WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006400040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
46
26 April 1968
No. 0017/68
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 25 April 1968)
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
Hanoi in the past week stood pat on its offers of
Phnom Penh or Warsaw for preliminary contacts with
the US, but the North Vietnamese have not ruled out
other sites. Militarily, enemy main forces in the
South continued to avoid major combat., apparently
devoting their efforts to resupply and replacement
in anticipation of further fighting.
LAO GOVERNMENT BRACES FOR COMMUNIST TERRORIST ATTACKS 7
The Communists may attempt to add some final victo-
ries to their already impressive dry season offensive.
POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The political situation remains tense in Peking, with
no clear trend in any direction.
PYONGYANG INCREASES PRESSURE AGAINST SOUTH KOREA
The spring cycle of North Korean pressure against the
south has apparently begun.
Europe
CZECHOSLOVAKIA PREPARES TO ADOPT NEW POLICIES
Though still beset by factional probLems, the Dubcek
regime is preparing to implement domestic reforms and
is putting a new face on Czechoslovak foreign policy.
POLISH PARTY FACTIONS LOCKED IN STRUGGLE
The first public clash between competing factions
has taken place in party publications.
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SI;CIRET
SWEDEN ORDERS 175 VIGGEN AIRCRAFT
Stockholm's order for the Swedish-built multimission
aircraft is valued at more than $440 million.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
RISING PRESSURE ON LAGOS TO END NIGERIAN WAR
Rising African pressures to halt the fighting are
having little effect on federal leader Gowon, who is
determined to force secessionist Biafra to accept
Nigeria's new state structure. Federal troops in
the field are having difficulties against well-organ-
ized Biafran resistance.
19
20
SOMALI ARMY WANTS MORE SOVIET ARMS 22
The Somali defense minister plans to visit Moscow for
25 days to seek additional arms aid.
TRIBAL TENSIONS HIGH IN SIERRA LEONE AFTER ARMY MUTINY 23
An intense struggle for political control has devel-
oped between Sierra Leone's two dominant tribal groups
in the aftermath of the overthrow on 18 April of the
ruling junta by mutinous army rank and file. Although
an uneasy peace now prevails, the potential for con-
flict along tribal lines has increased.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
CASTRO WIDENS ROLE OF CUBAN MILITARY
Castro has concentrated on the domestic situation
in his recent speeches and has given the armed forces
a greater part in organizing the economy.
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NEW ELEMENTS ENTER ECUADOREAN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
Former president Jose Maria Velasco has charged that
Interim President Otto Arosemena signed pacts which
will favor rightist candidate Camilo Ponce in the 2
June presidential elections. Rising campaign vio-
lence, possibly organized by paid Communist organ-
izers, may increase on 1 May.
KILLING OF GUATEMALAN RIGHTIST LEADER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS 28
The summary execution of a right-wing terroripst JP
bring on more troubles for President Menez.
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Hanoi appears confident that the delay in opening preliminary con-
tacts with the US is working to its advantage.
North Vietnamese propaganda claims that world opinion is growing
increasingly critical of alleged US moves to delay the talks and charges
that Washington has "completely changed its attitude" since President
Johnson's address on 31 March. Hanoi continues to insist on US accept-
ance of either Phnom Penh or Warsaw as the site for talks, but it has left
the door open for an eventual agreement on another site.
The level of military action rose this week with shar clashes
Saigon, in the delta, and in the Khe Sanh area.
warned of a widespread Communist offensive at the end
of April, including a major attack on Saigon. The general posture and
deployment of Communist forces, however, suggest that enemy initiatives
in the immediate future will be more limited in scope.
Communist preparations for political maneuvering and negotiations in
the months ahead are reflected in the emergence of the first national-level
"Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces." Local alliances,
formed in several areas during the Tet offensive, were portrayed as the
first step toward the formation of a coalition with the National Liberation
Front designed to replace the present Saigon government. The Liberation
Front tried to emphasize the non-Communist and independent status of
the alliance by addressing a congratulatory message to its founding con-
gress which met near Saigon last weekend.
The Lao Government has taken precautionary measures in response
to reports of Communist plans to launch attacks on several government-
held cities and to conduct sabotage and assassination operations. Although
there are no firm indications that a major offensive is imminent, the
Communists may stage another show of strength before the rainy season
begins next month.
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CONFIDENTIAL !
1
} HO TF(
t V/6rMAM
Demilitarized Ion*
I 1%fil
` DELAWARE/LAMSON 216
Khe Sa h
,
Ban Me
Tnuot
-
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 100
L. J
SF'CR RT
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V I ETNAM
During the past week Hanoi
stood pat on its earlier offers
of Phnom Penh or Warsaw as sites
for preliminary contacts with the
United States. Hanoi propaganda
has continued to charge the US
with "perfidy" on this issue but
has not ruled out other sites.
North Vietnamese spokesmen tried
to convey an impression that
Hanoi's suggestions were made on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but
they, too, left room for an agree-
ment on any other locations.
Military Activity in the South
Several sharp engagements
occurred in widely scattered
areas of South Vietnam during the
week, although most enemy main
forces continued a relative stand-
down.
: there
are numerous indications that
enemy forces are gearing for re-
newed heavy combat.
The current pattern of enemy
activity may be explained in part
by extensive replacement and re-
supply needs following the heavy
fighting last fall and in the Tet
offensive. A period of resupply
and regrouping is in keeping with
enemy activity in previous years.
Seasonal lulls between the Commu-
nist "winter-spring" campaign and
their "'summer-autumn" campaign
are also characteristic of Commu-
nist military action. In view
of the current US - North Viet-
namese diplomatic dialogue on a
site for preliminary talks, the
Communists may have hoped that
their relative inactivity for
the past month would be viewed
as restraint.
During the current rela-
tive lull, the enemy is making
his presence felt in stratigic
areas by mortar and rocket at-
tacks, harassment and limited
ground assaults against selected
targets. Occasionally, these ac-
tions have resulted in heavy cas-
ualties. On 21 April 22 Marines
were killed and nearly 80 wounded
in a clash in the mountainous ter-
rain east of Khe Sanh. Communist
losses were 24 dead. A number of
bloody engagements have also
broken out in recent days in the
provinces around Saigon and in
the delta. However, a large al-
lied sweep, Operation DELAWARE/
LAMSON :216, under way since
19 April in the A Shau Valley
and its eastern approaches, has
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so far met only moderate resist-
ance.
Communist Scenario for a Coalition
While Hanoi spars over the
site for initial contacts with the
US, the Communists in the South
are pushing ahead with a political
scenario which they hope will
eventually produce a Communist-
dominated "coalition" to replace
the present Thieu government. On
23 April, the Communists surfaced
the first national-level "alli-
ance," the Vietnam Alliance of
National, Democratic, and Peace
Forces. It is portrayed as a
political force independent not
only of the Communists but of the
Liberation Front as well and as
representing significant wide-
spread opposition to the Saigon
government.
Local counterparts of the
new national "alliance" first ap-
peared during the Tet offensive
when Communist broadcasts claimed
that several had been established
in urban areas. The propaganda
described them clearly as inde-
pendent of, but willing to work
with, the Liberation Front to es-
tablish governmental "administra-
tions" in these areas. Only one
such alliance--that for Hue city
and Thua Thien Province--was pub-
licized to any extent, however,
and even here most of the people
openly associated with the alli-
ance were minor figures. Propa-
ganda on this theme died out for
more than a month, until it was
revived in April.
On 9 April a Liberation Radio
broadcast claimed for the first
time that many new "revolutionary
administrations" had been estab-
lished throughout rural areas of
South Vietnam. A week later the
Thua Thien - Hue "alliance" was
publicized as a "revolutionary
committee" with regular semigov-
ernmental functions. The commt-
tee allegedly met to review its
activities during March and to
establish various programs of ac-
tion such as agricultural produc-
tion, budgeting, and the prepara-
tion of a "rural convention" to
organize a "new life in the coun-
tryside."
In rural areas, the Viet Cong
claimed that "revolutionary admin-
istrations" had been set up in
all "liberated areas, new and old"
and that, since Tet, their con-
trol has been extended over an,
additional 1.6 million people and
600 hamlets.
The next step was the an-
nouncement that the National Al-
liance had been formed at a con-
gress of delegates on 20-21 April.
Saigon lawyer Trinh Dinh Thao was
identified as a leader of the al-
liance. Thao is a fairly prominent
Saigon attorney, who has been long
known as a leftist and has been
arrested several times on suspi-
cion of pro-Communist activities.
Thao and at
least six other Saigon intellec-
tuals had defected to the Commu-
nists shortly after Tet. Most of
the other six also had leftist:
connections, although one reportedly
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had been a staunch anti-Commu-
nist. The Communists could get
considerable propaganda mileage
out of the use of these six in
the alliance.
Saigon's Mobilization
President Thieu's general
mobilization bill is running into
some trouble in the National
Assembly, although most of the
legislators favor full mobiliza-
tion in principle. On 10 April
Thieu submitted to the Lower House
Page 5
a draft law which would give him
decree powers for stipulating
specific mobilization procedures,
but the Assembly seems unwilling
to give him such carte blanche.
The defense committees of both
houses are now working with Thieu
and various cabinet members to
draft a new bill which will spell
out in detail the steps for mobil-
ization and leave less to the dis-
cretion of the President. The
new draft law, which will also
take into account deferments for
essent:al personnel, should soon
be ready for debate in the Lower
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Apr 68
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LAO GOVERNMENT BRACES FOR COMMUNIST TERRORIST ATTACKS
Although the military situa-
tion has remained quiet in re-
cent weeks, there are some signs
that the Communists may attempt
a dramatic finale to an already
successful dry season offensive.
rumors of a widespread
offensive to celebrate the Lao-
tian New Year two weeks ago did
not materialize.
U:iusual Communist activity
in recent days, however, has led
government authorities to take
precautions. On 23 April an en-
emy commando team destroyed the
quarters of US and Lao officials
at Muong Soui, although the Amer-
icans escaped unharmed. In the
south, a Communist attack against
the town of Ban Lahanam appeared
to be targeted against the USAID
facilities in the area.
ing.
The rainy season, when the
Communists usually go on the de-
fensive, is about a month away,
and the enemy may want to add a
few victories to this year's im-
pressive list of successes before
calling it quits. Although there
is no evidence that a major new
offensive is in the offing, the
Communists do have the capability
of mounting one, or of launching
raids on government towns at a
time and place of their own choos-
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Apr 68
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Status of Provincial Governments, 25 April 1968
EJ Revolutionary Committee
11 Preparatory Group for Revolutionary
^ Military Control Committee
(M) Committee with Military Chairman
(C) Committee with Civilian Chairman
REVOLUTIONARY
DATE OF
REVOLUTIONARY
DATE OF
COMMITTEE
FORMATION
COMMITTEE
FORMATION
Heilungkiang (C)
31 Jan. 1967
Honon (C)
27 Jan. 1968
Shanghai (C)
5 Feb. 1967
Hopeh (C)
3 Feb. 1968
Kweichow (M)
14 Feb. 1967
Hupeh (M)
5 Feb. 1968
Shantung (C)
23 Feb. 1967
Kwangtung (M)
21 Feb. 1968
Shansi (C)
16 March 1967
Kirin (M)
6 March 1968
Peking (C)
20 April 1967
Kiongsu (M)
23 March 1968
Tsinghoi (M)
12 Aug. 1967
Chekiang (M)
24 March 1968
Inner Mongolia (M)
1 Nov. 1967
Hunan (M)
9 April 1968
Tientsin (C)
6 Dec. 1967
Ningxia (M)
10 April 1968
Kiangsi (M)
S Jon. 1968
Anhwei (M)
18 April 1968
Kansu (M)
24 Jan. 1968
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POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The political situation re-
mains tense in Peking, with no
clear trend in any direction.
Propaganda media continue to warn
against both a "rightist resur-
gence" and attempts to reinstate
officials disgraced and dismissed
earlier in the Cultural Revolu-
tion.
Despite this campaign, no
attacks have developed on contro-
versial provincial officials re-
habilitated in the past several
months, and in fact, once-dis-
graced officials are still being
restored to positions of autho-
rity. A new revolution committee
was formed in Anhwei Province on
18 April. Even though Anhwei has
been in the forefront of the anti-
rightist propaganda campaign, two
of its new vice-chairmen are
former party officials who had
been publicly denounced and dis-
missed from office in January
1967.
Provincial appointments have
not departed significantly from
the pattern of military domina-
tion in recent months, despite
the "revolutionary" turn in propa-
ganda. The three provincial com-
mittees set up in the past month--
Anhwei, Hunan, and Ningsia---are
all dominated by military fig-
ures, despite continued propa-
ganda admonishments that Red
Guard representatives and "'revo-
lutionary cadres" should play a
role equal to the military on
such committees.
Efforts to establish revolu-
tionary committees in provinces
in southwest and northeast China
appear to be making little prog-
ress.
The principal stumbling
block to revolutionary committees
in these areas appears to be the
objections of "conservative"
military figures who govern these
areas to the inclusion of "radi-
cal" civilian cadres in the pro-
vincial governments. Despite a
mid-March chastisement of top
Szechwan leaders by Madame Mao
and other Peking officials, con-
servative forces in Szechwan con-
tinue to exert heavy pressure on
radical. provincial leaders and
Red Guards. Posters in Peking
have reported that bitter fighting
in Shenyang earlier this month
was triggered by recent political
decisions concerning the province
considered unfavorable to the
"conservative" leaders of the Shen-
yang Military Region.
Elsewhere in China political
conflicts seem to be on the de-
cline, but there are still trouble
spots. Shantung just recently an-
in Shensi, Shansi, and Fukien rov-
inces in recent
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PYONGYANG INCREASES PRESSURE AGAINST SOUTH KOREA
The yearly spring wave of
North Korean pressure against the
south has apparently begun. Ten-
sion heightened along the Demili-
tarized Zone this week as the re-
sult of a series of small-scale
Communist attacks against US
and South Korean units, accom-
panied by belligerent propaganda.
Unlike earlier incidents this
year, which generally arose from
chance encounters between infil-
trating agents and security pa-
trols, the latest attacks appar-
ently were deliberately planned
and executed by the North Koreans.
This suggests that Pyongyang now
sees less need for the relative
restraint it has shown since the
Pueblo seizure, and that a more
aggressive North Korean posture
along the DMZ, including larger
scale incidents, may be expected.
The rise in tension along
the DMZ comes amid indications
that Pyongyang may be planning
a substantial increase in guer-
.J
rilla activity in the South
The North Koreans probably
hope their efforts will force
Seoul to divert resources from,
economic development to defense,
stimulate internal South Korean
differences and strain US-ROK
relations.
25X1X1
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Apr 68
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Political unease was evident in Eastern Europe during the week as
another meeting opened in Budapest to prepare for a "summit" confer-
ence of Communist parties in the fall.
Moscow intervened in Poland's factional struggle with a forceful
reiteration of support for Gomulka by the Russian ambassador in Warsaw.
The situation in Poland remains fluid and much tension is evident. It is
likely to stay this way for some time.
The initial phase of the Czechoslovak democratization process-the
replacement of conservative Novotny supporters by progressives-has been
completed. The second, and more difficult phase-meeting the public's and
party members' hopes and expectations-is beginning and the new regime
must show results in a relatively short time or become a target of
hostility.
Marshal Yakubovsky, Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact, vis-
ited Warsaw, East Berlin, Sofia, and Prague-apparently to discuss a pro-
posal to reorganize the Pact's command structure.
Soviet leaders fanned out across the country during the last two
weeks carrying the official word from the central committee meeting on
9-10 April to local party organizations. None of these follow-up statements
has been published, but they reportedly repeat Brezhnev's call for "iron
discipline" and, in explaining developments in Czechoslovakia, adhere
closely to the heavily expurgated versions that have appeared in the Soviet
press.
The May Day demonstrations in Western Europe this year will en-
compass a wider range of issues and popular protest movements than any
in the recent past. 'in addition to the traditional marches to urge labor
solidarity, various groups are planning demonstrations against such diver-
gent targets as the war in Vietnam, the government, university and busi-
ness "establishments," and the Greek junta. Sponsors include not only the
traditional trade union, Socialist and Communist groups but also such
disparate elements as anarchists and Catholic intellectuals in Spain, and the
amorphous "new left."
The Belgian political crisis continues, almost one month after the
inconclusive elections. Socialist Party leader Collard is trying to form a
coalition with caretaker Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants' Social Chris-
tians, whose internal split on the linguistic issue has just been thinly
papered over. The Liberals, at present, seem to prefer going into opposi-
tion rather than share reponsibility for coping with the linguistic issue.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA PREPARES TO ADOPT NEW POLICIES
Though still beset by fac-
tional problems the Dubcek regime
is preparing to implement domestic
reforms and is putting a new face
on Czechoslovak foreign policy.
Progressives and conserva-
tives clashed during regional
party conferences last weekend,
with three conferences recommend-
ing that an extraordinary party
congress be held before the end
of the year so that conservatives
can be removed from the central
committee. Three other confer-
ences advocated a more moderate
course, recommending that the
regular congress be convened some-
time in 1969. The four remaining
regional party organizations,
when they meet in the next few
days, will find themselves under
severe pressure to take a stand
on the controversial issue of
convening the party congress.
If these four also recommend
an extraordinary congress, Dubcek
will probably abandon his middle-
of-the-road position. He has thus
far, somewhat equivocally, opposed
such a congress and has emphasized
that there can be no witch-hunts
in the party. At one regional
conference on 20 April, he re-
peated earlier admonitions that
"one cannot improvise but must
study the problems" before acting.
The National Assembly con-
vened on 24-25 April to hear Pre-
mier Cernik present the govern-
ment's legislative program, which
is based on the just-approved
party action program. Newly
elected assembly chairman, Josef
Smrkovsky has promised speedy
enactment of a number of reforms.
Cernik also informed the as-
sembly of plans to improve bilat-
eral relations with the Scandina-
vian and other Western European
countries, thus giving some sub-
stance to earlier statements! that
Prague will play a more active role
in European affairs. He again em-
phasized that the German queotion
is the basic problem for Prague's
foreign policy, but his position
on improvement of relations with
Bonn was imprecise and somewhat
contradicted earlier statements.
i
Cernik was not as forthcoming
as Foreign Minister Hajek, who on
22 April hinted that Prague's sole
condition for "normalizing" rela-
tions is that Bonn declare the 1938
Munich agreement null and void from
its inception. The Czechoslo'vaks'
equivocation on the German qufstion
suggests that they accept the;ne-
cessity to move slowly on an issue
so sensitive in terms of Prague's
relations with the USSR and some
of the Eastern European states.
Nevertheless, the new regime
has already made clear that it will
stress self-interest in dealing
with Communist nations. On
17 April, Foreign Trade Minister
Vales publicly criticized CEMAand
indicated that Prague will seek to
loosen its economic ties with the
Communist states and trade more
with the West. The new attention
to self-interest has already lod
to an apparent conflict with the
USSR about the nature of the forth-
coming international Communist,
conference. Rude Pravo on 21 April
criticized previous world Commu-
nist conferences as restrictive:
and advocated "open" sessions for
the current Budapest preparatory
meeting as well as at the confer-
ence scheduled later for Moscow.
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POLISH PARTY FACTIONS LOCKED IN STRUGGLE
The struggle between contend-
ing Polish Party factions is be-
ginning to break into the open.
The first public clash took
place in a polemical exchange be-
tween the party daily Trybuna
Ludu--controlled by Interior Min-
i is er Moczar's hard-line elements-
and the moderate party weekly
Polityka. Apparently aiming at
provincial party boss Gierek's
"technocrats," Trybuna Ludu on 10
April charged Polityka with con-
sistently extolling the leading
role of the managerial class to
the detriment of the working
masses. Polityka rebutted these
charges on 19 April and implicitly
portrayed Moczar as the false
champion of the workers.
Hard-line Warsaw party chief
Kepa in a speech on 17 April pro-
vided further evidence of the
struggle. He praised the hard-
line-controlled press and ex-
tolled the "fresh breeze" blowing
through the party, presumably as
a result of the current purges.
Kepa also became the first party
spokesman to condemn the Polish
Catholic hierarchy for its support
of dissident student elements.
He said that some 80 officials--
mostly Jews--have been purged so
far, including 14 at the ministe-
rial and deputy ministerial level.
Kepa's figures clearly fall short
of the total number of those
purged. If the lower party and
state echelons are included the
victims may number in the hundreds.
The purges already have
shaken the entrenched party and
government bureaucracy, a result
which the ambitious, younger party
elements apparently welcome
seemingly without regard for its
consequences. The extent of the
purges is related to the differ-
ent factions' efforts to gain con-
trol of the party apparatus be-
fore the congress scheduled for
later this year. The first meet-
ing of a party commission to pre-
pare the draft guidelines for the
congress met in Warsaw on 22 April
under party boss Gomulka's chair-
manship.
Most Poles are uneasy about
the outcome of the political
struggle but have no role to play
and are at the same time apathetic.
The students had threatened to
resume protests on 22 April if
their demands were not met, but
did not do so. Most of them ap-
pear intimidated and confused,
but there are rumors that they
will attempt new demonstrations
during the regime-sponsored May
Day celebrations. Renewed un-
rest could give added impetus
to the party turmoil, and would
probably benefit the art 's
extremist factions.
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SWEDISH AIRCRAFT
J-35 DRAKEN
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SWEDEN ORDERS 175 VIGGEN AIRCRAFT
The Swedish Government has
ordered 175 Viggen aircraft for
its defense forces.. The total
value of the order is more than
2.2 billion Swedish Kroner (over
$440 million).
The Viggen is designed to be
a multimission combat aircraft
with short takeoff and landing
capabilities and a top speed of
over Mach 2 (twice the speed of
sound). It is still in the pro-
totype stage of development. De-
sign difficulties must be resolved
if the plane is to meet Swedish
expectations.
The takeoff and landing fea-
tures will permit deployment of
the Viggen in widely dispersed
sites and should improve the sur-
vivability of the force in the
event of a surprise attack.
When the Viggen project was
first authorized, the Royal Swe-
dish Air Force expected to pur-
chase 800 planes. Budget cutbacks
have, however, forced sharp re-
ductions in procurement.
The manufacturer of the air-
craft, SAAB, has been seeking
markets for the Draken, a fore-
runner of the Viggen that is now
deployed in the Swedish Air Force.
Foreign sales would help maintain
earnings until Viggen production
begins?
The first foreign sale of
the Draken was made last month,
when Denmark ordered 23 of the
Mach 2 fighters and obtained an
option to buy more. Austria,
which will be re-equipping its
air force in a few years, is an-
other :Leading prospect for sales.
With the Viggen purchase by
the Swedish Government and the
Draken sale to Denmark, SAAB of-
ficials believe they are in posi-
tion to intensify their export
efforts. Viggen sales to the
United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and
West Germany are being sought
even though all of these countries
have strong indigenous aircraft
industries.
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The Arab-Israeli theater has been generally quiet this week, although
sporadic exchanges of fire have occurred along the Israeli-Jordanian cease-
fire lines.
Jordan's call for a UN Security Council meeting on Jerusalem may
well result in a full-scale discussion of Israeli occupation policies. The
Jordanians not only intend to emphasize the provocative nature of Israel's
planned Independence Day celebrations in Jerusalem on 2 May but also
will call attention to earlier Israeli moves to establish sovereignty over the
Old City.
King Hassan of Morocco is concluding an 18-day visit to the Middle
East-long-planned official visits to Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia with
brief stops in Egypt and Tunisia. He apparently views the trip as a way to
increase his stature at home and abroad, improve relations with the
moderate Arabs, and contribute to Islamic unity. Hassan may renew his
efforts of last fall to hold an Arab summit meeting in Rabat, if discussions
with Faysal, Nasir, and Bournediene prove promising.
In Athens Greek Orthodox Easter celebrations caused postponement
until this weekend of some parts of the regime's celebration of its first
year in power. The government did, however, take the opportunity to
praise the accomplishments of the 21 April :revolution, to announce some
new "reforms," and to revile the statements of regime opponents and
former premiers Papandreou and Kanellopoulos. Premier Papadopoulos
again emphasized the "harmful" aspects of the continued suspension of
major US military aid.
On 22 April the Indian cabinet ratified the decision not to sign the
Nonproliferation Treaty in its present form. Claiming that the treaty lacks
strong security assurances, the Indians remain determined to reject it
despite demarches from the US and USSR and at the risk of forfeiting
foreign aid for developing India's nuclear em;r ro ram.
In Congo (Kinshasa) the imminent arrival of Soviet diplomats will
mark the first time. in almost five years that the two countries have had
diplomatic relations. President Mobutu twice before had expelled the
Soviets for meddling in Congolese affairs.
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RISING PRESSURE ON LAGOS TO END NIGERIAN WAR
Despite Tanzania's recogni-
tion of Biafra and rising African
pressures to call a halt to the
fighting, federal leader Gowon ap-
pears determined to press on mili-
tarily until the secessionist Ibo
regime agrees to accept its place
in Nigeria's new state structure.
Federal forces in the field, how-
ever, are presently having trouble
handling well-organized Biafran
resistance.
Federal troops in the Onitsha
area have made no progress for
some time and have had to deal
with Biafran infiltration into
the Mid-West aimed at the supply
lines to Asaba. Meanwhile, Col-
onel Muhammed, a free-wheeling
hard-line Northerner who is the
field commander in the area, has
been in Lagos for consultations
for the past month and reportedly
is resisting pressures to return
to Onitsha and renew the offen-
sive. On 23 April, unknown to
his superiors, Muhammed flew to
London, possibly to buy the arms
he feels are not being supplied
him.
It now seems likely that
Gowon will urge his field com-
manders to push for Port Harcourt.
The federal army division in the
southern area, however, is having
considerable difficulty in moving
against well-organized Biafran
regulars. Federal troops attack-
ing Arochuku were forced back
across the Cross River to Ikot
Okporo and suffered heavy losses.
Federal troops, however, did suc-
ceed in seizing Afikpo, a provin-
cial center just north of the
Cross River, and may be attempt-
ing to link up with troops mov-
ing south from Abakaliki.
Although no other country
has followed Tanzania's recog-
nition action, several African
leaders are becoming increasingly
impatient with what they regard
as Gowon's intransigence on peace
talks. The presidents of Ivory
Coast, Senegal, Zambia, and Congo
(Kinshasa) now are seeking ways
to persuade Lagos to agree to a
cease-fire--a development the
Biafra regime insists is essen-
tial to meaningful peace talks.
Lagos, for its part, has severed
diplomatic relations with Tan-
zania and appears prepared to do
the same with any other country
which recognizes Biafra.
Nevertheless, Lagos' concern
and nervousness is manifest in
both its efforts to bring the
war quickly to a successful con-
clusion and in the sending of the
foreign minister to London to con-
tact other potential intermediaries,
notably British officials and the
Commonwealth Secretariat.
Prospects for talks of any
kind, however, remain dim. Biafran
leader Ojukwu's latest public state-
ment has raised additional poten-
tially complicating conditions be-
yond the demand for an immediate
cease-fire. Gowon, who has his
own hard-liners to consider is un-
likely to halt the fighting be-
fore certain key objectives are
reached, if then
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SCENE OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
,Tort Harcourt
' e Bonny
Makurdi
Abakaliki
fik o ~+"'~57
3 1 A VR A
FERNANDO P(
(SP.)
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SOMALI ARMY WANTS MORE SOVIET ARMS
Somali Defense Minister Guled
plans a 25-day visit to Moscow
beginning on 30 April to request
military equipment in addition
to what Somalia has already re-
ceived under the 1963 Somali-
Soviet arms agreement. Prime
Minister Egal apparently bowed to
army pressure for more arms
although receiving them could
undermine his carefully nurtured
detente policy toward Ethiopia
and Kenya.
The army has been unhappy
with Egal, primarily because he
wishes to de-emphasize the posi-
tion of the army and divert the
financial savings gained thereby
into badly needed economic develop-
ment. Egal has so far required
the army to give up training and
equipping Somali insurgents oper-
ating in Ethiopia and Kenya. The
army has also suffered a cut of
some 3,500 to 4,000 men, and under
pressure from Egal, has reluctantly
undertaken a civic action program
to avoid a budget cut.
Moreover, army commandant
General Siad has been agitating
in government circles, charging,
that Ethiopia, through arms pur-
chases and other acts, has taken
advantage of Egal's detente to
gain military and political ad-
vantages. Siad's campaign seems
to have had an effect. President
Abdirascid, badgered by the de
fense minister, in early April
said that when Egal returned from
a month abroad a complete review
of Somali military policy would,
take place. The decision to ask
for more arms appears to be the re-
sult of this review, and for polit-
ical reasons Egal apparently
has acquiesced.
A new Soviet arms agreement,
once it became generally known,
would adversely affect the current
detente between Somalia and its
neighbors. Further Soviet arms
aid would probably be viewed less
alarmingly in Kenya, but would
serve only to harden Ethiopia's
long-standing skepticism of Egal's
policy and make any further
accommodation between the two
countries even more difficult.
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TRIBAL TENSIONS HIGH IN SIERRA LEONE AFTER ARMY MUTINY
An intense struggle for po-
litical control has developed be-
tween Sierra Leone's two dominant
tribal groups in the aftermath of
the overthrow on 18 April of the
ruling junta by mutinous army rank
and file.
The mutineers, who were moti-
vated chiefly by desire for per-
sonal gain, apparently rebelled
because they believed the ruling
officer clique was enriching it-
self while neglecting the ranks.
They were probably encouraged to
revolt by supporters of the ban-
ned All People's Congress (APC)--
dominated by northern Temne tribes-
men--and by members of the former
ruling party of ex - prime minister
Margai--mostly southern Mende
tribesmen.
After arresting virtually all
members of the junta and other top
army and police officers, the mu-
tineers established a 14-man "ser-
geants' junta" and promised an
early return to civil government.
Although heavy firing occurred in
Freetown, casualties appear to
have been minimal. A seven-man
National Interim Council, composed
of army and police personnel, was
created to perform the functions
of government. Colonel Bangura,
a popular northerner who joined
APC party leader Siaka Stevens in
exile in Guinea last month, was
recalled to head the council and
to take command of the army.
Political maneuvering for
advantage with the new junta by
the Temne and Mende factions rap-
idly escalated into a major con-
frontation. Temne politicians,
working with Bangura, attempted
to develop a climate favorable
for Stevens' assumption of power.
Mende politicians, asserting
that they would meet with force
any arbitrary transfer of power
to Stevens, also endeavored to
influence the new ruling group.
They particularly encouraged
Lieutenant Colonel Genda, a Mende
and the deputy army commander,
to oppose the moves of Bangura.
With tensions at a fever
pitch,, a compromise agreement
was reached between the two fac-
tions on 22 April, under which
both sides agreed to convene the
parliament elected in March 1967
but not convened because of army
intervention. The parliament
would choose a new prime minister
to form a national government.
The Mendes probably agreed be-
cause they hope political inde-
pendents and the paramount chiefs
will support their candidate for
the premiership. The Temnes prob-
ably believe they can elect Stevens
by insisting that several of the
Mendes guilty of election fraud
be disqualified from parliament.
An uneasy peace now prevails,
but the possibility of conflict
along tribal lines still remains.
Stevens holds the advantage but
runs the risk of provoking inter-
vention by Mende troops unless he
is wi:Lling to form a coalition
government which will include
members of that tribe. The most
immediate problem is to restore
public; order. A lack of an of-
ficer corps in the army and po-
lice, has allowed discipline to
break down, and unruly troops
and security forces pose serious
problems.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The tranquility that has prevailed generally throughout Latin America
during the last two weeks is being threatened by increasing political
agitation and disquietude in a number of countries.
Minor incidents may materialize from demonstrations or meetings in
connection with May Day, traditionally an occasion in Latin America for
Communists and leftists to try to embarrass the authorities by staging
workers' parades and rallies. May Day observances in the hemisphere have
been fairly tame affairs in recent years, but electoral and other emotional
political issues this year have somewhat increased the possibilities of
disorders in several countries.
In Brazil, both the Costa e Silva government and leaders of the
pro-Moscow Communist party are concerned that violence may occur if
students follow through with their plans for antigovernment demonstra-
tions on 1 May similar to those that swept the country about a month
ago. Workers in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and several other countries
also plan demonstrations. Latin American affiliates of the Communist
front World Federation of Trade Unions have been instructed to dedicate
their May Day activities this year to "the defense of Vietnam," but so far
only Mexican and Uruguayan groups are known to have developed specific
plans for activities with this theme.
Other political issues are raising tensions in several countries. Violence
could result from a mass rally being planned for 28 April in Santo
Domingo by leftist Dominican political groups to mark the third anniver-
sary of the US troop landings there. In Honduras last week, the country's
major labor federation joined with leaders of the opposition Liberal party
in angrily protesting President Lopez' failure to respond to their demands
for nullification of the results of the blatantly fraudulent municipal elec-
tions on 31 March and punishment of those responsible.
In Canada, Pierre Elliott Trudeau was installed as prime minister on
20 April, two days ahead of schedule, and proceeded three days later to
dissolve Parliament and call for elections on 25 June.
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CASTRO WIDENS ROLE OF CUBAN MILITARY
In four major speeches during
the past five weeks, Fidel Castro
has been mainly preoccupied with
the Cuban economy and with the
lack of response to his calls for
greater sacrifice and productivity.
His speeches on 13 and 15 March
were stern lectures to city dwell-
ers for their "counterrevolution-
ary" tendencies. They also out-
lined Castro's idealized concept
of a moneyless, arcadian utopia
in Cuba. The tenor of these
speeches is in great contrast to
his theme a year ago, when he
was aggressively proclaiming his
advocacy of revolution in Latin
America.
the most elementary duty of every
citizen."
These martial decrees em-
phasize Castro's determination to
go forward with his radical "revo-
lutionary offensive" launched on
13 March when most small busi-
nesses were nationalized and all
bars and night clubs on the is-
land closed. In addition, the
move reflects Castro's growing
inclination to rely on his trusted
companions from the 26th of July
Movement and the struggle a decade
ago against Batista. He announced
on 19 April that all 91 of the
top-level officers recently pro-
moted were members of this group.
In his speech on 19 April
Castro announced measures designed
to expand considerably the role
of the armed forces in organizing
the Cuban economy. He revealed
that agricultural brigades are
being organized by the military
and that civilian and military
responsibilities will increasingly
be merged.
Special "induction centers"
have been opened with the imme-
diate objective of detailing
50,000 youths to three-year semi-
military stints in agricultural
areas of Camaguey Province. Others
who probably would not normally
have been inducted into military
service are likely to be sent to
other provinces. Castro also an-
nounced that military instruction
will be a part of the curriculum
for all students in Cuba and said
that "the bearing of arms will be
In a speech on 9 April Castro
appeared to be trying to mollify
his urban audience by praising
the past role of the urban popula-
tion in the Cuban revolution.
This gesture may have resulted at
least to some extent from growing
discontent in urban areas follgw-
ing the austerity measures decreed
in Ma
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Castro's dogmatic insistence
on restoring momentum to the revo-
lution through "moral incentives"
and military discipline is certain
to create further discontent. It
is unlikely, however, that this un-
rest will be translated into any
political threat so long as the
military remains loyal to Castro.
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NEW ELEMENTS ENTER ECUADOREAN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
Former President Jose Maria
Velasco charges that Interim Presi-
dent Otto Arosemena signed pacts
which will favor rightist candidate
Camilo Ponce in the 2 June presiden-
tial elections in which Velasco is
considered front runner.
In an attempt to refute Velas-
co's claims, Arosemena revealed on
11 April that in November 1966, when
he was parlaying leadership of a
small but strategic bloc of constit-
uent assembly deputies into his se-
lection as interim president, he
had agreed to name representatives
of certain parties to his cabinet.
His admission of the one pact may
have increased the public's willing-
ness to believe in the existence of
others, purported copies of which
Velasco gave to the press. In these
alleged agreements, conservative and
rightist independent deputies ac-
cepted Arosemena's timetable for re-
maining in office until 1 September
1968 in return for his administra-
tion's support for them in their
own provinces. Charging that Aro-
semena also promised electoral aid
to rival candidate, Camilo Ponce,
Velasco says that if he is defeated
by this "electoral fraud" he will
call for revolution. US officials
comment that the recently stepped-
up and well-organized violence
against Ponce rallies may be the
work of hired Communist hoodlums.
"IN EVERY SITUATION, LADIES
AND GENTLEMEN, THERE IS AN
ESSENCE WHICH IS THE ONE THAT
MUST BE UNDERSTOOD, WHICH MUST
BE STUDIED AND THERE IS A SEA
OF ACCIDENTAL THINGS WHICH CAN,
AT TIMES, INFLUENCE THE ESSENCE
OF THE MATTER, BUT MANY TIMES
THESE CAN BE IDLE OR MEANING-
LESS THINGS THAT MUST BE SEPA-
RATED. AND THE SAME WAY WITH
A MAN OR POLEMIST WHO IS RE-
SPECTED--HE CANNOT ATTRIBUTE
PO HIS ADVERSARY ALL SORTS OF
FANTASIES IN ORDER TO STRIKE
WITH ALL ELOQUENCE AGAINST THE
PHANTOM, EVEN THOUGH THAT PHAN-
TOM DOES NOT EXIST IN HIS ADVER-
SARY...."
--Jose Maria VeZasco,
Ecuadorean presidential
candidate
valid:Lty of the 2 June elections
will be compromised.
Ponce has been overshadowed
in this controversy, which has re-
vived Velasco's campaign. Mean-
while, third-running Andres Cordoba,
the candidate of the center left,
has recently gained surprising mo-
mentum in the important coastal
area. His gains are due largely
to efforts of Guayaquil Mayor Assad
Bucaram, who has political ambitions
of his own. This development could
work against Velasco. The remain-
ing three candidates--representing
the extreme right, the Communist
party, and the Unified Psychedelic
Cybernetic movement--remain largely
window dressing.
Arosemena has thus far skill-
fully rebutted the charges contained
in Velasco's spellbinding but fre-
quently incoherent speeches. If
the later pacts are proven genuine,
however, the Arosemena government
will be seriously weakened and the
In the increasingly uneasy
atmosphere, Arosemena has thus far
ignored warnings from civilian and
military officials and from demo-
cratic: labor leaders that he should
withdraw approval of the meeting
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of the Communist Latin American
Permanent Congress of Labor Unity
(CPUSTAL), scheduled to begin on
26 April in Quito. A Chilean
Communist labor leader is already
on the scene to organize the meet-
ing and has told leaders of the
Communist-dominated Ecuadorean
Labor Confederation (CTE) that he
would like to establish CPUSTAL
headquarters in Ecuador. The cTE
hopes to use the meeting to stir
up demonstrations during labor;
celebrations on 1 May. With pc-
litical tensions rising, some trio-
lence could result.
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KILLING OF GUATEMALAN RIGHTIST LEADER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS'
The assassination of a right-
ist terrorist leader by security
forces in Guatemala City may cause
new problems for the Mendez gov-
ernment.
Raul Lorenzana, a ringleader
in the kidnaping of Archbishop
Casariego last month, was executed
by government forces on 18 April.
One of Lorenzana's aides was also
killed. Oliverio Castaneda, a
leader of the civilian counterin-
surgency groups in Zacapa Depart-
ment, was seized but later released.
Lorenzana's death may stimu-
late renewed plotting against
President Mendez by rightist ter-
rorist groups. On the other hand,
the summary execution may point
up the security forces' determina-
tion to deal harshly with right-
ist counterterrorists and deter
the rightists from some of their
more blatant extralegal activities.
The fact that Lorenzana and
Castaneda were meeting points p
the problem that President Mendez
will have in dealing with the
clandestine counterinsurgent
groups. If the president takes
no action against them, they are
likely to continue their counter-
terrorist activity. If he moves
too rapidly in disbanding them4
however, the rightists and the{
military may begin more active!
coup plotting.
The Communist Rebel Armed
Forces (FAR) apparently believe
that the recent military changes
and Lorenzana's death probably'
mean the end, or at least the mod-
eration, of the government's re-
pression against them.
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