WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT BRAZIL: NEW DIRECTION IN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006100010002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 13, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00 00010002-4
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Brazil: New Direction in Foreign Policy
Secret
N?_ 42
13 October 1967
No. 0311 / 67A
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO06100010002-4
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The seven months since President Costa e
Silva's inauguration have seen a shift in the di-
rection of Brazilian foreign policy. Although
Brazil's basically pro-Western outlook remains
unquestioned, an "independent" policy is replacing
the unfailingly pro-US stance of the Castello
Branco days.
Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto, who nurtures
strong presidential ambitions, has had the leading
voice in creating the "New Look." He has pushed
for more nationalistic foreign policy stands,
accurately gauging not only their popular appeal
but also their attraction to many Brazilian mili-
tary men. Brazil's foreign policy is likely to
continue to follow this new path, more frequently
diverging from US views, but perhaps more nearly
reflecting national aspirations.
Background
Most Brazilians regard their
country as ready for "Great Power"
status--primarily by virtue of
its vast size (larger than the
continental US), burgeoning pop-
ulation (85 million plus), and
tremendous natural resources.
Few of them, however, would deny
that only rarely has any Brazil-
ian government used these advan-
tages to exert significant inter-
national--or even domestic--
leadership.
Under Presidents Quadros and
Goulart a strongly nationalistic
foreign policy developed, includ-
ing harassment of foreign compa-
nies, criticism of the Alliance
for Progress, and espousal of
"third world" doctrines. Rela-
tions between Brazil and the US
deteriorated greatly as Brazil
forged new links with the Commu-
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nist countries of Europe and with
the more vocal of the underde-
veloped "socialist" states.
The revolt by military and
civilian leaders that ousted
Goulart in April 1964 quickly
led to a distinct change in for-
eign policy orientation. Under
President Castello Branco, Bra-
zil not only returned'to its
traditionally close ties with
the US, but strengthened them to
the point that many Brazilians
accused the government of "sell-
ing itself to the Yankees."
Encouraged by opposition politi-
cians and leftists of all stripes,
the public tended to associate
unpopular government economic
stabilization programs with the
US.
When Arthur da Costa e Silva
succeeded Castello Branco as
president in March 1967, many
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Brazilians considered this shift
simply a changing of the guard.
In practice, however, Costa e
Silva has proved considerably
different from his predecessor.
He has sought to broaden his ad-
ministration's political base--
still =ssentially military--often
by disassociating himself from
some of the policies and prac
tices of Castello Branco. Strin-
gent economic controls have been
relaxed to some extent, produc-
ing an upswing both in business
confidence and in general popu-
lar approval of the administra-
tion's announced intent to "hu-
manize" the revolution. Foreign
policy emphasis has been shifted
to more popular, nationalistic
lines.
Costa e Silva's method of
operating has also had a consid-
erable impact on foreign policy.
He encourages his cabinet minis-
ters to operate independently--
within broad policy guidelines.
He apparently does not exercise
tight day-to-day control nor
does he provide the leadership
and guidance so obviously exer-
cised by Castello Branco. This
has resulted in considerable in-
dependence in enunciating policy,
as well as a good deal of jock-
eying for position among the
more ambitious cabinet ministers,
particularly by Foreign Minister
Jose Magalhaes Pinto.
The Foreign Minister
Magalhaes Pinto ardently
desires the Brazilian presidency,
and many of his actions are pred-
icated upon this desire. He is
an extremely clever politician
who does not operate from any
fixed ideolocical base or belief.
Over the years he has allied
himself with conservatives or
leftists as Circumstances dic-
tated. He is noted for his
ability to mi.nipulate opposing
factions for his own political
profit withoit antagonizing
either side. His ability to
wheel and deal has been honed
by years of Iolitical infighting
both in his Lome state of Minas
Gerais, when he served as gov-
ernor from 1!61 to 1966, and in
national campaigning. He re-
ceived more ' ?otes for federal
deputy than ,.ny other candidate
in the 1966 ongressional elec-
tions.
Magalhaes Pinto was one of
the key supporters of the 1964
revolution. He broke with Cas-
tello Branco however, when
the federal Government decided
to permit direct gubernatorial
elections, t].warting his bid to
have his own term extended and
in his view ~,ompromising his
political pr