MAO TSE-TUNG AND HIS ASSOCIATES: UNEASY ALLIANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006600080003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 20, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Mao Tse-tung and His Associates. Uneasy Alliance
Secret
N? 43
20 September 1968
No. 0038/68A
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For 18 months, the top of China's power structure-an inner circle of
seven-has presented a virtually unchangi:-lig public face. This outward sta-
bility has persisted despite violent social upheaval, bloody factional fighting,
several reversals of national policy, and the political destruction of half a
dozen men in the second echelon of the leadership. The official voices of the
regime have consciously portrayed the seven as a unified team. They have
appeared on the same platforms, mouthed many of the same propaganda
cliches, and have been careful in public to take consonant actions ever since
January 1967.
Appearances, nevertheless, are misleading. The current inner circle is
not the loyal phalanx of Mao's lieutenants that was projected to the outside
world in the regime's first 16 years. The members of today's power center
are a disparate group, not natural or congenial allies.
Given the severe internal strains that have developed in China, it does
not appear probable that the top leadership will be able to maintain its
facade of unity. A new purge may be near, and this time it might reach into
the inner circle.
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Divisive Elements
The present group of leaders
developed during the purge of
party stalwarts--Liu Shao-chi,
Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, and
Tao Chu--which shook the previous
politburo standing committee to
its foundations in 1966. Besides
Mao, the inner circle now in-
cludes Defense Minister Lin Piao,
the durable Premier Chou En-lai,
party theoretician Chen Po-ta,
secret police specialist Kang
Sheng, economic planner Li Fu-chun,
and Mao's wife, Chiang Ching.
Chou and Lin, the only sur-
vivors of the pre-1966 standing
committee besides Mao, had for
years been part of Mao's inner
councils, which had changed but
little from 1945 to 1965. Li Fu-
chun was promoted to the standing
committee from the rank of full
member of the politburo at the
11th plenum in 1966. Chen Po-ta
and Kang Sheng had been only al-
ternate politburo members before
then. Chiang Ching was brought
out of almost total obscurity to
take a prominent position at her
husband's side.
It has frequently been diffi-
cult to judge where each of these
individual leaders has stood and
to discover the degree to which
each has concurred or dissented
with regard to the main thrusts
CURRENT LEADERSHIP ELITE IN CHINA
The first seven form the inner circle, which has not varied since January 1967. The next seven
assumed their present status after the last purge in March 1968, and Wen was added in August 1968.
These additional officials appear with the inner circle at all important public functions and
presumably also carry considerable influence in the inner councils.
MAO TSE-TUNG Chairman of party and Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC)
LIN PIAO Vice Chairman, PBSC; Minister of National Defense; First Vice
Chairman, Military Affairs Committee (MAC)
CHOU EN-LA! Member, PBSC;Premier
CHEN PO-TA Member, PBSC; Chairman, Cultural Revolution Group (CRG)
KANG SHENG Member, PBSC; Adviser. CRG
LI FU-CHUN Member; Vice Premier
CHIANG CHING
CHANG CHUN-CHI AO
YAO WEN-YUAN
HSIEH FU-CHIH
HUANG YUNG-SHENG
WU FA-HSIEN
YEH CHUN
WANG TUNG-HSING
WEN YU-CHENG
First Vice Chairman, CRG
Vice Chairman, CRG
Member, CRG
Member, MAC. Minister of Public Security; Chairman, Peking
Municipal Revolutionary Committee
Member, MAC; Chief of Staff
Member, MAC; Deputy Chief of Staff; Commander of Air Force
Member, the CRG in the People's Liberation Army; wife of Lin Piao
Vice Minister of Public Security
Deputy Chief of Staff; Commander, Peking garrison
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of the Cultural Revolution. It is
apparent from an abundance of indi-
rect evidence, however, that a
fundamental division exists at the
ultimate center of power. This
seven-headed team is, in fact, a
volatile combination of individ-
uals--with conflicting personal
ambitions and differing policy
stands--which can be expected to
disintegrate if the strains of the
Cultural Revolution become suffi-
ciently powerful.
Although the official propa-
ganda media have been fairly
opaque regarding divergent atti-
tudes among the protagonists,
the less-restrained Red Guard
press has reprinted speeches and
pronouncements that tend to d-f--
ferentiate the individuals and
their basic orientations. In
some cases, animosities have shown
through.
Much more revealing of the
antagonisms at the center, how-
ever, have been the key policy
shifts and the related fortunes
of different sets of individuals
in the second echelon of the hi-
erarchy, Although not in the same
profusion as during the 1966
purges, the Cultural Revolution
has continued to spew lesser of-
ficials into political oblivion.
These new victims have been
closely identified with one or
another faction in the hierarchy,
and their respective fortunes have
reflected the inner tensions and
provide a measure of the shifting
political influence of these fac-
tions.
The ups and downs of the con-
tending forces in the Cultural Rev-
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olution over the last 18 months
throw some light on the semicon-
cealed struggle at the center.
Although most of the action on
stage necessarily revolves around
secondary figures, it tends to
show what the principals were up
to behind the scenes.
To Western observers, there
have been four clearly demarcated
phases in the Cultural Revolution
since the Red Guard convulsions of
1966 dismantled the party appara-
tus: (1) the radical attack on
the bureaucratic establishment
in the government and army, March
to August 1967; (2) the moderate
ascendancy, August 1967 to March
.1968; (3) the radical resurgence,
March to June 1968; and (4) the
turn to the right, July 1968 to
the present. Each of these was
ushered in by a shift in the
propaganda line, and each but the
most recent involved political
attacks on a particular group of
secondary officials.
The Radical Attack, March-
August 1967
During the first of these
periods, the radicals in the
leadership mounted a major cam-
petign against officials in au-
thority, primarily in government
and the military, who were ob-
structing or stalling the momen-
tum of the Cultural Revolution
out of a basic interest in eco-
nomic stability, the status quo,
and their own political survival.
Ultimately, this radical campaign
aborted, but only after it had
caused enormous damage to the
country's economic, social, and
political fabric, and had caused
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hairman Mao Twtung is the aging, ailing god-figure of
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the vaguely stated policies which have spurred the turbulent
movements of the last two years--both leftward and rightward--
Mao has clearly been the dominant figure in the Chinese
Communist movement for three decades. 25X1
Chinese Communism w 25X6
is t e key to China's nihilist drama-me
Cultural evo ution. The ostensible source of most if not all of
He has not uttered a sentence in public for years,
but brief, delphic "instructions" are issued periodically in his name
which are often used to their own advantage by opposing
political forces. Alone of all important leaders, Mao, despite his
declining abilities, has retained his charisma and has remained
immune from direct public criticism throughout the Cultural
Revolution.
Vice Chairman Lin Piao, who has led China's army since
1959, was catapulted into the role of crown prince to Mao when
the previous heir-designate Liu Shao-chi was toppled in disgrace
in 1966. Propelled to the seat of authority by his command of the
major instrument of political power in China, Lin may have lost
the allegiance of many old-line military commanders by espousing
the disruptive extremes of Mao's Cultural Revolution. The political
disgrace in March 1968 of his protege--acting chief of staff Yang--
cannot fail to have tarnished his own image, and there were
some tentative indications during the summer that his position
might be weakening.
Premier Chou En-lai has been the chief proponent of social
order, stability, national security, and a productive economy,
striving desperately at times to hold together a large enough
coalition of vested pressure groups to challenge or modify the
more extreme drives of the Cultural Revolution. This role has
come naturally for the man who has been responsible for so many
years for administering China's vast governmental bureaucracy.
Chou's instinct for self-preservation and political compromise,
however, has kept him silent at critical points during the Cultural
Revolution.
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Kang Shang, the sinister, xenophobic former chief of the
secret police, has been "adviser" to the Cultural Revolution group
from its inception. This title and his extreme public and private
statements paint Kang as one of. the prime movers behind the
destructive radical impulses of the Cultural Revolution.
The shadowy Chen Po-ta, longtime ghostwriter, propagandist,
and ideologue for Mao, has been chief of the Cultural Revolution
Group since its formation in the fall of 1966. Deriving his
political stature solely from close association with Mao, Chen
has generally been found on the radical side of controversies at
the center.
The sixth member of the Politburo Standing Committee,
Li Fu-chun, has played only a limited role in the Cultural
Revolution. He has appeared to be mainly symbolic of the
bureacratic administrators whose pragmatic views have been given
voice by Chou En-lai.
Last but not least, Mao's wife Chiang Ching, though not
a formal member of the Politburo Standing Committee (and not
even a central committee member), has exercised the influence of
that rank as a leader of the CRG and the most vocal spokesman
for the militants.
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Mao to doubt the reliability of
the army.
The overt evidence of this
campaign is found largely in the
posters and demonstrations of
militant Red Guards, who in Jan-
uary 1967 turned their ire on
two groups of leaders, mostly at
the secondary level, both asso-
ciated with the moderate end of
the spectrum. One of these groups
consisted of the minister of
petroleum and five vice premiers
more or less consistently identi-
fied with the pragmatic policies
championed by Chou En-lai: Li
Fu-chun, Foreign Minister Chen
Yi, Finance Minister Li Hsien-
nien, agricultural specialist
Tan Chen-lin, and national po-
lice chief Hsieh Fu-chih. The
second group was primarily mili-
tary: Hsu Hsiang-chien and Yeh
Chien-ying--both old army heroes
and members of the Military Af-
fairs Committee--and the head of
the state's scientific and tech-
nical program, Nieh Jung-chen,
who also is a member of the Mili-
tary Affairs Committee and a vice
premier. Fragmentary evidence
suggests
that these attacks were orches-
trated and at least partially
supervised by the radical leaders
in the inner circle Chiang Ching,
Kang Sheng, and Chen Po-ta.
Chou responded to both ini-
tiatives with a strong public
defense of the men involved,
probably risking his own politi-
cal standing to some degree in
the process. As a result, Li
Fu-chun and Hsieh Fu-chih escaped
from the ordeal unscathed, and
attacks on the others abated.
In May, they began again, those
against Foreign Minister Chen Yi
and agricultural specialist Tan
Chen-lin becoming particularly vir-
ulent. This thrust by the Red Guards
ended abruptly early in Septem-
ber 1967. Chou was apparently
not in a strong enough position
in the spring and early summer to
be as forthright in their defense,
and the Red Guards' targets grad-
ually became less active in pub-
lic, appearing mostly for cere-
monial occasions. Some were re-
moved or suspended from their
posts. Tan Chen-lin fell in dis-
grace during the summer. This
appeared to be a major blow to
Chou, who was clearly on the de-
fensive at this time.
Propaganda of last fall and
winter blamed the attacks of early
1967 against government and army
officials on "ultraleftist" ex-
tremists--the May 16 Corps. Spe-
cifically, these leftists, led by
members of the powerful Cultural
Revolution Group, were accused of
pressing a long-range plan to strike
at Premier Chou's subordinates and
allies and, ultimately, to bring'
down Chou himself.
Later on, at the time of
the disgrace of acting chief of
staff Yang Cheng-wu in March 1968,
propagandists in league with the
Cultural Revolution Group identi-
fied the period of February-Mardh
1967 as the "third wave" _of the
Cultural Revolution. They in-
dicted Tan Chen-lin--the only
target of the period they were
able to bring down--as the master-
.mind behind the so-called "Febru-
ary adverse current of reversing
current decision," i.e., a pur
!ported attempt to get earlier
Ipurge victims reinstated. Tan,
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however, was the politburo's only
total casualty from the period,
and the leftist treatment of his
political demise suggests that
the radicals considered the abor-
tive campaign a major piece of un-
finished business.
The Turn to Moderation,
September 1967
The most distinct switch in
regime policies and in the for-
tunes of secondary officials of
the Cultural Revolution occurred
during the moderate ascendancy
last fall. Directives against
revolutionary violence and in
support of orderly economic ac-
tivity--which had been publicly
promoted for many months to no
avail by Chou En-lai and members
of his entourage such as national
police chief Hsieh Fu-chih--were
suddenly reiterated and enforced.
But most striking of all, three
young second-line leaders of the
Cultural Revolution Group--Wang
PEKING'S OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE PHASES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
In speeches on 24 and 27 March 1968, Lin Pis,o, Chen Po-ta, and others defined the "five
waves"* of the Cultural Revolution and their key purgees, as listed below. These "waves" differ
from the phases identified by US observers, but the list shows that Chinese spokesmen understand
the political nature of these phases in terms not greatly different from ours. (Information in italics
supplied by OCI.)
(1) November 1965 June 1966
Deng Chen politburo member
A ttacks on allegedly anti-Mao elements Lo Jui-ching army chief of staff
in'the party Lu Tingipropaganda chief
Yang Shang-kunMao's aide
(2) August-December 1966 Liu Shao-chi heir apparent
Attack on party machine as a whole Teng Hsiao-ping party secretary
Tao Chu South China party boss
(3) February-March 1967 Tan Chen-lin politburo member, leader of
Purge of "rightists" "February adverse current" not
actually eliminated until August 1967
(4) August 1967 - January 1968 Wang Li member, Cultural Revolution Group
Purge of "ultralef,? rates Kua.ri Feng member, Cultural Revolution Group
counterattack by mode tes Chi.Pen-yu member, Cultural Revolution Group
(5) March 1968
New Yang Cheng-wu acting chief of staff
purge of "rightists Yu Li-chin air force commissar
radical reaction to 4th wave Fu Chun - r Peking g p garrison commander.
*A sixth wave was visible beginning in July 1968, with a new swing to the right and the stringent suppression o,
radical Red Guards. No major victims had come to light as of early September.
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Li, Kuan Feng, and Mu Hsin--were
disgraced in early September. All
were certified radicals, and all
were closely associated with Chen
Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and Chiang
Ching.
Charges against the out-
lawed anti-Chou group of extreme
leftists, the May 16 Corps, be-
came increasingly detailed and
explicit over the next six months,
naming all three as kingpins in
the attempt to eradicate Chou's
government bureaucrats and hint-
ing darkly that a more important
protector lurked untouched some-
where in the hierarchy. When a
fourth Cultural Revolution Group
member, Chi Pen-yu, was purged
in January, he was immediately
charged with the same crimes.
At this time, when the radi-
cal faction was suffering its
first important casualties of
the Cultural Revolution, the mod-
erate targets of the preceding
half-year were gradually being
reinstated. This process culmi-
nated in the apparently full re-
habilitation of Foreign Minister
Chen Yi in November 1967 and the
elevation of the relatively un-
important Petroleum Minister Yu
Chiu-li to the second rank of
leaders in public appearances--
no doubt as a symbol of the
changed balance of forces among
the top leaders of the regime.
The removal of the four
young radicals has since been of-
ficially termed the "fourth wave"
in the Cultural Revolution. This
period appears to have been one
when the radical members of the
inner circle were under some re-
straint and Chou En-tai, his
subordinates, and allied military
leaders were in the ascendancy.
Like other periods of retreat,
this one was given Mao's full
official endorsement, and was
said to be part of his "great
strategic plan" for rebuilding
the party. This retreat was short-
lived, however, indicating that
Mao viewed it with suspicion.
Radical Resurgence,
March 1968
The "fifth wave" was pre-
cipitated by behind-the-scenes
struggles in Peking at some point
between 8 and 24 March, when it
was announced that acting Chief
of Staff Yang Cheng-wu, the air
force political commissar, and
the Peking garrison commander
had been removed,
Although the ouster of Yang
and associates must have been
one of the major turning points
in the Cultural Revolution, at
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which the fortunes of the main
players took a sharp turn--this
much is acknowledged by radical
spokesmen--it is unclear who the
culprits were working for and
against. All were Lin Piao ap-
pointees, but Lin was seemingly
unhurt by their sudden fall from
grace. Immediately after their
political demise, however, lead-
ing members of Chou's State Coun-
cil again came under brief poster
attack and remained out of sight
for several weeks.
Nevertheless, the two men
brought in to replace the fallen
military leaders, Huang Yung-sheng
and Wen Yu-cheng, have even better
credentials as "conservatives" than
their predecessors. Chou En-lai
had backed Huang, then commander
of the Canton Military Region,
where Wen was his subordinate,
against charges in 1967 by radi-
cal Red Guards there that he was
guilty of suppressing them.
It would appear, therefore,
that while the Cultural Revolu-
tion took a sudden lurch to the
left again in March, the result-
ing situation was a stalemate be-
tween the two main leadership
factions. Propaganda became
notably more leftist and inflam-
matory, and Red Guard violence
in the provinces picked up once
again. Some of the lines of
moderate policy were blocked,
while others were sidetracked.
At the same time, however, re-
newed attacks on moderate fig-
ures--except for those on Nieh
Jung-chen, the head of the state's
scientific and technical program--
quickly died out without follow-
through, and such moderate drives
as the formation of provincial
.revolutionary committees headed
by old-line military and party
:Figures moved ahead at a good pace 25X1
through the end of May.
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In major ideological pro-
nouncements, "workers" were au-
thorized to take the lead in
"everything." In communist ter-
minology, "working class" is a
euphemism for whoever is exer-
cising authority, and in this
case meant the "conservative"
provincial leadership that had
fitfully been formed in late 1967
and 1968, evidently with the
backing of the more moderate ele-
ments of the central leadership.
Apparently, these pronouncements
thus tolled the death knell for
the Red Guard movement, an im-
portant power base for leaders of
the Cultural Revolution Group in
Peking. Another conservative mil-
itary figure, the new deputy chief
of staff and Peking garrison com-
mander Wen Yu-cheng, began appear-
ing with the elite list of 15 lead-
ers on 11 August.
In the face of this con-
certed swing back to law and or-
der, the inner circle continued
to appear together as if nothing
had changed. After two years of
the turmoil, however, there can
be little doubt that this super-
ficial unity masks a ferocious
fight for dominance. Strains of
-that fight have nearly split the
inner circle asunder at least
twice in the past year, and many
key lieutenants of both factions
have fallen in the fray. There
can be no security at the pin-
nacle of power in China today,
save perhaps for Mao himself. A
new, ruthless purge would seem to
be near and this time it might
reach into the inner circle.
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