THE SOVIET POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Soviet Position in Eastern Europe after Czechoslovakia
Secret
N! 39
11 April 1969
No. 0365/69A
C: [::
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THE SOVIETPOSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Czechoslovakia's dramatic and unexpected evolution toward a pluralistic
society, in 1968 revealed to Moscow the extent to which the existing order in
Eastern Europe is vulnerable to popular pressures for liberalization. Although
Moscow resorted to invasion and occupation to eliminate the threat, the results have
not measured up to its expectations.
in Czechoslovakia, the minimum goals of the occupation have probably been
met.-, The danger that Prague would gradually drift out of the Soviet orbit and into
that of the West, with intolerable consequences for the Soviet position in Eastern
Europe, has,been eliminated.
Moscow has not, however, been able to replace the reformist Czechoslovak
leadership with a puppet regime. It has adjusted to the situation by continually
forcing the Czechoslovak leaders to make concessions that it hopes will in the long
run obliterate the reforms of 1968. Moscow probably would like eventually to bring
about the downfall of the present Prague regime with a minimum risk of popular
upheaval, but the path of further developments is still unsure.
Beyond Czechoslovakia, the invasion served to add impetus to existing cen-
trifugal tendencies. Albania and Yugoslavia havE turned, respectively, to China and
the West for support against Moscow. Rumania has also made quiet approaches to
the West and has resisted Soviet pressures. Even among the loyal "allies," the
present _ leaders have lost prestige internally because of their participation in the
invasion.
Moscow is now using both bilateral and multilateral pressures to tighten its
control of its "allies," The Soviets look to the Warsaw Pact and CEMA organizations
as the. means of strengthening their institutional ties with the East Europeans. To
date, however, Moscow has made little progress, and differing national interests will
probably add to the difficulties that must be overcome.
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PRELUDE TO INVASION
Beginning in January 1968, events in Czech-
oslovakia slowly opened the Soviet leaders' eyes
to the fact that all was not well in Eastern
Europe. There is little evidence that Moscow
before that time perceived any serious threat to
its interests in the area. Rumania was, of course,
an annoyance, but hardly more than that. Bucha-
rest, for all its ostentatious demonstrations of
independence and only marginal participation in
the affairs of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), had been
careful to avoid any suggestion that it would
break completely with the "socialist camp."
There could be no talk of a "threat to socialism"
in Rumania, where moves toward liberalization
were barely under way and were under the com-
plete control of the party. As for the two Balkan
heretics, nonaligned Yugoslavia and pro-Chinese
Albania, Moscow gave every sign of having ac-
cepted their independence as an established fact,
albeit with bad grace.
It was clearly appreciated in Eastern Europe
that for geopolitical and ideological reasons there
were limits to what Moscow would consider tol-
erable behavior. For those parties and individuals
inclined to experiment, however, there was room
to do so, particularly in the economic sphere.
Certainly, Moscow was reluctant to revert to out-
right repression to ensure total conformity when
this seemed unnecessary and would have jeopard-
ized its efforts to establish a working relationship
with the West.
Soviet tolerance, along with the growing
self-confidence of the East European leaders--the
latter a function of the apparent erosion of any
serious domestic threat to Communist rule-
resulted in a modest resurgence of national asser-
tiveness among Moscow's European allies. This
tendency was by no means limited to reformist or
nationalistic regimes, such as the Hungarian or
Rumanian. Even East Germany's Ulbricht felt
free to take stands that were not always strictly in
accord with those of the Soviets. The Czecho-
Slovak reformers were doubtless both inspired by
the success of other reformers, particularly in
Hungary, and encouraged by the conviction that
the Soviets could be persuaded to accept liberali-
zation-or at least to refrain from taking action to
block it.
If the Czechoslovaks failed to judge the
limits of Soviet tolerance, the Soviets also seri-
ously misread the political climate within Czecho-
slovakia and the character of the new generation
of leaders that came to power in January. This
was illustrated by Soviet party leader Brezhnev's
refusal to intervene on behalf of the beleaguered
Novotny and his endorsement of Dubcek, when
he went to Prague in December, 1967, as one of
several acceptable successors.
Soviet confidence in the new leaders, how-
ever, diminished rapidly. The Dubcek leadership,
largely to put pressure on its conservative op-
ponents, loosened the restrictions under which
the Czechoslovak information media had oper-
ated. The resultant tide of reformist and liberal
sentiment, which found expression both in the
press and through the activities of spontaneously
organized-and often predominantly non-
Communist-pressure groups, in turn swept the
official leadership along in its wake. The result
was a dramatic and apparently irrevocable shift
toward a pluralistic society that threatened ulti-
mately to carry Czechoslovakia away from its
association with the other East Europeans and
with the Soviet Union.
The threat to Soviet interests was not
limited to Czechoslovakia. Polish student demon-
strations in April, although quickly suppressed by
the government, proved that the Czechoslovaks
had would-be emulators in other Eastern
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%ftor SECR.FT J
Meeting at Bratislava: Kos i a (USSR), AW
(Bul-
garia), Svoboda (Czechoslovak a), Brezhenv (USSR),
Gomulka (Poland), Ulbricht (East Germany), Dubcek
(Czechoslovakia).
European countries. Even the neo-Stalinist East
German regime was not wholly immune to the
Czechoslovak virus. East German officials reacted
with typically exaggerated alarm to weak and
scattered instances of dissent throughout the sum-
mer of 1968.
Once the Czechoslovak leaders had proven
their unwillingness or, more probably, their in-
ability to fulfill the terms of the Cierna and
Bratislava agreements of 3 August, Moscow could
see no palatable alternative to intervention.
Bluster and threat clearly had proven to be inef-
fective, even when backed by Soviet troops
massed on the Czechoslovak frontiers. With the
risk of Western intervention and the Possibility of
Czechoslovak resistance judged to be minimal, the
die was cast.
MIXED RESULTS OF THE INVASION
Moscow Probably calculated that the mere
presence of Soviet troops would be enough to
sweep away the Czechoslnvalr -r-- _
Main Points o? the
BRATISLAVA AGREEMENT
3 August 1968,
' support, consolidations, and protection of (socialist)
gains... is a common internationalist out
countries. y of all socialist
? ,..consolidate the leading role of the working class and its
vanguard, the Communist Parties,
? Unbending loyalty of
citable Marx ism- Leninismi-and
irrecon-
cialist struggle against bourgeois ideology and
forces. all antiso-
? ...snot to) allow anyone to drive a wedge betwee
ist states or undermine the foundations n social-
social system. of the socialist
' ...deepen the all-around cooperation of their Countries. .
wurxs, but these assumptions went yawr"IM y. ut The eir Moscow's would-be collaborators, cowed by
the unanimity and vehemence of the popular
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opposition to the invasion, came forward one by
one to deny any complicity and retired-for the
moment-from the political stage. The legitimate
leaders, who had been spirited off to Moscow by
Soviet officials within hours of the occupation of
Prague, were buoyed by the demonstrations of
popular support and adamantly turned down
Soviet demands for changes within their ranks.
Moreover, they refused to sanction the invasion
by issuing a public statement that socialism in
Czechoslovakia had been threatened by a counter-
revolution.
Faced with the unexpected intransigence of
the Czechoslovaks and an anticipated-but still
unwelcome-wave of international condemnation,
Moscow declined to impose an occupation gov-
ernment at bayonet point. Instead, it took the
embarrassing step of dealing with the leaders
whom its press had just denounced as "counter-
revolutionaries" and "traitors." This decision was
doubtless influenced by the probability that a
puppet government could not be installed with-
out converting into a bloodbath what had been a
remarkably bloodless occupation.
The Soviets did, however, succeed in ex-
torting concessions from the hard-pressed Czecho-
slovak leaders. These were formalized in the Mos-
cow Agreement of 26 August, which the Czecho-
clovaks were forced to sign before being allowed
to return home. This agreement committed the
Czechoslovaks to enforce the provisions of the
Cierna and Bratislava agreements and bound them
to "coordinate" their policies with the Soviets. In
effect, the agreement was aimed at the heart of
the liberal Czechoslovak Action Program. In re-
turn, the Soviets promised to withdraw their
troops once the "threat to socialism" had passed.
THE FORMS OF SOVIET PRESSURE
The "agreements" forced on Prague in
August still serve as Moscow's goals for Czecho-
slovakia, as the Czechoslovaks are regularly re-
minded. The Soviets have moved slowly, however,
in their application of pressure to gain corn-
pliance. The Soviet troops, whose presence was
belatedly legitimized in the "temporary" status'of
forces agreement of 16 October, have stayed on.
Despite rumors of an early partial or complete
- Main Points-&the
MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE
26 August-1969
After signing the Status of Forces Agreement: (from
left) Kuznetsov, Svoboda, Kosygin, and Gustav
Husak.
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...the main thing in the present situation is to carry o0
the mutual decisions adopted in Cierna nad Tisou and the
provisions and principles formulated by the Bratislava
conference... as well as to implement consistently the
practical steps (agreed upon).
...improving the methods of guiding society ...and
strengthening the socialist system on the basis of Matx-
ism-Leninism.
Agreement-..on measures aimed at the speediest normal-
ization of the situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic.
..,the withdrawal of (Soviet) troops from (Czechoslovak)
territory as the situation in Czechoslovakia normalizes.
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withdrawal, Moscow is not satisfied that the con-
ditions that led to the invasion have been re-
moved.
lace by keeping most of its troops out of large
urban centers, invasion"
has been used
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These troops number some 40,000 to
50,000 men, down from the original invading
force-in vontinLyents-of abQl~
300 000.
The most recent example occurred in late
March, after the victory of the Czechoslovak
national hockey team over the Soviets sparked
widespread and bitter anti-Soviet demonstrations.
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role as occupation forces. Their garrison areas,
near large Czechoslovak population centers, also
have been chosen with an eye to permitting quick
and decisive intervention should this be judged
necessary, a fact that has not been lost on the
Czechoslovak leaders.
Although Moscow has made an effort to
minimize frictions with the Czechoslovak popu-
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The
threat was sufficient to spur the zec os ovak 25X1
party presidium to announce the reimposition of
censorship over the press-blamed by the Soviets
for instigating the riots-and to promise a crack-
down on the alleged "organizers" of the riots.
It remains to be seen, however, to what
extent the Czechoslovaks, even now, will carry
out their pledges. Similar but less far-reaching
promises were made under virtually identical
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circumstances I
Moscow undoubtedly is aware that the
quickest and most effective solution to the prob-
lem would be a forced purge of the party and
state leadership at all levels. The same considera-
tions that led it to forgo the installation of an
out-and-out occupation regime in August, how-
ever, continue to militate against this step.
Instead, Moscow has adopted the slower and
more indirect tactic of attempting to undermine
the "liberals" by eroding their support at the
local level. One of the major purposes of the
official delegations that have shuttled constantly
between Czechoslovakia and the USSR has been
to establish contacts with lower level Czecho-
slovak officials in the party, state, and military
hierarchies.
On the Soviet side, the delegation led by
central committee secretary Konstantin Katushev,
which was in Czechoslovakia from 27 December
to 10 January, and the later one led by CPSU
politburo member Arvid Pelshe are particularly
notable. Katushev was accompanied by a coterie
of local and regional Soviet party officials who
made contact with their Czechoslovak counter-
parts in virtually every area of the country during
their two-week stay. The delegation of the CPSU
Control Commission led by Pelshe, which visited
Czechoslovakia from 27 February to 12 March,
had much the same composition and followed the
same practice.
It is difficult to measure the degree of suc-
cess these delegations have had in influencing the
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rank and file party members whom they en-
countered, but there can be little doubt that their
bluster and blandishments have had some influ-
ence on some career-minded Czechoslovak of-
ficials. On the Czechoslovak side, virtually every
top-level, and many middle-level officials have
made the pilgrimage to Moscow. Here again, it is
probable that the exposure to Soviet pressure and
inducements has been partly responsible for the
visible trend toward fence-straddling among many
Czechoslovak officials.
The resurgence of pro-Soviet conservatives at
higher levels in the Czechoslovak leadership since
last November is in large part a result of these
efforts. The retention of such old-line Novotny
ites as Alois Indra and Milan Jakes in the leader-
ship of the Czechoslovak party reportedly stems
from Moscow's insistence. Moreover, by refusing
to permit the convening of a Czechoslovak party
congress, Moscow has ruled out the possibility of
a liberal drive to oust the members of the pro-
Soviet minority faction. Soviet military officers
and diplomatic officials openly consult with the
members of this faction at meetings of the
Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society, which
serves as a principal organizational stronghold of
hh,
First Secretary Dubcek, Premier Cernik, and Slovak
party leader Husak boarding plane for Moscow in
October 1968.
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the conservatives. Although Soviet support has
not enabled these elements to seize power, it is
certainly responsible for their continued existence
as an organized faction, bereft as they are of
popular support.
Moscow can have little hope of swinging
popular opinion to the side of its conservative
allies, but it does have a good prospect of eroding
the popularity of the Dubcek leadership. Czecho-
slovak liberals unanimously fear that the conces-
sions which the liberal leaders have been com-
pelled to make over the past months will convert
the support of the public-their main prop-to
apathy, thus opening the way for a conservative
drive for power within the narrow confines of the
party. The growing disillusionment with the lead-
ership that is evident among students and workers
indicates that this hope may bear fruit in the long
run.
Pending an anticipated turnover in the
Czechoslovak leadership, Moscow exercises a
close and careful scrutiny of its activities through
the Soviet Embassy and various special repre-
sentatives-notably First Deputy Foreign Minister
V. V. Kuznetsov and, most recently, Defense Min-
ister Grechko and Deputy Foreign Minister
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Se:myenov-w
time to time.
HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS MOSCOW BEEN?
At this stage, Moscow probably believes that
the minimum objectives of the invasion have been
achieved. The Czechoslovak press, although still
the most outspoken in Eastern Europe, has toned
down since the days before the invasion. If the
new censorship regulations are enforced, it will be
even more circumspect in the future.
On the other hand, Moscow cannot count
the invasion as an unqualified success, even in
Czechoslovakia itself. The Dubcek faction in the
leadership still refuses to concede defeat and until
now has managed to maintain a measure of unity
and to evade full compliance with Soviet de-
mands. Although the "realists" in the leadership
are more promising from the Soviet point of view,
there is no indication that Moscow has any great
faith in their reliability.
The post-invasion career of Gustav Husak,
the Slovak party chief, is illustrative of Moscow's
difficulties in finding suitable collaborators. On
the one hand, Husak has reimposed party controls
on his Slovakian fief and is usually considered to
be among the opponents of liberalization. On the
other, there are reports that Husak recently
aligned himself with the moderates in opposition
to Soviet demands for changes in the Czecho-
slovak leadership.
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Moreover, Moscow is dissatisfied with the
lack of progress in re-establishing party control
over the students and the workers, two groups
still agitating in favor of further liberalization
measures. Last week, under Soviet pressure, the
police were granted new powers, which may have
some effect, and Moscow undoubtedly believes
that with time the strength of these pressure
groups will dissipate. It cannot, however, consider
the situation in Czechoslovakia stabilized until
they have been eliminated as independent factors
on the political scene.
THE EFFECT ON EASTERN EUROPE
Beyond Czechoslovakia, the results of the
invasion have been even more mixed, and in many
ways have furthered the trend toward disunity.
The Soviets probably expected that the blow
against Czechoslovakia would support their ef-
forts to reimpose discipline on their other allies.
Certainly, the tenor of Soviet propaganda in
the weeks after the invasion seemed in part de-
signed to create a psychological atmosphere of
threat. This was particularly true of the doctrine
of "limited sovereignty," which was elaborated at
great length in a landmark Pravda article on 26
September and has since been justified in various
leadership speeches. The "doctrine" tacitly grants
socialist states, e.g., the Soviet Union, the right to
intervene in defense of socialism. It was probably
originated as a rationale for the Czechoslovak
invasion, but it has been exploited to create fears
of Soviet intervention in other Eastern European
countries.
Despite the threatening posture adopted by
Moscow after August, however, the most im-
mediate effect of the invasion was to heighten the
tendency toward fragmentation in Eastern
Europe. Albania and Yugoslavia denounced both
the invasion and the doctrine of limited sover-
eignty in bitter terms, and have turned to Mos-
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cow's enemies for help in defending their inde-
pendence against a possible Soviet threat.
Albania, after renouncing its formal mem-
bership in the Warsaw Pact in September, has
made an ostentatious display of its alliance ties
with China and has asked for-and received, to a.
limited extent-military assistance from that
quarter. Yugoslavia, although not dropping its
posture of nonalignment, has made known its
determination to resist attack and has quietly
stepped up diplomatic and low-level military con-
sultations and cooperation with the Western
powers. In March, Belgrade even made approaches:
to China, still its most bitter ideological enemy,
dispatching a trade mission to Peking and signing
a trade agreement.
Rumania, which is most clearly threatened
by the new Soviet mood, decided that the best
defense was a good offense. It has played up its
independence in an effort to convince Moscow
that the price for stern measures would be higher
than in the Czechoslovak case. In addition to
consulting quietly with the Western powers, the
Rumanians have established an even closer rely
tionship with the Yugoslavs, most recently drama-
tized by the February meeting between Tito and
Ceausescu in Timosoara.
The Soviets have hardly strengthened their
position, even with the four collaborators in the
' t rs m o w n comrades, that t 1 ' i ` r e are O aws g
alS co ~ iation from which might
to a nevi t rf Th a ahsm such. When the internal
and a tt r+al #orcesV iostI a to socialism seek to revert the
!tent of any socialist country toward the restoration
rte CWP to oTaelf, a reattothe cause of socialism
to the security of the socialist
-le emerges, this is no longer only a
A Mbletn of the peotie of that counttrY but also a common
etary Brezhnev at the
ommunist Party Congress- t2 ovember 1968
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Hungarian leader Kadar is met in Kiev by 13rezhnev and Kosygin.
invasion of Czechoslovakia. The pro-Soviet leader-
ships in these countries lost prestige because of
their complicity in the invasion. In Hungary,
which participated only reluctantly, the liberal
leadership's reassertion of its intention' to proceed
with reforms has drawn the attention of the So-
i
t
v
e
s. Moscow reportedly warned Buda este
against carrying its liberal "New
Economic Mechanism" too far.
In Poland, where the Gomulka government
reportedly was one of the most ardent pro-
ponents, of intervention, the Soviets have cause
for concern. The threat to the leadership at the
October congress of the Polish party was real
enough to draw a ringing endorsement of
Gomulka from Brezhnev, who led the Soviet dele-
gation to Warsaw. Although the serious threat to
G
lk
'
omu
a
s position collapsed-and in any event,
did not have liberal origins-the urge to put a
humanistic face on socialism and the possibility
that the latent anti-Russian sentiment of the
Polish people might find expression in a leader-
ship change is enough to give Moscow the jitters.
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The Soviet position remains relatively solid
only in East Germany and Bulgaria, where the
regimes are dependent on Soviet political or eco-
nomic support. In Bulgaria, there are reports of
growing dissatisfaction with the Zhivkov govern-
ment's excessive subservience to Moscow. There
Yugoslav President Tito is welcomed to Bucharest by
Rumanian leader Ceausescu.
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have even been some reports of coolness in the
Moscow-Pankow relationship, with Ulbricht
suspicious of Moscow's apparent willingness to
deal with Bonn over his head. Their dependency
ensures the loyalty of the present pro-Soviet lead-
erships in these two countries, but disruptions in
these relations brought about by the differing
national interests of each country are likely to
increase.
MOSCOW SEEKS TO HOLD THE BLOC
TOGETHER
The Soviet leaders are undoubtedly aware of
the limited achievements of the Czechoslovak
intervention and the potential for future crisis in
Eastern Europe. A well-defined effort to do some-
thing about it, however, is not yet apparent.
Relations with Yugoslavia now are cooler
than at any time since the Khrushchev-engineered
reconciliation in 1955. Soviet criticism of Yugo-
slav foreign and domestic policy has been ex-
pressed both publicly and privately.I
a ow- ey
but constant stream o polemical articles has
poured from the press of both countries.
No open economic sanctions have been
directed against Belgrade. The Yugoslavs blame
Moscow, however, probably with reason, for in-
stigating or sanctioning Bulgarian irredentist
propaganda aimed at Yugoslavia's Macedonian re-
public. Belgrade's charges that Moscow is trying
to isolate Yugoslavia were given credibility by
Moscow's forbidding its allies to attend the March
congress of the Yugoslav party.
Since last fall, the Soviets have been pressing
the Rumanians to host Warsaw Pact maneuvers on
their soil. Bucharest has agreed "in principle," but
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no firm agreement has yet been reached con-
cerning the date, location, and types and numbers
of forces to take part in an exercise. Recently,
Bucharest has even seemed more confident of its
ability to stall off the exercises, perhaps indefi-
nitely.
In addition to bilateral pressures, Moscow
has looked to the Warsaw Pact and CEMA for
ways of tightening and multiplying institutional
controls over the Eastern Europeans. Reports that
Moscow would use "summit" meetings of the
Warsaw Pact and CEMA to promote institutional
changes that would further strengthen its control
of its allies have been frequent since last year.
A summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact was
finally held on 17 March, but it turned out to be
the shortest such meeting on record. It produced
only an appeal for a European security confer-
ence-largely a rehash of similar proposals issued
in 1966 and 1967-and a communique referring
to unspecified organizational changes in the War-
saw Pact. These amount to formal recognition of
existing practices by the establishment of a Coun-
cil of Defense Ministers and measures allowing for
greater East European participation at the staff
and command levels of the pact. Although it is
possible that these changes will make dissent
more difficult, they are unlikely to rule it out
altogether, and it remains to be seen what the
practical effect will be.
Developments in CEMA have been even
more meager. An economic summit meeting of
the CEMA states was first proposed at the Dres-
den Conference last March, but has yet to materi-
alize. There is little doubt that the USSR would
like to further some measure of economic integra-
tion for political purposes. The plethora of vary-
ing, and to some extent, contradictory proposals
which are being publicly promoted by the East
Europeans suggests, however, that Moscow has
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yet to come to a decision. It is likely that Mos-
cow, as well as the Eastern Europeans, is reluctant
to give up the degree of economic sovereignty
which meaningful integration would require, and
a CEMA summit still seems relegated to the indef-
inite future.
THE BALANCE SHEET
Despite its actions over the last year, Mos-
cow has little to show for its efforts and little
prospect at the present time of finding a long-
range solution to its Eastern European problems.
In the short run, the Soviet position is still strong
enough, particularly while the Czechoslovak les-
son is fresh, to slow down the disintegrative
trends at work in Eastern Europe.
If its strength were ruthlessly applied, there
can be no doubt that Moscow could suppress all
dissension in Eastern Europe. This would, how-
ever, mean the installation of purely puppet re-
gimes that would have to be perpetually backed
by Soviet military force, a course Moscow is
clearly unwilling to pursue.
Further, the considerations that have until
now prevented Moscow from bringing its full
weight to bear on the Eastern European dissidents
will persist. For reasons of self-interest, Moscow is
committed to maintaining at least a minimal
working relationship with the West, particularly
with its nuclear rival, the United States. Its credit
with the West, however, would be virtually
eliminated by a harsh policy of repression in
Eastern Europe, as would the trust of the leftist
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and "progressive" regimes throughout the world
which are currently inclined to cooperate with
the Soviet Union. China is a more immediate
concern than ever, and Moscow's interests world
wide are affected by its conduct in Eastern
Europe.
Although Moscow's international interests
militate against the adoption of a policy of
thoroughgoing repression, other factors hamper
the adoption of any clearcut and consistent pol-
icy in Eastern Europe. Not least among these is
the collegial nature of the Soviet leadership. In
the absence of a paramount leader, policy is likely
to fluctuate in response to shifting and transitory
realignments within the Soviet leadership.
-Special Report - 11 -
SECRET
11 April 1969
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06600100003-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-0092277AO06600100003-8
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06600100003-8