WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006400080001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
DIA review
completed.
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EDT, 23 May 1968)
VIETNAM
North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris continue to
hold to the unconditional cessation of the bombing
and "all other US acts of war" as the indispensable
first step before talks can move on to other issues.
They have not set any timetable for US acceptance of
this demand. In South Vietnam itself, fighting step-
ped up in I Corps and rocket and mortar attacks were
made throughout the country. In Saigon, Vice Presi-
dent Ky and the senior generals are none too happy
over the possibility of a more civilianized govern-
ment.
CONFLICTS IN PEKING LEADERSHIP UNRESOLVED
Propaganda media in Peking continue to demand the
purge of "degenerates" and "traitors", but no moves
to do so have been discernible in recent weeks. The
forces pushing for more purges may be either blocked
or not ready to make their move.
COMMUNIST FORCES IN LAOS CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITIONS
Communist forces are concentrating on consolidating
their hold over newly won territory.
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Europe
PRAGUE STILL PARRIES SOVIET PRESSURES
Premier Kosygin and a high-level military delegation
converged on Prague simultaneously in what may have
been a concerted effort to get more than verbal
assurances that Prague will stay in the fold. The
Czechoslovaks agreed to take part in "fair-sized"
summer maneuvers.
FRENCH GOVERNMENT MOVES TO EASE TURMOIL
Premier Pompidou's offer to hold a dialogue has been
accepted by the labor unions and could be a break-
through in the serious nationwide strike. The stu-
dent and university problem, which had been eclipsed
by the strike, moved into the headlines again with a
new outbreak of violence.
SOVIET GENERAL AFFIRMS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE MILITARY DOCTRINE
Colonel General Povaly has refuted the late Marshal
Sokolovsky's views that flexible response is not fea-
sible and claims the Soviet Union is ready to meet
any military situation.
RUMANIAN REGIME SOFT PEDALS DE GAULLE'S VISIT
President de Gaulle's "Europe for the Europeans" mis-
sion to Rumania from 14 to 18 May enhanced Bucharest's
international prestige, but achieved little else.
ITALIAN ELECTIONS RETAIN CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT
The center-left coalition was returned but the Social-
ists' losses may lead them to re-examine their posi-
tion.
POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE TEMPORARILY DORMANT
Neither faction has gained a victory and infighting
may break out at a forthcoming party plenum.
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PERSIAN GULF FEDERATION AT THE CROSSROADS
The Federation of the Arab Amirates has been unable
to get off the ground since its announced establish-
ment on 30 March. At a meeting on 25 May the member
rulers will attempt to alter the federation's make-
up to a more practical form.
NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS BEGIN IN UGANDA
Peace talks, which were to begin on 23 May, are
likely to be protracted and acrimonious. Biafra
believes its recognition by four African countries
has enhanced its political position, whereas Lagos
has virtually clinched a military v:Lctory.
INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY REVIVING AT THE POLLS
The party still faces many obstacles, however, in
regaining the substantial ground that it has lost
in many of the states.
ELECTION OUTLOOK IN TURKEY
The incumbent Justice Party (JP) is virtually cer-
tain to win the majority of both national and local
seats being contested. An overwhelming JP victory
could have an unsettling effect among opposition
parties that would see little chance of increasing
their influence in the government through normal
democratic procedures.
Western Hemisphere
OUTCOME OF PANAMA'S ELECTION STILL UNCERTAIN
The official counting of ballots cast in the presi-
dential and legislative elections on. 12 May contin-
ues amid confusion, government efforts to delay the
process, and charges of electoral fraud by both
sides.
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The invasion of northern Haiti by a group of 25 to
30 non-Communist exiles on 20 May was suppressed by
government forces the next day, leaving President
Duvalier in as strong a position as ever.
ECUADOREAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN NEARS THE FINISH LINE
Preparations for Ecuador's presidential and congres-
sional election on 2 June are proceeding smoothly.
Little fraud is expected, and the role of the mili-
tary probably will be limited to guaranteeing order.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERIORATION IN URUGUAY
A protracted cabinet crisis and labor agitation have
dimmed President Pacheco's prospects for dealing with
the country's economic problems.
GOVERNING PARTY WINS DOMINICAN ELECTIONS
The governing Reformist Party's victory in last week's
municipal elections was marred only by scattered dis-
orders and the usual wild charges of government fraud.
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Hanoi's delegation to the Paris talks is keeping attention focused on
the demand for an unconditional cessation of US bombing as the indis-
pensable first step before taking up other issues. The North Vietnamese
vigorously refuted Ambassador Harriman's references to points of simi-
larity in the positions of the two sides and accused the US of trying to
divert the talks from the bombing issue. They also sought to increase
pressure on the US for a unilateral concession by publicly expressing
readiness to discuss a political settlement if the bombing is halted.
The North Vietnamese appear confident that the Paris talks provide
an effective forum for this kind of propaganda warfare and they clearly
intend to keep the conversations going indefinitely.
In South Vietnam the Communists' tactics are designed to support
the delegation in Paris by projecting an impression that they hold the
military initiative. For this purpose, they are relying primarily on a series
of mortar and rocket: attacks against allied installations throughout the
country. Increased ground activity in the Khe Sanh and Da Nang areas,
however, suggests preparations for a coordinated large-scale offensive in
the northern provinces.
In Saigon, President Thieu and premier-designate Tran Van Huong are
engaged in delicate negotiations to broaden the government's political base
without provoking a dangerous reaction from senior military figures. Vice
President Ky and the generals reportedly recognize that they were out-
maneuvered by Thieu in the appointment of a new prime minister, but
they probably will work behind the scenes to resist threats to their power
and privileges.
The Chinese Communists continue to express displeasure over Hanoi's
decision to enter talks with the US, but they have avoided any hints of
reprisals, such as a reduction of their technical and material assistance to
North Vietnam.
Despite shrill demands in Peking's propaganda for the purge of
additional "traitors" in the domestic political struggle, there apparently
have been no attempts to bring down new victims since the dramatic
ouster of acting chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu in March. This suggests that
forces advocating further purges either have been effectively blocked or
that they are not ready to make their next move.
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4 LAOS
THAILAND
'Da Nang
I C,
SOUTH VIETNAM
Si,C.RF'T'
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bhuKL 1
VIETNAM
North Vietnamese negotiators
in Paris are settling in for what
they clearly expect to be a long
stay. They are conveying the im-
pression that they are prepared
for protracted discussions without
the prospect of early agreement
even on priority issues. The dele-
gation has moved into new quarters,
and gives every sign of intending
to remain indefinitely, including
the installation of extensive new
communications equipment.
The North Vietnamese continue
to hold to the unconditional cessa-
tion of US bombing and "all other
acts of war" as the indispensable
first step before the talks can
move on to other issues. Even
though there has been some escala-
tion in the polemics attending ex-
position of the Communist stand,
the North Vietnamese have refrained
thus far from setting any time
limit for US acceptance of their
demand.
Ha Van Lau, the deputy head
of the delegation, told a Japanese
correspondent that even if the US
refused to stop the bombings, "the
talks will continue." He added
that Hanoi believed the US attitude
toward negotiations was strongly
influenced by domestic political
considerations and that the North
Vietnamese did not really expect
serious bargaining to begin until
early August under the pressure of
the US political conventions.
Earlier last week, North Viet-
namese diplomat Mai Van Bo told a
French newsman that, although Hanoi
had no intention of agreeing to
any reciprocal action in return
for a bombing halt, it was pre-
pared to keep talking with the
Americans so long as it appeared
"useful." He specifically ruled
out the return of American pilots
or any other "gesture" which he
said could be used to save Ameri-
can "face" on the reciprocity is-
sue.
Hanoi spokesmen in other parts
of the world are also saying that
North Vietnam does not intend to
break off the talks over the bomb-
ing issue. A visiting North Viet-
namese delegate to Japan told his
hosts last week that Hanoi will not
break away from the Paris talks
and is prepared to take a flexible
attitude toward the negotiations.
As an example of this intended
flexibility, he cited his govern-
ment's willingness to accept a
phased withdrawal of US forces fol-
lowing successful peace talks, de-
spite Hanoi's demands for "im-
mediate" withdrawal.
Chinese Resigned to Paris Talks
Despite increasing evidence of
Communist China's displeasure with
the Paris talks, official spokes-
men in private discussions have
pointed up Peking's inability to
dissuade the North Vietnamese from
negotiating. They have indicated
that Peking has only limited room
for maneuver at this stage and have
emphasized that China will con-
tinue to support North Vietnam in
its war effort.
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Si.cRid
China probably estimates that
any attempt to reduce material sup-
port, the only significant lever
available to Peking, would not only
hinder the Vietnamese war effort
but would also undercut Chinese
influence in Hanoi at a critical
juncture.
Peking continues to avoid di-
rect comment publicly on the Paris
meetings, but Chinese spokesmen
have repeatedly attacked the con-
cept of negotiations in general
as a "hoax" and a "fraud." Foreign
Minister Chen Yi at a banquet on 18
May for a visiting Guinean-Malian
delegation bitterly denounced the
"US imperialist scheme of peddling
the peace negotiations swindle"
and called on the North Vietnamese
"to increase their resolve to fight
and win." Since Hanoi agreed to the
talks on 3 April, posters in Peking
supporting North Vietnam have been
removed and daily small-scale pro-
Vietnam parades and demonstrations
have stopped.
The War in the South
Communist forces during the
week combined increased activity
in the Khe Sanh and Da Nang areas,
possibly in preparation for a co-
ordinated offensive in the northern
provinces, with a series of mortar
and rocket attacks against allied
installations throughout the coun-
try. The rocket and mortar attacks
were probably designed both for
psychological impact and to restrict
allied reaction forces. Camp Evans,
the headquarters of the US lst Air
Cavalry Division, sustained the
heaviest damage. Five helicopters
were destroyed, 79 had moderate to
heavy damage, and 40 were lightly
damaged.
The attacks probably also had
the wider purpose of supporting
North Vietnamese negotiators in
Paris by contributing to an impres-
sion of continued Communist mili-
tary initiative. It is not clear
how far the Communists might wish
to carry offensive action to punc-
tuate this stage of the Paris talks,
but they almost certainly intend
at least to continue causing heavy
allied casualties, particularly US.
In the Khe Sanh area, US 'pa-
trols are again encountering stiff
resistance from what are believed
to be elements of the North Viet-
namese 304th Division.
Elsewhere in Quang Tri Prov-
ince, Communist main force units,
including elements of two North
Vietnamese divisions, threaten, many
vital allied positions and popu-
lated areas. Although some of,
these units suffered heavy casual-
ties in recent fighting, all are
either already back in combat or
getting ready for it.
In central I Corps, allied
forces conducted three major spoil-
ing operations against enemy uhits
preparing for a possible offensive
from the southwest against Da Nang.
The Communists, nonetheless, are
continuing to add to their strength
in the area. There are indications
that the North Vietnamese 2nd bi-
vision is returning here, its nor-
mal area of operations, after prob-
ably being re-equipped. There; are
also tenuous signs that a newly in-
filtrated North Vietnamese regiment
may also be in the area.
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Huong Forming New Cabinet
President Thieu accepted
Premier Loc's resignation on 18
May and a few hours later named
Tran Van Huong to succeed him.
Huong had a brief and troubled
tenure as premier in late 1964 and
early 1965, when his effectiveness
was limited by his own inflexibil-
ity, the opposition of the moder-
ate Buddhists, and lack of sup-
port from a military establishment
which itself was deeply divided.
Huong is widely respected never-
theless, both because of his in-
corruptibility and his demonstrated
willingness to devote himself
fully to his responsibilities.
The new premier, with Thieu's
blessing, is negotiating with rep-
resentatives of South Vietnam's
badly fractionalized political
community in an effort to broaden
the government's base, which under
Loc had been limited mainly to
technicians and military officers.
In view of long-standing animosi-
ties and rivalries among South
Vietnamese politicans, Huong faces
an up-hill task in putting to-
gether a new team.
Haong's appointment is not
sitting well with Vice President
Ky and the senior generals, who
are reported to be miffed over
Thieu's failure to consult with
them. Of probably greater weight
in their calculations is a fear
that Thieu, working through Huong,
is maneuvering to displace them
from the vortex of power through
a civilianization of the govern-
ment. Having been outmaneuvered by
Thieu, Ky and the generals appear
to have resigned themselves to
the change in government. They
are likely to content themselves
for the time being with a careful
monitoring of the situation, work-
ing behind the scenes to limit the
inroads Thieu and H.uona can make
into their power.
CONFLICTS IN PEKING LEADERSHIP UNRESOLVED
Two months after the dramatic
ouster of acting chief of staff Yang
Cheng-wu, propaganda media in Peking
are still demanding the purge of ad-
ditional "degenerates" and "trai-
tors." No moves to bring down new
victims have been discernible in
recent weeks, however, suggesting
that the forces pushing for more
purges either have been successfully
Page 5
blocked or are not ready to make
their move.
Regime accusations are tougher
and shriller than any published
since :Last summer. Charges against
Liu Shao-chi and other opponents
of the Cultural Revolution now em-
phasize that they are traitors and
Kuomintang agents, possibly in
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WEEKLY SUMMARY. 24 May 68
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preparation for applying legal sanc-
tions to them.
For the third time in three
weeks, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao
led a major leadership turnout in
Peking on 20 May. It appears that
hierarchic rankings have been static
since late March. The new elite
group around Mao--about 14 people--
consists of six politburo standing
committee members, three members of
the Cultural Revolution Group and
five drawn from the military and
police. Contrary to previous prac-
tice these latter five are now
ranked ahead of ordinary politburo
members.
The most recent turnout marked
the second anniversary of the 16 May
1966 central committee circular
which gave Mao's case against polit-
buro member Peng Chen and started
the overt phase of the Cultural Rev-
olution. The most inflammatory por-
tions of this circular were repub-
lished, along with commentary sup-
plied jointly by the editors of
People's Daily, Red Flag, and Lib-
eration Army Journal, which ap-
pears dlesigne two encourage greater
revolutionary activity by radical
elements. The joint article said
that considerably more "destruc-
tion" of society will be necessary
before "construction" can begin.
It listed all the key "revision-
ists" brought down thus far in the
Cultural Revolution except the ex-
treme leftists who were expelled
last fall and winter. Radical
forces in the leadership may heave
decided to stop publicizing the
sins of this group, who had been
so closely associated with their
militant policies.
Meanwhile violence continues
to stall the establishment of Rev-
olutionary Committees in the six
remaining problem areas. Since
mid-April, factional fighting has
been on the upswing again in
Kwangtung, where a committee was
set up in February. At the same
time, the acting chairman of
Kwangtung's Provincial Revolu-
tionary Committee--a radical who
has been running Canton since the
former head became chief of staff
in Peking in March--has himself
come under Red Guard poster attack.
It is possible that the new chief
of staff, who is reported to have 25X1
returned briefly to Canton in mid-
May, himself engineered the criti-
cism of his acting successor.
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COMMUNIST FORCES IN LAOS CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITIONS
Communist forces are concen-
trating on consolidating their
hold over newly won territory.
They have launched an in-
tensive sweep operation in a fol-
low-up to their capture of the
major government supply base at
Nam Bac last January. The sweep
has been aimed at eliminating
friendly guerrilla teams that have
harassed the enemy's lines of com-
munication in recent years. There
are continuing reports that the
Communists are also trying harder
than before to control the scat-
tered villages that have been aid-
ing the government's guerrillas.
An excessive use of terrorism by
the enemy may, however, prove
counterproductive.
In the northeast, heavy US
air strikes appear to have blunted,
at least for the time being, the
enemy offensive against the govern-
ment guerrilla base at Na Khang.
Although the capture of Na Khang
would severely hamper government
operations in the northeast and
would put the finishing touches to
the Communists' most successful dry
season offensive in many years, it
is far from certain that the Com-
munists are willing to sustain
heavy losses to take it.
In the south, Communist
forces are making further efforts
to consolidate their control of the
Sedone Valley, the scene of a
major government development pro-
gram over the past few years. The
Communists are using both propa-
ganda and terrorism to control a
populace that has in the past
proved friendly to the government.
In some instances sympathetic
groups have been given weapons and
trained as local militia, but the
majority of the people appear;to
be resisting close identification
with the Communists. Pathet ao
cadre are making a special of ort,
however, to convince the fence-
sitters that the government will
not be able to re-establish itself
in the valley.
The Communists evidently'in-
tend to maintain a substantial mil-
itary presence in the northern
part of the Bolovens Plateau. They
continue to move supplies into the
area via Route 23 and are estab- 25X1
lishing a medical facility for the
many North Vietnamese troops still
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Communist controlled territory
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SF,CRET
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Tensions are high in several countries of West and East Europe.
The French Government survived a vote of censure by 11 votes. The
vote came after the government offered to negotiate directly with the
unions to end the walkouts that have paralyzed the nation. Union leaders
said they were ready to negotiate but presented sweeping demands. The
powerful National Committee of French Employers, meanwhile, decided
to oppose any bilateral agreement between the government and the unions
that would increase wage costs.
Moscow's heavy pressure on Czechoslovakia, now well into its third
week, has had little visible effect on the leaders in Prague. Premier
Kosygin, in Czechoslovakia for an extended stay, had two conferences
with Czechoslovak leaders the past week. He may leave on the eve of the
Czechoslovak party's central committee plenum opening 29 May and will
probably try again to gain some commitment from Dubcek to moderate
his regime's policies.
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko and some high Soviet brass spent
five, presumably not very congenial, days in Prague before winning Czech-
oslovak agreement to participate in "fair-sized" 'Warsaw Pact maneuvers.
The pace of the political struggle in Warsaw has visibly slowed, in
part because of the regime's nervousness over the situation in Czecho-
slovakia. There may also have been some pressure from Moscow to
postpone any changes..
East Germany, to assert its independence, sovereignty and strength,
may introduce additional controls over West German travel to West Berlin.
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PRAGUE STILL PARRIES SOVIET PRESSURES
The virtually simultaneous
arrival in Prague last Friday
of Premier Kosygin and a high-
level Soviet military delegation
suggested Moscow had made an ur-
gent and possibly climactic effort
to check what it considered to
be a deteriorating situation in
Czechoslovakia.
The visits were the latest
in a series of confrontations. Mos-
cow presumably is now seeking more
than the verbal assurances with
which Prague has responded to
earlier Soviet criticisms. While
the leaders talked, Moscow main-
tained the psychological pres-
sure by keeping most of its mil-
itary units in place near the
Czechoslovak borders. Reports
in Soviet and Polish news media
that a joint Soviet-Polish Warsaw
Pact exercise took place in south-
ern Poland were a belated Soviet
attempt to explain the deployment
of its troops to the Czechoslo-
vak-Polish border.
The military delegation,
headed by Minister of Defense
Grechko, probably pressed Prague
for evidence of its intention to
continue cooperation with the
Warsaw Pact and apparently got
some relatively modest conces-
sions. Czechoslovak Minister of
Defense Dzur announced on 21 May
that Prague would participate in
"fair sized" maneuvers this sum-
mer. He added, however, that the
maneuvers would not involve "big
contingents" of troops. Dzur
also stated that he would head
a military delegation to the So-
viet Union, which suggests that
the question of military cooper-
ation is not yet completely set-
tled.
There are no signs that
Kosygin, who is scheduled to`re-
main in Czechoslovakia until at
least 28 May, and the Czechoslo-
vak leaders are making much prog-
ress in their negotiations. A
Czechoslovak spokesman said last
week that the USSR is still pon-
sidering Prague's request for a
foreign currency credit equiva-
lent to $400-500 million. If the
USSR withholds the credit or.
refuses to assure the continued
supply of raw materials to Czech-
oslovakia, Prague's probes for
economic aid from the West prob-
ably will be accelerated.
Kosygin is probably demand-
ing that the Czechoslovak lead-
ers suppress opposition to and
criticism of the party. Thus
far, the Czechoslovaks have held
their ground.
Factional fighting within
the Czechoslovak party may come
to a climax during a central
committee plenum which begins
on 29 May. Liberals have added
to their earlier pressure by
calling upon the conservatives
to resign voluntarily.
The party presidium report-
edly has decided to recommend
that an extraordinary congress
be convened at which the liblrals
could move against the conserva-
tives. Dubcek, however, will
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probably oppose the attempt by
liberals to force the factional
issue at the plenum, particu-
larly because he is under So-
viet pressure to rein them in.
The conservatives have re-
cently been more outspoken in
criticizing the liberal trend,
and there are no signs that they
intend to resign. Diplomats in
Prague believe the conservatives'
strength has been underrated, and
speculate that they will be ma-
neuvering actively at the plenum.
FRENCH GOVERNMENT MOVES TO EASE TURMOIL
An estimated 7-8 million work-
ers--about half of the industrial
labor force--are on strike and
rebellious students continue to
occupy universities throughout
France.
Premier Pompidou's midweek
offer to hold a dialogue with the
unions was immediately accepted
and could be a breakthrough. In an
effort to keep the university prob-
lem in the background and to con-
centrate on the more serious na-
tionwide strike, the government
had approved an amnesty for those
involved in the student disturb-
ances. A new outbreak occurred,
however, when a disorderly student
march flared into violence on 23
May. The march was called to pro-
test the government's refusal to
allow "new left" leader Cohn-Bendit
to return to France following trips
to Germany and Holland.
The dilemma the government now
faces is to offer enough conces-
sions to satisfy the workers with-
out undermining the economy. The
problem is complicated further by
the Patronat, France's powerful as-
sociation of factory owners and
managers, which opposes major con-
cessions to the unions and a di-
rect government role in any nego-
tions. Occupation of factories by
workers and the tactical "alliance"
of all the major unions against the
government give labor a strong bar-
gaining position. Strains between
the Communist-controlled General
Confederation of Labor and other
unions have begun to appear, how-
ever, and the government may be
able to exploit the disunity.
In offering to talk, the gov-
ernment took a significant step to
ease the crisis. The workers do
have legitimate economic grievances,
but a deeper problem is the per-
vasive sense of being incapable of
influencing both politics and eco-
nomics. The coming dialogue at
least gives the workers a direct
channe:L to the powers that be, some-
thing they have lacked in recent
years.
The government might couple
its offer to talk with concessions
calculated to defuse the crisis.
There have been indications that
cabinet: changes are under consider-
ation, although the timing of such
changes is uncertain. Another pos-
sibility is a nationwide referendum.
Given the depth of dissatisfaction
over the government's economic and
social policies, however, turning
to the people is risky and De Gaulle
would have to choose carefully what
issues to efore them.
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SOVIET GENERAL AFFIRMS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE MILITARY DOCTRINE
A senior Soviet general has
affirmed flexible response as an
important part of Soviet military
doctrine. He has refuted Marshal
Sokolovsky's famous treatise,
Military Strategy, which holds
that any future war between nu-
clear powers will inevitably
escalate into a general nuclear
conflict.
the enemy a "crushing blow of
decisive significance."
Colonel General M. Povaly,
who is believed to be responsible
for operational planning in the
Soviet General Staff, recently
told US military attaches in
Moscow that the latest edition
of Sokolovsky's book--published
in November 1967--was obsolete
and that US officials would be
wasting their time reading it.
At the high point of a distin-
guished career Marshal Sokolov-
sky served as Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff (1952-1960) and,
until his death two weeks ago,
was a member of the Inspector
General Group of aged, semi-
retired military leaders.
Povaly's charge probably
is directed primarily at Sokolov-
sky's opinion that flexible
response is not feasible. The
initial period of a future war
will be decisive, the marshal
claimed in his book, and the
Soviet Union will be able to
detect preparations for a "sur-
prise nuclear attack" and deal
(that
nuclear powers might not employ
nuclear weapons in the beginning
of a conflict or for -some period
thereafter. He endorsed the
rationale of the US strategy of
flexible response in a Red Star
article printed last March. ~When
a US attache recently asked if
the USSR's strategy resembled
that of flexible response,
Povaly replied, "Soviet strat-
egy has no label, but the Soviet
Union is ready to meet whatever
the situation requires." His
views seem more in line with pre-
dominant Soviet military think-
ing than do those of Sokolovsky.
The Soviet military leader-
ship has given more attention to
adapting its general purpose
forces for use in limited con-
flict situations. The Soviet
fleet in now operating in appre-
ciable strength, with obvious
political effect, in the Mediter-
ranean. Besides showing the flag,
it is capable of supporting very
limited landing operations with
its integral elements. Moreover,
as the new AN-22 Cock transport
aircraft comes into service, the
Soviet Union will have an im
proved ability to move military
forces to more distant areas.
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RUMANIAN REGIME SOFT PEDALS DE GAULLE'S VISIT
President de Gaulle's "Eu-
rope for the Europeans" mission
to Rumania from 14 to 18 May en-
hanced Bucharest's international
prestige, but achieved little
else. The tension in Eastern
Europe probably induced some
restraint and dampened the stri-
dent nationalism customarily
expected of De Gaulle and Ru-
manian party and state chief
Nicolae Ceausescu. De Gaulle
left a day early because of the
French domestic crisis.
In his speech to the Ruma-
nian parliament, De Gaulle re-
marked that no European nation
should submit to a "shameful
effacement of national sover-
eignty" by being caught in a
conflict between "two great
powers confronting each other
along a line which is exterior
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Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 May 68
to their own borders." Ceausescu
did not rebuke De Gaulle for h's
statements, as Poland's Gomulka
did last fall, but he "clarified"
selected sensitive points later
with accompanying reporters.
A bland communique at the,
visit's end skirted such touchy
issues as the German question,:
the future of military blocs, and
differing stands on the Middle.
East. Predictably, however, it
stressed the "special" role of
France and Rumania in promoting
European detente and called for
the establishment of a joint gov-
ernmental commission to promote
economic and technical-scientific
cooperations. The two sides also
agreed to a consular convention
and to establish French librar.es
in Bucharest and Rumanian librar-
ies in Paris.
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POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE TEMPORARILY DORMANT
The pace of the intraparty
struggle in Poland has slowed
temporarily and neither of the
contending factions has won a
decisive victory. The infight-
ing may break out again at a
party plenum reportedly to be
held within the next six weeks.
Since early May propaganda
against "Zionists" and other
internal enemies has been con-
ducted in low key and purges
appear to have fallen off. Stu-
dents and other elements of the
population have been quiet, with
party leaders apparently giving
only cursory public attention to
the intraparty situation?
No decisive personnel or
policy changes have occurred nor
have shifts in government posts
last month been followed by
changes in the upper echelons
of the party. Some changes may
be announced at the forthcoming
party plenum. Since March, how-
ever, purges of Jews and liberals
have affected significant areas
of the bureacracy as well as
academic and artistic life.
Anxiety over the future has
caused indecision and delays
at all levels of the party and
state apparatus.
The regime's nervousness
over the situation in Czecho-
slovakia, and possible Soviet
pressure to postpone party
changes in Warsaw, may have
induced the truce, as well as
the factions' fear of losing
control over zealous activists.
This lull may help party
boss Gomulka reassert his author-
ity, but there is little likeli-
hood he will regain his former
pre-eminence. The impact of last
year's Middle East crisis and of
the student disturbances in March
has shaken the Polish party,
and imparted an irreversible
impetus for change. The under-
lying forces of nationalism,
economic dissatisfaction, and
frustrated ambitions of the
postwar generation have not
been satisfied, and will have
to be considered in any recon-
struction of the party.
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ITALIAN ELECTIONS RETAIN CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT
The Unified Socialist Party's
losses in the 19-20 May elections
seem likely to strengthen those
in the party who favor a hard
look at continued participation
in the center-left government.
The party had hoped to win
100-110 seats and get back some
15 of the 24 seats held by the
Moscow-oriented, Proletarian
Socialist Party which opposes
Socialist participation in the
governing coalition. As it
turned out, the Unified Social-
ists won 91 seats and pressures
may develop to divide into new
right and left wing Socialist
parties.
No alternative to some form
of Christian Democratic - Socialist
coalition appears feasible, but
the Socialists may delay a de-
cision on joining the government
until after their party congress
next fall. They will, however,
probably support or participate
in a transitional government
under Christian Democratic lead-
ership for the intervening period.
The Christian Democrats won
six additional seats and now
hold 266 in the 630-seat parlia-
ment, and Premier Moro is the
leading candidate to head a new
government. The small, left-
center Republican Party, the
third member of the coalition,
increased its representation'
from five to nine. The parties
to the right--Monarchists, Fas-
cists, and Liberals--dropped
from 74 seats to 61.
The Communist Party gained
11 seats for a total of 177
while the Proletarian Socialists
lost only one seat to retain ,a
strength of 23.
The strength of the far
left, in part, is a result of.
the absence of any other major
opposition to the government.
In addition, the Communists evi-
dently attracted the protest
vote from youth voting for the
first time.
Nevertheless, the Commu-
nists' hopes for an election
outcome that would, at least
mathematically, permit a coali-
tion with the Proletarian So-
cialists, the Unified Socialists
and the Republicans were not
realized. The four left-of-
center parties won a total of
300 Chamber of Deputies seats,
47.6 percent of the total.
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Much of the area is threatened with a serious -locust plague this
summer.
Swarms breeding in Saudi Arabia may invade Iran, Pakistan, India,
Sudan, Egypt, the two Yemens, Ethiopia, and Somalia. A second danger-
ous breeding area is in eastern Africa. Unless controlled, the locusts will
severely damage crops throughout the area. The result would be increased
demands for emergency wheat shipments.
In the Arab-Israeli confrontation, Presideint Hilu of Lebanon is find-
ing it increasingly difficult to prevent Arab terrorists operating through
Syria from transiting his country. If these infiltration activities increase, he
fears Lebanon would be subject to Israeli counterattacks.
In Africa, the fourth summit meeting of 14 East and Central African
states ended on 15 May with a reaffirmation of "unflinching" African
support for the liberation of southern Africa and an expression of hope
for a peaceful solution of the Nigerian civil war.
The two combatants in the Nigerian war are scheduled to meet this
week in Kampala, Uganda, but prospects for an early peace settlement
remain gloomy.
Mali and Guinea may be trying to persuade Peking to finance and
construct a 200-mile rail line to link the two countries. The arrival of the
Guinean and Malian foreign ministers on an undisclosed "joint mission" in
Peking on 18 May and a recent week-long visit by a Chinese economic
delegation in Conakry lend substance to reports that the project is under
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PERSIAN GULF FEDERATION AT THE CROSSROADS
The newly created Federation
of Arab Amirates, which so far
exists only on paper, is in seri-
ous danger of being merely an in-
tellectual exercise, because of
dissension among its members and
hostility from Iran. A meeting
of member rulers scheduled for
25 May should indicate if the fed-
eration has any practical future
in its present form.
The widely heralded announce-
ment that the federation would
come into official existence on
30 March has proved misleading;
the announcement is still the
federation's only official act.
Despite all the positive reasons
for encouraging some form of union
among the small Arab states in the
Persian Gulf, the difficulties
inherent in trying to form a
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SECRET
Sharjah '
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cohesive and viable federation
have so far proved unsurmountable.
The strongest opposition to
the federation comes from Iran,
which lays claim to Bahrain, one
of the member states, as Iran
irredenta. It also sees the union
as another Arab puppet state, ripe
for Egyptian domination. Iran re-
gards Nasir as the greatest threat
to its security in the gulf area.
At the same time, both Nasir and
Saudi Arabia's Faysal, two of the
federation's strongest enthusiasts,
have failed to take energetic
steps to assist its development.
Effective support from them has
been keenly missed in the face of
strong-arm Iranian diplomacy.
Most of the federation members are
close to Iran in terms of social
and religious orientation as well
as geography, and without strong
Arab backing, their Arabism is
apt to falter.
Within the membership of the
federation, traditional divisive-
ness continues to erode the pub-
licized union. This divisiveness
stems from the differences of
wealth among the states, the
varying degrees of political so-
phistication of their rulers, the
orientation of their foreign re-
lations, and a hodge-podge of
traditional feuds and petty quar-
rels. The recent behavior of the
ruler of Abu Dhabi in doling out
millions of dollars in tribal
gifts has encouraged the suspicion
that he means to make the federa-
tion his own instrument. Bahrain,
on the other hand, believes that
the other rulers are far too
friendly with Iran, whose terri-
torial. ambitions are regarded as
the chief reason for Bahrain to
seek safety in numbers.
This interplay of enmities
so far has prevented any practi-
cal measures for implementing the
federation. The rulers of the
component states are scheduled
to meet on 25 May to review this
state of affairs. They will
attempt to resolve their differ-
ences, but if their talks enable
the federation to continue, even
in name only, there may emerge a
new form of federation, different
perhaps in number of members as
well as in organization.
NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS BEGIN IN UGANDA
On 23 May, federal and Bia-
fran representatives were to be-
gin peace talks in Kampala, Uganda.
The talks are likely to be pro-
tracted and acrimonious. Biafra
apparently believes that its rec-
ognition by four African countries
has significantly strengthened its
political position, whereas Lagos
has virtually clinched a military
victory in the civil war with the
capture of Port Harcourt.
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The talks in Kampala must re-
solve procedural items left over
from the preliminary talks in Lon-
don before getting into the more
crucial matters of a cease-fire
and political settlement. Lagos
is expected to insist that there
be no chairman and reportedly also
does not want any foreign observ-
ers at the talks.
The federal government, never-
theless, has been somewhat sus-
ceptible to international pres-
sures and could choose to be more
-forthcoming on procedural matters
now that its key military objec-
tive of recent weeks--Port Har-
court--has been captured. Lagos,
however, will not yield on its
substantive position that before
a cease-fire can take effect Biafra
must renounce secession and accept
the 12-state federal structure.
The Federal Military Govern-
ment has named a negotiating team
of 17 delegates and advisers headed
by Information Minister Enahoro,
who conducted the earlier talks
in London. The federal group
includes a number of minority
tribesmen, as well as one Ibo
from the former Eastern region.
The Biafrans are sending five
delegates, including Sir Louis
Mbanefo, who also was at London,
and Dr. Okpara, top political ad-
viser to Ojukwu.
Nigeria's ruling supreme
Military Council has reportedly
endorsed the recommendation of
army field commanders to continue
military operations until the
Biafran army is destroyed or
capitulates. Ojukwu, however,
in two recent speeches has ex-
horted the Ibos to fight on, even
from the forests if necessary,
and the civil war may well con-
tinue for a long time. In the,
wake of the federal capture of
Port Harcourt, Biafran forces
are disorganized. Federal
troops on the other hand are well
equipped and supplied and appear
to have adequate leadership.
Biafra may be continuing
its air shuttle service by using
another airfield farther north'
now that it cannot use Port Hax-
court. Unless sizable quanti-
ties of new supplies can be
brought in, the Biafra military
effort will begin to collapse and
could degenerate in time into
protracted guerrilla warfare,
particularly in the absence of 25X1
a political settlement acceptable
to the Ibos.
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INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY REVIVING AT THE POLLS
The Congress Party, after
more than a year of reaping the
bitter fruits of the 1967 general
elections, has made some progress
at the polls, but still faces
many obstacles in regaining the
substantial ground it lost in
many of the states.
Last week's victory :by Con-
gress in the Haryana state assem-
bly elections, the first state-
wide polling since the general
elections, capped a series of
favorable electoral bouts for the
party. In Communist-dominated
Kerala, Congress recently made
substantial advances in a series
of municipal elections, and in
Rajasthan the party dealt a
strong blow to the conservative
Swatantra party in two prestigious
by-elections.
These limited triumphs should
boost Congress morale as it pre-
pares for what promises to be
bitterly fought midterm elections
in the much larger and more impor-
tant states of Uttar Pradesh and
West Bengal later this year.
There is bound to be a measure of
bandwagon effect, but local issues
will be decisive in these elec-
tions. In both states factional-
ism continues to hurt the party.
As in Haryana, however, voters in
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have
suffered the chastening experience
of inept rule by non-Congress co-
alitions. This factor is bound
to work to the Congress Party's
advantage.
Meanwhile, the party is hav-
ing considerable trouble with the
highly unstable political situation
that has evolved in several other
states. At the heart of the prob-
lem is the difficulty in maintain-
ing stable majorities. The Con-
gress precedent in Haryana of
denying a place on the party slate
to defectors may alleviate this
problem, but is unlikely to cure
it. At least three more non-Con-
gress governments are approaching
the brink of dissolution, but Con-
gress units in these states are
in no position to take over.
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25X1
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ELECTION OUTLOOK IN TURKEY
The Turkish electorate goes to
the polls on 2 June to fill 52 of
the 183 seats in the senate, five
vacancies in the lower house, and
all municipal and local government
posts. As the pre-election campaign
enters its final week, the incumbent
Justice Party (JP) appears almost
certain to capture as much as 55-60
percent of the popular vote and rhost
of the contested parliamentary
seats. Moreover, initial reports
from several key areas suggest that
the JP probably will win a majority
of the municipal contests.
The campaign thus far has fo-
cused primarily on general party
orientation and on personalities
rather than on current issues. -Re-
ligious reactionism--a perennial
charge against the JP--economic de-
velopment, and the left-right con-
frontation, however, have been the
subject of partisan propaganda.
Anti-Americanism per se has not been
a major issue but is being exploited
by the leftist Turkish Labor Party
(TLP).
There have been few surprises
in the campaign; however, unexpected
cleavages appeared in the JP during
the earlier party primaries. These
have been glossed over during the
ensuing campaign. The governing JP
shows every sign of being confident
of victory, but over-confidence
could cost it votes. The relatively
mediocre performance of parliament
during the past two years does not
seem to be an issue with the elec-
torate which is more impressed by
the country's general economic prog-
ress in recent years. The JP in its
campaign has come out more openly
against the TLP, accusing it of being
crypto-Communist.
Page 24
The major opposition Republican
Peoples Party (RPP), led by octoge-
narian Ismetlnonu, expects to gain
little from the election. The, party
lost many of its supporters among the
landed gentry to the new Reliance
Party which was organized following
the RPP split between moderates and
the left-of-center faction last spring.
If the RPP receives less than 30
percent of thepopular vote, Bulent
Ecivet, party secretary general and
head of the left-of-center faction,
may be ousted in favor of a more con-
servative leader.
The conservative Reliance Party,
headed by Turhan Feyzioglu, has had
little time to organize nationally
and is generally regarded as too
middle-of-the-road to attract much
popular support.
The Marxist TLP, on the other
hand, is expected to do well iri gain-
ing popular votes, but probably will
not add to its 15 seats in parliament.
During the past three years, the TLP
has been bolstering its nationwide
organization and has succeeded. in at-
tracting some of the more leftist
members of the RPP.
Should the JP win more than
57-58 percent of the popular vote
Prime Minister Demirel's moderate
position within the party will be
strengthened, and the JP will have
more confidence in implementing its
program. A larger majority could lead
to increased pressure within the party
to muzzle the extreme left. Anover-
whelming majority could also result
in opposition attempts to undermine,
through propaganda and rumor, the good,
working relationship between the JP
and the military in an attempt to
cause the downfall of the regime which
largely represents the old Democratic
tion in 1960.
Party ousted by the military revolu-
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The hemisphere's most dramatic event of the week occurred in Haiti,
where a small, non-Communist Haitian exile force staged an unsuccessful
invasion attempt on 20 May that was squelched within two days. Another
bloody purge of Haitians suspected of working against Duvalier seems
inevitable.
Chances for avoiding a violent political showdown in Panama re-
mained rather poor even though National Guard Commandant Vallarino
decided not to obstruct the certification of an evidently decisive victory
by Arnulfo Arias in the presidential elections on 12 May. Public announce-
ment of the official results of the balloting has been delayed, however,
while backers of government candidate David Samudio seek through voting
officials under their control to get their man declared the winner.
Electoral developments in other countries of the hemisphere are
proceeding more routinely. The Dominican municipal elections on 16 May
were accomplished quietly, with mixed results that could be hailed by
each political faction as a "victory" for its own cause. Bermuda's first
legislative elections as an autonomous political entity were won by the
predominantly white pro-British United Bermuda Party on 22 May.
Preparations for Ecuador's presidential election on 2 June continued to go
forward relatively calmly, amidst growing indications that a rather tight
race is developing among the top three candidates.
Political tension climbed in Argentina last week as a result of indica-
tions that a showdown between President Ongania and his military critics,
headed by army chief Julio Alsogaray, was imminent. A misstep by either
Ongania or Alsogaray could provoke an open clash, in which the President
would probably come out on top.
In Chile, President Frei's annual state of the nation address to
Congress on 21 May was boycotted by legislators of all five leftist parties
because of violence that had erupted between government forces and
striking teachers the previous day. His speech contained an appeal for
action on his reform program that he seems unlikely to get--precisely
because of the excessive political partisanship he denounced during his
Page 25
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OUTCOME OF PANAMA'S ELECTION STILL UNCERTAIN
The official counting of bal-
lots to determine the winner of the
presidential and legislative elec-
tions on 12 May continues amid con-
fusion, government efforts to delay
the process, and charges of elec-
toral fraud by both sides. Although
the government-supported Samudio
forces are still trying to rig the
returns, National Guard Commandant
Vallarino is no longer supporting
the official candidate and is ig-
noring orders from the Robles gov-
ernment.
In a communi-
que issued on 17 May, Vallarino
emphasized the unity of the guard
and intimated acceptance of the de-
cisions of the National Elections
Board, which is legally charged with
counting the votes and proclaiming
the winner.
Although the board is weighted
in Arias' favor, the US ambas*ador
expects the government to try'to
keep it from declaring Arias pres-
ident-elect. While the board'is
legally authorized to grant cre-
dentials to the winner, the gov-
ernment-controlled Electoral Tri-
bunal can nullify the board's:
findings. Any attempt by the,gov-
ernment to annul the board's de-
cision and call for new elections,
however, would hinge on the posi-
tion taken by Vallarino. His
agreement with Arias puts the`pro-
Samudio forces in a weak position
to enforce its claims.
Explosions, sniper fire,; and
terrorism are creating a mood. of
growing tension. Serious violence
erupted again in Panama City on
23 May when Samudio toughs touched
off disorders near the building
where the elections board has'been
conducting its count. Twenty-two
persons were injured during the
ensuing gun battle.
Meanwhile, irresponsible' news
media on both sides are adding
fuel to the fire. A rabble-rousing
pro-Samudio tabloid, headlining
its story "Samudio or Chaos,"re-
ported the formation of a popular
militia to kill "oligarchs" atd
their children and burn their'
houses if Samudio is defeated. As
the contested election continues
unresolved, the potential forvio-
lence rows.
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24 May 68
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SECRET
HAITIAN EXILE INVASION FAILS
The invasion
of
northern
Haiti by a group
of
25 to
30
non-
Communist exiles
on
20 May
was
suppressed by government forces
the next day, leaving President
Duvalier in as strong a position
as ever.
After an ineffectual aerial
bombing of the National Palace
in Port-au-Prince, the invaders
captured the airfield at Cap-
Haitien and took the military
commander of the north prisoner.
Their plan to bring in a second
group of approximately 100 men
from the launching point in the
Bahamas was frustrated, however,
by the government's recapture of
the field the following morning.
The invasion leaders--who had
been involved in prior attempts
in 1963 and 1964--reportedly es-
caped. Some 18 of the other
insurgents also remain at large
and there may be skirmishes as
military units and militia at-
tempt to track them down.
The invasion was sponsored
by the Haitian Coalition--a non-
Communist Haitian exile group
based in New York. The invasion
failed because of inadequate or-
ganization on the part of the
exile group, which was not able
to reinforce or resupply the in-
vaders. The exiles also mis-
judged the capability and loyalty
of Duvalier's security forces as
well as the extent of popular
support that would be forthcoming.
Duvalier reacted calmly and
confidently. He dispatched approx-
imately 200 of his most effective
tactical troops to the area under
the leadership of the
capable Lt. Col. Franck Romain.
Romain distinguished himself in
a campaign against a group of
invaders in 1964. The secret
police immediately began to ar-
rest all potential government
opponents as well as relatives
of the invaders. Duvalier de-
liberately kept news of the in-
vasion from the public until
the situation was well under
control.
The invasion attempt is
likely to reinforce Duvalier's
underlying bitterness and antag-
onism toward the United States.
He appears convinced that the
US was involved in the plans
and suggested as much in a note
to the UN on 22 May requesting
a special meeting of the Secu-
rity Council. He protested
anti-Haitian propaganda by
American news media and the
alleged presence of US "warships"
in the area.
SECRET
24 May 68
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SECRET
ECUADOREAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN NEARS THE FINISH LINE
Preparations for Ecuador's
presidential and congressional
elections on 2 June are proceed-
ing smoothly.. Little fraud is
expected, and the role of the
military probably will be lim-
ited to guaranteeing order.
Center-left candidate Andres
Cordova continues to gain strength
at the expense of the two leading
candidates, Jose
Maria Velasco and conservative
Camilo Ponce. Clashes between
Velasquistas and center-left sup-
porters are continuing; such vio-
lence is a measure both of the
closeness of the presidential
race and depth of the political
passions it has aroused. Rowdy
antics of followers of former
president Carlos Julio Arosemena,
who is supporting Velasco, will
probably cost the Velasquista
congressional ticket some support,
although Carlos Julio is virtu-
ally assured of winning a senate
seat.
There is some military un-
easiness over the possibility
that Carlos Julio might go on to
win the Senate presidency, which
would put only the vice presi-
dent--a nonentity--between him and
the presidency. The US Embassy
comments that while the military
would be reluctant to overthrow
a popularly elected Velasco gov-
ernment, it would not take
lightly the idea that Arosemena
could regain a position of real
power.
A total of 1,198,987 citi-
zens--some 21 percent of the
population--are registered to.
vote, and observers expect that
approximately 850,000 of them
will actually cast their ballots.
This would be an increase of
100,000 over the vote in the 1960
presidential elections.
At the request of President
Otto Arosemena, the Organization
of American States will send a
group of observers headed by a
Panamanian to monitor the elec-
tions. Although the observers
could verify that the govern-
ment's organization and admini-
stration of the elections are
relatively honest and efficient,
they would be in no position to
evaluate the principal opposi-
tion charge of electoral fraud 25X1_
in terms of voter registration.
SECRET
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SECRET
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERIORATION IN URUGUAY
President Pacheco's pros-
pects for dealing with Uruguay's
basic economic problems have been
dimmed by a protracted cabinet
crisis and by labor agitation.
Although Pacheco managed to
form a new cabinet after the old
one resigned a month ago, the
subsequent resignation of Inte-
rior Minister Legnani demonstrated
the continued lack of political
stability and has sparked rumors
of further resignations..
Finance Minister Cesar Char-
lone now is under attack by Com-
munists and other opposition
elements within the legislature
because of his identification
with the unpopular economic aus-
terity program. Pacheco report-
edly will defend him by all con-
stitutional means and has threat-
ened to dissolve Congress and
call for new elections if Char-
lone is forced to resign.
Outside the cabinet, Central
Bank President Enrique Iglesias
has been severely criticized in
government circles for his role
in the latest currency devalua-
tion. Charges were made that a
cabinet: minister or top bank
official leaked advance word of
the devaluation to foreign ex-
change speculators, and Pacheco
authorized a Senate investigation.
Although the investigation
is not completed, the Senate is
attempting to publish a confi-
dential. Central Bank Report that
would trend to embarrass Iglesias
regardless of his guilt or inno-
cence. Press reports continue
to speculate that both Iglesias
and Charlone will resign.
A dramatic increase in la-
bor agitation is threatening
Pacheco's wage stabilization
policies. A recent offer to
government workers would increase
salary expenditures by approxi-
mately 20 percent, compared with
the 17 percent a representative
of the International Monetary
Fund had earlier described as
the limit the government can
afford. Even with the more gen-
erous crovernment offer, worker
demands have not been met and
organized labor may feel that
its position is strong enough to
hold out for still higher wages
and benefits.
SECRET
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SECRET
GOVERNING PARTY WINS DOMINICAN ELECTIONS
President Balaguer's govern-
ing Reformist Party (PR) won
heavily in last week's municipal
elections in the Dominican Re-
public.
Provisional returns released
by the Central Electoral Board
show the PR winning in 66 of the
77 municipalities contested. In
patronage-rich Santo Domingo the
party polled slightly more than
65 percent of the vote, and in
the country's second largest
city, Santiago, its plurality
was over 47 percent. Independent
slates topped the balloting in
nine contests, and the Social
Christians won in two. The left-
of-center Dominican Revolutionary
Party, which had controlled 13
local governments including Santo
Domingo, abstained on grounds
that the elections were rigged
by the PR.
Slightly over 55 percent of
an estimated 1.8 million eligible
voters turned out for what has
been termed one of the most
orderly elections in the nation's
history. In the 1966 presiden-
tial and congressional elections,
79 percent of the estimated 1.7
million voters went to the polls.
The size of the vote was.
held down by heavy rains on elec-
tion day and the local rather
than national character of the
elections, as well as by the
abstention of all opposition
parties except the Social Chris-
tians.
Reactions to the outcome,
have included charges of fraud
by defeated candidates. Comm4-
nist elements have interpreted
what they call a mediocre turn-
out as a repudiation of the
Balaguer government. The Pre4i-
dent has described the result$
as the "worst defeat of the oppo-
sition." The Social Christians,
however, were cheered by their
performance as they quadrupled
the vote they received in the
1966 elections.
There were scattered minor
incidents of violence, but plans
to disrupt the election never
materialized, in part because:
of heavy security precautions,
SECRET
25X1
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Secret
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