WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005900070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 4, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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S1ecret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
50
4 Aug 1967
No. 0301/67
State Department review completed
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VIETNAM
Attacks on Marine units near the Demilitarized Zone,
and rocket attacks on US and South Vietnamese Army
positions north of Saigon interrupted the general
lull in military activity in South Vietnam this week.
In Saigon, the ground rules for the presidential cam-
paign have been laid out. Hanoi has been forced to
seek administrative and technical manpower among its
heretofore distrusted middle class.
NEW COMMUNIST MILITARY PRESSURE IN LAOS
The most serious attacks have occurred in southern
Laos against government bases supporting increased
intelligence and harassment operations into the vital
infiltration corridor.
PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES IN BURMA
Popular enthusiasm over the government's stand against
Peking, even though subsiding somewhat, gives No Win
a face-saving opportunity to make additional changes
in the regime's doctrinaire and generally unsuccess-
ful socialist economic policies.
SINO-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS UNDER STRAIN
Relations between China and Cambodia appear to be go-
ing through a particularly difficult period, although
both countries are probably anxious to avoid an open
dispute.
PEKING IN CONFLICT WITH REGIONAL COMMANDERS
Maoist leaders are engaged in a major effort to bring
recalcitrant military commanders into line. The con-
flict is far from resolved, and violent incidents con-
tinue to erupt throughout the country.
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Europe
SOVIET MARSHAL STRESSES ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES
A Red Star article, probably politically inspired, by
the new Warsaw Pact chief, Marshal Yakubovsky, is the
most explicit Soviet statement to date on the import-
ance of ground forces in the USSR's defense planning.
SOVIETS AGAIN PROMOTING WORLD COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE
They want to keep the idea alive but realize that such
a meeting cannot be arranged anytime soon.
POLITICAL TROUBLES IN POLISH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
There are signs that opposition to the regime's pro-
Arab policies reached upper military echelons and led
to the dismissal of at least three high-level officers.
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Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
Arab states are holding a foreign ministers' confer-
ence this week in an attempt to salvage what they can
from their humiliating defeat by Israel. They--espe-
cially the radical states--will also try to set the
stage for a summit conference. In Israeli-annexed
Jerusalem, Arab discontent is running high and an
explosive situation is developing. Soviet military
aid to the Arabs is slowing down, and Soviet naval
activity offshore continues. Meanwhile, Britain is
planning to sound out UN members about a Security
Council resolution aimed at reopening the Suez Canal.
FEDERAL FORCES INCREASE PRESSURES IN NIGERIAN WAR
Federal troops have recaptured Nsukka in Biafra's
northwest and are beginning to expand their foothold
on the southern coast.
TANZANIAN PRESIDENT TIGHTENS CONTROL
The purge of pro-Communist radicals may bring a slight
lull in the regime's steady leftward drift, but will
not significantly improve relations with the West.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 27
CUBA IMPROVES ITS DEFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY
Recent Soviet military shipments to Cuba, while in-
tended primarily for materiel maintenance and replace-
ment, have improved the defensive capability of the
naval, air, and air defense forces.
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BOLIVIAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY
Recurrent guerrilla successes against poorly trained
and equipped army units continue to point up the
government's inability to cope with a serious in-
surgency problem. The Bolivian Army's inept perform-
ance is beginning to worry neighboring governments.
PERU'S UNRESOLVED CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
Peru's most serious constitutional crisis in recent
years remains unresolved, with the President and Con-
gress both seeking strong bargaining positions.
INVASION JITTERS HIT HAITI
President Duvalier established a nationwide curfew on
29 July following reports of an imminent invasion of
the north.
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FAR EAST
Maoist leaders are engaged in a major effort
to bring China's recalcitrant military commanders
into line. A Red Flag editorial admitted that
the Wuhan commander's open defiance of Peking
last week was "by no means an isolated phenom-
enon." Although attacks on the Wuhan leader
are continuing, there are indications that the
Maoists have been obliged to make concessions.
Their failure to deal cleanly with the Wuhan
authorities may reflect pressure from other
key military leaders. In an apparent effort
to prevent further open defiance, Maoist lead-
ers have been conferring with regional mili-
tary officials in Peking.
The South Vietnamese presidential campaign
opened officially on 3 August amidst signs of
friction between the supporters of Thieu and
Ky. Partisans in each camp have accused the
other of undermining their joint campaign com-
mittee. The long-standing rivalry between the
two men has been exacerbated by Thieu's sus-
picion that Ky is trying to project himself as
the real leader of the ticket. These frictions,
however, have not reached the point of jeopardiz-
ing the ticket's prospects for victory on 3 Sep-
tember.
Communist forces in Laos are increasing
pressure against government positions. The most
serious attacks have occurred in southern Laos
against government bases supporting recently
stepped-up intelligence and harassment opera-
tions into the vital panhandle infiltration
corridor. This upsurge in Communist activity
probably is also aimed at offsetting gains by
government forces in the last six months. 25X1
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VIETNAM
Military activity continues
at a slack pace in most of South
Vietnam, although several sig-
nificant engagements occurred
during the past week.
US Marines of Operation KING-
FISHER suffered more than 200
casualties when attacked several
miles north of Con Thien while
returning from a sweep into the
southern half of the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ). This sweep had been
the first major allied penetra-
tion of the DMZ since last May,
and its purpose was to locate
and destroy enemy artillery, mor-
tar, and rocket positions which
have shelled allied field posi-
tions in northern Quang Tri Prov-
ince almost continuously.
Page 2
Throughout South Vietnam's
III Corps, the activities of enemy
forces reflected implementation
of their rainy season offensive
plans. These plans include selec-
lated areas, interdiction of vital
supply routes, and attacks on
friendly outposts and base areas
all of which showed an increase
last week. Well-planned mortar
and 122-mm. rocket attacks were
directed at three US and South
Vietnamese Army positions north
and east of Saigon last weekend.
The attacking force probably con-
sisted of subordinate units of th
Viet Cong 9th Light Infantry Di-
vision, elements of which have
previously participated in simi-
lar rocket attacks in the same
general area.
To the south, the Communists
are suffering heavy casualties
as the result of allied operation
in the Mekong Delta. More than
225 enemy soldiers were killed
during a series of battles early
this week near My Tho, in south-
ern Dinh Tuong Province.
More than 7,500 US and South
Vietnamese troops in a combined
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NOR ti-I"
1 VIETNAak
,p,,, ho = route 4
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Cfa Trang
IM RANH
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operation nicknamed CORONADO II,
are scouring the area along Na-
tional Route 4 in search of sev-
eral Viet Cong main force bat-
talions--one of which, the 263rd,
was identified in the combat this
week. These enemy units have re-
cently intensified their harass-
ment of traffic on Route 4, the
vital ground link between the
delta and Saigon. During a ten-
day period in late July, there
were over 52 Viet Cong mining
incidents and ambushes along a
25-mile segment of this road.
This recently intensified enemy
activity in the eastern portion
of Dinh Tuong Province may be
a diversionary action to cover
the movement of supplies and re-
inforcing personnel into a large
Viet Cong base area suspected to
be in the western part of the
province.
Saigon Elections
The presidential campaign of-
ficially began on 3 August and
will continue, under the super-
vision of the newly formed Cen-
tral Election Campaign Committee,
until the day before the election
on 3 September. The committee,
composed of two representatives
of each ticket, outlined the ma-
jor features of the campaign in
late July. These include arrange-
ments for 24 joint public appear-
ances by the candidates through-
out the country and in Saigon be-
tween 6 August and 1 September.
There will also be two joint press
conferences and three television
appearances, during which each
Page 4
candidate may speak for five
minutes. A 15-minute radio talk
during the first week of the cam-
paign is also scheduled for each
candidate.
This schedule is not com-
pulsory and the candidates are
free, to a certain extent, to
make their own arrangements.
They may, for instance, hold in-
dependent press conferences in
private homes and restaurants,
but not in public buildings or
government offices. They are
also free to talk to individual
journalists at any time.
Little is known of the spe-
cific campaign plans of the two
major civilian candidates--Tran
Van Huong and Phan Khac Suu--
but both probably have the trap-
pings of a campaign organization
down to province level at least
in the delta and around Saigon.
According to press reports, both
intend to do most of their per-
sonal campaigning from Saigon
and will send representatives
on the government-arranged cam-
paign tour.
As for Chief of State Thieu
and Premier Ky, there are grow-
ing indications of friction and
poor working relations within
their campaign organization, al-
though both appear to be gaining
support as individuals, if not a
a team.
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Although the joint campaign
group may not be working well
as a team, supporters of either
Thieu and Ky individually appear
to be having some success in lin-
ing up support for their own
man--a development which may
serve to improve the joint
ticket's chances for victory.
Hanoi Soliciting "Bourgeoisie"
Hanoi has found it necessary
to call upon the country's mis-
Page 5
trusted middle class for adminis-
trative and technical manpower,
according to a 9 July radiobroad-
cast. The North Vietnamese Govern-
ment recently revised its employ-
ment policy for "bourgeois" in-
dividuals in an effort to assure
them jobs commensurate with their
capacities and training, and to
guarantee them pay scales and
other incentives comparable to
those received by "workers" in
state enterprises. In the past
Hanoi has discriminated against
individuals who had worked in
managerial and technically skilled
positions under the French, pre-
ferring to employ less experienced
but more politically reliable
young Communists trained in the
more advanced bloc countries.
Although there are few indi-
cations that the war has imposed
any general manpower shortage on
Hanoi, the new incentives offered
the "bourgeois" suggest that there
is a shortage of certain skilled
workers in critical areas. This
suggestion is reinforced by Hanoi's
decision to step up its foreign
training program. Beginning in
1967, the USSR and East European
countries have
agreements with
than triple the
namese students
study.
SECRET
signed
Hanoi
long-term
which more
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going
of Viet-
abroad for
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NEW COMMUNIST MILITARY PRESSURE IN LAOS
The Communists are increasing
pressure against widely separated
Laotian Government positions. The
most serious attacks have occurred
in southern Laos against govern-
ment bases supporting increased
intelligence and harassment opera-
tions into the vital infiltration
corridor.
North Vietnamese troops in
estimated battalion strength
destroyed a Royal Laotian Army
(FAR) command post at Thateng on
a libel
Mikdahan
!son as a result of the improved
I performance of government forces
and the increased effectiveness
= of tactical air support.!
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Page 6
27 July and inflicted heavy casu-
alties on the defenders before
withdrawing,
The FAR's tactical position at
Thateng was further weakened by
the loss of a key heavy weapons
position a few miles northeast
on 28 July.
These attacks are the most
intense the enemy has made in the
Bolovens Plateau area since
friendly troops were driven out
Aof Ban Phone on 19 July. They
emmrotio
Li-
pay presage a concerted effort
to push government forces from
The government has moved
reinforcements into Thateng
and another key position at
Lao Ngam, but its defensive
capability has been hampered
in recent weeks by poor
weather which has limited
tactical air support. The
enemy, moreover, has increased
pressure against government
positions farther south near
Attopeu, in what may be an
effort to draw off government
reinforcements from other
contested areas.
The upsurge in Communist
:activity during the current
;wet season may be an attempt to
Phona`redress tactical setbacks suf-
4 Aug 67
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PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES IN BURMA
Further modifications of the
"Burmese Way to Socialism" could
occur despite the ruling Revolu-
tionary Council's recent reaffir-
mation of basic economic policies
following an intensive review of
the economy.
The Burmese Government has
been retreating, albeit cautiously
and quietly, over the past several
months from its drive toward state
socialism. A number of commodi-
ties were restored to private
wholesale and retail trade last
September and several others have
been decontrolled since then.
The most significant step
was taken on 23 June, when the
government partially decontrolled
the rice trade. The failure of
the state monopoly in rice trade
to procure adequate supplies had
resulted in an acute internal rice
shortage and a further decline
in rice exports, which account
for an estimated 70 percent of
Burma's foreign exchange earnings.
The government may go even further
if, as expected, the 23 June de-
cision encourages farmers to
market the stocks they have ac-
cumulated because of the govern-
ment's unrealistically low price.
Burma's strained relations
with Peking following the anti-
Chinese disorders in Rangoon in
late June have not only provided
the Burmese Government with a
face-saving opportunity to effect
further economic changes but have
brought the nation's economic
plight into sharper focus. The
opportunity derives principally
from a wave of unprecedented
popular approbation ensuing from
Peking's diatribes against the
"fascist" Ne Win regime, although
time may be running out since
much of the enthusiasm generated
in the early stages of the dis-
pute probably is now waning.
For its part, Peking is
showing no disposition to relax
its propaganda offensive. The
Chinese have recently increased
their broadcasts to Burma and now
are emphasizing Burma's economic
difficulties. These broadcasts
could aggravate an already serious
dissidence problem among Communist
and tribal minority groups, es-
pecially if Burma's downward
economic spiral is not reversed.
F7 I
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SINO-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS UNDER STRAIN
Relations between Cambodia
and Communist China appear to be
going through a particularly dif-
ficult period, although both
25X1 countries are probably anxious
to avoid an open dispute.
The Yugoslav ambassador in
Phnom Penh told a US official that
anti-Chinese sentiment there is
reaching serious proportions and
could erupt in violent attacks
against the Chinese community.
He claimed that "patriotic" Cam-
bodians are increasingly disturbed
over Chinese domination of the
economy and particularly the role
the Chinese are playing in smug-
gling to South Vietnam. He stated
that the situation was aggravated
by the Chinese Communist Embassy's
"heavy-handed" interference in
the local Chinese school system,
which he claims has included
organization of Red Guard units.
Although these statements
may be somewhat overdrawn, there
has been an upsurge in leftist
activity in Cambodia in recent
months. Sihanouk has reacted
by declaring that "Red Guard -
type" activity will not be per-
mitted in Cambodia, and by dis-
couraging, apparently with some
success, the display of Maoist
badges and literature.
At the same time, Sihanouk
has made it clear he does not
want the crackdown on the Cam-
bodian left to result in a breach
with Communist China. He has
taken pains in his public remarks
to absolve Peking of responsibil-
ity for the activities of over-
zealous leftists. He reacted
mildly to the sacking of the of-
fices of an anti-Chinese news-
paper. He also refrained from
public comment on the offensive
behavior of a Chinese military
aid group which insisted the
Cambodian pilots could not fly
properly because they had been
trained by "imperialists."
The Chinese, for their part,
appear equally reluctant to
worsen relations. Their reaction
to Sihanouk's campaign against
the left, which has included the
deportation of the two leading
pro-Peking businessmen, has been
mild. The Peking regime's public
response to Cambodian press crit-
icism of its propaganda activities
has been couched in defensive and
generally noninflammatory lan-
guage. Finally, Peking has in-
vited the Cambodian foreign min-
ister to visit China, probably to
try to work out some of these
problems.
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PEKING IN CONFLICT WITH REGIONAL COMMANDERS
Maoist leaders are engaged
in a major effort to bring China's
recalcitrant military commanders
into line. The conflict is far
from resolved, and violent inci-
dents continue to erupt throughout
the country.
Peking broadcast revealed that
the leaders of the "million-man
army"--an anti-Maoist organization
responsive to Wuhan Military Re-
gion command--would also "be
given a chance to redeem them-
selves."
Growing frictions between
Maoists and military leaders
culminated in an open act of de-
fiance on 20 and 21 July when
Chen Tsai-tao, commander of the
Wuhan Military Region, arrested
two important officials from
Peking. After the two were re-
leased on 22 July, Peking mounted
frenetic demonstrations in the
capital and several regional
cities against the commander for
several days, and announced the
beginning of a drive to purge
military leaders.
On 30 July, however, a Red
Flag editorial said that pro-Mao
revolutionaries" should exercise
extreme caution in dealing with
errant military leaders, suggest-
ing that the Maoists were giving
ground. The editorial asserted
that in some localities the con-
flict between military and "revo-
lutionary" forces is "only a mis-
understanding." In such areas,
it said, pro-Mao forces should be
lenient.
Peking took another step
backward on 1 August, when a
Maoist leaders are probably
under strong pressure from mili-
tary leaders to moderate their
policies. For the past week
Maoist leaders have been confer-
ring with representatives from
regional military commands in an
extraordinary session in Peking.
Three regional military officials
appeared at a Peking rally on
25 July. Nine of them, repre-
senting six of the ten major com-
mands, showed up on 31 July for
the rally celebrating the 40th
anniversary of the founding of
the army.
This is the only time in
recent years that so many out-of-
town military men have gathered
in the capital at one time. They
normally celebrate even major
anniversaries in their own pro-
vincial capitals.
The event was not attended
by either Mao Tse-tung or Defense
Minister Lin Piao. The signifi-
cance of their absence is still
unclear. The keynote speech,
delivered by the acting chief of
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TSINGHAI
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WUHAN MILITARY RE61 .rte ANA F
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1 11AINAN
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staff, praised both men in the
usual effusive terms.
on a broad scale, and little ap-
parent action has been taken to
prevent them.
One major goal of the mili-
tary leaders probably is the
restoration of order. They may
have pressed Mao and Lin for a
clear mandate to the military to
impose order and bring to an end
those Red Guard activities which
have produced near anarchy. This,
however, would mean abandoning
the main thrust of the Cultural
Revolution to which both men are
committed.
There is no evidence as yet
that Maoists have given up on
this issue. On the contrary,
violent clashes and transport
disruptions are still occurring
The interruption of rail
traffic may be causing signifi-
cant delays in the distribution
of foods and raw materials to
urban areas. There is no direct
evidence to indicate extensive
backlogs of materials, however.
The effect on Soviet aid
shipments for North Vietnam is 25X1
uncertain. These shipments
probably receive special atten-
tion in transiting China.
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EUROPE
All but the most urgent matters will be held in
abeyance for the next few weeks as Europe's leaders
close up shop for their traditional August vacations.
All three of the Soviet Union's top leaders have left
Moscow.
Moscow, however, remains wrapped up in the Arab-
Israeli problem. The Soviets are also looking at the
turmoil in China and this week made a provocative plea
to the Chinese Army not to let Mao exploit it. Pravda
took an indirect shot at Castro's Latin American "sol-
idarity" meeting by reprinting an article by a Chilean
Communist which takes issue with Cuba's philosophy of
revolutionary violence.
President de Gaulle, after an unusually long
cabinet meeting, has retired unrepenting to his
country place following his extraordinary Canadian
trip. He will be back in Paris on 10 August, how-
ever, for a television appearance to promote forth-
coming decrees to effect socioeconomic reforms.
The decrees are expected to arouse considerable
public and parliamentary opposition.
The West Germans and Czechs have concluded pro-
tracted negotiations on trade. An agreement will
be signed shortly providing for expanded trade and
an exchange of permanent trade missions which will
have certain consular functions
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SOVIET MARSHAL STRESSES ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES
A top member of the USSR's
high command has published the
most explicit statement to date
on the importance of ground forces
in Soviet defense planning.
The author was Marshal Ivan
Yakubovsky, recently appointed
commander in chief of the Warsaw
Pact forces. Writing in the
21 July issue of Red Star, Yaku-
bovsky was careful to acknowledge
the great impact of nuclear weap-
ons but noted a wide range of
circumstances calling for ground
forces employing only the "class-
ical" means of warfare. He implied
that the USSR is making substan-
tial efforts to improve its
capacity to conduct nonnuclear
operations.
The Soviet Army and Navy
are large and reasonably well
equipped for conventional warfare.
The recently developed huge AN-22
transport aircraft and Alligator-
class landing ships will enhance
the mobility of Soviet forces.
Several new aircraft displayed in
the recent Moscow air show are
designed to improve air support
to ground troops.
The form and timing of
Yakubovsky's article suggest it
was inspired by the desire of
the new high command to influence
policy matters, particularly
defense allocations. Preliminary
decisions regarding the 1968 plan
probably are being taken now.
To underscore the political as
well as economic implications of
the policy he was propounding,
Yakubovsky cited the recent cen-
tral committee theses stressing
the importance of strengthening
defenses.
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SOVIETS AGAIN PROMOTING WORLD COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE
The Soviet-sponsored idea of
a conference of the world's Com-
munist parties is in the air again.
A Pravda editorial on 23 July,
echoing an earlier statement by
the East German party, said that
bilateral and multilateral meet-
ings of Communist parties are
paving the way for a new inter-
national conference. Subsequent
pronouncements have put the Bul-
garian, Hungarian, Danish, Brazil-
ian, and Uruguayan parties on
record as advocates of such a
conference, though with differing
degrees of enthusiasm.
The obstacles to a world Com-
munist meeting are such that the
Soviets are unlikely to try to
arrange it before their 50th anni-
versary celebrations in November.
The Pravda editorial took note of
these obstacles, mentioning
"nationalist moods" and "internal
difficulties" in the Communist
movement.
For one thing, Moscow is
aware that Tito's participation in
multilateral consultations on the
Middle East does not mean that he
has abandoned Yugoslavia's inde-
pendence in the Communist move-
ment. A Soviet diplomat in Bel-
grade recently conceded that the
alliance with Belgrade over the
Arab-Israeli crisis was only tem-
porary.
Moreover, Moscow will have
noted the Rumanian's silence
about Pravda's suggestion of a
conference. T ey ignored the op-
portunity for comment provided by
their well-publicized parliamen-
tary session last week in which
foreign policy discussions pre-
dominated.
The Soviets thus seem to be
no closer to achieving a demon-
stration of unity on the issue
than they were in April, when
several parties--notably Yugo-
slavia's and Rumania's--boycotted
the Karlovy Vary conference of
European Communists. Nevertheless,
the Soviets hope to keep the sub-
ject alive and look upon lesser
bilateral or multilateral meet-
ings--such as Karlovy Vary and the
get-togethers on the Middle East--
as serving that purpose.
There are tenuous indications
that some such gathering may be in
the offing.
If any such meeting were held
before November, it would be a
limited one intended to demonstrate
to foot-draggers the momentum and
inevitability of the move toward
a full-scale international con-
ference.
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POLITICAL TROUBLES IN POLISH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
There are signs that opposi-
tion to the Polish regime's pro-
Arab policy reached upper mili-
tary echelons and that, for a
while after the Mid-East war, the
regime was in doubt about the
political reliability of some
segments of the armed forces'
leadership.
In a widely publicized speech
on 21 July, Defense Minister Spy-
chalski-?-a close friend of party
boss Gomulka--implied that the
political attitudes of the mili-
tary failed to pass the "acute
test" of the Mid-East war and
that this was reflected in Polish
military performance during the
period of crisis. Spychalski also
seemed to indicate that some of-
ficers, fearing involvement in the
war because of Warsaw's support
of Moscow's policy, questioned
the value of the alliance with
the USSR, as well as the worth
of Soviet weapons, equipment,
and training.
The defense minister's
stress on ideological attitudes
as basic to combat readiness
suggests that the military es-
tablishment will be brought
more closely under party con-
trol in an effort to ensure its
reliability in any future
crisis.
Spychalski's address is
virtual confirmation of reports
that the air defense commander
and two of his deputies have
been purged for refusing to
prepare and circulate within
the air force an evaluation of
the Arab-Israeli conflict based
on false and tendentious regime
propaganda positions. Since
none of these officers is Jewish,
their purge was not related to
Gomulka's anti-Semitic policy
statement of 19 June.
Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky--
on his first official trip
since his appointment as Warsaw
Pact commander--made a protocol
visit to Warsaw on 24 July, pos-
sibly reflecting uneasiness on
the part of Soviet leaders over
the situation in the Polish
armed services.
Despite rumors in Warsaw
that a wider cleansing--involv-
ing foreign service and foreign
trade personnel--is being pre-
pared, it is not likely that
military purges will be exten-
sive. There are good domestic
reasons for avoiding a sweeping
change, mainly that it would en-
courage factionalism and pos-
sibly threaten the political
balance Gomulka has constructed
between dogmatic and relatively
liberal elements in I the regime.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The Arab foreign ministers are conferring
this week in an attempt to establish some unity
between the radical and moderate regimes, but
there is little prospect for any real achievement.
They will also try to set the stage for a later
summit conference--a forum which the radicals es-
pecially are seeking. Meanwhile, increasing Arab
discontent in Israeli-annexed Jerusalem is creat-
ing an explosive situation there.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, both Jordan
and Iraq have had cabinet reshuffles and some re-
alignment seems to be in progress in Syria. None
of these regimes is expected to make any major
policy changes, however.
The Congress Party in India suffered another
setback on 29 July when the Mishra government fell
in Madhya Pradesh. It was the third Congress state
regime to collapse since March, and Congress now
controls only seven of the 17 states in India.
Events are moving slowly in Africa's current,
top trouble spots--Congo and Nigeria. The mer-
cenaries in northeastern Congo have left their
Punia stronghold and are on their way to Bukavu.
The Belgian cabinet, meanwhile, decided on 28 July
that its presence in the Congo and the amount of
aid granted will depend on what guarantees of
safety the Mobutu government can provide Belgian
citizens there. In any event, some cutback in aid
is inevitable.
in Nigeria, federal troops consolidated
their successful seaborne invasion of Biafra's
oil terminal and now control the secessionists'
main outlet to the sea. Other moves against
Biafra's southwestern area are probably under
way, and Nsukka in the northwest has again fallen
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
The Arab foreign ministers'
conference opened in Khartoum on
1 August with a call for unity
among Arab regimes.
The agenda is apparently
still under consideration in
closed sessions. Proposed points
for discussion probably include
calling for Israeli withdrawal
from Arab territories, continu-
ing the oil embargo, and the
elimination of foreign military
bases in Arab countries.
Ahmad Shuqayri, head of the
Palestine Liberation organization,
told the press that the foreign
ministers would also discuss
such measures as severance of
diplomatic relations with the US
and UK and total boycott of trade.
Such extreme measures would prob-
ably touch off bitter debate be-
tween radical and moderate Arab
states, and the outcome is un-
certain.
Jerusalem and the West Bank
Arab resistance to the Is-
raeli occupation of Jerusalem and
Jordan's West Bank is rapidly in-
creasing to the point where seri-
ous incidents are likely. Apart
from the mere fact of alien occu-
pation, the opposition reflects
the Arabs' resentment of inept
and sometimes calculated Israeli
moves against their economic and
religious interests.
Israeli interference in the
religious rights of the Arab
Christians and Muslims, especially
the latter, is probably the touch-
iest issue. The application of
Israeli religious laws to the Old
City and especially, the placing
of Christian and Muslim religious
matters under the supervision of
the Israeli Ministry of Religious
Affairs headed by a rabbi has been
regarded by the Arabs as adding
insult to injury. On 2 August
the Israelis, in a probably futile
attempt to assuage Arab indigna-
tion, placed the supervision of
Muslim religious activities under
Defense Minister Dayan.
Forced closure of all business
establishments one day a week is
bitterly resented. Some Israeli
tourists have offended Muslim and
Christian sensibilities by their
dress and actions in holy places.
Latin ecclesiastical authorities
have responded by closing their
shrines, including the Holy Sepul-
chre, when not being used for re-
ligious services. Israeli-imposed
restrictions on both Muslim and
Christian religious courts have
aroused religious leaders. Cen-
sorship of Muslim sermons, another
sore point, has ceased.
A number of Old City judges
and lawyers have signed a protest
petition and have refused to act
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on cases. Arab doctors are
considering refusing to partici-
pate in the Israeli health insur-
ance scheme. Other professions
have joined the doctors' and law-
yers' protests. Teachers in Na-
blus have threatened to strike if
the school texts are replaced by
Israeli ones, and many merchants
have closed their stores. The
majority of the unemployed will
not register at the Israeli labor
exchange.
The Old City council has re-
fused to participate in an Is-
raeli-amalgamated city-wide coun-
cil protesting that this would be
recognition of the annexation of
the Old City by Israel, which they
have denounced. Half a dozen
anti-Israel leaflets have been
distributed warning Arab residents
against cooperating with the Is-
raeli authorities. One leaflet
originated with the Israeli Com-
munist Party. A boycott of Is-
raelis is reportedly planned by
the Old City Chamber of Commerce
and Muslim leaders as part of a
general civil disobedience cam-
paign aimed at heading off meas-
ures designed to detach Jerusalem
from the West Bank.
On 30 July the Israeli cabi-
net spent considerable time dis-
cussing the situation in Jerusalem
and the West Bank. Israeli of-
ficials have now indicated that
the "policy of moderation" toward
the Arab population has not worked
and that much sterner action is
planned for the future. An in-
dication of this new policy was
the 31 July arrest and exile to
Israeli towns of four prominent
West Bank political leaders, in-
cluding the former governor of
the Jerusalem district.
Soviet Political Activity
Soviet efforts to find a so-
lution to Middle East problems
have aroused resentment and anxi-
ety among some of the Arabs. So-
viet Foreign Minister Gromyko in
turn has given vent to his own
frustrations at the UN. His re-
marks have almost certainly of-
fended the sensitive Arabs, who
are becoming more distrustful of
Soviet intentions.
At home the Soviets are try-
ing to put the best possible face
on their actions in the Middle
East. Various Soviet news articles
have discussed the possibilities
of a future role for the Communist
parties in the Middle East as long
as "objective conditions pertain
for the development of the social-
ist trend." A recent Pravda arti-
cle emphasized that the release of
political prisoners in Egypt would
enable the "cooperation of all
genuinely progressive forces...
which undoubtedly has broadened
the revolution's social base," im-
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implying that the Soviet Govern-
ment expects a more important role
for Egyptian Communists. In an
earlier article, Pravda attributed
Egyptian military failures to the
bourgeois nonrevolutionary officer
corps, with the implication that
the fault did not lie with the
chief beneficiary of Soviet aid,
President Nasir himself.
Soviet Military Aid
Three additional Soviet arms
carriers docked at Middle East
ports in the past week. With
their arrival, about 42,000 tons
of military equipment have now
been delivered by 18 ships since
5 June--when hostilities began.
It would require some 80 addi-
tional voyages, however, to get
Arab military arms inventories
near prewar levels.
The Egyptian military dele-
gation left Moscow on 29 July.
An agreement on Soviet equipment
to be provided as part of the
resupply effort was probably con-
cluded.
Iraq's defense minister,
who has been in Moscow since
21 July, is also negotiating for
additional military equipment.
Soviet Naval Activity
Soviet submarine and surface
ship deployments in the Mediter-
ranean remain at a high level.
Several ships at sea since early
June probably have been replaced
by other units including two land-
ing ships and four submarines.
Three SAM-equipped combatants, a
destroyer, and three landing ships
are probably continuing to lend
support to Nasir by remaining in
or near the ports of Alexandria
and Port Said.
United Nations
Britain, concerned about the
effects of a prolonged closure of
the Suez Canal, is planning to
consult the USSR and the Middle
East countries on a Security Coun-
cil resolution aimed at reopening
it. London has in mind a resolu-
tion much like that agreed upon
privately between the US and the
USSR toward the end of the special
General Assembly session. This
resolution provided for withdrawal
of troops and an end of belliger-
ency. The UK, however, would
strengthen the provisions on free-
dom of passage. The UK also in-
tends to propose to Secretary Gen-
eral Thant that he pay a personal
visit to the Middle East, followed
by a possible appointment of a
special representative to the area.
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FEDERAL FORCES INCREASE PRESSURES IN NIGERIAN WAR
The Nigerian federal gov-
ernment continues to press its
month-old military campaign
against the seceded former East-
ern region, Biafra.
Troops of the landing force
that seized Bonny last week are
reportedly moving cautiously
Western
upriver toward Port Harcourt
accompanied by two naval patrol
boats. The first federal goal
is likely to be the refinery
near Port Harcourt.
On the northern front,
federal forces have recaptured
Nort~ter j~ Makurdi
EAST-CENTRAL
Scene of Nigerian Civil War
BENUE PLATEAU
TH-EASTERN
e? Calabar
_NGERIA
Eastern Region
(BIAFRA)
Boundary of former region
New state boundary decreed by Gowan
SECRET
Benin City
Mid-Western
MID-WESTERN
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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 Approver Release Zq$!X11I41 : CIA-RDP79- 7A005900070001-2
Nsukka, although the situation
there appears to remain fluid.
Biafran Governor Ojukwu
still appears confident of ulti-
25X1 mate victory, and there does not
seem to be any significant decline
25X1 in morale.
Additional problems may
arise for Biafra after the fed-
eral government gets delivery of
25X1 six jet trainers it purchased
from Czechoslovakia. Two of these
transited Morocco last weekend
on their way to Lagos.
Biafra, on the other hand,
has received no heavy military
Page 24
equipment and probably is short
of foreign exchange needed to
purchase such equipment.
The federal seizure of Bonny
has apparently caused the oil
companies--especially Shell-BP
and SAFRAP, which have producing
wells in the East--to have second
thoughts about royalty payments
to Ojukwu.
In a further attempt to
influence Shell-BP, Ojukwu is
holding the company's manager
hostage in Enugu and has asked
the company to suspend all opera-
tions. He said Biafran security
forces would guard the instal-,
lations for safekeeping. Shell,-BP
does not appear to be disturbed
by Ojukwu's action, however, and
is now maintaining that its
original agreement with Lagos
called for royalty payments only
once a year. I
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Aug 67
25X1
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 Approved For Re4Wse 2007/030W_bP79-00927AOiii+900070001-2
TANZANIAN PRESIDENT TIGHTENS CONTROL
President Nyerere has taken a
still firmer grip on the Tanzanian
Government in the face of increasing
resistance to his socialist policy.
The purge of such pro-Communist rad
icals as Oscar Kambona, minister
of regional administration and sec-
retary general of the country's only
party, may bring a slight lull in
the regime's steady leftward drift,
but will not significantly improve
relations with the West.
Kambona's flight to London last
week removed Nyerere's most likely
challenger and settled a long power
struggle between the Kambona fac-
tion and those party leaders allied
with Vice President Kawawa. Kawawa's
colleagues resented the ambitious
Kambona, who was studying in England
while they were building the party
prior to independence, and have
been maneuvering for years to oust
him as secretary general. In June
Kambona resigned from both his
cabinet and party positions after
Nyerere assumed personal jurisdic-
tion over the country's 17 regional
commissioners and left Kambona with
no real authority.
Kambona's position had stead-
ily eroded since 1963 when he was
minister of both external affairs
and defense and second only to
Nyerere in political power. He lost
the defense portfolio after the
army mutiny in 1964 and external
affairs in 1965. Nyerere found
Kambona to be an ineffective and
undependable administrator of
questionable loyalty, but had been
reluctant to curb him openly. His
latent suspicions about Kambona's
Page 25
long-time Communist contacts may
have been finally aroused by recent
revelations about his foreign bank
accounts and East German financial
support. In the last two weeks,
five of Kambona's followers have
been arrested for subversive activity
which included contacts with the
army and efforts to form an opposi-
tion party.
During the past six months new
resistance to Nyerere's socialist
policies has come not only from con-
servative businessmen but also from
radical politicians who strongly
object to his decree that they may
not have outside income. This op-
position is fragmented and lacks
any common bonds of doctrine or
friendship, but is likely to accel-
erate Nyerere's authoritarian trend.
The government shake-up in June
removed several other radicals from
the cabinet and left more able, con-
servative administrators in charge.
Nyerere has no intention of abandon-
ing his socialist ideals but the
changes appear designed to restore
investor confidence and prevent the
radicals from forcing too fast a
socialist pace.
Despite the apparent swing to-
ward moderation, Nyerere's fixation
with "imperialists" and his mili-
tant support for southern Africa's
nationalists would seem to preclude
any significant improvement in
Tanzania's relations with the West.
The government press remains viru-
lently anti-American and those
leaders who favor closer relations
with Communist China are now in firm
control.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The Latin American Solidarity Organization
(LASO) meeting in Havana this week has given Fidel
Castro a forum to call for the creation of "many
Vietnams" in the Western Hemisphere. Speaking at
the opening ceremonies on 31 July, Cuban President
Dorticos lashed out at "Yankee imperialism" and
stressed that armed struggle is the only way to
achieve true liberation. Dorticos implied that
this doctrine of revolutionary violence is primar-
ily a reaction to "imperialism's repressive meas-
ures" in Latin America, a line apparently accepted
by the pro-Moscow Communists at the conference.
Revolutionary slogans and anti-US tirades can be
expected to continue for the balance of the con-
ference, which probably will culminate in a fiery
closing speech by Castro on 8 August.
Venezuela's interest in pressing the organi-
zation of American States to meet soon and take up
its complaint against Cuba took a back seat last
week because of the devastating earthquake that
rocked Venezuela and Colombia on 29 July. The OAS
is still trying to find an acceptable date for the
meeting, with most governments now apparently favor-
ing late September.
In Peru, a dispute between the ruling and oppo-
sition coalitions over the leadership of the Senate
plunged the country into a serious constitutional
crisis. President Belaunde, however, is quietly
seeking a negotiated compromise and the military,
while it is following the dispute with interest, is
following a hands-off policy. Bolivia's hapless mil-
itary forces reportedly suffered more casualties
this week in new encounters with the guerrillas and,
as the week closed, Brazil faced the possibility
of new student disorders protesting the govern-
ment's determination to keep an illegal extremist-
led national student organization from meeting in
Sao Paulo. F7 I
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CUBA IMPROVES ITS DEFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY
The defensive capability of
the Cuban armed forces has been
improved by new equipment deliv-
ered by the USSR over the past
11 months.
Since last September, Cuba
has received 19 major military aid
shipments, and at least one more
is en route. Although these de-
liveries appear intended primarily
to replace materiel worn out or
expended in training, some of the
equipment is more modern and
sophisticated than that being
replaced. For example, the Cubans
have received at least 23 MIG-21FL
jet fighters, the Soviets' standard
export model with a limited all-
weather capability. These are
replacements for an estimated 30
to 40 earlier model MIGs.
The newer SA-3 surface-to-air
missile system, designed primarily
for protection against low-flying
aircraft, may be introduced
shortly. The SA-3 would comple-
ment the SA-2 system which has
been established throughout Cuba
since 1962. While no SA-3 mis-
siles or related equipment have
yet been seen in Cuba, aerial
25X1 photography showed what
appeared to be an A- site under
construction in a Havana suburb,
less than three miles from air
defense headquarters. If the
system is indeed to be deployed
in Cuba, it will be the first
time outside the USSR.
The Cuban Navy's force of
12 Komar guided-missile patrol
boats, Cuba's most potent weapons
afloat, has been increased to 18.
In addition, four SO-1-class
submarine chasers have arrived in
the last six months, bringing the
total of this class to ten. These
acquisitions considerably enhance
the navy's ability to defend
coastal waters and prevent illegal
emigration.
The Cuban ground forces ap-
parently have received only one
new type of equipment, the BMD-20.
This 200-mm., truck-mounted rocket
launcher was first displayed in
the Soviet Union in 1954. An es-
timated 25 to 30 have arrived in
Cuba since December.
The Castro regime is contin-
uing extensive construction of
underground shelters for personnel
and equipment
5X11
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BOLIVIAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY
Recurrent guerrilla suc-
cesses against poorly trained and
equipped Bolivian Army units
again point up the army's con-
tinuing inability to cope with
an insurgency that has become in-
creasingly troublesome since it
broke out last March.
Encounters with small guer-
rilla groups have been more fre-
quent since 19 July, the end of
a brief lull in activity. An
BOLIVIA
r ~1 SALT FLAT
N.A.
RAILROAD
o NATIONAL CAPITAL
... DEPA RTAMENTO
BOUNDARY
J1E0 MILES
O 130 KILOMETERS
C o-iCY
RLJ Ate;
army patrol, in a sweep operation
in the guerrilla zone around Naca-
huasu, engaged a small band of
insurgents on 21 and 23 July. No
army casualties were reported,
but the Bolivians claim that two
guerrillas were captured and three
killed.
On 23 July at Yerba Buena,
north of the guerrilla zone, an-
other band reportedly stormed a
small army garrison at a farm,
seizing arms and food supplies.
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According to Bolivian press re-
ports, the guerrillas met with
little resistance and easily
evaded army support units which
arrived later on the scene.
Moving southward, the band
engaged army units in sporadic
clashes from 27 to 31 July in
the rugged Duran area--about 54
miles north of Nacahuasu. Gov-
ernment forces are said to have
suffered some dead and wounded
without inflicting any confirmed
guerrilla casualties.
The army's recurrent demon-
strations of its inability to
cope with the guerrillas--who
seem able to roam at will through
the area--and increasing evidence
that local garrisons lack aggres-
siveness will further weaken the
Barrientos government in the
long run. The present situation
has spurred contingency planning
by the governments of neighbor-
ing Paraguay and Argentina to
take action if the situation de-
teriorates.
PERU'S UNRESOLVED CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
Peru's most serious consti-
tutional crisis in recent years
remains unresolved, with Presi-
dent Belaunde and Congress both
seeking strong bargaining posi-
tions.
On 28 July the opposition-
controlled Senate, allegedly
using fraudulent tactics, voided
the election of the government's
candidate as presiding officer
of the Senate. The government
senators, incensed at this tactic
boycotted further meet-
ings--thereby preventing any
activity by either house of Con-
gress. Each side now is accusing
the other of violating the consti-
tution.
An opposition party spokes-
man met with Belaunde on 29 July
to discuss the impasse. Although
no agreement was reached, both
appeared eager for a compromise.
Belaunde's relations with
Congress, never warm, have been
deteriorating steadily for
months. Recent actions of Con-
gress have challenged his govern-
ment's handling of several im-
portant issues.
Belaunde is under consider-
able pressure from hard-line
elements within his own party
to deal firmly with the opposi-
tion parties.
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INVASION JITTERS HIT HAITI
Haitian President Duvalier
established a nationwide curfew
on 29 July following reports of
an imminent invasion of the north.
Duvalier's action was ini-
tiated in response to "invasion"
reports reaching him from his
representatives in Washington and
Miami. He acted characteristically
in tightening security controls
while investigating activities
which had aroused his suspicions.
The US ambassador reports
that Port-au-Prince is calm even
though rumors of an invasion have
been heightened by the curfew.
Anti-Duvalier exiles are consid- 25X1
ered to have little capability
for mounting a serious invasion
attempt at this time.
Page 31
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Secret
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