WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006700020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 11, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
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a
H
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed DIA review
completed.
Secret
47 ,
11 October 1968
No. 0042/68
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 10 October 1968)
Europe
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 1
CZECHOSLOVAKS RESIST NEW SOVIET PRESSURES TO CAPITULATE 2
Despite new Soviet pressures, Czechoslovak lead-
ers continued to procrastinate concerning Moscow's
demands that they implement the August agreement.
Although the reaction of the Czechoslovak leader-
ship to the latest Prague-Moscow "summit" confer-
ence was far from submissive, a Czechoslovak Gov-
ernment delegation went to Moscow on 8 October to
negotiate an agreement which will legalize an in-
definite occupation.
NATO'S RESPONSE TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS 3
The 15 allies ended the first round of their con-
tinuing assessment of the Czechoslovak situation
last week in general agreement on the need--if not
the means--for strengthening the alliance.
NEW PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT MAKES IMPRESSIVE DEBUT 4
Marcello Caetano is off to a good start as prime
minister, with his initial moves having pleased
both the military and the opposition.
INVASION TO HAVE NO LONG-TERM IMPACT ON EAST-WEST TRADE 6
Western governments have made little economic re-
sponse to the Czechoslovak crisis and are not
likely to come up with any basic change in policy.
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Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 9
VIETNAM 10
Precautionary moves were taken by the Saigon
government on 8 October to forestall a possible
coup following unconfirmed reports from various
sources of plotting by some low-level South
Vietnamese military officers. The Communists
generally avoided heavy ground engagements again
this week, and weekly casualty figures for US
and Communist forces were the lowest since mid-
August. Hanoi's seaborne imports increased by
35 percent during the first nine months of 1968
compared with the same period last year.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMY CONTINUES TO LAG 1.3
Peking paid little attention to the economy in
National. Day propaganda and placed.further polit-
ical obstacles to a recovery in industrial pro-
duction.
LAOTIAN POLITICAL FACTIONS CONTINUE MANEUVERING 15
The Pathet Lao appear to be raising their price
for any return to the government, and Prime
Minister Souvanna is making another of his
periodic efforts to get the government organ-
ized for a future political contest with the
Communists.
PHILIPPINE-MALAYSIAN DEADLOCK PERSISTS ]..6
No significant. exchanges between Manila and
Kuala Lumpur over the Philippine claim to Sabah
have occurred since mid-September, and both
sides appear to have turned for the moment to
the domestic implications of -the dispute.
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Middle East -- Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 17
LOCUST THREAT INCREASES IN EAST AFRICA 19
New locust swarms in East Africa could threaten
crop production throughout the Middle East and
East Africa if not quickly controlled.
RESUPPLIED BIAFRANS STALL NIGERIAN THRUSTS 21
Biafran resistance has stiffened considerably,
mainly as a result of an increase in arms sup-
plies to the rebels. The Biafrans will probably
be able to delay considerably the capture of
their remaining strongholds by federal forces.
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MULELE AFFAIR ROCKS BOTH CONGOS 22
The return and execution of rebel leader Pierre
Mulele has created considerable agitation in
Congo (Kinshasa) and neighboring Congo (Brazza-
ville), and has precipitated a rupture of rela-
tions between the two governments.
INDIA'S MONSOON CAUSING PROBLEMS 23
An erratic monsoon is creating hardships in some
areas and will reduce Indian foodgrain production
by several million tons under last year's record
harvests.
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Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
25
PERU'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT EXPROPRIATES US COMPANY 26
This move will increase the Velasco government's
popular support, but will also delay future
foreign investment.
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COMPLEX PROBLEMS PLAGUE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT 28
The Costa e Silva government is being hard pressed
by a variety of perplexing problems' that involve
the military, students, workers, and elements of
the church.,
ECUADOR'S VELASCO WEATHERS FIRST CONGRESS SESSION 29
President :rose Maria Velasco has came through the
first session of congress without serious chal-
lenge and is asserting his economic and polit-?
ical control with determination.
VENEZUELAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN HEATS UP 30
Venezuela's presidential election campaign has
grown perceptibly hotter as the 1 December elec-
tion date draws nearer. None of the leading
candidates has a lead wide enough to ensure vic-
tory, and the closeness of the contest has al-.
ready resulted in charges of coup plotting,
violence and election fraud.
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EUROPE
The Czechoslovaks returned from Moscow late last week bowed but
unbroken.
The negotiations were tough, with further concessions forced on
Prague. Dubcek reportedly twice broke down emotionally during the talks.
A separate government delegation went to Moscow this week to work out a
status of forces agreement. On other key points, as set forth in the com-
munique upon Dubcek's return home, however, the Czechoslovak party
leadership has reverted to its typical procrastination. Prague still refuses to
reconcile itself to full submission to the USSR, although its line on maintain-
ing the post-January liberal policy seems to have weakened.
The USSR has bluntly indicated its dissatisfaction with the pace and
scope of Czechoslovak compliance with the Moscow agreement of last
August and has clearly forced another backward step on Prague. It is not
likely to put up for long with this latest Czechoslovak foot-dragging.
To the rest of the world, Moscow goes on saying that it has the right
and duty to manage affairs in the "socialist commonwealth," but that the
invasion should be forgotten and "business as usual" resumed. Indeed, the
Soviets appeared to be trying hard to refurbish their image by welcoming
several important visitors to Moscow and having Gromyko make a relatively
moderate presentation to the UN General Assembly. Kosygin's surprise visit
to Finland this week may have been aimed at quieting fears there. The Soviet
Premier seems to have been mainly interested, however, in warning Helsinki
not to let its opposition to the occupation of Czechoslovakia affect its basic
relationship with Moscow.
Yugoslav leader Tito has lost confidence in the Soviet leadership and
remains apprehensive over possible long-range Soviet moves in the Balkans.
The East Germans this week intensified their propaganda denouncing West
German "provocations" in West Berlin, especially the Christian Democrats'
congress scheduled for early November.
NATO wound up the first phase of its continuing assessment of the
Czechoslovak crisis, agreeing that the Alliance must be strengthened but
failing to come up with specific measures. Meanwhile, Western governments
have made little economic response to the invasion. East-West trade has been
set back temporarily. but shows no sign of decline over the long run.
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CZECHOSLOVAKS RESIST NEW SOVIET PRESSURES TO CAPITULATE
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Despite new Soviet pressures,
Czechoslovak leaders continued to
procrastinate concerning Moscow's
demands that they implement the
August agreement.
Party leader Dubcek,, Premier
Cernik, and Slovak party chief
Husak received a cold. reception
in Moscow during their summit con-
ference with Brezhnev, Kosygin
and Podgorny on 3-4 October. The
communique issued at the end of
the talks showed that the Russians
are dissatisfied with the pace and
scope of Czechoslovak compliance
with the Moscow agreement of
26 August.. The communique' makes
clear that Moscow is determined
to compel the Czechoslovaks to
act according to its wishes, and
will force Prague to make conces-
sions.
During the talks, Prague
leaders agreed to at least one
major concession, to negotiate a
treaty that will provide a basis
for the indefinite Soviet occupa-
tion of Czechoslovakia. The
agreement calls for the "tempo.-
rary" stationing of an unspeci-
fied number of Soviet troops on
Czechoslovak soil. "Other
troops"--presumably those not
included in the occupation force--
will be withdrawn in "stages."
about 100,000 troops will. remain.
Deputy Premier Hamouz led a
15-member Czechoslovak Government
delegation to Moscow on 8 October
to negotiate the status-of-forces
agreement. It is possible that
President Svoboda also accompanied
this delegation since, he, as an
old general, might feel that his
presence was necessary during such
vital negotiations. He may also
have wanted to make one last at-
tempt to convince the Soviets to
dilute their demands or face a new
leadership crisis in Prague.
While in Moscow, Dubcek and
company apparently also were pres-
sured to make immediate policy
changes that will water down :Dub-
cek's liberalization program--
particularly in the areas of party-
controlled personnel appointments,
ideology, propaganda, censorship,
and centralization of the economy.
Of these, Prague now seems most
ready to impose stricter controls
on the news media.
Despite Soviet pressures
Czechoslovak leaders are not :yet
reconciled to full submission to
all of these demands. On 8 Oc-
tOber the presidium issued a com-?
munique suggesting that Prague
intends to salvage what it can
while talking about the conces-
sions it may make to the Soviets.
Moreover, the statement stressed
that Prague will continue as many
as possible of Dubcek's liberal
policies, and that there will be
no purge at the top level of the
party or government.
Prague also intends to pro-
ceed with federalization of the
country on 28 October
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More specific indications
of Prague's intentions may come
to light when the central commit-
tee convenes, probably next week,
to consider a list of "tasks"--
presumably reflecting Soviet de-
sires--which Dubcek and his col-
leagues will submit for approval.
The Slovak Communist party
after hearing party chief Husak's
report on the trip to Moscow,
took immediate steps to impose
new controls on Slovak informa-
tion media. The party ordered
an increase in the amount of time
and space allotted to propaganda
and to political indoctrination
in the press, radio, and televi-
sion.
In addition, the Soviet am-
bassador in Prague met with the
Czechoslovak minister of justice
on 7 October, possibly to discuss
terminating another phase of
Dubcek's liberalization--the re-
habilitation of former political
prisoners. The Russians will
clearly try to prevent the re-
opening of any more trials that
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would expose Moscow's role in
the bloody purges of the Stalin-
ist era.
the Soviets
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are demanding three training areas
as well as numerous housing fa-
cilities which were to b
e made
available by 10 October.
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NATO's RESPONSE TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS
The NATO allies ended the
first round of their continuing
assessment of the Czechoslovak
crisis last week in general agree-
ment on the need--if not the
means--for strengthening the al-
liance.
In four days of special con-
sultations, all 15 allies recog-
nized the importance of develop-
ing a greater degree of solidarity
in the wake of the Soviet inter-
vention. There was also a gen-
eral reaffirmation--although with-
out French concurrence--of the
traditional concept of "forward
defense," envisioning an initial
response to Soviet aggression as
close to Communist borders as
possible.
The three allied powers
responsible for Berlin reasserted
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their basic commitment to defend
the city. The allies pointedly
subordinated the search for de-
tente to their own defense in-
terests. In advancing the date
of the regular NATO ministerial
meeting to mid-November the mem-
bers symbolically underlined the
importance of the events in Czech-
oslovakia for the alliance..
Judging from initial state-
ments, however, few of the Euro-
pean governments were willing to
match principle with performance.
West Germany tentatively offered
to maintain a small number of
additional forces, while Italy
agreed to upgrade the readiness
of units already assigned to NATO.
Only Greece, with an obvious stake
in strengthening its image, went
beyond a purely minimal commit-
ment, offering both a budgetary
increase and a hike in the :number
of its NATO contingents.
The British, who had already
pledged two increases in their
forces prior to the Soviet in-
vasion, declined to take on any
new obligations until the allies
jointly determined NATO's needs
and priorities. Most of the
smaller members were also unwill-
ing to move ahead without some
kind of prior agreement on joint
defense goals.
One decision taken last
week may eventually meet this re-
quirement. Ignoring French pro-
tests, the North Atlantic Council
finally endorsed a summary state-
ment on the meetings highlighting
various categories of action deemec
necessary. This document may per-
mit some of the more cautious al-
lied governments to urge their
parliaments to grant higher ap-
prfopriations for defense.
The progress toward a col-
lective initiative could also pay
another dividend. It has already
focused new attention on the pos-
sibility that. Europe could assume
a more equitable share of NATO's
defense burdens and responsibili-
ties. In particular, it revived
interest in creating a European
"identity" within NATO. Talk
has also been renewed--especially
in the Benelux states--about using
the Western European Union as a
center for European collaboration
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NEW PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT MAKES IMPRESSIVE DEBUT
Marcello Caetano's initial
moves as prime minister are
creating a favorable impression
of his ability to handle the
transition from Salazar.
His inaugural speech was a
model of balance between affirm-
ing continuity with Salazar's pol-
icies and hinting at the need for
cautious and gradual changes.
While praising Salazar, Caetano
clearly showed that he means to
be his own man. His cabinet re-
tains most of Salazar's key min-
isters, but the few new appoint-
ees---mostly professional people
close to Caeta.no--will bring
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needed energy to the adminis-
tration.
At his first cabinet meet-
ing on 1 October, Caetano pre-
sented general policy lines for
improving public administration,
intensifying economic develop-
ment, and promoting social wel-
fare. Changes in economic and
financial policies to stimulate
growth are also in the offing,
according to a close associate
of Caetano. Reportedly the pace
of government activity has al-
ready picked up, and old methods
of doing business are being ques-
tioned.
Caetano
has established good rapport with
military leaders. He has assured
them that he is determined to
hold all three of Portugal's
African provinces, thus dispel-
ling rumors that he might favor
withdrawal to cut down on the
economic drain caused by military
action there. Ranking military
leaders believe Caetano will be
sympathetic to their need for
more modern equipment to maintain
the African campaign. Caetano's
new minister of defense expects
to achieve greater offensive
punch in the antiguerrilla effort
through more efficient use of ma-
teriel and manpower. He hopes,
at least at first, to get along
without larger funds, realizing
that Caetano is also committed
to carry out development, welfare,
and education programs.
The new government has also
begun to relax censorship some-
what, although for now it will
make no formal legal changes.
The government has decided to
free the top Socialist opposi-
tion leader. Most opposition
leaders are reportedly impressed
with these and other opening
moves by Caetano. They plan to
hold off any demonstrations for
at least two months to see whether
Caetano offers any genuine open-
ing to liberalization. One wild-
cat demonstration by some 50-100
students took place in Lisbon on 25X1
5 October, the anniversary of the
founding of the republic, but was
quickly dispersed by strop police
action.
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Prime Minister
MARCELLO CAETANO
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INVASION TO HAVE No LONG-TERM IMPACT ON EAST-WEST TRADE
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Western governments have
made little economic response to
the invasion of Czechoslovakia
and are not likely to come up
with long-term changes in pol-
icy. East-West trade, set back:
temporarily, shows no sign of a
long-run decline. West Germany
and France have emphasized that:
their trade policies toward the
Warsaw Five will not be affected.
West European official ac-
tions against Warsaw Pact coun-?
tries have been limited to
short-run moves. They have cur-
tailed trade promotional visits
of cabinet-level. officials, and
have slowed down. or delayed
scheduling trade negotiations
and agreements for scientific
and technical cooperation.. Some
decline in business contacts may
have temporarily slowed the ex-
tension of new trade credits. In
some cases, Western countries have
canceled official representa-
tion at trade fairs, and West-
ern businessmen have postponed
or canceled communist trade ex-
hibits in the West.
These actions are expected
to slow down East-West trade over
the next few months, but they
will probably have little or no
long--term impact.
the growth in trade with the USSR
and Eastern Europe will not, be
significantly or permanently af-
fected.
In addition to the direct
costs caused by the disruptions
of the invasion itself, Czechoslo-
vakia will lose out on the West-
ern trade it hoped would result
from its planned economic reform
program. The economies of the
other East European countries suf-
fered only minor economic dislo-
cations as a result of the in-
vasion, and little effect on their
trade with the West is expected.
Eastern Europe is :Losing some of
its-profitable Western tourism
this year, but. West Europeans seek-
ing inexpensive vacations probably
will be :back in force in 1969.
Soviet authorities are said to be
making special, efforts to encourage
a "'business as normal" attitude.
Most West European govern-
ments are sympathetic to increas-
ing their trade with Rumania and
Yugoslavia, which disapproved of
the Warsaw Pact action. Rumania,
although heavily indebted to the
West, is still planning to step
up its credit purchases and has
asked several West European coun-
tries to buy more Rumanian goods.
Yugoslavia, also heavily in debt
to the West, is more inhibited by
this than Rumania and is less prone
to increase its Western imports.
Moreover, Western quota restric-
tions on Yugoslav agricultural and
textile goods, although partially
liberalized by several West Euro-
pean countries, are likely to keep
down growth of trade in these
products in the near future. The
Yugoslavs hope that discussions
next week with the EEC on a non-
preferential trade agreement will
provide additional export oppor-
tunities.
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FAR EAST
There appears to be considerably more smoke than fire behind the new
rash of coup rumors in Saigon. President Thieu's action in putting gov-
ernment forces briefly on full alert on the basis of a low-level report of
highly questionable validity suggests that he may be unrealistically jumpy
about a possible move against him by Vice President Ky. Whatever the case,
Thieu could be laying the groundwork for further purges of military ele-
ments associated with Ky.
In the ground war in Vietnam, major action by Communist forces came
to a virtual standstill as a number of units appeared to be pulling back from
prime target areas. Enemy withdrawals at this time are not, however, as
widespread as during the pronounced lull in the fighting between mid-June
and early August. Communist local forces, meanwhile, continued to chip
away at the government presence in the countryside through terror, harass-
ment and interdiction of lines of communication.
In Communist China's hard-pressed factories, still attempting to over-
come the effects of earlier political excesses, workers are being told to start a
new mass movement to replace "bourgeois" technicians and managers with
workers motivated by the thought of Mao Tse-tung. The confusion is being
further compounded by a new Peking-sponsored drive to force managers to
do manual labor for extended periods.
The international aspects of the Sabah dispute seem for the moment to
have given way to domestic considerations. Philippine President Marcos is
finding the issue useful to him as he begins his bid for re-election next year.
In Malaysia, Prime Minister Rahman and other national Alliance leaders
feel themselves under less compulsion to exploit the Sabah issue because of
the party's already bright prospects for parliamentary elections, also to be
held next year. The furor over Sabah nevertheless is having a unifying effect,
especially in Sabah itself and in the other East Malaysian state of Sarawak,
which has tended to be more autonomy-minded than other constituents of
the Federation. 25X1
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VIETNAM
Precautionary moves were
taken by the Saigon government
on 8 October to forestall a pos-
sible coup following reports
from various sources of plotting
by some low-level South Vietnam-
ese military officers. The va-
lidity of the reporting is as
yet undetermined.
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There is no firm evidence
that. any high-level individual;;
were involved, but President
Thieu clearly is very nervous
over the possibility of a move
against him by Vice President
Ky's faction or other disgruntled
military leaders currently out
of favor.. This was apparent
early last month when he placed
the Saigon police on alert fol-
lowing a coup rumor which later
proved unfounded. However ap-
prehensive Thieu actually may
be, he could use the current
flurry of rumors as a pretext
for arrests and command realign-
ments designed further to neu-
tralize his opponents.
In an address to the National
Assembly on 7 October, Thieu
warned the country against those
who try to satisfy their personal
or factional ambitions by spread-
ing rumors that. the government
has been "bought out by foreigners"
and that it advocates coalition
with the Communists. The return
of General "Big" Minh from exile
on 5 October has apparently pro-
vided added grist for the rumor
mill. Some South Vietnamese
"hawks" allege that Minh harbors
neutralist sentiments.
Saigon's rumormongers are
likely to be particularly active
during the next few weeks with
tales of intrigue and forecasts
of personnel shifts. South Viet-
nam's National Day on 1 November
is traditionally a time for an-
nouncements of changes in the
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assignment of military personnel,
and stories are already abroad
to the effect that Thieu plans
changes that will further
strengthen his position at the
expense of the supporters of Vice
President Ky.
Military Developments
In the large-unit war, the
Communists generally avoided heavy
ground engagements again this
week. Even at the Thuong Duc
Special Forces camp southwest of
Da Nang, which has been threatened
by North Vietnamese regulars since
late last month, enemy actions
were limited to mortar attacks
and ambushes of allied patrols.
US casualties, one of the
best indicators of the intensity
of the war and the level of the
enemy's military effort, have
declined steadily in recent weeks.
US killed in action numbered 290
for the week ending 21 September,
247 for the week before last, and
190 last week. The figure of
190 is the lowest American death
toll since mid-August, just
prior to the opening of the Com-
munists' most recent offensive
phase. South Vietnamese Army and
Communist losses have also dropped
recently, and the 1,654 enemy
killed during the week ending 5
October also was the lowest
weekly figure reported since
early August. A number of Commu-
nist units appear to be pulling
back from prime target areas.
The Communists have tempo-
rarily withdrawn selected units
from active combat zones from
time to time in the past. Dur-
ing the pronounced lull in the
ground war between mid-June and
early August, enemy withdrawals
were considerably more widespread
than at present. In late March
and early April, between the Tet
and May offensives, the Communists
also pulled back selected units
to rear base areas. As in the
past, the current withdrawals
appear to be aimed at providing
some Communist forces with an
opportunity to regroup, refit,
and prepare for renewed initia-
tives.
The enemy's need to recover
from allied spoiling operations
and other difficulties stemming
from unusually heavy rains in
the northern part of the country
are undoubtedly major factors in
the current withdrawals. The
enemy's losses in the actions
which began on 18 August, how-
ever, are substantially lower
than those reported in the May
offensive.
Meanwhile, in guerrilla ac-
tions the Communists continued
their local harassment through-
out all four corps areas. Viet
Cong terrorists, for example,
kidnaped 753 persons during the
past two weeks and killed 348
civilians, including many local
officials, in terror attacks in
villages scattered through many
provinces. The Communists have
also been actively disrupting
lines of communication, espe-
cially Route 4 which connects Sai-
gon and the Viet Cong infested
delta provinces.
Authoritative justification
for the tactical pullback now
going on in South Vietnam was
provided by politburo member Tru-
ong Chinh in a major position
paper broadcast by Hanoi in mid-
September. Speaking on behalf
of the politburo, Truong Chinh
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SECRET'
noted that "at times, under cer-
tain circumstances, we must. shift
to the defensive to gain time,
dishearten the enemy and buildd
up our forces." He went on, how-
ever, to state flatly that the
purpose of such a shift is to
"prepare for a new offensive."
Truong Chinh's remarks came
as part of an over-all statement
of regime policy both on the war
in the South and on problems in
North Vietnam. He reaffirmed
in unmistakable terms Hanoi's
continued insistence on the "vio-
lent" approach to seizing power
in South Vietnam, and he specifi-
cally ruled out any possibility
of "peaceful" political competi-
tion with the current Saigon gov-
ernment. The only road for the
Communists in the South, accord-
ing to Tru.ong Chinh, is the vio-
lent one--increased military pres-
sure combined with political ac-
tion, which in his defintion,
consists of such tactics as crip-
pling strikes and show-of-force
demonstrations.
Despite his reaffirmation
of the correctness of Hanoi's
past policies, Truong Chinh ad-
mitted that the "general offen-
sive and uprising" launched at
Tet this year has been less than
a complete success. Tet, he told
his audience, was not an end in
itself. It was "just a new step,
the beginning of a new phase in
the war. "Many hardships and
sacrifices" will still have to
be faced, according to Chinh,
suggesting that the party leader-
ship is prepared to dig in for
another long :period of fighting
if it proves :necessary..
Truong Chinh's observations
on North Vietnam also tend to
copfirm that :Hanoi. foresees the
possibility of a rather long
period of continued combat. His
proposals on economic development
in. the North, for example, were
pointed toward those steps which
cap be taken during a period of
possible renewed bombing north of
the 19th parallel..
Hanoi Increasing Imports
Hanoi's seaborne imports
increased by 35 percent during
the first nine months of 1968
compared with the same period
last year and this higher level
of shipping is expected to con-
tinue. Foodstuffs and petroleum
from the USSR and China accounted
for most of the increase. Food-
stuffs this year represent about
38 percent of North Vietnamese
imports compared with about 30
percent last year. Imports of
lage quantities of rice and
flour are expected to continue
in light of the poor North Viet-
namese agricultural performance.
The USSR continued to be
the largest single supplier of
goods to North Vietnam, account-
ing for 43 percent of North Viet-
namese imports. Deliveries from
Chinese Communist ports have also
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SECRET
risen, and they constitute 35
percent of North Vietnamese im-
ports.
The combination of record
import levels and recent bad
weather has led to unprecedented
congestion at Haiphong. Average
layover time for departing dry
cargo ships jumped from 14 days
in May to almost 43 days in Sep-
tember, despite improvements in
the capacity of the port since
the bombing
25X1
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMY CONTINUES TO LAG
The propaganda treatment
given the Chinese Communist econ-
omy during National Day celebra-
tions on 1 October was uncharac-
teristically low-keyed, reflect-
ing this year's dearth of achieve-
ments. The keynote addresses by
Chou En-lai and Lin Piao at the
major National Day events did not
refer to the economy at all.
Peking's continuing concen-
tration on political programs
was highlighted in the week pre-
ceding the holiday. Although
factories were still attempting
to overcome the effects of pre-
vious political excesses, workers
were told to start a new mass
movement to replace "bourgeois"
technicians and managers with
workers motivated by the thought
of Mao Tse-tung. The press made
extravagant claims of workers
designing machine tools beyond
the ability of professional en-
gineers and adapting steel roll-
ing mills to uses exceeding orig-
inal design specifications. The
beginning of the new worker move-
ment was followed in early Oc-
tober with a large-scale program
directing all managers to do
manual labor for extended periods.
In addition, some of the most de-
pendable workers--about 7 percent
of the labor force, according to
a provincial broadcast--are being
withdrawn into "propaganda teams"
to supervise schools and propa-
ganda media.
This preoccupation with pol-
itics in factories places an-
other stumbling block in the path
to recovery from the depressed
production of 1967, when the to-
tal value of industrial output is
estimated to have declined some
10 to 20 percent from 1966. Over
all, there will probably be lit-
tle if any increase over last
year in 1968. In certain impor-
tant military programs further
declines are known to have taken
place.
Agriculture in 1968 has not
enjoyed
the exceptionally good
weather
of 1967 which brought
forth a
bumper crop. In 1968,
Peking h
as increased its pur-
chase of
chemical fertilizer
from Jap
an and the European con-
sortium,
Nitrex, to a record 7
million
tons partly to compen-
sate for
production shortfalls.
Most of
the fertilizer did not, 25X1
however,
arrive in time for use
on this
year's main crop.
25X1
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LAOTIAN POLITICAL FACTIONS CONTINUE MANEUVERING
The Pathet Lao appear to be
raising their price for any re-
turn to the government.
Recent Communist broadcasts,
while reaffirming that any future
accommodation with Vientiane must
be within the framework of the
1962 Geneva Accords, charged that
the tripartite structure worked
out among the Laotian parties,
and which gave the Pathet Lao some
relatively unimportant cabinet
posts in the government, has now
been "wrecked" by Souvanna and the
rightists. The Communists are
demanding that any settlement
must reflect the "realities of
the current situation."
Pathet Lao spokesman Sot
Phetrasi recently spelled out
these "realities" in a conversa-
tion with a US official by warn-
ing that changes in territorial
control and in the Vientiane po-
litical scene since 1962 will
have to be taken into account be-
fore any new formula can be worked
out. In the past year, the Com-
munists have strengthened their
position militarily through a
number of victories.
Although no new negotiations
are in the offing, Prime Minister
Souvanna is making another of his
periodic efforts to get the gov-
ernment organized for a future
political contest with the Pathet
Lao. A number of his more for-
ward-looking lieutenants are try-
ing to interest younger civilian
elements in establishing a united
government party. So far the ef-
fort has had no more success than
others in past years. The opposi-
tion of some military officers to
anything involving a possible ac-
commodation with the Pathet Lao
is the major stumbling block.
Souvanna is also making lit-
tle headway in streamlining the
military establishment. A reor-
ganization plan has gone into
effect, and a move is presently
under way to break the concentra-
tion of power in the general
staff by shifting some of its
responsibilities to the Defense
Ministry. Thus far, however, the 25X1
old-guard military leadership has
been able to maintain its posi-
tion despite the changes.
25X1
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SECRET
PHILIPPINE-MALAYSIAN DEADLOCK PERSISTS
No significant exchanges
between Manila and Kuala Lumpur
over the Philippine claim to Sa-
bah have occurred since mid-Sep-
tember, and both sides appear to
have turned for the moment to
the domestic implications of the
dispute.
The Philippines has announced
that its embassy staff members
will not withdraw from Kuala Liam-
pur as announced earlier. Also,
Manila has acceded to a Malaysian
request and has pulled out its
customs inspectors stationed in
Sabah; under the antismuggling
agreement which Kuala Lumpur re-
cently abrogated.
Although Philippine Presi-
dent Marcos is currently trying
to prevent any further increases
in-Philippine-Malaysian tensions,
at home he is playing the Sabah
dispute to his own political ad-
vantage. Marcos appears to have
turned the tables on political op-
ponents who kept: the claim to Sa-
bah alive in order to discomfit
him. He is showing considerable
skill in converting an issue he
initially regarded as a political
embarrassment into a matter of na-
tional honor, which he is confi-
dent will strengthen his bid for
re-election next year. He prob-
ably also calculates that emo-
tions over Sabah can be used to
deflect public dissatisfaction
*
over the administration's per-
formance on domestic problems.
In Malaysia the issue has
also tended to, consolidate popu-
lar' support for the government,
but Prime Minister Rahman, in
sharp contrast to Marcos, so far
has not exploited the issue for
domestic political purposes. His
national Alliance coalition has
a commanding parliamentary ma-
jority and is in no danger of
defeat in elections set for next
spring.
In the East Malaysian state
of Sarawak, however, the position
of the local Alliance affiliate
is weaker than that of the parent
body, and it has made some ef-
foxHt: to strengthen its position
by.exploiting the dispute. Oppo-
sition parties have been persuaded
to participate in government--spon--
sored rallies and to issue state-
ments denouncing Manila. More
significantly, the Principal op-
position leader, Stephen Ningkan,
once a vocal advocate of greater
autonomy, has now loudly pro--
claimed his party's loyalty to
the concept of` national unity.
In Sabah itself, Chief Minister
Tun Mustapha has deliberately
exaggerated the Philippine 25X1
"threat" to further consolidate
his already strong osition.
25X1
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SECRET
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The US decision to begin negotiations on the sale of 50 Phantom jet
aircraft to Israel has produced a fierce outcry from the Arab states and
charges that the US has thus torpedoed the Jarring Mission. Israeli Foreign
Minister Eban's "nine-point" peace plan, as enunciated in the UN on 8
October, is similarly meeting Arab criticism as providing no new proposals
toward a Middle East settlement.
The Shah of Iran reportedly believes that his recent trip to the USSR
reinforced his policy of national independence. The Shah says that he
refused to permit a condemnation of US policy in the joint communiqu6
unless Iran's condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was also
added. The communique therefore dismissed international affairs in one
sentence.
Algerian Premier Boumediene, overriding the suspicions of his foreign
minister, is continuing to pursue his detente with Moroccan King Hassan.
The timing of a Boumediene-Hassan "summit" is still undecided, however.
Both Congo governments are preoccupied with the Mulele affair. Braz-
zaville's decision to sever relations with Kinshasa as a reaction to Mulele's
execution was received with silence across the river, where Kinshasa officials
presumably are discussing an appropriate response.
In the Nigerian civil war, numerous Biafran counterattacks, made pos-
sible by a sharp increase in arms imports, have nearly halted the federal
offensive and even regained some ground for the secessionists. French
support for Biafra now includes the airlift of weapons to the Ivory Coast and
Gabon for transshipment to Biafra. The fighting is likely to be drawn out for
a long time.
Id Sierre Leone, the political situation continues to deteriorate as Prime
Minister Stevens' northern-dominated government tries to put the lid on
activities of the southern-based opposition party. Tribal tensions are pro-
ducing increasing unrest within the army as well as among civilians.
The entire area from West Africa to India will face a locust threat for
the next two years if the swarms presently moving through the Sudan into
East Africa are not brought under control. The East African locust control
organization is critically short of insecticide, spraying planes, and pilots,
however. 25X1
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LOCUST PLAGUE THREATENS AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST
r
92322 10-68
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LOCUST THREAT INCREASES IN EAST AFRICA
The locust plague which has
been menacing the Middle East
and East Africa since last fall
is entering a new and more crit-
ical phase. Crop production
throughout the area could be
threatened for the next two years
if new swarms in East Africa
are not quickly controlled.
Twenty separate locust
swarms, ranging in size from
44 to 300 square miles, have
been reported moving eastward
30 to 40 miles per day across
the Sudan. At this rate they
will reach the foot of the
Ethiopian highlands this week.
A large area of Ethiopia is
already infested, and the
arrival of additional hordes
from the Sudan could cause
serious damage to the Ethiopian
harvest.
The Sudanese have been
dilatory in their own efforts
to contain the locust threat.
The ineffective government in
Khartoum was reluctant even to
acknowledge the existence of
the plague until locusts appeared
in the environs of the capital.
At the same time, the Ethiopian
authorities have not fully rec-
ognized the gravity of their
situation, which could result
in a major food shortage within
six months if the locusts are
not controlled.
Locust control facilities
are still extremely limited in
East Africa, despite efforts by
the regional Desert Locust Con-
trol Organization for East Africa
(DLCOEA) to mobilize support for
spraying activities to put down
the threat. The organization is
now suffering a critical shortage
of insecticides, and both spray-
ing planes and pilots are in
short supply.
If the locusts are not
controlled in Ethiopia and
Somalia they will probably move
south into Kenya, threatening
that country's crops as well.
The Kenyan Government is already
preparing for an invasion.
Locusts now moving in the
Sudan could also move south to
Uganda.
The locust threat farther
east seems to be under slightly
better control. The Pakistanis
claim that the swarms there have
been eliminated, and there have
been no recent reports of serious
infestations in either Iran or
India. Nevertheless, the present
breeding trend, and failure to
control the insects in the crucial
area of the Sudan and the Horn
of Africa, will leave the entire
Middle East - African area vul-
nerable to locust swarms for the
next two years.
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SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA
,Benin City
0
L-D Federal attack
Biafran counterattack
O 25 6O 7,5
STATUTE MILES
92314 10-68 CIA
e Enuou
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
FERNANDO PO
(SP.)
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Port Harcourt,
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RESUPPLIED BIAFRANS STALL NIGERIAN THRUSTS
25X1
25X1
Biafran resistance to the
federal Nigerian push on remain-
ing secessionist-held territory
has stiffened considerably over
the past few weeks, mainly be-
cause of a marked increase in
arms supplies to the rebels. This
increase in munitions will prob-
ably enable the Biafrans to delay
considerably the capture of their
remaining strongholds by federal
forces, despite federal superiority
in numbers and equipment.
The airlift of arms from
Libreville and Abidjan has re-
ceived at least
from the French;
the French
Air Force may even a moving French
arms there for shipment to Biafra.
This increased arms supply
will not only enable the Biafrans
to hold their remaining territory
longer, but will also make more
likely a prolonged guerrilla ef-
fort by the Biafrans when and if
these bastions are taken by the
Nigerians. Morale in Biafra still
appears generally high, and Biafran
leader Ojukwu has shown no signs
of giving up the struggle.
In recent fighting, Nigeria's
lst Division has made no signifi-
cant advances since capturing
Okigwi on 30 September. Last month
the division had launched a push
from the north toward Umuahia, the
last major Biafran town still in
secessionist hands. The 3rd Ma-
rine Commando Division, which made
gains in the south during August
and September, is now occupied with
sharp Biafran counterattacks. The
2nd Division has been unable to move
beyond its long-held positions around
Onitsha and Awka.
25X1 25X1
* *
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MULELE AFFAIR ROC
The return and execution of
rebel leader Pierre Mulele has
created considerable agitation
in both Congo (Kinshasa) and
Congo (Brazzaville) and has pre-
cipitated a rupture of relations
between the two governments.
Mulele was seized, tried
and executed secretly following
his return to Kinshasa from Braz--
zaville under an amnesty granted
by Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko
in President Mobutu's absence.
An associate of leftist former
Premier Patrice Lumumba, Mulele
had been directing a bloody guer-
rilla campaign against the cen-
tral government in the western
Congo since 1963, but in September
he fled to Brazzaville in search
of sanctuary.
Ordered by Mobutu to return
Mulele to Kinshasa by any means,
Congolese authorities first, tried
to kidnap the rebel leader. When
that failed, Bomboko went to
Brazzaville to negotiate hi vol-
untary:.return. After several days'
discussions with Mulele and Braz-
zaville officials, Bomboko granted
amnesty and Mulele returned to
Kinshasa almost in triumph for a
round of welcoming festivities.
The reaction of most Congo-
lese--smarting under the remem-
brance of the atrocities ascribed
to Mulele and his followers---was
bitter, however, and many demanded
his arrest and execution. When
MS Bom CONGOS
Mobutu returned to the Congo
several days later, he quickly re-
versed his foreign minister's
decision and announced that Mulele
would; be arrested and brought to
trial,. A three-man military tri-
bunal:met secretly on17 October
and sentenced Mulele to death.
His execution was announced on 9
,October.
there had been indications
that ~ioth countries tried to play
down the affair in an effort to
minimize the damage to their
official relations, which had
been improving over, the past two
years',. Prior to the announcement
of Mulele's execution, the govern-
ment-pontrolled radio 'in Brazza-
villedenounced the demonstration
which; had been staged by local
Leftist youths in front of the
Kinshasa embassy following Mule-
'Le's arrest. In Kinshasa, the
press; put much of the ''blame for
-the demonstration on foreign--
i.e., Cuban and Chinese--influ-
ence and pleaded with Kinshasa
youth to keep calm.
Once Mulele's execution was
made public, however,LBrazzaville's
rulin military-civilian council
promptly announced its decision
to sever relations. The action
reflects the Brazzaville govern-
ment's acute embarrassment over
the episode and its strong desire
to dissociate itself publicl from
Kinshasa's double-dealin
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25X1
25X1
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SECRET
INDIA'S MONSOON CAUSING PROBLEMS
An erratic monsoon is creat-
ing hardships in some areas and
will reduce Indian foodgrain
production by several million
tons under last year's record
harvests.
After nearly a month of un-
usually dry weather, late Septem-
ber and early October rains have
provided some relief. The belated
rains have revived. some standing
crops, enabled the overdue trans-
plantation of paddy in key rice
producing areas in the south,
Normal Withdrawal Dates of SW Monsoon
AFGHANISTAN
CHINA
I
1Sep
Area of
PAKISTAN
violent
storm
/
1 Oct NEPAL NGTAN
..
-:A-;SAM Jam
/
~
00*0
/
PAKISTAN
/ ~ BIHA R
1000,
4
CseNa. ~ yet
\
INDIA BURMA
~
15 0ct
~
1 Nov
0
001
~
GO
i 1 Jan
6
bN
'
92317 10-
8
CSn
,
and have improved planting condi-
tions for winter crops.
Nevertheless, crop damage
from the August-September dry
spell is likely to keep foodgrain
production several million tons
below last year's record level
of 96-100 million tons. This
summer's production may approach
60 million tons and the normally
much smaller winter crop is un-
likely to match the record high
of about 31 million tons harvested
last spring.
The October rains that broke
the dry spell in northeastern
India turned into a violent and
destructive 60-hour storm in the
Himalayas. The Indian protector-
ate of Sikkim was. probably the
hardest hit, although northern
West Bengal and parts of neigh-
boring Bihar and Assam states
were also heavily damaged. Thou-
sands have been reported missing
or killed and thousands more are
homeless.
The expected decline in food-
grain production will be a psy-
chological setback to the "green
revolution," and India probably
will have to release much of the
buffer stock accumulated from
last year's bumper harvests.
Large-scale imports of food will
probably be necessary for several
more years, i 1 to replenish
the reserves. 25X1
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Student-organized outbreaks erupted again in several Latin American
countries during the past week. Some of the disturbances were linked to the
anniversary of Che Guevara's death on 9 October, while others seemed to be
in reaction to the coup in Peru earlier this month or in sympathy with the
Mexican students. As expected, US installations were among the primary
targets.
Students stoned a US-Chilean binational center and the US Consulate in
Santiago. In Peru, minor violence-much of it student-inspired-occurred
throughout the country as demonstrators protested the ouster of President
Belaunde by the military last week. In the Dominican Republic, Molotov
cocktails were exploded outside a US-run binational center, and explosives
were discovered near other US facilities. In Brazil, antigovernment student
demonstrations on 8 October resulted in bloodshed when a large security
force moved against the protesters.
5X6
At present there is no evidence available that student riots in Latin
America are interrelated or directed from abroad. Local Communists, Trot-
skyites, Castroites, and other leftist extremists among the students, however,
have been quick and well prepared-and in many cases well armed-to
exploit the student grievances.
The new military government in Peru has expropriated the large US-
owned International Petroleum Company. This move demonstrated the
strong nationalist sentiment of the regime.
The execution of two "confessed saboteurs" in Cuba on 7 October has
re-emphasized Fidel Castro's apparent concern over "counterrevolutionary"
acts. Although most of the frequent reports of antiregime incidents in Cuba
during recent weeks remain unconfirmed, some strong reaction by indi-
viduals against the increasing severity of living conditions seems inevitable.
The Bahamas has taken an important step toward eventual inde-
pendence as a result of the recent London constitutional conference. Upon 25X1
his return from London, Prime Minister Pindling announced that his govern-
ment now will have responsibility for internal security and will also gain
power to negotiate foreign trade, labor, and cultural agreements
25X1
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SECRET
PERU'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT
One of the first official acts
of the military government of Presi-
dent Velasco, which ousted President
Belaunde on 3 October, was to expro-
priate large holdings of the US-
owned International Petroleum Com-
pany (IPC) in northwestern Peru.
This move reflects the new govern-
ment's strong nationalistic senti-
ment and will increase its popular
support. The expropriation will,
also delay foreign investment and
debt refinancing which Peru badly
needs and has been seeking.
The decree, made public on
9 October, expropriated the La Brea
and Parinas oil fields, the refin-
ery complex at Talara, pipelines,
port facilities, and other assets
connected with the operation of the
EXPROPRIATES US COMPANY
oil fields and refinery. Army
its claim to some $144 million that
troops were immediately ordered in
IPC allegedly owed the state for
to take possession of the installa-
"back taxes" and "unjust enrich-
tions. The decree states that IPC's
merit."
"debt" to Peru will be applied
against the company's assets.
The public disturbances that
the military government faced in
The IPC has long been an emo-
its first week in power appear to
tional. issue with most Peruvians,
be dissi ating.
many of whom believe that the com-
APRA, Peru's
pany has "unjustly enriched" itself
largest and best organized political
through the exploitation of natural
party, has decided to take a posi-
resources which should be used for
tibn of "responsible" opposition to
the betterment of Peru. The settle-
the new government; APRA leaders
ment that the Belaunde administra-
are. now in the process of trying to
tion made with IPC in August was
form a "national civic front" with
termed. a "sell-out" by many civilian
the: pro-Belaunde faction of the
politicians and has been used to
Popular Action Party and other mod-
justify the military take-over of
erate parties. The parties of both
the government. The Belaunde agree-
the extreme right and extreme left
ment involved the government's
so far appear to be supporting the
acquiring only the La Brea and Pa-
military take-over.
rinas oil fields, in return dropping
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Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 Oct 681
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General
JUAN VELASCO
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Several Latin American for-
eign ministers present at the
United Nations sessions are con-
suiting in what was described as
a "desultory manner," on recogni-
tion of the new military govern-
ment, according to the US mission.
The Argentine representative at
the UN has disclosed that his
government may recognize Peru as
early as 11 October. Many Latin
American countries are expected
to recognize the new Peruvian
Government within 15 days, al-
though no country wants to be
either first or last to do so. 25X1
Spain was the first country to
accord reco nition.
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COMPLEX PROBLEMS PLAGUE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT
The Costa e Silva government
is being hard pressed by a variety
of perplexing problems that in-
volve the military, students,,
workers, and. elements of the
church.
Perhaps the most serious is
a crisis in the air force caused.
by the apparent attempts of right-
wing officers to use an elite
parachute unit to eliminate oppo-
sition student and political lead-
ers. A shake-up in the air force
leadership is likely if the al-
legations prove true or are widely
accepted. This scandal is sympto-
matic of the renewed activity
among right-wing extremists--not
only in the military but also in
civilian circles---who believe the
government has noi_ dealt firmly
enough with corruption and sub-
version.
Army minister General Lyra
Tavares has confided his unease
over the "national situation" to
the US army attache. The general
is upset by the implications of
the air force crisis and by the
activities of a group around the
President who "shield" Costa e
Silva from unpleasant truths.
The general. believes that
many officers deeply resent recent
speeches by left-wing federal
deputies bitterly attacking the
military. He reportedly has urged
the President to suspend the po-
litical rights of at least one of:
the offenders--a move that would
be of questionable constitution-
ality. Certainly there is some
disquiet among congressional lead-
ers who fear that any further gov-
ernment curtailment of legislative
prerogatives or interference with
the rights of deputies would irrep-
arably damage the prestige and
independence of the congress.
Military restiveness is com-
plicated by other developments on
the civilian front.; Rioting in
Sao Paulo last week took one stu-
dent's life. Radical leftist Sao
Paulo University students continue
to fend off attacks' by their con-
servative MacKenzi.e University
counterparts---who appear to have
at least tacit police support.
Leftist-led students staged a large
protest march on 4',October in Sao
Paulo that drew some support from
nonstudent groups.' A second dem-
onstration on 8 October also re-
sulted in violence.'', Heavy-handed
police action in breaking up the
marches may bring the students new
sympathizers.
i
Labor unhappiness has been
manifested by illegal strikes by
bank and metal workers in Belo
Hor_izonte and by bank workers in
other cities. Swift government
intervention has temporarily quelled
the strikers' enthusiasm, but new
outbreaks of labor discontent seem
likely in the next few weeks.
i
The church haslalso added to
Costa e Silva's burdens. The mod-
erate cardinal. of Sao Paulo re-
fusjed last week to accept a decor-
ation from the President--a ges-
ture that not only dealt a personal
rebuff to Costa e Silva but also
made clear the Sao Paulo clergy's
reluctance to endorse the govern-
ment publicly. In northeast Bra-
zil', Archbishop Dom'.Helder Camara
has inaugurated his."Liberating
Moral Pressure" campaign that will
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stress "nonviolent" efforts to al-
leviate social injustices. The
campaign seems likely to serve as
a focal point for the disapproba-
tion of conservative civilian and
military men who regard Dom Helder
as a Communist.
There is growing evidence
that at least some officers are
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not satisfied with Costa e Silva's
performance.
Stability is largely predi-
cated upon Costa e Silva's ability
to react firmly but judiciously to
these new challenges. So far, at
least, he has not shown this kind
of leadershi
ECUADOR'S VELASCO WEATHERS FIRST CONGRESS SESSION
President Jose Maria Velasco
has come through the first session
of congress without serious chal-
lenge and is asserting his economic
and political control with deter-
mination.
A working agreement between
the Velasquistas and the center-
left coalition in both the house
and senate did not result in sig-
nificant legislation, but did with-
stand efforts by rightists and ex-
president Carlos Arosemena to cur-
tail Velasco's power over many gov-
ernmental appointments. Arosemena
reportedly is disappointed that
more of his followers did not re-
ceive government jobs in return
for his electoral assistance to
Velasco, and the uneasy truce be-
tween the two old enemies appears
to have broken down. The most un-
savory Arosemena appointee has been
removed as head of the security
agency, but other supporters remain
in positions where their leader's
penchant for mischief could cause
Velasco trouble.
Sugar exporters in Guayaquil,
the first target of Velasco's cru-
sade against the "oligarchy" he
accuses of exploiting the country,
have agreed to his demands, at least
for the present. The three larg-
est mills will turn over their ex-
tra profits on sales to the US to
the government--a windfall which
may amount to nearly $1 million in
1968. Although his government is
critically short on operating funds
and long on debts, Velasco says he
will use the money for development
projects.
Velasco is exploring closer
trade and, possibly, other ties
with Communist countries. He in-
vited the Soviet ambassador to
Chile to his inauguration, but then
was noncommittal on the ambassador's
overture toward a resumption of dip-
lomatic relations. He has been
less demagogic than in the past
about Ecuador's boundary dispute
with Peru, and has kept a discreet
silence on the military coup in
Peru--the method by which Vela
was ousted in 19
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VENEZUELAN ELECTION
Venezuela's presidential
election campaign has grown per-
ceptibly hotter as the 1 December
election date draws nearer.
The relative strengths of
leading candidates Gonzalo Bar-
rios, Rafael Caldera, Luis Prieto,
and Miguel Burelli Rivas have
shifted somewhat, but none has a
lead wide enough to ensure vic-
tory. The closeness of the con-
test has already resulted in
charges of coup plotting, vio-
lence, and election fraud.
Supporters of governing Demo-
cratic Action (AD) Party candi-
date Gonzalo Barrios have attacked
the platform of the Christian So-
cialist Party (COPEI) as a stat-
ist, totalitarian document which
would regiment the economic and
political life of the nation.
The AD has flooded the press with
a series of ads portraying COPEI
leaders and, presidential candi-
date Rafael Caldera as New World
Nazis. These charges will prob-
ably reinforce the suspicions of
some members of the middle class
and business community who are
already concerned over Caldera's
alleged inability to control rad:L-
cal elements within his party.
In response Caldera accused
the government of preparing a
coup d'etat to keep COPEI from
office and that the government
was importing arms to equip re-
gional and local party organiza-
tions. Although AD leaders dis-
Although the
litary acknowledge their commit-
nt to peaceful. political change,
e US Embassy notes that the
rrent situation has the military
a quandary over possible future
urses of action.
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Page 30 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17L Oct 68
CPMPAIGN HEATS UP
miss Caldera.'s accusations as a
desperate: stratag m to avoid cer-
tain defeat in December, other
political groups have voiced simi-
lar fears that the AD does not
intend to relinquish power if it
loses.
In another election develop-
nnent, Luis Prieto, the candidate
of the People's Electoral Move-
ment (MEP) which broke away from
trhe AD in December 1967, report--
ddly has refused to accept open
k acking from the Communist Party's
4:Lectoral front, the Union for
Advancement (UPA). Prieto re-
portedly told UPA leaders that
4f his wishes were disregarded
1e would flatly reject UPA sup-
sort and attack the Communists
vfrith every resource at his com-
mand. Prieto has been increas-
aj.ngly worried over the damage to
k.is candidacy of such public sup-
port, and has taken pains to in-
I US Embassy officials that
the party has not made, nor will
:
Make, any deals with the UPA.
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