HAITI: DUVALIER'S PRIMITIVE TOTALITARIAN STATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006700050005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Haiti. Duvalier's Primitive Totalitarian State
Secret
N2 43
1 November 1968
No. 0045/68B
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HAITI: DUVALIER'S PRIMITIVE TOTALITARIAN STATE
For more than a decade, President Francois Du-
valier has exercised life and death control over
Haiti. In spite of attempts to oust him and reports
that his health is declining, Duvalier at 61 is still
the undisputed dictator. Within the past several
months, he has given fresh evidence of his ability
to retain control by repelling an attempted exile in-
vasion and by maintaining stability while removing
key individuals in the power structure.
Nevertheless, there are numerous factors of in-
stability, which may become more evident in the next
few years. The only persons still actively support-
ing Duvalier are those who benefit from his continu-
ance in power. Assassination is always a possibil-
ity, and a rapid deterioration in his mental or phys-
ical powers could inspire either his henchmen or his
enemies to supplant him. The extent of the turmoil
that follows his eventual disappearance from the po-
litical scene will depend on whether he is removed
by natural causes, coup, or assassination, and on the
ability of his would-be heirs to consolidate powers.
Background
In Haiti's 164 years of in-
dependence, violence and counter-
violence with intermittent peri-
ods of silent oppression have
been the pattern of political
life. Personalities, rather than
issues, have been the focal point
of politics. With few exceptions,
those who have been successful in
obtaining power have felt no re-
sponsibility as public servants
but instead have established cor-
rupt and dictatorial regimes,
have enriched themselves at pub-
lic expense, and have attempted
to remain in power permanently.
Page 1
The government of Francois
Duvalier is no exception. Since
his accession to power in 1957,
he has been able to remain in of-
fice by manipulating or neutral-
izing existing power forces. He
has minimized any potential threat
from the army by creating two coun-
terforces, the civil militia and
the secret police. All incidents
of internal opposition have been
crushed, mostly by the secret po-
lice and a powerful group of Du-
valier henchmen known as the Ton
Ton Macoutes. His concentration
on political security, however,
has lead to a steady deterioration
in the standards of living of the
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SPECIAL REPORT 1 Nov 68
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Caicos Is.
(U.K.)
BAHAMA ISLANDS Turks Is.
(U.K.) (U.K.)
HAITI,.,'
Navassa F.
(U.S.)
HAITI
)..-- 25 50 1Q0
I
STATUTEMILES
PORT?AU-PRINCE + SANTO DOMINGO
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At(antiC0-
A.A.. I??
HAITI ...~~
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Haitian people, most of whom are
illiterate, poverty stricken, and
beset by disease and malnutrition.
The Political Situation
From the time Haiti gained
its independence from France in
1804 until Duvalier's election
in 1957, a small mulatto elite
tended to dominate the vast Negro
majority. The mulattoes tradi-
tionally were better educated and
predominated in the professions,
commerce, and the important gov-
ernment jobs.
The emergence of Duvalier,
however, brought to power a Negro
who was determined to end this
tradition for his own political
gains. Duvalier has systemati-
cally inculcated hatred of the
mulatto elite in the minds of the
predominant blacks. Although
many mulattoes have retained
their wealth and prestige, Du-
valier has effectively isolated
them from the political process.
Duvalier also uses the race
issue to explain the lack of eco-
nomic reform. He frequently pre-
sents grandiose plans for Haiti's
economic future, states that for-
eign aid is essential, and then
claims that it is not forthcoming
because foreign countries do not
like Negroes.
The President capitalizes
on the ignorance and superstition
of the Haitians. Although he is
a nominal Catholic, he includes
voodoo priests among his advisers
Typical Haitian Voodoo Ceremony
and celebrates events that happen
to occur on the 22nd of any month--
22 is a magic number in voodoo.
He regularly compares himself to
the ancient leaders of Haiti, often
going so far as to imply that he
is their reincarnation.
Duvalier has had to use strong-
arm methods, however, to retain con-
trol over the upper classes. He
began his rule by taking measures
to weaken the military leadership,
which had figured prominently in
almost every change of government
since independence. By systemati-
cally removing all competent offi-
cers who might oppose him and re-
placing them with officers who
owed him their allegiance, Duval-
ier soon gained control of the
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Civilian Militia Unit on Parade
army. Although military commander
Gerard Constant privately maintains
that there are still some conspira-
tors within the army, it appears
that they would become a subversive
threat only if their lives were
directly threatened by Duvalier.
Duvalier's creation of two
counterforces, the civil militia
and the secret police "Service Du-
valier," has further undercut mil-
itary authority. The 5-7,000-man
militia is maintained in parallel
but separate status from the regu-
lar armed forces and is directly
responsive to Duvalier through his
hand-picked leaders. Each of these
leaders is responsible for every-
thing in a specific geographical
region and is required to report
all unusual events in his area im-
mediately to Duvalier.
Almost all of the members of
the militia are Negroes. A high
percentage of them are illit-
erate, and many have criminal
backgrounds. There is no sub-
stantive difference between
the backgrounds of the leader-
ship and that of the rank and
file. In fact, Duvalier fre-
quently reorganizes sections
of the militia by promoting
or demoting its members. Two
weeks ago he disarmed some
militia units in the north and
installed new leaders. This
particular reorganization prob-
ably reflects Duvalier's un-
easiness about the possibility
of future invasion attempts
and may indicate his dissatis-
faction with the militia's
performance during the exile
invasion in May.
The "Service Duvalier" is
Duvalier's small personal inves-
tigation unit, which is primarily
responsible for dealing with po-
litical crimes such as threats
to the President's safety. Its
members are militiamen, most of
whom also apparently belong to
the Ton Ton Macoutes. The Ton
Ton Macoutes, whose members in-
clude cabinet ministers as well
as ordinary thugs, is the most
feared group in Haiti and is the
major factor in Duvalier's abil-
ity to retain power.
The pressure groups found in
most other countries cannot exist
in the politically repressive at-
mosphere of Haiti. Labor organiza-
tions are totally dominated by the
government. The secret police
network of informants has created
fear and suspicion within the
business community. Professional
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organizations are under the con-
trol of Duvalier, and business-
men prefer to endure the regime
rather than assume the risks of
actively opposing it. In fact,
many Haitian businessmen owe
their financial success to the
government as a result of monopoly
concessions they have obtained.
Duvalier has erected a facade
of legality around his regime.
The legislature and the judiciary,
however, like all. other organiza-
tions and groups, are directly
subservient to the President. All
political parties except Duvalier's
Party of National Unity (PUN) have
been suppressed since he came to
power. Although PUN was declared
to be the only legal party in
Elois Maitre (Chief of Secret Police)
Stands Behind President Francois Duvalier
Haiti in 1963, it is a party in
name only and lacks even a paper
organization.
Economic Conditions
The standard of living in
Haiti, long the lowest in the
Western Hemisphere, has become
still worse under Duvalier. Agri-
cultural production is lower than
in the mid-1950s, and the output
of the small manufacturing sector
has increased only slightly since
1960. Estimated per capita gross
national product has declined from
about $90 in 1955 to between $60
and $70, less than 20 percent of
the Latin American average. In-
deed, it is said that Haiti's
gross national product is less
now than it was 150 years ago.
The economic problems are
too basic and severe for any quick
solution. Yet Duvalier, instead
of taking constructive measures
to ameliorate them, has usually
pursued policies having the oppo-
site effect. His ineffectiveness
in dealing with economic problems
stems not from a lack of under-
standing but from his interest in
instituting only programs that
will have a favorable and imme-
diate political effect.
He has consistently ignored
the recommendations of interna-
tional financial organizations
to eliminate corruption and imple-
ment fiscal and administrative re-
forms. As a result, Haiti has been
denied the benefits of external
assistance programs large enough
to halt economic and social de-
terioration.
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In 1963, the US suspended
most forms of direct aid because
funds were being siphoned off by
local politicians and projects were
being manipulated to further the
government's political control.
External assistance from several
countries and international or-
ganizations for humanitarian pur-
poses, however, has continued to
increase since 1963 despite the
donors' aversion to the Duvalier
dictatorship. Haiti currently re-
ceives approximately $12 million
in private aid, most of which
comes from the US.
In recent years, the Haitian
Government has completed a few pub-
lic investment projects, which Du-
valier has used as prestige items.
A new jet airport was completed in
1967 and a few miles of new high-
way have been built. The govern-
ment has contracted with an Italian
firm to install hydroelectric gen-
eratinq equipment at the Peligre
Dam, which was recently renamed
the "Francois Duvalier Hydroelec-
tric Complex." Now that the dam
bears Duvalier's name, the pros-
pects for completion are somewhat
brighter than they were four years
ago, when a similar contract was
negotiated with the same firm.
ponents are intimidated, nonvocal,
and disorganized. The masses,
who have displayed an extraor-
dinary capacity for suffering,
will not easily be shaken out of
their apathy and malleability.
The active opposition to Du-
valier is centered in a number
of exile groups, both Communist
and non-Communist, which are lo-
cated in the United States, 25x1
Canada, Western Europe, the Do-
minican Republic the Bahamas
and Venezeula.
I Individual emigres
Duvalier's overwhelming
electoral victory in 1957 was
engineered by the army. Within
a year, the repressive character
of his regime became apparent,
and political opponents began
fleeing into exile. The few po-
litically minded people still in
Haiti are probably opposed to
Duvalier and his methods of rule,
but most of these potential op-
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enjoy almost no following within
Haiti, with the possible excep-
tion of former president Paul
Magloire, a financial mainstay
of the Haitian Coalition, which
has between 200 and 300 members
in its New York headquarters.
It is probably the largest and
most active of the exile groups.
The exiles have undertaken
several unsuccessful invasions
of Haiti. The most recent oc-
curred on 20 May 1968 when a 25-
man group flew from the Bahamas
to Cap Haitien on the north coast
but was routed by government
troops.
Inside the country, only
the Communists seem to have any
potential for subversion. So far,
however, their two largest par-
ties, the United Haitian Demo-
cratic Party (PUDA) and the Party
of Popular Accord (PEP), together
have only approximately 600 mem-
bers. They are weak and disor-
ganized, and maintain a generally
passive role designed to avoid a
government crackdown. The PEP
is oriented toward Moscow, while
the PUDA is more militantly na-
tionalistic and tends to favor
Castro. They generally do not
cooperate but are loosely allied
in a "united front."
Communism is outlawed, but
the ban has not been strictly en-
forced. Communists have not been
singled out for control or repres-
sion provided they do not engage
in overt opposition activities.
Recently, however, following re-
ports of small-scale terrorist
incidents instigated by the Party
of Popular Accord, Duvalier or-
dered his military commanders to
arrest Communists in areas where
terrorist attacks occurred. This
is the first time in the past few
years that militant Communist ac-
tivity has been reported. Al-
though further incidents may oc-
cur, neither Communist party ap-
pears to have the capability to
be a serious threat to Duvalier.
25X1
The Soviet Union and Cuba
provide what little outside as-
sistance the Haitian Communists
obtain.
Radio Havana continues to
broadcast in Creole 14 hours a
week, but there is no evidence
that the programs--which con-
demn Duvalier and the support he
is alleged to receive from the
United States--have any signifi-
cant effect on the Haitian people.
Foreign Relations
Haiti's most important in-
ternational ties have been with
the United States, its major
trading partner, the origin of
most of its tourist revenues, and
the traditional source of nearly
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all of its foreign loans, grants,
and technical assistance. Du-
valier has consistently taken US
assistance for granted and has
blamed the US diplomatic mission
for the curtailment of US assist-
ance in mid-1963.
from the US. Its orientation
is more to the UN, however, both
because of its cultural ties with
Africa and because it views the
OAS as a puppet of the US.
Haiti's relations with the
neighboring Dominican Republic
are also of importance. A tradi-
tional mutual antagonism has
existed between the two coun-
tries but relations between Du-
valier and President Balaguer
are "correct."
Since the recent invasion
in May, Duvalier has attempted
to restrict the travel of Hai-
tian exiles in the Caribbean.
The government has instructed
its diplomatic representatives
in Nassau and Miami to refuse
visas and passports to exiles
traveling to or from the Bahamas,
which Duvalier has long accused
of being a "den of Haitian op-
position exiles." He also al-
leges that the US condones Hai-
tian exile activity. Recently,
Duvalier has claimed to have re-
liable information that an exile
force is en route to Venezuela
to train for an invasion of
Haiti throw h the Dominican Re-
ublic
Haiti is a member of both
the UN and the OAS, which it
considers forums for attempting
to extract financial assistance
Page 8
The Haitian constitution
makes no provision for presiden-
tial succession, and Duvalier
has not prepared anyone to fol-
low him. Since he personally
handles all major administrative
matters, no one with leadership
experience will be available.
Indeed, any potential leader in
the past ten years would have to
have kept his ambitions secret in
order to survive.
There is no indication that
Duvalier will voluntarily leave
the scene in the immediate future.
He made himself President-for-
life in 1964 and gives every sign
of intending to serve out that
term. His health is not particu-
larly good--he is a diabetic, re-
portedly had a serious heart at-
tack in 1959, and probably suf-
fers from arteriosclerosis--
but neither does it show signs
of rapid deterioration. Recent
rumors of cancer have not been
substantiated. The possibility
of assassination is always pres-
ent, but Duvalier takes unusual
precautions. He appears in pub-
lic only on special occasions
and then under extremely heavy
guard.
When the time for change
does come, it is possible that
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the succession will fall to the
traditional opposition groups--
the exiles, the mulatto elite,
or the Communists--but available
evidence points in another direc-
tion. The first to hear of any
weakening in Duvalier's leader-
ship, for whatever cause, will
be his palace confidants. Of
these, the ones in the strongest
position to act will be members
of one or more of the armed
groups, either on their own or
in concert with civilian authori-
ties.
Page 9
The actions of Luc Desir and
Eloise Maitre, the two most promi-
nent leaders of the Ton Ton
Macoutes, would probably affect
the outcome in the struggle for
leadership.
The top military figure,
Chief of the General Staff Ger-
ard Constant, commands no troops
and is generally considered in-
effectual, but he could well
serve as a front for some leader
in the police, the secret serv-
ice, or the Ton Ton Macoutes.
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