COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM
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CIA-RDP79-00927A006000060005-7
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S
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9
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December 19, 2016
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Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A0
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
0 e5-- 0
Secret
1 -1
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Communist Aid to North Vietnam
Secret
N2 45
29 September 1967
No. 0309/67B
Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A006000060005-7
Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7
Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7
Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7
SECRET
COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM
The grant aid agreement Hanoi has just signed
with the Soviet Union climaxes the aid-seeking tour
of Communist countries being made by North Vietnamese
Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi. Agreements have also
been signed this year with China, North Korea, Mon-
golia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Cuba. The Soviet an-
nouncement of the new aid agreement reasserts the
prime role Moscow plays in supporting North Vietnam
and underscores Hanoi's heavy dependence on Communist
aid both to maintain essential production and serv-
ices and to support the war in the South. This
year's announcement for the first time enumerates
specific types of military assistance in what is
apparently an effort by Moscow to strengthen its
claims of giving all-out assistance to the DRV.
The Communist countries have supplied an es-
timated $1.4 billion in economic aid since 1954.
From that year through June 1967, they also are es-
timated to have supplied military aid worth $1.2
billion, as computed in foreign trade costs; if fig-
ured at US factor costs, the value would be $1.5 bil-
lion. The Communist countries are continuing to sup-
ply Hanoi with the necessary goods and equipment to
prosecute the war despite North Vietnam's rapidly
declining ability to repay.
The Communist Aid Program
The Communist aid program
for North Vietnam has grown rap-
idly since early 1965 when the
US began bombing the North and
increasing its troop commitment
in the South. Sea shipments of
goods from Communist countries
have grown from almost 550,000
tons in all of 1965 to 735,000
tons in the first half of 1967.
Most of the economic aid is
shipped by sea, while military
equipment comes in by rail.
Page 1
Economic aid is aimed at
keeping North Vietnam's vital
services operating and on main-
taining minimum subsistence lev-
els while also sustaining and im-
proving Hanoi's ability to infil-
trate men and supplies into South
Vietnam. The Communist countries
have supplied substantial quanti-
ties of equipment for transporta-
tion, construction, power, and
maintenance programs. Machinery
and equipment are also being pro-
vided to implement a program of
dispersing industry into small
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 29 Sep 67
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Estimated Communist Economic Aid to North Vietnam
MILLION US $
EAST EUROPE
USSR
COMMUNIST CHINA
Total Value
Unknown
North Vietnam's Seaborne Imports and Exports
to Communist Countries
1,010 in metric tons
Misc.
Goods
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1965
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1966
1966 1965
Estimates
Ist Half
66060 9-67 CIA
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10; F.
units throughout the country.
Food imports have increased
sharply this year following the
poor 1966 fall rice harvest.
Military aid thus far has
been designed largely to supply
and maintain an air defense sys-
tem that includes early warning
radar, a small but modern air
force, a surface-to-air missile
system, and antiaircraft artil-
lery. In addition, Communist aid
has provided Hanoi with small
arms, field artillery, and ammu-
nition, much of which has been
infiltrated into the South.
food shipments that began in Jan-
uary of this year.
The character of aid to Viet-
nam has changed considerably since
the bombing began. Prior to 1965,
economic aid emphasized Hanoi's
economic development program. The
Soviets were providing a number of
major industrial installations,
including the Thac Ba hydroelectric
power plant and the Lam Thao su-
perphosphate fertilizer plant.
The Chinese had put into operation
a pig iron facility at Thai Nguyen
and were helping to expand it into
a small steel complex.
Economic Aid
The new aid agreements cur-
rently being signed probably call
for an increase in economic aid
over the estimated $340 million
expected to be supplied this year.
The USSR continues to be the
prime supplier, providing equip-
ment for road building, mining
and manufacturing, as well as pe-
troleum and food. The Chinese
concentrate their aid on light
industry and agriculture, while
the East Europeans emphasize
light industry, transportation,
and medical. supplies.
Little is known about the
new agreements but, as in the
past, they are probably suffi-
ciently flexible to allow for
frequent adjustments to meet
Hanoi's quickly changing require-
ments resulting from the war.
Such a revision is believed to
have been made in late 1966 when
agricultural deficiencies in
North Vietnam required the large
Since the initial bombing in
early 1965, however, the emphasis
in aid has been switched to meet
current consumption, maintenance,
and reconstruction requirements.
Economic development has for all
practical purposes been shelved.
At major aid projects started
prior to 1965, activity has either
stopped or continues at only a
minimum level.
The one possible exception
may be the continuing expansion
and modernization of the anthra-
cite mines in the Hon Gai - Cam
Pha area. Soviet technicians
also are working at a number of
mines and at the Vanh Danh coal
processing plant. Hanoi's 1967
economic plan emphasized increased
coal production--the one hard-
currency export readily market-
able in the free world.
Imports in 1967 emphasize
the priority attention given to
North Vietnam's transportation
network. The USSR continues not
SECRET
29 Sep 67
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SECRET
only to supply a large portion of
the vehicles needed to move sup-
plies south, but also the road
construction equipment needed to
keep existing roads serviceable
and to build new ones in the
southern North Vietnam and Laotian
panhandles. In addition, the So-
viets have been supplying rail-
road equipment, barges, bridge
trusses, and petroleum for North
Vietnam's transportation industry.
The Soviets also are providing
equipment to dredge Haiphong
harbor and apparently plan to
assist in expanding berthing
space at Haiphong. China and
Eastern Europe have provided ve-
hicles and construction equipment.
Food imports became increas-
ingly important in 1967 after a
poor rice harvest in the fall of
1966 created shortages. North
Vietnam imported 222,000 tons of
grain and foodstuffs from Commu-
nist countries in the first half
of this year--almost four times
as much as in all of 1966. The
Soviets have shipped almost 70,000
tons of wheat and wheat flour out
of Vladivostok in the first six
months of the year, while China
shipped 90,000 tons of food.
mostly rice.
Hanoi in the past year has
signed project aid agreements
with the USSR and Eastern European
25X1
Estimated Communist Military Aid to North Vietnam
MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS
CHINA
USSR
*VALUES IN FOREIGN TRADE COSTS. IF COMPUTED AT US FACTOR COST THE VALUES WOULD BE
$200, $350, $550 RESPECTIVELY.
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SECRET
countries. These agreements prob-
ably include repair and mainten-
ance facilities as well as proj-
ects designed to help Hanoi's
regional self-sufficiency program
aimed at dispersing essential in-
dustry to the countryside in order
to minimize bomb damage. A few
may be for major projects that
the North Vietnamese intend to
begin after the war.
In addition to the agreements'
providing for aid goods, Hanoi has
recently signed a series of cul-
tural and scientific-technical
agreements, primarily with the
USSR and East European countries.
The agreements provide for the
training of as many as 20,000
Vietnamese in universities, pro-
fessional/technical schools, and
in industrial enterprises through
1969. Most of the students are
probably scheduled for long-term
training looking forward to a
posthostility recovery of the
North Vietnamese economy. A few,
however, may be receiving inten-
sive training in basic technical
skills that can be used during
the war.
Military Aid
Since 1965, when the US
bombing of the North began, the
USSR has surpassed Communist China
as the principal supplier of mil-
itary aid to North Vietnam. In
an apparent response to the US
bombing of the North, the Soviet
military aid program has focused
on the rapid development of an
air defense system. Since the
beginning of 1965, the Soviets
have supplied about 30 surface-
Page 5
to-air missile (SAM) firing bat-
talionsy a radar network, and 147
aircraft, including eight IL-28
jet light bombers, 42 MIG-21s,
and 74 MIG-15/17s.
In addition, the USSR has
supplied North Vietnam with a
large quantity of antiaircraft
artillery as well as ground forces
equipment. There are an estimated
2,000 Soviet military technicians
in North Vietnam providing assist-
ance and training in the use of
SAM and radar equipment as well
as furnishing some administrative
support.
Fewer Soviet aircraft have
been delivered this year possibly
because the North Vietnamese Air
Force has been relatively inef-
fective in defending against US
Lrd-
nance aeiiverles, however, are
up. North Vietnam expended about
1,750 SAMs in the first six
months of this year. compared with
about 1,100 in 1966. Expenditures
of conventional antiaircraft ar-
tillery ammunition have also in-
creased. In addition, Communist
forces in South Vietnam have been
using Soviet-made 140-mm. rockets
and 120-mm. mortars since early
1967.
Communist China's major con-
tribution has been the deployment
of a number of troops in North
Vietnam. Some are believed to
be antiaircraft units, and the
remainder are engineering troops
aiding in the repair of roads,
rail lines and airfields north
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 29 Sep 67
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of Hanoi. Military equipment de-
liveries from China continue to
emphasize small arms, ammunition,
and light antiaircraft artillery.
Peking's deliveries of major equip-
ment this year include at least
12 MIG-15/17s, the first since
1965.
Only minor quantities of
military aid are being supplied
by the other Communist countries,
and very little of this is es-
timated to be weapons. Some East-
ern European countries are sup-
plying sport rifles in small quan-
tities, and North Korea is sup-
plying automatic attack rifles.
In addition, about 50 North Ko-
rean pilots are currently in North
Vietnam, F
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Secret
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