WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006400050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 3, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
DIA review(s)
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
4
3 May 1968
No. 0018/68
i
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(Information as of noon EDT, 2 May 1968)
VIETNAM
There are still indications of impending widespread
enemy attacks, but Communist forces in some areas
do not yet appear to have completed offensive prep-
arations. Hanoi is maintaining a high level of
logistics supply into the South. In Saigon, there
are still indications that Premier Loc will be re-
placed.
NORTH KOREAN HARASSMENT OF SOUTH GAINING MOMENTUM
Last week witnessed bombing attacks in Seoul and am-
bushes along the Demilitarized zone, while national
security matters loomed large in party and government
deliberations in Pyongyang.
Page
1
POLITICAL TENSION APPARENTLY RISING IN COMMUNIST CHINA 6
The Chinese Communist leadership staged a new show
of unity on May Day but recent propaganda statements
indicate that Maoist militants are pressing hard to
step up "revolutionary" activity, a push that is ap-
parently meeting strong resistance.
Europe
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EAST GERMANS MAINTAIN BAN ON ACCESS TO BERLIN
Allied and West German countermeasures to lift the
ban on Bonn officials traveling to and from Berlin
may have little early effect on the intransigent East
Germans, who appear to have Soviet support for their
actions.
POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE MARKS TIME 16
In his speech on May Day, party leader Gomulka hit
hard against the US, Israel, and "international Zion-
ism," but otherwise ignored the issues involved in
the continuing factional struggle within the party.
CZECHOSLOVAK LEADER CALLS FOR UNITY 17
In his speech on May Day, party leader Dubcek appealed
for national unity and reaffirmed Prague's friendship
for and reliance on the Soviet Union.
COMMUNIST DISUNITY APPARENT AT BUDAPEST CONFERENCE
The meeting of Communist parties in Budapest last
week was distinguished more by strife than by the
"comradely exchange" noted in thefinal communique.
RUMANIA LAUNCHES REHABILITATION CAMPAIGN
By rehabilitating the reputations of selected party
figures disgraced during the Stalin era, the regime
is trying to highlight its nationalist character and
the beginning of controlled liberalization.
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Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 21
JERUSALEM PARADE RAISES ARAB HOSTILITY
Israel's Independence Day parade through Jerusalem
has pushed Arab resentment to a new peak. Border
incidents are occurring at a high rate
CIVILIAN RULE RETURNING TO SIERRA LEONE
The new prime minister, Siaka Stevens, has been suc-
cessful in forming a "national" coalition government,
but tensions persist between the two tribally based
political factions, and the country's undisciplined
army remains a definite threat.
NIGERIAN COMBATANTS EDGE CLOSER TO TALKS
Both sides appear 'willing to begin talks about talks,
but obstacles to a cease-fire remain. Meanwhile, a
new federal military offensive has started in the south
aimed at Port Harcourt, which Lagos wants to capture
before substantive negotiations begin.
ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES NEW ECONOMIC! CONTROLS
President Kaunda's recent shift in economic policies
was apparently made in an effort to accelerate the
country's development and to ease its growing finan-
cial troubles, but it is likely to have the opposite
effect.
Western Hemisphere
UNREST IN BERMUDA ON THE EVE OF ELECTIONS
The civil disturbances in Bermuda last week were
primarily racial in character, but they also had
political overtones.
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PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT CONCOCTING MASSIVE ELECTORAL FRAUD
The Robles government is pulling out all stops to
"control" the election and ensure the victory of of-
ficial candidate David Samudio.
POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES IN VENEZUELA
Political activity in Venezuela is increasing as the
parties maneuver for advantage prior to the presi-
dential elections in December.
STRIKES STILL PLAGUE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT
Labor agitation may force President Frei to increase
government expenditures and reduce development in-
vestment programs.
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Hanoi's desire to prolong the impasse over a site for preliminary talks
with the US was evident in its reported rejection of Djakarta's offer of an
Indonesian ship as the site for talks. The North Vietnamese tried to justify
their rejection by claiming that the proposal fails to meet President
Johnson's own conditions for preliminary talks, despite the fact that
Hanoi officially denounced these conditions three days earlier as "senseless
and insolent." Hanoi also felt obliged to state bluntly that "Indonesia is
not neutral."
In addition to Hanoi's apparent belief that it will be able to extract a
US concession by prolonging the impasse, its adamant insistence on either
Warsaw of Phnom Penh may also serve to meet Chinese Communist
reservations about the wisdom of talks with the US at this stage. A
Chinese delegation visited Hanoi in the last week of April and the US
Embassy in Laos reports receiving information that Hanoi has been trying
to "mend fences" with Peking on this issue.
On the military front, resistance to allied sweep operations in the
northern provinces of South Vietnam resulted in bitter fighting and heavy
Communist losses. There are continuing indications of Communist prepara-
tions for a new wave of coordinated attacks in the near future. The
Communist timetable, however, may have been upset by allied spoiling
operations in some areas.
There has been a resurgence of armed conflict in at least five
provinces of China. The official press is again endorsing factional fighting
and stressing militant themes. This revival of violence follows the purge of
acting chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu in late March and wide publication of
new "instructions" by Chairman Mao.
The North Koreans have accelerated their harassment tactics with a
terrorist bombing in the center of Seoul and. attacks on US and South
Korean patrols in the Demilitarized Zone. Pyongyang's psychological war-
fare was highlighted by an announcement of an unprecedented budget
increase of 33 percent, including a one-third rise in defense expenditures.
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L A C? S ?'~??~ HAINAN
~> t He Tlnh
Mu Gia X ruck Movement
Pass '?`
Demilitarized Zone
LAO'
U
t'
i1L
DAO PHU QUOC
(Vietnam)'
5u Ipo I OM.Ies
0 50 iOi) ! 50 KI!ameters
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VIETNAM
There were more indications
of enemy preparations for offen-
sive activity this week, although
enemy units in many areas do not
yet seem poised for battle. In
some sectors, allied counteroper-
ations have probably frustrated
Communist attack plans.
In the northern provinces,
the enemy is offering stiff re-
sistance to allied sweep opera-
tions, and bitter fighting has
occurred along the coastal plain
extending from Hue northward to
the Demilitarized Zone. Heavy
losses occurred on both sides in
a three-day battle in northeastern
Quang Tri, and high enemy losses
resulted from an engagement north-
west of Hue. Operation DELAWARE,
the 19-battalion allied drive
against the Communist-infested A
Shau Valley staging area, met only
moderate enemy opposition but con-
tinued to uncover extensive war
materiel and enemy storage facil-
ities.
Indications persist in the
northern provinces that the Commu-
nists are preparing for a major
offensive during May and June.
a
high-level conference in mid-
March of the Communists' Military
Region 5--the senior enemy command
authority in the coastal provinces
of southern I Corps and most of
II Corps--concluded that the of-
fensive in Quang Nam Province, al-
ready delayed by allied pressure,
should last generally from early
May through June.
The precise timing of any
specific new Communist military
initiatives remains unclear, but
the enemy may feel compelled to
move soon in order to counter the
momentum of allied operations over
the last few weeks. A coordinated
offensive would most probably fea-
ture country-wide mortar, rocket,
and artillery attacks, perhaps
combined with a few ground assaults
against allied positions.
The Communists are contin-
uing to move a high volume of
logistics supplies in southern
North 'Vietnam.
is roug the pass into Laos
during April continued at a high
South Vietnamese Political
President Thieu, apparently
still considering broad cabinet
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changes to strengthen his govern-
ment, is coming under renewed
National Assembly pressure to act
quickly.
rumors were widespread that former
presidential candidate Tran Van
Huong would replace Prime Minister
Loc. The absence of any clear-cut
moves in this direction, however,
together with Huong's public dis-
avowals of the reports
have to
quiet the rumors.
Although Thieu may have
changed his mind about Huong, he
apparently still intends to remove
Loc, possibly at an early date.
On 26 April, 46 Lower House
deputies signed a petition asking
that the question of no confi-
dence be placed on the agenda,
and the house debated the issue
inconclusively but heatedly a few
days later. Further debate will
await house action on the general
mobilization bill, but the depu-
ties have accomplished part of
their purpose simply by reviving
the threat of assembly action
against the government. One of
the petition's signers told an
embassy officer that the interim
will give Thieu a chance to act
before further consideration of
the petition is necessary.
Full house debate of a de-
fense committee draft mobilization
bill began on 2 May and the entire
assembly has been under some pres-
sure to enact a law swiftly. he
defense committee's draft affects
all males between the ages of 16
and 50, and "requisitions" females
from 18 to 29 for education,
health, and welfare work. Men
from 18 to 40 will be subject to
service in the regular armed
forces, while the others will be
drafted into the self-defense
force. The draft bill prohibits
mobilization in place and draft
exemptions, and provides for only
limited deferments.
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NORTH KOREAN HARASSMENT OF SOUTH GAINING MOMENTUM
North Korea's campaign of
harassment in the South picked up
momentum during the week. North
Korean terrorists on 30 April
bombed the International Telecom-
munications Building in Seoul,
and there was also at least one
suspected bomb attempt. In the
Demilitarized Zone, North Korean
infiltrators ambushed a US patrol
on 27 April and carried out a
machine gun attack on a South Ko-
rean patrol on 29 April.
In Pyongyang, national secu-
rity matters apparently played a
prominent role in recent high-
level party and government: dis-
cussions. A North Korean broad-
cast reported that Kim Il-song
made an "important speech"' at
the North Korean Labor Party cen-
tral committee plenum, which met
from 22 to 25 April, but it has
not yet been publicized.
Pyongyang has announced an
apparently unprecedented budget
increase for 1968 of 33 percent
above the previous year, with de-
fense expenditures rising by one
third. Very little is known about
the North Korean budget so that it
is difficult to measure the impact
of the announced increase on the
military establishment. In any
event, the announcement was prob-
ably aimed in part at impressing
the US and South Korea with Pyong-
yang's strength and resolve.
The listing of leaders attend-
ing the Supreme People's Assembly
on 25 April indicates that mili-
tary and national security offi-
cials have apparently been raised
to more important positions in the
North :Korean leadership. General
Choe Hyon, who is closely associ-
ated with the dispatch of guerril-
las against the South, Foreign
Minister Pak Song-chol, and De-
fense Minister Kim Chang-pong were
all moved up over the heads of
other senior officials to the
fifth, sixth, and seventh ranking
positions in the hierarchy.
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POLITICAL TENSION APPARENTLY RISING IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The Chinese Communist lead-
ership staged a new show of unity
on May Day but recent propaganda
statements indicate that Maoist
militants are pressing hard to
step up "revolutionary" activity.
This thrust is apparently still
meeting strong resistance.
Scores of leaders were pres-
ent at the evening rally for May
Day, the first major turnout since
7 March. All the important mod-
erates who have been out of sight
since the ouster of acting chief
of staff Yang Cheng-wu on 25 March
appeared, as did all the principal
radical leaders. Many inactive
members of the old hierarchy were
present along with large numbers
of the military--including com-
manders of seven of the 13 mili-
tary regions.
Current propaganda statements
indicate, however, that struggle
continues behind this facade of
unity.
The May Day joint editorial
by People's Daily, Red FFlaag, and
the Liberation Armes Journal, like
earlier ra .cal-sour in3 ng state-
ments in Peking and Shanghai, ac-
centuated the fact that where
there is class struggle, there
must also be factions; hence, fac-
tional struggle is good, so long
as proletarians are striking down
the bourgeoisie. The current line
even warns against "occupying our-
selves in an inane discussion on
the struggle to oppose factional-
ism."
The new line is based on a
set of "newest instructions" from
Chairman Mao, first cited in late
March when acting chief of staff
Yang Cheng-wu was purged. These
instructions, published on
10 April and disseminated as study
material to groups all over China,
state that the Cultural Revolution
is essentially a class struggle,
a continuation of the struggle
between the Kuomintang and the
Chinese Communist Party.
Despite the new emphasis on
"revolutionary" activity and the
increased use of leftist slogans
during the past month, moderate
positions are simultaneously set
forth. The May Day editorial, for
example, managed to support both
views. Moderate leaders recently
under attack appear to be still
in place. The most recently or-
ganized provincial revolutionary
committees seem to be dominated
by conservatives and the milita4ry.
Nevertheless, violence ap-
peared to be on the rise in the
provinces. During the past week,
significant armed conflict oc-
curred in at least five provinces--
Kwangtung, Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu,
and Tibet--and there has been some
upturn elsewhere as well.
Domestic political turmoil
has not yet, however, spilled over
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into the conduct of foreign policy.
Communist China continues to avoid
provocative actions while main-
taining diplomatic movement in
areas of immediate national con-
cern.
In response to British at-
tempts to ease a diplomatic im-
passe, Peking has now made some
minor concessions. The Chinese
have allowed the British to visit
a British Reuters correspondent
who has been held under house ar-
rest since July 1967. The Chinese
Foreign Ministry has also informed
the British charge that the Chinese
henceforth "would do their best"
to expedite visas for British dip-
lomatic personnel.
Peking's latest moves under-
score Communist China's concern
over the situation in Hong Kong.
Protracted strikes which have re-
sulted in the dismissal of many
Communist workers, have damaged
the morale of the local Communist
trade organizations there. Peking
may believe that its shift will
induce the colonial authorities
to be more forthcoming on the is-
sue of reinstatement for the
strikers.
Peking also moved quickly to
bolster its ties with Pakistan on
the heels of Soviet Premier Ko-
sygin's recent visit. A Chinese
military delegation arrived se-
cretly in Rawalpindi on 26 April.
Since 1965, Peking has delivered
a substantial amount of military
assistance to Pakistan, including
tanks and MIG-19 and IL-28 air-
craft. The supply of spare parts
and the maintenance of this equip-
ment will probably be a major
topic of discussion. The dele-
gation can also be expected to
push the line that the Soviets
cannot be relied upon. In this
regard, Chinese propaganda during
the past week has played up So-
viet military assistance to India
and has warned of the Soviet-
Indian threat to Pakistan's secu-
rity.
]?eking continues to take a
hard propaganda line against a
negotiated settlement of the con-
flict in Vietnam. The Chinese,
however, have maintained flexi-
bility on the question by avoid-
ing public comment on Hanoi's
stated willingness to begin pre-
liminary talks with the US.
Moreover, there are indica-
tions that Peking is adjusting 25X1
its position to meet the possi-
bility of negotiations.
In the past, Chinese
Communist officials have privately 25X1
decried negotiations of any sort,
although they have left them-
selves room for maneuver by as-
serting that the final decision
on this question was up to Hanoi.
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On May Day, Eastern European and Soviet leaders were occupied less
with celebrating the workers' revolution of the past than with urgent
problems of the present.
Moscow had its traditional speechmaking and a parade displaying the
same weapons as last November.
In Czechoslovakia, party leader Dubcek"s speech appealed for party
and national unity. Pressures within the party mounted for convening an
extraordinary congress at an early date at which conservatives and No-
votny supporters could be ousted. In contrast to the routine parades of
past years, Prague witnessed a great outpouriag into the streets of people
celebrating their new-found freedom.
Polish leader Gomulka, in his May Day speech, tried to construct a
facade of national unity and party stability, but another round in the
party's factional struggle appears imminent.
The Bulgarians, too, seem to be breaking some of their chains to the
past. A high-level Bulgarian trade mission will arrive in the US on 6 May
to explore the possibility of expanding commercial exchanges. Bulgaria
needs access to the technology of the West if it is to maintain its
economic growth.
East Germany, choosing to ignore Allied and West German protests
of its ban on Bonn officials' use of the autobahn to and from Berlin,
detained West Berlin's Mayor Schuetz, who was also at the time acting
federal president. The East Germans appear to have at least the implicit
support of the USSR.
President Tito this week added Moscow onto the end of a long Asian
tour. While he was. there, Belgrade announced it would not attend the
international Communist meeting set for November. The Yugoslavs and
Russians also hold widely differing views on events taking place in Poland
and Czechoslovakia, and Tito probably has aroused some resentment in
Moscow by insisting that the Mediterranean region be free of both US and
Soviet military presence. Tito probably also 'jriefed Soviet leaders on his
latest scheme to convene yet a third conference of nonaligned countries.
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EAST GERMANS MAINTAIN BAN ON ACCESS TO BERLIN
The East Germans appear to
have Soviet support for their
denial of the use of the auto-
bahn to Bonn officials going
to and from Berlin. Moreover,
Allied and West German counter-
measures to lift the ban may
have little early effect on
the intransigent East Germans.
The ban was announced on
13 April. Since then, at least
three persons have been stopped,
including Berlin's Mayor
Schuetz, who is the acting
federal president. The stop-
ping of Schuetz brought a strong
West German press reaction
calling for Allied counter-
measures. When the Allies de-
livered their second protest
of the ban to the Soviet Em-
bassy in East Berlin on 29
April, they were informed by
a Soviet Embassy official that
his government supported the
East German action.
Initial reaction by the
Bonn Foreign Ministry was ex-
tremely cautious, probably out
of consideration for its policy
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toward Eastern Europe, which
might suffer if a Berlin crisis
developed. At US insistence,
however, the Foreign Ministry
as well as the French and the
British have opened discussions
on possible countermeasures
lest
the more
than
32,000
fed-
eral
employees
in
Berlin
be
denied use of
permanently.
the
autobahn
The list of suggested
countermeasures includes a
number of parallel actions to
be taken by the West Germans and
the Allies. Most of the measures
fall into the trade and travel
category under either Interzonal
Trade (IZT) or Allied Travel
Office administration, respec-
tively. For example, one dual
measure calls for Bonn to issue
a warning to the East German
IZT negotiator regarding in-
terrupted deliveries or other dif-
ficulties, accompanied by the
parallel Allied step of stopping
the issuance of visas to certain
categories of East German travel-
ers. The visa restriction may
also be applied by other NATO
countries on a voluntary basis.
None of the possible counter-
measures that might be agreed to
would be felt immediately by East
Germany, however. Moreover, if
the countermeasures prove to be
too weak the East Germans may
feel free to tighten their restric-
tions on travel.
The Soviets broke their si-
lence on the matter only after pub-
lication in the West of the Allies'
protests. An article in Pravda
cited Schuetz's "illegal" Federal
office as evidence of "Bonn's
groundless claims to West Berlin,"
which recently "have become par-
ticularly intolerable." The charge
that Bonn seeks to incorporate
West Berlin has been a consistent
theme of Soviet diplomacy and p-op-
aganda over the past five months.
Further discussion of the access
question was expected at a meeting
in East Berlin on 3 May between So-
viet Ambassador Abrasimov and US
Ambassador McGhee.
The Soviets evidently are
counting on Western restraint,
and seem convinced so far that
Bonn and the Allies will not
react in a manner that would
lead to increased tension
around Berlin. The East Ger-
mans, for their part, probably
believe that as long as the
ban does not affect Allied
access to the city, there is
little risk of a strong Allied
response.
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COMMUNIST DISUNITY APPARENT AT BUDAPEST CONFERENCE
The meeting of Communist par-
ties in Budapest last week was
distinguished more by strife than
by the "comradely exchange" noted
in the final communique?
According to information
reaching the US Embassy in Buda-
pest, the Russian and Hungarian
delegates succeeded only with
great difficulty in dissuading
the Czechoslovaks from walking
out after an acrimonious clash
with the East Germans. The Czech-
oslovaks not only refused to
agree to withhold publicity of
the proceedings, but went out of
their way to ridicule attempts to
work "behind closed doors."
One participant is said to
have stated that if it were not
for the Vietnam issue, there would
have been no unifying topic.
Zoltan Komocsin, the Hungarian
party secretary in charge of the
arrangements, reportedly gave a
rather bleak account of his una-
vailing efforts to secure wider
attendance. Only seven of the 14
ruling Communist parties sent
delegates to the five-day meet-
ing. Once again, Moscow found
it necessary to pad the list of
participants with such parties
as those from Lesotho, Martinique,
and Puerto Rico in order to reach
a respectable count--this time 54.
Last week's meeting sched-
uled, the opening of a world con-
ference of Communist parties for
25 November in Moscow, set up a
"working group" to prepare docu-
ments, and decided to hold an-
other preparatory meeting in
September.
The difficulties the Soviets
encountered at Budapest are in-
dicative of the arduous, uphill
battle they face. A number of
parties will probably support
Prague and insist on frank, open
discussions--the Italians have
already made a gesture in this
direction. Many other hurdles
also remain in Moscow's path.
The Yugoslavs, even as Tito was
in Moscow preparing to hold talks
with the Soviet leaders, scorned
the Budapest gathering, and imme-
diately after its close announced
they would not attend the world
meeting.
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POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE MARKS TIME
The struggle within the
Polish Communist Party continues,
out of sight of an anxious and
intimidated public. In his speech
on May Day, Gomulka hit hard
against the US, Israel, and "in-
ternational Zionism," but gave
no hint of just what is going on
between the party's factions.
Gomulka stressed the need
for domestic "unity" against al-
leged foreign and domestic "reac-
tion." Although he renewed his
call for some moderation in the
continuing campaign against Jews
and liberals, he raised the pitch
of the regime's mounting propa-
ganda against Poland's bad press
in the West by charging that the
US is backing the "Zionist" cam-
paign of "slander." He defen-
sively invited comparison between
the welfare of Polish-Americans
in the US and that of the Jews in
Poland.
Anticipated student demon-
strations did not materialize.
The public appears apathetic over
the daily progress of the party
factional struggle, which most
view as merely "one Communist
trying to get another." At the
same time, most Poles appear
tense, confused, and concerned
over the country's future. Many
believe that one consequence of
the party struggle is that other
important domestic issues are be-
ing ignored.
The challenges to Gomulka
still appear to come from hard-
line Interior Minister Moczar on
the one hand, and pragmatic pro-
vincial party leader Gierek on
the other. Their support in the,
party is not yet clearly defined;,
but both are attempting to win
over younger elements who are anx-
ious to get power away from Go-
mulka's old guard. A prolonged
period of instability probably is
in the offing. Both the contend-
ing factions will attempt to con-
solidate their positions before
the party congress scheduled for,
later this year.
Gomulka probably is hoping
to exploit any factional stalemate
in an effort to regain his once
pre-eminent position. Moczar, who
controls most of the public media,
continues to press for additional
purges. New curbs on dissident
writers and academicians probably
are imminent. Moczar thus appears
to control the purging, but he has
not been able to place his own
men in the positions vacated. Most
recent appointees to key govern-'
ment posts, for example, are young
persons who have not been commu-
ted to any faction. These appoint-
ments suggest that Gomulka may lie
striking a compromise with Giereik's
reformist elements to thwart Mod-
zar's ambitions.
Despite the temporary publilc
moratorium in the party struggle;
in deference to the May Day demon-
stration of "unity," there are n-
dications that another round in!the
factional contest is imminent. `Ad-
ditional government changes, pos-
sibly already decided upon, maybe
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CZECHOSLOVAK LEADER CALL.S FOR UNITY
Party leader Dubcek this
week appealed for national unity
and reaffirmed Prague's friend-
ship for and reliance on the So-
viet Union. Meanwhile, the in-
traparty struggle continued and
rumors circulated that the Soviet
Union was applying economic
pressure.
Dubcek, speaking at the an-
nual May Day celebration in
Prague, reiterated that the "re-
vival process" will continue but
added that in solving the "ex-
ceptionally exacting tasks" that
face Czechoslovakia, unity within
the party and within the nation
is required.
These remarks were probably
intended to reassure the now
somewhat skeptical and nervous
liberals that the reform program
will not be further compromised
in an effort to placate conserva-
tives. The liberals and others
who support the moderate Dubcek
apparently were highly disturbed
this week. when several Novotny
supporters, who had earlier been
ousted from high-level posts,
were given positions on important
parliamentary committees.
Dubcek earlier had attempted
to assuage the liberals when he
informed the Prague party meeting
that it is necessary to elect a
new central committee and that
this should "obviously" be done
before the next party congress,
due in 1970. Dubcek then equivo-
cated somewhat, however, by re-
iterating that preparation for the
congress requires time. He did
say that he will propose to the
central committee plenum in May
that the congress be convened as
soon as possible.
Pressure to convene an ex-
traordinary congress at which the
conservatives could be ousted con-
tinues to mount. The important
Prague city conference and another
reg:Lonal party conference have rec-
ommended this course of action.
The party rank and file as well
as organizations of writers, ar-
tists, and scientists also favor
an extraordinary congress. The
May plenum, then, may be a stormy
one.
Dubcek's foreign policy com-
ments were low-keyed. They were
probably intended to reassure the
Soviet Union that Prague does not
intend to change its basic foreign
policy orientation and the Czech-
oslovak population that Moscow is
not pressuring the regime.
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RUMANIA LAUNCHES REHABILITATION CAMPAIGN
The Rumanian leadership has
launched a campaign to rehabili-
tate selected party figures dis-
graced during the Stalin era.
The campaign, revealed at an en-
larged party plenum held from
22 to 25 April, is meant to high-
light the beginning of controlled
liberalization in Rumania and
the nationalist character of the
regime. The plenum also dis-
closed that Rumania was not in-
vited to last month's discussions
at Dresden in which all the other
active members of the Warsaw Pact
and CEMA participated.
In its first open break
with the predecessor regime of
Gheorghiu-Dej, the Ceausescu
leadership accused Dej of allow-
ing and even arranging the ille-
gal conviction of numerous -Ru-
manian Communists in the 1940s
and 1950s. Foremost among those
so far rehabilitated are Lucretiu
Patrascanu, a minister of justice
under Dej who was executed for
"nationalist deviations" in 1954,
and Stefan Foris, a one-time
party secretary general who was
executed in 1944.
Of the present hierarchy
only Deputy Premier Alexandru
Draghici has been directly im-
plicated, and he has been re-
moved from all his government
and party posts. Other "old
guard" types will become vulnera-
ble, however, as the party con-
tinues its investigations.
The rehabilitation of those
purged appears to be one of Ceau-
sescu's ways of emphasizing his
concern for individual rights.
He seems intent on giving credi-
bility to his claims that "social-
ist democracy"--now being sought
so avidly in Czechoslovakia--had
existed in Rumania since 1965
when he became party leader.
Ceausescu, however, made it clear
that liberalization in Rumania
will be decidedly more modest
and carefully controlled than it
Czechoslovakia.
The rehabilitations are beng
handled in such a way as to under-
score Moscow's close connection
with those Rumanians who were
responsible for the past crimes.
No Soviet-installed leaders have
been mentioned as candidates for
rehabilitation. Moscow also car;
take little comfort in the im-
plicit downgrading of the "old
guards," who continue to be
shunted aside.
Rumania's absence from
Dresden underscores an important
change in Bucharest's relations
with its Warsaw Pact allies. In
view of Rumania's heretofore suc=-
cessful resistance to Moscow's ef-
forts to tighten the pact's com-
mand structure, Moscow apparently
excluded Bucharest in part to
circumvent obstructionism on
this issue. The failure of the
pact commander, Soviet General
Yakubovsky, to stop in Bucharest;
during his recent tour of all
other active pact countries is
further evidence of Moscow's
desire to bypass Rumania on some:
pact discussions.
The Rumanians are expected
to define carefully their view
of this new pattern of relations
soon, perhaps at the 47th anni-
versary of the Rumanian party
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Israel defied both the UN Security Council and rising Arab hostility
with a military parade through Jerusalem on 2 May and increasingly harsh
tactics against Arab demonstrators and Palestinian terrorists. King Husayn
is winding up a successful fund-raising tour with a trip to Europe in search
of armaments, and in several Arab countries increased financial support for
Palestinian terrorist groups is being openly and successfully solicited. The
current influence of the moribund Jarring UN mission is nil.
Egyptian President Nasir got a vote of confidence on 2 May in a
national referendum. on his vaguely defined reform program for the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU). Reforming the nation's only mass organization is
Nasir's response to recent popular agitation for greater political freedom.
As an organ for effectively expressing the people's will, even a reformed
ASU holds little prospect of satisfying popular desires.
Morocco's King Hassan has apparently given up his efforts to pro-
mote an Arab summit meeting, which took shim on visits to Turkey, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Tunis. He canceled a scheduled visit to Cairo.
Algerian President Boumediene--the target of an unsuccessful assas-
sination attempt on 25 April--went ahead with a planned inspection tour
of eastern Algeria this week. Algiers, uncertain of just who was behind the
attempt, has characterized the assailants as "mercenaries in the pay of the
imperialists."
The Greek junta put two former cabinet ministers under house arrest
this week for issuing antiregime statements, revealing again the govern-
ment's ingrained sensitivity to criticism.
Under considerable international pressure, both sides in the Nigerian
civil war have edged closer to preliminary talks about peace terms. Lagos
has no intention of halting the fighting until Biafra renounces its secession,
and federal military forces are currently driving on Port Harcourt.
In Sierra Leone, newly appointed Prime Minister Siaka Stevens has
managed to form an unbalanced coalition cabinet in a major step toward
restoration of civilian rule. The West African ministate faces a long, rocky,
and uphill road back to stability, however.
State-level problems continue to dominate the Indian political scene.
Madhya Pradesh may soon join the growing list of states where non-
Congress coalitions have broken down. Haryana state's mid-term election
campaign is in full swing, with even the prime minister stumping the
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JERUSALEM PARADE RAISES ARAB HOSTILITY
Israel held its 20th anniver-
sary Independence Day parade in
Jerusalem on 2 May despite formal
UN Security Council objections.
Jordan had called for the
Security Council meeting last week
to protest Israel's plans for a
parade as well as other Israeli
actions in Arab Jerusalem. The
vote supporting the Jordanian
protest was unanimous. Israel,
however, went ahead and paraded
equipment captured during the
June war through the streets of
Arab Jerusalem. Israeli authori-
ties maintained tight security
in the city. Earlier in the week,
Israeli police had used clubs to
break up a demonstration in Jeru-
salem by Arab women; some 30 of
the demonstrators were arrested.
Border incidents have con-
tinued at a high rate. On 30
April, an Israeli force mounted
on half-tracks penetrated Jordanian
territory. Whether the Israelis
were pursuing infiltrators or
running a sweep against suspected
terrorist concentrations is not
known.
In Lebanon, money to support
local Palestinian commando activ-
ities is being collected openly
by Muslim religious leaders and
commando representatives. Lebanese
officials, who have been trying
to inhibit infiltration across
their border, are pinned between
their fear of Israeli reprisals
and their desire not to appear
hostile to the commandos' increas-
ingly popular cause.
Kuwait has decided to support
the Palestinian commandos with the
proceeds of a two-percent sur-
charge on gasoline and theater
tickets. The surcharge was orig-
inally levied for the support of
the Algerian FLN and subsequently
for Algerian charitable agencies.
King Husayn, meanwhile, has
been working hard to gather finan-
cial support for his government
from fellow Arab states, and
apparently had a fair amount of
success during a recent fund-
raising tour of the eastern Arab
world.
The Jarring UN mission to
find a peaceful solution in the
area is continuing, but success:.
seems as far away as ever,
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CIVILIAN RULE RETURNING TO SIERRA LEONE
With the appointment of Siaka
Stevens to the post of prime min-
ister last week and his subsequent
designation of a coalition govern-
ment, Sierra Leone moved closer to
formal restoration of civilian rule.
Tensions between the country's two
tribally based political parties
continue to run high, however, and
the undisciplined army poses a
threat to stability for some time
to come.
Stevens was named prime min-
ister on 26 April by the acting
governor general after consulta-
tions with members of parliament,
which had been reconvened under a
compromise hammered out among the
two political parties and the "ser-
geants' junta" that had taken power
on 18 April. The Sierra Leone
People's Party (SLPP), in disarray
since its government was ousted in
last year's military coup, finally
chose not to contest the choice of
Stevens, leader of the former oppo-
sition All People's Congress (APC).
SLPP politicians probably had as-
surances from Stevens, however, that
their party would be given. some
important posts in a new government.
This week, Stevens, a moderate
with Fabian Socialist leanings,
named a 17-member cabinet made up
of eight members of his party, four
SLPP members, two independents, and
three paramount chiefs. Although
some of the APC nominees have been
somewhat left of center, none be-
longs to the party's radical wing
and all appear competent. The new
foreign minister, an independent,
probably favors a more neutral for-
eign policy and may well advocate
seek:_ng increased assistance from
Communist countries--an effort
Stevens is likely -to endorse.
SLPP partisans, mostly south-
ern Mende tribesmen, appear to have
entered the coalition with great
reluctance. They apparently be-
lieve Stevens has reneged on his
original formula for a balanced
coalition by offering them only
mino:c ministerial posts. Although
SLPP leaders could still regard
cooperation with Stevens as their
best course in the near term, they
may eventually withdraw from the
government if Stevens appears to
be ignoring the needs of the south-
erners. Conceivably, they could
also turn to Mende troops in the
army for support.
The most urgent task facing
Stevens is to bring the army under
control. It is now virtually
leaderless and essentially an armed
rabble. The burden of command is
falling upon the noncommissioned
officers, and they have been unable
to exercise much control.
Unless Stevens is able to re-
dress some of the troops' griev-
ances and to restore authority in
their ranks, fighting might begin
among tribal elements in the army,
or the troops could turn against
Stevens himself. The troops'
principal demand--more pay--con-
fronts Stevens with an immediate
dilemma because he recognizes the
urgent need for economic austerity
as a first step toward rebuilding
the country's shattered economy.
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NIGERIAN COMBATANTS EDGE CLOSER TO TALKS
Both sides in the Nigerian
civil war now appear willing to
begin exploratory discussions of
the prerequisites for actual peace
negotiations, but serious obsta-
cles remain. Meanwhile, federal
military forces in southern Biafra
have launched a major offensive
toward Port Harcourt, which Laqos
wants to capture before peace
talks begin.
On 24 and 25 April, elements
of the federal 3rd Division
crossed the Imo River from Opobo
and Ekeffe; by 30 April, advance
units were about 15 miles from
Port Harcourt. Biafran forces
NIGERIA: STATUS OF FEDERAL ADVANCE INTO BIAFRA
Bross
Area controlled by Federal forces
Federal advance
s+* Biafran counterattack
- Road
as so
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in the area scattered and fell
back in disarray, but reinforce-
ments are being rushed in and a
strong defense of Port Harcourt
is expected. Elsewhere, federal
forces probing toward Aba and
those attempting to link up the
Abakaliki and Afikpo areas are
continuing to meet strong resist-
ance.
In the north, federal forces
at Onitsha are still troubled by
Biafran infiltrators into the
Mid-West, but are reported to be
inflicting heavy casualties on
Biafran units counterattacking
at Onitsha and along the road to
the east.
The federal air force has
stepped up its erratic bombing
of important Biafran towns, prin-
cipally Aba, Umuahia, Owerri, and
Port Harcourt, including the
nearby refinery. The Biafran
radio has reported scores of ci-
vilian casualties, but few mili-
tary tar ets appear to have been
hit.
In the wake of pressures from
the UK Government, the Commonwealth
secretariat, and the organization
of African Unity, it was announced
in London on 2 May that federal and
Biafran representatives would meet
there this weekend for preliminary
discussions. Lagos has agreed to
put the subject of a cease-fire
first on the agenda, but in other
statements has made it clear that
the fighting will not stop until
Biafra renounces secession and ac-
cepts Nigeria's 12-state structure.
Biafran leader Ojukwu, who had
earlier objected to London as a
site because of UK arms shipments
to Lagos, may still insist on an
African city, such as Dakar or Nai-
robi, for substantive talks.
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Biafra continues to hope that
international pressure will force
Lagos into a cease-fire, and until
now Ojukwu has stalled on meeting
with federal representatives.
Federal leader Gowon was, in fact,
ready to start private talks on his 25X1
present terms as long ago as last
October. It still seems unlikely,
however, that meaningful negotia-
tions will take place before fed-
eral military forces have, at a
minimum, seized Port Harcourt.
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ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES NEW ECONOMIC CONTROLS
Zambia's President Kaunda re-
cently announced an abrupt shift in
government policies toward foreign
investment in an effort to increase
local control and to force more for-
eign-earned money into the Zambian
economy.
Going back on pre-independence
pledges made in 1964, the government
has moved to prevent the country's
two major copper companies and other
foreign firms from sending more than
half of their profits home, and has
decided to take controlling inter-
est in some 25 leading noncopper
firms, most of which are owned by
British and South African interests.
In addition, no new expatriate
trading firms will be licensed to
do business in Zambia.
Kaunda's moves apparently were
prompted by his dissatisfaction
with the foreign firms' failure to
participate more fully in develop-
ing the country and his growing
concern over Zambia's mounting eco-
nomic and financial problems. Since
independence, little progress has
been made in increasing the coun-
try's mining and agricultural out-
put. More recently, the copper-
based economy has been adversely
affected by declining copper prices.
For the first time since independ-
ence, the government has large
budget deficits and faces a reduc-
tion in its foreign exchange hold-
ings.
The new measures, however, are
likely to dampen prospects for de-
velopment. Most significantly,
Kaunda's announcement comes at a
time when the copper companies must
decide on the magnitude of their
investments over the next several
years. Large additional sums will
soon be required just to maintain
the present level of copper output,
as new mines will have to be opened
to replace those now being depleted.
The restrictions on repatriation of
profits, however, will probably
lead to lower capital expenditures
than would have occurred otherwise.
The unrepatriated profits may
not be sufficient even to cover the
maintenance of current copper pro-
duction levels, much less finance
increased production. Furthermore,
even if Kaunda subsequently softens
the effects of the restrictions on
the two copper companies, his new
policy direction will probably
cause them to place greater empha-
sis on developing interests else-
where, such as Botswana, where both
firms are now planning to exploit
copper deposits. Additional in-
vestment in other industries it
also likely to be discouraged by
the government's new policies.
The action will do little to
solve Zambia's increasing financial
difficulties. Only a sustained
upsurge in copper prices, a very
unlikely event, would improve the
country's budget and balance-of-
payments situation. About 65 per-
cent of government revenues and 90
percent of the country's foreign
exchange earnings are from copper.
Moreover, although the government's
measures will reduce the amount of
corporate profits paid abroad, this
saving will probably be largely
offset by a drop in the existing
flow of investment capital to Zam-
bia.
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May Day was generally quiet throughout Latin America. Except in
Uruguay and Brazil., Communists and leftists were able to stage only
unimpressive parades and rallies, many of which had heavy anti-US over-
tones.
Uruguay experienced its most violent May Day in some years. Crowds
of up to 6,000 roamed Montevideo, breaking store windows and creating
general havoc. The US Embassy and some US-owned businesses suffered
slight damage from fire bombs and rocks. In Brazil, the most significant
incident occurred in Sao Paulo where extremist students and workers
broke up a peaceful labor rally, attacked the governor, and then proceeded
to break windows and incite other disturbances.
Coming elections in a number of countries dominated the political
news this week. In Panama, where elections will be held on 12 May, the
Robles government is pulling out all stops to rig the results in favor of the
official candidate, David Samudio. In contrast, Dominican President Bala-
guer has issued a series of decrees designed to ensure that the municipal
elections on 16 May will be honest. The Dominican public so far has
shown little interest in the elections. The third anniversary of the landing
of US troops on 28 April passed quietly under the watchful eye of heavily
reinforced security forces.
Bermudians are intensely interested in their election, which will be
held on 22 May. All 40 seats in the House of Assembly are at stake.
Although the rioting and violence that wracked Hamilton over the week-
end was primarily racial in character, election fervor played a role. In
Ecuador, Jose Marna Velasco Ibarra, one of the leading presidential candi-
dates in the election set for 2 June, appears to be running scared. j
Argentine army leaders are pressuring, President Ongania to replace
Interior Minister Borda. Borda, a former Peronist, is now one of the most
outspoken supporters in the administratior., for the eventual development
of.some kind of fascist-style corporate state.
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UNREST IN BERMUDA ON THE EVE OF ELECTIONS
Th
e civil disturbances in
Bermuda last week were caused
primarily by militant Negros'
resentment of white economic and
Political Power. Negro hostility
toward the police, which is 80-
percent white, was also a factor.
This discontent has been inflamed
during the pre-electoral period
by the predominantly Negro Pro-
gressive Labor Party (PLP), which
is the principal opposition party
and expounds a "black power"
philosophy. The recent racial
disorders in the US have also
had some influence.
The election on 22 May prom-
ises to be the most important in
Bermuda's history. The new lib-
eralized constitution grants
considerable self-government, and
political parties will be par-
ticipating for the first time.
Redistricting has increased the
number of assembly seats from
36 to 40, and all adults above
the age of 21 are now allowed to
vote.
Because race issues over-
shadow all others, the PLP st4.:ds
to make some gains at the expense
of the white-dominated United
Bermuda Party (UBP). Twenty-six
members of the House of Assembly
will be chosen from predominantly
Negro electoral districts, while
14 will be chosen from areas with
white majorities. Recognizing
the need to face up frankly and
openly to race problems, the UF3P
has adopted a position support-
ing racial integration and is
running 16 Negro candidates.
The small, moderate, biracial
Bermuda Democratic Party is also
expected to attract votes from
progressives in both the white
and Negro communities.
Police and defens
f
e
orces--
reinforced by over 400 British
troops--have restored calm to
the island; the troops will prob-
ably stay through the election.
British officials believe that
a UBP victory could provoke
further outbursts of violence by
frustrated PLP supporters. The
nightly curfew is still in ef-
fect, and the tourist industry
is already suffering from the
tt r. e. .L t_l _ _
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PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT CONCOCTING MASSIVE ELECTORAL FRAUD
Panama's presidential elec-
tions on 12 May probably will set
a new record for blatant vote
manipulation by the government
in behalf of the official candi-
date. The Robles government is
continuing to pursue a course
designed to guarantee the victory
of former finance minister Samudio
and undermine the chances of ex-
president Arnulfo Arias, candi-
date of the National Union (NU)
and probable winner in a reason-
ably fair election.
With the connivance of the
Robles govenment, Samudio is
making plans to "control" the
election outcome with such so-
phisticated means as an "elaborate
communications center" utilizing
computers to determine in which
districts the vote will have to be
altered to ensure Arias' defeat.
Page 30
The government is also mov-
ing against the opposition through
various legal maneuvers. The
pro-Robles electoral tribunal is
proceeding with plans to inv4l-
idate the National Patriotic
Coalition--one of the principal
parties now backing Arias. Its
elimination from the elections
would further weaken Arias' elec-
tion chances.
In addition, the government
is pressing charges against NU
deputies running for re-election,
demanding that they be disqual-
ified for having exercised "com-
mand and jurisdiction" within;
six months of the elections by
participating in the Robles im-
peachment trial. To preclude
recourse to the courts, govern-
ment plans reportedly call for
electoral authorities to declare
the NU deputies ineligible
shortly before the elections.
Both candidates have been
campaigning vigorously through-
out the country. In a recent
speech, Samudio alleged that
Arias is conspiring to win the
election with either votes or
bullets , and stated that his
forces would answer "with bullets
if necessary." Although both
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 May 68
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sides are using the draft canal
treaties as campaign issues in
the press, the principal thrust
of recent speeches has been di-
rected at local problems,,
Meanwhile, President Robles
has refused to invite observers
from the Organization of American
States, ostensibly because he
intends "to guarantee free elec-
tions" but probably because he
would find their presence em-
barrassing. Although Arias is
reported to be pessimistic about:
his prospects under these circum-
stances, popular indignation over
a large-scale fraud could increase
the potential for antigovernment
violence in his behalf during and
after the elections.
POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES IN VENEZUELA
Political activity in Ven-
ezuela is increasing as the par-
ties maneuver for advantage prior
to the presidential elections in
December.
The minority Democratic Re-
publican Union has withdrawn
from the government in order to
campaign for the presidential
candidacy of its leader, Jovito
Villalba. In the subsequent
cabinet changes, President Leoni
turned to "technocrats" rather
than political leaders. The new
cabinet is designed to ride out
the remaining months of his term
as a caretaker body that will
make few changes in government
policies.
In an attempt to win sup-
port for his party's presidential
Army units in Falcon and Yaracuy
states have twice engaged elements
of the Douglas Bravo guerrillas
and have inflicted heavy cas-
ualties with minimum loss of
life for the arm
The recent amnesty and the
expected release of Communist
party leader Gustavo Machado will
further irritate military leaders,
who see their efforts to control
candidate, President Leoni re-
leased about 80 political pris-
oners, including Communists and
.former guerrillas.
the guerrillas being frustrated
by politicians in Caracas.
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STRIKES STILL PLAGUE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT
The month-long strike by
postal and telegraph workers and
teachers threatens to develop in-
to a general walkout in the face
of strong government opposition
to the strikers' demands.
Public employees are pro-
testing that they will not re-
ceive fair treatment under the
government's wage readjustment
bill presently before congress.
The National Association of Pub-
lic Employees (ANEF) has asked
President Frei to intercede on
its behalf, and has threatened
a general strike if the demands
are not met.
Frei has indicated his de-
termination to hold the line,
insofar as he is able, against
illegal strikes that would re-
sult in inflationary settlements,
and has characterized the walk-
outs as a measure "to pressure
the government and to obtain
more benefits than it can grant."
He added that the government
cannot accept ANEF's demands
"without renouncing its authority
and without precipitating the
country into veritable chaos."
If a general strike is called
to support ANEF, the government
probably will call in military
and police forces to maintain
services.
SECRET
So far, the Christian Demo-
cratic Party (PDC) has supported
President Frei's hard line against
the strikers. A minority of the
workers are PDC members who have
remained on the job. They hope
that a firm stand by the govern-
ment will undermine the union
leadership, which is controlled
by the Radical Party.
The government has made a
number of important modifications
in the wage adjustment bill in
order to pick up congressional
votes from the Communists and
the conservative National Party.
Among other changes, it has with-
drawn a provision restricting
cash increases for workers in the
private sector, thus avoiding
what the opposition claimed was,
an infringement of the right to
strike. The government has also
promised to reduce expenditures:,
and some of the revenue measures
of the legislation have been
watered down.
If congress eventually pro-
vides full compensation for the,
1967 cost-of-living increase en-
tirely in cash, the government
will have to transfer expenditures
from investment to current operat-
ing costs or incur an increased
budget deficit. As a result, Frei
will have trouble carrying out 25X1
his promised stablization and
develo ment programs.
25X1
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