vietnam
seems largely tailored for political effect. Carefully calibrated by Hanoi, the
renewed action serves Communist purposes by probing for the limits of the
bombing halt "understanding," fanning US - South Vietnamese differences,
heightening Saigon's apprehensions about US and Communist intentions,
and reminding all concerned of the Vietnamese Communists' continued
military capabilities.
Military action which the Communists conceive to be below the thre -
old of a m'or US res once is likel to continue.
some o is planning may have been stimulated by the Communist leader-
ship mainly for morale purposes, extensive small-scale activity in support of
the Communists' efforts to extend their network of village-level admin-
istrative committees almost certainly is in prospect.
The extent to which this kind of activity is supplemented by mortar
and rocket spectaculars and large-unit attacks will depend on Hanoi's con-
tinuing assessment of a number of political variables, including trends in the
Paris talks.
In China, the central committee plenum last month apparently did little
to resolve divisions in the leadership on many key policy issues. Continuing
debate on these matters, especially on the touchy question of rebuilding the
shattered party apparatus, may again force postponement of the party
congress called for in the plenum communique. Maoist radicals, apparently
trying to delay a congress which might be dominated by the moderates, are
warning of the dangers of allowing experienced party cadres to dominate the 25X1
new party structure and have made thinly veiled demands for a continued
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VIETNAM
Recent Communist military
activity in South Vietnam seems
tailored largely for political
effect. Limited military initia-
tives in the Demilitarized Zone
area and against South Vietnam-
ese cities, towns and administra-
tive centers, probably were con-
ducted under close supervision
from Hanoi. The incidents, ap-
parently intended to probe the
limits of the US-Hanoi "under-
standing" which led to the bomb-
ing halt, are likely to continue.
The Communists doubtless also
calculate that this measured ac-
tivity will exacerbate US-Saigon
differences and heighten Saigon's
apprehensions about US and Commu-
nist intentions.
The Communists parried US
objections to their military ac-
tivity by insisting that the
bombing halt was "unconditional"
and that unrestricted operations
will continue in the South. North
Vietnam's Foreign Ministry as-
serted on 16 November than Hanoi
has "always respected" the De-
militarized Zone and charged the
US with launching attacks there
since 1 November. Ha Van Lau
told a French magazine that any
Communist actions in the Demili-
tarized Zone area were being car-
ried out by "patriotic forces of
the South." Like Hanoi's propa-
ganda, Lau asserted that the Com-
munists were free to operate any-
where in South Vietnam to counter
"US imperialist aggression."
The Vietnamese Communists
seem ready for the next phase
of the Paris talks. Politburo
member and chief Hanoi negotiator
Le Duc Tho is on his way back to
Paris, presumably with a set of
new instructions following month-
long consultations in Hanoi and
stopovers in Peking and Moscow.
Despite the fact that the
Communists have taken a tough
public stance on all issues since
the bombing halt, they have not
raised new conditions for moving
on in Paris. For the moment,
Hanoi is attributing the stale-
mate to Saigon's recalcitrance,
but the stage has been set for
a prolonged procedural hassle
should the Communists insist
that the Liberation Front dele-
gation be treated as an independ-
ent and equal entity.
During the past week the
Communists increased their ef-
forts to enhance the status of
the Liberation Front at the ex-
pense of the Saigon government.
Liberation Front and Hanoi spokes-
men in Paris frequently met with
the press to further these ends.
Madame Binh played the part of
a full-fledged member of the
diplomatic community by making
"courtesy calls" on several for-
eign embassies and the French
Foreign Ministry. Vietnamese
Communist diplomats elsewhere
were similarly active in spread-
ing the current line.
Military Developments
In South Vietnam
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were generally light. Communist
tactics in the Da Nang area al-
legedly call for local force ele-
ments to lead off with shellings
and localized attacks; main force
units, including the North Viet-
namese 2nd Division, would be com-
mitted if the opening phase is
successful.
The Communists will probably
continue to stress economy-of-
force tactics together with well-
planned but limited large-scale
actions in key sectors of the
country. By such tactics, the
enemy would hope to show some
degree of military initiative in
order to maintain their aura of
strength. The major emphasis
during the week was along the
coastal flatlands of Quang Nam
and Quang Tin provinces, with
emphasis on military installa-
tions near the city of Da Nang.
It is not clear whether the
two multibattalion attacks launched
late last week in northeastern
Tay Ninh Province were intended
the current dis-
position of many enemy main force
units suggests that only very
limited action could be mounted
on a large-scale, country-wide
basis unless a major reshuffling
of units takes place. This would
involve the redeployment of many
combat forces presently out of
country, in border sanctuaries,
and in remote areas.
The Communist rocket and
mortar attacks on allied instal-
lations at Da Nang early this
week were coupled with an in-
crease in terrorism and harass-
ment within the city and sharp
skirmishes in the surrounding
areas. Allied casualties and
damage inflicted by these actions
1
CAMBODIA
PHNOM
PENH
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SOUTH VIETNAM
'.aO 100
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as the beginning of a new offen-
sive drive in northern III Corps
in coordination with the renewed
fighting in southern I Corps or
were merely localized affairs re-
flecting enemy sensitivity to
aggressive allied operations near
Political Developments
In South Vietnam
The Saigon leadership ap-
pears to be moving toward resolv-
ing its differences with the US
on terms for South Vietnamese
participation in the Paris talks.
Meanwhile, the government
is continuing its country-wide
indoctrination and propaganda
campaign to exploit and nurture
the upswelling of support that
followed President Thieu's speech
on 2 November. This campaign
seems designed to head off pos-
sible adverse reactions to a gov-
ernment announcement that it will
join the talks and, in the longer
term, to bolster anti-Communist
forces for future struggle during
protracted negotiations.
Support remains strong for
the government's refusal to deal
with the Liberation Front as a
co-equal partner in the talks, al-
though the militant Buddhists are
taking a neutral position regard-
ing the Front. Some criticism of
Thieu's stand has developed, how-
ever. A group of 14 Senate lead-
ers have sent a signed appeal to
Thieu urging him to reach a commor,
position with the US regarding
the talks.
Some of the criticism is
probably motivated by political
opportunism. Renewed attacks
from such elements as the Revolu- 25X1.
tionary Dai Viet party and from
northern Catholics seem intended
mainly to capitalize on the
President's difficulties in find-
ing a way to enter the Paris talks
without great loss of face.
Vice President Ky, who has
strongly supported Thieu on this
issue, apparently hopes to take
advantage of Thieu's need for
solid national support to return
some members of his team to key
positions. Rumors are circulat-
ing once again that Prime Min-
ister Huong, Information Minister
Thien, and Foreign Minister Thanh,
none of whom is close to Ky, may
soon be replaced.
Ironically, during recent
weeks, when the government has
been receiving more public sup-
port than at any time since the
overthrow of President Diem, 13
publications have been suspended,
mostly on charges of failing to
uphold the national position.
This new intolerance of public
criticism suggests that Thieu and
his colleagues are more nervous
about the possible political re-
percussions of the present crisis
than their outward confidence
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THAI GOVERNMENTS ELECTION CAMPAIGN DISORGANIZED
The Thanom regime continues
to have trouble getting organized
to campaign for next February's
legislative elections.
The initial session of the
government's Saha Pracha Thai
party failed to live up to the
expectations of government lead-
ers. The meeting in Bangkok was
designed to generate enthusiasm
among the party's rank and file
and to move ahead with organiza-
tional details, but was marked
instead by factional quarrels and
heated attacks on the high-handed
tactics of government spokesmen.
Most of the protests came
from politicians close to Deputy
Prime Minister Praphat. Brought
into the government party via
the Praphat-organized Free Peo-
ple's League, these men may be-
lieve they had certain assurances
about their role in the govern-
ment party that are now being
circumvented by the party's
organizers. Their protests ap-
parently were similar to those
they made earlier about not being
consulted on such fundamental
issues as party membership and
campaign tactics. Conciliatory
gestures by Prime Minister Thanom
and other government leaders
during the meeting have so far
forestalled an open split, but
their differences obviously have
their differences obviously have
not been reconciled.
Dissatisfaction among the
rank and file has come at a time
when party leaders have only be-
gun to smooth over their own dif-
ferences about party policies.
One government official claims
that the factions are still work-
ing at cross-purposes in recruit-
ing members and potential candi-
dates for the government party.
It seems likely that Pra-
phat's rival, Prime Minister
Thanom, who has been criticized
for his leadership deficiencies,
has lost some ground in the cur-
rent situation. Thanom was un-
usually caustic in discussing
his political woes during a re-
cent press conference in Bangkok.
He made it clear that he has
little appetite for the give-and-
take of party politics.
The campaign itself is off
to a fairly slow start. Much
of the activity thus far has
centered in the northeast, where
antigovernment sentiment is
strongest. Leftist splinter
parties, which hope to deny the
government a clear majority in
the legislature, have held rallies
in a number of the region's larger
towns. The government party's
efforts have been desultory so
far.
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STRUGGLE ON POLICY ISSUES CONTINUES IN CHINA
The recent central committee
plenum--the first in over two
years--has not resolved and may
have exacerbated debate on a va-
riety of key policy issues. Many
of these issues have been sources
of friction throughout the Cultural
Revolution.
Perhaps the most important
issue is the touchy question of
rebuilding the shattered party
apparatus. Radical voices in
the leadership appear to be en-
gaged in a polemic with forces
working toward stabilization.
They have been expressing them-
selves through Shanghai newspapers
which have frequently served as
an outlet for the views of Maoist
radicals in Peking. Since Septem-
ber, Shanghai media have been un-
derscoring the radical position.
By contrast, the Peking press has
been taking an ambiguous line.
This difference in emphasis be-
came more evident while the plenum
was meeting in secret in October.
Ignoring some points and stressing
others, the Shanghai media ex-
panded on official Peking edi-
torials to warn of the dangers
of allowing experienced party
cadres to dominate the new party
structure.
The plenum clearly failed
to end the debate. Two weeks
after the. final plenum communique
was issued, a Shanghai newspaper
went far beyond Peking commentary
in demanding a new purge of party
officials, making it clear that
it had in mind individuals who
still held important posts. The
editorial accused these unnamed
individuals of using their posi-
tions to exclude "rebels" from
influential posts in the nascent
party organization and of pro-
tecting old colleagues who have
been "proved" guilty of political
crimes.
Provincial congresses of
party members are meeting now
to study a draft charter for the
new party organization, produced
by the plenum, in preparation
for the long-postponed Ninth
Party Congress. As if sensing
that this congress may be stacked
against the "radicals," one re-
cent Shanghai editorial went to
the extraordinary length of in-
sisting that party members "have
the right to go over the heads
of their superiors to report to
the central authorities and the
Chairman." Division on this is-
sue runs very deep. Commenting
on the problem
Foreign Minister Chen Yi
recently remarked that continued
disagreements could again force
postponement of the party con-
gress.
Other divisive issues, de-
riving from the Maoist drive to-
ward a greater degree of social
equalitarianism, which was par-
tially frustrated in the years
immediately preceding the Cul-
tural Revolution, also appear to
be surfacing. Several social
and political experiments rem-
iniscent of the mid-1960s are
being introduced selectively and
in very tentative fashion. The
more extreme experiments have not
yet been mentioned in the official
press.
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25X1
25X1
25X1
A drive to "simplify admin-
istration," involving the whole-
sale displacement of administra-
tive personnel and a segment of
the urban work forces is now in
full swing. Large numbers of
people are being sent to the
countryside on what is intended
to be a semipermanent basis to
work in agriculture
caused severe dislocations in
administrative work, and leader-
ship elements intent on restor-
ing order in China can be expected
to drag their feet.
At the same time innovations
are being introduced in the edu-
cational field. State-run pri-
mary schools in the countryside,
formerly attended mainly by chil-
dren of local cadres, are being
abandoned in favor of schools
run and paid for by local com-
mune farm brigades; the new
schools presumably will be more
egalitarian.
These efforts have received
official sanction, but in south
and east China individual com-
munes are announcing plans--ap-
parently hastily prepared--to
confiscate or reduce peasant's
private plots, and abandon or
modify the work-point system--
the present basis of payment for
nonsalaried work throughout the
country.
These reports may be related
to another drive involving a whole-
sale re-examination and reclass-
ification of individual's offi-
cial "social classification"--
landlord, rich peasant, poor
peasant, and so forth--which is
now under way in Kwangtung and
perhaps other provinces in east
and south China. Because job
assignments, privileges, and of-
ficial attitudes toward indivi-
duals depend largely on such
classifications, this drive has
been causing considerable anx-
iety wherever it has been imple-
mented.
Some land unofficially ac-
quired by peasants when controls
were relaxed during Cultural Rev-
olution confusion may be re-
claimed by commune authorities,
and the work-point accounting
tem may be modified "to reduce
inequities." There is no sign,
however, that a thorough revamp-
ing along these lines, modifying
rural institutions introduced af-
ter the Great Leap Forward failed,
is contemplated. Such measures
would almost certainly meet
fierce resistance on the part
of both the general population
and much of the entrenched bu-
reaucracy.
The new experiments, sha-
dowy as they are, bear a strong
family resemblance to those
measures introduced in the pe-
riod just preceding the Cultural
Revolution, and are probably mo-
tivated by social, rather than
economic, considerations. Mao-
ist radicals have claimed that
the earlier measures were vi-
tiated by entrenched officials
intent on protecting their own
positions and privileges, and
the present measures, even if
formally adopted, are likely to
meet a similar fate.
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During the past week two important Communist party meetings in
Eastern Europe provided insight into the possible future course of political
developments in the Communist world. In general, a harder ideological line
and tightening of domestic policies seem likely.
The Czechoslovak party's central committee plenary meeting estab-
lished a new eight-man party executive body, carefully balanced politically
so that neither liberals nor conservatives would have excessive influence.
Conservative Lubomir Strougal, who was appointed to the new body and to
several other top posts, now appears to be Dubcek's leading rival.
The Polish party congress re-elected Gomulka as first secretary but also
altered the factional balance in the party. As a consequence, the rising
generation of tough, pragmatic, and nationalistic party officials will have a
greater but not immediately decisive influence on party policy. Stagnation
and indecision are coming to an end in Poland, though the new men will, for
a time, have to work under old policy guidelines.
Meanwhile, the representatives of more than 60 Communist parties
gathered in Budapest to discuss rescheduling the world conference of Com-
munist parties. The talks are part of the continuing struggle between
Moscow, which seeks to enforce discipline in the movement, and the more
important of the West European parties, which do not wish to be sub-
servient. The Soviets have exerted considerable pressure and probably will be
satisfied with a world conference in Moscow in the spring.
The international financial crisis bordered on chaos during the week, as
massive speculation against the French franc and in favor of the Deutsche
mark forced the closing of almost all the important foreign exchange
markets of Western Europe. The Basel meeting last weekend of the West's
important central bankers-aimed at producing some agreement between
Bonn and Paris on how to alter their exchange rate parities-failed dismally.
The problem is now being discussed by the finance ministers and central
bank chiefs of the Group of Ten countries amid continuing disagree-
ment
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THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
Against the background of
the Czechoslovak crisis, the
NATO ministerial conference in
Brussels last week seems to have
generated a renewed sense of
solidarity among the allies, but
the long-range results will prob-
ably fall short of the high prom-
ise of the communique.
All 15 members supported
statements warning the Soviets
against other threatening ac-
tions not only in Europe and
the Mediterranean but also in
the so-called "gray areas" on
NATO's periphery--implicitly
Austria, Yugoslavia and perhaps
even Rumania. Moreover, 14 en-
dorsed continuation of the al-
liance for "an indefinite pe-
riod." France, in an ostensibly
"concurring opinion," accepted
NATO's retention for only "as
long as it appears necessary."
Despite these surface agree-
ments, however, significant dif-
ferences on the nature of the
Soviet threat must still be rec-
onciled. The French, Danes,
Norwegians and Canadians, all
anxious to resume detente, con-
tinue to believe the Soviet threat
is only temporary and will be
reduced once Soviet troops leave
Czechoslovakia. West Germany,
Britain and the Mediterranean
allies are much less optimistic.
They view the new Soviet doc-
trine of intervention as a per-
manent threat if only because
of the increased uncertainty.
To the satisfaction of this
more pessimistic group, the com-
munique's clear warning to the
USSR was couched in firm lan-
guage and extended to cover the
Mediterranean as well as Western
Europe. The French view prevailed,
however, in the preparation of the
statement covering the peripheral
areas. This was watered down to
suggest only that the allies would
not remain indifferent to further
Soviet actions there.
In preministerial discussions
Paris had opposed making a pledge
to continue the alliance beyond
its twentieth anniversary next
year. Canada and Portugal joined
the French, claiming that any
explicit commitment would create
constitutional problems. A final
compromise was adopted only be-
cause it did not firmly commit the
allies to remain in NATO after
the option comes up for review
next year.
Most of the European allies
offered to do more for the common
defense. Not until NATO's new
five-year plan is completed in
January, however, will it be clear
whether they will meet their com-
mitments.
They also seem to have rec-
ognized that Europe can continue to
count on American support only by
doing more for and by itself. Ac-
cordingly, during the course of the
week the British reached agreement
with West Germany and several other
European allies on the need for
joint consultations on defense mat-
ters. It will be difficult, how-
ever, to make such an accord mean-
ingful so long as Bonn remains re-
luctant to become involved in any-
thing that might split the alliance
and offend President de Gaulle.
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ICELAND TAKES STEPS TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC CRISIS
Iceland's worst economic
crisis in this century has re-
quired the government to take a
number of drastic measures at
the risk of political and labor
turmoil.
On 11 November, the govern-
ment announced a 35.2-percent
devaluation of the krona, the
second within a year. The ob-
jective was to reduce the high
domestic costs of the fishing
and fish products industries.
These industries account for 92
percent of Iceland's exports and
20 percent of its gross national
product. The fishing and fish
products industries have been
suffering from a sharp drop in
the size of the herring catch,
a decline in world prices, and
the loss of some traditional
markets.
To hold down inflation re-
sulting from devaluation, the
government is enforcing strict
price controls and is urging
labor to forgo wage increases
for the duration of the crisis.
After last year's devaluation,
the trade unions demanded wage
increases to match the initial
price increases and called a gen-
eral strike to back up their de-
mands. Facing increased unemploy-
ment resulting from cutbacks in
the fishing industry and possible
closures of economically marginal
industries, Iceland's trade unions
are not inclined to cooperate in
stabilization measures at their
expense.
If a general strike takes
place, the government--a coali-
tion of the conservative Independ-
ence Party and the Social Demo-
cratic Party--would probably have
to resign and call new parlia-
mentary elections. The govern-
ment tried to get the support of
the opposition parties--the
agrarian Progressives and the Com-
munist-dominated Labor Alliance--
in a natonal coalition, but they
refused to share responsibility
for the nation's economic disar-
ray. The government hopes that
it can stay in power at least
until next spring, the earliest
time at which elections might
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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS MOVE TO THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD
The Czechoslovak Communist
Party's collective leadership
has taken on a centrist politi-
cal coloration which will lessen
the influence of both the lib-
eral and conservative factions.
Party first secretary Dub-
cek, President Svoboda, Premier
Cernik, and National Assembly
President Smrkovsky all retained
their posts after a stormy cen-
tral committee plenum between
14-17 November. Their collec-
tive authority has been diluted,
however, by the creation of a
new eight-member Executive Com-
mittee of the Presidium. This
new "inner group"--in which real
power resides--is charged with
settling urgent political prob-
lems. Its majority of moderates
will prevent either the liberals
or conservatives from seizing
control of the party.
Dubcek now appears to have
a potential rival in conserva-
tive Lubomir Strougal, who was
installed in four top party posi-
tions. Once a personal friend
of former party boss Novotny,
Strougal is a pragmatic Commu-
nist without scruples who has
bent with the Soviet wind and
has apparently gained Moscow's
support. If the Russians main-
tain their heavy pressure on
Prague, Strougal is in a good
position ultimately to challenge.
Dubcek for the party leadership.
In addition to his eleva-
tion to the presidium's execu-
tive committee where he will
represent conservative inter-
ests, Strougal was also desig-
nated chief of the new party
bureau for the Czech lands. This
bureau has broad powers to or-
ganize a Czech party, parallel-
ing the Slovak party organiza-
tion.
The conservatives made sub-
stantial gains during the plenum.
The increase in the number of
party secretaries from three to
eight brought conservatives into
a position where they can in-
fluence policy. In addition,
the bureau of the Czech lands,
which the liberals had hoped to
use as a base of operations, now
appears to be dominated by con-
servatives and moderates. One
of the most significant person-
nel changes was the resignation
of Zdenek Mlynar, a prominent
liberal, from the party presid-
ium and secretariat.
Czechoslovak students staged
nonviolent demonstrations through-
out the week in support of Dubcek
and the reform program. They
were supported by some workers
and the majority of journalists.
Some factory workers conducted
15-minute sympathy strikes. The
railway workers threatened that
if the authorities took action
against the students, not one
train would move out of Prague.
Czechoslovak leaders pleaded
all week for an end to the sit-
ins, and by 21 November there
were indications that students
were ready to return to class.
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CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY (KSC)
* Cernik, Oldrich
* Dubcek, Alexander
* Erban, Evzen
* Husak, Gustav
* Saclovsky, Stefan
* Smrkovsky, Josef
* Svoboda, Ludvik
* Strougal, Lubomir
MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDIUM
Bilak, Vasil
Kabrna, Vladimir
Slavik, Vaclav
Cernik, Oldrich
Neubert, Vaclav
Smrkovsky, Josef
Dubcek, Alexander
Piller, Jan
Spacek, Josef
Erban, Evzen
Pinkava, Josef
*Strougal, Lubomir
Hettes, Jarolim
Sadovsky, Stefan
Svoboda, Ludvik (Honorary)
Hrdinova, Libuse
Simecek, Vaclav
Tazky, Anton
Husak, Gustav
Simon, Bohumil
Zrak, Jozef
CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDIUM
Dubcek, Alexander
SECRETARIES
*Bilak, Vasil
* Hettes, Jarolim
Indra, Alois
* Kempny, Josef
Lenart, Jozef
* Penc, Frantisek
Spacek, Josef
* Strougal, Lubomir
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POLISH PARTY CONCEDES MODEST GAINS TO NEW GENERATION
The Polish party's fifth
congress has endorsed a new fac-
tional balance under Gomulka's
leadership, giving significant,
but not decisive power to a rising
generation of hard liners. New
blood was infused into the lead-
ership at the end of the six-day
meeting on 16 November, but
Gomulka's losses were not as ex-,
tensive as his opponents probably
had hoped.
Three dispensable veterans,
Foreign Minister Rapacki and two
deputy premiers, were dropped
from the policy-making politburo,
and one from the party secretariat.
Rapacki dissociated himself from
the regime's policies in April
when he went on leave of absence.
Of the four, he was the only one
removed from the central commit-
tee. With the ouster of deputy
premier Szyr, no Jews remain in
the politburo. The "token" Jew
in the new top leadership is
party secretary Starewicz.
Three of the four newcomers
are youthful, provincial party
leaders associated with Gomulka's
main factional rivals, tough but
pragmatic politburo member Gierek
and candidate politburo member
Moczar, leader of the hard-line,
chauvinistic faction in the party.
Significantly, the new men were
promoted over the heads of other
veteran leaders, including Moczar
himself.
The most significant gains
for the new generation are in
the central committee, where most
of the new faces are those of
young and forceful critics of
Gomulka's stagnant policies. As
a result, shifts can be expected
in the central committee apparatus
(Poland's government-within-the-
government), which will enable
these newcomers to extend their
influence to all party levels.
Moczar's failure to gain a
full politburo seat somewhat
trims his personal ambitions,
but this probably reflects an
earlier compromise on the sharing
of power between Gomulka and him.
Gomulka has partially deflected
his main challenger, but only
by giving the younger genera-
tion--represented by Moczar--a
mandate for change.
The factional struggle
probably will continue on the
lower levels of the party, under
the guise of the militant "anti-
revisionist" policy endorsed by
the congress. It will be carried
on in Gomulka's name by tough
newcomers, some of whom will
seek reform but without any
liberal overtones.
Government changes result-
ing from the party shifts prob-
ably will be announced at an early
parliamentary session. Defense
Minister Jaruzelski's failure
to gain a politburo seat sug-
gests that defense, as well as
foreign policy, will remain
under Gomulka's personal pur-
view. There have been no changes
in either domestic or foreign
policies. In Gomulka's words,
"unshakable loyalty to our alli-
ance with the Soviet Union, for
better or worse," will remain the
main feature of foreign policy.
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In the economic sector also,
the congress reaffirmed the status
quo. No greater role for free
market forces is planned. Agri-
culture will remain largely in
private hands. Modest organiza-
tional streamlining in industry
has been approved to facilitate
foreign trade, and the need for
some reorientation of investment
toward the consumer sector has
been conceded. It is doubtful,
however, that any marked improve-
ment in living standards will be
achieved beyond the two percent
annual increase in real wages
registered annually since 1964_
Changes in Polish Party Leadership at Fifth Congress
11-16 November 1968
POLITBURO
(12 Members)
CANDIDATE POLITBURO
Old
New
Old
New
3 Members
4 Members
?Cyrankiewicz
Cyrankiewicz
?Gomulka
Gomulka
? Jagielski
Jagielski
? Gierek
Gierek
? Jaroszewicz
Jaroszewicz
?Jaszczuk
Jaszczuk
? Moczar
Moczar
?Jedrychowski
Jedrychowski
? Szydlak
?Kliszko
Kliszko
? Kociolek
? Kruczek
? Loga-Sowinski
Loga-Sowinski
? Rapacki
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
? Spychalski
S
ch
i
ki
Numerical Shifts
o S
py
a
s
Old New
trzelecki
Strzelecki
? Szyr
85 Members 91 Members
52 re-elected
32 dropped 39 additional:
1 died in office 14 promoted from
candidate Central
Committee,
25 newly elected
SECRETARIAT
Old New
8 Members 9 Members
? Gomulka
? Jarosinsk i
?Jaszczuk
? Kliszko
? Moczar
? Starewicz
o Strzelecki
CANDIDATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Old New
75 Members 91 Members
34 re-elected -
1 died in office
40 removed:
14 promoted to
Central Committee,
26 dropped
? Pro-Gomulka
? New generation of hardliners of various hues
o Associated with hardliners on selected issues
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Jaszczuk
Kliszko
Moczar
? Olszowski
Starewicz
Strzelecki
? Szydlak
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ITALIAN AND FRENCH COMMUNISTS FACE SOVIET PRESSURE
The Italian and French Com-
munist parties, the two largest
in Western Europe, continue to
be under considerable pressure
from Moscow to bring their views
concerning both Czechoslovakia
and the scheduling of a world Com-
munist conference into line with
those of the Soviets.
Both parties have rejected
a Japanese proposal for a sepa-
rate conference of Communist par-
ties from capitalist countries,
but neither is enthusiastic about
Soviet moves to convoke the long-
planned world Communist confer-
ence. Both the Italians and the
French fear that if a conference
were held soon, they would appear
to have reversed themselves and
endorsed the Soviet intervention.
The Italian party has been
in the forefront of world Commu-
nist criticism of the interven-
tion and has been attacked in the
Soviet, East German, and Polish
press. Meetings with Soviet party
leaders both in. Italy and in the
USSR have made Italian Communists
apprehensive. Even Secretary
General Longo's thrombosis in Oc-
tober was blamed by his wife on
the rigors of dealing with the
Soviets.
Several Italian party lead-
ers have suggested that the par-
ty's criticism has gone too far,
and some believe replacing Longo
would smooth relations with Mos-
Page 16
cow. The Soviet Embassy in Rome
is credited with promoting this
dissidence, and foreign Commu-
nists report a Soviet threat to
split the party.
Nevertheless, the Italian
Communists appear to be giving
little ground to the Soviets on
the Czechoslovak question. The
Italians immediately contradicted
a TASS claim of 15 November that
the Italian party had approved
the intervention. The Italians,
even after a visit of party lead-
ers to Moscow last week, maintain
their position remains unchanged
since August.
During earlier talks between
Soviet and French party leaders
in Moscow, the Soviets bluntly
threatened to force a formal split
in the French party. Under this
strong pressure the French tempered
their previous opposition to con-
voking an international conference,
and agreed to attempt to create
favorable conditions for such a
meeting. The French remained ada-
mant, however, in criticizing the
Czechoslovak invasion during the
Moscow meeting. Since then the
party has decided not to allow its
differences with the Soviets to
be quietly forgotten. On 12 No-
vember, just one week after the
party delegation returned from
Moscow, the official party organ
L'Humanite editorially repeated
the criticism of the intervention.
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Both the French and the Ital-
ians are likely to continue to drag
their feet on the issue of the in-
ternational conference. French
Communists describe their position
as being halfway between that of
the Soviets, who want the confer-
ence soon, and the Italians, who
would like to postpone it indefi-
nitely. This week in Budapest,
at the Communist preliminary con-
ference which Moscow organized pri-
marily to set a firm date for a
world conference, the Italians re-
portedly are seeking further de-
lays. Relations between the USSR
and the two Western parties are
therefore likely to continue to
be strained for the foreseeable
future.
SOVIET AID ACTIVITY TO INCREASE IN ALGERIA
The tempo of Soviet activity
in Algeria probably will acceler-
ate in the coming months. A So-
viet delegation is now in Algiers
to work out the final details of
the economic arrangements drawn
up in Moscow during the July visit
of the Algerian minister of in-
dustry and energy. In addition,
negotiations for a new arms pact
may have been held last month
when a Soviet military delegation
visited Algeria.
The economic talks probably
are concentrating on the Soviet
promise to purchase five million
hectoliters of wine annually in
1969-70 and to make similarly high
purchases during 1971-75. Alge-
ria is particularly anxious to
see a long-term contract con-
cluded, because it plans to use
a portion of the earnings from
the sales to finance Soviet aid
projects, including the cost of
technicians.
Page 17
Little has been achieved un-
der the USSR's economic aid pro-
gram, in large part because of
serious deficiencies in Algerian
planning and management in aid
projects. Few of the major con-
struction projects under credit
agreements dating as far back as
1963 have been started. Some
progress has been made, however,
on projects involving substantial
technical assistance, such as
geological and petroleum explora-
tion and the establishment of
technical institutes. There cur-
rently are almost 1,900 Soviet
economic technicians in Algeria,
the largest single contingent
from the USSR in any underdeveloped
country.
The number of Soviet techni-
cians will rise still further with
the implementation of the July
agreements. Moscow soon will ex-
pand its mineral exploration work
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by undertaking a seven-year pro-
gram which eventually will involve
700 specialists. It also has
agreed to send additional engi-
neers and technicians to help run
recently nationalized firms.
The beginning of construc-
tion on such projects as a power
plant in the Annaba area, a cognac
plant, a plate glass factory, fish
canning and refrigeration facili-
ties as well as vocational train-
ing schools will require addi-
tional Soviet personnel. Moscow
also can be expected to try to
speed up work on the prestigious
Annaba steel complex, scheduled
for completion next year but which
now is far behind.
Unlike its economic aid pro-
gram, the USSR's military aid pro-
gram in Algeria has been imple-
mented rapidly. Although Soviet
military shipments continue--six
P-6 motor torpedo boats were de-
livered last week--the rate of
shipments has fallen off this
year, probably reflecting the ap-
proaching fulfillment of the 1963-
65 arms agreements.
Both countries are believed
to be negotiating a new formal
arms pact. Soviet Defense Minis-
ter Grechko toured Algerian mili-
tary bases in July, and in mid-
October a Soviet military delega-
tion visited Algeria at the invi-
tation of the Algerian defense
minister, presumably to discuss
the details of a new agreement.
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No major incidents have occurred recently on the Arab-Israeli borders,
but the usual cross-border firefights continue. King Husayn is holding his
own vis-a-vis the terrorists and treading a delicate line. The Jordanians are
now promoting the idea of another Arab summit conference, but King
Faysal is unlikely to accept another summit until the Jarring mission is
officially pronounced dead. Meanwhile, Jarring, still in New York, will
probably leave at the end of the month if no new initiative is taken.
Fighting in the Nigerian civil war has intensified, but neither side has
scored any major victories. The Biafran counterattack on the town of
Onitsha continues, with entrenched federal troops there providing stiff
resistance. Both sides are receiving fresh arms supplies, and the federal
government has finally agreed to the presence of a Soviet miliary attache in
Lagos.
Elsewhere in Africa, a coup by junior officers has overthrown the
radical regime of President Modibo Keita, and Sierra Leone's Prime Minister
Stevens declared a nation-wide state of emergency following election vio-
lence. Tanzanian mainland police, supported by Zanzibar army units, seized
control of the Zanzibar capital on 20 November in an unprecedented
surprise maneuver. The efficiency of the operation is bound to impress the
island's perennial plotters and pro-Communist hoodlums, and President
Nyerere may also have intended to show the recalcitrant Zanzibar govern-
ment that Dar es Salaam is the locus of power.
The Mobutu regime celebrates its third anniversary in power this
weekend. Congo (Kinshasa) has had a greater measure of political stability
under Mobutu than at any time since independence, but the regime is still
unpopular with the masses.
In West Pakistan, antigovernment disorders subsided following the
arrest of former Foreign Minister Bhutto on 13 November. The political
scene was complicated, however, by the entry of Asghar Khan-the respected
former chief of the Pakistan Air Force-into opposition politics.
Turkish political conventions are now being held with an eye toward
next year's elections. Meanwhile, the leftist-inspired "anti-imperialist"
campaign has attracted little support, as both government and opposition
leaders have su ested th mistimed their efforts.
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JUNIOR ARMY OFFICERS OVERTHROW KEITA REGIME IN MALI
The junior army officers who
overthrew the radical regime of
President Modibo Keita on 19 No-
vember appear to be firmly in con-
trol at least for the present.
They have formed a 14-man provi-
sional military government coun-
cil, called the "Military Commit-
tee of National Liberation," and
have lined up the support of most
upcountry army garrisons.
The swift and well-executed
coup met with little or no resis-
tance. Participating army units,
including US-trained paratroopers,
seized control of all strategic
points in Bamako and effectively
neutralized the main camp there
of the Popular Militia, the para-
military arm of Mali's single
party. The population has re-
mained calm and a night curfew
is in effect.
Keita, who was visiting up-
country at the time of the coup,
probably has been taken into cus-
tody and returned to Bamako.
There have been selective arrests
of cabinet ministers and left-wing
party militants. The fate of
senior army officers is not known,
but some, including the army com-
mander, are reported to be under
detention.
Moussa Traore, a heretofore
obscure French-trained lieutenant,
has emerged as the apparent leader
of the coup. He has been named
President of the Military Commit-
tee, five members of which have
received training in the US. Al-
though the political orientation
of the group is not yet known,
preliminary indications suggest
that they are less radical and
less favorably disposed to the
Soviets and Chinese than the lead-
ers of the previous regime. Ap-
parently lacking any specific pro-
grams of their own, they have
called for the cooperation of
civil servants to keep the govern-
ment functioning. They are also
seeking advice from leaders of
the former regime who have sup-
ported Mali's rapprochement with
France.
Intense friction between the
army and the militia was probably
an important factor in the deci-
sion to move against the regime.
The army had resented the in-
creased authority given the mili-
tia after mid-1967 when the re-
gime took on a more rigidly left-
wing cast. In addition, popular
discontent with the Keita regime
had increased because of the
troubled state of the economy and
differences over whether Mali
should maintain its revolutionary
socialist course or pursue more
pragmatic policies.
Paris recently made high-level
remonstrances to Keita over the
failure of his government to
carry out promised economic re-
forms, and French officials have
been increasingly disturbed by
Mali's tendency to look toward
the Chinese Communist regime as
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RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS STALEMATED
The latest round of British-
Rhodesian talks on terms for Rho-
desian independence ended on 16 No-
vember with no solution in sight.
Negotiations were stalemated
on the issue of an external safe-
guard for the political rights of
Rhodesian blacks, and on a number
of closely related points of dif-
ference, although initially there
appeared to be some movement toward
a settlement. Smith has refused
to go much beyond the terms which
he accepted in early October--token
African representation in his gov-
ernment and an elected bloc of
Africans comprising one fourth of
the Rhodesian parliament. When
voting as a unit, the Africans could
then block retrogressive legislation.
Even as the latest talks broke
up, the British seemed to be leav-
ing the way open for further contacts.
It is unclear, however, when discus-
sions might resume, or at what level.
Smith, for his part, seems willing
to let negotiations drag out, but he
may try to pressure London into of-
fering more acceptable terms. He
may, for example, set a date for
referendums on the retrogressive con-
stitutional changes approved by the 25X1
Rhodesian Front Congress in Septem-
ber, and on the proposal to declare
Rhodesia a republic.
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onuKV-1
PARLIAMENTARY BY-ELECTIONS SPARK VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE
Heated politicking in par-
liamentary by-elections has
sparked violent clashes between
supporters of the country's two
tribally and regionally dispar-
ate parties. Prime Minister
Siaka Stevens, faced with a frac-
tious army and unable to control
extremists in his northern-based
All People's Congress (APC), has
declared a nationwide state of
emergency and for the second time
has postponed elections in two
key southern districts.
The by-elections are for
nearly one third of the seats in
parliament lost by the opposition
Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)
through government-initiated court
action. The elections have been
going on since mid-October and
would have ended next week if
Stevens had not ordered the
postponement.
Youthful bands of APC
toughs, mostly Temne tribesmen,
have been a major irritant. They
have waged an unrelenting campaign
of harassment and intimidation
against SLPP candidates, pro-
voking violence in all districts
where seats are being contested.
The youths, who reportedly re-
ceived some guerrilla training
in nearby Guinea earlier this
year, are apparently operating
as an action arm of the APC's
Marxist-oriented left-wing.
Their heavy-handed tactics have
paid off. The APC now holds 42
seats in parliament to only eight
for the SLPP. In the most recent
by-election, for example, the
APC won four of eight seats in
traditional SLPP southern baili-
wicks.
Although disorganized and
divided, the more tradition-
oriented SLPP has begun to fight
back. SLPP leaders have made
blatant appeals to the tribal
feelings of their supporters,
primarily Mende tribesmen, and
efforts are being made to dis-
rupt the freewheeling activities
of the APC guerrillas.
Stevens' past failure to
exercise leadership at the top
has contributed heavily to cur-
rent tensions. His decision to
declare a state of emergency
probably stemmed from the fear
that serious tribal polariza-
tion could engulf his regime.
Moreover, Stevens is acutely
aware that his control of army
troops, whose mutiny last April
catapulted him into power, re-
mains tenuous. Mende soldiers
are reportedly disturbed by ru-
mors that the government is
planning to replace them with
APC guerrillas.
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SEUKK 1
The hemisphere's most dramatic event this week occurred on 20 No-
vember when two Venezuelan frigates fired upon and captured a Cuban
fishing trawler off Venezuela's eastern coast.
Venezuelan military leaders have been extremely concerned that
Cuban-trained guerrillas might attempt a landing to aid insurgency forces
now operating in the country and to harass the general elections on 1
December. The Cuban military has almost no ability to retaliate, but Fidel
Castro has launched a bitter propaganda and diplomatic offensive against
Caracas.
The four-month-old student-government conflict in Mexico may be
heating up again. Allegations that a student was shot by a policeman have
helped strike leaders maintain solidarity in the boycott of classes. Sentiment
in favor of returning to classes appears to be dissolving.
In Peru, the prime minister has announced that constitutional guar-
antees, suspended by the Belaunde administration, would be restored this
week in view of the "calm in the country and the mass support for the
military government." He also said that civilians would be appointed to the
cabinet, but declined to fix a specific date.
Costa Rican Government officials have confirmed a $5-million coffee
sale to the Soviet Union. The cash sale cuts the country's large coffee surplus
by about a third, and will ease the serious balance-of-payments deficit. The
foreign minister has denied that the sale has any "strings attached."
The municipal elections in 11 of Brazil's 22 states on 15 November
were held in an atmosphere of calm. ARENA, the government party, is
winning nearly all the mayoralty and municipal council races as expected.
The Brazilian Democratic Movement-the only opposition party-is doing
well in the larger cities, however.
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Cuban Trawler Seized by Venezuela
Trawler Alecrin, seized by Venezuelan navy on 20 November
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SECRET
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TRINIDAD
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VENEZUELA SEIZES A CUBAN FISHING TRAWLER
The seizure of the Cuban
fishing trawler Alecrin on 20
November appears to be the fore-
runner of similar moves to pre-
vent the Cuban fishing fleets
from infiltrating agents and
guerrillas into Venezuela. Cuba
is extremely limited in its abil-
ity to retaliate, but has launched
a shrill propaganda offensive and
has undertaken diplomatic moves
to condemn Venezuela.
The navy is acting on di-
rect government orders that any
Cuban vessels sighted within or
outside territorial waters claimed
by Venezuela were to be boarded
and towed into port.
Venezuela claims a 12-nau-
tical-mile territorial sea, from
base lines drawn through islands
located some 40-80 miles north
of the mainland. The government
also claims the right of hot
pursuit into international waters
of any ship sighted within Vene-
zuelan territorial waters.
President Leoni told US Ambassa-
dor Bernbaum, however, that the
trawler was caught within terri-
Page 27
The Alecrin is sister-ship
of the Sierra, which was used in
May 1967 to infiltrate Cuban
agents, Cuban-trained Venezuelan
guerrillas, and supplies into
Venezuela at Machurucuto, on the
northeast coast.
In the meantime President
Leoni has asked US support for
its action. In an emotional
discussion with US Ambassador
Bernbaum over the incident,
Leoni asserted that the seizure
of the Alecrin would have to be
accepted by Castro in the same
way that the United States has
had to accept the seizure of
the Pueblo by the North Koreans.
He mane it clear that Venezuela's
patience with Cuban subversion
was exhausted. The Alecrin has
been confined at the naval base
at Carupano. There is no indi-
cation what the Leoni government
plans to do with the ship or its
crew of 37 Cubans and one Japanese
fishing expert.
Fidel Castro has little capa-
bility to retaliate militarily
against Venezuela. There have
been no indications that the
Cuban military has been placed
on alert, and its naval and
air forces have almost no long-
range capability. The Komar
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guided-missile patrol boats, how-
ever, could intercept, or attack
Venezuelan ships within a few
hundred miles of the Cuban coast,
and Havana's MIG aircraft could
also be used offensively on short-
range missions. Tensions in the
Caribbean area are, therefore,
likely to remain high. On 21
November, for example, the cap-
tain of a Venezuelan freighter
requested US protection while
transiting the Mona Passage be-
tween Puerto Rico and the Domini-
can Republic.
Cuban reaction, however, is
likely to be limited for the time
being to a bitter propaganda and
diplomatic offensive. In addi-
tion, it is possible that Cuban
agents or sympathizers may at-
tempt to hijack Venezuelan air-
craft in an attempt to put Castro
CUBA EXPANDS ITS FISHING INDUSTRY
Cuba's government-controlled
fishing industry has embarked on
an extensive expansion program in
order to develop a new source of
foreign exchange. This program
entails increased contacts in the
Caribbean area and has implica-
tions for potential subversive
activity.
Prior to Castro's revolution,
the fishing industry played an
insignificant role in the Cuban
economy. Now, however, the Na-
tional Fishing Institute controls
four separate fleets with more
than 3,200 fishing boats ranging
from small one- and two-man lob-
ster boats to large, steel-hulled
trawlers of more than 500 tons.
Castro's efforts to expand
the industry are focused pri-
marily on two of the four fleets--
the Cuban Fishing Fleet and the
Caribbean Fishing Fleet. The
latter organized just this year,
operates out of Havana at pres-
ent but by 1970 will be based at
a large new port facility under
construction near Cienfuegos on
the south coast of Las Villas
Province. The fleet currently
has fewer than two dozen 97-ton
LAMBDA-class boats but will even-
tually consist of 136 trawlers,
including 90 shrimp boats being
built in Spain at a cost of
$8 million. The National Fish-
ing Institute is presently ne-
gotiating with French and Dutch
authorities in an effort to ob-
tain port privileges for the
shrimp fleet in French Guiana
and Surinam.
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In addition to the 90 shrimp
boats on order from Spain, Cuba
has contracted with East Germany
for five ATLANTIK-class stern
trawlers and 15 CUTTER-class
trawlers for the Cuban Fishing
Fleet. These will be delivered
in the next two years. Three
large refrigerated trawlers have
been ordered from Spain for an
additional $8 million, and Italy
is supplying an undetermined num-
ber of fishing boats in return
for $35 million in seafood. The
Cuban Fishing Fleet is made up
of about 50 steel-hulled traw-
lers built in Japan, the USSR,
and Spain. These fish in waters
ranging from the Grand Banks of
Newfoundland south to the coasts
of Argentina and Brazil.
The Cuban Fishing Fleet and
the Gulf Fleet are both based in
Havana and use the facilities of
the new $35 million Soviet-fi-
nanced fishing terminal. The
Gulf Fleet has about 200 Cuban-
built LAMBDA, SIGMA, and RO-class
fishing boats that operate in
the Gulf of Mexico and off the
Yucatan Peninsula.
The fourth fleet has close
to 3,000 small coastal boats or-
VENEZUELAN ELECTION C
The campaign in Venezuela
for the election on 1 December
is drawing to a close amid tight-
ened security precautions and a
spurt of activity by the four
major presidential candidates.
None of the four--Gonzalo
Barrios, Rafael Caldera, Luis
Prieto, and Miguel Angel Burelli
Page 29
ganized into 32 fishing coopera-
tives located in ports along the
island's north and south coasts.
Cuba's fishing industry,
which already employs over 2,000
workers, will continue to grow
as boats now under contract are
delivered. As the fishing
grounds, are expanded throughout
the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mex-
ico, and the Atlantic, Havana
will realize a significant re-
turn on its investment.
CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL DAYS
Rivas--appears to be appreciably
ahead. The Christian Democratic
Party, operating from its strong
base in the west, is buoyed by
large crowds drawn by Rafael
Caldera in Caracas. In addition,
as the party's chances have im-
proved, dissident party leaders
have subordinated their private
ambitions until after the elec-
tions.
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Barrios, whose Democratic
Action Party looked like a cer-
tain loser in January, has made
a remarkable comeback. He has
used government power and money
to support a vigorous and intel-
ligent nationwide campaign. In
addition to the government's
normal rural strength, Barrios
enjoys broad middle-class sup-
port because he represents sta-
bility and a continuance of the
steady progress that has charac-
terized his party in power.
Prieto is counting on the
traditional opposition to the
Democratic Action Party in the
major urban centers to win the
race for his Popular Electoral
Movement.
Burelli's three-party coali-
tion is not given much of a chance
to win. Its major role may evolve
into depriving the Christian Demo-
crats of the small margin of urban
votes that could give Caldera the
presidency.
Meanwhile, security measures
have been increased following a
rise in terrorist activity. On
17 November terrorists attempted
to assassinate a high-ranking
army officer in western Venezuela,
in an area infested by Douglas
Bravo's dissident Communist Armed
Forces of National Liberation.
In the east, guerrillas
belonging to the Castro-lining
Movement of the Revolutionary Left
have clashed with government troops
on at least four occasions. This
band, which has been quiet for
months, has reportedly received
reinforcements and supplies,
chiefly from a consolidation of
its forces and the withdrawal of
one of its bands from the mountains
south of Caracas. Terrorists are
likely to make other attempts to
disrupt the elections but govern-
ment forces appear sufficient to
handle them. Nevertheless, the
government's plan to withdraw some
units from rural areas beginning
27 November to protect voting sites
in major urban centers could have
some isolated areas open to attack.
President Leoni has approved
plans to arrest large numbers of
Communists and "other political
figures" who promote disturbances
before or after the elections. He
also has authorized the police and
national guard to put severe limi-
tations on political activities
of the Communist-front Union For
Advancement on the grounds that
its meetings are centers for sub-
versives and provocateurs.
A close outcome may cause some
strain in the immediate postelection
period, particularly if Gonzalo Bar-
rios wins. Demonstrations and
small-scale disorders are possible.
The Communists are likely to try to
aggravate any unrest in order to
force military intervention on the
broadest possible scale.
The military are expected to
accept the victory of any candidate
other than Prieto. Their concern
arises from thinly veiled support
given Prieto by leftists and Com-
munists and from fears that Prieto
will not be able to control left
wingers in his party, however hard
he tries. There are indications,
however, of strong opposition within
the armed forces to a military move
against any government in the ab-
sence of a clear threat to the na-
tional interest.
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Page 30 WEEKLY SUMMARY 22 Nov 68
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Secret
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