WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0
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Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Secret WEEKLY SUMMARY Secret 52 5 January 1968 No. 0001/68 1CPV C.7 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 SECRET (Information as of noon EST, 4 January 1968) Far East THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE VIETNAM Communist military forces violated the New Year's cease-fire with a record number of incidents and two malor attacks. F_ _j Hanoi this week strengthened its commit- ment to talk with the US in exchange for a bombing cessation. CAMBODIA SOFTENS STAND ON "HOT PURSUIT" In the face of mounting indications that allied forces might soon conduct ground operations into Cambodia, Sihanouk has made a series of moves designed to take some of the heat out of the crisis. JAPANESE-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROWING Trade between the Soviet Union and Japan reached an all-time high in 1967, and the two countries are dis- cussing the further expansion of economic relations. SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 SECRET Europe THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE SA-3 AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT INTRODUCED INTO EAST GERMANY 11 POLAND'S GOMULKA TACKLES PARTY :CNSTABILITY Year-end political developments in Poland indicate that party boss Gomulka is adopting a stern line against prevailing economic problems, public res- tiveness, and factional instability in the party. CZECHOSLOVAK LEADER HINTS AT ATTEMPTS TO MUDDLE THROUGH President and party boss Novotny appears to be seek- ing compromises in grappling with his domestic and party problems. TOP-LEVEL CEMA MEETINGS NOTE SLOW PROGRESS Recent Council of Mutual Economic Assistance meet- ings have stressed the standard theme of expanded economic cooperation in spite of continuing economic problems among member states. Multilateral activi- ties are to be increased, specifically in the estab- lishment of new industries, production specialization, and research activities. SECRET Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET Middle East - Africa THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15 NEW TENSIONS ARISE ON CYPRUS The Turkish Cypriots' creation of an administrative council to oversee the affairs of their community has aroused the ire of the Makarios regime. ALGERIA'S POLITICAL PACE QUICKENS The Boumediene regime is moving to restructure the National Liberation Front, to mold the country's only labor organization into an.arm of the party, and to tighten the command structure of the armed forces. The purging of disloyal elements can only enlarge the hitherto disunited opposition. PEACE EFFORTS RENEWED IN YEMEN The tripartite Arab committee on a peace settlement in Yemen has decided to set up an all-Yemeni com- mittee to prepare for a conciliation conference as the royalists apply more military pressure to the republican regime. INDIAN GOVERNMENT STRENGTHENED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 19 The Gandhi government has acted with uncharacteristic decisiveness in recent months, and the result has been an enhancement of the prime minister's political stature. Western Hemisphere THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 21 FIDEL CASTRO DELIVERS ANNIVERSARY SPEECH Fidel Castro spent the bulk of his anniversary speech on 2 January discussing Cuban internal developments, as is customary on this occasion. With regard to international problems, he reiterated Cuba's support of armed revolution and again criticized US "imperial- ism." SECRET Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 SECRET BRAZILIAN LABOR BECOMING RESTIVE A trade-union campaign against the government's restrictive wage law offers an easy target for ex- ploitation by Communists and other far leftists. PARAGUAY TIGHTENING UP ON DPPCSITION AGAIN The atmosphere of political liberalization that E!X- isted during last summer's constitutional convention in Paraguay appears to be deteriorating somewhat in the stress of the present presidential election cam- paign. LINES FIRMLY DRAWN FOR PANAMA'S ELECTIONS Opposing forces for Panama's presidential elections in May have solidified around two leading contenders, Arnulfo Arias, twice elected and twice ousted from the presidency, and former finance minister Samudio. Arias, now by far the stronger contender, is moving to ensure h:_s victory at the polls. SECRET Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET FAR EAST Hanoi has issued a less ambiguous statement of its position regarding talks following a cessa- tion of bombing in an effort to stimulate greater international and domestic pressure for US conces- sions. Foreign Minister Trinh's statement that Hanoi "will hold talks" with the US after an un- conditional halt in bombing and other "acts of war" against North Vietnam may have been timed to encour- age efforts to extend the cease-fire during the lu- nar new year in late January. North Vietnam's terms for a negotiated settlement remain unchanged. Chi- nese displeasure over Hanoi's move to appear more flexible on negotiations was evident in Peking's silence on Trinh's statement. Cambodia Chief of State Sihanouk has issued a flurry of statements designed both to deter ma- jor allied intrusions into Cambodia in pursuit of Vietnamese Communist forces and to warn the lat- ter to limit their presence in Cambodia. He has sought to gain time and greater maneuverability in dealing with this dangerous problem by indicating willingness to receive an American envoy and by distinguishing between US operations into isolated areas of Cambodia and intrusions into populated areas. Hanoi, Peking, and the National Liberation Front have attempted to exploit international at- tention to this "sanctuary" issue by promising support for Cambodia in the event of US "aggres- sion." SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12SEC 'x'79-00927AO06200040002-0 NORTH 2 VIETNAM Hued 1\\ SOUTH VIETNAM 100 MILES SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-R?P79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET VIETNAM The allied New Year's cease- fire was punctuated by a record 170 Communist-initiated incidents and two large-scale enemy attacks, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Most losses were suffered during a major Commu- nist attack on a US artillery po- sition in northern Tay Ninh Prov- ince. The multibattalion enemy attack in Tay Ninh was launched on the night of 1-2 January, well before the end of either the Communist or allied cease-fire periods. Two regiments of the Viet Cong 9th Division--the 271st and 272nd--struck a newly con- structed US artillery position just eight miles below the Cam- bodian border with mortar bar- rages followed by several unsuc- cessful. attempts to overrun the site. More than 380 enemy troops were killed and American losses totaled 23 killed and 153 wounded. identified as the 261st and 263rd-- shelled a South Vietnamese base camp. The intense enemy mortar and rocket bombardment was fol- lowed by ground assaults on the garrison. Before they were routed, the attackers lost 60 killed, reportedly including a battalion commander, while friendly losses in the action came to 19 killed and 48 wounded. As in the Christmas cease- fire period a week earlier, Com- munist forces in both North and South Vietnam were observed tak- ing advantage of the New Year's stand-down. Heavy truck. traffic was noted above the Demilitarized Zone. Since the end of the holiday respite and the resumption of ma- jor allied search-and-destroy op- 25X1 erations in Communist-dominated territory, contact with the enemy has been sporadic. Both Communist units in- volved had suffered heavy losses last October, but have been suf- ficiently reinforced, probably with North Vietnamese infiltra- tors, to mount an attack of this scope. It is possible that the attack was also designed to di- vert allied attention from a current movement of men and sup- plies along nearby infiltration routes. The second major enemy vio- lation of the cease-fire occurred in southern Dinh Tuong Province in the Mekong Delta where elements of two Viet Cong battalions-- SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 SECRET bombing of North Vietnam, but shows no sign of modifying its hard-line terms for a negotiated settlement. In a speech at a diplomats' reception last wee:{, Foreign Min- ister Nguyen. Duy T.rinh declared that his government "will" hold talks with Washington "about questions concerned" if the US unconditionally terminates the bombing and all other "acts of war" against North Vietnam. Ha- noi's previous position had been based on Trinh's statement of 28 January 1967 to the effect that there "could" be talks if the US took these actions. Hanoi on a Cessation Of Bombing Hanoi has publicly committed itself to begin talks with the US in return for an end to the This less ambiguous North Vietnamese position probably is designed to increase domestic and international pressure on the US for a bombing halt and an extension of the cease-fire dur- ing lunar new year later this month. An end to the attacks has long been a primary objec- tive of the Hanoi regime, and the original, offer a year ago was designed to achieve this without making any significant substantive concessions on a settlement of the war. The foreign minister avoided spelling out the timing or con- tent of any talks, but indicated that the basis for solving the Vietnam problem remained Hanoi's four points and the political program of the Liberation Front. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET CAMBODIA SOFTENS STAND ON "HOT PURSUIT" In the face of mounting in- dications that allied forces might soon conduct ground operations against Communist units utilizing Cambodia for sanctuary, chief of state Sihanouk has moved to take some of the heat out of the crisis. He announced to Western news- men last week that he would make a tacit distinction between US operations conducted in isolated areas of his country, where there was little likelihood that Cam- bodian personnel or property would be jeopardized, and Ameri- can probes in populous sectors. In the former case, his reaction would be passive and limited mainly to diplomatic protests against both the Communists and the US. He would send forces "im- mediately," however, to "repel" American units threatening harm to Cambodian property or people. Sihanouk probably believes his stand will deter any immediate American action along the heavily populated southern section of the Cambodian.-Vietnamese border, where the most serious consequences for his regime are likely to ensue if "hot pursuit" operations are un- dertaken. Moreover, by making known his willingness to discuss Cambodian.-US relations with an American "envoy," he doubtless hopes to head off cross-border operations while such talks are under way and until their outcome is clear. Sihanouk also sought to put additional pressure on'the Com- munist side. He blamed Soviet and Polish intransigence for the failure of efforts to strengthen the International Control Com- mission (ICC) and implied that their resistance was stimulated by the Vietnamese Communists. Sihanouk has long advocated the strengthening of the ICC both as a counterweight to the Communist presence along the border, and as an example of Cambodia's desire to remain "neutral." Meanwhile, the developing crisis has prompted Sihanouk to make changes in his government. He called for the resignation of the Son Sann "interim" cabinet, and asked Sirik Matak, who sub- sequently turned him down, to form a new government. Matak, the Cambodian ambassador to Japan, is considered pro-Western and conservative, and Sihanouk's in- terest in him may be one more in- dication that he is seeking to project a slightly more pro-West- ern stance. It is likely, nonetheless, that Sihanouk's softened position on the border issue during the past week mainly reflects his cur- rent appraisal of the power re- alities in the area and is not indicative of any genuine willing- ness to reach a real acc mmd on with the US. F_ i SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET JAPANESE-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROWING Trade between the Soviet Union and Japan reached an all-- time: high in 1967, and the two countries are discussing the fur- ther expansion of economic rela- tion.s. Assisted by the rapid growth in Soviet exports, total Soviet- Japanese trade in 1967 probably will reach some $600 million. This will surpass Japan's trade with Communist China, which was Tokyo's major Communist trading partner in 1966. Soviet exports of raw materials such as timber and metallic ores increased in 1967, although crude oil shipments dropped off because of the closure of the Suez Canal. The Soviets also increased purchases of ma- chinery, equipment,and consumer goods. New developments in trans- portation will also facilitate So- viet-Japanese economic relations. 'Pest shipments via the Trans-Siber- ian railroad are in progress for Japanese goods destined for Western Europe and the Middle East. Earlier this year, the two countries began direct flights between Moscow and Tokyo using Soviet aircraft. The Japanese hope eventually to gain onward rights to Western Europe using their own aircraft. Soviet-Japanese economic com- missions are studying several joint ventures for development of Siberia and natural gas fields in northern Sakhalin. The Soviets have shown some interest, for example, in Jap- anese assistance in exploiting un- derdeveloped copper and oil re- sources. Moreover, the Soviets have permitted some Japanese tech- In addition to these transac- tions arranged by the governments, private barter trade agreements also expanded. A potential $167- million deal is presently under negotiation involving the exchange of Soviet timber for Japanese plant and equipment to develop forestry resources along the Amur River over a five-year period beginning in 1969. Japan already has the largest business representation in Moscow of any non-Communist country, and the Soviets recently permitted a Japanese trading corporation to set up the first permanent non-Commu- nist trade office in Moscow. This privilege was also extended to other Japanese firms. nicians to tour western Siberia, but they are still reluctant to permit more than short visits., Problems persist, however, con- cerning credit terms and the kinds of goods to be exchanged. Moreover political problems related to a peace treaty and the return of the Kurile Islands are also likely to slow the development of joint So- viet-Japanese industrial ventures. SECRET Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 200611N2RC RD P79-00927A006200040002-0 EUROPE Factional discord, dissidence among intel- lectuals, economic problems, and alienation of youth are taxing both the Polish and Czechoslovak regimes. In Warsaw, the Gomulka administration seems to be preparing to reinstall rigorous con- trols in an effort to head off a crisis of confi- dence such as is now shaking Czechoslovakia. In Prague, party chief Novotny is still in charge, but his grip seems weaker, and a leadership shake- up could occur at a party central committee meet- ing reportedly scheduled to begin during the week of 2 January. Preparations continue for the Communist con- sultative conference in Budapest sch duled for February. high-ranking Italian, French, and Yugoslav party officials have consulted with their Hungarian counterpart in Buda- pest concerning the meeting. In Yugoslavia on 3 January, Rumania's Ceau- sescu and Yugoslavia's Tito also got together to discuss the meeting, which both oppose. They strongly believe that such Soviet-sponsored af- fairs tend to restrict their independence and erode Communist unity. These two held similar consulta- tions before individually declining to attend the April 1967 meeting of European Communist parties in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev's on-again, off-again trip to Cairo, which seemed to have been set for next week, has once more been postponed. There is no ready ex- planation for this most recent postponement, but the press of domestic business may have been important factor. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET SA-3 AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT INTRODUCED INTO EAST GERMANY The Soviets are installing equipment in SA-3 Goa surface-to- air missile (SAM) sites in East Germany, marking the first de- ployment of this air defense mis- sile system outside the USSR. bomber threat from Western Europe. 25x1 fective against aircraft at alti- tudes possibly as low as 500 feet. The poor performance of the SA-2 SAM against aircraft maneu- vering at low altitudes in Vietnam and the Middle East may also have influenced Moscow's decision to deploy the SA-3 in Eastern Europe. The Soviets probably decided to introduce the SA-3 into East Germany in an effort to counter more effectively the fighter- Page 11 SECRET In addition to contributing to the over-all defense of East Germany, the SA-3 sites are po- sitioned to provide point defense for Soviet tactical aircraft bases. More than 100 SA-3 sites have been identified in the So- viet Union since deployment be- gan in 1961. The system probably will go to Soviet forces in Poland and Hungary, and eventually might also be exported to the armed forces of Eastern Europe and other nations relying on Soviet militar aid. Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET POLAND'S GOMULKA TACKLES PARTY INSTABILITY Year-end political develop- ments in Poland indicate that party boss Gomulka is adopting a stern line against prevailinci economic problems, public res- tiveness, and factional insta- bility in the party. At the moment, elements favoring greater rigor appear to be in the as- cendancy, and there may be fur- ther personnel and organizational shifts in coming months more sig- nificant than the relatively low- level changes in recent weeks. Gomulka evidently has been working to reassert :ais control over the party since last summer, but postponed the first round of his personnel shifts until after the 50th anniversary of the Rus- sian revolution. His current moves, however, may have been spurred by the impact of wide- spread restiveness, which sur- faced after a meat price rise in late November. There are signs that the party leadership is becoming deeply concerned by the state of Poland's economy and its prospects. Economic problems thus may become the catalyst for expected future policy and personnel changes. The imposition in Warsaw on 23 December of the first death sentence in an espionage case since 1956 is the most telling recent indication that hard liners--who control the security apparatus--may be achieving their long-sought goal of a general. tightening of domestic policies. These nationalistic and anti- Semitic elements have been seek- ing to influence Gomulka, and since last June, have sought to exploit factional instability arising from the impact of the Middle East crisis in, Poland. Un- til now, their efforts had not re- sulted in any clearly demonstrable gains. The personnel shifts have involved the appointment of Jan Ptasinski, tough-minded former party boss of Gdansk Province, as ambassador to Moscow, and his re- placement by Stanislaw Kociolek, formerly party chief in Warsaw and long considered Gomulka's mouth- piece there. Other changes in- clude the political demise of Leon Kasman, veteran chief editor of the main party daily, and the ousters of the mayor of Warsaw and the local government chief in Lodz. These shifts-.-especially of Kasman, who is Jewish--have also renewed fears among the party's moderate Jewish segment that they will be targets of a gradual, future purge. Gomulka's recent moves, how- ever, probably are only the initial stages of a gradual process de- signed to construct a new factional balance in the party. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET CZECHOSLOVAK LEADER HINTS AT ATTEMPTS TO MUDDLE THROUGH Czech President and party boss Novotny appears to be seek- ing compromises in grappling with his domestic and party problems. In a New Year's day speech, he endorsed reinvigoration of the economic reform program, a stand that may help to blunt the thrusts of his liberal chal- lengers. Perhaps with these people in mind, Novotny once again gave his blessing to mak- ing use of "everything progres- sive.-including things-in the capitalist countries." The Czech- oslovak party leader, however, also threw a small bone to re- gime conservatives by aligning the future of the reform program with Prague's economic ties with the Soviet Union and the East European countries. Novotny attempted to allay popular fears of reform by play- ing down a series of price in- creases slated for the coming year, and indicated that in- creased wages would offset the over-all rise of retail prices. Novotny also suggested he has been able to smooth over his differences with Slovak leaders, at least temporarily. Novotny apparently believes he has bought them off with a resolution passed by the central committee in De- cember, which called for acceler- ation in the growth of the Slovak economy. Novotny's future rela- tions with the Slovaks will de- pend in part on how well he will be able to deliver on this prom- ise, but it is difficult to see how he could be paying more than lip service to Slovak desires for "equality." In sum, Novotny's speech seems to point to a continuing attempt on the leadership's part to muddle through its major problems, including the crisis of confidence within the party leadership. This, incidentally, is not yet over: a party plenum is reportedly scheduled to con- vene this month to discuss remedies for the critical Politi- cal situation. TOP-LEVEL CEMA MEETINGS NOTE SLOW PROGRESS Communiques issued by recent Council of Mutual Economic As- sistance (CEMA) meetings have stressed the standard theme of expanded cooperation in spite of continuing economic problems among member states. Multi- lateral activities are to be in- creased, specifically in the es- tablishment of new industries, production specialization, and research activities. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET The Council--the organiza- tion's policy-making organ--met from 12 to 14 December in Buda- pest, but presented no surprises. Agreements reportedly were adopted on mid-range economic planning, on further development of industrial specialization, and on financing scientific/tech.- nical research. The Executive Committee--which supervises ac- tivities of the organization-- met from 15 to 19 December to discuss coordination of two- and three-year plans. CEMA's most successful multi- lateral efforts to date have been of a technical nature. The Joint Freight Car Pool, estab- lished in 1964, has permitted more efficient use of freight cars. The Friendship Oil Pipe- line brings more than 80 percent of the total Soviet crude oil de- liveries to Poland, East Germany,) Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The Integrated Electric Power Sys- tem permits its members to cover peak power demands more ade- quately. During its long history, the organization has made some progress toward coordination of economic plans and conclusion of agreements on industrial specialization. An accommodation evidently was made during 1967 between Rumania and other members that should make it easier to establish multilateral CEMA projects in which all members do not wish to participate. More- over, in the past year progress has been made in expanding direct contacts among the producing, purchasing, and foreign trade agencies of various CEMA members. Despite these modest suc- cesses in multilateral coopera- tion, however, _Ln recent years bi- lateral Soviet ?- East European re- lations have been of greater im- portance within CEMA. This is in part the natural consequence of the overwhelming disparity in size and resources between the USSR and the smaller countries, which renders Moscow far more im- portant to them than they are to each other. Statements regarding the re- cent meetings reflect continuing differences of opinion on some economic issues. Disagreements over prices in Soviet - East Eu- ropean trade persist. Moreover, Soviet demands for East European credits for Soviet exploitation of raw materials have been re- ceived unenthusiastically by other members. Finally, Poland appar- ently has gained little support for its long-standing proposal for settling mutual accounts at least partly in gold or convertible cur- rency rather than by shipments of goods. SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA New strains have developed in several of the area's trouble spots, while in others there has been some forward movement. Greek Cypriot officials have reacted with predict- able rancor to the Turkish community's formal estab- lishment of an administrative council to oversee Turk- ish Cypriot affairs. The Makarios regime claims the move is illegal and has cautioned foreign ambassadors against contacts with the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Meanwhile, a hitch may be developing in the im- plementation of the Greek-Turkish troop withdrawal agreement. No Greek troops have left Cyprus since 20 December, and the Turks are concerned that Athens will not make good on its pledge to withdraw all forces by 18 January. Egypt is reportedly preparing to carry out the clearing operations needed to allow the release of the 15 merchant vessels trapped in the Suez Canal since the June war. Cairo is probably responding to the numerous appeals for the release of the trapped ships in the hope of capitalizing on the favorable publicity that will likely attend such a move. The tripartite Arab committee seeking peace in Yemen has called for the formation of an all-Yemeni committee to prepare for a conciliation conference. Much could happen to thwart the proposal, however, be- tween now and the first meeting of the proposed com- mittee, scheduled for 12 January. In the Nigerian civil war, Federal military progress continues to be slow, with heavy losses suf- fered on both sides. Biafran resolve does not seem to have weakened. Biafran-hired French mercenaries are beginning to play an active role in ground op- erations against federal forces. Dahomey's shaky new military regime is in im- mediate trouble as a result of a French decision to continue to withhold essential subsidies. Paris seems determined to force a further change in the composi- tion of the government even at the risk of a Possible breakdown of rd in the country. 25X1 25X1 SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET NEW TENSIONS ARISE ON CYPRUS The Turkish Cypriots' an- nouncement on 29 December of the creation of a provisional admin- istrative council to manage the affairs of the community has created new strains on the island. The Turkish Cypriot community, which has been isolated in sepa- rate enclaves since. the fighting of December 1963, has handled its own affairs since that time, but until now has not formalized the existence of such a governing body. The Turkish Government aided in the formation of the counc:Ll and has approved of its implementation. The Greek Cypriots reacted predictably. President. Makarios called the action "devoid of any legality," and other Greek Cypri- ots regard it as the first step toward the establishment of an independent Turkish Cypriot state. The Makarios government has banned foreign ambassadors from having any contact with Turkish Cypriot. Vice President Kucuk and the threat exists that any ambassador visiting Kucuk may be declared persona non grata. This has al- ready been done in the case of the 'Turkish foreign minister, who visited the island just before the Turkish Cypriot announcement. It also seems likely that Makarios will not now carry out his planned "normalization" measures to remove some of the restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community. Although Ankara gives full support to the Turkish Cypriot action, it has attempted to em- phasize the temporary nature of the council, insisting that the existence of such a body is clearly within the limits of the 1960 constitution, which guaran- teed rights to the Turkish Cypriot minority. A Turkish official has admitted that Ankara failed to anticipate the seriousness of the Greek Cypriot reaction, but insists that foreign observ- ance of Makarios' ban would be considered an "unfriendly act" toward Ankara as well as the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Government has de- clared that the move appears to violate the recent Greek-Turkish agreement and is likewise con- trary to UN Secretary General Thant's appeal for restraint by both parties. Ankara is concerned that Athens will use this :Latest inci- dent as a basis for delaying the removal of its "illegal" forces from the island. A Turkish offi- cial says that the lack of any withdrawals since 20 December could mean that, the Greeks will not have their troops out by the agreed deadline of 18 January. Approximately 3,200 troops re- portedly have departed so far. SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET ALGERIA'S POLITICAL PACE QUICKENS The Boumediene regime appar- ently continues to move from a position of strength to revamp the national institutions but, de- spite massive security measures, has not yet apprehended the ring- leaders of the mid-December mili- tary revolt. Ahmed Kaid, the ruthless, energetic, and anti-Communist chief of the country's only party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), has moved swiftly to begin the re- structuring of the party. For the present, Kaid will retain the ad- visers of Cherif Belkacem, who was the principal member of the party's five-man ruling committee that Kaid supplanted early last month. Belkacem, himself, although long close to Boumediene, seems to have dropped out of sight. He was known, however, to have been criti- cal of the moribund FLN and to have urged its restructuring. Kaid's authority is supported not only by Colonel Boumediene, who has made clear that the party is to play a dominant role in the new Algeria, but also by three strong men who have emerged from the shadows in the aftermath of the Z'Biri revolt--presidency advis- ers Abdelkader Chabou and Sliman Hoffman, and gendarmerie chief Ahmed ben Cherif. Kaid has also seized control over the country's only labor or- ganization, the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), and will attempt to mold it into an arm of the FLN. Although the party has always sought to control labor, some factions within the UGTA wanted it to develop into an inde- pendent organization. Many labor leaders have become increasingly critical of the regime, particu- larly those who prefer worker man- agement rather than state control over production. Some leaders en- couraged former chief of staff Colonel Tahar Z'Biri to launch his abortive revolt. Kaid has already decided that the recently post- poned congress of the UGTA will be held early this year. Meanwhile, the military cadres summoned to Algiers by Boume- diene last week have pledged their loyalty, denounced the mutinous movement, and declared themselves anxious to perserve the "holy unity" of the army. With this overt support, Boumediene can be expected to engage in a massive purge of the disgruntled former guerrillas, to tighten the command structure, and thus to enhance the efficiency of his military forces. Weeding out the disloyal from military or party, however, can only enlarge and perhaps strengthen the thus far weak and disunited hard-core opposition. Even though he continues to move rapidly, Bou- mediene also can expect to encoun- ter great difficulty in selling his program to the rural Algerians who to ed who want lobs. SECRET Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET PEACE EFFORTS, RENEWED IN YEMEN The tripartite Arab commit-- I The republicans, however, tee on a peace settlement in Yemen emphasized the two conditions that has decided to set up an all-Yem- I have formed the basis of their eni committee to prepare for a conciliation conference, as the royalists apply more military pressure to the republican re- gime. The committee, composed of Morocco, Iraq, and Sudan, has once more taken steps to end the Yemen conflict following a repub- lican announcement of their in- tention to cooperate. After meeting in Cairo, the committee announced on 31 December that it had decided to form a preparatory committee that would include an equal number of representatives of the royalists, the official republicans, and the republicans not in the present government. policy: the republican form of government must. be maintained, and the family of the royalist imam must not be permitted to take part in future Yemeni gov- ernments. If either the official republicans or the royalists come to believe that the third party in the preparatory committee--the "republicans not in the govern- ment"--will be able to turn the committee against them, the idea will probably collapse and the first meeting---scheduled for 12 January in Beirut--will not take place. Meanwhile,, the royalists have been rebuilding their military pressure. Sana and Taiz are un- der harassing fire, and the roads to the capital remain, cut. SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET INDIAN GOVERNMENT STRENGTHENED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS Prime Minister Indira Gan- dhi's government seems to be re- covering from the paralysis that overtook it after the scare of last February's general election. The decline in influence of inflexible outgoing Congress Party president Kamaraj, Mrs. Gandhi's gradual consolidation of her own position, and the increasingly evident disarray of the opposi- tion parties have contributed to the government's new willingness to act on politically hazardous issues. The change was first trans- lated into action late last year when the green light finally was given to Congress state units to undermine several failing non- Congress coalitions. Within a short time, West Bengal and the Punjab both had new Congress- backed regimes, although as yet the party has declined to enter their cabinets. In addition, the politically stymied govern- ment of Haryana was replaced with direct rule from New Delhi, and the ensuing parliamentary storm in New Delhi was met with determi- nation and skill. Only in cha- otic West Bengal did the Congress move provoke violence, and even there the challenge by the ousted coalition members proved less effective than most observers had expected. A more determined legislative program also emerged during the recently ended session of the national Parliament. The govern- ment's strong parliamentary per- formance reflected a growing sense of self-confidence. Most noteworthy was a bill enacting the assurances of prime ministers Nehru and Shastri that English will be used--along with Hindi--as the central government's official language as long as any non - Hindi-speaking state so de- sires. Mrs. Gandhi and Home Min- ister Y. B. Chavan skillfully steered the bill on its difficult passage through the Congress Party's legislative ranks and in Parliament. Although the com- promise legislation inflamed pop- ular emotions, it may serve in the longer run to take some of the poison out of the long-fester- ing language issue. Legislation was also passed that paves the way for the pro- jected lifting of the highly controversial state of emergency on 10 January. The new unlawful activities act empowers the gov- ernment to apply selectively some SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET of the more important "emergency" powers; it heretofore exercised under the unpopular Defense of India Rules, promulgated after the Chinese Communist attacks of 1962. The legislation also gave the government the leeway to free the long-detained K:ashmiri na- tionalist leader Sheik Abdullah on 2 January. If he behaves, the relatively moderate Abdullah's presence in Kashmir could actually help New Delhi by drawing support away from more extremist elements. If, on the other hand, he presses too hard for Kashmir autonomy, there is adequate provision in the unlawful activities legisla- tion to arrest him once again. Her recent political suc- cesses have improved Mrs. Gandhi's image, although much of her gov- ernment's belated forward move- ment can be attributed. to the parliamentary skill of Home Min- ister Chavan and the continuing support she gets from her arch- rival, Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai. Both men harbor strong ambitions for the prime ministership, but tend to balance each other off and seem content for now to continue their coop- eration. As long as they continue to pull together and the opposi- tion remains in disarray, the Gandhi government should be able to improve on its ast: unins irin performance. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 SECRET WESTERN HEMISPHERE Economic problems and prospects figured promi- nently in end-of-year statements by many Latin Ameri- can government leaders, In Brazil, where the government devalued the cruzeiro by 19 percent on 29 December, President Costa e Silva stressed the curtailing of inflationary pressures during 1967, and for the future reaffirmed his intention to promote the fullest use of nuclear energy in his country. Argentina's President Ongania similarly hailed the progress toward stemming the tide of inflation and called for national unity in following this course, while reiterating that the country is not yet ready to return to constitutional rule. Chile's President Frei, in his year-end assess- ment, seemed to disregard the politically difficult situation he faces. He pointed to strikes and work stoppages as the greatest obstacle to his country's development, but avoided criticizing the Communists and socialists who are responsible for many of them. Frei also glossed over his deep differences with the leadership of his Christian Democratic Party. Venezuelan President Leoni, along with his claims of economic progress, hit hard at continued Castroite subversion, and promised a continued battle against "antidemocratic sectors." Although Colombia's Lleras made no reference to subversion in his economic-ori- ented message, the arrest of two Colombian guerrillas as they returned from training in Cuba gave fresh evi- dence that Castro has not been discouraged by his re- cent setback in Bolivia. Castro himself, in his traditional speech on 2 January, reaffirmed in fairly routine terms his in- tention to support the world-wide revolutionary move- ment to the limit of Cuba's capabilities. While in- sisting that Cuba would continue to follow its "own path" and to maintain its own ideology--an implicit dig at Moscow--he went out of his way to pay tribute to the Soviet Union's efforts to keep up petroleum shipments. Castro addressed most of his comments to measures to deal with the petroleum shortage. SECRET Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET FIDEL CASTRO DELIVERS ANNIVERSARY SPEECH Fidel Castro spent the bulk of his anniversary :speech on 2 January discussing Cuban internal developments, as is customary on this occasion. With regard to international problems, he reit- erated Cuba's support of armed revolution and again criticized US "imperialism." Relations with the USSR came into the speech somewhat indi- rectly. In discussing Cuba's acute fuel shortage, Castro said it was caused by rapidly increas- ingly domestic consumption, pri- marily in the fast-growing agri- cultural and industrial sectors. He went out of his way to say that the Soviet Union is doing all it can to supply Cuban needs. In fact, Soviet petroleum de- liveries last year were about the same as in 1966?--about five million tons. Although deliver- ies fell off somewhat in late summer after the Middle East crisis, they returned to normal again in the last quarter. Castro made it clear that he intends to continue his rev- olutionary efforts despite the fact that this issue has strained relations between Havana and Mos- cow and is a divisive factor in most Latin American Communist parties. He said that Cuba will continue "without hesitation of any sort" to support the world-wide revolutionary move- ment "as far as it is capable." He also said that Cuba will main- tain its own ideology, "its most absolute independence and its very own path determined by its own people." Castro designated 1968 as the "year of the heroic guerrilla" as a tribute to Ernesto "Che" Guevara and the "other Cubans (who) died fight- ing" with Guevara--his first ad- mission that Cubans had ac- companied Guevara to Bolivia. Castro's jabs at the US were fairly routine. He spoke out against US efforts to "sabo- tage Cuban trade deals with non-Communist, countries, but avoided any repetition of his denunciation last summer of Moscow's trade and aid activi- ties with "oligarchic" govern- ments in Latin America. Castro promised that educa- tion through the pre-university level will be made mandatory some day soon. He also plans to incorporate compulsory military training for both men and women into the re ular school curricu- lum. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET BRAZILIAN LABOR BECOMING RESTIVE Brazil's long-silent labor movement has begun a united cam- paign against the government's restrictive wage law and the con- tinuing inflation. Six of the country's seven labor confedera- tions have agreed to a plan call- ing for joint union meetings and the formation of committees to coordinate grievances with the aim of petitioning Congress to re- peal the law. The other confed- eration--the largest--has drawn up a memorandum appealing directly to President Costa e Silva. The workers so far have not benefited from the 1964 revolu- tion that ousted leftist presi- dent Goulart and, in fact, have actually lost ground. The cost of living has continued to rise, although the rate of increase for the first 11 months of 1967 was only 24 percent, compared with 41 percent for all of 1966. Real wages have continued a decline that began in 1961, and for many industrial workers it is estimated that real wages may have dropped ten percent since 1964. As a result, workers believe that they are being made to bear the brunt of the government's stabilization program. This be- lief has made it easier for Com- munists and extreme leftists to regain the influence they had had in key labor unions under Goulart. Further, the workers' ali- enation has been exploited by op- portunistic politicians, such as fiery conservative leader Carlos Lacerda. He has already attacked the government in general terms and is now zeroing in on the wage policy. The concerted campaign of- fers an easy target for exploita- tion by Communists and other leftists. They have already in- stigated a congressional hearing to be held this month on charges of "foreign intervention" in Brazilian unions. The Interna- tional Federation of Petroleum Workers has been a particular target of such allegations and hints of US complicity have been given headline treatment. It is not clear what the ad- ministration's response to a newly vocal labor movement will be. The government is very sen- sitive to instances of possible subversion. On the other hand, the legitimacy of many of the workers' grievances and the Pres- ident's oft-stated desire to "humanize" the Brazilian revolu- tion as it evolved under his predecessor may lead the govern- ment to seek some compromise. SECRET Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRFT PARAGUAY TIGHTENING UP ON OPPOSITION AGAIN The atmosphere of political by Stroessner himself, his liberalization that existed dur- Colorado Party newspaper re- ing last summer's constitutional minded voters of past conspira- convention in Paraguay appears torial activities of the PLR and to be deteriorating somewhat in expressed the hope that returning the stress of the present presi- exiles would not constitute a new dential election campaign. threat. This change in atmosphere may Last year, President Stroes- be having its effect on opposition sner allowed the Radical Liberal I leaders. PLR officials recently Party (PLR) to become the major claimed complete ignorance of a opposition party, after being party-sponsored radiobroadcast outlawed for 25 years, and per- that reportedly referred to Presi-- mitte_d several of its exiled mem- dent Stroessner as a "police chief" bers to return to Paraguay. Now, I and attacked US assistance to Par-- even though Stroessner is soon aguay as one of the main props of to be re-elected, his government the regime. A top party official may be having second thoughts further stated that the program about permitting the opposition was not under the direct control to campaign freely for the Febru- cf the party. ary election. Despite the apparent re- In late September, Carlos straints on opposition activity, Pastore, former president of the ! however, next month's elections Liberal Party in exile, was will probably be the most demo- picked up for questioning by the cratic in Paraguayan history, as police shortly after returning ? three opposition parties are be- to Paraguay. Last week, follow- ing allowed to participate openly ing a hard-line campaign speech I in the campaign. S1;C;RET Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 SECRET LINES FIRMLY DRAWN FOR PANAMA'S ELECTIONS After weeks of uncertainty and shifting, the opposing forces for Panama's presidential elections in May appear to have solidified around two of the leading contenders, Arnulfo Arias, twice elected and twice ousted from the presidency, and former finance minister David Samudio. With official regis- tration closing on 13 January, no other nominations are ex- pected. that formerly belonged to the government coalition. President Robles' attempts to assemble a stronger govern- ment coalition to oppose Arias fell through last week when he failed to persuade Samudio-- his earlier choice for the nom- ination--to step down in favor of National Guard commandant General Vallarino. Two government parties have already picked Samudio as their candidate, and two others are scheduled to do so on 5 January. Arias was nominated last month by the National Union (NU), made up of his own mass-based Pana- menista Party and four parties Robles hoped that Valla- rino's candidacy might win back some of the former government parties now aligned with Arias. Neither Vallarino nor Samudio was enthusiastic about the Pres- ident's plan, however, and Sa- mudio announced on 27 December David Samudio Avila Arnulfo Arias Madrid SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 SECRET that he would continue the race "regardless of the obstacles." SECRET Page 26 WEEKLY SU14MARY 5 Jan 68 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2006/10/12 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06200040002-0