WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006500040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 28, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A006501Sfbt
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
_ 4.5
28 June 1968
No. 0026/68
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(Information as of noon EDT, 27 June 1968)
VIETNAM
Prime Minister Huong ran into new difficulties during
the week as his various opponents probed for weak
points in his fledgling government. Both militant
and moderate factions of the Buddhist movement issued
statements calling for a cease-fire. The lull in the
ground war continued as the enemy concentrated on re-
deploying his troops, possibly in preparation for
large-scale action later this summer.
NORTH KOREA STEPS UP INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTH
Pyongyang's annual campaign to infiltrate agents into
the South has apparently begun.
NEW THAI CONSTITUTION INCREASES POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The new Thai constitution will almost certainly usher
in a period of heightened political activity, but it
is not likely to result soon in major changes in the
government.
Page
1
Europe
WESTERN ALLIES PONDER MOVES ON BERLIN SITUATION
The NATO conferees in Reykjavik affirmed their sup-
port of free access to Berlin while the Allies con-
tinued their limited countermeasures and Secretary
Rusk underlined US concern by meeting in Bonn with
West German Chancellor Kiesinger and Berlin Mayor
Schuetz.
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NATO MINISTERS MEET AT REYKJAVIK
The semiannual NATO ministerial meeting, held at
Reykjavik on 24-25 June, was highlighted by discus-
sions of security in the Mediterranean and the pos-
sibility of East-West mutual force reductions.
SOVIET TROOPS ENTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR PACT EXERCISE
The Czechoslovak Government is still trying to play
down the size and significance of Soviet participa-
tion in the current Warsaw Pact exercise, but the
official statements are unlikely to eliminate all
doubts and fears among the people.
CZECHOSLOVAKS CONCENTRATE ON DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
The most significant action of the National Assembly
was the enactment of a constitutional law preparing
the way for a Czech-Slovak federation, but a contin-
uing coolness in relations with the USSR was reflected
in comments by key party officials.
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR INCREASE MILITARY CONTACTS
The arrival in Belgrade on 24 June of the commander
of the Soviet Air Force may presage closer military
cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USSR, and is
another reflection of the gradual step up in military
contacts since last summer.
MOSCOW TURNS WARY EYE ON "NEW LEFT"
Student assaults on the political order in some West
European countries have drawn unsympathetic responses
from Soviet leaders and have led them to take further
measures to tighten discipline over Soviet youth.
GAULLISTS IN STRONG POSITION FOR SECOND FRENCH VOTE
The French voter chose stability and order in the
first round of the parliamentary elections and gave
the Gaullists not only a six-percent increase in the
popular vote but also an unprecedented number of
first-ballot victories.
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Middle East - Africa
TANZANIA'S NYERERE WHEELS AND DEALS
President Nyerere's ventures in international diplo-
macy during the past fortnight will probably yield
additional Communist aid for Tanzania and will fur-
ther dilute Western influence within the country.
NEW SOVIET ECONOMIC AID FOR IRAN
Moscow is busily soaking up Iran's anticipated reve-
nues from the sale of natural gas with economic de-
velopment projects and arms contracts.
NASIR OFFERS "ELECTIONS" TO STEM DISSENT IN EGYPT
The election campaign currently under way in Egypt
is another of Nasir's efforts to dampen internal
discontent, and will bring about no diminution in
Nasir's control of the state machinery.
Western Hemisphere
BRAZILIAN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS PLAGUE GOVERNMENT
Demonstrations and protests have taken place in almost
every major city, and dangerous countercurrents may
be building up in the military.
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UNEASY POSTELECTORAL SITUATION IN ECUADOR
Delay in confirming Jose Maria Velasco's victory in
the presidential election on 2 June has aggravated
long-standing political strains in Ecuador. Mean-
while, persistent student and labor agitation has
created serious tensions in the Pacific coast port
of Guayaquil.
STUDENT DISCONTENT INCREASING IN URUGUAY
Deteriorating economic conditions have engendered
serious, sometimes violent protests by students and
organized labor.
PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT BACKS DOWN ON SHIPPING DECREE
The furor over Panama's controversial shipping decree
subsided when President Robles in essence rescinded
the measure last weekend. Meanwhile, the vote-count-
ing to determine the make-up of the National Assembly
remains stalled.
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In Saigon, tension within the military establishment appears to be
easing as Vice President Ky withdraws further into the background..
Uncertainty over how to play the sensitive peace issue is further
blurring the political picture in Saigon. Huong created a brief furor in the
legislature by merely suggesting that the National Liberation Front may at
one time have had some genuine Vietnamese nationalists in it. On the
other hand, both the militant and the moderate Buddhists began a cau-
tious probe for the limits of tolerance on the issue by calling for an early
cease-fire. Even though. the government is tacitly allowing more open
discussion of possible terms for a settlement, Saigon politicians are likely
to pursue the subject with considerable circumspection, at least until the
course of the Paris talks becomes clearer.
North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris broke no new ground on the
central issue of a bombing halt during the tenth session on Wednesday.
They did, however, use the occasion to dwell at some length on the
National Liberation Front's program for South Vietnam. Extraneous to
the business currently at hand in the talks, the North Vietnamese may
have chosen to interject this political issue at least in part with an eye
toward playing on the sensitivities of the South Vietnamese.
North Korea's seizure last week of a small South Korean motor
reconnaissance boat gives Pyongyang a propaganda bonanza at a time
when it is pulling out all the stops in its annual observance of the start of
the Korean war. The North Koreans have linked the incident to the
Pueblo affair to bolster their charges of US - South Korean aggression. In
the meantime, North Korea's annual campaign to infiltrate agents into the
South-both through the Demilitarized Zone and by sea-appears to have
begun.
In Thailand, the newly promulgated constitution, nine years in the
writing, will usher in a period of activity by long-suppressed civilian
politicians. It will not significantly affect the ruling military oligarchy's
control over the country, however.
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VIETNAM
Prime Minister Huong encoun-
tered new difficulties last week
as his opponents probed for op-
portunities to embarrass him in
what seems to be a developing cam-
paign to unseat his fledgling gov-
ernment.
In the Upper House repre-
sentatives of the Revolutionary
Dai Viet Party, bitter over Huong's
failure to offer a key cabinet
post to party chairman Ha Thuc Ky
have been leading the attack on
Foreign Affairs Minister Tran
Chanh Thanh, whom they consider
to be the cabinet's "jugular
vein." The Dai Viets, however,
are reportedly planning to broaden
their attack to include both Huong
and newly appointed Saigon Mayor
Nhieu. The party is said to be
organizing a "shadow cabinet" in
the expectation that it will be
called upon to form the govern-
ment in the next go-round.
Another possible pretender
to Huong's mantle, former deputy
premier Tran Van Tuyen, is also
maneuvering to bring down the
government. Tuyen claims that
Huong's performance in his brief
second tenure as prime minister
has already been too shaky for
his cabinet to be entrusted with
the vital questions of war and
peace. Tuyen has recently been
advocating talks with the Na-
tional Liberation Front as both
a "political reality" and as a
means of gaining time for non-
Communist political development
under some form of coexistence.
The unfavorable reaction to
Huong's appointment of Colonel
Nhieu as mayor of Saigon led to
considerable speculation that the
prime minister might resign. Re-
ports surfaced, but were not of-
ficially confirmed, that Defense
Minister Vy had threatened to
resign to back up his allegations
of corruption in Nhieu's past,
and because Interior Minister
Khiem had announced the mayor's
appointment while Vy's charges
were still under study by Huong
and Thieu. Even though Huong was
upset by the controversy, there
has been no confirmation that he
in fact offered his resignation.
The prime minister provoked
a raucous display of shouting and
desk pounding in the Lower House
on 24 June when, in an attempt to
chronicle the development of the
National Liberation Front, he
said that a number of nationalists
joined the Viet Minh in 1945 and
even assisted later in the forma-
tion of the National Liberation
Front. After the furor subsided,
Huong added that the Front had
since become a thoroughgoing in-
strument of the Communists, and
he later sought to set the record
straight in the semiofficial
Vietnam Press by emphasizing that
his position was "not to recog-
nize, not to negotiate, and not
to have a coalition with the so-
called 'National Liberation Front.'"
On the other side of the
peace issue, several organiza-
tions in Saigon have issued state-
ments at least partially at vari-
ance with the official government
position. A recently formed labor
organization petitioned President
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Thieu for an end to what it de-
scribed as careless and indis-
criminate allied air and artillery
strikes in Saigon and the country-
side. On 22 June, the militant
Buddhist faction published a
statement calling for an immediate
cease-fire, and castigating both
sides for the indiscriminate shell-
ing and bombing of Saigon. The
next day, the moderate Buddhists
also issued a statment calling
for peace, but a spokesman made
it clear that the onus was on
North Vietnam for not matching
allied de-escalation.
The War in the South
The lull in the fighting
continued as the enemy concen-
trated on redeployment of his
forces, possibly in preparation
for renewed large-scale fighting.
In Quang Tri Province, Com-
munist harassment of Khe Sanh and
other allied bases eased. No
firm evidence is available to ex-
plain the enemy's apparent abandon-
ment of its objectives in western
Kontum Province. Captured docu-
ments indicate that in one case
a planned Communist assault on
an allied fire support base was
called off because heavy losses
incurred by the unit assigned
the mission.
Pressure in the Saigon area
also eased during the week, and
the populace has enjoyed a five-
day surcease from rocket attacks.
Nevertheless, there continue to
be indications of an early inten-
sification of the enemy's campaign
against the capital.
Despite the current lull
throughout the country, all
indications--including captured
documents and prisoner interro-
gations--point to a period of
intensified enemy action. Units
in some areas will probably not
be fully prepared until late July
or early August, which would
largely rule out a countrywide
offensive until that time. Rather
than wait, the Communists may
choose to stagger their operations.
Analysis of present indicators
suggests that the enemy may have
another go at Saigon in about a
week, may venture major action in
I Corps by mid or late July, and
may not be ready for resumed ac-
tivity in the highlands before
sometime in August.
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NORTH KOREA STEPS UP INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTH
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Pyongyang's annual campaign
to infiltrate agents into the
South has apparently begun.
Unlike incidents earlier this
year in which North Korean forces
deliberately attacked US and South
Korean units along the Demilita-
rized zone, groups of infiltrators
since the beginning of June have
attempted to avoid contact with
security forces and have only fired
after their presence was detected.
Supplies picked up after these
incidents suggest that the in-
filtrators were agents being
sent on intelligence-collection
or sabotage missions.
The North Koreans are ap-
parently also stepping up mari-
time infiltration, which normally
accounts for about 70 percent of
all agents dispatched to South
A tightening of South Korean
security in response to the at-
tempted North Korean attack on
the presidential residence last
January appears to be hampering
the operations of the infiltra-
tors.
The South Koreans are par-
ticularly concerned over the pos-
sibility of terrorist incidents
during the period between the
anniversaries of the start of
the Korean war on 25 June and
the armistice on 27 July. A
curfew was ordered for Seoul on
the evening of 25 June and over
200,000 police, reservists, and
troops checked homes, hotels, and
other places where North Korean
agents could be hiding.
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NEW THAI CONSTITUTION INCREASES POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The new Thai constitution
will almost certainly usher in a
period of heightened political
activity, but it is not likely
to result soon in major changes
in the government.
Nine years in the writing,
the constitution promulgated by
King Phumiphon on 20 June is an
expression of the military oli-
garchy's desire to accommodate
pressure for political change
while maintaining itself in power.
The constitution provides for an
independent executive, chosen by
the King with what will undoubt-
edly prove to be the close super-
vision of the present leaders,
and a bicameral legislature having
carefully circumscribed powers.
The upper house, which will have
a de facto veto over legislation,
will be chosen by the King.
The constitution provides
for lower house elections within
eight months, and the government
has recently announced the forma-
tion of an as yet unnamed politi-
cal party with Prime Minister
Thanom at its head. Although
progress in organizing the govern-
ment party has been slow, the
fragmented nature of the opposi-
tion and the considerable power
at the disposal of the government
should permit it to control the
lower house with little diffi-
culty.
Leftist politicians almost
immediately attempted to use the
new constitution to challenge
existing laws curtailing civil
liberties. Apparently acting in
concert with student leaders, the
politicians managed to stage a
large and well-organized student
demonstration on 21 June to back
up their demands for legal reforms.
The demonstration, the first in
Bangkok since the 1957 coup, sur-
prised Thai authorities, who have
long taken student docility for
granted, but they managed to con-
trol it adroitly.
The demonstration will al-
most certainly be viewed by some
ruling elements as a confirmation
of their worst fears, and it will
increase the resolve of the mili-
tary establishment to monitor
carefully the liberalizing process.
Deputy Prime Minister Praphat,
long a foe of political change,
has stated that martial law will
remain in effect despite promul-
gation. Prime Minister Thanom,
who characteristically blamed the
student outbreak on "outsiders,"
has indicated that the government
will take steps to ensure there
is no recurrence.
Even if the government is
successful in keeping opposition
elements under wraps, the resump-
tion of open political activity
will raise a number of domestic
problems embarrassing to the
leadership. Bangkok's relations 25X1
with the US and the large number
of US military personnel in Thai-
land are almost certain to be-
come political issues.
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Foreign Minister Gromyko told the USSR's Supreme Soviet on 28
June Chat Moscow was prepared to "exchange views" on the limitation of
offensive and defensive strategic weapons. This statement--the most affirm-
ative response the Soviets have yet given publicly to the US offer to
discuss a limitation on strategic weapons-leaves much to be examined
further. It seems to mark, however, the end of a long period of hesitation
in Moscow, during which the chief issue was not what to discuss, but
whether.
Electoral developments were the center of interest during the week in
France and Italy. In France, the Gaullists won an impressive victory in the
first round of balloting on 23 June. A repeat win in the run-off ballot on
.30 June would be an even greater indication of De Gaulle's political
virtuosity as well as a demand for stability and order.
The postelection situation in Italy, where a weak center-left coalition
emerged, is unresolved. The new government may last until the autumn,
but continued labor and student unrest appears likely to test its staying
power.
Virtually all custom duties on trade between the six members of the
European Economic Community are to be eliminated on 1 July. Satisfac-
tion over reaching this long-sought goal will be flawed, however, by the
"emergency" protectionist measures announced by France this week, alleg-
edly to be in effect through 1 January 1969. Despite the sense of betrayal
this action has caused among France's partners, it seems unlikely that the
commission will use its potentially far-reaching powers to gain support
among the Five for insisting on a reversal.
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WESTERN ALLIES PONDER MOVES ON BERLIN SITUATION
The Western focus on the Ber-
lin problem this week turned to
the semiannual NATO foreign min-
isters meeting in Reykjavik. The
conferees affirmed their support
of free access to Berlin, and
agreed that the Soviet Union must
ultimately be held responsible
for the recent East German re-
strictions. To underline US con-
cern, Secretary Rusk flew to Bonn
on 26 June for a luncheon meeting
with Chancellor Kiesinger and Ber-
lin Mayor Schuetz.
The West continued limited
countermeasures. Following dis-
cussions in the North Atlantic
Council on 20 June, travel re-
strictions, including fees, were
imposed on East German travel to
NATO countries. At the same time,
an American and a British airline
reached tentative agreement on
running a West German - subsidized
air-shuttle service between Han-
nover and Berlin beginning 1 Au-
gust. Last weekend, under the
decision to limit East German
travel to West Germany, Bavarian
police turned back several hun-
dred East Germans wishing to at-
tend a memorial meeting in Munich.
The West German announcement
on 24 June that the Bundestag
will hold two "work weeks" in
West Berlin this fall is being
read by Pankow and Moscow as a
new challenge, and may provide
the justification for further har-
assments at that time.
Autobahn traffic has mean-
while adjusted to the East German
visa and fee requirements, and no
unusual tie-ups have been reported,
but the imposition this week of
scheduled East German hikes in
daily visitation fees and currency
conversion minimums will provide
new headaches. British, Austrian,
and Swedish officials in Berlin
complain that the East German visa
requirements are causing diffi-
culties for their nationals living
in East Germany, who were accus-
tomed to unrestricted access to
West Berlin and West Germany.
Morale in West Berlin seems
to be taking a beating. Although
there is a sense of resignation,
Berlin officials fear that many
workers and youths will leave the
city, and business leaders are
worried about obtaining new in-
vestment. So far, however, most
Berliners appear to be more criti-
cal of Bonn than of Washington for
what they see as a lack of force-
ful countermeasures.
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NATO MINISTERS MEET AT REYKJAVIK
The semiannual NATO minis-
terial meeting, held at Reykja-
vik on 24-25 June, was high-
lighted by discussions of security
in the Mediterranean and the pos-
sibility of East-West mutual force
reductions.
All 15 ministers agreed to
direct NATO Secretary General
Brosio to maintain a watch over
Alliance security interests in
the Mediterranean. As antici-
pated, the French refused to "as-
sociate" with military policy de-
cisions regarding the Mediter-
ranean. The Fourteen outlined no
specific proposals, preferring a
simple call for actions designed
to enhance NATO surveillance ac-
tivities in the area.
To demonstrate the Alli-
ance's commitment to detente as
well as to defense, the ministers
attached an eight-paragraph decla-
ration on mutual force reductions
to the communique. For reasons
of "principle and procedure"--
that is, their opposition to
statements implying negotiations
via blocs--the French declined to
associate with four of the para-
graphs. The Fourteen pledged to
make "all necessary preparations
for discussions" on mutual force
reductions with the Soviet bloc;
emphasis was placed on the need
for such reductions to be "re-
ciprocal and balanced in scope
and timing."
The coupling of defense and
detente in the communique carried
to fruition the "two pillar" con-
cept of NATO outlined in the Harmel
report on the future tasks of the
Alliance, which was issued by the
ministers last December. The Four-
teen also demonstrated a strong
desire to make policy decisions
involving action rather than ad-
ditional studies. They were able
to overcome French intransigence
through circumvention--acting as
the Defense Planning Committee in
which France is not represented--
and by using language designed to
give evidence of Alliance soli-
darity. Secretary Rusk found
"less disarray and more determina-
tion at this meeting than in any
NATO ministerial in recent years."
Scandinavian anti-NATO ele-
ments, opponents of the Greek re-
gime, and Africans from Portuguese
Angola combined in efforts to dis-
rupt the ministerial conference.
The ministers were subjected to
only slight harassment by posters
and verbal abuse. Police broke
up an attempted sit-in by arrest-
ing 20 demonstrators.
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SOVIET TROOPS ENTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR PACT EXERCISE
The Czechoslovak Government
is still trying to play down the
size and significance of Soviet
participation in the current,
widely publicized and hastily
scheduled Warsaw Pact exercise.
Some Soviet combat troops,
armor, and tactical aircraft moved
into Czechoslovakia during the
week to take part. Prague claims
that the combat forces will be
used only in small numbers as
"marker" units--that is, to
represent larger, probably divi-
sion-level formations. Neverthe-
less, the Soviet military presence
will serve as a reminder to the
Czechoslovak populace of the facts
of Soviet military power and the
binding nature of Czechoslovakia's
ties with the Warsaw Pact.
Early in the week, Prague
announced that a Soviet tank unit
had taken up a position in the
western part of the country.
Another Prague announcement
stated that motorized rifle units
also had moved into Czechoslova-
kia, but this statement failed
to give the nationality of these
units, which are presumed to be
Soviet.
Prague has been releasing
daily announcements that are in-
tended to counter any popular in-
terpretation of the military
moves as a Soviet attempt to in-
terfere in Czechoslovak affairs.
Czechoslovak officials have
stated that all foreign troops
will leave the country at the
conclusion of the exercise, which
is expected to be no later than
30 June. In view of the fact
that Soviet participation in the
exercise is apparently more ex-
tensive than Prague had initially
let on, the official statements
are unlikely to eliminate all
doubts and fears among the popu-
lace.
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CZECHOSLOVAKS CONCENTRATE ON DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
The Dubcek regime's at-
tention this week was primarily
focused on solving domestic prob-
lems, but the coolness in Czech-
oslovak-Soviet relations was once
again reflected in commentaries
by key party officials.
The most significant action
of the National Assembly was the
enactment of a constitutional law
preparing the way for establish-
ment of a Czech-Slovak federation,
which will give Slovakia the
autonomy it has long sought. The
law established a Czech national
council, to be composed of Czech
members of the assembly and other
leading personalities, that will
work with the existing Slovak
council in preparing a joint
proposal on federalization. The
assembly thus side-stepped the
problem of working out an ac-
ceptable federal arrangement in
the assembly itself, where Czechs
could outvote Slovaks if a di-
visive issue were involved.
The assembly also enacted a
rehabilitation law providing for
review of past criminal sentences
as well as monetary compensation
for persons who were unjustly
imprisoned or whose property was
seized.
In addition, after a stormy
debate, the existing press law
was amended to abolish censorship
of the press, radio, and televi-
sion. According to the minister
of culture and information, cen-
sorship is sweepingly defined as
"any intervention by a state body
against freedom of speech and
illustration, and their dissemina-
tion." A new and presumably more
liberal press law will be pro-
posed after the party congress
in September.
Reporting on his recent trip
to the USSR, assembly chairman
Smrkovsky noted that the Soviets
"were of slightly different opin-
ion" concerning the role of the
press, even after listening to
the Czechoslovak arguments.
Smrkovsky, who had earlier come
under fire by Czechoslovak news
media for some of his comments in
the Soviet Union, added that many
problems remain between the two
countries, but that Moscow "tol-
erates" Czechoslovak views and
developments. Moscow, however,
is still taking a critical view
of Czechoslovak liberals. The
Soviet press last week continued
its antiliberal polemics and
prominently featured a "letters
to the editor" campaign illustra-
ting its support of conservative
elements in Czechoslovakia.
Earlier in the week, party
secretary Cisar replied to the
criticism the Soviets recently
made of him in Pravda. Cisar's
comments, although made in low-key
fashion, suggest that the Czech-
oslovaks will not accept public
criticism of leading party of-
ficials without replying. More-
over, the regime continued to
move against appointees of ex-
party chief Novotny by dismissing
four deputy ministers of the
interior.
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YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR INCREASE MILITARY CONTACTS
The arrival in Belgrade on
24 June of Marshal Vershinin,
commander of the Soviet Air Force,
may presage closer military co-
operation between Yugoslavia and
the USSR. It is certainly an-
other reflection of the gradual
step-up in military contacts be-
tween Yugoslavia and the Warsaw
Pact nations since last summer.
The commander in chief of
the Soviet Black Sea Fleet,
aboard a guided-missile cruiser,
visited Yugoslavia last January.
Last August, for the
first time, Yugoslav observers
attended Warsaw Pact exercises
in Bulgaria. Yugoslav Defense
Ministry delegations also visited
Moscow last February, for the
50th anniversary of the Red
Army, and were in East Germany
last month. Such exchanges follow
several years during which Moscow
has been the sole source of modern
heavy armaments for the Yugoslavs,
supplying MIG-21 aircraft, mis-
sile-armed patrol boats, and
tanks.
Yugoslavia's air defense net
appears effective only against
NATO's southern flank and does
not seem to cover all air ap-
proaches from Eastern Europe. Al-
though there is no evidence that
the Yugoslavs plan to plug their
air defense system into that of
the Warsaw Pact, Vershinin might
raise this possibility during his
visit. A precedent already ex-
ists for the exchange of defense
information between Belgrade and
25X1
25X1
If the Yugoslavs should link
up with the Pact air defense sys-
tem, a new dimension would be
added to their defense policy but
Yugoslavia's basic posture as an
independent state would not be
changed. Tito does not intend
to join the Warsaw Pact and he
remains opposed to attending the
Moscow-sponsored International
Communist Conference. Belgrade
is intent on expanding Yugosla-
via's economic ties with the West
and is insistent on pressing Yugo-
slavia's role as a leader of the 25X1
nonaligned nations.
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MOSCOW TURNS WARY EYE ON "NEW LEFT"
Student assaults on the po-
litical order in some West Euro-
pean countries have drawn unsym-
pathetic responses from Soviet
leaders and have led them to take
further measures to tighten dis-
cipline over Soviet youth.
Party Secretary Demichev,
speaking to a social science con-
ference on 19 June, lashed out
at "revisionist ideologists"
abroad who try to replace the
class struggle in capitalist so-
ciety with the struggle between
generations and who proclaim
young people to be the only true
revolutionary force of our time.
Earlier, a critique of the "New
Left" doctrine of Herbert Marcuse
had appeared in Pravda. Corres-
pondent Yury Zhukov hurled the
epithet "werewolves" at Marcuse's
followers, including the leader
of the French radical students,
Cohn-Bendit.
Such outbursts display the
traditional Communist antipathy
toward revolutionary movements
not of the working class. More-
over, the consequences that stu-
dent agitation could have on Com-
munist rule have been made plain
to Soviet leaders by events in
Eastern Europe. A Czechoslovak
students' proposal to create an
organization free of any ties with
the Communist Party received a
sharp rebuke from a Soviet educa-
tion official.
Even allowing for some over-
reaction on the part of a regime
that tends to abhor the unconven-
tional, Soviet leaders apparently
judge that the ideological apathy
and generational antagonisms of
Soviet youth incline them to re-
spond in unwelcome ways to the
example of their peers in Europe.
Youth and teacher conferences
throughout the Soviet Union have
made the younger generation the
focal point of current efforts to
shore up ideological defenses.
The campaign reinforces other evi-
dence indicating that Soviet stu-
dents are following European
events with interest, especially
by listening to foreign radio-
broadcasts.
Official dissatisfaction with
the training of the young, as well
as Kremlin infighting, probably
were responsible for recent changes
in the leadership of the Soviet
youth organization, the Komsomol.
At the plenum of the Komsomol
central committee on 12 June, first
secretary Pavlov--long considered
a proteg4 of the politburo's
"lonesome end," Aleksandr Shele-
pin--was released from his posi-
tion, as were four other members
of the central committee bureau.
The politburo apparently dictated
the replacement of Pavlov by a
provincial party secretary from
outside the Komsomol in order
to strengthen its control over
the organization.
There are no firm signs as
yet that this shake-up will be
accompanied by any change in the
regime's traditional policy of
reliance on ideological indoctrina-
tion for youth. The aim of in-
stilling "a purposeful, ordered
system of views" that Demichev
set for the social scientists,
however, represents the authori-
tarian approach that has in the
past worked to alienate students
from party leadership both at
home and abroad. 25X1
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GAULLISTS IN STRONG POSITION FOR SECOND FRENCH VOTE
The French voter chose sta-
bility and order in the first
round of the parliamentary elec-
tions and gave the Gaullists not
only a six-percent increase in
the popular vote but also an un-
precedented number of first-bal-
lot victories. Both the Commu-
nists and the Federation of the
Left, apparently unable to over-
come the voter's fear of changes
that the left might make, dropped
over two percent from their 1967
showing. The center, which
dropped 2.5 percent, was unable
to buck the powerful trend toward
a polarization between left and
right. Apart from the Gaullists,
only the small, extreme-left Uni-
fied Socialist Party made gains,
almost doubling its percentage.
Although polls and other in-
dicators pointed to gains for the
government and its allies on the
first ballot, even the Gaullists
appeared surprised by the magni-
tude of their victory. By winning
152 seats on the first round, as
opposed to only 68 in 1967, the
Gaullists and the allied Inde-
pendent Republicans now need only
92 additional seats for a major-
ity. Opposition candidates man-
aged to win only 14 seats.
The Gaullists are taking no
chances that overconfidence,
which cost them seats after a
favorable first-round election
showing in 1967, will again mar
their prospects for a second-round
victory. Gaullist leaders are ex-
horting the public to return to
the polls and De Gaulle himself
will make a final radio-TV appeal
tomorrow. A high abstention rate
would hurt the Gaullists because
voters of the left are usually
more disciplined and therefore
more likely to come to the polls
in any event.
Run-offs will take place on
30 June in the districts where no
candidate received an absolute
majority on the first round, ap-
proximately two thirds of the
total. The federation and the
Communists applied their prior
agreement to withdraw in favor of
the best-placed candidate and the
regular Gaullists and Independent
Republicans followed the same pol-
icy. The center withdrew all of
its sure losers in districts where
the withdrawal would probably pre-
vent the election of a Communist.
In keeping with this policy,
former centrist presidential can-
didate Jean Lecanuet withdrew in
favor of a Gaullist candidate.
A Gaullist will oppose a Com-
munist or federation candidate in
about 70 percent of the remaining
districts. In such straight left-
right confrontations in 1967 the
Gaullists fared badly, particu-
larly at the hands of the feder-
ation. In another 14 districts,
Gaullists will face centrists and
they will battle the Unified So-
cialist Party in another three
districts. Triangular contests
will take place in 55 districts
among Gaullists and their allies,
centrists, and leftists or Commu-
nists .
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The recent pattern of daily exchanges of fire across the Israeli-
Jordanian cease-fire line continues, and the possibility of a major confron-
tation in the northern sector remains high. UN emissary Jarring, who has
been trying to get the Arabs and Israelis together in New York for the
past month, has gone home to Sweden for a vacation, and will return to
New York in mid-July.
Egyptian President Nasir is scheduled to leave on 4 July for a visit to
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. This will be his first visit to Moscow
since 1965. Meanwhile, the first stage of the electoral process to "reform"
the country's only political organization begins this week, culminating in
the election of a national party congress in July.
Other visitors to the USSR include the Somali army chief of staff,
who is currently in Moscow as a follow-up to the recent visit there of the
Somali minister of defense. In addition, a Pakistani military delegation led
by the commander in chief of the army left Karachi for Moscow yester-
day, presumably to discuss specifics of a Soviet arms supply arrangement.
Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives met in Nicosia early this
week for the first of a series of twice-weekly intercommunal talks. Both
exuded optimism for the future but urged against the expectation of a
speedy solution to the island's problems.
The military regime in Greece will publish its draft of the proposed
constitution within the next few days, thereby initiating the "second
phase" of its plan for the constitution; the third phase, the referendum, is
still slated for 1 September.
In Nigeria, the civil war grinds on as the secessionist Biafrans con-
tinue their vigorous resistance to the much stronger federal forces. Both
sides remain unmoved by the efforts of mediators to arrange a resumption
of peace talks.
There is increasing evidence that influential left-wing elements in
Sierra Leone are getting support and encouragement for their anti- Western
propaganda campaign from Communist embassies in Freetown. Prime Min-
ister Stevens has virtually eliminated the "national" character of the new
government by arresting almost all the leaders of the former ruling party
who had joined his coalition.
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TANZANIA'S NYERERE WHEELS AND DEALS
President Nyerere's ventures
in international diplomacy during
the past fortnight will probably
yield additional Communist aid
for Tanzania and will remove more
Western advisers from his govern-
ment. In terms of the relative
influence of East and West, Nye-
rere is rapidly approaching the
equilibrium he has long sought,
but it remains to be seen whether
true nonalignment can be pre-
served.
Nyerere returned on 26 June
from a triumphant eight-day state
visit to Peking and Pyongyang,
where the elite of both capitals
gave his high-level delegation a
rousing, red-carpet welcome. He
was accompanied by his three min-
isters of state and his chiefs of
the armed forces, police, and in-
telligence, virtually all those
responsible for Tanzania's secu-
rity.
for Tanzania's security forces,
including jet fighters, as well
as military assistance for Biafra
and the southern African liber-
ation movements. Despite the
lavish attentions of China's
top leaders, Nyerere maintained
a consistently moderate tone in
his speeches and avoided all op-
portunities to denigrate the West.
London announced on 20 June
that it will halt all aid to Tan-
zania in reprisal for the annul-
ment of a preindependence agree-
ment whereby Dar es Salaam has
been paying some $2.8 million a
year in pensions to British co-
lonial civil servants. Tanzania
also reneged on the repayment of
$15.6 million in UK loans cover-
ing these pensions. Henceforth,
it will pay retirement benefits
only for service performed since
independence.
Although the talks in Peking
undoubtedly covered economic aid,
such as the Tan-Zam railroad and
the purchase of Chinese locomo-
tives, the Tanzanians appeared
to put greater emphasis on mili-
tary matters than during Nyerere's
last trip there in February 1965.
The delegation visited army and
air force installations around
Peking. The Tanzanians have been
seeking additional Chinese aid
London has provided little
or no capital development aid to
Tanzania since 1965 when diplo-
matic relations were broken, but
its technical assistance has
amounted to about $4 million an-
nually and has supported nearly
700 UK nationals throughout the
Tanzanian civil service, includ-
ing 180 in the education field.
London apparently intends now to
bring home about two thirds of
them as their contracts expire,
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allowing the rest to stay on at
Tanzanian expense.
The departure of the British
technicians, who numbered 1,200
in 1965, will throw a further
strain on Tanzania's understaffed
civil service, but it is in line
with Nyerere's continuing efforts
to reduce Western influence in his
administration, particularly in
the educational system. Over the
past 18 months, as Western teachers
have been phased out of the pri-
mary and secondary schools, the
US Peace Corps contingent has been
halved and now the 110 British
Volunteers are to be withdrawn.
A Tanzanian drive to recruit tech-
nical advisers from small European
nations has met only partial suc-
cess. Scandanavia has supplied
some and East Germany has sent
about 40 secondary school teachers.
To help fill the void, Nyerere had
reportedly intended to ask Peking
to supply some Chinese personnel
for his civil service.
Tanzania is again looking
to the USSR for help after years
of fruitless aid discussions.
Recently, a minister flew to Mos-
cow to seek aid in building and
staffing a technical university
that will absorb the small, USAID-
assisted technical college in
Dar es Salaam. A Soviet Air
Force mission arrived in Dar es
Salaam about 16 June to survey
existing air facilities in re-
sponse to a request for air de-
fense assistance. Tanzania's
armed forces commander had toured
air force installations in the
USSR in May. The small Tanzanian 25X1
Air Force is now being trained
and equipped by Canada for re-
connaissance and logistical sup-
port missions, but Dar es Salaam
is determined to ac uire modern
let ficrhters.
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NEW SOVIET ECONOMIC AID FOR IRAN
Moscow's role in Iran's eco-
nomic development continues to
grow. With the recent agreement
for about $200 million in new
credits, total Soviet economic
aid has reached almost $550 mil-
lion. Although the bulk of fi-
nancing for Iran's fourth devel-
opment plan is largely under-
written by oil revenues from the
West, Soviet credits now repre-
sent about six percent of total
planned investment.
Repayment of these credits,
as in the case of earlier Soviet
credits, will be accomplished
through deliveries of natural gas.
Gas deliveries to the USSR during
1970-85 will provide Iran with
over $1 billion in purchasing
power, almost three fourths of
which now has been earmarked for
Soviet economic aid projects and
the purchase of $110 million
worth of military equipment.
The new Soviet credits are
to be used for such projects as
port development on the Caspian
Sea, renovation and electrifica-
tion of the Soviet-Iranian rail
link, and construction of lead
and zinc smelting plants. Mos-
cow also agreed to double the
capacity of the 600,000-ton So-
viet-financed steel plant now
under construction at Isfahan.
Iran may be holding off the
allocation of the remaining $350
million that will accrue from
natural gas exports with an eye
to future military purchases from
the USSR. The Soviets already
are providing wheeled vehicles,
armored personnel carriers, and
antiaircraft guns under an arms
agreement of January 1967.1
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NASIR OFFERS "ELECTIONS" TO STEM DISSENT IN EGYPT
Nasir is continuing his ef-
forts to dampen internal unrest
by keeping the country busy with
widely publicized political
changes.
The labor and student riots
that rocked the Egyptian regime
in February led Nasir to promise
the country a vague program of
political reforms, one of which
was the reformation of Egypt's
only legal political organization,
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU).
The first step in this program
began this week with some 180,000
candidates running for election
to 7,584 local ASU committees.
The process is to continue through-
out the next month at progres-
sively higher levels until a
2,000-member ASU national congress
is elected and convened on
23 July, the anniversary of the
seizure of power in 1952 by the
current ruling group.
Nasir has attempted to bill
this process as the "re-creation"
of the ASU in a more representa-
tive and democratic form, but the
essentials for truly free elec-
tions are lacking. Only those
Egyptians who are approve members
of the ASU can participate in the
electoral process, thus eliminating
those who hold significantly dif-
ferent views from the regime.
Many Egyptians probably see
this as just another regime ef-
fort to create the impression of
democracy where it does not in
fact exist. Nasir's previous
promises to create "democratic"
political bodies have not materi-
alized. In any event, the elec-
tions will not reduce Nasir's
personal control over the state
machinery.
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Student unrest continued to dominate the news from Latin America
last week. For the most part the demonstrations are still aimed at legiti-
mate grievances, but in a few countries the violence is now directed at the
"downfall of the dictatorships" and at US policies. In some cases, it is
coming under Communist influence, and charges of police brutality are
also being heard.
The most serious student disorders have occurred in Brazil. Leader-
ship of the demonstrations has been increasingly well organized, and has
been taken over principally by dissident Communists who are more radical
than orthodox party members. Divisions are likely to occur within the
military-whose support is essential to the government-on the handling of
the continuing political turmoil.
Student and labor agitation continued throughout the week in Uru-
guay as well. President Pacheco seems to be taking firmer action against
relatively quiet the past week, but plan to join in labor demonstrations
scheduled for 28 June.
Elections were in the news as well. The make-up of the 42-man
National Assembly in Panama is still undecided. In Ecuador, President-
elect Jose Maria Velasco has still not been officially proclaimed the winner
of the national elections on 2 June. A congressional by-election will be
held in Chile on 7 July. A loss by the Christian Democratic candidate
would be interpreted in Chile as further indication of popular dissatisfac-
tion with the Frei government.
25X1 Antigovernment student demonstrations also erupted in Cocha-
am a, Bolivia, on 25 June. The US Consulate was stoned and the offices
of the Peace Corps were slightly damaged.
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's personal style of campaigning and
his strong stand against granting greater autonomy to the provincial gov-
ernment of French-speaking Quebec carried the Liberal Party to a decisive
victory in the parliamentary elections on 25 June. Trudeau can be ex-
pected to move fairly fast in seeking a reconciliation with Quebec and in
implementing his proposed review of Canada's foreign and defense com-
mitments, including the possibility of recognizing Communist China.
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BRAZILIAN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS PLAGUE GOVERNMENT
The Costa e Silva administra-
tion has been plagued by a spread-
ing wave of student disorders that
erupted into violence on 21 June
in Rio de Janeiro. Demonstrations
and protests have taken place in
almost every major city, and dan-
gerous countercurrents may be build-
ing up in the military.
A powerful bomb explosion on
26 June extensively damaged the
new Second Army headquarters in
Sao Paulo, killing one soldier and
injuring four others. The job was
clearly done by professionals who
may also have been involved in the
theft of rifles from an army hospi-
tal a week earlier. Sao Paulo
military leaders are reported to be
furious. Military and police in
that city have exercised consider-
able restraint in dealing with the
continuing disorders, but they are
now likely to crack down sharply.
Sao Paulo citizens are worried and
increasingly hostile to violence--
much of which has been perpetrated
by students.
In contrast to Sao Paulo, sup-
port for students in Rio de Janeiro
has broadened, principally because
of exaggerated and indiscriminate
police violence. A "March for
Liberty Against Repression" on
26 June had quite extensive labor
backing and included some clergy,
teachers, and intellectuals among
the 10,000 to 12,000 students. The
large crowd carried banners denounc-
ing the "dictatorship," demanding
the release of arrested students,
and voicing solidarity with stu-
dent demands for reform of the out-
moded educational system. A mob
attacked the US Embassy on 21 June
and broke numerous windows before
being driven off by police, but
anti-US placards were not much in
evidence during the march on 26
June, although anti-US leaflets
were distributed and some student
speeches were larded with anti-
US remarks that were well applauded.
President Costa e Silva and
Education Minister Dutra have again
promised educational reforms, but
their lackluster statements are
unlikely to conciliate the students.
Leadership of the student demon-
strations has been increasingly
well organized and has been taken
over principally by members of the
dissident Communist Party, a group
more radical than the orthodox
Communists.
Student demonstrations, no
matter how well organized and wide-
spread, are not likely by them-
selves to bring down the Costa e
Silva government. They may, how-
ever, cause divisions within the
military--whose support is essen-
tial to the government--on the
handling of the continuing politi-
cal turmoil. F_ I
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UNEASY POSTELECTORAL SITUATION IN ECUADOR
Delay in confirming Jose
Maria Velasco's victory in the
presidential election on 2 June
has aggravated long-standing po-
litical strains in Ecuador. Mean-
while, persistent student and
labor agitation has created se-
rious tensions in the Pacific
coast port of Guayaquil.
The official count of votes
by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
has been dogged by discoveries
of voting irregularities, violent
demonstrations, and the resigna-
tion of a majority of its members.
Velasco's fear that his opponents
could use the tribunal to over-
turn his narrow victory seems to
have been unfounded. Some coali-
tions formed during the campaign
are breaking up as various groups
seek favorable deals for the new
congress and administration.
Several of his recent opponents
are now courting Velasco.
Extremist senator-elect and.
former president Carlos Julio
Arosemena is again emerging as
a key figure in Ecuadorean poli-
tics.
In addi- 25X1
___~ personally
tion, Arosemena is
exacerbating labor and student
agitation, which has been serious
enough to necessitate calling
out troops to aid the police in
Guayaquil. He is also serving
as legal adviser to a new labor
group whose hard-line Communist
leader has called for a general
strike to protest alleged violent
treatment of strikers by security
forces.
Top military commanders
had declared that they would
accept the results of the elec-
tion but appear to be increasingly
concerned over the turbulence
that has followed Velasco's re-
emergence in Ecuadorean politics.
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STUDENT DISCONTENT INCREASING IN URUGUAY
Deteriorating economic con-
ditions have engendered serious,
sometimes violent protests by
Uruguayan students and organized
labor.
Since 6 June, high school
and university students have
clashed repeatedly with Monte-
video police, and on 13 June
President Pacheco was forced to
invoke emergency security meas-
ures. Student violence has sub-
sided at least temporarily, but
the underlying problems that pre-
cipitated the unrest and agita-
tion have not been alleviated.
Unemployment in the under-35 age
group, for example, is nearly 20
percent as compared with 12 per-
cent for the population as a
whole.
a key role in the recent protests,
there is no evidence that Com-
munist Party leaders directed the
ensuing violence. On the con-
trary, several attempted unsuc-
cessfully to reduce student agi-
tation.
President Pacheco intends
to take firmer action against
labor leaders and other agitators
responsible for the wave of dis-
orders. On 24 June, he sent army
and navy units to occupy the gov-
ernment bank and "mobilized" bank
workers to force them back to
work. Congress is expected to
approve the state of siege soon
The Communist Party has ex-
ploited the discontent and has
dominated the student movement
for many years. In the univer-
sity, Communist youth have won
and used the student seats on
the administrative council to in-
fluence policies and to discredit
faculty members who oppose them.
Although students have par-
ticipated in numerous pro-Com-
munist demonstrations and rallies,
only a few fought with police or
committed other acts of violence
until recently. It now appears,
however, that the number of
student militants is increasing
and that more students are being
attracted to such radical left-
wing groups as the pro-Cuban Revo-
lutionary Movement, which is
more extreme than the Communists.
Although Communist-oriented stu-
dent organizations have played
It is not clear how effective
Pacheco's measures will be. Mili-
tary intervention is unprecedented
and could precipitate renewed
violence. Some of the military
officers, particularly the right-
wing, are already irritated with
radical intransigence. With their
support, Pacheco may bypass Con-
gress and attempt to rule by de-
cree even though there is no con-
stitutional provision for such
action.
If the government cannot
soon gain the confidence of the
public in its ability to alleviate
the chaotic economic conditions,
punitive measures against labor
and student agitators will only
accelerate the erosion of its
authority.
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PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT BACKS DOWN ON SHIPPING DECREE
President Robles has for all
practical purposes rescinded a
decree issued on 18 June that
would have permitted ships flying
the Panamanian flag to trade with
Communist countries, including
Cuba.
The measure, which was op-
posed by some cabinet members
and drew heavy criticism from
the mass media of president-elect
Arias, was "suspended," ostensibly
because other members of the Or-
ganization of American States
had not been consulted "as re-
quired by international agree-
ment." Most observers conclude
that this is little more than a
face-saving gesture that allows
the government to withdraw grace-
fully from an awkward situation.
The principal authors of
the decree were the ministers of
government and finance, both of
whom are staunch supporters of
defeated presidential candidate
Samudio.
Meanwhile, the vote-counting
for assembly seats in the impor-
tant provinces of Panama and
Colon remains stalled as Arias
maneuvers to rig the outcome so
that his coalition will have
complete control of the legisla-
SECRET
Approved Re?else 2 $f797~ f P79-0F 27~M6 80040001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8
 sdmed For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06500040001-8