THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Evolution of Soviet Collective Leudershi~i
Secret
N ?_ 4 5
22 March 1968
No. 0012/68A
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THE EVOLUTIO~J OF SOVIET COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP
The Soviet leadership has now survived more
than three and a half years without major changes
in its composition or in the way it functions. One
reason for this is simply the personalities that
make up the politburo: no single leader has the
combination of desire and political strength neces-
sary to dominate the political scene as did Khru-
shchev. Moreover, none has seemed to favor policies
that carry the chance of big gains or big losses,
and the system of shared power has reinforced this
individual conservatism.
Thus, the collective system, as clumsy and in-
adequate as it is, has shown itself to be practi-
cable in the present circumstances. The men who
work within it can and do make policy decisions,
and the system has had enough "give" to enable the
political fortunes of some top figures to advance
while others receded. The system has not, how-
ever, been put to the test of a major foreign or
domestic failure, nor has it had to deal with the
problem of the death of one of the top leaders.
Until collectivity shows that it can survive a
"crisis" of this magnitude, it must be considered
temporary. In the meantime, it will probably con-
tinue as the system best suited to the men and to
the power relationships at the top of the hierarchy.
The Men in the Kremlin
Within the politburo there
have been adjustments in assign-
ments and shifts in power rela-
tions since Khrushchev's removal,
but the membership of this top
policy-making body--especially
its full or "voting" members--
has changed very little in the
past two years. Several appoint-
ments were made in the early
months of the new regime. "Old
Bolshevik" Mikoyan, Khrushchev's
closest mentor, retired in Decem-
ber 1965, and in April 1966 Arvid
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Pelshe replaced Nikolay Shvernik,
who was 78 years old and all but
inactive. This stability is
largely a result of a political
standoff. The younger members
with ambition and promise have
been pushed into the background
or maneuvered into positions of
little power while the older men
at the top lack the ambition or
the power to attempt to take
over all reins of control.
General Secretary Brezhnev's
confidence and authority have
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grown over the past three years
and he has been able to remove
rivals from the party secretariat,
the powerful executive arm of the
party. His supporters--mainly
past and present members of the
Ukrainian party organization, such
as party secretary Kirilenko--form
an impressive plurality within
the politburo. In addition,
Brezhnev has put a number of his
associates in key party and gov-
ernment posts at lower levels.
Nevertheless, he appears willing
to work within the system of
shared power and it is doubtful,
even if he so desired, that he
has the stuff to become another
Khrushchev or Stalin.
Among the younger members
of the politburo, the one man who
seemed to have the necessary com-
bination of opportunity, ambition,
and leadership qualifications--ex-
KGB chief Shelepin--apparently did
make a bid to topple the old guard
in 1965. Polyansky and Mazurov,
the two other aspiring younger mem-
bers of the politburo, hold posi-
tions as first deputy premiers and
are thus less well placed to chal-
lenge Brezhnev. They may, how-
ever, be competing for Kosygin's
job. Polyansky is ambitious, a
hard liner on many policy issues,
and a seemingly close ally of
Brezhnev. Mazurov appears to be
cast more in the Kosygin mold.
Kosygin has proved a compe-
tent premier and is widely re-
spected in both government and
party circles, but he does not
seem to have either the background
in party work or the desire to
step into the top political po-
sition. Ideologist Suslov, a
20-year veteran of the party sec-
retariat, wields considerafle in-
fluence within the present lead-
ership, particularly on matters
of Communist faith and morals.
He is reported to have remained
largely aloof from party organi-
zational matters, however, and is
perhaps too doctrinaire in out-
look to command wide support.
Podgorny may harbor ambitions,
but he is hampered by his assign-
ment to the largely ceremonial
post of president and by his de-
clining health. In fact, all
four senior members appear to
have medical problems of varying
degree.
Modus Operandi
The group that ousted Khru-
shchev in October 1964 reinstated
the system of collective leader-
ship in which members of the po-
litburo share--although not
equally--in formulating policy.
Lenin devised the system; Stalin
ignored it. Khrushchev paid lip
service to it but increasingly
violated it toward the end of his
tenure. In fact, his tendency to
bypass his politburo colleagues
on controversial issues was a ma-
jor factor in uniting them against
him. According to a Soviet polit-
ical handbook published last sum-
mer, the central committee plenum
in October 1964 decided that the
posts of party first secretary and
of premier would not again be held
by one man as they were under
Khrushchev. An agreement to fore-
swear the Khrushchev style of
leadership was probably necessary
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to bring the main plotters together
and to rally enough politburo sup-
port to oust Khrushchev.
As a constitutional guaran-
tee, this is a slender reed and
one that can obviously be abro-
gated by some future strong man,
but the agreement is a step toward
the creation of an institutional
sanction to regulate political in-
terplay within the leadership.
Khrushchev's successors have had
to improvise as they went along
in order to work out procedures
and a code of conduct to protect
collectivity, which most, if not
all, have a vital personal stake
in maintaining. With the passage
of time, the various ad hoc ar-
rangements and informal under-
standings probably have become
more binding and less subject to
individual manipulation.
The present leadership has
been much more scrupulous than
Khrushchev in observing the "norms
of party life." The division of
responsibilities between individ-
uals and between branches of the
party and government are more
clearly defined. The distinction
between the party's guiding,
checking role and the government's
administrative functions has also
been made more clear. Central com-
mittee plenums are held more or
less within the time limits set
by the party statutes, and the
top governing bodies meet fairly
regularly--the politburo once a
week.
There is only fragmentary in-
formation on the inner workings of
this body, but its approval is re-
quired on all important matters
as well as on a large number of
seemingly trivial questions. Rec-
ommendations and position papers
are submitted to the politburo
after an elaborate process of co-
ordination by interested minis-
tries and party departments. An
effort is apparently made to
reach unanimous agreement among
all 11 members of the politburo.
If this is not possible, the mi-
nority view may be overridden.
Brezhnev chairs politburo
meetings and presumably his opin-
ion carries greater weight than
any of the others. Judging by
the men who have been given key
jobs recently, he clearly has an
important voice on matters affect-
ing party organization and assign-
ment of party personnel. Despite
the efforts to coordinate even
small details of official policy
positions and the fairly careful
observation of accepted codes of
procedure, however, it is clear
that differences of views, politi-
cal rivalries, and the consider-
able overlapping of responsibil-
ities among members of the polit-
buro all create strain within the
leadership. Friction between
Brezhnev and Kosygin, for in-
stance, is reported to have arisen
over a number of issues.
The composition of the polit-
buro now more closely reflects
and is responsible to the power
relationships among the major
interest groups in the country.
The party apparatus, government
bureaucracy, agricultural inter-
ests, and the military - defense
industry complex all seem to have
men on the politburo to whom they
can look to represent their views.
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This has favored both stability
and orthodoxy. In contrast to
Khrushchev, who was constantly
waging war against one bureau-
cratic element or another in his
effort to get things moving his
way, the present leaders appear
less willing to offend any of the
big interest groups.
Collective leadership by its
very nature has meant hesitation,
procrastination, and compromise,
These charactistics appear to be
more marked now than during the
first year of the present leaders'
rule.
Domestic Programs--Yesterday
and Today
When the current leadership
took over from Khrushchev, it let
loose a flurry of legislative
activity. Some of this merely
involved undoing what Khrushchev
had done, but several new programs
were put forward and a few of
these seemed well designed to
put the affairs of the country
and the party back in order after
Khrushchev's tinkering. "Busi-
nesslike" would be a fitting label.
An ambitious agricultural
program was launched in March
1965. It aimed at combining mas-
sive investments with reform in
the pricing and the procurement
systems. This program, unlike
Khrushchev's earlier, hoped-for
panaceas, promised a serious,
long-range attack o:n Soviet agri-
cultural ills.
In October, the long-dis-
cussed economic reform for the
industrial sector was approved.
It gave plant managers greater
authority at the expense of cen-
tral planners and made profit an
important indicator of economic
performance. This reform repre-
sented an assortment of painful
compromises and did not really
attack the roots of the problem,
but it is slowly being put into
operation and has had a limited,
though beneficial, effect on the
economy. The most difficult phase
of economic reform, however, still
lies ahead.
It was also during 1965 that
the regime renewed Khrushchev's
pledge to draft a new constitu-
tion and revived the idea of call-
ing a collective farm (kolkhoz)
congress to amend the kolkhoz
charter. This charter had been
drawn up in 1935 as a model to
be followed by all collective
farmers. There was considerable
debate in the press about what
the new charter should be like,
and about the advantages and dis-
advantages of a proposal--advanced
by Brezhnev in early 1966--to es-
tablish a hierarchy of elective
unions to manage the collective
farms. The kolkhoz union idea
has long been favored by the
Ukrainian farm lobby and its spokes-
men in the politburo; it has been
strongly opposed by the Ministry
of Agriculture and by the Belorus-
sian party organization, which
tend to favor unified state con-
trol over both collective and
state farms.
These politically charged
debates on the constitution and
on the organization and management
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of kolkhozes have extended to
related questions basic to the
future course of the Soviet sys-
tem. Although not promoted by
the leadership, collectively or
individually, this discussion was
at least tolerated. In any event,
there were new ideas in the air
and the belief prevailed that the
new regime would not only carry
on the liberalizing trends that
were evident under Khrushchev but
might even do a better job of it.
The collective farm charter was
to have been drafted by late 1966.
The constitution, according to
Brezhnev, would be ready in time
"to crown" the 50th anniversary
celebration in November 1967.
By late 1965 and early 1966,
however, this sense of movement
and searching in Moscow began
to give way to an atmosphere of
increasing orthodoxy and concern
with domestic discipline. The
retirement in December 1965 of
President Mikoyan, the man who
came closest to being a spokesman
for the intellectual community,
was a kind of watershed.
The Growing Orthodoxy in Soviet
Policy
The international situation
certainly contributed to the
growing orthodoxy in Soviet
policy. The Soviets decided to
respond to the United States'
stepped-up military involvement
in Vietnam. with their own firm
commitment to Hanoi (something
Khrushchev had avoided}. Fear
of a Chinese Communist military
threat and the Middle East crisis
last summer have given the spokes-
men for the military and the de-
fense industry more powerful
voices in policy-making circles,
particularly when it comes to a
question of allocating resources.
The heightening international
tension also proved a boon for
other conservatives who oppose
steps toward detente with the
West and favor greater discipline
at home.
With the atmosphere not con-
ducive to the. cause of reform-
minded moderates, their position
in the leadership has~been
weakened. Kosygin has come to
have less influence than Brezhnev,
who has shown himself ready to
listen to the military. Brezh-
nev has been careful to stay
close to the center of opinion
in the politburo, and that center
is considerably more to the con-
servative side than it was at
the time of Khrushchev's ouster.
Another reason for the lead-
ership's recent stand-pat approach
was its concern with presenting
a facade of national unity during
the 1967 jubilee year. Meaningful
debate on almost all issues vir-
tually disappeared from the So-
viet press and official attacks
mounted against proponents of
further decentralization of eco-
nomic management. Although the farm
debate seems to have resumed since
the celebrations, the basic issues
still appear to be unresolved and
no new date for a collective farm
congress has yet been set. The
commission to draft a new consti-
tution apparently did not survive
the jubilee year and may have been
disbanded. The leadership in its
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present conservative frame of
mind is obviously content to
live with the old "Stalin consti-
tution" of 1-936.
Even during the jubilee year,
perenially thorny issue of re-
source allocations. Some aspects
of the budgets and plans announced
in October were left hazy, but
the basic decision was made to
sacrifice long-range investment
goals in agriculture--and to some
extent in industry as well--in
order to meet increased military
and consumer appetites. Although
this brought an immediate public
outcry from Polyansky, the polit-
buro member with primary responsi-
bility for agricultural policy, he
may not be able to do anything
more than complain for the time
being, given the good harvests of
the past two years and the
strength of the farces lined up
against him.
The Yegorychev Incident
The jubilee year was also
marred by the Middle East crisis,
which apparently occasioned an
attack by Moscow party boss
Yegorychev on the leadership's
handling of the crisis. Although
there have been a number of re-
ports about what he said, none
can be fully verified. It is
probable that Yegorychev argued
that the country's defenses
were flabby and in no shape to
respond effectively in the crisis.
The four senior members of
the politburo--Brezhnev, Kosygin,
Podgorny, and Suslov--worked closely
together during and immediately
after the crisis, and appeared to
be in agreement on the course to
be taken; but Brezhnev, at least,
may have been shaken by Yegory-
chev's criticism and the support
that it garnered. Yegorychev was
summarily removed from his Moscow
post, and steps were apparently
taken to correct the situation
that he is reported to have com-
plained of in the armed forces.
A desire of the top four to avoid
further criticism on this issue
may have played a part in their
willingness later on to listen
more closely to the military at
budget time.
An additional complicating
factor in the Yegorychev case was
his probable association with
politburo member Shelepin and his
"Komsomol group." This connection
raises the possibility that Ye-
gorychev's fall was part of a
gradual campaign on Brezhnev's
part to break up Shelepin's group
and to neutralize h' lly.
the 25X1
senior leaders--and Brezhnev in
particular--were concerned about
Shelepin's factional political
activity: he wanted Brezhnev's
job. Nevertheless the views of
the Shelepin group--or what are
thought to be their views: es-
pousal of a more militant foreign
policy and stress on discipline,
efficiency, and centralized
administration at home--retain
wide support in important party
and government circles.
This platform's appeal would
explain why the majority of the
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politburo, at every step in the
process of weeding out the Kom-
somol clique, at the same time
seemed to move to adopt the views
and methods of those being ousted--
witness the Yegorychev case. The
pattern can be seen as far back
as December 1965, when Shelepin
lost his party-state control post
while at the same time Mikoyan, the
liberals' best advocate, retired
and the moderate-minded Pod-
gorny was kicked upstairs to the
presidency. Little by little,
Brezhnev has gravitated toward
the conservative side. It is ob-
vious that he has not felt the
same pressures from the moderate
wing.
Looking Ahead
The present collective system
will probably continue to result
in policy decisions that are or-
thodox and unimaginative. The
prospects for the system itself
hinge to a large extent on mat-
ters of chance. The strongest
argument for its continuing is
simply the fact that it has sur-
vived for three and a half years
without significant change. On
the other hand, it is still an
"unnatural" way of managing po-
litical power in the Soviet Union
and it has not had to face either
a major policy failure or the
removal of one of the top lead-
ers. A test on one or both of
these scores, however, may not be
far off .
There were a flurry of rumors
during the winter that Kosygin
would soon leave the political
scene. Most of the reports say
that he will retire, citing poor
health and dissatisfaction with
the trend of thinking on the
politburo as the reasons. As for
the latter factor, it would appear
that as long as the economy con-
tinues to move ahead, Kosygin will
stay on the job. He probably
plays the most important role at
present in maintaining the deli-
cate power balance at the top.
Should he step down, his moderat-
ing influence would be lost and
the political balance might be
tipped in Brezhnev's favor, al-
though even this would not neces-
sarily spell the end of collective
leadership.
The growing ferment in East-
ern Europe, particularly in Czech-
oslovakia, is also likely to
test the cohesion of the Soviet
leadership. Thus far, ttlese
events seem to have reinforced the
retrograde tendency in Moscow.
The regime's first response has
been to tighten domestic controls
in an apparent effort to ensure
that the ferment does not spread
to the Soviet Union. As events
continue to unfold, however, ap-
prehension is likely to grow in
the Kremlin. If things go badly
for Moscow and the leadership
reacts indecisively, there would
be another powerful argument that
could be used against one or sev-
1 f the current leaders.
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