IMPACT OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT ON EASTERN EUROPE

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Impact of Arab-Israeli Conflict on Eastern Europe
Secret
21 July 1967
No. 0299/67B
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IMPACT OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT ON EASTERN EUROPE
A deep emotional reaction among the popula-
tions of most Eastern European countries has devel-
oped because of their regimes and the USSR backing
the Arabs against Israel. One effect has been to
intensify within many Communist hierarchies long-
existing strains deriving from the chronic anti-
semitism which persists in varying degrees in most
of the countries. Popular reactions have been
strongly pro-Israeli. This attitude, in the cir-
cumstances, also has an anti-Communist quality
indicating increased alienation between the rulers
and the ruled. Most of the regimes, except Rumania,
have followed Moscow's vehement pro-Arab lead with
more or less reluctance because of differing factors
of national self-interest. Within some of the rul-
ing Communist cliques, the strains between influ-
ential Jews and antisemites may have lasting effects
on intraparty politics.
Pro-Israeli Sentiment
Versus Antisemitism
The outbreak of Arab-Israeli
hostilities came as a surprise
and shock to Eastern European
countries. The impact was per-
haps the greater because there
was no preparatory propaganda
campaign to which the populations
of these countries have long been
accustomed. The most significant
result has been the emergence of
strong and widespread pro-Israeli
sentiment, imbued with antiregime
overtones.
This effect has been most
marked in three countries with
strong traditions of antisemitism,
Poland, Hungary, and to a lesser
extent, Czechoslovakia. This
can be partially explained by the
close personal ties which still
exist between individuals in
these countries and the emigrant
survivors of prewar Jewish popula-
tions who have gone to Israel and
elsewhere in large numbers since
World War II. This is especially
true of Poland, and to a lesser
extent of Hungary, where many of
the remaining Jews hold influ-
ential positions within the party
and state apparatus. In Czecho-
slovakia, where purges during the
Stalinist period swept most Jews
out of power, the population's
predisposition for Israel as the
"underdog" in the conflict was
bolstered by an emotional reaction
against the party's antisemitic
and anti-Zionist past.
Until World II, the bulk of
Eastern Europe's Jewish population
resided in these three countries
and Rumania. Poland had propor-
tionately the largest Jewish
minority of any country in the
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world--some 3.5 million represent-
ing about ten percent of its popu-
lation. The socioeconomic compe-
tition between the Jews, most of
whom belonged to the middle class
and the professions, and all the
ethnic populations except the
Czechs, tended to strengthen anti-
semitism among the urban elements
as well as among the peasantry
where it had been prevalent for
centuries. Generally, however,
most Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians,
and Rumanians were inclined to
view antisemitism as a purely
domestic issue, or at most a
typical Eastern European one, and
not as a feature of the world-wide
Zionist question.
Antisemitism in these
countries was successfully ex-
ploited by the Nazi regime during
World War II. Most Eastern Euro-
peans came to realize, however,
that they ranked little higher
than the Jews on the Nazi racial
scale. This feeling was later
augmented by sympathy developing
for the Jewish victims of Nazi
extermination policies, especially
in Poland, where the role of Jews
in the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in
1944 drew admiration.
The virtual destruction of
Jewish minorities in Eastern
Europe during the war created
something akin to neurosis among
most of the non-Jewish popula-
tions there. One ingredient in
the conflict of sentiment that
persists is a sense of relief that
the prewar social and economic
strains arising from the existence
of sizeable Jewish minorities had
been eliminated. Along with this,
however, there is a mixture of
guilt about the past and of re-
spect for the survivors of Euro-
pean Jewry who are successfully
developing a new homeland against
great odds. On the other hand,
the relatively high proportion of
Jews within the Communist lead-
erships of Eastern Europe at one
time or another during the postwar
period has tended more than any
other factor to perpetuate anti-
semitism, even though most of
the Jews who survived the post-
Stalin purges and who remain in
the ruling cliques tend to be
moderates.
Over most of Eastern Europe,
however, the antisemitism di-
rected at Jews who helped impose
unpopular Communist policies at
home does not extend to Israel
itself. Strong popular admira-
tion for Israel as a state has
thus emerged. Many Eastern Euro-
peans identify and sympathize
with Israel's search for security,
the nonrecognition of its borders
by its neighbors, and its inclina-
tion to make territorial adjust-
ments. These facets of Israel's
history, as well as the presence
within its frontiers of hostile
populations are similar to, or
reminiscent of, the post - World
War II experience of many Eastern
European countries, as for example
Poland and Czechoslovakia. The
resulting sense of understanding
has tempered the antisemitic
character of public attitudes.
Since the late 1950s these
popular sympathies seem also to
have been reinforced by the in-
creasingly antisemitic and anti-
Israeli policies of the Soviet
Union, climaxed by what most
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Eastern Europeans viewed as Mos-
cow's crude pro-Arab power play
since May of this year. The
Soviet propaganda offensive fol-
lowing the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and the willingness of most
Eastern European regimes to
parrot such a line, appears to
have engendered a strong feeling
that "my enemy's enemy is my
friend" among large segments of
the Jewish and non-Jewish popu-
lation.
In East Germany, where
sensitivity to antisemitism is
widespread, the population appears
to have generally avoided the
racial aspect of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. There is some evidence,
however, that the majority of
East Germans--like other Eastern
Europeans--rejected their regime's
assertions that the Arab-Israeli
confrontation was a class war of
"progressives against imperialist
reaction."
As in other countries of the
area, such propaganda merely
promoted the belief that the real
issue was the onslaught of Commu-
nist-supported dictatorships
against a small,democratic state.
East Germany's propaganda has
also tended to strengthen popular
fears over the implications for
Eastern Europe of Moscow's stand,
including a possibility of direct
military involvement. When the
extent of the Israeli victory
became clear, there was a general
tendency to question the value
of Soviet support for the Arabs
and even the worth of Soviet
commitments in general. There
is no information on popular
reaction to the crisis in Bulgaria,
where prior to World War II,
antisemitism was not a serious
problem.
Regime Reactions and Motivations
With the exception of Rumania,
the Eastern European regimes al-
lied with the USSR supported Mos-
cow's strongly pro-Arab position,
and by 12 June had broken diplo-
matic relations with Israel. The
convictions behind this support
varied in intensity, as did the
motivations. Apart from Yugo-
slavia, most of the Eastern Euro-
pean regimes followed Moscow's
lead because of their alliances
with the Soviet Union. The reac-
tions of the regimes most depend-
ent on Soviet military and politi-
cal guarantees, i.e., East Germany,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary
were especially vehement. The lead-
ers of these regimes appear to have
been convinced that the Arab-Is-
raeli conflict was merely part of
a concerted political, military,
and ideological offensive by the
West against Soviet prestige, de-
signed to exploit growing diversity
within the Communist bloc.
Yugoslavia's Tito apparently
shared this fear. His decision
to associate himself with Moscow
was probably also strongly moti-
vated by concern over the future
of his ties with Cairo. There is
evidence, however, that the pub-
lic and many high party and gov-
ernment leaders feared that Bel-
grade's signature on the 9 June
bloc declaration in Moscow fore-
shadowed closer relations with
the USSR. Tito seems to have
been sufficiently concerned by
the prevalence of such ideas to
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think it wise to emphasize in a
speech on 1 July that no return
to the bloc was contemplated and
that Yugoslavia would remain in-
dependent and nonaligned.
The degree of support most
other Eastern European regimes
gave Moscow's line has varied,
depending generally on the level
of pro-Israeli sentiment among
the people and within the parties.
In Poland, the official reaction
has been vehement largely be-
cause of the sensitivity of
Gomulka and others in the lead-
ership (whose wives are Jewish)
to domestic and foreign Communist
criticism of the "excessive"
numbers of Jews within the party
and state apparatus. It must
have been embarrassing to the
regime that the majority of Po-
land's ambassadors to the Arab
countries are of Jewish origin.
Gomulka's warnings on 19 June to
influential Jewish elements against
"double loyalties" reflected this
sensitivity, which was evidently
enhanced by the private "victory"
celebrations which many prominent
Jews in Poland reportedly held
following Israel's victory.
A topical joke circulating
in Warsaw concerns a telegram
allegedly sent by Israeli Premier
Eshkol to Gomulka after Poland
broke diplomatic relations, which
read simply, "Unless you rescind
your decision, we shall withdraw
all our people from your party
and government."
Differences over the regime's
anti-Israeli measures were prob-
ably widespread within the Polish
party both before and after the
"summit" meeting of Eastern Euro-
pean leaders in Moscow on 9-10
June. Although severance of
diplomatic relations with Israel
was probably decided at the
meeting, Poland did not take this
step until 12 June, and was the
last Eastern European country to
do so. Moreover, on Polish
initiative, two Israeli and two
Polish diplomats remained at
their posts without diplomatic
status until 4 July, when the
continued presence of the Israeli
officials in Warsaw became un-
tenable.
As in other Eastern European
countries, internal differences
within the Polish party were prob-
ably strengthened by arguments
of ranking foreign trade offi-
cials who feared the impact of
the crisis on the regime's com-
mercial relations with Jewish
businessmen in Western countries,
especially in the United States.
A similar situation probably
exists in most other countries
of the area, all of which have
quantitatively small but well-
established trade relations with
Israel which they do not want
to jeopardize. Polish-Israeli
trade, for example, has so far
remained at near normal levels,
and commercial representatives
of both countries apparently
have remained at their posts.
Similar indications of dis-
sent beneath the surface have
developed in Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, where elements of some
strength within the party were,
if not in total sympathy with
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the Israeli cause, at least op-
posed to unquestioning support
of Moscow's pro-Arab policy. A
vehemently anti-Israeli editorial
published in the 15 June issue
of the main Czech party newspaper
was said to have caused a heated
central committee debate, and
drew censure by the party and a
warning to the editorial board.
It is likely that the central com-
mittee was concerned lest the
zeal of the press in vindicating
Prague's anti-Israeli policy be
construed by the public as signal-
ing a return to the neurotically
antisemitic line of the early
1950s.
In Hungary, similar evidence
of intraparty dissension has ap-
peared, although the-reports are
less specific. Differences be-
tween Jews and antisemites within
the party and elsewhere in public
life were sharpened, and special
party meetings reportedly were
held in many parts of the country
to counter pro-Israeli sentiment.
Probably as a response to this,
various senior regime spokesmen,
including First Secretary Janos
Kadar, issued a series of warnings
in late June against the excesses
of either anti- or philo-semitism,
designed to prevent racial over-
tones from overshadowing the
"class nature" of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Differences of opinion also
existed among East European offi-
cials attending the UN General
Assembly session. Many of these
were said to be piqued at the
failure of the Soviet mission to
supply adequate information and
coordination during the proceed-
ings. In private, some officials
showed relative moderation and
realism, while others confined
themselves to parroting the regime
line. Similar ambivalent reac-
tions have been noted among some
Eastern European UN correspondents,
several of whom courted regime
sanctions by expressing their op-
position to official policy by
deliberately failing to file
stories.
Albania has also reacted
harshly, but the regime neverthe-
less appears to be cautious. Its
people, although 70-percent Mos-
lem, are indifferent. Tirana's
alliance with Peking--whose pro-
Arab but anti-Soviet position it
shares--has predictably led it to
charge US-Soviet collusion against
the Arab world.
Rumania--A Special Case
Alone among Eastern European
countries, the Rumanian regime
formally declared its neutrality
in the crisis, refused to sign
the bloc statement on 9 June
following the Moscow meeting
which it attended, and failed
to break diplomatic relations
with Israel. These moves once
again illustrated the confidence
of the Bucharest leadership in
its national Communist point of
view, and the subordination of
both foreign and domestic factors
to a policy of self-interest.
The domestic factors which
might have been expected to af-
fect Bucharest's policy on the
crisis are no less sensitive and
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paradoxical than those in most
other Eastern European countries.
Rumania traditionally has been
among the most antisemitic
nations in the area, and party
chief Ceausescu reportedly shares
the national prejudice. The pre-
Ceausescu leadership in 1959
was the last in Eastern Europe
to liberalize Jewish emigration
to Israel. Nevertheless, the
present regime's policy on this
score has been among the most
restrictive. Since 1955 Jewish
membership on the party central
committee has been whittled from
over 15 percent to about six per-
cent. The proportion of Jews
in the total population is one
percent.
Despite the prevalence of
prejudice, however, the regime's
policy has evolved from other
sources and is consistent both
with its drive for independence
from Moscow and its recently aug-
mented economic relations with
Israel. Moreover, with its sense
of national sovereignty, the
Ceausescu leadership probably
also noted the parallels between
Israel's isolation among the
Arabs and Rumania's already marked
isolation within the Communist
bloc.
European leaders are also on record
in support of Israel's right to
statehood, but Ceausescu's 17 June
public statement to this effect
was the most emphatic and unequivo-
cal.
The economic motives under-
lying Rumania's neutral stand are
underscored by its 1967-70 trade,
technical, and scientific coop-
eration agreement with Israel
signed on 14 April--the first such
formal accord concluded with Israel
by any Communist state. The
agreement calls for further devel-
opment of mutual trade, which
had already more than doubled
during the 1960-66 period. For
example, commercial exchanges in
1967 are to be double those in
1966, according to a Bucharest
radio Yiddish-language broadcast
beamed to North America on 5 June--
the opening day of Arab-Israeli
hostilities.
Popular reaction in Rumania
to the regime's Middle East policy
probably is in broad accord with
the official position. Past
regime actions reflecting Rumanian
nationalism and independence gen-
erally have had the effect of
broadening the party's base of
popular support.
Although Bucharest's declara-
tion of 10 June called for the
"withdrawal of Israeli forces from
occupied territories," it did not
assign responsibility for the
outbreak of hostilities. The
Rumanian statement also sharply
conflicted with that of its allies
by calling for direct Arab-Israeli
negotiations. Most other Eastern
Outlook
The Middle East policy Moscow
has promoted with most of the re-
gimes in Eastern Europe raises
another major obstacle to contacts
with the West and strengthens the
hand of hard-line elements opposed
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to expansion of such ties. Further
unspecified commitments by the
Eastern Europeans, including sup-
plying arms to the Arabs, appar-
ently were made at the bloc meet-
ing on 11-12 July in Budapest.
Such aid to Arab countries could
pose additional economic strains,
especially on Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Hungary, and probably East
Germany.
The course of Rumanian policy
will clearly increase its isola-
tion in Eastern Europe, and add
to existing strains in its rela-
tions with Moscow. Rumania did
not attend the meeting in Buda-
pest. Yugoslavia's Tito, now com-
mitted to joint bloc action, may
find it increasingly difficult to
reconcile this position with his
nonaligned policy and to forestall
opposition within his own leader-
ship.
In terms of internal party
repercussions, the Polish regime
appears to be the most susceptible.
There, the hard-line, antisemitic
faction of the party may seek to
use the current situation to in-
tensify its long-standing efforts
to diminish Jewish influence, es-
pecially in the Foreign Ministry
where such influence is dominant.
Whether this faction, whose strength
had been waning in recent months,
will now be more successful than
in the past remains to be seen. In
the absence of suitable replace-
ments for Jews within the top and
middle echelon of the leadership,
it is unlikely that a sweeping
purge is imminent. Some dismis-
sals and reshuffling may occur,
but Gomulka's propensity for main-
taining a political balance within
the regime suggests that such
changes would not automatically
mean a rise in the power of the
hard-line, antisemitic elements.
Similar problems may arise
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
although in view of the rela-
tively small number of Jews in
the Czech party, differences may
hinge more on substantive policy
issues than on the question of
antisemitism. Probably least af-
fected in the long run will be
the regimes in Bulgaria and East
Germany. Antisemitism is weak in
Bulgaria whose tangible contribu-
tions to bloc pro-Arab policies
are potentially small. In East
Germany, the ability of the Ul-
bricht regime to smother domestic
opposition has been demonstrated
in the past.
The recent crisis may have
a lasting impact of widening the
gulf between the peoples of East-
ern Europe and the ruling Com-
munist cliques. In most of the
countries whose regimes have sup-
ported Moscow's pro-Arab stand,
the effort to demonstrate bloc
"unity" could have effects counter
to party interests and could pro-
mote popular nationalistic tenden-
cies. This is likely to be mir-
rored within the respective par-
ties themselves, where strains
may increase between elements who
had hoped for a further loosening
of Moscow's influence and those
who have sought to stem the trend
toward diversity. Such differ-
ences may, in turn, have potential
long-range effects on old con-
troversies and party factional
disputes over issues unrelated to
the Middle East crisis. (SECRET
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