WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006600090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 26, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
44
26 July 1968
No. 0039/68
DIA review(s) completed.
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 25 July 1968)
Europe
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
1
PRAGUE AND MOSCOW EDGE TOWARD SUMMIT MEETING 2
The Soviets intensified their political pressure on
Prague this week, and announced a large-scale mili-
tary exercise in western USSR. Although Moscow
agreed to the Dubcek regime's proposal to hold bi-
lateral discussions on Czechoslovak soil, there was
little information on details of the meeting.
USSR ENTERS WEST EUROPE'S NATURAL GAS MARKET
The first contract for delivery of Soviet natural 5
gas by pipeline to Western Europe has been concluded
with Austria.
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
Commentary out of Hanoi and hints circulated through
third parties suggest the Communists may be trying
to create an impression of restraint through reduced
military activity and intimations of flexibility on
the key issues of a settlement. In Saigon, some
peace proposals have been put forward with what ap-
pears to be at least a measure of government sanc-
tion. Communist military activity increased somewhat
this week, particularly in the northern provinces.
MALAYSIA-PHILIPPINE SPLIT OVER SABAH WIDENS
Tensions have heightened between the two governments
since Malaysia formally rejected the Philippine claim
to Sabah on 17 July and walked out of the month-long
talks in Bangkok.
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THAIS BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR
The military regime is making preparations to domi-
nate next year's legislative elections although it
has not yet settled differences within its own ranks.
Middle East - Africa
NIGERIAN COMBATANTS TALK AS FIGHTING CONTINUES
Prospects for a cease-fire have brightened in the
wake of renewed contacts between federal and Biafran
representatives. Such a cease-fire, however, might
be limited to cover only passage of relief supplies,
and there appears to be no give by either side in
basic conditions for a political settlement.
MILITARY MEN DOMINATE NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT
The new regime now appears to be a coalition of at
least three groups, two of them military, with the
Baathists in a minority position. Neighboring Arab
states regard the new government as essentially mod-
erate in character.
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Western Hemisphere
LATIN AMERICAN NAVIES SEEKING NEW EQUIPMENT
Although there has been some talk in the press of an
"arms race," the largest programs--those in Brazil
and Argentina--will provide only the bare minimum to
keep the navies operational.
POLITICAL CRISIS IN BOLIVIA SUBSIDES
There may be further repercussions, however, if addi-
tional government or military personalities are im-
plicated with Minister of Government Arguedas in the
leaking of "Che" Guevara's diary to the Cubans.
GUATEMALA ATTEMPTS RETURN TO NORMALCY DESPITE EXTREMISTS
Preparations for municipal elections scheduled for 11
August are providing a test of the ability of Guate-
mala's sharply antagonistic political forces to re-
sume peaceful activity following the end of the five-
month state of alert in June.
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The Soviet Union maintained extreme pressure this week on the
Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia in its effort to induce Prague to turn
aside from the liberal path it has chosen. By the end of the week, there
was no official word on the unprecedented top-level meeting of the
politburos of the two countries beyond the announcement that such a
meeting would be held on Czechoslovak soil.
Some Soviet forces remained in Czechoslovakia, and Soviet units in
the western USSR began what appeared to be a large-scale exercise. The
exchange of propaganda blows between the two capitals continued with-
out respite.
Except for East Germany, no Eastern European country appeared
willing to stomach actual Soviet military intervention, and Poland and
Hungary apparently are adamantly opposed, as are most Western European
parties.
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PRAGUE AND MOSCOW EDGE TOWARD SUMMIT MEETING
The Soviets intensified their
political pressure on Prague this
week, as Czechoslovak and Soviet
leaders prepared to confront one
another directly. Although Moscow
agreed to the Dubcek regime's pro-
posal to hold bilateral discussions
on Czechoslovak -soil, there was
little information as of 25 July
on when the meeting would take
place or on the composition of
the delegations.
TASS announced on 22 July that
the Soviet politburo had agreed to
the bilateral meeting, "having in
mind" that the entire ruling bodies
of both parties would attend. The
Czechoslovak presidium quickly ac-
knowledged the TASS statement, but
said nothing as to the specific
place and time of the meeting.
Czechoslovak officials stated that
these details were being negotiated.
Prague has yet to announce of-
ficially that its entire 11-member
presidium would meet the Soviet
politburo, and the composition of
the delegations may be another de-
tail being negotiated. The Soviets
are pressing to have the entire
Czechoslovak presidium included,
presumably because they believe
that one or more of the Czechoslo-
vaks will waver in the face of So-
viet pressure.
Various factions are repre-
sented in the Czechoslovak presid-
ium, and some members reportedly
favored the Soviet Eastern Euro-
pean summons to attend the summit
meeting in Warsaw on 14-15 July.
They eventually acquiesced in the
final decision not to go, however,
and since then the nationwide sup-
port given to the leadership has
strengthened party leader Dubcek's
position. Although Dubcek presum-
ably would prefer that a smaller
group of his most trusted support-
ers represent Czechoslovakia, he
may relent on this point in the ex-
pectation that the Czech ranks can
be held together. Moscow's heavy-
handed use of military pressure
seems to be helping unite the Czech-
oslovaks and their leadership.
The steadily mounting Soviet
pressure indicates that Moscow
probably will restate the demands
made on Prague in the joint letter
sent by the Warsaw conferees, and
will seek tangible Czechoslovak con-
cessions. Partly for domestic po-
litical reasons, however, Prague
cannot afford to give much ground.
In an effort to bolster the
position of its politburo in the
confrontation with the Czechoslovak
leadership, Moscow announced on 23
July that a large Rear Services ex-
ercise was taking place in most of
the western USSR. Along with this
saber rattling, the Soviets stepped
up their propaganda against Prague,
broadening their blacklist of Czech-
oslovak officials in the process.
Earlier, several editorials in
Pravda and Izvestia and a statement
by President Podgorny had clearly
expressed the USSR's disenchantment
with the situation in Czechoslovakia.
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A statement by the
commander of the Czechoslovak border
guards defending Prague's ability
and willingness to protect its
borders suggests that the Czecho-
slovaks are alert to a possible at-
tempt by Moscow to justify a demand
for stationing some of its troops
in Czechoslovakia.
Despite Moscow's pressure
tactics, Prague has maintained its
resolute stance. A central commit-
tee meeting on 19 July unanimously
acclaimed the presidium's reply of
18 July to the Warsaw conferees.
Dubcek restated at the meeting that
the party is "resolved" not to de-
part from the path it charted in
January. He again asserted that if
the party were to reverse its course,
socialism in Czechoslovakia and the
ovi #D,'a S q5 1.4ar Czechoslovakia
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Berline
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Motorized rifle
division
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"international Communist movement"
would be discredited. As he had
on earlier occasions, Dubcek called
on the Czechoslovak news media to
exercise voluntary self-restraint,
but offered no essential conces-
sions in the face of the Soviet
demand for a severe crackdown. The
presidium's stand has received wide-
spread and continuing support from
the Czechoslovak public as well as
from government and party organiza-
tions.
Only Poland, East Germany,
and Bulgaria have backed the USSR.
Of these, the East Germans led the
way in launching vicious propaganda
attacks against Prague. Indeed,
25X1with the exception of East Germany,
no Eastern European country appears
to favor Soviet military interven-
tion in Czechoslovakia.
Yugoslav and Rumanian diplo-
mats are planting seeds of optimism
in Eastern Europe, suggesting that
in their view Soviet military inter-
vention is unlikely. The Yugoslavs
Page 4
and Rumanians are, however, antici-
pating a continuation of psychologi-
cal pressures on the Dubcek leader-
ship.
At a reception in Prague on 22
July, Czechoslovak military officials
told the US Army attache that the $o-
viets had moved 15-16,000 troops into
Czechoslovakia for the recent Pact.
exercise and that 5-6,000 were still
in the country but would be withdrawn
by 25 July. On 24 July, however, a
Czechoslovak party spokesman con-
firmed the continued presence of some
Soviet troops. The spokesman said.
"small units" would remain in Czecho-
slovakia until the issuance of a cqm-
munique ..
The large-scale Rear Services.
exercise in the western USSR includes
units in the Carpathian Military Ds-
trict adjacent to Czechoslovakia.
US military attache observations in
the Moscow area on 23 July indicate
that some Rear Services exercise-asso-
ciated activity is under way in that
area. At least one other large Rear
Service exercise of this type took
place in the Soviet Union in 1961.
The exercise reportedly is to end on
10 August.
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USSR ENTERS WEST EUROPE'S NATURAL GAS MARKET
The first contract for de-
livery of Soviet natural gas by
pipeline to Western Europe has
been concluded with Austria.
Signed on 1 June, the agreement
will lead to greatly increased
trade between the two countries.
Price differences have stalled
current Soviet negotiations with
Italy, however, regarding the
sale of gas. via a projected
5,000-kilometer large-diameter
pipeline from western Siberia
through Austria to Trieste.
The agreement with Austria
provides for the delivery of gas
via Czechoslovakia to Austria
for 23 years. Austria completed
a short connection pipeline to
Czechoslovakia last spring. Up
to 300 million cubic meters of
gas will be shipped in the last
quarter of 1968, increasing to
over 1 billion cubic meters in
1970, and eventually reaching
1.5 billion cubic meters annually.
Austria also agreed to ex-
tend a $115 million credit to
the USSR to cover Soviet purchases
over the next two years of 520,000
tons of 40- and 48-inch steel
pipe, as well as $15 million
worth of other equipment, to be
used in construction of a pipe-
Page 5
line to extend from western Si-
beria to the industrial center
of European Russia. Austria's
national steel works, Voest, will
be the prime contractor for the
steel pipe, but about $60 million
of the credit will be allocated
to several West German firms for
procurement and fabrication of
steel pipe. Soviet repayment
will be in natural gas deliveries
to Austria over the next seven
years.
Current Soviet-Italian nego-
tiations on natural gas deliv-
eries are stalled over price dif-
ferences. Competition in the
European gas market has intensi-
fied greatly because new sources
of supply are expanding faster
than demand in Western Europe.
The Italian state-owned oil and
gas agency, ENI, has announced
the discovery of two offshore
natural gas deposits in the
North Adriatic Sea, which will
strengthen Italy's bargaining
position with the USSR. A re-
cent UK agreement to lower the
price of natural gas from the
North Sea has created downward
pressure on all prices being
discussed in current European
negotiations.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Hanoi chose to downplay the significance of the Honolulu meeting of
the US and South Vietnamese presidents, describing it in effect as a
tiresome exercise President Johnson felt compelled to suffer through in
order to shore up the Saigon government. The Communists professed to
see no signs of any new initiatives flowing from the conference and
implied that in any event, the crucial decisions would be made unilaterally
in Washington.
For his part, President Thieu could point to promises of expanded
US material support and a meeting of minds on military and political
strategy. On his return to Saigon, Thieu gave a hard-hitting television
address that sought to define further the limits within which the peace
issue could be safely discussed in the South Vietnamese political com-
munity. He again ruled out any coalition government with the National
Liberation Front but repeated a willingness expressed at Honolulu to
permit enemy combatants to re-enter the, country's political life so long as
they eschewed violence and denounced Communism.
The Vietnamese Communists passed a major milestone in their slowly
unfolding campaign to develop the concept of a "third force" as a bridge
between the Front and acceptable elements of the Saigon regime. An
authoritative Foreign Ministry memorandum last week reformulated point
three of Hanoi's four-point basis for a settlement in such a way as no
longer to require that the internal affairs of the South Vietnamese be
settled "in accordance with the program" of the National Liberation
Front. Under the new interpretation, point three merely "affirms the
South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination in their internal
affairs." As if to emphasize the shift, Ho Chi Minh gave special promi-
nence to the new front organization, the Alliance of National, Democratic,
and Peace Forces, in his otherwise routine annual statement in observance
of the anniversary of the Geneva Accords.
Despite a slight upsurge, mainly in the form of rocket and mortar
attacks, Communist-initiated activity remained at considerably less than
normal levels for the sixth straight week.
The split between Malaysia and the Philippines is widening. Although
neither side apparently intends to force a break in relations, edginess on
both sides could lead to serious incidents.
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VIETNAM
Commentary out of Hanoi and
hints circulated through third
parties suggest that the Commu-
nists may be trying to create an
impression of restraint through
reduced military activity and in-
timations of flexibility on the
key issues of a settlement.
Hanoi, for example, chose
to soft-pedal its reaction to
the Honolulu conference in a nota-
bly low-keyed article in the party
paper Nhan Dan on 22 July. The
article sought to play down the
significance of the conference
by noting that questions of war
and peace will be decided--by
implication unilaterally--in
Washington and not jointly with
the South Vietnamese. Nhan Dan
treated the conference as a te-
dious ritual required of Presi-
dent Johnson in order to shore
up the Saigon government and to
"force his new decisions" on Pres-
ident Thieu. There was little
effort to play up the conference
as a sign of new US "escalation."
On the contrary, the paper noted
that the conference "failed to
produce any novelty" or new poli-
cies.
The North Vietnamese Foreign
Ministry issued a memorandum on
17 July formally signaling a sig-
nificant policy change toward
which Hanoi has been moving for
several months. In a new inter-
pretation of point three of the
Four Points that North Vietnam has
long said should be the basis
for a settlement, the memorandum
stated that it "affirms the South
Vietnamese people's right to self-
determination in their internal
affairs." In previous official
versions of the Four Points, point
three had called for settlement
of South Vietnam's internal af-
fairs "in accordance with the pro-
gram" of the National Liberation
Front. Elsewhere in the memoran-
dum, it was affirmed that the
Four Points remain the "basis
for a correct political solution"
and that they conform to the
"spirit" of the Front's political
program.
For several months, the Com-
munists have been muting their
former insistence that the Front
is the "sole genuine representa-
tive of the South Vietnamese peo-
ple." At the same time they have
been developing the concept em-
bodied in the new peace Alliance
of a "third force," which would
serve as a bridge between Commu-
nist and non-Communist elements
in South Vietnam.
The concept of a "third force"
now appears to be a fundamental
part of the Vietnamese Communist
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strategy for a settlement. Plans
for applying the concept are be-
ing kept deliberately vague, how-
ever. Such vague hints fit a
growing pattern suggesting the
Communists are angling for
a political voice in South Viet-
nam via the Alliance concept, if
not via the Alliance itself.
There is no evidence that the
Communists are changing their
basic position of categorically
refusing to deal with the so-
called "Thieu-Ky clique," but
their evolving tactics suggest
they may be more flexible on this
key issue than indicated by their
outward position.
Political Developments
In Saigon
In the past week or so, two
groups in Saigon have issued peace
proposals that appeared to have
at least a measure of government
sanction. On 17 July, the Vietnam-
ese Confederation of Labor held
a press conference, attended by
Labor Ministry officials, at which
the labor organizations' presi-
dent, Tran Quoc Buu, outlined a
peace program. According to Buu's
formula, the government must play
the role of a "leading partner"
in peace talks, which must ensure
that North Vietnam stops all war-
like acts and that the National
Liberation Front and other Com-
munist fronts disband. The 17th
parallel must be accepted as a
provisional demarcation line, and
the UN should oversee the with-
drawal of North Vietnamese and
allied troops from the South.
Buu's plan would allow both
North and South Vietnam to retain
their present forms of government,
but the UN would ensure that there
was a "free interchange" of peo-
ple between the two zones. As
a final step, Buu's program calls
for a UN-controlled referendum,
to be held "under favorable and
practical conditions," in order
that the Vietnamese people can
"choose for themselves a form of
government" and unify the country.
A similar but more vaguely
worded appeal was advanced at a
seminar on 21 July at which sev-
eral old-time politicians spoke.
Also in attendance among the 100
or so guests were President Thieu's
brother and his secretary general.
Neither of these proposals
went beyond the limits of the
government's stand against coali-
tion with the Communists, neutral-
ism, and the establishment of a
neutral buffer zone, as have pro-
grams recently presented by other
groups.
In a further attempt to de-
fine the limits within which the
peace issue can be safely dis-
cussed, the government has brought
Truong Dinh Dzu to trial before a
military tribunal. Dzu, who ran
a surprisingly strong race in the
presidential elections last year
on a peace platform, had been held
under "protective custody" for
some time while the government
cast about for some means to le-
gitimize his jailing.
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Loc Ninh
Spacial Forces Camp j
r-
PHNOM
PENH
Special
Capital
,
SOUTH VIETNAM
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The War in South Vietnam
Communist-initiated activity
increased somewhat this week as
the enemy carried out mortar and
rocket attacks on various allied
positions, particularly in the
northern provinces. The US mili-
tary base complex in the Da Nang
area was the target of an espe-
cially heavy concentration of
enemy fire, on 22 July, followed
by a lighter barrage later in the
week. Casualties and damage from
both attacks were light.
In the northern provinces of
III Corps, the enemy continued to
build up its forces for possible
large-scale offensive action. These
elements are within striking dis-
tance of the US Special Forces
camp at Loc Ninh, the object of
a heavy but unsuccessful and
costly Communist attack last fall.
Elsewhere in the country any
new eruptions of a major Communist
offensive still appear some weeks
away, a timetable that might be
further affected by allied sweeps
and Hanoi's strategy at the Paris
talks. F_ I 25X1
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MALAYSIA-PHILIPPINE SPLIT OVER SABAH WIDENS
Tensions have heightened be-
tween the two governments since
Malaysia formally rejected the
Philippine claim to Sabah on 17
July and walked out of the month
long talks in Bangkok.
On 20 July, the Philippines
announced its intention to with-
draw its ambassador and diplomatic
staff from Kuala Lumpur. Malay-
sia, for its part, has recalled
its ambassador from Manila for
consultation but announced that
25X1 no immediate withdrawal is planned.
Despite the tension, the two
governments still profess a will-
ingness to talk. The foreign min-
isters of both nations are ex-
pected to attend two upcoming re-
u ust.
karta on 6 August-
Asian Nations which opens in Dja-
Asian
gional meetings--the Asian Paci-
fic Council in Canberra on 30 July
and the Association of Southeast
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THAIS BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR
The Thai military regime is
making preparations to dominate
next year's legislative elections
although it has not yet settled
differences within its own ranks.
Deputy Prime Minister Pra-
phat appears to be playing an in-
creasingly active political role.
Praphat is managing an effort by
the ruling military regime to
emasculate the Democratic Party,
the only currently active opposi-
tion group with significant sup-
port in the country. He is pro-
moting an independent slate of
candidates for the Bangkok munic-
ipal elections in September in
order to draw conservative but
antigovernment votes away from
the Democrats and to clear the
way for a government-sponsored
ticket. The government hopes
that a defeat in Bangkok, where
Democratic support is strongest,
will virtually destroy the party's
electoral chances in next year's
country-wide legislative elections.
Praphat's machinations may
also be designed to further his
own political ambitions. He not
only expects to get the credit
for defeating the Democrats in
September, but he evidently is
making plans to pick up the pieces.
Praphat recently assumed control
of a government-supported politi-
cal group. He has flatly told
his followers that he intends to
use the group as a vehicle for a
Page 14
country-wide political organization,
which presumably will be respon-
sive to his direction.
The extent to which Praphat's
plans dovetail with the govern-
ment's is not entirely clear. Al-
though a number of preliminary
steps have been taken to organize
a party for next year's election,
it is clear that the differences
within the ruling establishment
have not yet been ironed out.
Praphat's actions may be in behalf
of those hard-line elements in the
government who fought against the
constitution and are now apparently
trying to ensure that their fac-
tion will dominate the new govern-
ment.
The military leaders are dis-
playing considerable sensitivity
to political requirements in an
election year. A highly unpopular
bus fare increase was recently
rescinded, and the mayor of Bangkok,
whose unsavory reputation is a
major political liability, has
been kept out of public view.
Meanwhile, both right- and
left-wing opposition groups appear
to be making only desultory efforts
to organize parties for next year's
elections. At this juncture, they
appear to be more interested in
making deals with the government
than in actively challenging it at
the polls.
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The Algerian Government continues to hold the El Al aircraft, its
crew, and the 12 Israeli passengers seized following a hijacking by Pales-
tinian terrorists on 23 July. Israel has so far applied only political pressure
to recover the aircraft and its Israeli occupants, but eventual retaliatory
action against Algeria or Egypt-blamed as the terrorists' sponsor-is a
distinct possibility. Meanwhile, Arab terrorist incidents along the Israeli
border continue to average about one a day.
The new Iraqi regime emerging from last week's coup has a strong
military cast; the minority Baathist element seems to have been added to
give the group a broader base of support. The kingpin of the coup was
apparently the new prime minister, who once served the deposed Arif as
deputy director of military intelligence. Iraq's neighbors are characterizing
the coup group as moderates, and the pro-Egyptian press has assailed them
as tools of the West.
Tension is growing along the Saharan border of Algeria and Morocco.
Moroccan forces are reported on the alert against renewed Algerian mili-
tary activity in the disputed Oued Draa area, but the two governments are
still talking to each other about the situation.
In Turkey, renewed student demonstrations are now targeted against
the police as well as the US presence.
The Indian Government is fending off strenuous opposition attacks
tied to the Soviet decision to sell arms to Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi and her
supporters have so far blunted the attacks with adroitly worded condem-
nations of the Soviet action while heading off stronger resolutions that
might imperil Indo-Soviet relations.
Prospects for at least a partial cease-fire in Nigeria have brightened,
and the two sides are continuing their talks. Military operations have
accordingly slowed, but the likelihood of a complete end to the fighting
remains remote.
Sierra Leone's internal situation continues unstable. The fragile and
erratic government has failed to exert any control over the unruly army or
over the sporadic violence its own supporters have been inspiring against
political enemies in the hinterlands.
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GERIA
1.
*Niamty t -.' --
Sokoto?~?.
Ouagadougou
UPPER VOLTA Y
`*
L ar(?s
DAHOMEY Kaduna
~?` ras,
IVORY
COAST
TOGO
i
#t
Porto Novo
Lome
Benin
,City
PL-i EA U
Makurdi
Onitaha !I
"ikot+~alabar
_Ek"ner
CAMEROON
Douala
EQUATORIAL GUINEA `Santa
Fernando Po Isp.t Isabel
t-~ Approximate area remaining
under Biafran control
Boundary of Biafra
State boundary
Road
7ECR.T
Principe
(Pop.)
~i
Sao Tome
G A B O N ; CONGO j
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Annobon (Sp-1
pounde
\r.Fort-Lamy
Ii
CHAD
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
EQUATORIAL GUINEA ?-11,'
Rio Muni (Sp.)
^breyill+!t _.)
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 Approved For Release 2006/03/$.j((K4LRpP79-00927AO06600090001-2
NIGERIAN COMBATANTS TALK AS FIGHTING CONTINUES
Prospects for a cease-fire
have brightened in the wake of
renewed contacts between federal
and Biafran representatives. Such
a cease-fire, however, might be
limited to cover only the passage
of relief supplies, and there ap-
pears to be no give by either side
in basic conditions for a politi-
cal settlement.
The Organization of African
Unity's (OAU) Consultative Commit-
tee on Nigeria, which concluded
its meeting on 19 July, success-
fully persuaded the two sides in
the civil war to meet to talk
about cease-fire possibilities and
the problem of getting relief sup-
plies into war-torn eastern Ni-
geria. Both federal leader Gowon
and Biafran leader Ojukwu paid
separate visits to Niamey in
Niger, and their representatives
have been meeting there since
20 July under the general chair-
manship of Niger's President
Diori. Although the OAU issued
a communique that an agenda had
been agreed upon for further talks
to take place in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, indications are that
the two sides had agreed only on
what they would talk about at
their next meeting in Niamey.
The general atmosphere among the
participants, however, is one of
cordiality.
On his return to Biafra,
Ojukwu told the press that chances
for some sort of cease-fire were
good. This statement, coupled
with his trip to Niamey and his
willingness to talk there, neatly
puts the onus on Lagos for con-
tinuing the fighting. Ojukwu
hopes that resulting international
pressures will force Gowon to
agree to a cease-fire and thus
give Biafra a breathing spell.
If Gowon yields to these
pressures, there could be a severe
test of the strength of his lead-
ership in the Federal Military
Government. Civilian leaders
and army commanders view Biafra's
renunciation of secession as the
only acceptable end to the crisis.
Ojukwu, too, has been receiving
some international pressure to
soften a little on the secession
question, but he may himself be
a captive of the hard-line propa-
ganda the Biafran population has
been hearing for more than a
year.
Military activity in the
civil war has slowed appreciably.
Gowon has told his field command-
ers not to push too hard while
talks were under way, and the
Biafrans have been putting up a
stout defense and mounting strong
counterattacks. Federal forces
in the south are slowly clearing
Bia=ran troops out of Rivers
State, but have lost some ground
around Ikot Ekpene in the South-
Eastern State. In the northern
sector, federal troops are con-
tinuing efforts to regain control
over the main road east of Onitsha,
but are generally sitting tight
elsewhere.
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MILITARY MEN DOMINATE NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT
The new regime in Iraq now
appears to be a coalition of at
least three groups, with the
Baathists in a minority position.
Although the full story be-
hind the coup has not yet emerged,
there are indications that the
movement may have been sparked
by the former deputy director of
military intelligence, Abd al-
Razzaq al-Nayif, who has just
been named prime minister. Al-
Nayif seems to have been the
leader of a group of unknown,
politically inexperienced, youth-
ful army officers calling them-
selves the "Arab Revolutionary
Movement." Al-Nayif was said to
be the actual power in the Iraqi
Palace Guard, which played the
key role in the successful coup.
Al-Nayif's group apparently
allied itself with a group of
relatively conservative senior
army officers led by Abd al-Aziz
Uqayli, known previously as a
leading "hawk" on the Kurdish
issue. In order to create an
image of broader representation
and of civilian participation,
the two military groups apparently
turned to the more moderate wing
of the Baath Party. It now appears
that the Baathists, rather than
being dominant in the new regime,
are no more than a minority ele-
ment in what is in fact a mili-
tary junta.
There are already signs
of friction between al-Nayif--who
has been describedas a crafty
and ambitious man--and President
al-Bak r .
al-Nayif has moved to neutralize
the Baath National Guard, a
civilian organization, by making
it known that any civilian carry-
ing a weapon will be jailed. Al-
Nayif apparently intends to keep
all actual power firmly in the
hands of the military. In addi-
tion, the coalition could split
over the Kurdish issue, because
Uqayli has favored a renewal of
the Kurdish war and al-Bakr has
already announced that "we are
determined to solve the problem
peacefully."
Neighboring Arab states ap-
parently regard the new regime
as essential) moderate in
character.
For-
danian newspapers are p aying
up the participation of
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SOUTHERN YEMEN REGIME THREATENED ON ALL SIDES
independent statesmen and moder-
ate elements from various parties.
It is significant that pro-Egyp-
tian and Syrian newspapers are
denouncing the coup as a "prod-
uct of the United States, Britain,
and Iran in an effort to set up a
The near-bankrupt regime in
Southern Yemen is beset by dissi-
dent groups both inside and out-
side the country, as well as by
factionalism within its mainstay,
the army.
The split in the ranks of
the army and security forces prob-
ably poses the gravest threat.
One faction, led by the director
general of security, favors
broadening the ruling National
Liberation Front (NLF) command
to include members of other po-
litical groups. Faced with hard-
core resistance to any change in
the ruling structure, this group
is said to be holding almost daily
strategy meetings.
At the same time, some mem-
bers of the NLF command are appar-
ently working to undermine the
army by "exposing" it as a self-
reactionary regime linked with the
west." It is unlikely that the new
government will move quickly to
restore relations with the US, how-
ever, given the present bitterness
over US Middle Eastern policy.
F7
seeking group that places itself
above the "struggling masses."
Their tactics apparently include
encouraging tribal differences
within the armed forces, and play-
ing off the army against the pub-
lic; security organization.
There are fragmentary reports
of recent upcountry dissidence
for which the Front for the Lib-
eration of Occupied South Yemen
(FLOSY), the NLF's archrival,
is claiming the credit. A pamph-
let issued on 17 July in the name
of the FLOSY general command
announced the fall of several
outlying areas to "courageous
revolutionary forces." Other
sources agree that tribes--rather
than civil or military authorities
--control several areas, but it
is not clear that FLOSY is respon-
sible; the loss of control may
be due to a withering of former
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S EC R ET'
NLF organizations combined with
the reassertion of traditional
tribal forces.
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SECRET
The ghost of "Che" Guevara appeared again, this time bringing a
political crisis to Bolivia that momentarily seemed to threaten the Bar-
rientos government.
The crisis arose when smoldering suspicion that some Bolivian offi-
cials had colluded in Cuba's publication three weeks ago of Guevara's
diary finally smoked out Minister of Government Arguedas. Accused of
treason, Arguedas fled to Chile, where he admitted responsibility. Barri-
entos' opponents mounted violent demonstrations in La Paz in an effort
to bring down the government, but failed to obtain military support.
Order was restored after a country-wide state of siege was ordered and
some 40 leaders and members of the opposition were arrested. Further
repercussions may come, however, if more governmental figures are impli-
cated in the release of the diary.
As Havana propaganda exploited the Bolivians' embarrassment, Fidel
Castro removed one of the most important figures in his own government,
replacing Interior Minister Valdes with politburo member Sergio del Valle.
Although it is not clear from the announcement whether the move is more
than temporary, the shift may well be an attempt by Castro to secure a
greater personal control over the Cuban security apparatus. He has been
concerned with the increasing number of acts of overt opposition since he
imposed austerity measures last March.
Three neighboring South American north-coast countries are showing
interest in a variety of ties with European Communist countries. Colombia
agreed with Czechoslovakia to raise representation from the consular to
the diplomatic level.1
tankers carry Venezuelan petroleum, produced by subsidiaries of US firms,
to Europe. Until now, Soviet ships taking oil to Cuba have had to return
to Europe in ballast.
Communist groups in many countries have been arranging to send
students to next week's World Youth Festival in Sofia. Non-Communists
as well as Communists are included in the delegations. The 18-member
Panamanian group, for example, includes two members of the party of
President-elect Arnulfo Arias, with his approval.
The Panamanian political situation remains clouded because of a
delay in determining the composition of the new National Assembly that
takes office with Arias on 1 October. Supporters of defeated government
candidate Samudio are using legal devices to fight every inch of the way,
but Arias evidently retains the vital support of the National Guard.
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LATIN AMERICAN NAVIES SEEKING NEW EQUIPMENT
Argentina and Brazil have
undertaken modest naval re-equip-
ment programs, and other South
American navies hope to do the
same if funds can be found. Al-
though there has been some talk
in the press of an "arms race,"
the goal is replacement of ob-
solescent ships rather than ex-
pansion.
The Argentine Navy, after
more than two years of pleading
for new ships to replace some
that date from World War II, has
been promised $83 million by the
Ongania government to buy a
prototype destroyer and submarine.
The navy hopes later to build one
of each in Argentine yards. Part
of the funds will go to buy six
jet trainers, and the total pack-
age will be spread over several
years to reduce the impact on
the military budget. As justifi-
cation for the purchases, Admiral
Varela, commander in chief of
the Argentine Navy, has cited the
border controversy with Chile
in the Beagle Channel, the in-
cursions of Soviet fishing boats,
and the "security of the South
Atlantic."
Brazil has established a
somewhat more ambitious program.
Most of the ships--destroyer es-
corts, patrol craft, submarines,
and fleet-support vessels--will
be built in Brazil. Amortization
of the long-term loans necessary
to finance the program will be
kept within the regular navy
budget.
Lack of funds has prevented
more ambitious re-equipment pro-
grams in these and other coun-
tries. Both Peru and Venezuela
have talked of acquiring newer
ships, but the Venezuelans may be
limited to adding a few patrol
boats. Peru has no firm purchase
plans yet and will be restricted
in the future by austerity moves
now being made by the Belaunde
government. Argentina has ex-
pressed some interest in a Dutch
aircraft carrier but can hardly
afford to divert funds for such
a purchase from its growing public
investment program. Chile has
also talked in the past of buying
a carrier, to match the one Ar-
gentina already has, but it too
lacks the money.
The Latin navies have been
relying for several years on ships
loaned to them by the US. Lately,
they have begun to show annoyance
at the restrictions placed on the
use of these ships, especially in
patrolling the territorial waters
of 200 miles that many of them
claim but that the US does not
recognize. Although they may
still shop in the US for ships or
ancillary equipment, it appears
that most of the purchases will
be made in Europe.
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POLITICAL CRISIS IN BOLIVIA SUBSIDES
The political crisis last
week over the leaking of "Che"
Guevara's diary to the Cubans,
which led to public disorders and
coup rumors, appears to have sub-
sided. The final outcome of the
incident that temporarily weak-
ened the Barrientos government--
the charge of treason against
Minister of Government Arguedas
and his subsequent flight to
Chile--is not yet clear, however.
Arguedas has admitted in
Chile that he was responsible for
having provided Fidel Castro with
the Guevara diary. Chilean
authorities have expressed some
doubt about his story but have
agreed to grant him political
asylum. At a press conference
on 24 July, Arguedas stated that
he was a Marxist but added that
he supported the constitutional
government of Bolivia. He fur-
ther stated that he planned to
travel to Argentina soon and that
from there he might return to
Bolivia. Giving further credi-
bility to Arguedas' story, Castro
announced in a speech on the same
night that it was indeed the Bo-
livian minister of government who
had provided him with the Guevara
diary. Castro added that Arguedas
had been offered political asylum
in Cuba.
Order has been restored in
La Paz under the state of siege
imposed on 20 July. Some 40 lead-
ers and members of the political
opposition have been arrested,
and there has been no repetition
of the violent demonstrations with
which they were trying to exploit
the government's temporary vul-
nerability.
Although there were rumors
that some military officers were
planning to move against the gov-
ernment, the armed forces remained
solidly behind Barrientos and took
up positions to prevent further
outbreaks of violence. Armed
forces support was lacking, how-
ever, for Barrientos' plan to
form an entirely military cabinet.
National guard chief Colonel Juan
Perez Tapia has been named to
fill the vacated Ministry of Gov-
ernment position. Additional
changes are under consideration.
The inability of the polit-
ical opposition to overthrow Bar-
rientos without the support--or
at least the acquiescence--of the
armed forces, and the noted public
distaste for military governments
indicate that for now there is no
serious threat to the Barrientos
government.
Further unraveling of the
mystery surrounding Arguedas could
have more repercussions on the
Bolivian political situation,
particularly if, as seems likely,
additional governmental or mili-
tary personalities are implicated.
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GUATEMALA ATTEMPTS RETURN TO NORMALCY DESPITE EXTREMISTS
Preparations for municipal
elections scheduled for 11
August are providing a test of
the ability of Guatemala's
sharply antagonistic political
forces to resume peaceful ac-
tivity following the end of the
five-month state of alert in
June.
The municipal elections
will provide the most meaning-
ful gauge of voter opinion since
moderate reformist President
Mendez Montenegro and his Revo-
lutionary Party (PR) were
elected in March 1966. Present
signs are that the country's
major nonrevolutionary politi-
cal forces will compete di-
rectly, with the PR challenged
from the left by the Christian
Democrats and, at the other
end of the political spectrum,
by a merged rightist ticket.
Although moderation is a scarce
commodity in Guatemalan politics,
peaceful and relatively honest
elections would be an important
boost toward normality that
could undercut the appeal of
Communist revolutionaries as
well as the extreme rightists.
Rightist political ele-
ments, including large land-
owners, remain bitter over what
they regard as the government's
diluted anti-Communist pro-
gram--especially since Mendez
removed the top three security
officials last March and reined
in the ri htist counterterror-
is is ..
The economically
important Association of Guate-
malan Agriculturalists (AGA) re-
cently drafted a letter to the
archbishop of Guatemala express-
ing concern over the Catholic
Church's role in encouraging the
peasants to organize. They equate
clerical words on social justice
with "playing the Communist game."
Communist terrorists, for
their part, continue active. The.
most recent incidents occurred
on 18 July, when several bombs
were set off simultaneously at
the national palace, police head-
quarters and the Brazilian Em-
bassy.
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